

U.S. War Dept

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WAR OF THE REBELLION:

A COMPILATION OF THE

OFFICIAL RECORDS

OF THE

UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES. vol. 19

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PREPARED, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, BY

The late Lieut. Col. ROBERT N. SCOTT, Third U. S. Artillery.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

Lieut. Col. HENRY M. LAZELLE, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.

PURSUANT TO ACTS OF CONGRESS.

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- 5, 1862.—The armies of the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, Maj. Gen. John Pope, U. S. Army, is relieved and ordered to report to the Secretary of War.
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* Of some of the minor conflicts noted in this "Summary," no circumstantial reports are on file.

† For reports, see Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 756-763.

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* See also report of Col. Henry F. Clarke, U. S. Army, Commissary of Subsistence, Series I, Vol. XI, Part I, pp. 166-177.

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No. 1.

Report of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Army, General-in-Chief, of operations September 3–October 24.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., November 25, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with your orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations since the 23d of July last, when, in compliance with the President's order of July 11, I assumed command of the Army as General-in-Chief.*

* * * * *

Seeing that an attack upon Washington would now† be futile, Lee pushed his main army across the Potomac for a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. General McClellan was directed to pursue him with all the troops which were not required for the defense of Washington. Several corps were immediately thrown out in observation at Darnestown, Rockville, and Leesborough, and most of his army was in motion by the 5th of September. A portion of it entered Frederick on the 12th.

As this campaign was to be carried on within the department commanded by Major-General Wool, I directed General McClellan to assume control of all troops within his reach, without regard to departmental lines. The garrisons of Winchester and Martinsburg had been withdrawn to Harper's Ferry, and the commanding officer of that post had been advised by my chief of staff to mainly confine his defense, in case he was attacked by superior forces, to the position of Maryland Heights, which could have been held a long time against overwhelming numbers. To withdraw him entirely from that position, with the great body of Lee's forces between him and our army, would not only expose the garrison to capture, but all the artillery and stores collected at that place must either be destroyed or left to the enemy. The only feasible plan was for him to hold his position until General McClellan could relieve him or open a communication so that he could evacuate it in safety. These views were communicated both to General McClellan and to Colonel Miles.

The left of General McClellan's army pursued a part of the enemy's forces to the South Mountain, where, on the 14th, he made a stand. A severe battle ensued, the enemy being defeated and driven from his position with heavy loss. Lee's army then fell back behind Antietam

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 4–12.

† September 3.

Creek, a few miles above its mouth, and took a position admirably suited for defense. Our army attacked him on the 16th, and a hotly contested battle was fought on that and the ensuing day, which resulted in the defeat of the rebel forces. On the night of the 17th our troops slept on the field which they had so bravely won. On the 18th neither party renewed the attack, and in the night of the 18th and 19th General Lee withdrew his army to the south side of the Potomac.

Our loss in the several battles on South Mountain and at Antietam was 1,742 killed, 8,066 wounded, and 913 missing, making a total of 10,721.* General McClellan estimates the enemy's loss at nearly 30,000, but their own accounts give their loss at about 14,000 in killed and wounded.

On the approach of the enemy to Harper's Ferry, the officer in command on Maryland Heights destroyed his artillery and abandoned his post, and on the 15th Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry with only a slight resistance and within hearing of the guns of General McClellan's army. As this whole matter has been investigated and reported upon by a military commission,† it is unnecessary for me to discuss the disgraceful surrender of the post and army under Colonel Miles' command.

General McClellan's preliminary report of his operations in Maryland, including the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, is submitted herewith, marked Exhibit No. 4.‡ No reports of his subordinate officers have been submitted.

From the 17th of September till the 26th of October General McClellan's main army remained on the north bank of the Potomac, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Harper's Ferry. The long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret. Your letter of the 27th and my reply of the 28th of October in regard to the alleged causes of this unfortunate delay, I submit herewith, marked Exhibit No. 5.

In reply to the telegraphic order of the 6th of October, quoted in my letter of the 28th, above referred to, General McClellan disapproved of the plan of crossing the Potomac south of the Blue Ridge, and said that he would cross at Harper's Ferry and advance upon Winchester. He, however, did not begin to cross till the 26th of October, and then at Berlin. This passage occupied several days, and was completed about the 3d of November. What caused him to change his views, or what his plan of campaign was, I am ignorant, for about this time he ceased to communicate with me in regard to his operations, sending his reports directly to the President.

On the 5th instant I received the written order of the President relieving General McClellan and placing General Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac. This order was transmitted by a special messenger, who delivered it to General McClellan at Rectortown on the 7th §.

* * * * *

It is seen from this brief summary of military operations during the last three or four months, that while our soldiers have generally fought

* But see revised statement, Maryland Campaign, pp. 183-204.

† See p. 549.

‡ See No. 2, report of October 15, 1862, p. 24.

§ Portion here omitted relates to operations in Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee.

with bravery and gained many important battles, these victories have not produced the usual results. In many instances the defeated foe was not followed from the battle-field, and even where a pursuit was attempted, it almost invariably failed to effect the capture or destruction of any part of the retreating army. This is a matter which requires serious and careful consideration. A victorious army is supposed to be in condition to pursue its defeated foe with advantage, and during such pursuit to do him serious if not fatal injury. This result has usually been attained in other countries. Is there any reason why it should not be expected in this?

It is easily understood that in a country like that between Yorktown and Richmond, or the thickly-wooded swamps of Mississippi and Louisiana, a retreating force, by felling trees across the roads and destroying bridges over deep and marshy streams, can effectually prevent any rapid pursuit. The one in a few minutes blocks up or destroys roads which the other cannot clear or repair for hours, or even days. The pursuer has very little hope of overtaking his flying foe. But this reasoning is not applicable to Maryland and the greater part of Virginia, Kentucky, and Middle Tennessee. It must be admitted that in these theaters of war the rebel armies have exhibited much more mobility and activity than our own. Not only do they outmarch us, both in advance and retreat, but on two memorable occasions their cavalry have made with impunity the entire circuit of the Army of the Potomac. If it be true that the success of an army depends upon its "arms and its legs," ours has shown itself deficient in the latter of these essential requisites. This defect has been attributed to our enormous baggage and supply trains, and to a want of training in making marches.

There is no doubt that the baggage trains of our armies have been excessively large. Every possible effort has been made within the last few weeks to reduce them, but this is no easy task. Once accustomed to a certain amount of transportation, an army is unwilling to do without the luxuries which it supplies in the field. By the recent increase of the army ration, which was previously larger than in any other country, a considerable amount of transportation is employed in moving provisions and supplies which are not necessary for the subsistence of the soldiers.

An examination of the returns of the Quartermaster-General a few days since developed the fact that the Army of the Potomac, including the troops around Washington, most of which are without field trains, had 54,000 animals, and that 9,000 of these were employed in transporting ambulances and hospital stores. In addition to all this, the roads, streets, and wharves are encumbered with private vehicles used for the transportation of sutler's stores. No matter how large the main body of an army may be, it can never move rapidly with such a mass of *impedimenta*, and yet speculative projects are almost daily urged on the War Department to increase the immobility of our armies in the field. Again, our troops, especially those in the East, have been very little accustomed to marching—at least to that kind of marching usually required by active operations in the field.

Absenteeism is one of the most serious evils in all our armies. Hundreds of officers and thousands of men are almost continually away from their commands. Many of these are really stragglers and deserters. In regard to officers, the evil is being abated by summary dismissals, and if the law could be stringently enforced against the men, it would soon put an end to desertions. But straggling on the march and in

battle can be prevented only by severe and summary punishment inflicted on the spot.

In this and many other important particulars our military laws require revision and amendment. They were mostly enacted for a small army and for times of peace, and are unsuited to the government of the army we now have and the war in which we are now engaged.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

[Exhibit No. 5.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, October 27, 1862.

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

GENERAL: It has been publicly stated that the army under General McClellan has been unable to move during the fine weather of this fall for want of shoes, clothing, and other supplies. You will please report to this Department upon the following points:

1st. To whom and in what manner the requisitions for supplies to the army under General McClellan have been made since you assumed command as General-in-Chief, and whether any requisition for supplies of any kind has since that time been made upon the Secretary of War or communication had with him except through you.

2d. If you, as General-in-Chief, have taken pains to ascertain the condition of the army in respect to supplies of shoes, clothing, arms, and other necessities, and whether there has been any neglect or delay by any Department or bureau in filling the requisitions for supplies, and what has been and is the condition of that army as compared with other armies in respect to supplies.

3d. At what date after the battle of Antietam the orders to advance against the enemy were given to General McClellan, and how often have they been repeated.

4th. Whether, in your opinion, there has been any want in the army under General McClellan of shoes, clothing, arms, or other equipments or supplies that ought to have prevented its advance against the enemy when the order was given.

5th. How long was it after the orders to advance were given to General McClellan before he informed you that any shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are his means of promptly communicating the wants of the army to you or to the proper bureaus of the War Department?

Yours, truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, *October 28, 1862.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

SIR: In reply to the several interrogatories contained in your letter of yesterday, I have to report:

1st. That requisitions for supplies to the army under General McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of bureaus here—that is, for quartermaster supplies, by his chief quartermaster on the Quartermaster-General; for commissary supplies, by his chief commissary on the Commissary-General, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my

knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the General-in-Chief.

2d. On several occasions General McClellan has telegraphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies. All these telegrams were immediately referred to the heads of bureaus, with orders to report. It was ascertained that in every instance the requisitions had been immediately filled except one, where the Quartermaster-General had been obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, tents, &c., not having a full supply here.

There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay in any Department or bureau in issuing all supplies asked for by General McClellan or by the officers of his staff. Delays have occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies by rail on account of the crowded condition of the depots or of a want of cars, but, whenever notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under the excellent superintendence of General Haupt, I think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. Any army of the size of that under General McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of neglect in making timely requisitions and unavoidable delays in forwarding them and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of opinion that the requisitions from that army have been filled more promptly, and that the men, as a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the West. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world while in campaign have been more promptly or better supplied than ours.

3d. Soon after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements, in order that if he moved between the enemy and Washington, re-enforcements could be sent from this place. On the 1st of October,* finding that he purposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of October* he was peremptorily ordered to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. "Your army *must* move now, while the roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given.

4th. In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac, he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side.

5th. On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to his intended movements, General McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter-tents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filled, and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies.

On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies sent by rail had been delayed. As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint, and they reported that every-

* See Addenda to this report, p. 10.

thing had gone forward. On the same date (the 11th), he spoke of many of his horses being broken down by fatigue.

On the 12th he complained that the rate of supply was only 150 horses per week for the entire army there and in front of Washington. I immediately directed the Quartermaster-General to inquire into this matter, and to report why a larger supply was not furnished. General Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to General McClellan's army in the field and in front of Washington for the previous six weeks had been 1,450 per week, or 8,754 in all; in addition, that large numbers of mules had been supplied, and that the number of animals with General McClellan's army on the Upper Potomac was over 31,000. He also reported that he was then sending to that army all the horses he could procure.

On the 18th, General McClellan stated, in regard to General Meigs' report that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing—

General Meigs may have ordered these articles to be forwarded, but they have not reached our depots, and unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which General Meigs is the head, they might as well remain in New York or Philadelphia so far as this army is concerned.

I immediately called General Meigs' attention to this apparent neglect of his department. On the 25th he reported, as the result of his investigation, that 48,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the quartermaster of General McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown; that 20,000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st; that 10,000 more were on their way, and 15,000 more ordered. Colonel Ingalls, aide-de-camp and chief quartermaster to General McClellan, telegraphed on the 25th:

The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated, I think, and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regimental and brigade commanders.

On the 24th he telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General that—

The clothing was not detained in cars at the depots. Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted. I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions as far as clothing is concerned. Our department is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee no time when any army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles.

In regard to General McClellan's means of promptly communicating the wants of his army to me or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I report that in addition to the ordinary mails he has been in hourly communication with Washington by telegraph.

It is due to General Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from General McClellan.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

[Inclosure.]

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
October 22, 1862—9.40 p. m.

Brigadier-General MEIGS:

Your dispatch of this date is received. I have never intended in any letter or dispatch to make any accusation against yourself or your department for not furnishing or forwarding clothing as rapidly as it was possible for you to do. I believe that everything has been done that could be done in this respect both by yourself and department. The

idea that I have tried to convey was that certain portions of the command were without clothing, and the army could not move until it was supplied.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

[Addenda.]

McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
October 1, 1862—11 a. m. (Received 11.55 a. m.)

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

I take it for granted that we will hereafter hold Harper's Ferry as a permanent arrangement whatever line of operations may be adopted for the main army. In this event, a permanent and reliable bridge is needed there across the Shenandoah. Mr. Roebling can build a double-track suspension bridge on the existing piers in three or four weeks. The wire is now in possession of the Government, and the cost will be some \$5,000 besides the wire. No pontoon nor trestle bridge can be made to resist the freshets. I ask authority to have this work undertaken at once. I would also renew the recommendation that a permanent wagon-bridge be made across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. This without reference to the further operations of the main army, but simply as a necessity for the proper defense of Harper's Ferry itself.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 1, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Your telegram of to-day in relation to the building of bridges at Harper's Ferry is received. If you adhere to that place as your base, why not cross at once and give battle to the enemy? Unless I am greatly deceived in regard to the enemy's numbers, this can be done now while the river is low. If you wait till the river rises, the roads will be such as to greatly impede your operations. I still adhere to the opinion formerly expressed, that, holding Maryland Heights in force, your army should cross below and compel the enemy to fall back or to give you battle. If he should recross into Maryland or move west, you will then be in his rear, and can be strongly re-enforced from Washington. I know that the Government does not contemplate the delay in your movements for the length of time required to build permanent bridges. I therefore cannot order them till your dispatch has been laid before the War Department and the President. The latter will be with you to-day, and you can consult him there.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If

you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads.

I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD.,
October 7, 1862—1 p. m. (Received 2.30 p. m.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, U. S. Army:

After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for immediate operations against the enemy, now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement between the Shenandoah and Washington. I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as important for ulterior objects. It is important only so long as the enemy remains near Winchester, and we cannot follow that line far beyond that point, simply because the country is destitute of supplies, and we have not sufficient means of transportation to enable us to advance more than 20 or 25 miles beyond a railway or canal terminus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon Staunton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that route, and we must then take a new line of operations, based upon water or railway communication. The only possible object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat we have nothing to gain by pursuing them—in fact, cannot do so to any great distance. The objects I propose to myself are to fight the enemy if they remain near Winchester, or, failing in that, to force them to abandon the Valley of the Shenandoah; then to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike at the heart of the rebellion.

I have taken all possible measures to insure the most prompt equipment of the troops, but from all that I can learn it will be at least three days before the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps are in condition to move from their present camps. They need shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter-tents, &c. I beg to assure you that not an hour shall be lost in carrying your instructions into effect. Please send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. I would prefer that the new regiments be sent as regiments, not brigaded, unless already done so with old troops. I would again ask for Peck's division, and,

if possible, Heintzelman's corps. If the enemy gives fight near Winchester it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our resources. I hope that no time will be lost in sending forward the re-enforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Knoxville, October 11, 1862—9 a. m. (Received 2.30 p. m.)

Major-General HALLECK:*

* * * * *

We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that they have been forwarded by railroad, but owing to bad management on the roads, or from some other cause, they come in very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army unless the railroad managers forward supplies more rapidly.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 11, 1862—3.30 p. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK:

I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing that still exists in some of the corps of this army. Upon assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculations upon information received from Washington that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet arrived.

Unless some measures are taken to insure the prompt forwarding of these supplies, there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in getting the army ready to move, as the men cannot march without shoes. Everything has been done that can be done at these headquarters to accomplish the desired result.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

[Indorsements.]

OCTOBER 12, 1862.

The Quartermaster-General will please read this and return it.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

OCTOBER 12, 1862—1 p. m.

I was informed yesterday that everything called for in the way of clothing from this department, except blankets, had gone forward. There had been some delays for want of cars at this point. As we had not enough blankets and shelter-tents at this point, I ordered by tele-

* The whole of this dispatch is printed with reports of Stuart's raid, October 9-12.

graph, a day or two since, 20,000 blankets and a sufficient supply of shelter-tents to be sent direct from New York to Harper's Ferry.

All the power of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and of the Cumberland Valley Railroad has been used, under the direction of Brigadier-General Haupt, invested by the Secretary with special and full powers to do anything necessary to expedite the forwarding of supplies to the army under General McClellan. It is nearly impossible to supply such an army, having over 30,000 animals to feed, by means [limited] to two railroads. The canal will be repaired and ready for use in a few days. It was hoped that water could have been admitted to it to-day. This, if boats can be found to navigate it, will increase the power of this department to forward supplies considerably. I understand, however, that everything called for has gone forward. What has been intercepted and destroyed by the rebel cavalry in rear of the army at Chambersburg and on the railroad I have not yet learned.

Respectfully,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 12, 1862—12.45 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

It is absolutely necessary that some energetic measures be taken to supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses. The present rate of supply is 150 [1,050*] per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. From this number the artillery draw for their batteries.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., October 13, 1862.

Major-General MCCLELLAN:

MY DEAR SIR: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautionsness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named. He now waggons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with waggons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break

* See McClellan's report, pp. 77, 78.

your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit.

If he should move northward I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him; fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try;" if we never try we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub toward the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Hay Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.

The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, 5 miles; Gregory's, 13; Snicker's, 18; Ashby's, 28; Manassas, 38; Chester, 45; and Thornton's, 53. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

Yours, truly,

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 14, 1862.*Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, *Commanding, &c.:*

GENERAL: I have caused the matters complained of in your telegrams of the 11th and 12th to be investigated. I am now informed by the Quartermaster-General that every requisition from you for shoes and clothing had been filled and the articles forwarded as directed; that all requisitions for tents and blankets had been filled so far as the stock on hand here could furnish supplies, and that the deficiency was ordered to be immediately made up from Philadelphia and New York. There has been no delay that was not unavoidable.

In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of supply is only 150 per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. I find from the records that the issues for the last six weeks have been 8,754, making an average per week of 1,459. I inclose a copy of a letter of the Quartermaster-General, in answer to my inquiry on this subject.

It is also reported to me that the number of animals with your army in the field is about 31,000. It is believed that your present proportion of cavalry and of animals is much larger than that of any other of our armies.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

[Inclosure.]

OCTOBER 14, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

Commander-in-Chief, Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I find that in the month of September there were issued from this department to the army defending Washington, under command of Major-General McClellan, 4,493 horses; from 1st to 11th October, 3,261 horses; total from this department, 7,754 horses. Colonel Ingalls, by special authority from this department, purchased in Harrisburg 1,000 horses, which were taken direct to the army near Frederick and Sharpsburg, so that for six weeks the issue has been at the rate of 1,459 per week.

There remained on hand, on the 11th, 497 serviceable horses, which, with what have been daily received since, have been issued before this time.

During the first days of September 1,500 horses, not included in the above, were sent out toward Centreville to the army of General Pope; 42 of these were lost, and the remainder exchanged for unserviceable stock not included in the above statement.

There have been issued, therefore, to the army about the Potomac, since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 9,254 horses. For transportation, a very large number of mules has been supplied in addition to the above.

Is there an instance on record of such a drain and destruction of horses in a country not a desert?

I was informed by Colonel Ingalls, whose report, though called for, has not yet been received, that the number of animals with the army on the Upper Potomac was over 31,000.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

NEAR HARPER'S FERRY,
October 16, 1862—8.30 a. m. (Received 9.30 a. m.)

His Excellency the PRESIDENT:

Your letter of the 13th just received from Colonel Perkins. I sent, at daylight this morning, heavy reconnaissances to Charlestown, Leetown, &c. As I hear sharp artillery firing in that direction, I go to the front to see what the truth is. This may delay my reply to your letter, which shall be sent, however, as soon as practicable.

I have not yet received the shoes, &c., necessary for the men, nor have I any reply from General Halleck in regard to my suggestion as to sending troops from Washington to guard Lower Potomac from Seneca Creek, and thus make Stoneman more available.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp in Pleasant Valley, October 17, 1862.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT:

SIR: Your letter of the 13th instant reached me yesterday morning by the hands of Colonel Perkins.

I had sent out strong reconnaissances early in the morning in the direction of Charlestown, Leetown, &c., and as sharp artillery fire was heard, I felt it incumbent to go to the front. I did not leave Charlestown until dark, so that I have been unable to give Your Excellency's letter that full and respectful consideration which it merits at my hands.

I do not wish to detain Colonel Perkins beyond this morning's train; I therefore think it best to send him back with this simple acknowledgment of the receipt of Your Excellency's letter. I am not wedded to any particular plan of operations. I hope to have to-day reliable information as to the position of the enemy, whom I still believe to be between Bunker Hill and Winchester. I promise you that I will give to your views the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration, and that it is my intention to advance the moment my men are shod and my cavalry are sufficiently renovated to be available.

Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a course which differs at all from your views without first fully explaining my reasons, and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 18, 1862.

Major-General HALLECK,

Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: Your letter of the 14th instant, inclosing a copy of one from the Quartermaster-General, has been received.

In this letter you say you are informed by the Quartermaster-General that every requisition from me for shoes and clothing has been filled and the articles forwarded as directed. General Meigs may have ordered these articles to be forwarded, but they have not yet reached our depots, and unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which General Meigs is the head, they might as

well remain in New York or Philadelphia, so far as this army is concerned. I am officially informed by one corps commander that there is a deficiency of 5,000 pairs of shoes in the amount he called for, and other commanders are continually making similar complaints. The soldiers of this army have for some time past been suffering for clothing, and I am constrained to believe it in a great degree owing to the want of proper action on the part of the Quartermaster's Department.

General Meigs states further that the Army of the Potomac has, since the battles in front of Washington, received 9,254 horses, to replace losses; and, in this connection, inquires most seriously if there is an instance on record of such drain and destruction of horses.

When I marched this army from Washington, on the 8th day of September, it was greatly deficient in cavalry horses, the hard service to which they had been subjected in front of Washington having rendered about half of them unserviceable. Nearly all the horses that this army has received since then have been to replace those that were broken down at that time, but there has not been anything like the number named by the Quartermaster-General. The following statement furnished at my order by Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, assistant chief quartermaster, gives the actual number of horses received by this army since September 8, 1862:

Horses from Harrisburg:	
By Capt. J. C. Crane, assistant quartermaster, Frederick.....	732
By Captain Weeks, assistant quartermaster, Hagerstown.....	134
Horses from Washington:	
By Captain Pitkin, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry	201
By Captain Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry	498
By Capt. J. B. Howard, assistant quartermaster, headquarters.....	399
Total received	1,964
Number stated by Quartermaster-General.....	9,254
Difference.....	7,290

From this statement it will be seen that the total number of horses received by this army since the commencement of the present campaign is only 1,964—7,290 less than the number given by the Quartermaster-General. Of those delivered very many were totally unfitted for the service, and should never have been received. General Pleasanton, [who] commands a cavalry division, says, in a report made yesterday:

The horses now purchased for cavalry service are much inferior to those first obtained, and are not suitable for the hard service of cavalry horses.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
 Washington City, October 21, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I have the honor to return the letter of General McClellan of the 18th instant, upon the supply of clothing and of horses to the army under his command.

General McClellan is constrained to believe that suffering for want of clothing among the soldiers of his command for some time past is in a great degree owing to the want of proper action on the part of the

Quartermaster's Department. He remarks that the Quartermaster-General may have ordered the clothing to be forwarded, but that it has not yet reached the depots of his army, and that unless greater efforts to insure prompt transmission are made by this department, the articles might as well remain in New York or Philadelphia, so far as the army under his command is concerned.

Upon first hearing that there was a deficiency of supply of clothing in that army, I made inquiries of those whose duty it was to attend to this portion of the business of the Quartermaster's Department, and I am assured that all the articles of clothing called for by requisition from General McClellan's headquarters were not only ordered but had been shipped on the 14th of October. This department cannot control the trains upon railroads of which the War Department has not taken the management into its own hands. Messengers were sent over the railroads by Colonel Sawtelle, appointed quartermaster, assistant to the chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, to endeavor to facilitate and hasten the transport of these stores, and Colonel Sawtelle reported to me that not only had they all been shipped but that the messengers could find none of them *in transitu*, and he concluded that they must have reached the termini of the railroads in Hagerstown, Frederick, or Harper's Ferry, with the exception of 51 boxes of clothing, which it was feared had been captured at Chambersburg by Stuart's cavalry. The railroad companies complain that cars are not unloaded at their destinations, and that their sidings are occupied with cars which are needed for forwarding supplies. I presume that the missing articles are in some of these cars, or that they have been unloaded and have not yet reached the particular corps or detachment for which they are intended.

The Secretary of War gave to General Haupt (and a more capable man is not to be found) an unlimited authority to do whatever was necessary, in his opinion, to insure safe and rapid transit over the railroads supplying the army of General McClellan. He has, at the instance of the Quartermaster-General, within a few days directed General Haupt to take possession of the Cumberland Valley road, against which the greatest complaints are made, and to run it as a United States military railroad route, if on inspection this should appear to be necessary to the public service.

The fact is that no railroad can provide facilities for unloading cars and transacting the business attending the supply of an army of the size of General McClellan's in a short time or in a contracted space. Sidings, switches, depots, turn-outs do not exist and cannot be laid down at once for such a traffic. I believe that the railroad companies and the officers of the Quartermaster's Department have worked faithfully and zealously, but too much business has been thrown upon these railroads. In addition to the stores transported, they have been called upon to move large bodies of troops, which interfered with the transportation and delivery of stores.

General Porter informs me that his troops need clothing still. Any deficiency which may be pointed out will be filled if possible.

General McClellan states that the number of horses received by his army since the commencement of the present campaign is only 1,964, which is several thousands less than reported in my letter of the 14th October to the Secretary of War. The apparent discrepancy is only apparent. That letter was a report made upon seeing a dispatch to you from General McClellan, stating that the arrangements to supply horses were insufficient; that the weekly average issue to the Army of the

Potomac, "including that in front of Washington," was only 150, which was not enough to supply waste. That letter stated distinctly that there had been issued to the "army about the Potomac" since the battles in front of Washington 9,254 horses; that of these, 1,500 had been sent out toward Centreville to the army of General Pope.

The statement which General McClellan compares with this is a statement of the horses received by assistant quartermasters stationed at Frederick, Hagerstown, Harper's Ferry, and at Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, from the 8th of September to the date of the report, which is only 1,964 horses, 7,290 less than the number given by the Quartermaster-General as issued to the whole army defending Washington from the date of the battles of Bull Run to the 11th of October.

I have no doubt that both statements are correct. They are not inconsistent. Both depend upon official reports, but reports of very different transactions. One is the whole, the other a part only of the issues.

Upon General McClellan assuming command of the troops for defense of Washington, he gave orders to the chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac to issue no horses except upon his order. I gave instructions to the chief quartermaster of this depot to issue horses only as required by this order, that is, to issue them only upon requisitions approved by General McClellan or by the staff officers representing him. Some 11,000 horses have been thus issued, the only exception authorized by me having been a special issue of 1,000 horses to enable General Banks' cavalry to scout and picket the country in front of Washington at the time Stuart's cavalry raid made this of urgent importance.

If General McClellan will instruct the officers authorized to approve requisitions in his name to confine this approval to issues to be made on the Upper Potomac, all the horses will be sent there till his wants are fully supplied; but if by his authority or in his name they approve requisitions for the troops in front of Washington, the horses will be issued to these troops under his direction. The whole 11,000 or 12,000 horses would have been sent to Harper's Ferry or Frederick had he so ordered.

In regard to a falling off in the quality of the horses, I can only say that the horses lately provided have been procured by contracts, and on specifications and inspection identical with those formerly used, excepting that, finding five-year-old horses liable to distemper and disease, officers providing them have generally been instructed to buy no horses under six years of age. The demand for horses has been so great lately that they have been carried off and put to service in many cases before they recovered from the fatigue and exhaustion of transportation from the country by rail.

The railroads are heavily taxed and transportation has been delayed. A case is reported in which horses remained fifty hours on the cars without food or water, were taken out, issued, and put to immediate service. The horses were good when shipped, and a few days' rest and food would have recruited them, but the exigencies of the service, or perhaps carelessness and ignorance, put them to a test which no horses could bear.

I do not think that the complaint of General Pleasanton has any greater foundation than this. The same system of purchase, the same system of inspection, the same specifications, and a price fixed by public competition of bidders and contractors, as heretofore, ought to procure horses of the same quality as of old. The stock is not yet

seriously affected by the war consumption. There were 6,000,000 of horses in the United States in 1860.

As I have learned that General McClellan was of opinion that many horses could be purchased quickly in the country which he now occupies, I have authorized Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster of the army under his command, to purchase 2,000 horses in that neighborhood. Several thousands are ordered here from more distant markets.

General McClellan's letter blames the Quartermaster's Department, of which I am the head. In reply, I have sought only to show that the department has endeavored to supply all the wants of his army, as far as known, and have stated the measures taken for that end, and my opinion, from the investigations made, that the greater part if not all the clothing required is within the lines of his army, and needs only to be distributed by the force under his command.

The department had the supplies on hand, sent them forward, and will send forward others to replace them if advised of any being lost or captured. There was no intention in my letter of 14th instant to make accusations against any one. The statement made to you that only 150 horses had been issued weekly to the Army of the Potomac, including that in front of Washington, was a mistake which I was obliged to correct when the dispatch was referred to me. It is the duty of this department to provide for the wants of the army, and it is my desire to do so efficiently, promptly, and abundantly.

I regret that any officer in high command should think that the department under my direction has failed to do its whole duty; but, while I cannot admit that he is right in this opinion, I shall gladly avail myself of any suggestions which he or you may have to offer tending to improve the efficiency of the department and promote that of the army which so much depends upon it.

There should be no controversy or misunderstanding between the generals and this department, and there shall be none if I can prevent it. Whether the efforts of the department are recognized or not, they will be continued.

The letter of General McClellan is returned herewith.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

OCTOBER 22, 1862—2 p. m.

P. S.—Since writing the above, I have seen a telegraphic requisition, received to-day from headquarters, for a large quantity of clothing, shoes, shelter-tents, &c. Most of the articles called for will be supplied immediately from this depot; the rest I order by telegraph from Philadelphia and New York, directing special agents to be sent with each shipment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 24, 1862—10 p. m. (Received October 24, 1862.)

General M. C. MEIGS, *Quartermaster-General:*

Your dispatch is received. On the 21st instant 20,000 pairs of booties arrived at the Harper's Ferry depot. Over 7,000 pairs are now on hand, but are sizes higher than No. 9. I asked that the extraordinary

sizes should not be sent; they are utterly useless. No bootees have arrived since. More than 30,000 pairs have been received altogether, and over 10,000 pairs are on the way here.

The clothing has uniformly arrived slowly. That ordered to Hagerstown on the 7th did not arrive until long after Stuart's last raid. It is not detained in cars at the depots. Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted. I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions. So far as clothing is concerned, our department is not at fault, and it provides as soon as due notice is given.

I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-Camp, &c.

[Indorsement.]

OCTOBER 25, 1862—11.45 a. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK:

As directed by the Secretary of War, I have ascertained the date of the receipt at Harper's Ferry of the 12,000 bootees about which Colonel Ingalls telegraphed. He reports that they reached Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st October; that over 30,000 pairs have been received, and that over 10,000 pairs are on the way there; 116,000 were on hand in Washington 18th October; 25,000 came that week. The complaint in regard to large-sized shoes is heard at this office for the first time this year to-day. Last year the same complaint was made, and orders were given to prevent the difficulty. The volunteer army appears to use smaller shoes than the old regular army, by whose experience the distribution of sizes has been regulated.

Respectfully,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

—
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, October 25, 1862.

Brigadier-General MEIGS, *Quartermaster-General:*

GENERAL: It has been publicly alleged that the army under the command of General McClellan has been unable to move for want of shoes and other supplies which it is the duty of the Quartermaster's Department to furnish. You will please report whether there has been any failure or neglect to furnish shoes or other supplies to that army or meet promptly any requisition for its supply upon your department.

Yours, truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

(Similar letter to the Commissary-General of Subsistence.)

—
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington City, October 25, 1862.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, stating that it has been publicly alleged that the army under

General McClellan has been unable to move for want of shoes and other supplies which it is the duty of the Quartermaster's Department to furnish, and directing me to report whether there has been any failure or neglect to furnish shoes or other supplies to that army or to meet promptly any requisitions for its supply upon this department. Every requisition for shoes, clothing, and such supplies approved at General McClellan's headquarters has been promptly met, and the goods have been forwarded by rail, mostly from this depot, with all possible speed.

Lately special agents have been sent with every shipment to prevent delay upon the route. The greater part of the supplies were, when called for, on hand in this depot. Such as were not here have been ordered by telegraph from the Philadelphia and New York depots and forwarded.

The requisitions have been very large. Ten days ago I was assured that every such requisition had been filled and forwarded. Within the last two days, however, new and large requisitions have been received, which are being shipped as rapidly as possible.

The supply of clothing, shoes, and other stores to an army of such size must be continuous, like that of a great city whose population it equals in number. Were every man well shod and clothed to-day, many would be in want to-morrow.

The department has not been able instantly to fill all requisitions for horses. These requisitions have far exceeded any estimate. Over 13,000 horses have been issued to the army on the Potomac River since the 1st of September. The demand continues, and the daily issues are still very large.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

—
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington City, October 25, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: As directed by the Secretary of War, I have ascertained the date of the receipt at Harper's Ferry of the 12,000 bootees about which Colonel Ingalls telegraphed. He reports that they reached Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st October, on which day 20,000 pairs were received; that about 48,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received at that place, Frederick, and Hagerstown altogether; that 10,000 pairs are now on the way and 15,000 more ordered. On the 18th of October there were 116,000 pairs on hand in the Washington depot, though 25,000 pairs had been issued in the week ending that day.

The complaint in regard to a surplus of large-sized shoes is heard to-day at this office for the first time this year. Last year the same complaint was made, and orders were given which removed the difficulty. The volunteer army appears to use smaller shoes than the old regular army, by whose experience the distribution of sizes has been regulated.

Copies of two dispatches from Colonel Ingalls on the subject are inclosed.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

[Inclosures.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 24, 1862—10 p. m.
(Received October 24, 1862.)

General M. C. MEIGS, *Quartermaster-General*:

Your dispatch is received. On the 21st instant 12,000 pairs of bootees arrived at the Harper's Ferry depot. Over 7,000 pairs are now on hand, but are sizes higher than No. 9. I asked that extraordinary sizes should not be sent; they are utterly useless. No bootees have arrived since. More than 30,000 pairs have been received altogether, and over 10,000 pairs are on the way here.

The clothing has uniformly arrived slowly. That ordered to Hagerstown on the 7th did not arrive until long after Stuart's last raid. It is not detained in cars at the depots. Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted. I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions. So far as clothing is concerned, our department is not at fault; it provides as soon as due notice is given.

I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 25, 1862—1.30 p. m.
(Received October 25, 1862—1.45 p. m.)

General MEIGS:

In my dispatch of last night I should have written 20,000 instead of 12,000 bootees received on 21st instant at Harper's Ferry. At the three depots, Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown, there have been received about 40,000 pairs bootees and 8,000 pairs of boots altogether. Some 10,000 more are *in transitu*, and 15,000 additional ordered. Clothing will come forward as rapidly as it can be transported and issued.

By mail I will send detailed statement. The amounts ordered would seem ample. Of course clothing will be wanted all the time, and can be provided even on the march.

The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated, I think, and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regimental and brigade commanders.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster.

—
OFFICE COMMISSARY-GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE,
Washington City, October 25, 1862.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

SIR: In reply to yours of this date,* I have the honor to state that, so far as is known to this office, there has been no failure nor neglect of the Subsistence Department to furnish subsistence for the army under

* See p. 21.

command of General McClellan, and that all requisitions for its subsistence on this department have been promptly met.

With great respect, your most obedient servant,

A. E. SHIRAS,

Major, Acting Commissary-General of Subsistence.

No. 2.

Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding the Army of the Potomac, of operations August 14–November 9.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 15, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a preliminary report of the military operations under my charge since the evacuation of Harrison's Landing.

This measure, directed by the General-in-Chief, was executed successfully, with entire safety to my command and its *matériel*, between the 14th and 19th of August. The line of withdrawal selected was that of the mouth of the Chickahominy, Williamsburg, and Yorktown. Upon this line the main body of the army with all its trains was moved, Heintzelman's corps crossing the Chickahominy at Jones' Bridge and covering by its march the movement of the main column. The passage of the Lower Chickahominy was effected by means of a bateau bridge 2,000 feet in length. The transfer of the army to Yorktown was completed by the 19th of August. The embarkation of the troops and *matériel* at Yorktown and Fort Monroe was at once commenced, and as rapidly as the means of transportation admitted everything was sent forward to Aquia Creek and Alexandria. No mere sketch of an undertaking of such magnitude and yet so delicate a military character will suffice to do justice. I must now, however, content myself with a simple notice of it, deferring a full description for my official report of the campaign before Richmond, a labor which I propose to undertake as soon as events will afford me the necessary time. Justice to the achievements of the Army of the Potomac and the brave men who composed it requires that the official record of that campaign should be prepared with more care than circumstances have hitherto permitted me to bestow upon it. The delay will not have been felt as injurious to the public interest, inasmuch as by frequent reports from time to time I have kept the Department advised of events as they occurred.

I reached Aquia Creek with my staff on the 24th of August, reported my arrival, and asked for orders. On the 27th of August I received from the General-in-Chief permission to proceed to Alexandria, where I at once fixed my headquarters. The troops composing the Army of the Potomac were meanwhile ordered forward to re-enforce the army under General Pope. So completely was this order carried out that on the 30th of August I had remaining under my command only a camp guard of about 100 men. Everything else had been sent to re-enforce General Pope. In addition, I exhausted all the means at my disposal to forward supplies to that officer, my own headquarters teams even being used for that purpose.

Upon the unfortunate issue of that campaign, I received an intimation from the General-in-Chief that my services were desired for the pur-

pose of arranging for the defense of the capital. They were at once cheerfully given, although while awaiting definite instructions at Alexandria I had endeavored, as just seen, to promote a favorable result in the operations then pending, and had thus contributed, though indirectly, yet as far as I could, to the defense of Washington. On the 2d of September the formal order of the War Department placed me in command of the fortifications of Washington "and of all the troops for the defense of the capital." On the 1st of September I had been instructed that I had nothing to do with the troops engaged in active operations under General Pope, but that my command was limited to the immediate garrison of Washington. On the next day, however, I was verbally instructed by the President and the General-in-Chief to assume command of General Pope's troops (including my own Army of the Potomac) as soon as they approached the vicinity of Washington; to go out and meet them, and to post them as I deemed best to repulse the enemy and insure the safety of the city.

At this time the task imposed upon me was limited to the dispositions necessary to resist a direct attack of the enemy upon the capital. Such, indeed, was the danger naturally indicated by the defeat of our forces in front. The various garrisons were at once strengthened and put in order, and the troops were disposed to cover all the approaches to the city, and so as to be readily thrown upon threatened points. New defenses were thrown up where deemed necessary. A few days only had elapsed before comparative security was felt with regard to our ability to resist any attack upon the city. The disappearance of the enemy from the front of Washington and their passage into Maryland enlarged the sphere of operations, and made an active campaign necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and drive them out of Maryland. Being honored with the charge of this campaign, I entered at once upon the additional duties imposed upon me with cheerfulness and trust, yet not without feeling the weight of the responsibilities thus assumed and being deeply impressed with the magnitude of the issues involved.

Having made the necessary arrangements for the defense of the city in the new condition of things, I pushed forward the First and Ninth Corps, under Generals Reno and Hooker, forming the right wing under General Burnside, to Leesborough on the 5th instant; thence the First Corps, by Brookville, Cooksville, and Ridgeville, to Frederick; and the Ninth Corps, by Damascus, on New Market and Frederick. The Second and Eleventh [Twelfth] Corps, under Generals Sumner and Williams, on the 6th were moved from Tennallytown to Rockville; thence, by Middlebrook and Urbana, on Frederick, the Eleventh [Twelfth] Corps moving by a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining the communication between the center and right wing, as well as covering the direct route from Frederick to Washington. The Sixth Corps, under General Franklin, was moved to Darnestown on the 6th instant; thence, by Dawsonville and Barnesville, on Buckeystown, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in position to connect with and support the center should it have been necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division was thrown forward to Offut's Cross-Roads and Poolesville by the river road, thus covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the Sixth Corps. The object of these movements was to feel the enemy—to compel him to develop his intentions—at the same time that the troops were in position readily to cover Baltimore or Washington, to attack him should he

hold the line of the Monocacy, or to follow him into Pennsylvania if necessary.

On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the city and in its streets. On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and center passed through Frederick. In this city the manifestations of Union feeling were abundant and gratifying. The troops received the most enthusiastic welcome at the hands of the inhabitants. On the 13th the advance, consisting of Pleasonton's cavalry and horse artillery, after some skirmishing, cleared the main passage over the Catoctin Hills, leaving no serious obstruction to the movement of the main body until the base of the South Mountain range was reached.

While at Frederick, on the 13th, I obtained reliable information of the movements and intentions of the enemy, which made it clear that it was necessary to force the passage of the South Mountain range and gain possession of Boonsborough and Rohrer'sville before any relief could be afforded to Harper's Ferry. On the morning of the 13th I received a verbal message from Colonel Miles, commanding at Harper's Ferry, informing me that on the preceding afternoon the Maryland Heights had been abandoned, after repelling an attack by the rebels, and the whole force was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, the Maryland, Loudoun, and Bolivar Heights being all in possession of the enemy. The messenger stated that there was no apparent reason for the abandonment of the Maryland Heights, and that, though Colonel Miles asked for assistance, he said he could hold out certainly two days. I directed him to make his way back, if possible, with the information that I was rapidly approaching and would undoubtedly relieve the place. By three other couriers I sent the same message, with the order to hold out to the last. I do not learn that any of these messengers succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry. I should here state that on the 12th I was directed to assume command of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, but this order reached me after all communication with the garrison was cut off. Before I left Washington, while it was yet time, I recommended to the proper authorities that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn, via Hagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumberland Valley, or that, taking up the pontoon bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should fall back to the Maryland Heights and then hold its own to the last. In this position it should have maintained itself for weeks. It was not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the subject was left to my discretion it was too late to do anything except to try to relieve the garrison.

I directed artillery to be frequently fired by our advance guards, as a signal to the garrison that relief was at hand. This was done, and I learn that our firing was distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry, and that they were thus made aware that we were approaching rapidly. It was confidently expected that this place could hold out until we had carried the mountains and were in a position to make a detachment for its relief. The left, therefore, was ordered to move through Jefferson to the South Mountains, at Crampton's Pass, in front of Burkittsville, while the center and right moved upon the main or Turner's Pass, in front of Middletown. During these movements I had not imposed long marches on the columns. The absolute necessity of refitting and giving some little rest to troops worn down by previous long-continued marching and severe fighting, together with the uncertainty as to the actual position, strength, and intentions of the enemy, rendered it incumbent upon me to move slowly and cautiously until the headquarters reached Urbana,

where I first obtained reliable information that the enemy's object was to move upon Harper's Ferry and the Cumberland Valley, and not upon Baltimore, Washington, or Gettysburg.

In the absence of the full reports of corps commanders, a simple outline of the brilliant operations which resulted in the carrying of the two passes through the South Mountains is all that can at this time, with justice to the troops and commanders engaged, be furnished.

The South Mountain range near Turner's Pass averages perhaps 1,000 feet in height, and forms a strong natural military barrier. The practicable passes are not numerous and are readily defensible, the gaps abounding in fine positions. Turner's Pass is the more prominent, being that by which the National road crosses the mountains. It was necessarily indicated as the route of advance of our main army.

The carrying of Crampton's Pass, some 5 or 6 miles below, was also important to furnish the means of reaching the flank of the enemy, and having, as a lateral movement, direct relations to the attack on the principal pass, while it at the same time presented the most direct practicable route for the relief of Harper's Ferry.

Early in the morning of the 14th instant General Pleasonton, with a cavalry force, reconnoitered the position of the enemy, whom he discovered to occupy the crests of commanding hills in the gap on either side of the National road and upon advantageous ground in the center upon and near the road, with artillery bearing upon all the approaches to their position, whether that by the main road or those by the country roads which led around up to the crest upon the right and left. At about 8 o'clock a. m. Cox's division of Reno's corps, a portion of Burnside's column, in co-operation with the reconnaissance, which by this time had become an attack, moved up the mountain by the old Sharpsburg road to the left of the main road, dividing, as they advanced, into two columns. These columns (Scammon's and Crook's brigades) handsomely carried the enemy's position on the crest in their front, which gave us possession of an important point for further operations. Fresh bodies of the enemy now appearing, Cox's position, though held stubbornly, became critical, and between 12 and 1 o'clock p. m. Willcox's division of Reno's corps was sent forward by General Burnside to support Cox; between 2 and 3 p. m. Sturgis' division was sent up.

The contest was maintained with perseverance until dark, the enemy having the advantage as to position and fighting with obstinacy, but the ground won was fully maintained. The loss in killed and wounded here was considerable on both sides, and it was here that Major-General Reno, who had gone forward to observe the operations of his corps and to give such directions as were necessary, fell, pierced with a musket ball. The loss of this brave and distinguished officer tempered with sadness the exultations of triumph. A gallant soldier, an able general, endeared to his troops and associates, his death is felt as an irreparable misfortune.

About 3 o'clock p. m. Hooker's corps, of Burnside's column, moved up to the right of the main road by a country road, which, bending to the right, then turning up to the left, circuitously wound its way beyond the crest of the pass to the Mountain House on the main road. General Hooker sent Meade, with the division of Pennsylvania Reserves, to attack the eminence to the right of this entrance to the gap, which was done most handsomely and successfully.

Patrick's brigade, of Hatch's division, was sent—one portion up around the road to turn the hill on the left, while the remainder advanced as skirmishers—up the hill, and occupied the crest, supported by Double-

day's and Phelps' brigades. The movement, after a sharp contest on the crest and in the fields in the depression between the crest and the adjoining hill, was fully successful.

Ricketts' division pressed up the mountain about 5 p. m., arriving at the crest with the left of his command in time to participate in the closing scene of the engagement. Relieving Hatch's division, Ricketts' remained on the ground, holding the battle-field during the night. The mountain sides, thus gallantly passed over by Hooker on the right of the gap and Reno on the left, were steep and difficult in the extreme. We could make but little use of our artillery, while our troops were subject to a warm artillery fire as well as to that of infantry in the woods and under cover.

By order of General Burnside, Gibbon's brigade of Hatch's division, late in the afternoon, advanced upon the center of the enemy's position on the main road. Deploying his brigade, Gibbon actively engaged a superior force of the enemy, which, though stubbornly resisting, was steadily pressed back until some hours after dark, when Gibbon remained in undisturbed possession of the field. He was then relieved by a brigade of Sedgwick's division. Finding themselves outflanked both on the right and the left, the enemy abandoned their position during the night, leaving their dead and wounded on the field, and hastily retreated down the mountain.

In the engagement at Turner's Pass our loss was 328 killed and 1,463 wounded and missing;* that of the enemy is estimated to be, in all, about 3,000. Among our wounded I regret to say were Brig. Gen. J. P. Hatch and other valuable officers.

The carrying of Crampton's Pass by Franklin was executed rapidly and decisively. Slocum's division was formed upon the right of the road leading through the gap, Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbert's brigades, supported by Newton, whose activity was conspicuous, all of Slocum's division, advanced steadily upon the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy were driven from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, and steadily forced back up the mountain until they reached the position of their battery, near the road, well up the mountain. Here they made a stand. They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery *en échelon*, until, after an action of three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy hastily fled down the mountains on the other side. On the left of the road Brooks' and Irwin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Slocum's flank, charged up the mountain in the same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the crest was carried. The loss in Franklin's corps was 115 killed, 416 wounded, and 2 missing.† The enemy's loss was about the same. One piece of artillery and four colors were captured, and knapsacks and even haversacks were abandoned as the enemy were driven up the hill.

On the morning of the 15th I was informed by Union civilians living on the other side of the mountains that the enemy were retreating in the greatest haste and in disordered masses to the river. There was such a concurrence of testimony on this point that there seemed no doubt as to the fact. The hasty retreat of the enemy's forces from the mountain, and the withdrawal of the remaining troops from between Boonsborough and Hagerstown to a position where they could resist attack and cover the Shepherdstown ford and receive the re-enforcements expected from

* But see revised statement, pp. 184-188, 204.

† See pp. 183, 204.

Harper's Ferry, were for a time interpreted as evidences of the enemy's disorganization and demoralization.

As soon as it was definitely known that the enemy had abandoned the mountains, the cavalry and the corps of Sumner, Hooker, and Mansfield were ordered to pursue them, via the turnpike and Boonsborough, as promptly as possible. The corps of Burnside and Porter (the latter having but one weak division present) were ordered to move by the old Sharpsburg road, and Franklin to advance into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville, and to endeavor to relieve Harper's Ferry. Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsborough to Rohrersville, were to re-enforce Franklin or to move on Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. Franklin moved toward Brownsville and found there a force, largely superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong position to receive him. Here the total cessation of firing in the direction of Harper's Ferry indicated but too clearly the shameful and premature surrender of that post.

The cavalry advance overtook a body of the enemy's cavalry in Boonsborough, which it dispersed after a brief skirmish, killing and wounding many, taking some 250 prisoners and 2 guns.

Richardson's division, of Sumner's corps, passing Boonsborough to Centreville or Keedysville, found a few miles beyond the town the enemy's forces displayed in line of battle, strong both in respect to numbers and position, and awaiting attack. Upon receiving reports of the disposition of the enemy, I directed all the corps, except that of Franklin, upon Sharpsburg, leaving Franklin to observe and check the enemy in his front and avail himself of any chance that might offer. I had hoped to come up with the enemy during the 15th in sufficient force to beat them again and drive them into the river. My instructions were that if the enemy were on the march they were to be at once attacked; if they were found in force and in position, the corps were to be placed in position for attack, but no attack was to be made until I reached the front.

On arriving at the front in the afternoon I found but two divisions—Richardson's and Sykes'—in position. The rest were halted in the road, the head of the column some distance in rear of Richardson. After a rapid examination of the position, I found that it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed locations to be selected for our batteries of position, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg pike. The corps were not all in their places until the next morning some time after sunrise.

On the 16th the enemy had slightly changed their line, and were posted upon the heights in rear of the Antietam Creek, their left and center being upon and in front of the road from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and protected by woods and irregularities of the ground. Their extreme left rested upon a wooded eminence near the cross-roads, to the north of J. Miller's farm, the distance at this point between the road and the Potomac, which makes here a great bend to the east, being about three-fourths of a mile. Their right rested on the hills to the right of Sharpsburg, near Snively's farm, covering the crossing of the Antietam and the approaches to the town from the southeast. The ground between their immediate front and the Antietam is undulating. Hills intervene, whose crests in general are commanded by the crests of others in their rear. On all favorable points their artillery was posted. It became evident from the force of the enemy and the strength of their

position that desperate fighting alone could drive them from the field, and all felt that a great and terrible battle was at hand.

In proceeding to the narrative of the events of this and the succeeding day, I must here repeat what I have observed in reporting upon the other subjects of this communication—that I attempt in this preliminary report nothing more than a sketch of the main features of this great engagement, reserving for my official report, based upon the reports of the corps commanders, that full description of details which shall place upon record the achievements of individuals and of particular bodies of troops.

The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left—at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more by assailing the enemy's right—and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have on hand.

The morning of the 16th (during which there was considerable artillery firing) was spent in obtaining information as to the ground, rectifying the position of the troops, and perfecting the arrangements for the attack.

On the afternoon of the 16th, Hooker's corps, consisting of Ricketts' and Doubleday's divisions, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Meade, was sent across the Antietam Creek, by a ford and bridge to the right of Keedysville, with orders to attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's left. Mansfield, with his corps, was sent in the evening to support Hooker. Arrived in position, Meade's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, which was at the head of Hooker's corps, became engaged in a sharp contest with the enemy, which lasted until after dark, when it had succeeded in driving in a portion of the opposing line and held the ground. At daylight the contest was renewed between Hooker and the enemy in his front. Hooker's attack was successful for a time, but masses of the enemy, thrown upon his corps, checked it. Mansfield brought up his corps to Hooker's support, when the two corps drove the enemy back, the gallant and distinguished veteran Mansfield losing his life in the effort. General Hooker was, unhappily, about this time wounded and compelled to leave the field, where his services had been conspicuous and important. About an hour after this time, Sumner's corps, consisting of Sedgwick's, Richardson's, and French's divisions, arrived on the field—Richardson's some time after the other two, as he was unable to start as soon as they. Sedgwick, on the right, penetrated the woods in front of Hooker's and Mansfield's troops. French and Richardson were placed to the left of Sedgwick, thus attacking the enemy toward their left center. Crawford's and Sedgwick's lines, however, yielded to a destructive fire of masses of the enemy in the woods, and, suffering greatly (Generals Sedgwick and Crawford being among the wounded), their troops fell back in disorder; they nevertheless rallied in the woods. The enemy's advance was, however, entirely checked by the destructive fire of our artillery. Franklin, who had been directed the day before to join the main army with two divisions, arrived on the field from Brownsville about an hour after, and Smith's division replaced Sedgwick's and Crawford's line. Advancing steadily, it swept over the ground just lost but now permanently retaken. The divisions of French and Richardson maintained with considerable loss the exposed positions which they had so gallantly gained, among the wounded being General Richardson.

The condition of things on the right toward the middle of the after-

noon, notwithstanding the success wrested from the enemy by the stubborn bravery of the troops, was at this time unpromising. Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had lost heavily, several general officers having been carried from the field. I was at one time compelled to draw two brigades from Porter's corps (the reserve) to strengthen the right. This left for the reserve the small division of Regulars, who had been engaged in supporting during the day the batteries in the center, and a single brigade of Morell's division. Before I left the right to return to the center, I became satisfied that the line would be held without these two brigades, and countermanded the order, which was in course of execution. The effect of Burnside's movement on the enemy's right was to prevent the further massing of their troops on their left, and we held what we had gained.

Burnside's corps, consisting of Willcox's, Sturgis', and Rodman's divisions, and Cox's Kanawha division, was intrusted with the difficult task of carrying the bridge across the Antietam, near Rohrback's farm, and assaulting the enemy's right, the order having been communicated to him at 10 o'clock a. m.

The valley of the Antietam at and near this bridge is narrow, with high banks. On the right of the stream the bank is wooded, and commands the approaches both to the bridge and the ford. The steep slopes of the bank were lined with rifle-pits and breastworks of rails and stones. These, together with the woods, were filled with the enemy's infantry, while their batteries completely commanded and enfiladed the bridge and ford and their approaches.

The advance of the troops brought on an obstinate and sanguinary contest, and, from the great natural advantages of the position, it was nearly 1 o'clock before the heights on the right bank were carried. At about 3 o'clock p. m. the corps again advanced, and with success, the right driving the enemy before it and pushing on nearly to Sharpsburg, while the left, after a hard encounter, also compelled the enemy to retire before it. The enemy here, however, were speedily re-enforced, and with overwhelming masses. New batteries of their artillery also were brought up and opened. It became evident that our force was not sufficient to enable the advance to reach the town, and the order was given to retire to the cover of the hill which was taken from the enemy earlier in the afternoon. This movement was effected without confusion and the position maintained until the enemy retreated. General Burnside had sent to me for re-enforcements late in the afternoon, but the condition of things on the right was not such as to enable me to afford them.

During the whole day our artillery was everywhere bravely and ably handled. Indeed, I cannot speak too highly of the efficiency of our batteries and of the great service they rendered. On more than one occasion when our infantry was broken they covered its reformation and drove back the enemy.

The cavalry had little field for operations during the engagement, but was employed in supporting the horse-artillery batteries in the center, and in driving up stragglers, while awaiting opportunity for other service.

The Signal Corps, under Major Myer, rendered, during the operations at Antietam as well as at South Mountain and during the whole movements of the army, efficient and valuable service. Indeed, by its service here, as on other fields elsewhere, this corps has gallantly earned its title to an independent and permanent organization.

The duties devolving upon my staff during the action were most important, and the performance of them able and untiring. At a later day I propose to bring to the notice of the Department their individual services.

With the day closed this memorable battle, in which, perhaps, nearly 200,000 men were for fourteen hours engaged in combat. We had attacked the enemy in position, driven them from their line on one flank and secured a footing within it on the other. Under the depression of previous reverses we had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of former successes and inflated with a recent triumph. Our forces slept that night conquerors on a field won by their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy.

The night, however, presented serious questions; morning brought with it grave responsibilities. To renew the attack again on the 18th or to defer it, with the chance of the enemy's retirement after a day of suspense, were the questions before me. A careful and anxious survey of the condition of my command, and my knowledge of the enemy's force and position, failed to impress me with any reasonable certainty of success if I renewed the attack without re-enforcing columns. A view of the shattered state of some of the corps sufficed to deter me from pressing them into immediate action, and I felt that my duty to the army and the country forbade the risks involved in a hasty movement, which might result in the loss of what had been gained the previous day. Impelled by this consideration, I awaited the arrival of my re-enforcements, taking advantage of the occasion to collect together the dispersed, give rest to the fatigued, and remove the wounded. Of the re-enforcements, Couch's division, although marching with commendable rapidity, was not in position until a late hour in the morning; and Humphreys' division of new troops, fatigued with forced marches, were arriving throughout the day, but were not available until near its close.* Large re-enforcements from Pennsylvania, which were expected during the day, did not arrive at all.

During the 18th, orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the 19th. On the night of the 18th the enemy, after having been passing troops in the latter part of the day from the Virginia shore to their position behind Sharpsburg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their line. This movement they executed before daylight. Being but a short distance from the river, the evacuation presented but little difficulty. It was, however, rapidly followed up.

A reconnaissance was made across the river on the evening of the 19th, which resulted in ascertaining the near presence of the enemy in some force and in our capturing six guns.

A second reconnaissance, the next morning, which, with the first, was made by a small detachment from Porter's corps, resulted in observing a heavy force of the enemy there. The detachment withdrew with slight loss.

I submit herewith a list of the killed, wounded, and missing in the engagements of the 14th and of the 16th and 17th. The enemy's loss is believed from the best sources of information to be nearly 30,000. Their dead were mostly left upon the field, and a large number of wounded were left behind.

While it gives me pleasure to speak of the gallantry and devotion of officers and men generally, displayed throughout this conflict, I feel it

* See Humphreys' report, p. 373.

necessary to mention that some officers and men skulked from their places in the ranks until after the battle was over. Death on the spot must be hereafter the fate of all such cowards, and the hands of the military commanders must be strengthened with all the power of the Government to inflict it summarily.

The early and disgraceful surrender of Harper's Ferry deprived my operations of results which would have formed a brilliant sequence to the substantial and gratifying successes already related. Had the garrison held out twenty-four hours longer, I should in all probability have captured that part of the enemy's force engaged in the attack on the Maryland Heights, while the whole garrison, some 12,000 strong, could have been drawn to re-enforce me on the day of the decisive battle—certainly on the morning of the 18th. I would thus have been in a position to have destroyed the rebel army. Under the same circumstances, had the besieging force on the Virginia side at Harper's Ferry not been withdrawn, I would have had 35,000 or 40,000 less men to encounter at the Antietam, and must have captured or destroyed all opposed to me. As it was, I had to engage an army fresh from a recent and to them a great victory, and to reap the disadvantages of their being freshly and plentifully supplied with ammunition and supplies.

The object and results of this brief campaign may be summed up as follows:

In the beginning of the month of September the safety of the National Capital was seriously endangered by the presence of a victorious enemy, who soon after crossed into Maryland and then directly threatened Washington and Baltimore, while they occupied the soil of a loyal State and threatened an invasion of Pennsylvania. The army of the Union, inferior in numbers, wearied by long marches, deficient in various supplies, worn out by numerous battles, the last of which had not been successful, first covered by its movements the important cities of Washington and Baltimore, then boldly attacked the victorious enemy in their chosen strong position and drove them back, with all their superiority of numbers, into the State of Virginia, thus saving the loyal States from invasion and rudely dispelling the rebel dreams of carrying the war into our country and subsisting upon our resources. Thirteen guns and thirty-nine colors, more than 15,000 stand of small-arms, and more than 6,000 prisoners were the trophies which attest the success of our arms.

Rendering thanks to Divine Providence for its blessing upon our exertions, I close this brief report. I beg only to add the hope that the army's efforts for the cause in which we are engaged will be deemed worthy to receive the commendation of the Government and the country.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General, U. S. Army.

*Tabular Statement of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the battles of South Mountain and Crampton's Pass, on the 14th of September, 1862.**

Command.	Officers.		Enlisted men.			Aggregate.			Grand aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
First Corps, Major-General Hooker:									
1st Division.....						62	395	42	499
2d Division.....						9	26		35
3d Division.....						99	299	1	399
Total.....						170	720	43	933
Sixth Corps, Major-General Franklin:									
1st Division.....						114	397	2	513
2d Division.....						1	19		20
Total.....						115	416	2	533
Ninth Corps, Major-General Burnside:†	1					1			1
1st Division.....	2	13	63	272		65	285		350
2d Division.....	1	5	9	112	30	10	117	30	157
3d Division.....			2	8		2	8		10
4th Division.....	2	12	78	248		80	260		340
Total.....	6	30	152	640	30	158	670	30	858
Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier-General Pleasanton:							1		1
Grand total.....						443	1,807	75	2,325

Official:

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 29, 1862.

Tabular Report of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the battle of Antietam, on the 16th and 17th of September, 1862.

Corps and divisions.	Officers.		Enlisted men.			Aggregate.			Grand aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
First Corps, Major-General Hooker:									
1st Division.....						98	669	95	862
2d Division.....						153	898	137	1,188
3d Division.....						97	449	23	569
Total.....						348	2,016	255	2,619
Second Corps, Major-General Sumner:									
1st Division.....	21	39	192	860	24	212	900	24	1,136
2d Division.....	2		355	1,577	321	355	1,579	321	2,255
3d Division.....	22	50	272	1,271	203	293	1,322	203	1,818
Total.....	45	89	819	3,708	548	860	3,801	548	5,209
Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. E. J. Porter:									
1st Division.....									
2d Division.....		2	13	92	1	13	94	1	108
Artillery Reserve.....	1		7	13	1	8	13	1	22
Total.....	1	2	20	105	2	21	107	2	130

* For revised statements of losses shown by this and the following tables, see pp. 183-204.

† Major-General Reno, temporarily commanding, killed.

Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the battle of Antietam, &c.—Continued.

Corps and divisions.	Officers.		Enlisted men.			Aggregate.			Grand aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
Sixth Corps, Major-General Franklin :									
1st Division.....						5	58	2	65
2d Division.....						65	277	31	373
Total.....						70	335	33	438
Ninth Corps, Major-General Burnside:									
1st Division.....	2	20	44	264	7	46	284	7	337
2d Division.....	7	29	121	493	20	128	522	20	670
3d Division.....	8	40	212	743	70	220	783	70	1,073
4th Division.....	5	7	33	145	23	38	152	23	213
Total.....	22	96	410	1,645	120	432	1,741	120	2,293
Twelfth Corps (General Banks), Brigadier-General Williams comdg.:									
1st Division.....	9	35	151	827	54	160	862	54	1,076
2d Division.....	6	26	107	481	30	113	507	30	650
Artillery.....			1	15	1	1	15	1	17
Total.....	15	61	259	1,323	85	274	1,384	85	1,743
Major-General Couch's division.....		1		8			9		9
Brigadier-General Pleasonton, Cavalry Division.						5	23		28
Grand total.....						2,010	9,416	1,043	12,469

Official:

S. WILLIAMS,
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
*Camp near Sharpsburg, September 29, 1862.**Tabular Report of Casualties in Morell's division, Fifth Corps, in actions of 19th and 20th of September, 1862, near Shepherdstown, Va.*

Command.	Officers.			Enlisted men.			Aggregate.			Grand aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
First Brigade.....	4	5	2	63	120	126	67	125	128	320
Second Brigade.....		1		1	10		1	11		12
Third Brigade.....					7			7		7
First U. S. Sharpshooters.....				2	5		2	5		7
Total.....	4	6	2	66	142	126	70	148	128	346

Official:

S. WILLIAMS,
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 29, 1862.

Statement of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, September 3-20, 1862, inclusive.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.	Remarks.
First Corps, Major-General Hooker....	170	720	43	933	Battle of South Mountain.
Sixth Corps, Major-General Franklin..	115	416	2	533	Battle of Crampton's Pass.
Ninth Corps, Major-General Burnside (Major-General Reno temporarily in command).	158	670	30	858	Battle of South Mountain.
Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier-General Pleasanton.	-----	1	-----	1	Do.
First Corps, Major-General Hooker....	348	2, 016	255	2, 619	Battle of Antietam.
Second Corps, Major-General Sumner..	860	3, 801	548	5, 209	Do.
Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. F. J. Porter....	21	107	2	130	Do.
Sixth Corps, Major-General Franklin..	70	335	33	438	Do.
Ninth Corps, Major-General Burnside..	432	1, 741	120	2, 293	Do.
Twelfth Corps, Major-General Banks (Brigadier-General Williams).	274	1, 384	85	1, 743	Do.
Major-General Couch	-----	9	-----	9	Do.
Brigadier-General Pleasanton	5	23	-----	28	Do.
Major-General Morell	12	55	13	80	Advance guard.
	70	148	128	346	Shepherdstown, Va.
Total	2, 535	11, 426	1, 259	15, 220	

Official:

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 29, 1862.

NEW YORK, August 4, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations of the Army of the Potomac while under my charge. Accompanying it are the reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders pertaining to the various engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaigns, and important documents connected with its organization, supply, and movements. These, with lists of maps and memoranda submitted, will be found appended, duly arranged, and marked for convenient reference.*

* * * * *

FOURTH PERIOD.

On the 1st of September I went into Washington, where I had an interview with the General-in-Chief, who instructed me verbally to take command of its defenses, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and prohibiting me from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged in front under General Pope. During this interview I suggested to the General-in-Chief the necessity of his going in person or sending one of his personal staff to the army under General Pope for the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of affairs. He sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant adjutant-general.

During the afternoon of the same day I received a message from the General-in-Chief to the effect that he desired me to go at once to his house to see the President.

* Portions of report here omitted are printed in Vols. V and XI of this series.

The President informed me that he had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and supporting General Pope; that he had "always been a friend of mine," and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, substantially, that I was confident that he was misinformed; that I was sure, whatever estimate the Army of the Potomac might entertain of General Pope, that they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty. The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to "Fitz John Porter or some other of my friends," and try to do away with any feeling that might exist, adding that I could rectify the evil and that no one else could.

I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to General Porter, or do anything else in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety; upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured me that he could never forget my action in the matter, &c., and left.

I then wrote the following telegram to General Porter, which was sent to him by the General-in-Chief:

WASHINGTON, *September 1, 1862.*

Major-General PORTER:

I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is that for their country's sake they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me.

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe should that become necessary.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

To which he sent the following reply:

FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE,
September 2, 1862—10 a. m.

General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding, Washington:

You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty.

F. J. PORTER.

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram nor at any other time did I think for one moment that General Porter had been or would be in any manner derelict in the performance of his duty to the nation and its cause. Such an impression never entered my mind. The dispatch in question was written purely at the request of the President.

On the morning of the 2d the President and General Halleck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our affairs were in a bad condition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defenses of Washington; the roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers, to place the works in a proper state of defense, and to go out to meet and take command of the army when it approached the vicinity of the works; then to place the troops in the best position—committing everything to my hands.

I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and sent an aide to General Pope with the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS,
Washington, September 2, 1862.

Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE,
Commanding Army of Virginia:

GENERAL: General Halleck instructed me to repeat to you the order he sent this morning to withdraw your army to Washington without unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double precaution.

In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar, it would be best to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's Hill, &c.; McDowell's to Upton's Hill; Franklin's to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain Bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most convenient.

In haste, general, very truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the advance of McDowell's corps, and with it Generals Pope and McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few aides at my disposal to the left, to give instructions to the troops approaching in the direction of Alexandria, and, hearing artillery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel were returning, and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably engaged, I went with a single aide and three orderlies by the shortest line to meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be able to reach its intended position without any serious molestation. I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent instructions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington.

Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the troops and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supplies, &c. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy on the south side of the Potomac.

On the 3d the enemy had disappeared from the front of Washington, and the information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross the Upper Potomac into Maryland. This materially changed the aspect of affairs and enlarged the sphere of operations; for, in case of a crossing in force, an active campaign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. I therefore on the 3d ordered the Second and Twelfth Corps to Tennallytown, and the Ninth Corps to a point on the Seventh-street road near Washington, and sent such cavalry as was available to the fords near Poolesville, to watch and impede the enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity.

On September 5 the Second and Twelfth Corps were moved to Rockville, and Couch's division (the only one of the Fourth Corps that had been brought from the Peninsula) to Offutt's Cross-Roads.

On the 6th the First and Ninth Corps were ordered to Leesborough; the Sixth Corps and Sykes' division of the Fifth Corps to Tennallytown.

On the 7th the Sixth Corps was advanced to Rockville, to which place my headquarters were moved on the same day.

All the necessary arrangements for the defense of the city under the new condition of things had been made, and General Banks was left in command, having received his instructions from me.

It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time that could be avoided in moving the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the support of the Army of Virginia; that I spared no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass of the army had sailed, and that after my arrival at Alexandria I left nothing in my power undone to forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Pope. I sent with the troops that moved all the cavalry I could get hold of. Even my personal escort was sent out upon the line of the railway as a guard, with the provost and camp guards at headquarters, retaining less than 100 men, many of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of bands, &c. All the headquarters teams that arrived were sent out with supplies and ammunition, none being retained even to move the headquarters camp. The squadron that habitually served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth with General Burnside, as he was deficient in cavalry.

I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was known that the mass of the rebel army had passed up the south side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that army had crossed into Maryland; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view to turn Washington by a flank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which at that time we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to march cautiously, and to advance the army in such order as continually to keep Washington and Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand, so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania, or to return to the defense of Washington if, as was greatly feared by the authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the capital.

In the mean time the process of reorganization, rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing; the troops were regaining confidence, and their former soldierly appearance and discipline were fast returning. My cavalry was pushed out continually in all directions, and all possible steps were taken to learn the positions and movements of the enemy.

The following table shows the movements of the army from day to day up to the 14th of September:

Command.	September 4.	September 6.	September 9.	September 10.
BURNSIDE.				
9th Corps; Reno	Seventh-street road.	Leesborough	Brookville	
1st Corps, Hooker	Upton's Hill	do	do	
SUMNER.				
12th Corps, Williams	Tennallytown	Rockville	Middlebrook	Damascus.
2d Corps, Sumner	do	do	do	Clarksburg.
FRANKLIN.				
6th Corps, Franklin	Alexandria Seminary	Tennallytown	Darnestown	Barnesville.
Couch's division	Tennallytown	Offutt's Cross-Roads	Mouth of Seneca.	Poolesville.
Sykes' division	Tennallytown	Rockville	Rockville.

Command.	September 11.	September 12.	September 13.	September 14.
BURNSIDE.				
9th Corps, Reno	New Market	Frederick	Middletown	South Mountain.
1st Corps, Hooker	Ridgeville, New Market, and on the Monocacy.	Frederick	Do.
SUMNER.				
12th Corps, Williams.	Damascus	Ijamsville Cross- Roads.do	Do.
2d Corps, Sumner ..	Clarksburg	Urbanado	Do.
FRANKLIN.				
6th Corps, Franklin..	Barnesville	Licksville Cross- Road.	Buckeystown ...	Burkittsville.
Couch's division.....	Poolesville	Barnesville	Licksville	Do.
Sykes' division.....	Middlebrook	Urbana	Frederick	Middletown.

The right wing, consisting of the First and Ninth Corps, under the command of Major-General Burnside, moved on Frederick; the First Corps via Brookville, Cooksville, and Ridgeville, and the Ninth Corps via Damascus and New Market.

The Second and Twelfth Corps, forming the center, under the command of General Sumner, moved on Frederick; the former via Clarksburg and Urbana, the Twelfth Corps on a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining the communication with the right wing, and covering the direct road from Frederick to Washington. The Sixth Corps, under the command of General Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via Darnestown, Dawsonville, and Barnesville, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and support the center should it have been necessary, as was supposed, to force the line of the Monocacy.

Couch's division moved by the "River road," covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the Sixth Corps.

The following extracts from telegrams received by me after my departure from Washington will show how little was known there about the enemy's movements, and the fears which were entertained for the safety of the capital. On the 9th of September General Halleck telegraphed me as follows:

Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Dranesville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping too much the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this.

Again, on the 11th of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows:

Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front. More troops can be spared from here.

This dispatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the General-in-Chief, reads as follows:

Why not order forward Porter's corps or Sigel's? *If the main force of the enemy is in your front, more troops can be spared from here.*

I remark that the original dispatch as received by me from the telegraph operator is in the words quoted above, "*I think the main force of the enemy,*" &c.

In accordance with this suggestion, I asked, on the same day, that all the troops that could be spared should at once be sent to re-enforce me, but none came.

On the 12th I received the following telegram from His Excellency the President:

Governor Curtin telegraphs me, "I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland."

The President adds:

Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt.

On the 13th General Halleck telegraphed as follows:

Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over.

Again, on the 14th, General Halleck telegraphed me that—

Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear.

Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the most positive evidence that Lee's entire army was in front of us, I received the following:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
September 16, 1862—12.30 p. m.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Yours of 7 a. m. is this moment received. As you give me no information in regard to the position of your forces, except that at Sharpsburg, of course I cannot advise. I think, however, you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject. A heavy rain might prevent it.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

The importance of moving with all due caution so as not to uncover the National Capital until the enemy's position and plans were developed was, I believe, fully appreciated by me, and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to the Potomac, with the extreme left flank moving along that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it appears from the foregoing telegrams that the General-in-Chief was of a different opinion, and that my movements were, in his judgment, too precipitate, not only for the safety of Washington but also for the security of my left and rear.

The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a precipitate advance may now be perceived. The General-in-Chief, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says:

In respect to General McClellan going too fast or too slow from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He had mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought General McClellan should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry.

As I can find no telegram from the General-in-Chief recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe that when he gave this testimony he had forgotten the purport of the telegrams above quoted, and had also ceased to remember the fact, well

known to him at the time, that my left, from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and my center was continually in position to re-enforce the left or right, as occasion might require. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more rapidly than the other columns marched upon the roads to the right, I should have thrown that flank out of supporting distance of the other troops and greatly exposed it, and if I had marched the entire army in one column along the bank of the river, instead of upon five different parallel roads, the column, with its trains, would have extended about 50 miles, and the enemy might have defeated the advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action. Moreover, such a movement would have uncovered the communications with Baltimore and Washington on our right and exposed our right and rear. I presume it will be admitted by every military man that it was necessary to move the army in such order that it could at any time be concentrated for battle; and I am of opinion that this object could not have been accomplished in any other way than the one employed. Any other disposition of our forces would have subjected them to defeat in detached fragments.

On the 10th of September I received from my scouts information which rendered it quite probable that General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his intention was to move toward Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then known. On the 11th I ordered General Burnside to push a strong reconnaissance across the National road and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad toward New Market, and, if he learned that the enemy had moved toward Hagerstown, to press on rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops constantly ready to meet the enemy in force. A corresponding movement of all the troops in the center and on the left was ordered in the direction of Urbana and Poolesville.

On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the city and in the streets.

On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and center passed through Frederick. It was soon ascertained that the main body of the enemy's forces had marched out of the city on the two previous days, taking the roads to Boonsborough and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering it necessary to force the passes through the Catoctin and South Mountain ridges and gain possession of Boonsborough and Rohrer'sville before any relief could be extended to Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry.

On the 13th an order fell into my hands, issued by General Lee, which fully disclosed his plans, and I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigorous forward movement. The following is a copy of the order referred to:

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 191. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

September 9, 1862.

The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday night, take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry.

General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is

now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Keys' Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy.

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.

General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments to procure wood, &c.

By command of General R. E. Lee: .

R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Maj. Gen. D. H. HILL,
Commanding Division.

In the report of a military commission, of which Maj. Gen. D. Hunter was president, which convened at Washington for the purpose of investigating the conduct of certain officers in connection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, I find the following:

The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot from any motives of delicacy refrain from censuring those in high command when it thinks such censure deserved.

The General-in-Chief has testified that General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only 6 miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading enemy.

The General-in-Chief also testifies that, in his opinion, he could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the commission fully concurs.

I have been greatly surprised that this commission in its investigations never called upon me nor upon any officer of my staff, nor, so far as I know, upon any officer of the Army of the Potomac able to give an intelligent statement of the movements of that army. But another paragraph in the same report makes testimony from such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows:

By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that, at the very moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland Heights, his little army was in reality relieved by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, within 7 miles of his position.

The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a part of the army which I at that time had the honor to command, and they were acting under my orders at Crampton's Gap and elsewhere; and if, as the commission states, Colonel Ford's "little army was in reality relieved" by those officers, it was relieved by me.

I had on the morning of the 10th sent the following dispatch in relation to the command at Harper's Ferry:

CAMP NEAR ROCKVILLE,
September 10,* 1862—9.45 a. m.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.:*

Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, with 9,000 troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me by the most practicable route.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

* September 11, according to files of Headquarters of the Army.

To this I received the following reply:

[WASHINGTON, D. C., September 11, 1862.]

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, *Major-General*:

There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present. His only chance is to defend his works till you can open communication with him.*

H. W. HALLECK.

It seems necessary for a distinct understanding of this matter to state that I was directed on the 12th to assume command of the garrison of Harper's Ferry as soon as I should open communications with that place, and that when I received this order all communication from the direction in which I was approaching was cut off. Up to that time, however, Colonel Miles could, in my opinion, have marched his command into Pennsylvania by crossing the Potomac at Williamsport or above, and this opinion was confirmed by the fact that Colonel Davis marched the cavalry part of Colonel Miles' command from Harper's Ferry on the 14th, taking the main road to Hagerstown, and he encountered no enemy except a small picket near the mouth of the Antietam.

Before I left Washington, and when there certainly could have been no enemy to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Colonel Miles, I recommended to the proper authorities that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn, via Hagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumberland Valley; or that, taking up the pontoon bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should fall back to the Maryland Heights and there hold out to the last. In this position it ought to have maintained itself for many days.

It was not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the matter was left to my discretion it was too late for me to do anything but endeavor to relieve the garrison. I accordingly directed artillery to be fired by our advance at frequent intervals, as a signal that relief was at hand. This was done, and, as I afterwards learned, the reports of the cannon were distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry. It was confidently expected that Colonel Miles would hold out until we had carried the mountain passes and were in condition to send a detachment to his relief. The left was therefore ordered to move through Crampton's Pass in front of Burkittsville, while the center and right marched upon Turner's Pass in front of Middletown.

It may be asked by those who are not acquainted with the topography of the country in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry why Franklin, instead of marching his column over the circuitous road from Jefferson via Burkittsville and Brownsville, was not ordered to move along the direct turnpike to Knoxville and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It was for the reason that I had received information that the enemy were anticipating our approach in that direction, and had established batteries on the south side of the Potomac which commanded all the approaches to Knoxville. Moreover the road from that point winds directly along the river bank at the foot of a precipitous mountain, where there was no opportunity of forming in line of battle, and where the enemy could have placed batteries on both sides of the river to enfilade our narrow approaching columns. The approach through Crampton's Pass, which debouches into Pleasant Valley in rear of Maryland Heights, was the only one which afforded any reasonable prospect of

* As recorded at Headquarters of the Army, this dispatch continues, "When you do so, he will be subject to your orders."

carrying that formidable position. At the same time the troops upon that road were in better relation to the main body of our forces.

On the morning of the 14th a verbal message reached me from Colonel Miles, which was the first authentic intelligence I had received as to the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The messenger informed me that on the preceding afternoon Maryland Heights had been abandoned by our troops, after repelling an attack of the rebels, and that Colonel Miles' entire force was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, the Maryland, Loudoun, and Bolivar Heights having been abandoned by him and occupied by the enemy. The messenger also stated that there was no apparent reason for the abandonment of the Maryland Heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed him to say that he could hold out with certainty two days longer. I directed him to make his way back if possible, with the information that I was approaching rapidly and felt confident I could relieve the place.

On the same afternoon I wrote the following letter to Colonel Miles, and dispatched three copies by three different couriers on different routes. I did not, however, learn that any of these men succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry.

MIDDLETOWN, September 14, 1862.

Col. D. S. MILES:

COLONEL: The army is being rapidly concentrated here. We are now attacking the pass on the Hagerstown road over the Blue Ridge. A column is about attacking the Burkittsville and Boonsborough Passes. You may count on our making every effort to relieve you. You may rely upon my speedily accomplishing that object. Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland Heights with your whole force. If you can do that, I will certainly be able to relieve you. As the Catoclin Valley is in our possession, you can safely cross the river at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposition on this side of the river is concerned. Hold out to the last.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

On the previous day I had sent General Franklin the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Frederick, September 13, 1862—6.20 p. m.

Maj. Gen. W. B. FRANKLIN,
Commanding Sixth Corps:

GENERAL: I have now full information as to movements and intentions of the enemy. Jackson has crossed the Upper Potomac to capture the garrison at Martinsburg and cut off Miles' retreat toward the west. A division on the south side of the Potomac was to carry Loudoun Heights and cut off his retreat in that direction. McLaws, with his own command and the division of R. H. Anderson, was to move by Boonsborough and Rohrer'sville to carry the Maryland Heights. The signal officers inform me that he is now in Pleasant Valley. The firing shows that Miles still holds out. Longstreet was to move to Boonsborough and there halt with the reserve corps, D. H. Hill to form the rear guard, Stuart's cavalry to bring up stragglers, &c. We have cleared out all the cavalry this side of the mountains and north of us.

The last I heard from Pleasanton he occupied Middletown, after several sharp skirmishes. A division of Burnside's command started several hours ago to support him. The whole of Burnside's command, including Hooker's corps, march this evening and early to-morrow morning, followed by the corps of Sumner and Banks and Sykes' division, upon Boonsborough, to carry that position. Couch has been ordered to concentrate his division and join you as rapidly as possible. Without waiting for the whole of that division to join, you will move at daybreak in the morning, by Jefferson and Burkittsville, upon the road to Rohrer'sville. I have reliable information that the mountain pass by this road is practicable for artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occupied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as practicable, and debouch upon Rohrer'sville, in order to cut off the retreat of or destroy McLaws' command. If you find this pass held by the enemy in large force, make all your dispositions for the attack, and commence it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws' command and relieve Colonel Miles. If you effect this, you will order him to join you at

once with all his disposable troops, first destroying the bridges over the Potomac, if not already done, and, leaving a sufficient garrison to prevent the enemy from passing the ford, you will then return by Rohrersville on the direct road to Boonsborough if the main column has not succeeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the road by Rohrersville to Sharpsburg and Williamsport, in order either to cut off the retreat of Hill and Longstreet toward the Potomac, or prevent the repassage of Jackson. My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. I believe I have sufficiently explained my intentions. I ask of you, at this important moment, all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Again, on the 14th, I sent him the following :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Frederick, September 14, 1862—2 p. m.

Major-General FRANKLIN:

Your dispatch of 12.30 just received. Send back to hurry up Couch. Mass your troops and carry Burkittsville at any cost. We shall have strong opposition at both passes. As fast as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in readiness to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at any of these passes, let me know at once, and amuse them as best you can, so as to retain them there. In that event I will probably throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here. If I carry that it will clear the way for you, and you must then follow the enemy as rapidly as possible.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

General Franklin pushed his corps rapidly forward toward Crampton's Pass, and at about 12 o'clock on the 14th arrived at Burkittsville, immediately in rear of which he found the enemy's infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, with artillery in strong positions to defend the approaches to the pass. Slocum's division was formed upon the right of the road leading through the gap and Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbert's brigades, supported by Newton, whose activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy were driven from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, steadily forced back up the slope until they reached the position of their battery on the road, well up the mountain. There they made a stand. They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery *en échelon* until, after an action of three hours, the crest was gained and the enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the other side.

On the left of the road Brooks' and Irwin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Slocum's flank, charged up the mountain in the same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the crest was carried. Four hundred prisoners from seventeen different organizations, 700 stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three colors were captured by our troops in this brilliant action. It was conducted by General Franklin in all its details. These details are given in a report of General Franklin, herewith submitted, and due credit awarded to the gallant officers and men engaged.

The loss in General Franklin's corps was 115 killed, 416 wounded, and 2 missing.* The enemy's loss was about the same. The enemy's position was such that our artillery could not be used with any effect. The close of the action found General Franklin's advance in Pleasant Valley on the night of the 14th, within $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the point on Maryland Heights, where he might, on the same night or on the morning of the 15th, have formed a junction with the garrison of Harper's Ferry had it not been previously withdrawn from Maryland Heights, and within 6 miles of Harper's Ferry.

* But see revised statement, pp. 183, 204.

On the night of the 14th the following dispatch was sent to General Franklin:

BOLIVAR, *September 15—1 a. m.*

General FRANKLIN:

GENERAL: * * * The commanding general directs that you occupy with your command the road from Rohrsersville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient force at Rohrsersville to hold that position in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boonsborough. Endeavor to open communication with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enemy as you may find in Pleasant Valley. Should you succeed in opening communication with Colonel Miles, direct him to join you with his whole command, with all the guns and public property that he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns will be spiked or destroyed; the rest of the public property will also be destroyed. You will then proceed to Boonsborough, which place the commanding general intends to attack to-morrow, and join the main body of the army at that place; should you find, however, that the enemy have retreated from Boonsborough toward Sharpsburg, you will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat.

By command of Major-General McClellan:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,
Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

On the 15th the following were received from General Franklin:

AT THE FOOT OF MOUNT PLEASANT,
In Pleasant Valley, 3 miles from Rohrsersville, September 15—8.50 a. m.

General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

GENERAL: My command started at daylight this morning, and I am waiting to have it closed up here. General Couch arrived about 10 o'clock last night. I have ordered one of his brigades and one battery to Rohrsersville or to the strongest point in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about 2 miles to our front, one brigade in sight. As soon as I am sure that Rohrsersville is occupied, I shall move forward to attack the enemy. This may be two hours from now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen—and the cessation of firing makes me fear that it has—it is my opinion that I should be strongly re-enforced.

* * * * *

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major-General, Commanding Corps.

SEPTEMBER 15—11 a. m.

General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, *Commanding:*

GENERAL: I have received your dispatch by Captain O'Keeffe. The enemy is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretching across the valley, and a large column of artillery and infantry on the right of the valley looking toward Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to one. It will, of course, not answer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances. I shall communicate with Burnside as soon as possible. In the mean time I shall wait here until I learn what is the prospect of re-enforcement. I have not the force to justify an attack on the force I see in front. I have had a very close view of it, and its position is very strong.

Respectfully,

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major-General.

Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 8 a. m. on the 15th, as the cessation of the firing indicated, and General Franklin was ordered to remain where he was, to watch the large force in front of him, and protect our left and rear until the night of the 16th, when he was ordered to join the main body of the army at Keedysville, after sending Couch's division to Maryland Heights.

While the events which have just been described were taking place at Crampton's Gap, the troops of the center and right wing, which had united at Frederick on the 13th, were engaged in the contest for the possession of Turner's Gap.

On the morning of the 13th General Pleasanton was ordered to send McReynolds' brigade and a section of artillery in the direction of Gettysburg, and Rush's regiment toward Jefferson to communicate with Frank-

lin, to whom the Sixth U. S. Cavalry and a section of artillery had previously been sent, and to proceed with the remainder of his force in the direction of Middletown, in pursuit of the enemy.

After skirmishing with the enemy all the morning, and driving them from several strong positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South Mountain in the afternoon, and found the enemy in force and apparently determined to defend the pass. He sent back for infantry to General Burnside, who had been directed to support him, and proceeded to make a reconnaissance of the position. The South Mountain is at this point about 1,000 feet in height, and its general direction is from northeast to southwest. The National road from Frederick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly at right angles through Turner's Gap, a depression which is some 400 feet in depth.

The mountain on the north side of the turnpike is divided into two crests, or ridges, by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north. There are two country roads, one to the right of the turnpike and the other to the left, which give access to the crests overlooking the main road. The one on the left, called the "Old Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. The other road, called the "Old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the mountains about a mile from the turnpike, and, bending to the left over and along the first crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass.

On the night of the 13th the positions of the different corps were as follows:

Reno's corps at Middletown, except Rodman's division at Frederick.

Hooker's corps on the Monocacy, 2 miles from Frederick.

Sumner's corps near Frederick.

Banks' corps near Frederick.

Sykes' division near Frederick.

Franklin's corps at Buckeystown.

Couch's division at Licksville.

The orders from headquarters for the march on the 14th were as follows:

13th, 11.30 p. m.—Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown.

13th, 11.30 p. m.—Sykes to move at 6 a. m. after Hooker, on the Middletown and Hagerstown road.

14th, 1 a. m.—Artillery reserve to follow Sykes closely.

13th, 8.45 p. m.—Sumner to move at 7 a. m.

14th, 9 a. m.—Sumner ordered to take the Shookstown road to Middletown.

13th, 6.45 p. m.—Couch ordered to move to Jefferson with his whole division.

On the 14th General Pleasonton continued his reconnaissance. Gibson's battery and afterwards Benjamin's battery of Reno's corps were placed on high ground to the left of the turnpike, and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's position in the gap.

General Cox's division, which had been ordered up to support General Pleasonton, left its bivouac near Middletown at 6 a. m. The First Brigade reached the scene of action about 9 a. m., and was sent up the Old Sharpsburg road by General Pleasonton to feel the enemy and ascertain if he held the crest on that side in strong force. This was soon found to be the case, and General Cox having arrived with the other brigade, and information having been received from General Reno that the column would be supported by the whole corps, the division was ordered

to assault the position. Two 20-pounder Parrotts of Simmonds' battery and two sections of McMullin's battery were left in the rear in position near the turnpike, where they did good service during the day against the enemy's batteries in the gap. Colonel Scammon's brigade was deployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope to the left of the road, with the object of turning the enemy's right, if possible. It succeeded in gaining the crest and establishing itself there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of the enemy, who was posted behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, and the fire of a battery which poured in canister and case-shot on the regiment on the right of the brigade. Colonel Crook's brigade marched in columns at supporting distance. A section of McMullin's battery, under Lieutenant Crome (killed while serving one of his guns), was moved up with great difficulty, and opened with canister at very short range on the enemy's infantry, by whom, after having done considerable execution, it was soon silenced and forced to withdraw. One regiment of Crook's brigade was now deployed on Scammon's left and the other two in his rear, and they several times entered the first line and relieved the regiments in front of them when hard pressed. A section of Simmonds' battery was brought up and placed in an open space in the woods, where it did good service during the rest of the day.

The enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery to a point more to the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. It was now about noon, and a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours, during which the rest of the corps was coming up. General Willcox's division was the first to arrive. When he reached the base of the mountain, General Cox advised him to consult General Pleasanton as to a position. The latter indicated that on the right, afterwards taken up by General Hooker. General Willcox was in the act of moving to occupy this ground when he received an order from General Reno to move up the Old Sharpsburg road and take a position to its right, overlooking the turnpike. Two regiments were detached to support General Cox, at his request. One section of Cook's battery was placed in position near the turn of the road (on the crest), and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across the gap. The division was proceeding to deploy to the right of the road, when the enemy suddenly opened (at 150 yards) with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off Cook's cannoneers with their limbers, and caused a temporary panic, in which the guns were nearly lost. But the Seventy-ninth New York and Seventeenth Michigan promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire, and moved out to protect the guns, with which Captain Cook had remained. Order was soon restored, and the division formed in line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as much as possible under the shelter of the hillside until the whole line advanced. It was exposed not only to the fire of the battery in front, but also to that of the batteries on the other side of the turnpike, and lost heavily.

Shortly before this time Generals Burnside and Reno arrived at the base of the mountain, and the former directed the latter to move up the divisions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Willcox, and to move upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he was informed that General Hooker (who had just been directed to attack on the right) was well advanced up the mountain.

General Reno then went to the front and assumed the direction of affairs, the positions having been explained to him by General Pleasanton. Shortly before this time I arrived at the point occupied by

General Burnside, and my headquarters were located there until the conclusion of the action. General Sturgis had left his camp at 1 p. m., and reached the scene of action about 3.30 p. m. Clark's battery, of his division, was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General Reno, and two regiments (Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire) were detached by General Reno and sent forward a short distance on the left of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear of Willcox's, and Rodman's division was divided; Colonel Fairchild's brigade being placed on the extreme left, and Colonel Harland's, under General Rodman's personal supervision, on the right.

My order to move the whole line forward and take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a desperate resistance, charging our advancing lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere routed, and fled.

Our chief loss was in Willcox's division. The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of our infantry, but its position was made untenable, and it was hastily removed and not again put in position near us; but the batteries across the gap still kept up a fire of shot and shell.

General Willcox praises very highly the conduct of the Seventeenth Michigan in this advance—a regiment which had been organized scarcely a month, but which charged the advancing enemy in flank in a manner worthy of veteran troops; and also that of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, which bravely met them in front.

Cook's battery now reopened fire. Sturgis' division was moved to the front of Willcox's, occupying the new ground gained on the further side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the batteries across the gap. The enemy made an effort to turn our left about dark, but were repulsed by Fairchild's brigade and Clark's battery.

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another effort to regain the lost ground, attacking along Sturgis' front and part of Cox's. A lively fire was kept up until nearly 9 o'clock, several charges being made by the enemy and repulsed with slaughter, and we finally occupied the highest part of the mountain.

General Reno was killed just before sunset, while making a reconnaissance to the front, and the command of the corps devolved upon General Cox. In General Reno the nation lost one of its best general officers. He was a skillful soldier, a brave and honest man.

There was no firing after 10 o'clock, and the troops slept on their arms ready to renew the fight at daylight, but the enemy quietly retired from our front during the night, abandoning their wounded, and leaving their dead in large numbers scattered over the field.

While these operations were progressing on the left of the main column, the right, under General Hooker, was actively engaged. His corps left the Monocacy early in the morning, and its advance reached the Catoctin Creek about 1 p. m. General Hooker then went forward to examine the ground.

At about 1 o'clock General Meade's division was ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno. The following is the order sent:

SEPTEMBER 14—1 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER:

GENERAL: General Reno requests that a division of yours may move up on the right (north) of the main road. General McClellan desires you to comply with this request, holding your whole corps in readiness to support the movement, and taking charge of it yourself. Sumner's and Banks' corps have commenced arriving. Let General McClellan be informed as soon as you commence your movement.

GEO. D. RUGGLES,
Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Aide-de-Camp.

Meade's division left Catoctin Creek about 2 o'clock, and turned off to the right from the main road on the Old Hagerstown road to Mount Tabor Church, where General Hooker was, and deployed a short distance in advance, its right resting about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the turnpike. The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the mountain side, but did no considerable damage. Cooper's battery (B), First Pennsylvania Artillery, was placed in position on high ground at about 3.30 o'clock, and fired at the enemy on the slope, but soon ceased by order of General Hooker, and the position of our lines prevented any further use of artillery by us on this part of the field. The First Massachusetts Cavalry was sent up the valley to the right to observe the movements, if any, of the enemy in that direction, and one regiment of Meade's division was posted to watch a road coming in the same direction. The other divisions were deployed as they came up, General Hatch's on the left and General Ricketts', which arrived at 5 p. m., in the rear. General Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's division by General Burnside for the purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's center up the main road, as soon as the movements on the right and left had sufficiently progressed. The First Pennsylvania Rifles, of General Seymour's brigade, were sent forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy, and it was found that he was in force. Meade was then directed to advance his division to the right of the road, so as to outflank them, if possible, and then to move forward and attack, while Hatch was directed to take with his division the crest on the left of the Old Hagerstown road, Ricketts' division being held in reserve. Seymour's brigade was sent up to the top of the slope on the right of the ravine through which the road runs, and then moved along the summit parallel to the road, while Colonel Gallagher's and Colonel Magilton's brigades moved in the same direction along the slope and in the ravine.

The ground was of the most difficult character for the movement of troops, the hillside being very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls and timber. The enemy was very soon encountered, and in a short time the action became general along the whole front of the division. The line advanced steadily up the mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. During this advance, Colonel Gallagher, commanding the Third Brigade, was severely wounded, and the command devolved upon Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson.

General Meade, having reason to believe that the enemy was attempting to outflank him on his right, applied to General Hooker for reinforcements. General Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts' division, was ordered up, but it did not arrive until the close of the action. It was advanced on Seymour's left, but only one regiment could open fire before the enemy retired and darkness intervened.

General Meade speaks highly of General Seymour's skill in handling his brigade on the extreme right, securing by his maneuvers the great object of the movement—the outflanking of the enemy.

While General Meade was gallantly driving the enemy on the right, General Hatch's division was engaged in a severe contest for the possession of the crest on the left of the ravine. It moved up the mountain in the following order: Two regiments of General Patrick's brigade deployed as skirmishers, with the other two regiments of the same brigade supporting them; Colonel Phelps' brigade in line of battalions in mass at deploying distance; General Doubleday's brigade in the same order bringing up the rear. The Twenty-first New York, having gone

straight up the slope instead of around to the right, as directed, the Second U. S. Sharpshooters was sent out in its place. Phelps' and Doubleday's brigades were deployed in turn as they reached the woods, which began about half-way up the mountain. General Patrick with his skirmishers soon drew the fire of the enemy, and found him strongly posted behind a fence, which bounded the cleared space on the top of the ridge, having on his front the woods through which our line was advancing, and in his rear a corn-field full of rocky ledges, which afforded good cover to fall back to if dislodged.

Phelps' brigade gallantly advanced under a hot fire to close quarters, and after ten or fifteen minutes of heavy firing on both sides (in which General Hatch was wounded while urging on his men) the fence was carried by a charge, and our line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat sheltered by the slope of the hill. Doubleday's brigade, now under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann (Colonel Wainwright having been wounded), relieved Phelps, and continued firing for an hour and a half, the enemy, behind ledges of rocks some 30 or 40 paces in our front, making a stubborn resistance, and attempting to charge on the least cessation of our fire. About dusk Colonel Christian's brigade, of Ricketts' division, came up and relieved Doubleday's brigade, which fell back into line behind Phelps'. Christian's brigade continued the action for thirty or forty minutes, when the enemy retired, after having made an attempt to flank us on the left, which was repulsed by the Seventy-sixth New York and Seventh Indiana. The remaining brigade of Ricketts' division (General Hartsuff's) was moved up in the center, and connected Meade's left with Doubleday's right. We now had possession of the summit of the first ridge, which commanded the turnpike on both sides of the mountain, and the troops were ordered to hold their positions until further orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the afternoon General Gibbon, with his brigade and one section of Gibbon's battery (B, Fourth Artillery), was ordered to move up the main road on the enemy's center. He advanced a regiment on each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers and followed by the other two regiments in double column, the artillery moving on the road until within range of the enemy's guns, which were firing on the column from the gorge.

The brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy before it from his positions in the woods and behind stone walls until they reached a point well up toward the top of the pass, when the enemy, having been reinforced by three regiments, opened a heavy fire on the front and on both flanks. The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the enemy being entirely repulsed, and the brigade, after having suffered severely, and having expended all its ammunition, including even the cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued to hold the ground it had so gallantly won until 12 o'clock, when it was relieved by General Gorman's brigade of Sedgwick's division, Sumner's corps (except the Sixth Wisconsin, which remained on the field all night). General Gibbon, in this delicate movement, handled his brigade with as much precision and coolness as if upon parade, and the bravery of his troops could not be excelled.

The Second Corps (Sumner's) and the Twelfth Corps (Williams') reached their final positions shortly after dark. General Richardson's division was placed near Mount Tabor Church, in a position to support our right, if necessary. The Twelfth Corps and Sedgwick's division bivouacked around Bolivar, in a position to support our center and left. General Sykes' division of Regulars and the Artillery Reserve halted for the night at Middletown. Thus, on the night of the 14th the whole

army was massed in the vicinity of the field of battle, in readiness to renew the action the next day or to move in pursuit of the enemy.

At daylight our skirmishers were advanced, and it was found that he had retreated during the night, leaving his dead on the field and his wounded uncared for.

About 1,500 prisoners were taken by us during the battle, and the loss to the enemy in killed was much greater than our own, and probably also in wounded. It is believed that the force opposed to us at Turner's Gap consisted of D. H. Hill's corps (15,000) and a part, if not the whole, of Longstreet's, and perhaps a portion of Jackson's, probably some 30,000 in all. We went into action with about 30,000 men, and our losses amounted to 1,568 aggregate (312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 missing).*

On the next day I had the honor to receive the following very kind dispatch from His Excellency the President:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 15, 1862—2.45 p. m.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Your dispatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.

A. LINCOLN.

ANTIETAM.

On the night of the battle of South Mountain orders were given to the corps commanders to press forward the pickets at early dawn. This advance revealed the fact that the enemy had left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was ordered—the cavalry under General Pleasonton and the three corps under Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Mansfield, the latter of whom had arrived that morning and assumed command of the Twelfth (Williams') Corps by the National turnpike and Boonsborough, the corps of Generals Burnside and Porter (the latter command at that time consisting of but one weak division, Sykes') by the Old Sharpsburg road, and General Franklin to move into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a detachment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's Ferry; Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsborough to Rohrersville, were to re-enforce Franklin, or to move on Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. Franklin moved toward Brownsville and found there a force of the enemy, much superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong position to receive him. At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the surrender of that place. The cavalry overtook the enemy's cavalry in Boonsborough, made a daring charge, killing and wounding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners and 2 guns. General Richardson's division of the Second Corps, pressing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor, passed Boonsborough and Keedysville, and came upon the main body of the enemy, occupying in large force a strong position a few miles beyond the latter place.

It had been hoped to engage the enemy during the 15th. Accordingly, instructions were given that if the enemy were overtaken on the march, they should be attacked at once; if found in heavy force and in position, the corps in advance should be placed in position for attack, and await my arrival. On reaching the advanced position of our troops, I found but two divisions, Richardson's and Sykes', in position. The other troops were halted in the road, the head of the column some distance in rear of Richardson. The enemy occupied a strong position on

* But see revised statement, pp. 184-188.

the heights on the west side of Antietam Creek, displaying a large force of infantry and cavalry, with numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on our columns as they appeared in sight on the Keedysville road and Sharpsburg turnpike, which fire was returned by Captain Tidball's light battery, Second U. S. Artillery, and Pettit's battery, First New York Artillery. The division of General Richardson, following close on the heels of the retreating foe, halted and deployed near Antietam River, on the right of the Sharpsburg road. General Sykes, leading on the division of Regulars on the Old Sharpsburg road, came up and deployed to the left of General Richardson, on the left of the road.

Antietam Creek in this vicinity is crossed by four stone bridges—the upper one on the Keedysville and Williamsport road; the second on the Keedysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, some $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles below; the third about a mile below the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharpsburg road, and the fourth near the mouth of Antietam Creek, on the road leading from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some 3 miles below the third. The stream is sluggish, with few and difficult fords. After a rapid examination of the position, I found that it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed the placing of the batteries in position in the center, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps were not all in their positions until the next morning after sunrise.

On the morning of the 16th it was discovered that the enemy had changed the position of his batteries. The masses of his troops, however, were still concealed behind the opposite heights. Their left and center were upon and in front of the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hidden by woods and irregularities of the ground, their extreme left resting upon a wooded eminence near the cross-roads to the north of J. Miller's farm, their left resting upon the Potomac. Their line extended south, the right resting upon the hills to the south of Sharpsburg, near Snavelly's farm.

The bridge over the Antietam, described as No. 3, near this point was strongly covered by riflemen, protected by rifle-pits, stone fences, &c., and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in front of this line consisted of undulating hills, their crests in turn commanded by others in their rear. On all favorable points the enemy's artillery was posted, and their reserves, hidden from view by the hills on which their line of battle was formed, could maneuver unobserved by our army, and, from the shortness of their line, could rapidly re-enforce any point threatened by our attack. Their position, stretching across the angle formed by the Potomac and Antietam, their flanks and rear protected by these streams, was one of the strongest to be found in this region of country, which is well adapted to defensive warfare.

On the right, near Keedysville, on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike, were Sumner's and Hooker's corps. In advance, on the right of the turnpike and near the Antietam River, General Richardson's division, of General Sumner's corps, was posted. General Sykes' division, of General Porter's corps, was on the left of the turnpike and in line with General Richardson, protecting the Bridge No. 2, over the Antietam. The left of the line, opposite to and some distance from Bridge No. 3, was occupied by General Burnside's corps.

Before giving General Hooker his orders to make the movement which will presently be described, I rode to the left of the line to satisfy myself that the troops were properly posted there to secure our left flank from any attack made along the left bank of the Antietam, as well as to enable us to carry Bridge No. 3.

I found it necessary to make considerable changes in the position of General Burnside's corps, and directed him to advance to a strong position in the immediate vicinity of the bridge and to reconnoiter the approaches to the bridge carefully. In front of Generals Sumner's and Hooker's corps, near Keedysville, and on the ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the Antietam, and between the turnpike and Pry's house on the right of the road, were placed Captains Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleiser's, and Lieutenant Wever's batteries of 20-pounder Parrott guns; on the crest of the hill, in the rear and right of Bridge No. 3, Captain Weed's 3-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's 20-pounder batteries. General Franklin's corps and General Couch's division held a position in Pleasant Valley, in front of Brownsville, with a strong force of the enemy in their front. General Morell's division, of Porter's corps, was *en route* from Boonsborough, and General Humphreys' division of new troops *en route* from Frederick, Md. About daylight on the 16th the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery on our guns in position, which was promptly returned. Their fire was silenced for the time, but was frequently renewed during the day. In the heavy fire of the morning, Major Arndt, commanding First Battalion First New York Artillery, was mortally wounded while directing the operations of his batteries.

It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for attack, being compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitering the new position taken up by the enemy, examining the ground, finding fords, clearing the approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains, which had been delayed by the rapid march of the troops over the few practicable approaches from Frederick. These had been crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery pressing on with the hope of overtaking the enemy before he could form to resist an attack. Many of the troops were out of rations on the previous day, and a good deal of their ammunition had been expended in the severe action of the 14th.

My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and, as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and, whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center with all the forces then disposable.

About 2 p. m. General Hooker with his corps, consisting of Generals Ricketts', Meade's, and Doubleday's divisions, was ordered to cross the Antietam at a ford, and at Bridge No. 1, a short distance above, to attack and, if possible, turn the enemy's left. General Sumner was ordered to cross the corps of General Mansfield (the Twelfth) during the night and hold his own (the Second) Corps ready to cross early the next morning. On reaching the vicinity of the enemy's left, a sharp contest commenced with the Pennsylvania Reserves—the advance of General Hooker's corps—near the house of D. Miller. The enemy were driven from the strip of woods where he was first met. The firing lasted until after dark, when General Hooker's corps rested on their arms on ground won from the enemy.

During the night General Mansfield's corps, consisting of Generals Williams' and Greene's divisions, crossed the Antietam at the same ford and bridge that General Hooker's troops had passed, and bivouacked on the farm of J. Poffenberger, about a mile in rear of General Hooker's position. At daylight on the 17th the action was commenced by the

skirmishers of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The whole of General Hooker's corps was soon engaged, and drove the enemy from the open field in front of the first line of woods into a second line of woods beyond, which runs to the eastward of and nearly parallel to the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike.

This contest was obstinate, and as the troops advanced the opposition became more determined and the number of the enemy greater. General Hooker then ordered up the corps of General Mansfield, which moved promptly toward the scene of action.

The First Division, General Williams', was deployed to the right on approaching the enemy; General Crawford's brigade on the right, its right resting on the Hagerstown turnpike; on his left General Gordon's brigade. The Second Division, General Greene's, joining the left of Gordon's, extended as far as the burned building to the northeast of the white church on the turnpike. During the deployment, that gallant veteran, General Mansfield, fell mortally wounded while examining the ground in front of his troops. General Hartsuff, of Hooker's corps, was severely wounded while bravely pressing forward his troops, and was taken from the field.

The command of the Twelfth Corps fell upon General Williams. Five regiments of the First Division of this corps were new troops. One brigade of the Second Division was sent to support General Doubleday.

The One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers were pushed across the turnpike into the woods beyond J. Miller's house, with orders to hold the position as long as possible.

The line of battle of this corps was formed, and it became engaged about 7 a. m., the attack being opened by Knap's (Pennsylvania), Coltran's (New York), and Hampton's (Pittsburgh) batteries. To meet this attack the enemy had pushed a strong column of troops into the open fields in front of the turnpike, while he occupied the woods on the west of the turnpike in strong force. The woods (as was found by subsequent observation) were traversed by outcropping ledges of rock. Several hundred yards to the right and rear was a hill which commanded the *déboûché* of the woods, and in the fields between was a long line of stone fences, continued by breastworks of rails, which covered the enemy's infantry from our musketry. The same woods formed a screen, behind which his movements were concealed, and his batteries on the hill and the rifle-works covered from the fire of our artillery in front. For about two hours the battle raged with varied success, the enemy endeavoring to drive our troops into the second line of wood, and ours in turn to get possession of the line in front. Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the enemy back into the woods near the turnpike, General Greene with his two brigades crossing into the woods to the left of the Dunker Church. During this conflict General Crawford, commanding the First Division after General Williams took command of the corps, was wounded, and left the field.

General Greene being much exposed and applying for re-enforcements, the Thirteenth New Jersey, Twenty-seventh Indiana, and the Third Maryland were sent to his support, with a section of Knap's battery.

At about 9 o'clock a. m. General Sedgwick's division of General Sumner's corps arrived. Crossing the ford previously mentioned, this division marched in three columns to the support of the attack on the enemy's left. On nearing the scene of action the columns were halted, faced to the front, and established by General Sumner in three parallel lines by brigade, facing toward the south and west; General Gorman's brigade in front, General Dana's second, and General Howard's third.

with a distance between the lines of some 70 paces. The division was then put in motion, and moved upon the field of battle under fire from the enemy's concealed batteries on the hill beyond the roads. Passing diagonally to the front across the open space, and to the front of the First Division of General Williams' corps, this latter division withdrew. Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike and driving the enemy before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the batteries on the hill commanding the exit from the woods. Meantime a heavy column of the enemy had succeeded in crowding back the troops of General Greene's division, and appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's division. By command of General Sumner, General Howard faced the third line to the rear, preparatory to a change of front to meet the column advancing on the left; but this line, now suffering from a destructive fire both in front and on its left, which it was unable to return, gave way toward the right and rear in considerable confusion, and was soon followed by the first and second lines. General Gorman's brigade and one regiment of General Dana's soon rallied and checked the advance of the enemy on the right. The second and third lines now formed on the left of General Gorman's brigade, and poured a destructive fire upon the enemy.

During General Sumner's attack he ordered General Williams to support him. Brigadier-General Gordon with a portion of his brigade moved forward, but when he reached the woods the left of General Sedgwick's division had given way, and finding himself, as the smoke cleared up, opposed to the enemy in force with his small command, he withdrew to the rear of the batteries at the second line of woods. As General Gordon's troops unmasked our batteries on the left, they opened with canister, the batteries of Captain Cothran, First New York, and I, First Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff, doing good service. Unable to withstand this deadly fire in front and the musketry fire from the right, the enemy again sought shelter in the woods and rocks beyond the turnpike.

During this assault Generals Sedgwick and Dana were seriously wounded and taken from the field. General Sedgwick, though twice wounded and faint from loss of blood, retained command of his division for more than an hour after his first wound, animating his command by his presence.

About the time of General Sedgwick's advance, General Hooker, while urging on his command, was severely wounded in the foot and taken from the field, and General Meade was placed in command of his corps. General Howard assumed command after General Sedgwick retired.

The repulse of the enemy offered opportunity to rearrange the lines and reorganize the commands on the right, now more or less in confusion. The batteries of the Pennsylvania Reserve, on high ground near J. Poffenberger's house, opened fire, and checked several attempts of the enemy to establish batteries in front of our right, to turn that flank and enfilade the lines.

While the conflict was so obstinately raging on the right, General French was pushing his division against the enemy still farther to the left. This division crossed the Antietam at the same ford as General Sedgwick, and immediately in his rear. Passing over the stream in three columns, the division marched about a mile from the ford, then, facing to the left, moved in three lines towards the enemy; General Max Weber's brigade in front, Col. Dwight Morris' brigade of raw troops, undrilled, and moving for the first time under fire, in the second,

and General Kimball's brigade in the third. The division was first assailed by a fire of artillery, but steadily advanced, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and encountered the infantry in some force at the group of houses on Roulette's farm. General Weber's brigade gallantly advanced, with an unwavering front, and drove the enemy from their position about the houses.

While General Weber was hotly engaged with the first line of the enemy, General French received orders from General Sumner, his corps commander, to push on with renewed vigor, to make a diversion in favor of the attack on the right. Leaving the new troops, who had been thrown into some confusion from their march through corn-fields, over fences, &c., to form as a reserve, he ordered the brigade of General Kimball to the front, passing to the left of General Weber. The enemy was pressed back to near the crest of the hill, where he was encountered in greater strength, posted in a sunken road forming a natural rifle-pit running in a northwesterly direction. In a corn-field in rear of this road were also strong bodies of the enemy. As the line reached the crest of the hill, a galling fire was opened on it from the sunken road and corn-field. Here a terrific fire of musketry burst from both lines, and the battle raged along the whole line with great slaughter.

The enemy attempted to turn the left of the line, but were met by the Seventh Virginia and One hundred and thirty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers and repulsed. Foiled in this, the enemy made a determined assault on the front, but were met by a charge from our lines which drove them back with severe loss, leaving in our hands some 300 prisoners and several stand of colors. The enemy, having been repulsed by the terrible execution of the batteries and the musketry fire on the extreme right, now attempted to assist the attack on General French's division by assailing him on his right and endeavoring to turn this flank, but this attack was met and checked by the Fourteenth Indiana and Eighth Ohio Volunteers, and by canister from Captain Tompkins' battery, First Rhode Island Artillery. Having been under an almost continuous fire for nearly four hours, and the ammunition nearly expended, this division now took position immediately below the crest of the heights on which they had so gallantly fought, the enemy making no attempt to regain their lost ground.

On the left of General French General Richardson's division was hotly engaged. Having crossed the Antietam about 9.30 a. m. at the ford crossed by the other divisions of Sumner's corps, it moved on a line nearly parallel to the Antietam, and formed in a ravine behind the high grounds overlooking Roulette's house; the Second (Irish) Brigade, commanded by General Meagher, on the right; the Third Brigade, commanded by General Caldwell, on his left, and the brigade commanded by Colonel Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, in support. As the division moved forward to take its position on the field, the enemy directed a fire of artillery against it, but, owing to the irregularities of the ground, did but little damage.

Meagher's brigade, advancing steadily, soon became engaged with the enemy, posted to the left and in front of Roulette's house. It continued to advance, under a heavy fire, nearly to the crest of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the enemy being posted in a continuation of the sunken road and corn-field before referred to. Here the brave Irish Brigade opened upon the enemy a terrific musketry fire.

All of General Sumner's corps was now engaged—General Sedgwick on the right, General French in the center, and General Richardson on the left. The Irish Brigade sustained its well-earned reputation. After

suffering terribly in officers and men, and strewing the ground with their enemies as they drove them back, their ammunition nearly expended, and their commander, General Meagher, disabled by the fall of his horse, shot under him, this brigade was ordered to give place to General Caldwell's brigade, which advanced to a short distance in its rear. The lines were passed by the Irish Brigade, breaking by company to the rear, and General Caldwell's, by company to the front, as steadily as on drill. Colonel Brooke's brigade now became the second line.

The ground over which Generals Richardson's and French's divisions were fighting was very irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills covered with growing corn, inclosed by stone walls, behind which the enemy could advance unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines. Taking advantage of this, the enemy attempted to gain the right of Richardson's position in a corn-field near Roulette's house, where the division had become separated from that of General French. A change of front by the Fifty-second New York and Second Delaware Volunteers, of Colonel Brooke's brigade, under Colonel Frank, and the attack made by the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, sent farther to the right by Colonel Brooke to close this gap in the line, and the movement of the One hundred and thirty-second Pennsylvania and Seventh Virginia Volunteers, of General French's division, before referred to, drove the enemy from the corn-field and restored the line.

The brigade of General Caldwell, with determined gallantry, pushed the enemy back opposite the left and center of this division, but, sheltered in the sunken road, they still held our forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Colonel Barlow, commanding the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Regiments, of Caldwell's brigade, seeing a favorable opportunity, advanced the regiments on the left, taking the line in the sunken road in flank, and compelled them to surrender, capturing over 300 prisoners and three stand of colors.

The whole of the brigade, with the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth New York Regiments, of Colonel Brooke's brigade, who had moved these regiments into the first line, now advanced with gallantry, driving the enemy before them in confusion into the corn-field beyond the sunken road. The left of the division was now well advanced, when the enemy, concealed by an intervening ridge, endeavored to turn its left and rear.

Colonel Cross, Fifth New Hampshire, by a change of front to the left and rear, brought his regiment facing the advancing line. Here a spirited contest arose to gain a commanding height, the two opposing forces moving parallel to each other, giving and receiving fire. The Fifth, gaining the advantage, faced to the right and delivered its volley. The enemy staggered, but rallied and advanced desperately at a charge. Being re-enforced by the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, these regiments met the advance by a counter-charge. The enemy fled, leaving many killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the colors of the Fourth North Carolina in our hands.

Another column of the enemy, advancing under shelter of a stone wall and corn-field, pressed down on the right of the division; but Colonel Barlow again advanced the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York against these troops, and, with the attack of Kimball's brigade on the right, drove them from this position.

Our troops on the left of this part of the line having driven the enemy far back, they, with re-enforced numbers, made a determined attack directly in front. To meet this, Colonel Barlow brought his two regiments to their position in line, and drove the enemy through the corn-

field into the orchard beyond, under a heavy fire of musketry, and a fire of canister from two pieces of artillery in the orchard, and a battery farther to the right, throwing shell and case-shot. This advance gave us possession of Piper's house, the strong point contended for by the enemy at this part of the line, it being a defensible building several hundred yards in advance of the sunken road. The musketry fire at this point of the line now ceased. Holding Piper's house, General Richardson withdrew the line a little way to the crest of a hill, a more advantageous position. Up to this time the division was without artillery, and in the new position suffered severely from artillery fire, which could not be replied to. A section of Robertson's horse battery, commanded by Lieutenant Vincent, Second Artillery, now arrived on the ground and did excellent service. Subsequently a battery of brass guns, commanded by Captain Graham, First Artillery, arrived, and was posted on the crest of the hill, and soon silenced the two guns in the orchard. A heavy fire soon ensued between the battery farther to the right and our own. Captain Graham's battery was bravely and skillfully served, but, unable to reach the enemy, who had rifled guns of greater range than our smooth-bores, retired by order of General Richardson, to save it from useless sacrifice of men and horses. The brave general was himself mortally wounded while personally directing its fire.

General Hancock was placed in command of the division after the fall of General Richardson. General Meagher's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Burke, of the Sixty-third New York, having refilled their cartridge-boxes, was again ordered forward, and took position in the center of the line. The division now occupied one line in close proximity to the enemy, who had taken up a position in the rear of Piper's house. Col. Dwight Morris, with the Fourteenth Connecticut and a detachment of the One hundred and eighth New York, of General French's division, was sent by General French to the support of General Richardson's division. This command was now placed in an interval in the line between General Caldwell's and the Irish Brigade.

The requirements of the extended line of battle had so engaged the artillery that the application of General Hancock for artillery for the division could not be complied with immediately by the chief of artillery or the corps commanders in his vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the troops, General Hancock felt confident that he could hold his position, although suffering from the enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, as the great length of the line he was obliged to hold prevented him from forming more than one line of battle, and, from his advanced position, this line was already partly enfiladed by the batteries of the enemy on the right, which were protected from our batteries opposite them by the woods at the Dunker Church.

Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on some of our troops to the left of his position, General Hancock obtained Hexamer's battery from General Franklin's corps, which assisted materially in frustrating this attack. It also assisted the attack of the Seventh Maine, of Franklin's corps, which, without other aid, made an attack against the enemy's line and drove in skirmishers who were annoying our artillery and troops on the right. Lieutenant Woodruff, with Battery I, First Artillery, relieved Captain Hexamer, whose ammunition was expended. The enemy at one time seemed to be about making an attack in force upon this part of the line, and advanced a long column of infantry toward this division, but, on nearing the position, General Pleasanton opening on them with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire, and retreated, closing the operations on this portion of the field.

I return to the incidents occurring still farther to the right.

Between 12 and 1 p. m. General Franklin's corps arrived on the field of battle, having left their camp near Crampton's Pass at 6 a. m., leaving General Couch with orders to move with his division to occupy Maryland Heights. General Smith's division led the column, followed by General Slocum's.

It was first intended to keep this corps in reserve on the east side of the Antietam, to operate on either flank or on the center, as circumstances might require, but on nearing Keedysville the strong opposition on the right, developed by the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it necessary at once to send this corps to the assistance of the right wing.

On nearing the field, hearing that one of our batteries (A, Fourth U. S. Artillery), commanded by Lieutenant Thomas, who occupied the same position as Lieutenant Woodruff's battery in the morning, was hotly engaged without supports, General Smith sent two regiments to its relief from General Hancock's brigade. On inspecting the ground, General Smith ordered the other regiments of Hancock's brigade, with Frank's and Cowan's batteries, First New York Artillery, to the threatened position. Lieutenant Thomas and Captain Cothran, commanding batteries, bravely held their positions against the advancing enemy, handling their batteries with skill.

Finding the enemy still advancing, the Third Brigade of Smith's division, commanded by Colonel Irwin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was ordered up, and, passing through Lieutenant Thomas' battery, charged upon the enemy and drove back the advance until abreast of the Dunker Church. As the right of the brigade came opposite the woods it received a destructive fire, which checked the advance and threw the brigade somewhat into confusion. It formed again behind a rise of ground in the open space in advance of the batteries.

General French having reported to General Franklin that his ammunition was nearly expended, that officer ordered General Brooks with his brigade to re-enforce him. General Brooks formed his brigade on the right of General French, where they remained during the remainder of the day and night, frequently under the fire of the enemy's artillery.

It was soon after the brigade of Colonel Irwin had fallen back behind the rise of ground that the Seventh Maine, by order of Colonel Irwin, made the gallant attack already referred to.

The advance of General Franklin's corps was opportune. The attack of the enemy on this position, but for the timely arrival of his corps, must have been disastrous had it succeeded in piercing the line between Generals Sedgwick's and French's divisions. General Franklin ordered two brigades of General Slocum's division, General Newton's and Colonel Torbert's, to form in column to assault the woods that had been so hotly contested before by Generals Sumner and Hooker. General Bartlett's brigade was ordered to form as a reserve. At this time General Sumner, having command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of this, the only remaining corps available for attack, would peril the safety of the whole army.

General Porter's corps, consisting of General Sykes' division of Regulars and Volunteers and General Morell's division of Volunteers, occupied a position on the east side of Antietam Creek, upon the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and directly opposite the center of the enemy's line. This corps filled the interval between the right wing and General Burnside's command, and guarded the main approach from the enemy's position to our trains of supply. It was necessary to watch

this part of our line with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage of the first exhibition of weakness here to push upon us a vigorous assault for the purpose of piercing our center and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our rear could have met with but feeble resistance, as there were no reserves to re-enforce or close up the gap.

Toward the middle of the afternoon, proceeding to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. Several general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect of affairs was anything but promising. At the risk of greatly exposing our center, I ordered two brigades from Porter's corps, the only available troops, to re-enforce the right. Six battalions of Sykes' Regulars had been thrown forward across the Antietam Bridge on the main road to attack and drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasonton's horse batteries in advance of the bridge. Warren's brigade, of Porter's corps, was detached to hold a position on Burnside's right and rear, so that Porter was left at one time with only a portion of Sykes' division and one small brigade of Morell's division (but little over 3,000 men) to hold his important position.

General Sumner expressed the most decided opinion against another attempt during that day to assault the enemy's position in front, as portions of our troops were so much scattered and demoralized. In view of these circumstances, after making changes in the position of some of the troops, I directed the different commanders to hold their positions, and, being satisfied that this could be done without the assistance of the two brigades from the center, I countermanded the order, which was in course of execution.

General Slocum's division replaced a portion of General Sumner's troops, and positions were selected for batteries in front of the woods. The enemy opened several heavy fires of artillery on the position of our troops after this, but our batteries soon silenced them.

On the morning of the 17th, General Pleasonton, with his cavalry division and the horse batteries, under Captains Robertson, Tidball, and Lieutenant Hains, of the Second Artillery, and Captain Gibson, Third Artillery, was ordered to advance on the turnpike toward Sharpsburg, across Bridge No. 2, and support the left of General Sumner's line. The bridge being covered by a fire of artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skirmishers were thrown out, and Captain Tidball's battery advanced by piece and drove off the sharpshooters, with canister, sufficiently to establish the batteries above mentioned, which opened on the enemy with effect. The firing was kept up for about two hours, when, the enemy's fire slackening, the batteries were relieved by Randall's and Van Reed's batteries, U. S. Artillery. About 3 o'clock, Tidball, Robertson, and Hains returned to their positions on the west of Antietam, Captain Gibson having been placed in position on the east side to guard the approaches to the bridge. These batteries did good service, concentrating their fire on the column of the enemy about to attack General Hancock's position, and compelling it to find shelter behind the hills in rear.

General Sykes' division had been in position since the 15th, exposed to the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. General Morell had come up on the 16th, and relieved General Richardson, on the right of General Sykes. Continually under the vigilant watch of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital point.

The position of the batteries under General Pleasanton being one of great exposure, the battalion of the Second and Tenth U. S. Infantry, under Captain Poland, Second Infantry, was sent to his support. Subsequently four battalions of regular infantry, under Captain Dyer, Fourth Infantry, were sent across to assist in driving off the sharpshooters of the enemy.

The battalion of the Second and Tenth Infantry, advancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon their guns. Few in numbers and unsupported, they were unable to bring them off. The heavy loss of this small body of men attests their gallantry.

The troops of General Burnside held the left of the line opposite Bridge No. 3. The attack on the right was to have been supported by an attack on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on the evening of the 16th General Burnside's corps was moved forward and to the left, and took up a position nearer the bridge.

I visited General Burnside's position on the 16th, and after pointing out to him the proper dispositions to be made of his troops during the day and night, informed him that he would probably be required to attack the enemy's right on the following morning, and directed him to make careful reconnaissances.

General Burnside's corps, consisting of the divisions of Generals Cox, Willcox, Rodman, and Sturgis, was posted as follows: Colonel Crook's brigade, Cox's division, on the right; General Sturgis' division immediately in rear; on the left was General Rodman's division, with General Scammon's brigade, Cox's division, in support; General Willcox's division was held in reserve.

The corps bivouacked in position on the night of the 16th.

Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered General Burnside to form his troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, and to await further orders. At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson, Topographical Engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear. After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I dispatched an aide to ascertain what had been done. The aide returned with the information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards. The aide returned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in the possession of the enemy; whereupon I directed Colonel Sacket, Inspector-General, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet, and I ordered Colonel Sacket to remain with General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly.

After these three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at 1 o'clock by a brilliant charge of the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers. Other troops were then thrown over and the opposite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the heights beyond. A halt was then made by General Burnside's advance until 3 p. m., upon hearing which I directed one of my aides, Colonel Key, to inform General Burnside that I desired him to push forward his troops with the utmost vigor, and carry the enemy's position on the heights; that the movement was vital to our success; that this was a time when we must not stop for loss of life if a great object could thereby be accomplished; that if, in his judgment, his attack would fail, to inform me so at once,

that his troops might be withdrawn and used elsewhere on the field. He replied that he would soon advance, and would go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on the left would permit. Upon this report I again immediately sent Colonel Key to General Burnside with orders to advance at once, if possible, to flank the battery or storm it, and carry the heights, repeating that if he considered the movement impracticable to inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. The advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was nearly dark, and strong re-enforcements just then reaching the enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked General Burnside's troops on their left flank and forced them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge. If this important movement had been consummated two hours earlier, a position would have been secured upon the heights from which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear. Our victory might thus have been much more decisive.

The following is the substance of General Burnside's operations, as given in his report:

Colonel Crook's brigade was ordered to storm the bridge. This bridge (No. 3) is a stone structure of three arches with stone parapets. The banks of the stream on the opposite side are precipitous, and command the eastern approaches to the bridge. On the hillside immediately by the bridge was a stone fence, running parallel to the stream. The turns of the roadway as it wound up the hill were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks of rails, &c. These works and the woods that covered the slopes were filled with the enemy's riflemen, and batteries were in position to enfilade the bridge and its approaches.

General Rodman was ordered to cross the ford below the bridge. From Colonel Crook's position it was found impossible to carry the bridge. General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his division for that purpose. He sent forward the Second Maryland and the Sixth New Hampshire. These regiments made several successive attacks in the most gallant style, but were driven back. The artillery on the left were ordered to concentrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. Colonel Crook brought a section of Captain Simmonds' battery to a position to command the bridge. The Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania were then ordered to assault the bridge. Taking advantage of a small spur of the hills which ran parallel to the river, they moved toward the bridge. From the crest of this spur they rushed with bayonets fixed and cleared the bridge. The division followed the storming party, also the brigade of Colonel Crook, as a support. The enemy withdrew to still higher ground, some 500 or 600 yards beyond, and opened a fire of artillery on the troops in the new position on the crest of the hill above the bridge. General Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the ford after a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, and joined on the left of Sturgis, Seamon's brigade crossing as support. General Willcox's division was ordered across to take position on General Sturgis' right.

These dispositions being completed, about 3 o'clock the command moved forward, except Sturgis' division, left in reserve. Clark's and Durell's batteries accompanied Rodman's division, Cook's battery with Willcox's division, and a section of Simmonds' battery with Colonel Crook's brigade. A section of Simmonds' battery and Mullenberg's and McMullin's batteries were in position. The order for the advance was obeyed by the troops with alacrity. General Willcox's division,

with Crook in support, moved up on both sides of the turnpike leading from the bridge to Sharpsburg, General Rodman's division, supported by Scammon's brigade, on the left of General Willcox. The enemy retreated before the advance of the troops. The Ninth New York, of General Rodman's division, captured one of the enemy's batteries and held it for some time. As the command was driving the enemy to the main heights on the left of the town, the light division of General A. P. Hill arrived upon the field of battle from Harper's Ferry, and with a heavy artillery fire made a strong attack on the extreme left. To meet this attack, the left division diverged from the line of march intended, and opened a gap between it and the right. To fill up this, it was necessary to order the troops from the second line. During these movements General Rodman was mortally wounded. Colonel Harland's brigade, of General Rodman's division, was driven back. Colonel Scammon's brigade, by a change of front to rear on his right flank, saved the left from being driven completely in. The fresh troops of the enemy pouring in, and the accumulation of artillery against this command, destroyed all hope of its being able to accomplish anything more.

It was now nearly dark. General Sturgis was ordered forward to support the left. Notwithstanding the hard work in the early part of the day, his division moved forward with spirit. With its assistance the enemy were checked and held at bay.

The command was ordered to fall back by General Cox, who commanded on the field the troops engaged in this affair beyond the Antietam. The artillery had been well served during the day. Night closed the long and desperately contested battle of the 17th. Nearly 200,000 men and five hundred pieces of artillery were for fourteen hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had attacked the enemy in a position selected by the experienced engineer then in person directing their operations. We had driven them from their line on one flank and secured a footing within it on the other. The Army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of recent success. Our soldiers slept that night conquerors on a field won by their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy.

The night, however, brought with it grave responsibilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement, was the question before me.

After a night of anxious deliberation, and a full and careful survey of the situation and condition of our army, the strength and position of the enemy, I concluded that the success of an attack on the 18th was not certain. I am aware of the fact that under ordinary circumstances a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a reasonable prospect of success; but at this critical juncture I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country had I been willing to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. At that moment—Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded—the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched, as it pleased, on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country, extorted tribute from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was there another organized force able to arrest its march.

The following are among the considerations which led me to doubt the certainty of success in attacking before the 19th:

The troops were greatly overcome by the fatigue and exhaustion attendant upon the long-continued and severely contested battle of the 17th, together with the long day and night marches to which they had been subjected during the previous three days. The supply trains were in the rear, and many of the troops had suffered from hunger. They required rest and refreshment. One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's corps on the right had, after fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and much scattered, so that they were for the time somewhat demoralized. In Hooker's corps, according to the return made by General Meade, commanding, there were but 6,729 men present on the 18th, whereas on the morning of the 22d there were 13,093 men present for duty in the same corps, showing that previous to and during the battle 6,364 men were separated from their command.

General Meade, in an official communication upon this subject, dated September 18, 1862, says :

I inclose a field return of the corps made this afternoon, which I desire you will lay before the commanding general. I am satisfied the great reduction in the corps since the recent engagements is not due solely to the casualties of battle, and that a considerable number of men are still in the rear, some having dropped out on the march, and many dispersing and leaving yesterday during the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so far as it goes, good. To resist an attack in our present strong position I think they may be depended on, and I hope they will perform duty in case we make an attack, though I do not think their *morale* is as good for an offensive as a defensive movement.

One division of Sumner's corps had also been overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps commander in proper condition to attack the enemy vigorously the next day.

Some of the new troops on the left, although many of them fought well during the battle and are entitled to great credit, were, at the close of the action, driven back and their *morale* impaired.

On the morning of the 18th, General Burnside requested me to send him another division to assist in holding his position on the other side of the Antietam, and to enable him to withdraw his corps if he should be attacked by a superior force. He gave me the impression that if he were attacked again that morning, he would not be able to make a very vigorous resistance. I visited his position early, determined to send General Morell's division to his aid, and directed that it should be placed on this side of the Antietam, in order that it might cover the retreat of his own corps from the other side of the Antietam should that become necessary, at the same time it was in position to re-enforce our center or right if that were needed.

Late in the afternoon I found that, although he had not been attacked, General Burnside had withdrawn his own corps to this side of the Antietam, and sent over Morell's division alone to hold the opposite side.

A large number of our heaviest and most efficient batteries had consumed all their ammunition on the 16th and 17th, and it was impossible to supply them until late on the following day. Supplies of provisions and forage had to be brought up and issued, and infantry ammunition distributed. Finally, re-enforcements to the number of 14,000 men, to say nothing of troops expected from Pennsylvania, had not arrived, but were expected during the day.

The 18th was, therefore, spent in collecting the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, removing the wounded, burying the dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal of the battle.

Of the re-enforcements, Couch's division, marching with commenda-

ble rapidity, came up into position at a late hour in the morning. Humphreys' division of new troops, in their anxiety to participate in the battle which was raging when they received the order to march from Frederick about 3.30 p. m. on the 17th, pressed forward during the entire night, and the mass of the division reached the army during the following morning. Having marched more than 23 miles after 4.30 o'clock on the preceding afternoon, they were, of course, greatly exhausted, and needed rest and refreshment. Large re-enforcements expected from Pennsylvania never arrived.

During the 18th orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the 19th.

On the night of the 18th the enemy, after passing troops in the latter part of the day from the Virginia shore to their position behind Sharpsburg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their position and retreating across the river. As their line was but a short distance from the river, the evacuation presented but little difficulty and was effected before daylight.

About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under the direction of Major Davis, assistant inspector-general, counted and buried upon the battlefield of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy. This is conclusive evidence that the enemy sustained much greater loss than we.

Thirteen guns, 39 colors, upwards of 15,000 stand of small-arms, and more than 6,000 prisoners were the trophies which attest the success of our arms in the battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antietam. Not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles.

An estimate of the forces under the Confederate General Lee, made up by direction of General Banks from information obtained by the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., previous to the battle of Antietam, is as follows:

General T. J. Jackson's corps.....	24, 778
General James Longstreet's corps.....	23, 342
General D. H. Hill's two divisions.....	15, 525
General J. E. B. Stuart, cavalry.....	6, 400
Generals Ransom's and Jenkins' brigade.....	3, 000
Forty-six regiments not included in above.....	18, 400
Artillery, estimated at 400 guns.....	6, 000
Total.....	97, 445

These estimates give the actual number of men present and fit for duty.

Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were as follows:

First Corps.....	14, 856
Second Corps.....	18, 813
Fifth Corps (one division not arrived).....	12, 930
Sixth Corps.....	12, 300
Ninth Corps.....	13, 819
Twelfth Corps.....	10, 126
Cavalry Division.....	4, 320
Total in action.....	87, 164

When our cavalry advance reached the river on the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that nearly all the enemy's forces had crossed into Virginia during the night, their rear escaping under cover of eight batteries, placed in strong positions upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite bank. General Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, ordered

a detachment from Griffin's and Barnes' brigades, under General Griffin, to cross the river at dark and carry the enemy's batteries. This was gallantly done under the fire of the enemy. Several guns, caissons, &c., were taken, and their supports driven back half a mile.

The information obtained during the progress of this affair indicated that the mass of the enemy had retreated on the Charlestown and Martinsburg roads toward Winchester. To verify this and to ascertain how far the enemy had retired, General Porter was authorized to detach from his corps, on the morning of the 20th, a reconnoitering party in greater force. This detachment crossed the river and advanced about a mile, when it was attacked by a large body of the enemy, lying in ambush in the woods, and driven back across the river with considerable loss. This reconnaissance showed that the enemy was still in force on the Virginia bank of the Potomac, prepared to resist our further advance.

It was reported to me on the 19th that General Stuart had made his appearance at Williamsport with some 4,000 cavalry and six pieces of artillery, and that 10,000 infantry were marching on the same point from the direction of Winchester. I ordered General Couch to march at once with his division and a part of Pleasonton's cavalry, with Franklin's corps within supporting distance, for the purpose of endeavoring to capture this force. General Couch made a prompt and rapid march to Williamsport and attacked the enemy vigorously, but they made their escape across the river.

I dispatched the following telegraphic report to the General-in-Chief:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Sharpsburg, September 19, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army:

I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, who have been driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's Ferry.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

On the following day I received this telegram:

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1862—2 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so. You should keep me advised of, both, so far as you know them.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

To which I answered as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Near Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862—8 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington:

Your telegram of to-day is received. I telegraphed you yesterday all I knew, and had nothing more to inform you of until this evening. Williams' corps (Banks') occupied Maryland Heights at 1 p. m. to-day. The rest of the army is near here, except Couch's division, which is at this moment engaged with the enemy in front of Williamsport. The enemy is retiring via Charlestown and Martinsburg on Winchester. He last night reoccupied Williamsport by a small force, but will be out of it by morning. I think he has a force of infantry near Shepherdstown.

I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch I have the honor to receive from you in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, or even to allude to them.

I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, small-arms, prisoners, &c., captured until I could do so with some accuracy. I hope by to-morrow evening to be able to give at least an approximate statement.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

On the same day I telegraphed as follows :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 20, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commanding U. S. Army :

As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of the Potomac, must, in a great measure, be dependent for supplies of ammunition and provisions upon Richmond, I would respectfully suggest that General Banks be directed to send out a cavalry force to cut their supply communication opposite Washington. This would seriously embarrass their operations, and will aid this army materially.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Maryland Heights were occupied by General Williams' corps on this day, and on the 22d General Sumner took possession of Harper's Ferry.

It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the command of the forces for the defense of the National Capital, on the 2d day of September, 1862, the greater part of all the available troops were suffering under the disheartening influences of the serious defeat they had encountered during the brief and unfortunate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers were greatly reduced by casualties, their confidence was much shaken, and they had lost something of that *esprit de corps* which is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. Moreover, they had left behind, lost, or worn out the greater part of their clothing and camp equipage, which required renewal before they could be in proper condition to take the field again.

The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Maryland was received in Washington on the 4th of September, and the Army of the Potomac was again put in motion, under my direction, on the following day, so that but a very brief interval of time was allowed to reorganize or procure supplies.

The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam, fought by this army a few days afterwards, with the reconnaissances immediately following, resulted in a loss to us of 10 general officers, many regimental and company officers, and a large number of enlisted men, amounting in the aggregate to 15,220. Two army corps had been sadly cut up, scattered, and somewhat demoralized in the action on the 17th.

In General Sumner's corps alone 41 commissioned officers and 819 enlisted men had been killed ; 4 general officers, 89 other commissioned officers, and 3,708 enlisted men had been wounded, besides 548 missing ; making the aggregate loss in this splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, 5,209.

In General Hooker's corps the casualties of the same engagement amounted to 2,619.

The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest previous to the last battle.

When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, the means of transportation at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single day's supply of subsistence in advance.

Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had fought like

veterans, but the *morale* of others had been a good deal impaired in those severely contested actions, and they required time to recover as well as to acquire the necessary drill and discipline.

Under these circumstances I did not feel authorized to cross the river with the main army over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army and its base of supply.

I telegraphed on the 22d to the General-in-Chief as follows:

As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are commanding regiments, and companies are without a single commissioned officer.

On the 23d the following was telegraphed to the General-in Chief:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Near Shepherdstown, September 23, 1862—9.30 a. m.

Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington:

From several different sources I learn that General R. E. Lee is still opposite to my position at Leetown, between Shepherdstown and Martinsburg, and that General Jackson is on the Opequon Creek, about 3 miles above its mouth, both with large forces. There are also indications of heavy re-enforcements moving toward them from Winchester and Charlestown. I have, therefore, ordered General Franklin to take position with his corps at the cross-roads, about 1 mile northwest of Bakersville, on the Bakersville and Williamsport road, and General Couch to establish his division near Downsville, leaving sufficient force at Williamsport to watch and guard the ford at that place. The fact of the enemy's remaining so long in our front, and the indications of an advance of re-enforcements, seem to indicate that he will give us another battle with all his available force.

As I mentioned to you before, our army has been very much reduced by casualties in the recent battles, and in my judgment all the re-enforcements of old troops that can possibly be dispensed with around Washington and other places should be instantly pushed forward by rail to this army. A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to our cause. I cannot think it possible that the enemy will bring any forces to bear upon Washington till after the question is decided here, but if he should, troops can soon be sent back from this army by rail to re-enforce the garrison there.

The evidence I have that re-enforcements are coming to the rebel army consists in the fact that long columns of dust extending from Winchester to Charlestown and from Charlestown in this direction, and also troops moving this way, were seen last evening. This is corroborated by citizens. General Sumner, with his corps and Williams' (Banks'), occupies Harper's Ferry and the surrounding heights. I think he will be able to hold his position till re-enforcements arrive.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

On the 27th I made the following report:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 27, 1862—10 a. m.

All the information in my possession goes to prove that the main body of the enemy is concentrated not far from Martinsburg, with some troops at Charlestown; not many in Winchester. Their movements of late have been an extension toward our right and beyond it. They are receiving re-enforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts, perhaps entirely so.

This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regiments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the old regiments—our main dependence—and in supplying vacancies among the officers by promotion.

My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side.

Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure *débouché*, but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we

cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and then acting according to circumstances, viz, moving on Winchester, if from the position and attitude of the enemy we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops, preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at once. I have no fears as to an attack on Washington by the line of Manassas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they will not run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear while they have the garrison of Washington in their front. I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt in Maryland should the river remain low for a great length of time, and should they receive considerable addition to their force.

I would be glad to have Peck's division as soon as possible. I am surprised that Sigel's men should have been sent to Western Virginia without my knowledge. The last I heard from you on the subject was that they were at my disposition. In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in number, and it was only by very hard fighting that we gained the advantage we did. As it was, the result was at one period very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day. If the enemy receives considerable re-enforcements and we none, it is possible that I may have too much on my hands in the next battle. My own view of the proper policy to be pursued, is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else available to re-enforce this army. The railways give us the means of promptly re-enforcing Washington should it become necessary. If I am re-enforced, as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington. Several persons recently from Richmond say that there are no troops there except conscripts, and they few in number. I hope to give you details as to late battles by this evening. I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington.

The work of reorganizing, drilling, and supplying the army I began at the earliest moment. The different corps were stationed along the river in the best positions to cover and guard the fords. The great extent of the river front from near Washington to Cumberland (some 150 miles), together with the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was to be carefully watched and guarded, to prevent, if possible, the enemy's raids. Reconnaissances upon the Virginia side of the river, for the purpose of learning the enemy's positions and movements, were made frequently, so that our cavalry, which, from the time we left Washington, had performed the most laborious service, and had from the commencement been deficient in numbers, was found totally inadequate to the requirements of the army. This overwork had broken down the greater part of the horses; disease had appeared among them, and but a very small portion of our original cavalry force was fit for service. To such an extent had this arm become reduced, that when General Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania on the 11th of October with 2,000 men, I could only mount 800 men to follow him.

Harper's Ferry was occupied on the 22d, and in order to prevent a catastrophe similar to the one which had happened to Colonel Miles, I immediately ordered Maryland, Bolivar, and Loudoun Heights to be strongly fortified. This was done as far as the time and means at our disposal permitted.

The main army of the enemy during this time remained in the vicinity of Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, forcibly taking their property where it was not voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroying railroads.

On the 1st day of October His Excellency the President honored the

Army of the Potomac with a visit, and remained several days, during which he went through the different encampments, reviewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields of South Mountain and Antietam. I had the opportunity during this visit to describe to him the operations of the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac.

On the 5th of October the division of General Cox (about 5,000 men) was ordered from my command to Western Virginia.

On the 7th of October I received the following telegram :

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 6, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads.

I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

At this time General Averell with the greater part of our efficient cavalry was in the vicinity of Cumberland, and General Kelley, the commanding officer, had that day reported that a large force of the enemy was advancing on Colonel Campbell at Sir John's Run. This obliged me to order General Averell to proceed with his force to the support of Colonel Campbell, which delayed his return to the army for several days.

On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's Ferry with 2,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, on his road into Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary to use all our cavalry against him. This exhausting service completely broke down nearly all of our cavalry horses, and rendered a remount absolutely indispensable before we could advance on the enemy.

The following were the dispositions of troops made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid:

General Averell, then at Green Spring, on the Upper Potomac, was ordered to move rapidly down upon the north side of the river with all his disposable cavalry, using every exertion to get upon the trail of the enemy and follow it up vigorously. General Pleasonton, with the remaining cavalry force, was ordered to take the road by Cavetown, Harmon's Gap, and Mechanicstown, and cut off the retreat of the enemy should he make for any of the fords below the position of the main army. His orders were to pursue them with the utmost rapidity, not to spare his men or horses, and to destroy or capture them if possible. General Crook, at that time commanding Cox's division at Hancock, *en route* for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cars, and remain in readiness to move to any point above should the enemy return in that direction, keeping his scouts well out on all the roads leading from the direction of Chambersburg to the Upper Potomac. The other commanders between Hancock and Harper's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigilant watch upon all the roads and fords,

so as to prevent the escape of the rebels within these limits. General Burnside was ordered to send two brigades to the Monocacy Crossing, there to remain in cars with steam up, ready to move to any point on the railroad to which Stuart might be aiming, while Colonel Rush, at Frederick, was directed to keep his Lancers scouting on the approaches from Chambersburg, so as to give timely notice to the commander of the two brigades at the Monocacy Crossing. General Stoneman, whose headquarters were then at Poolesville, occupying with his division the different fords on the river below the mouth of the Monocacy, was directed to keep his cavalry well out on the approaches from the direction of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any point where the enemy might attempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. He was informed of General Pleasonton's movements.

After the orders were given for covering all the fords upon the river, I did not think it possible for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the capture or destruction of his entire force was perfectly certain; but, owing to the fact that my orders were not in all cases carried out as I expected, he effected his escape into Virginia without much loss.

The troops sent by General Burnside to the Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not giving the necessary orders to the commander, instead of remaining at the railroad crossing, as I directed, marched 4 miles into Frederick, and there remained until after Stuart had passed the railroad, only 6 miles below, near which point it was said he halted for breakfast.

General Pleasonton ascertained, after his arrival at Mechanicstown, that the enemy were only about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty retreat toward the mouth of the Monocacy. He pushed on vigorously, and near its mouth overtook them with a part of his force, having marched 78 miles in twenty-four hours, and having left many of his horses broken down upon the road. He at once attacked with his artillery, and the firing continued for several hours, during which time he states that he received the support of a small portion of General Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict any material damage upon the enemy.

General Stoneman reports that, in accordance with his instructions, he gave all necessary orders for intercepting the return of the rebels, and Colonel Staples, commanding one of his brigades, states that he sent two regiments of infantry to the mouth of the Monocacy and one regiment to White's Ford; that on the morning of the 12th, about 10 o'clock, he, by General Stoneman's order, marched the remaining three regiments of his command from Poolesville toward the mouth of the Monocacy; that before getting into action he was relieved by General Ward who states that he reported to General Pleasonton with his command while the enemy was crossing the river, and was informed by him (General Pleasonton) that he was too late, and that nothing could be done then.

General Pleasonton, in his report of this affair, says:

It was at this time that Colonel Ward reported to me from General Stoneman's division, with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a section of artillery. I told him that his command could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed the river. These are the only troops that I knew of that were in that vicinity, and this was the first intimation I received that any troops were endeavoring to assist me in capturing the rebels. I succeeded in preventing the enemy from crossing at the mouth of the Monocacy, and drove him to White's Ford, 3 miles below. Had White's Ford been occupied by any force of ours previous to the time of the occupation by the enemy, the capture of Stuart's whole force would have been certain and inevitable. But with my small force, which did not exceed one-fourth of the enemy's, it was not practicable for me to occupy that ford while the enemy was in front.

It would seem from the report of General Stoneman that the disposition he made of his troops previous to the arrival of Stuart was a good one. He stationed two regiments at the mouth of the Monocacy and two regiments at White's Ford, the latter in the very place where the crossing was made, and the former only 3 miles off, with a reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, some 6 miles distant. General Pleasonton's report shows that from the time the firing commenced until the enemy were across the river was about four and a half hours. General Stoneman states that he started the reserve from Poolesville at about 9 o'clock, but it appears from the report of General Pleasonton that it did not reach him until 1.30 o'clock.

At the time I received the order of October 6 to cross the river and attack the enemy, the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made since the battle of Antietam, and even prior to that date, to refit the army with clothing as well as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, who believed that the necessary articles could be supplied in about three days. Orders were immediately issued to the different commanders who had not already sent in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all the necessary steps were forthwith taken by me to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. The requisitions were forwarded to the proper department at Washington, and I expected that the articles would reach our depots during the three days specified; but day after day elapsed and only a small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps commanders, upon receiving notice from the quartermasters that they might expect to receive their supplies at certain dates, sent the trains for them, which, after waiting, were compelled to return empty. Several instances occurred where these trains went back and forth from the camps to the depots as often as four or five different times without receiving their supplies, and I was informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had traveled over 150 miles to and from the depots before he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac and was moving into Virginia; General Reynolds' corps was delayed a day at Berlin to complete its supplies; and General Porter only completed his on reaching the vicinity of Harper's Ferry.

I made every exertion in my power, and my quartermasters did the same, to have these supplies hurried forward rapidly, and I was repeatedly told that they had filled the requisitions at Washington and that the supplies had been forwarded. But they did not come to us, and of course were inaccessible to the army. I did not fail to make frequent representation of this condition of things to the General-in-Chief, and it appears that he referred the matter to the Quartermaster-General, who constantly replied that the supplies had been promptly ordered. Notwithstanding this, they did not reach our depots.

The following extracts are from telegrams upon this subject:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 11, 1862—9 a. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington:

* * * * *

We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that they have been forwarded by railroad, but owing to bad management on the roads, or from some other cause, they come in very

slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army unless the railroad managers forward supplies more rapidly.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 11, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Commander-in-Chief, Washington:

I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing that still exists in some of the corps in this army. Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculation upon information received from Washington, that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet arrived. Unless some measures are taken to insure the prompt forwarding of these supplies, there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in getting the army ready to move, as the men cannot march without shoes. Everything has been done that can be done at these headquarters to accomplish the desired result.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 15, 1862—7 p. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

* * * * *

I am using every possible exertion to get this army ready to move. It was only yesterday that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at Hagerstown. It is being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 15, 1862—7.30 p. m.

Col. R. INGALLS,
Care of Colonel Rucker, Quartermaster, Washington:

General Franklin reports that there is by no means as much clothing as was called for at Hagerstown. I think, therefore, you had better have additional supplies, especially of shoes, forwarded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 16, 1862.

Col. R. INGALLS,
Care of Colonel Rucker, Quartermaster, Washington:

General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as follows: "My quartermaster reports that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks at Hagerstown. He was able to procure only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few socks, drawers, and coats. This leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. My requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes."

Please push the shoes and stockings up to Harper's Ferry as fast as possible.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Knoxville, Md., October 9, 1862.

Col. C. G. SAWTELLE,
Depot Quartermaster, Washington:

You did right in sending clothing to Harper's Ferry. You will not be able to send too much or too quickly. We want blankets, shoes, canteens, &c., very much.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Knoxville, Md., October 10, 1862.

Capt. AUGUSTUS BOYD,
Quartermaster, Philadelphia:

Shipments to Hagerstown must be made direct through to avoid the contemptible delays at Harrisburg. If Colonel Crosman was ordered to send clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the suffering and impatience are excessive.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Knoxville, October 13, 1862.

Capt. GEORGE H. WEEKS,
Depot Quartermaster, Hagerstown:

Has the clothing arrived yet? If not, do you know where it is? What clothing was taken by the rebels at Chambersburg? Did they capture any property that was en route to you? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg? Send an agent over the road to obtain information, and hurry up the supplies. Reply at once.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster.

SHARPSBURG, October 15, 1862.

General INGALLS:

I have just returned from Hagerstown, where I have been for the clothing for the corps. There was nothing there but overcoats, trousers, and a few uniform coats and socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts, or shelter-tents. Will you please tell me where and when the balance can be had? Shall I send to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow? The corps surgeon has just made a requisition for forty-five hospital tents. There are none at Hagerstown. Will you please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's Ferry?

FIELDING LOWRY,
Captain and Quartermaster.

HAGERSTOWN, October 15, 1862.

Colonel INGALLS, Quartermaster:

I want at least 10,000 suits of clothing in addition to what I have received. It should be here now.

G. H. WEEKS,
Assistant Quartermaster.

HARPER'S FERRY, October 22, 1862.

General INGALLS,
Chief Quartermaster, &c.:

We have bootees, 12,000; great-coats, 4,000; drawers and shirts are gone; blankets and stockings nearly so; 15,000 each of these four articles are wanted.

ALEX. BLISS,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster.

MCCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
October 24, 1862—11 a. m.

Capt. D. G. THOMAS,
Military Storekeeper, Washington:

Please send to Captain Bliss, at Harper's Ferry, 10,000 blankets, 12,000 caps, 5,000 overcoats, 10,000 pairs bootees, 2,000 pairs artillery and cavalry boots, 15,000 pairs stockings, 15,000 drawers, and 15,000 pants. The clothing arrives slowly. Can it not be hurried along faster? May I ask you to obtain authority for this shipment?

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster.

HAGERSTOWN, October 30.

Colonel INGALLS:

Clothing has arrived this morning. None taken by rebels. Shall I supply Franklin, and retain portions for Porter and Reynolds until called for?

G. H. WEEKS,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster.

The following statement, taken from a report of the chief quartermaster with the army, will show what progress was made in supplying the army with clothing from the 1st of September to the date of crossing the Potomac on the 31st of October, and that a greater part of the clothing did not reach our depots until after the 15th of October:

Statement of clothing and equipage received at the different depots of the Army of the Potomac from September 1, 1862, to October 31, 1862.

Clothing and equipage.	Received at the depot—				
	From September 1 to October 6.	From October 6 to October 15.	From October 15 to October 25.	From October 25 to October 31.	Total.
Drawers	10, 700	17, 000	40, 000	30, 000	97, 700
Forage caps.....	4, 000	11, 000	19, 500		34, 500
Stockings.....	6, 200	22, 025	65, 200	30, 000	123, 425
Sack coats.....	4, 190				4, 190
Cavalry jackets.....	3, 000	500	1, 250	1, 500	6, 250
Canteens.....	6, 000	10, 221	9, 000	3, 008	28, 229
Flannel shirts.....	6, 200	18, 325	18, 876	2, 200	45, 301
Haversacks.....	6, 000	12, 989	5, 000	9, 900	33, 889
Trousers (mounted).....	4, 200	1, 000	2, 500	5, 000	12, 700
Boots.....	4, 200	6, 000	3, 600	20, 040	33, 840
Shelter-tents.....	11, 100	3, 000	9, 000		23, 100
Camp kettles.....	799	1, 302	1, 894		3, 995
Mess-pans.....	2, 030	2, 100	4, 500		8, 630
Overcoats (foot).....	3, 500	12, 000	14, 770		30, 270
Artillery jackets.....	1, 200	500	1, 750	1, 000	4, 450
Blankets.....	20		6, 500	4, 384	10, 904
Overcoats (mounted).....	1, 200	875	3, 500	2, 015	7, 590
Felt hats.....	2, 200	7, 000			9, 200
Infantry coats.....	2, 000	12, 060	22, 500	7, 500	44, 060
Trousers (foot).....	2, 000	9, 500	39, 620	25, 000	76, 120
Bootees.....	2, 000	7, 000	52, 900		61, 900
Knit shirts.....		2, 655	2, 424	11, 595	16, 674

Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his report upon this subject, says:

There was great delay in receiving our clothing. The orders were promptly given by me and approved by General Meigs, but the roads were slow to transport, particularly the Cumberland Valley road. For instance, clothing ordered to Hagerstown on the 7th of October for the corps of Franklin, Porter, and Reynolds, did not arrive there until about the 18th, and by that time, of course, there were increased wants and changes in position of troops. The clothing of Sumner arrived in great quantities near the last of October, almost too late for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia. We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferry, partly on the cars just arrived and partly in store.

The causes of the reduction of our cavalry force have already been recited. The difficulty in getting new supplies from the usual sources led me to apply for and obtain authority for the cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their own horses. The following are the telegrams and letters on this subject:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 12, 1862—12.45 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be taken to supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses. The present rate of supply is 1,050 per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. From this number the artillery draw for their batteries.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

The General-in-Chief, in a letter to me dated Washington, D. C., October 14, 1862, replies to this dispatch in the following language:

I have caused the matters complained of in your telegrams of the 11th and 12th to be investigated.

* * * * *

In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of supply is only 150 per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. I find from the records that the issues for the last six weeks have been 8,754, making an average per week of 1,459.

One thousand and fifty is the number stated in the original dispatch, now in my possession; and as not only figures were used, but the number was written out in full, I can hardly see how it is possible for the telegraphic operator to have made a mistake in the transmission of the message.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 14, 1862—7 p. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Commander-in-Chief*:

* * * * *

With my small cavalry force it is impossible for me to watch the line of the Potomac properly or even make the reconnaissances that are necessary for our movements. This makes it necessary for me to weaken my line very much by extending the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. This will continue until the river rises, and it will be next to impossible to prevent the rebel cavalry raids. My cavalry force, as I urged this morning, should be largely and immediately increased, under any hypothesis, whether to guard the river or advance on the enemy, or both.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

The following is an extract from the official report of Colonel Ingalls:

Immediately after the battle of Antietam, efforts were made to supply deficiencies in clothing and horses. Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. The artillery and cavalry required large numbers to cover losses sustained in battle, on the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms were deficient when they left Washington. A most violent and destructive disease made its appearance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of service. Horses reported perfectly well one day would be dead lame the next, and it was difficult to foresee where it would end or what number would cover the loss. They were attacked in the hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account for the appearance of this disease. Animals kept at rest would recover in time, but could not be worked. I made application to send West and purchase horses at once, but it was refused on the ground that the outstanding contracts provided for enough; but they were not delivered sufficiently fast nor in sufficient numbers until late in October and early in November. I was authorized to buy 2,500 late in October, but the delivery was not completed until in November, after we had reached Warrenton.

In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 14th of October and addressed to the General-in-Chief, it is stated:

There have been issued, therefore, to the Army of the Potomac since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 9,254 horses.

What number of horses were sent to General Pope before his return to Washington I have no means of determining; but the following statement, made upon my order by the chief quartermaster with the army, and who had means for gaining accurate information, forces upon my mind the conclusion that the Quartermaster-General was in error:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Chief Quartermaster's Office, October 31, 1862.

Horses purchased since September 6, 1862, by Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster, and issued to the forces under the immediate command of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan..... 1,200

Issued and turned over to the above force by Capt. J. J. Dana, assistant quartermaster (in Washington).....	2, 261
Issued to forces at and near Washington, which have since joined the command.....	352
<hr/>	
Total purchased by Colonel Ingalls and issued and turned over by Captain Dana to the forces in this immediate command.....	3, 813
Issued by Capt. J. J. Dana, assistant quartermaster, to the forces in the vicinity of Washington.....	3, 363
<hr/>	
Grand total purchased by Col. R. Ingalls, chief quartermaster, and issued and turned over by Capt. J. J. Dana, assistant quartermaster, to the entire Army of the Potomac and the forces around Washington.....	7, 176

About 3,000 horses have been turned over to the Quartermaster's Department by officers as unfit for service. Nearly 1,500 should now be turned over also, being worn out and diseased.

Respectfully submitted.

FRED. MYERS,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Quartermaster.

This official statement, made up from the reports of the quartermasters who received and distributed the horses, exhibits the true state of the case, and gives the total number of horses received by the Army of the Potomac and the troops around Washington during a period of eight weeks as 7,176, or 2,078 less than the number stated by the Quartermaster-General. Supposing that 1,500 were issued to the army under General Pope previous to its return to Washington, as General Meigs states, there would still remain 578 horses which he does not account for.

The letter of the General-in-Chief to the Secretary of War on the 28th of October, and the letter of General Meigs to the General-in-Chief on the 14th of October, convey the impression that, upon my urgent and repeated applications for cavalry and artillery horses for the Army of the Potomac, I had received a much greater number than was really the case.

It will be seen from Colonel Myers' report that of all the horses alluded to by General Meigs, only 3,813 came to the army with which I was ordered to follow and attack the enemy. Of course the remainder did not in the slightest degree contribute to the efficiency of the cavalry or artillery of the army with which I was to cross the river. Neither did they in the least facilitate any preparations for carrying out the order to advance upon the enemy, as the General-in-Chief's letter might seem to imply.

During the same period that we were receiving the horses alluded to, about 3,000 of our old stock were turned in to the Quartermaster's Department, and 1,500 more reported as in such condition that they ought to be turned in as unfit for service, thus leaving the active army some 700 short of the number required to make good existing deficiencies, to say nothing of providing remounts for men whose horses had died or been killed during the campaign and those previously dismounted. Notwithstanding all the efforts made to obtain a remount, there were, after deducting the force engaged in picketing the river, but about 1,000 serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st day of October.

In a letter dated October 14, 1862, the General-in-Chief says:

It is also reported to me that the number of animals with your army in the field is about 31,000. It is believed that your present proportion of cavalry and of animals is much larger than that of any other of our armies.

What number of animals our other armies had I am not prepared to

say, but military men in European armies have been of the opinion that an army, to be efficient while carrying on active operations in the field, should have a cavalry force equal in numbers to from one-sixth to one-fourth of the infantry force. My cavalry did not amount to one-twentieth part of the army, and hence the necessity of giving every one of my cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse.

Cavalry may be said to constitute the *antenne* of the army. It scouts all the roads in front, on the flanks, and in the rear of the advancing columns, and constantly feels the enemy. The amount of labor falling on this arm during the Maryland campaign was excessive.

To persons not familiar with the movements of troops, and the amount of transportation required for a large army marching away from water or railroad communications, the number of animals mentioned by the General-in-Chief may have appeared unnecessarily large; but to a military man who takes the trouble to enter into an accurate and detailed computation of the number of pounds of subsistence and forage required for such an army as that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the 31,000 animals were considerably less than was absolutely necessary to an advance.

As we were required to move through a country which could not be depended upon for any of our supplies, it became necessary to transport everything in wagons and to be prepared for all emergencies. I did not consider it safe to leave the river without subsistence and forage for ten days.

The official returns of that date show the aggregate strength of the army for duty to have been about 110,000 men of all arms. This did not include teamsters, citizen employés, officers' servants, &c., amounting to some 12,000, which gave a total of 122,000 men. The subsistence alone of this army for ten days required for its transportation 1,830 wagons, at 2,000 pounds to the wagon, and 10,980 animals. Our cavalry horses at that time amounted to 5,046 and our artillery horses to 6,836.

To transport full forage for these 22,862 animals for ten days required 17,832 additional animals; and this forage would only supply the entire number (40,694) of animals with a small fraction over half allowance for the time specified.

It will be observed that this estimate does not embrace the animals necessary to transport quartermaster's supplies, baggage, camp equipage, ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage for officers' horses, &c., which would greatly augment the necessary transportation.

It may very truly be said that we did make the march with the means at our disposal, but it will be remembered that we met with no serious opposition from the enemy; neither did we encounter delays from any other cause. The roads were in excellent condition, and the troops marched with most commendable order and celerity.

If we had met with a determined resistance from the enemy, and our progress had been very much retarded thereby, we would have consumed our supplies before they could have been renewed. A proper estimate of my responsibilities as the commander of that army did not justify me in basing my preparations for the expedition upon the supposition that I was to have an uninterrupted march. On the contrary, it was my duty to be prepared for all emergencies; and not the least important of my responsibilities was the duty of making ample provision for supplying my men and animals with rations and forage.

Knowing the solicitude of the President for an early movement, and

sharing with him fully his anxiety for prompt action, on the 21st of October I telegraphed to the General-in-Chief as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 21, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington:

Since the receipt of the President's order to move on the enemy,* I have been making every exertion to get this army supplied with clothing absolutely necessary for marching.

This, I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished. I have also, during the same time, repeatedly urged upon you the importance of supplying cavalry and artillery horses, to replace those broken down by hard service, and steps have been taken to insure a prompt delivery. Our cavalry, even when well supplied with horses, is much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, but in efficiency has proved itself superior. So forcibly has this been impressed upon our old regiments by repeated successes, that the men are fully persuaded that they are equal to twice their number of rebel cavalry. Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in picketing the river, I have not at present over about 1,000 horses for service. Officers have been sent in various directions to purchase horses, and I expect them soon. Without more cavalry horses our communications from the moment we march would be at the mercy of the large cavalry force of the enemy, and it would not be possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary information of the position and movements of the enemy in such a way as to insure success. My experience has shown the necessity of a large and efficient cavalry force.

Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask whether the President desires me to march on the enemy at once, or to await the reception of the new horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt arrival.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

On the same day General Halleck replied as follows:

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1862—3 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have not been and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move, and on what lines you propose to march.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

From the tenor of this dispatch I conceived that it was left for my judgment to decide whether or not it was possible to move with safety to the army at that time, and this responsibility I exercised with the more confidence in view of the strong assurances of his trust in me as commander of that army with which the President had seen fit to honor me during his last visit.

The cavalry requirements, without which an advance would have been in the highest degree injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting. The country before us was an enemy's country, where the inhabitants furnished to the enemy every possible assistance, providing food for men and forage for animals, giving all information concerning our movements, and rendering every aid in their power to the enemy's cause. It was manifest that we should find it, as we subsequently did, a hostile district, where we could derive no aid from the inhabitants that would justify dispensing with the active co-operation of an efficient cavalry force. Accordingly, I fixed upon the 1st of November as the earliest date at which the forward movement could well be commenced.

* See Addenda to Halleck's report, p. 10.

The General-in-Chief, in a letter to the Secretary of War on the 28th of October, says:

In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy.

Notwithstanding this opinion, expressed by such high authority, I am compelled to say again that the delay in the reception of necessary supplies up to that date had left the army in a condition totally unfit to advance against the enemy; that an advance under the existing circumstances would, in my judgment, have been attended with the highest degree of peril, with great suffering and sickness among the men, and with imminent danger of being cut off from our supplies by the superior cavalry force of the enemy, and with no reasonable prospect of gaining any advantage over him.

I dismiss this subject with the remark that I have found it impossible to resist the force of my own convictions, that the commander of an army who, from the time of its organization, has for eighteen months been in constant communication with its officers and men, the greater part of the time engaged in active service in the field, and who has exercised this command in many battles, must certainly be considered competent to determine whether his army is in proper condition to advance on the enemy or not, and he must necessarily possess greater facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the wants of his men and the condition of his supplies than the General-in-Chief in his office at Washington City. The movement from Washington into Maryland, which culminated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the invasion of the enemy's territory and an attack upon his capital, but was defensive in its purposes, although offensive in its character, and would be technically called a "defensive offensive campaign." It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the National Capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by the battle of Antietam, which brought the Army of the Potomac into what might be termed an accidental position on the Upper Potomac.

Having gained the immediate object of the campaign, the first thing to be done was to insure Maryland from a return of the enemy; the second, to prepare our own army, exhausted by a series of severe battles, destitute to a great extent of supplies, and very deficient in artillery and cavalry horses, for a definite offensive movement, and to determine upon the line of operations for a further advance.

At the time of the battle of Antietam the Potomac was very low, and presented a comparatively weak line of defense unless watched by large masses of troops. The reoccupation of Harper's Ferry, and the disposition of troops above that point, rendered the line of the Potomac secure against everything except cavalry raids. No time was lost in placing the army in proper condition for an advance, and the circumstances which caused the delay after the battle of Antietam have been fully enumerated elsewhere.

I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity as a proper base of operations for a movement upon Richmond. I still considered the line of the Peninsula as the true approach, but for obvious reasons did not make any proposal to return to it.

On the 6th of October, as stated above, I was ordered by the Presi-

dent, through his General-in-Chief, to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Two lines were presented for my choice:

1st. Up the Valley of the Shenandoah, in which case I was to have 12,000 to 15,000 additional troops.

2d. To cross between the enemy and Washington—that is, east of the Blue Ridge—in which event I was to be re-enforced with 30,000 men.

At first I determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah, for these reasons: The Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad and the various turnpikes converging upon Winchester afforded superior facilities for supplies. Our cavalry being weak, this line of communication could be more easily protected. There was no advantage in interposing at that time the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah between the enemy and myself.

At the period in question the Potomac was still very low, and I apprehended that, if I crossed the river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy would promptly check the movement by recrossing into Maryland, at the same time covering his rear by occupying in strong force the passes leading through the Blue Ridge from the southeast into the Shenandoah Valley. I anticipated, as the result of the first course, that Lee would fight me near Winchester, if he could do so under favorable circumstances, or else that he would abandon the Lower Shenandoah and leave the Army of the Potomac free to act upon some other line of operations. If he abandoned the Shenandoah, he would naturally fall back upon his railway communications. I have since been confirmed in the belief that if I had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in the early part of October, General Lee would have recrossed into Maryland.

As above explained, the army was not in condition to move until late in October, and in the mean time circumstances had changed. The period had arrived when a sudden and great rise of the Potomac might be looked for at any moment; the season of bad roads and difficult movements was approaching, which would naturally deter the enemy from exposing himself very far from his base, and his movements all appeared to indicate a falling back from the river toward his supplies. Under these circumstances, I felt at liberty to disregard the possibility of the enemy's recrossing the Potomac, and determined to select the line east of the Blue Ridge, feeling convinced that it would secure me the largest accession of force and the most cordial support of the President, whose views from the beginning were in favor of that line.

The subject of the defense of the line of the Upper Potomac, after the advance of the main army, had long occupied my attention. I desired to place Harper's Ferry and its dependencies in a strong state of defense, and frequently addressed the General-in-Chief upon the subject of the erection of field works and permanent bridges there, asking for the funds necessary to accomplish the purpose. Although I did my best to explain, as clearly as I was able, that I did not wish to erect permanent works of masonry, and that neither the works nor the permanent bridges had any reference to the advance of the army, but solely to the permanent occupation of Harper's Ferry, I could never make the General-in-Chief understand my wishes, but was refused the funds necessary to erect the field-works, on the ground that there was no appropriation for the erection of permanent fortifications, and was not allowed to build the permanent bridge on the ground that the main army could not be delayed in its movements until its completion. Of course I never thought of delaying the advance of the army for that purpose, and so

stated repeatedly. On the 25th of October I sent to the General-in-Chief the following telegram:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 25, 1862—10.45 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington:

As the moment is at hand for the advance of this army, a question arises for the decision of the General-in-Chief, which, although perhaps impliedly decided by the President in his letter of the 13th,* should be clearly presented by me, as I do not regard it as in my province to determine it. This question is the extent to which the line of the Potomac should be guarded, after the army leaves, in order to cover Maryland and Pennsylvania from invasion by large or small parties of the enemy. It will always be somewhat difficult to guard the immediate line of the river, owing to its great extent and the numerous passages, which exist. It has long appeared to me that the best way of covering this line would be by occupying Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardensville, and Moorefield, or the *débouchés* of the several valleys in which they are situated. These points, or suitable places in their vicinity, should be strongly intrenched and permanently held. One great advantage of this arrangement would be the covering the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and an essential part of the system would be the construction of the link of railway from Winchester to Strasburg, and the rebuilding of the Manassas Gap Railway Bridge over the Shenandoah. The intrenchment of Manassas Junction would complete the system for the defense of the approaches to Washington and the Upper Potomac. Many months ago I recommended this arrangement—in fact, gave orders for it to be carried into effect. I still regard it as essential under all circumstances.

The views of the chief engineer of this army in regard to the defenses and garrison of Harper's Ferry and its dependencies are in your possession.

The only troops under my command, outside of the organization of the Army of the Potomac, are the Maryland brigade, under General Kenly; the Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania [Colonel Campbell]; Twelfth Illinois Cavalry [Colonel Voss], and Colonel Davis' Eighth New York Cavalry; total, 2,894 infantry, one battery, and about 900 cavalrymen. There are also two of my regiments of cavalry (about 750 men) guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Hancock and Cumberland. As I have no department, and command simply an active army in the field, my responsibility for the safety of the line of the Potomac and the States north of it must terminate the moment I advance so far beyond that line as to adopt another for my base of operations. The question for the General-in-Chief to decide, and which I regard as beyond my province, is this:

1st. Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac be regarded as assured by the advance of the army south of the Blue Ridge, and the line left to take care of itself?

2d. If it is deemed necessary to hold the line, or that hereinbefore indicated in advance of it, how many troops shall be placed there, at what points (and in what numbers and of what composition at each), and where shall they be supplied, *i. e.*, from this army or from other sources?

Omitting the detached troops mentioned above and the small garrisons of Boonsborough and Frederick, the last returns show the strength of this army for duty to be about 116,000 officers and men. This includes the divisions of Stoneman and Whipple, but does not include Meintzelman, Sigel, and Bayard.

If Harper's Ferry and the river above are rendered fully secure, it is possible that the active army, if it supplies the garrison, may be reduced so much as to be inadequate to the purposes contemplated. If it is preserved intact, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad may be unduly exposed.

I leave the decision of these grave questions to the General-in-Chief. I know nothing of the number of troops at Baltimore, &c.

An important element in the solution of this problem is the fact that a great portion of Bragg's army is probably now at liberty to unite itself with Lee's command.

I commence crossing the river at Berlin in the morning, and must ask a prompt decision of the questions proposed herein.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

To which I received the following reply:

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1862—1.35 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

In addition to the command which you had when I came here, you also have the greater part of that of Major-General Pope. Moreover, you have been authorized to

* See Addenda to Halleck's report, p. 13.

use any troops within your reach in General Wool's department and in Western Virginia. General Banks' command is also under your direction, with the single restriction that he is not to remove troops from Washington till he has notified me of his orders.

Since you left Washington I have advised and suggested in relation to your movements, but I have given you no orders. I do not give you any now. The Government has intrusted you with defeating and driving back the rebel army in your front. I shall not attempt to control you in the measures you may adopt for that purpose. You are informed of my views, but the President has left you at liberty to adopt them or not, as you may deem best. You will also exercise your own discretion in regard to what points on the Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad are to be occupied or fortified. I will only add that there is no appropriation for permanent intrenchments on that line. Moreover, I think it will be time enough to decide upon fortifying Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardensville, and Moorefield when the enemy is driven south of them and they come into our possession.

I do not think that we need have any immediate fear of Bragg's army. You are within 20 miles of Lee's, while Bragg is distant about 400 miles.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

On the 29th I sent the following:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 29, 1862—1.15 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington:

On the 25th instant I sent you a dispatch requesting you to decide what steps should be taken to guard the line of the Potomac when this army leaves here. To this I received your reply that I had been intrusted by the President with defeating and driving away the rebel army; that you had given me no orders heretofore, did not give me any then, &c. Under these circumstances, I have only to make such arrangements for guarding this extended line as the means at my disposal will permit, at the same time keeping in view the supreme necessity of maintaining the moving army in adequate force to meet the rebel army before us.

The dispositions I have ordered are as follows, viz: Ten thousand men to be left at Harper's Ferry; one brigade of infantry in front of Sharpsburg; Kenly's brigade of infantry at Williamsport; Kelley's brigade, including Colonel Campbell's Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania Infantry, at Cumberland, and between that point and Hancock. I have also left four small cavalry regiments to patrol and watch the river and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Cumberland down to Harper's Ferry.

I do not regard this force as sufficient to cover securely this great extent of line, but I do not feel justified in detaching any more troops from my moving columns. I would therefore recommend that some new regiments of infantry and cavalry be sent to strengthen the forces left by me. There should be a brigade of infantry and section of artillery in the vicinity of Cherry Run, another brigade at Hancock, an additional brigade at Williamsport, one regiment at Hagerstown, and one at Chambersburg, with a section of artillery at each place if possible. This is on the supposition that the enemy retain a considerable cavalry force west of the Blue Ridge. If they go east of it, the occupation of the points named in my dispatch of the 25th instant will obviate the necessity of keeping many of these troops on the river.

There are now several hundred of our wounded, including General Richardson, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, that cannot possibly be moved at present.

I repeat that I do not look upon the forces I have been able to leave from this army as sufficient to prevent cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, as cavalry is the only description of troops adequate to this service, and I am, as you are aware, deficient in this arm.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

To which I received on the 30th this reply:

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1862—11.30 a. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Your telegram of yesterday was received late last evening. The troops proposed for Thoroughfare Gap will be sent to that place whenever you are in position for their co-operation, as previously stated, but no new regiments can be sent from here to the Upper Potomac. The guarding of that line is left to your own discretion with the troops now under your command.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

I accordingly left the Twelfth Corps at Harper's Ferry, detaching one brigade to the vicinity of Sharpsburg. General Morell was placed in command of the line from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland; General Slocum in command of Harper's Ferry and the line east of the mouth of the Antietam.

The orders given to these officers were as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 29, 1862—1 p. m.

General H. W. SLOCUM,
Commanding Army Corps, Harper's Ferry:

The general commanding directs that you send one brigade of your corps to march at once to the position now occupied by General F. J. Porter's corps, in front of Sharpsburg, to watch and guard the line of the river from the ford near the mouth of the Antietam Creek to the mouth of the Opequon Creek. The officer in command will also take steps to afford proper protection to the sick and wounded in the hospitals in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Boonsborough. The regiment now at Boonsborough will be placed under his orders. General Kenly, at Williamsport, will guard the river from the mouth of the Opequon above, including the ford at the mouth of the Opequon.

The commanding general also directs that you take immediate steps to establish the remainder of your corps as follows, viz: One brigade on Maryland Heights, one brigade on Loudoun Heights, with the remainder on Bolivar Heights and at Harper's Ferry.

These dispositions should be made at once, so that General Couch can move with his corps.

Please acknowledge the receipt of this.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 31, 1862.

General GEORGE W. MORELL,
Commanding Upper Potomac:

GENERAL: I am instructed by the commanding general to say to you that he has selected you to perform the highly important and responsible duty of taking charge of and commanding the troops left for the defense of the line of the Potomac River, from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland, as well as any other troops that may hereafter be sent for the protection of the Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier, within the limits of the lines herein specified. The force which has been left to guard the line is not deemed adequate to prevent cavalry raids, but it is all that the commanding general feels authorized to detach from the Army of the Potomac at the present time, and it devolves upon you to make the best use of this force in your power. You will have four cavalry regiments under your command, which should be so distributed along the river as to watch all the available fords and give timely notice to the infantry of the approach of any force of rebels. You will afford all the protection in your power to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania. You will take steps to have all the sick and wounded of our army, as well as of the rebel army within your lines, properly taken care of until they can be sent to general hospitals, or discharged or paroled. You will make your headquarters at Hagerstown, and occasionally visit the different parts of your line. You will please report promptly to these headquarters everything of importance that occurs within the limits of your command. The three brigades now at Cumberland, Williamsport, and Sharpsburg, including the Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers, near Cumberland, will be under your command. They are commanded by Generals Kelley, Kenly, and Gordon.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 25th of October the pontoon bridge at Berlin was constructed, there being already one across the Potomac and another across the Shenandoah, at Harper's Ferry.

On the 26th two divisions of the Ninth Corps and Pleasonton's brigade of cavalry crossed at Berlin and occupied Lovettsville. The First, Sixth, and Ninth Corps, the cavalry, and the reserve artillery crossed at Berlin between the 26th of October and the 2d of November.

The Second and Fifth Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between the 29th of October and the 1st of November. Heavy rains delayed the movement considerably in the beginning, and the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were obliged to halt at least one day at the crossings, to complete, as far as possible, necessary supplies that could not be procured at an earlier period.

The plan of campaign I adopted during this advance was to move the army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main body, seizing each pass on the Blue Ridge by detachments as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with the Eleventh Corps and Sickles' division near Thoroughfare Gap. We depended upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the Manassas Gap Railway was reached. When that occurred, the passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in any direction.

It was my intention if, upon reaching Ashby's or any other pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac in the Valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley, and endeavor to gain their rear. I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that, by striking in between Culpeper Court-House and Little Washington, I could either separate their army and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the Army of the Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad beyond Culpeper.

On the 27th of October the remaining divisions of the Ninth Corps crossed at Berlin, and Pleasanton's cavalry advanced to Purcellville. The concentration of the Sixth Corps, delayed somewhat by intelligence as to the movements of the enemy near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on this day, and the First Corps was already in motion for Berlin.

On the 28th the First Corps and the general headquarters reached Berlin.

On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and encamped near Lovettsville. Stoneman's division, temporarily attached to the Ninth Corps, occupied Leesburg; Averell's cavalry brigade moved toward Berlin from Hagerstown; two divisions of the Ninth Corps moved to Wheatland, and one to Waterford. The Second Corps commenced the passage of the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley east of Loudoun Heights.

On the 30th the First Corps crossed at Berlin and encamped near Lovettsville, and the Second Corps completed the passage of the Shenandoah. The Fifth Corps commenced its march from Sharpsburg to Harper's Ferry.

On the 31st the Second Corps moved to the vicinity of Hillsborough; the Sixth Corps reached Boonsborough; the Fifth Corps reached Harper's Ferry, one division crossing the Shenandoah.

On the 1st of November the First Corps moved to Purcellville and Hamilton; the Second Corps to Wood Grove; the Fifth Corps to Hillsborough; the Sixth Corps reached Berlin, one division crossing. Pleasanton's cavalry occupied Philomont, having a sharp skirmish there and at Bloomfield.

On November 2 the Second Corps occupied Snicker's Gap; the Fifth

Corps, Snickersville; the Sixth Corps crossed the Potomac and encamped near Wheatland; the Ninth Corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union, and Philomont. Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Union. Averell was ordered to join Pleasonton. The enemy offered no serious resistance to the occupation of Snicker's Gap, but advanced to regain possession of it with a column of some 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, who were driven back by a few rounds from our rifled guns.

On the 3d the First Corps moved to Philomont, Union, Bloomfield, &c.; the Second Corps to the vicinity of Upperville; the Fifth Corps remained at Snicker's Gap; the Sixth Corps moved to Purcellville; the Ninth Corps moved toward Upperville. Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Upperville after a severe fight.

On the 4th the Second Corps took possession of Ashby's Gap; the Sixth Corps reached Union; the Ninth Corps, Upperville; the cavalry occupied Piedmont. On the 5th the First Corps moved to Rectortown and White Plains; one division of the Second Corps to the intersection of the Paris and Piedmont with the Upperville and Barbee's road; the Sixth Corps to the Aldie pike, east of Upperville; the Ninth Corps beyond the Manassas Railroad, between Piedmont and Salem, with a brigade at Manassas Gap. The cavalry under Averell had a skirmish at Manassas Gap, and the brigade of Pleasonton gained a handsome victory over superior numbers at Barbee's Cross-Roads. Bayard's cavalry had some sharp skirmishing in front of Salem.

On the 6th the First Corps advanced to Warrenton; the Second Corps to Rectortown; the Fifth Corps commenced its movement from Snicker's Gap to White Plains; the Ninth Corps to Waterloo and vicinity on the Rappahannock; the Eleventh Corps was at New Baltimore, Thoroughfare and Hopewell Gaps; Sickles' division guarding the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Manassas Junction toward Warrenton Junction; the cavalry near Flint Hill; Bayard to cut off what there might be in Warrenton and to proceed to the Rappahannock Station.

November 7 General Pleasonton was ordered to move toward Little Washington and Sperryville, and thence toward Culpeper Court-House.

November 8 the Second Corps moved half way to Warrenton; the Fifth Corps to New Baltimore.

November 9 the Second and Fifth Corps reached Warrenton; the Sixth Corps New Baltimore.

Late on the night of the 7th I received an order relieving me from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and directing me to turn it over to General Burnside, which I at once did.

I had already given the orders for the movements of the 8th and 9th. These orders were carried into effect without change.

The position in which I left the army, as the result of the orders I had given, was as follows:

The First, Second, and Fifth Corps, Reserve Artillery, and general headquarters, at Warrenton; the Ninth Corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the Sixth Corps at New Baltimore; the Eleventh Corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare Gap; Sickles' division of the Third Corps on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction; Pleasonton across the Rappahannock at Amissville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets at Hazel River, facing Longstreet, 6 miles from Culpeper Court-House; Bayard, near Rappahannock Station.

The army was thus massed near Warrenton, ready to act in any required direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable condition and

spirits. I doubt whether during the whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. When I gave up the command to General Burnside the best information in our possession indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front near Culpeper; Jackson, with one, perhaps both, of the Hills, near Chester and Thornton's Gaps, with the mass of their force west of the Blue Ridge.

The reports from General Pleasanton, on the advance, indicated the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Longstreet separately or forcing him to fall back at least upon Gordonsville, to effect his junction with the rest of the army.

The following is from the report of General Pleasanton:

At this time and from the 7th instant my advance pickets were at Hazel River, within 6 miles of Culpeper, besides having my flank pickets toward Chester and Thornton's Gaps extended to Gaines' Cross-Roads and Newby's Cross-Roads, with numerous patrols in the direction of Woodville, Little Washington, and Sperryville.

The information gained from these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet with his command being at Culpeper, while Jackson with D. H. Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenandoah Valley, on the western side of the Blue Ridge, covering Chester and Thornton's Gaps, and expecting us to attempt to pass through and attack them.

As late as the 17th of November a contraband just from Strasburg came in my camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps was 2 miles beyond that place, on the railroad to Mount Jackson. Hill was tearing up the road and destroying the bridges, under the impression that we intended to follow into that valley, and was *en route* for Staunton. Jackson's corps was between Strasburg and Winchester. Ewell and A. P. Hill were with Jackson. Provisions were scarce, and the rebels were obliged to keep moving to obtain them.

Had I remained in command, I should have made the attempt to divide the enemy as before suggested, and could he have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies, I cannot doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our army.

On the 10th of November General Pleasanton was attacked by Longstreet with one division of infantry and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed the attack. This indicates the relative position of our army and that of the enemy at the time I was relieved from the command.

It would be impossible to participate in operations such as those described in the foregoing pages without forming fixed opinions upon subjects connected with the organization of our armies and the general conduct of military operations.

This report would be incomplete without a brief allusion to some general considerations which have been firmly impressed upon me by the events which have occurred. To my mind the most glaring defect in our armies is the absence of system in the appointment and promotion of general and other officers and the want of means for the theoretical instruction of the mass of officers. The expansion of the army was so great and so rapid at the commencement of the existing war that it was perhaps impossible, in the great scarcity of instructed officers, to have adopted any other course than that which was pursued; but the time has arrived when measures may be initiated to remedy existing defects and provide against their recurrence.

I think that the army should be regarded as a permanent one; that is to say, its affairs should be administered precisely as if all who belonged to it had made it their profession for life, and those rules for promotion, &c., which have been found necessary in the best foreign armies to excite honorable emulation, produce an *esprit de corps*, and secure efficiency, should be followed by us. All officers and soldiers

should be made to feel that merit—that is to say, courage, good conduct, the knowledge and performance of the duties of their grade, and fitness to exercise those of a superior grade—will insure to them advancement in their profession, and can alone secure it for them. Measures should be adopted to secure the theoretical instruction of staff officers at least, who should, as far as possible, be selected from officers having a military education or who have seen actual service in the field. The number of cadets at the Military Academy should be at once increased to the greatest extent permitted by the capacity of the institution. The Regular Army should be increased and maintained complete in numbers and efficiency. A well-organized system of recruiting and of depots for instruction should be adopted in order to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and supply promptly losses arising from battle or disease. This is especially necessary for the artillery and cavalry arms of the service, which from the beginning of the war have rendered great services, and which have never been fully appreciated by any but their comrades. We need also large bodies of well-instructed engineer troops. In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. A statesman may perhaps be more competent than a soldier to determine the political objects and direction of a campaign; but those once decided upon, everything should be left to the responsible military head without interference from civilians. In no other manner is success probable. The meddling of individual members or committees of Congress with subjects which, from lack of experience, they are of course incapable of comprehending, and which they are too apt to view through the distorted medium of partisan or personal prejudice, can do no good, and is certain to produce incalculable mischief.

I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for the constant evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sustain the military plans which my judgment led me to urge for adoption and execution. I cannot attribute his failure to adopt some of those plans, and to give that support to others which was necessary to their success, to any want of confidence in me; and it only remains for me to regret that other counsels came between the constitutional commander-in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the head of his armies—counsels which resulted in the failure of great campaigns.

If the nation possesses no generals in service competent to direct its military affairs without the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds them and places them in position the better will it be for its fortunes.

I may be pardoned for calling attention to the memorandum submitted by me to the President on the 4th of August, 1861, my letter to him of July 7, 1862, and other similar communications to him and to the Secretary of War. I have seen no reason to change, in any material regard, the views there expressed.

After a calm, impartial, and patient consideration of the subject—a subject which demands the closest thought on the part of every true lover of his country—I am convinced that, by the proper employment of our resources, it is entirely possible to bring this war to a successful military issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the organized military power of the Confederates, and that such a result should be accompanied and followed by conciliatory measures, and that, by pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to

bring about a permanent restoration of the Union—a reunion by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect while they respect each other.

In this report I have confined myself to a plain narrative of such facts as are necessary for the purposes of history. Where it was possible I have preferred to give these facts in the language of dispatches written at the time of their occurrence, rather than to attempt a new relation.

The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto annexed, recite what time and space would fail me to mention here—those individual instances of conspicuous bravery and skill by which every battle was marked. To them I must especially refer, for without them this narrative would be incomplete and justice fail to be done. But I cannot omit to tender to my corps commanders, and to other general officers under them, such ample recognition of their cordial co-operation and their devoted services as those reports abundantly avouch. I have not sought to defend the army which I had the honor to command, nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so rife. It has seemed to me that nothing more was required than such a plain and truthful narrative to enable those whose right it is to form a correct judgment on the important matters involved.

This report is, in fact, the history of the Army of the Potomac.

During the period occupied in the organization of that army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a lately victorious enemy while the fortification of the capital was in progress, and under the discipline which it then received it acquired strength, education, and some of that experience which is necessary to success in active operations, and which enabled it afterward to sustain itself under circumstances trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops to the realities of war.

The army grew into shape but slowly, and the delays which attended on the obtaining of arms, continuing late into the winter of 1861-'62, were no less trying to the soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the time of the organization of the Peninsular campaign some of the finest regiments were without rifles; nor were the utmost exertions on the part of the military authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles to active service.

When at length the army was in condition to take the field, the Peninsular campaign was planned, and entered upon with enthusiasm by officers and men. Had this campaign been followed up as it was designed, I cannot doubt that it would have resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms and the permanent restoration of the power of the Government in Virginia and North Carolina, if not throughout the revolting States. It was, however, otherwise ordered, and, instead of reporting a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, there to abandon one and originate another and new plan of campaign, which might and would have been successful if supported with appreciation of its necessities, but which failed because of the repeated failure of promised support at the most critical and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. That heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its illustration must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm reflection, when the nation shall be looking back to the past from the midst of peaceful days. For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my comrades were victors on every field save one, and there the endurance of but little more than a single corps accomplished the object of the fighting,

and, by securing to the army its transit to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren victory.

The Army of the Potomac was first reduced by the withdrawal from my command of the division of General Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain Department, under General Frémont. We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula when it was further reduced by a dispatch revoking a previous order giving me command of Fort Monroe, and under which I had expected to take 10,000 men from that point to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire before the defenses of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of General McDowell's corps of about 35,000 men. This completed the overthrow of the original plan of the campaign. About one-third of my entire army (five divisions out of fourteen, one of the nine remaining being but little larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance, which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up the York River, it was only left to besiege Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the army, and, when these strong works at length yielded to our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the sanguinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, surrounded with fortifications and guarded by an army larger than our own, but the prospect did not shake the courage of the brave men who composed my command. Relying still on the support which the vastness of our undertaking and the grand results depending on our success seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. The weather was stormy beyond precedent; the deep soil of the Peninsula was at times one vast morass; the Chickahominy rose to a higher stage than had been known for years before. Pursuing the advance, the crossings were seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junction with reinforcements now promised and earnestly desired, and upon the arrival of which the complete success of the campaign seemed clear. The brilliant battle of Hanover Court-House was fought, which opened the way for the First Corps, with the aid of which, had it come, we should then have gone into the enemy's capital. It never came. The bravest army could not do more under such overwhelming disappointment than the Army of the Potomac then did. Fair Oaks attests their courage and endurance when they hurled back again and again the vastly superior masses of the enemy. But mortal men could not accomplish the miracles that seemed to have been expected of them. But one course was left—a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy to another and better base—one of the most hazardous movements in war. The Army of the Potomac, holding its own safety and almost the safety of our cause in its hands, was equal to the occasion. The seven days are classical in American history—those days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an outnumbering enemy by day and retreated from successive victories by night through a week of battle, closing the terrible series of conflicts with the ever memorable victory of Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, the entire eastern army of the Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place of rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital from the banks of the James. Richmond was still within our grasp had the Army of the Potomac been re-enforced and permitted to advance; but counsels which I cannot but think subsequent events proved unwise prevailed in Washington, and we were ordered to abandon the campaign. Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a nation

than the Army of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsular campaign, and although that meed was withheld from them by the authorities, I am persuaded they have received the applause of the American people.

The Army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight of Richmond and incorporated with the Army of Virginia. The disappointments of the campaign on the Peninsula had not damped their ardor or diminished their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gallantly, under General Pope, yet were compelled to fall back on Washington, defeated and almost demoralized.

The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his own capital, poured his troops northward, entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and even Washington itself. Elated by his recent victories, and assured that our troops were disorganized and dispirited, he was confident that the seat of war was now permanently transferred to the loyal States, and that his own exhausted soil was to be relieved from the burden of supporting two hostile armies; but he did not understand the spirit which animated the soldiers of the Union. I shall not, nor can I, living, forget that when I was ordered to the command of the troops for the defense of the capital, the soldiers with whom I had shared so much of the anxiety and pain and suffering of the war had not lost their confidence in me as their commander. They sprang to my call with all their ancient vigor, discipline, and courage. I led them into Maryland. Fifteen days after they had fallen back defeated before Washington, they vanquished the enemy on the rugged heights of South Mountain, pursued him to the hard-fought field of Antietam, and drove him, broken and disappointed, across the Potomac into Virginia.

The army had need of rest. After the terrible experiences of battles and marches, with scarcely an interval of repose, which they had gone through from the time of leaving for the Peninsula, the return to Washington, the defeat in Virginia, the victory at South Mountain and again at Antietam, it was not surprising that they were in a large degree destitute of the absolute necessities to effective duty. Shoes were worn out, blankets were lost, clothing was in rags; in short, the army was unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and equipment was necessary. When the slowly forwarded supplies came to us, I led the army across the river, renovated, refreshed, in good order and discipline, and followed the retreating foe to a position where I was confident of decisive victory, when, in the midst of the movement, while my advance guard was actually in contact with the enemy, I was removed from the command.

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with this brave army was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if, by this report, the Army of the Potomac is not placed high on the roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always ready for battle, always firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I never called on it in vain; nor will the nation ever have cause to attribute its want of success, under myself or under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that noble body of American soldiers.

No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the commanding general to the private, any lack of devotion to the service of the United States Government and to the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffer-

ing, danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comrades, dead on all the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a nation's reverence than the survivors to the justice of a nation's gratitude.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General, U. S. Army.

No. 3.

Report of Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls, chief quartermaster, Army of the Potomac, of operations of the quartermaster's department September 2–November 9, 1862, with annual report for fiscal year ending June 30, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 17, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 20th ultimo asking for a report of the operations of the quartermaster's department from the time I succeeded General Van Vliet to the date of transfer of the command by General McClellan.*

* * * * *

On arrival at Yorktown and Fortress Monroe, the troops were embarked, as rapidly as our means of water transportation would allow, for Aquia and Alexandria, in order to unite with the forces under General Pope. The cavalry and means of land transportation were the last to be shipped. Much of the cavalry did not arrive until after Pope had fallen back on the defenses and had been relieved in command. Many of the baggage trains were still behind, and did not come up until this army was reorganized by General McClellan after Pope's reverses, and had reached the Antietam. Great exertions were required and made to supply the army on its march in the Maryland campaign.

So soon as General McClellan was invested with the command of the army for "the defenses of Washington," I ordered all quartermasters to make requisitions for such supplies as would be necessary to put the troops in condition to take the field. The army was then resting near its great depots. Most of the troops were well supplied for that occasion, but some commands, owing to the suddenness of the march, having left their clothing on vessels at Harrison's Landing to be brought to Alexandria, neglect, or inexperience of staff officers, subsequently were subjected to some privations.

It was at this period that General McClellan organized and put in motion a grand army that expelled the enemy from Maryland. This army moved early in September toward Frederick by way of Rockville and Urbana. I left on the 8th and joined headquarters at Rockville. Until the army reached the vicinity of railroads, it was supplied exclusively by our wagon trains direct from Washington. At that season of

* So much of this report as relates to operations July 10–September 2 will be found in Vol. XI, Part I, pp. 164–166; but see annual report following.

the year it was not difficult to do this at a distance of 20 or 30 miles from our base, the roads then being good. Our first supplies by rail came to the Monocacy, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. So soon as the bridge was finished, the depot was moved into the city of Frederick. After the battle of South Mountain, the country was opened to Hagerstown, on the Cumberland Valley Railroad, where another depot was immediately established. Soon after the battle of Antietam another was established near Harper's Ferry. The canal was navigable for supplies to near Poolesville.

With these depots the army from Williamsport to Poolesville was supplied with all its material wants, except as hereafter referred to in this report. The labor, however, of arranging and perfecting this system of transportation, of bringing to each depot the requisite amount, and the details of trains for the distribution of these vast supplies to the different portions of the army, was excessively onerous night and day. Immediately after the battle of Antietam, efforts were made to supply deficiencies in clothing and horses. Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. The artillery and cavalry required large numbers to cover losses sustained in battle, on the march, and by disease. Both of these arms were deficient when they left Washington. A most violent and destructive disease made its appearance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of service. Horses reported perfectly well one day would be dead or lame the next, and it was difficult to foresee where it would end or what number would cover the loss. They were attacked in the hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account satisfactorily for the appearance of this disease. Animals kept at rest would recover in time, but could not be worked. I made application to send West and purchase horses at once, but it was refused on the ground that the outstanding contracts provided for enough; but they were not delivered sufficiently fast nor in sufficient numbers until late in October and early in November. I was authorized to buy 2,500 late in October, but the delivery was not completed until in November, after we had reached Warrenton.

There was great delay in receiving our clothing. The orders were promptly given by me and approved by General Meigs, but the roads were slow to transport, particularly the Cumberland Valley road. For instance, clothing ordered to Hagerstown on the 7th of October for the corps of Franklin, Porter, and Reynolds, did not arrive there until about the 18th, and by that time, of course, there were increased wants and changes in position of troops. The clothing, however, arrived in great quantities near the last of October, almost too late for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia. We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferry, partly on the cars just arrived and partly in store.

During the whole of September and October we increased our stock of animals all in our power. In the beginning of October my records show that there was with the army immediately present under General McClellan about 3,219 baggage and supply wagons, some 7,880 artillery, 8,142 cavalry, and 6,471 team horses, and 10,392 mules, making some 32,885 animals in all. Many additional were absolutely necessary to move the army. (See list herewith, marked A.)

About the 1st of November following there was much improvement. My records show that, exclusive of the forces about Washington, there were 3,911 wagons, 907 ambulances, 7,139 artillery, 9,582 cavalry, and 8,693 team horses, and 12,483 mules, making 37,897 in all. (See return herewith, marked B.) This exhibits about the number on hand when

General McClellan was relieved. Of course these figures show the whole number of animals for which forage had to be provided. I am aware that during October and November my returns showed a much larger number of horses on hand than were reported fit for active service by the corps commanders. Forage was necessarily provided for all, while many of the cavalry and artillery horses present were unfit for a march. Subsequently our trains were increased to near 3,000 wagons and 6,000 animals of all kinds, after the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps had joined. We could then have ten days' supply.

Near the last of October preparations were made to cross the Potomac at Berlin, a few miles below Harper's Ferry. Supplies of subsistence, forage, ordnance, and hospital stores were loaded in our wagons to meet our wants until we should reach the Manassas Gap Railroad at Salem and Rectortown, to which points stores were sent direct from Washington and Alexandria. Our trains at this time could not carry supplies of provisions and short forage for the army, with the necessary ordnance, hospital stores, camp equipage, &c., for more than six or eight days. A wagon drawn by six mules over good roads can haul 1,200 short rations of provisions (bread, sugar, coffee, salt, and soap) and six days' rations of grain for mules. Over hilly or muddy roads the weight would be correspondingly reduced. It can thus be easily seen how far from our depots an army can be supplied by wagons. When the supplies in trains become exhausted, an army must be at or near another source of supply, as a matter of course.

The march from the Potomac at Berlin to Warrenton, where General McClellan left the army, was a magnificent spectacle of celerity and skill. It was in camp near Rectortown, on the 7th November, 1862, that the general was relieved. At this time the department was well organized. The officers had become well instructed, experienced, zealous, and practical. But for their untiring energy and implicit obedience to orders, such an army on the march, with constantly changing depots, could never have been furnished with necessary allowances.

The great success attending our marches is due in part to the intelligence, fidelity, and perseverance of the officers of the Quartermaster's Department, to whom I owe much and to whom my gratitude is due. I am bound, also, to bear testimony to the promptness of the Quartermaster-General and all his depot officers, all of whom have invariably desired to assist me all in their power. I must also call the attention of General McClellan to the merits of those officers in my department who have served at our great depots. It was on these officers we mainly relied for our supplies. Lieut. Col. Fred. Myers, aide-de-camp and quartermaster, joined me in the march into Maryland, and has had particular charge of transportation. His services have been laborious and valuable. It was Colonel Myers who took charge of and successfully brought in the trains after Pope's defeat. I was then at Alexandria and knew the fact, though General Pope did not refer to his name at all in his report, and his services recently have not been rewarded. I feel greatly indebted to Colonel Sawtelle, to whom I have already referred. My thanks are also due to Captains Rankin, Wagner, Peirce, Pitkin, and Bliss.

I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

RUFUS INGALLS,

Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

General R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff, Major-General McClellan, New York City.

[Inclosures.]

A.—Report of the means of transportation, &c., with the Army of the Potomac, on October 1, 1862.

Command.	Number of men.	Means of transportation.				Horses.		Number of animals.
		Horses.	Mules.	Wagons.	Ambulances.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	
Army Headquarters.....	1,000	229	254	120	6	500	983
First Army Corps.....	13,707	1,496	703	463	168	180	3,239
Second Army Corps.....	16,083	338	1,798	440	1,860	3,176
Fifth Army Corps.....	30,926	882	2,243	605	119	34	1,980	5,139
Sixth Army Corps.....	18,743	654	999	363	85	1,200	2,938
Ninth Army Corps.....	12,860	*922	*1,317	400	217	1,080	3,536
Twelfth Army Corps.....	17,159	*1,146	*1,523	360	76	1,080	3,825
Fourteen regiments of cavalry†	7,000	520	780	260	7,000	8,300
Four batteries of horse artillery†	600	80	20	640	720
General Couch's division‡	9,740	204	775	188	22	50	1,029
Total	127,818	6,471	10,392	3,219	§315	8,142	7,880	32,885

RUFUS INGALLS,

Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

B.—Report of the number of officers and enlisted men, the number of horses and other means of transportation, and the number of cavalry and artillery horses in each regiment or battery, and at brigade and division headquarters, in the Army of the Potomac on November 1, 1862.

Command.	Number at army headquarters and in each corps.									Number of public animals.
	Number of officers.	Number of enlisted men.	Means of transportation.					Horses.		
			Horses.	Mules.	Army wagons.	Two-horse wagons.	Ambulances.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	
Headquarters Army of the Potomac..	98	2,154	343	553	165	21	10	1,062	-----	1,958
FIRST ARMY CORPS.										
Headquarters of corps.....	13	80	33	16	9	-----	3	30	-----	-----
First Division, General A. Doubleday commanding.	370	7,072	758	329	207	4	78	25	456	-----
Second Division, General J. B. Ricketts commanding.	375	7,598	398	428	147	-----	57	37	226	-----
Third Division, General George G. Meade commanding.	357	7,283	579	279	164	1	62	10	364	-----
	1,115	21,983	1,768	1,052	527	5	200	102	1,046	3,968
SECOND ARMY CORPS.										
Headquarters of corps.....	11	89	16	32	7	-----	1	94	-----	-----
First Division, General W. S. Hancock commanding.	391	8,264	240	582	161	-----	25	-----	215	-----
Second Division, General W. A. Gorman commanding.	385	8,561	146	992	196	2	5	6	336	-----
Third Division, General William H. French commanding.	427	8,516	135	528	151	-----	4	6	223	-----
	1,214	25,430	537	2,134	515	2	35	106	774	3,551

*A number of these animals were transferred to other corps. † Estimated.

‡ Attached to Sixth Corps. Artillery horses accounted for in that corps.

§ Several of the corps did not report the ambulances.

B.—Report of the number of officers and enlisted men, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Number at army headquarters and in each corps.										Number of public animals.
	Number of officers.	Number of enlisted men.	Means of transportation.					Horses.			
			Horses.	Mules.	Army wagons.	Two-horse wagons.	Ambulances.	Cavalry.	Artillery.		
FIFTH ARMY CORPS.											
Headquarters of corps.....	23	272	38	63	15	2	185				
First Division, General George Sykes commanding.	162	4,235	148	605	128	33		195			
Second Division, General A. A. Humphreys commanding.	311	7,268	409	178	138	33	12	162			
Third Division, General Morell commanding.	573	13,054	238	1,037	228	5	14		446		
Artillery Reserve, Colonel Hays commanding.	31	931	327	102	100	8		788			
	1,100	25,760	1,160	1,985	609	5	90	197	1,591	4,933	
SIXTH ARMY CORPS.											
Headquarters of corps.....	19	203	247	13	30	2	99				
First Division, General W. T. H. Brooks commanding.	439	9,614	633	453	219	2	33	4	473		
Second Division, General William F. Smith commanding.	554	13,623	238	859	190	44		444			
Third Division, General J. Newton commanding.	584	12,605	166	951	211	3	19	5	192		
Maryland Brigade, General J. R. Kenly commanding.	179	3,755	58	242	70	1	1	58	106		
	1,775	39,800	1,342	2,518	720	6	104	166	1,215	5,241	
NINTH ARMY CORPS.											
Headquarters of corps.....	8	43	212	32	5	1	101	18			
First Division, Col. William M. Fenton commanding.	293	6,503	236	407	106	6	1	6	140		
Second Division, General S. D. Sturgis commanding.	275	6,571	302	437	164	6	23	16	308		
Third Division, General G. W. Getty commanding.	225	5,246	87	548	114	4	5		175		
Fourth Division, General George Stoneman commanding.	616	11,714	753	746	194	5	90	757	298		
	1,417	30,077	1,590	2,170	583	22	220	797	921	5,478	
TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.											
Headquarters of corps, including artillery of First and Second Divisions.	38	1,170	106	459	121	8	10	54	747		
First Division, General A. S. Williams commanding.	572	13,374	444	551	188	1	61	23			
Second Division, General J. W. Geary commanding.	436	8,501	480	189	128	1	39	5			
Third Division, General A. W. Whipple commanding.	272	5,508	171	331	79	23	10	7	215		
	1,318	28,553	1,201	1,530	516	33	120	89	962	3,782	
Cavalry and horse artillery	396	7,995	752	541	276	34	7,063	630	8,986		
Total	8,433	*181,752	8,693	12,483	3,911	94	813	9,582	7,139	37,897	

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

November 1, 1862.

I certify that the above report is correct.

RUFUS INGALLS,

Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

* Overestimated, I suspect, but so reported by the quartermasters.—R. I.

Annual report of Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls, chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Camp near Culpeper, Va., September 28, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with your General Orders, No. 13, of last July, the 22d, I have the honor to submit the following report on the operations of the quartermaster's department of the Army of the Potomac during the fiscal year ending on the 30th June, 1863:

On the first day of the fiscal year I established the great depot on James River, at Harrison's Landing, at and around which point General McClellan concentrated his army after the eventful seven days' battles about Richmond. On the 28th of June preceding I had broken up the depot at White House, on the Pamunkey, in execution of orders received from the general commanding and General Van Vliet, then chief quartermaster of the army, and had successfully removed all the transports containing the public supplies—more than five hundred vessels of all descriptions—from the York to James River. I arrived at Haxall's, above City Point, on the left bank of the James, near noon of the 30th of June, and reported in person to General McClellan when he came to the river some two or three hours later in the day, and while the first great fight at Malvern Hill was raging.

The army was destitute of supplies; my arrival was exceedingly fortunate and opportune. Temporary barge wharves were at once constructed at Harrison's Landing, the transports were brought alongside, and the subsistence, ordnance, hospital, and quartermaster's departments were prepared for the issue of necessary supplies on the arrival of the troops. We found in the vicinity a few old wharves, which contributed greatly to the accommodation of the commissary, ordnance, and hospital departments, but generally we had to rely upon our own resources in the construction of landings or wharves at our various depots.

At the commencement of the movement to the Peninsula I was placed in charge of the assembling of transports, fitting them for the voyages, and embarking the troops. I took post at Alexandria, by order of the War Department, so soon as the blockade of the Potomac was raised, and remained there from the 18th of March until the 3d of April, 1862, up to which time I had personally superintended the embarkation of more than 70,000 men of the Army of the Potomac.

It was my duty, while on the Peninsula, to establish the depots of supply for the army, and to see that all proper stores were provided and issued. This duty was excessively laborious and responsible, especially at Cheeseman's Creek, Yorktown, and White House, during the night as well as day. There were few officers of experience in the quartermaster's department at that time with the army, either in the regular or volunteer service. The magnitude of our operations far exceeded what any quartermaster had ever before witnessed, or, indeed, read of. The sites of the depots at Cheeseman's Creek and White House were selected by me, and the landings constructed under my immediate superintendence, and sometimes with the assistance of my own hands. I was up to that date almost alone, so far as good officers were concerned. Proper measures had been taken by General Van Vliet to have an abundance of forage, clothing, &c., afloat, and in readiness to be issued at the depots. The subsistence department, also,

from the first to the present time, has always been well prepared with stores and employés.

In the mean time officers were acquiring the requisite experience, and by the 1st of July the army possessed very many well trained and efficient quartermasters, so that at Harrison's Landing, for instance, I was relieved of an onerous load of duty by officers whom I had selected on account of their great merit. I made the following assignment at this depot, holding the general superintendence myself, viz:

Capt. C. G. Sawtelle (now lieutenant-colonel and chief quartermaster Cavalry Bureau), in special charge of water transportation and other branches; Capt. L. H. Peirce, in charge of land transportation; Capts. C. B. Wagner and A. Bliss, in charge of clothing; Capt. P. P. Pitkin, in charge of employés; and Capt. J. B. Winslow, in charge of forage. In twenty-four hours after the establishment of this depot, every duty was performed with great punctuality and accuracy. All issues were made on prescribed requisitions and necessary supplies called for.

A record of all arrivals and departures of vessels was kept by the harbor-master. Regular mail and freight boats were put on the route to Fortress Monroe, and vessels were constantly plying between the depot and the principal seaport cities.

I will here remark that I must refer you to the detailed reports of my subordinate officers, who have been in charge of special branches of our department, for information called for under the second, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth paragraphs of your order. These reports will serve to remind you of a portion of the stupendous operations of our department during the past fiscal year, conducted under your orders.

On the 10th of July, by the voluntary retirement of General Van Vliet, I was announced the chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, a position which I have had the honor to hold to the present time, and which has confined me generally to headquarters. My duties since that period have been supervisory and administrative. I have continued to provide for the wants of the army on all its campaigns, and have established the depots and lines of supply in all instances, but have placed suitable officers at the different points to execute the instructions given by me to meet the wishes of the general commanding. You will receive the reports of these officers.

It is due to my predecessor to record my regret at his leaving an army to which he was devotedly attached, and for which he had labored so assiduously and with such great talent.

It must be borne in mind that war on a scale inaugurated by this rebellion was decidedly new to us, if not to the civilized world.

Easy as it may seem now, after the lapse of two years, to organize the transportation of a great army, and provide its supplies with the known means we now have, there were few men at that day in the republic who could have accomplished the task sooner than it was. It required the united abilities and exertions of our whole department, aided by the loyal producers and manufacturers of the country, to meet the public wants; and, if there were temporary failures, the department should stand excused, for its labors have been unparalleled and gigantic. Perhaps the failures in our department have been fewer than in fighting the troops.

I had no data left me to show what means of transportation and other quartermaster's property were still with the army after its severe battles and change of base. Inspections were immediately made throughout. It was found that there were in the service, about the last of July,

3,100 wagons, 17,000 horses, 8,000 mules, and 350 ambulances. I have no means of knowing the original number. The supply of clothing, camp and garrison equipage, &c., was good. In the river at the depot were bountiful supplies of forage, subsistence, and hospital stores.

The general commanding received orders early in August to evacuate the Peninsula. About the middle of the month one corps was thrown across the Chickahominy near its mouth, over a pontoon bridge of 2,000 feet in length; another command was pushed out toward New Kent Court-House over Bottom's Bridge; both with a view of protecting our trains, which were now sent forward rapidly in advance of the remainder of the army, by the pontoon bridge. They all passed in safety, and proceeded to the point of embarkation at Yorktown, Newport News, and Fortress Monroe. The transports were withdrawn under the direction of Colonel Sawtelle, who was my principal assistant at White House, and whose sagacity, zeal, promptness, and experience qualify him for any position in your Department. The headquarters left Harrison's Landing on the morning of the 16th of August, and the depot was broken up and abandoned, without loss, on the evening preceding. The march was a rapid and orderly one. I arrived at Fortress Monroe on the 18th by water from Yorktown. Fitz John Porter's corps, which was the first to cross the Chickahominy on the retreat, had already embarked for Aquia Creek to join Burnside and Pope. It was arranged that Heintzelman's corps should embark at Yorktown; Keyes' should remain there; that Franklin should embark at Newport News, and Sumner at Fortress Monroe.

Leaving Colonel Sawtelle at the latter point to provide transports and push forward the troops, cavalry, horses, and artillery, I returned to Yorktown to hasten the embarkation of the Third Corps.

I finally left Fortress Monroe with General McClellan and staff on the 23d of August, and arrived off Aquia early on the 24th instant, where we remained on the transports sixty hours awaiting orders. I left Aquia on the 26th instant, and arrived at Alexandria on the 27th, where headquarters went into camp near the city.

After the evacuation of Harrison's Landing the troops were pushed forward as rapidly as our means would permit. The officers and men seemed anxious and impatient to reach the scene of conflict in front of Washington, where it was known great battles must be fought, on which mighty national interests were staked.

I know the officers of our department used untiring exertions to expedite the embarkation; but it is now apparent that either we did not leave Harrison's Landing soon enough, or that General Pope did not fall back without risking a general engagement, as perhaps he might have done, at least earlier in the campaign, until more forces should arrive. I allude to the matter only in justice to our own department, which has sometimes been accused of tardiness and having inadequate means of transportation on that occasion. Our means were ample and as great as the country could afford. Transports were assembled, as far as possible, from all available sources. It was not to be expected that there should be transports enough to move 100,000 men, with the artillery, cavalry, and trains, at once. It was necessary to perform this service by successive voyages of the vessels. It had required more than a month to transport the army from Alexandria to the Peninsula. It could not be brought back in a day. It did absorb three weeks' time to bring all back. Many of the wagon trains and a portion of the cavalry did not arrive until the army had left Washington on the Maryland campaign. Indeed, some did not join until after the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

It is fresh in your memory how Pope's campaign resulted. Disorganized trains and wearied and dispirited troops were crowded in on Washington and Alexandria during the latter days of August.

General McClellan was invested on the 4th of September with the command of the "defenses of Washington." At the same time I ordered all quartermasters to draw supplies, to place their commands in marching condition, and to reorganize their trains at once.

These orders were obeyed very promptly. There was probably some 2,500 wagons conducted in by Col. Fred. Myers to Alexandria, which he saved from the recent retreat of General Pope. These, added to what had arrived from the Peninsula and what General Rucker could spare from the Washington depot, made up the train for the Maryland campaign.

It was soon ascertained that portions of the rebel army had crossed the Potomac, and had entered Maryland above Harper's Ferry. On the 5th and 6th of September our army was put in march toward Frederick City, by Rockville and Urbana.

I left Washington on the 7th instant, and joined headquarters same day at Rockville. We remained there two or three days, while our cavalry and advanced infantry and artillery commands were gaining information of the enemy and feeling of his position. Meantime General McClellan became possessed of the plans of the rebel general, and the army was pushed on through Frederick to the gorges of South Mountain, where the rebels made their first stand of any importance.

The battle of South Mountain was fought on the 13th and 14th of September. That victory opened the Cumberland Valley. The army followed rapidly, and came up with the entire rebel army in position on the heights of Sharpsburg on the 15th instant.

The battle of Antietam was fought on the 17th, and resulted in favor of our arms, freeing Maryland completely of the enemy, and compelling him to retreat into Virginia.

The army was supplied by our wagon trains exclusively, until we recaptured Frederick. The enemy had burned the railroad bridge over the Monocacy, but a depot was established on the left bank while the bridge was being rebuilt, and supplies of subsistence and forage were brought up over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; Capt. J. C. Crane, assistant quartermaster, was placed in charge. The commands within reach sent wagons to this depot for what they required. Wagon trains were also kept plying between Washington and the army until after it had passed South Mountain. A depot was next established at Hagerstown, under Capt. George H. Weeks, assistant quartermaster, and supplies of clothing, subsistence, and forage were brought over the Cumberland Valley Railroad.

These supplies came mainly from Washington, but forage and clothing were frequently brought direct from New York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. After the battle of Antietam the army was assembled about Harper's Ferry. The canal was now available; with all these sources of transportation we had no embarrassment, save in the extreme slowness, in some instances, with which stores turned over to the railroad for transportation were delivered at their destinations. From this cause we were unfortunately very late in receiving clothing, and much of it arrived at Berlin too late for issue, as the army was already on its march to White Plains, Warrenton, &c.

Generally, however, the railroads did splendid service. I always found the principal officers and agents of the roads extremely obliging, courteous, and energetic.

Our wagon trains had been much increased. About the 1st of November they numbered 3,911 wagons, 8,693 horses, 12,483 mules, 907 ambulances, 7,139 artillery horses, and 9,582 cavalry. We had sufficient to haul seven days' supplies for the army, besides its baggage, camp equipage, &c. The army crossed the Potomac over pontoon bridges at Berlin the last of October. I crossed on the 1st of November, and reached Salem, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, on the 3d following. Supplies had already been ordered by this road direct from Washington and Alexandria.

On the 9th of November General Burnside assumed command of the army, and soon after he moved it to Falmouth, in front of Fredericksburg. On the 13th I left the army at Warrenton, with orders to proceed to Washington and Alexandria, thence to Aquia Creek, and to take measures for the support of the army by the Aquia and Fredericksburg Railroad. On the 16th, in company with Generals Woodbury and Haupt, I went to Aquia and Belle Plain on a reconnaissance. We found the old wharf and entire depot at Aquia a mass of ruins, and the interior of the country still in the hands of the enemy. It was decided to create temporary landings at both Aquia and Belle Plain, to land supplies and haul them to the army on its arrival with wagons, while permanent arrangements on a proper scale could be made.

This plan was most successfully executed. I returned to Belle Plain about the 19th, and joined headquarters at Falmouth. The depot at Aquia was made as spacious and commodious as any one we have ever had. Large wharves were constructed and storehouses erected to accommodate all departments. I placed Capt. T. E. Hall, assistant quartermaster, in charge, with several officers to assist him. Captain Hall was finally succeeded by Lieut. Cols. A. Thompson and Painter, assistant quartermasters. Frequent inspections were made by myself and Colonels Sawtelle, Myers, and Painter. General Haupt placed Mr. W. W. Wright at the place as railroad agent. He was an exceedingly energetic, gentlemanly, and business-like officer. Stations were established at convenient points along the road for the delivery of supplies—the principal one having been at Falmouth, under Capt. L. H. Peirce, assistant quartermaster, now assistant chief quartermaster of this army. His report will show you the immensity of his business during the past year. I regard him as one of the best quartermasters in the service.

The land transportation of the army was reorganized while at Falmouth, and to-day corresponds precisely with the standard prescribed in Orders, No. 83.* (A copy is herewith, marked A.)

The rule will be found useful if applied to our other armies. There would be, besides, the advantage of uniformity. Our supply trains are calculated for seven days' subsistence, three of salt meat, six of short forage, and 100 rounds of small-arm ammunition to be hauled in wagons. By our system, knowing the number of men, we can at once determine the exact number of wagons.

The battle of Fredericksburg was fought on the 13th of December, 1862. General Hooker assumed command of the army January 26, 1863.

To show what was our custom on the eve of battles with regard to our trains, I take the liberty to inclose a copy of my report of our arrangements during the Chancellorsville campaign, herewith, marked B. This report and its accompanying papers, now in your office, will give you full and valuable information.

The battle of Chancellorsville and second battle of Fredericksburg were fought from the 2d to the 4th of May, 1863. In a forward move-

* Of August 21, 1863, Army of the Potomac.

ment our trains are never in the way of the troops; on the contrary, each corps has its train which follows it on the march, and which forms its indispensable, movable magazine of supplies. Wagon trains should never be permitted to approach within the range of battle-fields. They should be parked in safe and convenient places out of risk, and well guarded. Troops should go forward to battle lightly loaded, and without wagons except for extra ammunition. If they are successful, the trains can be brought up very quickly. If defeated, they will find an unobstructed road, and will get back to their wagons soon enough.

In all our engagements this precaution has been observed. At the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville wagons were not permitted to cross the river except on special order and for some pressing necessity.

At the great battle of Gettysburg I had the trains of the whole army parked at Westminster, on the Baltimore Branch Railroad and pike, at a distance of 25 miles from the field, guarded by cavalry and artillery. It would appear that the Army of the Cumberland could not have observed this essential rule, since reports show a great loss of trains during the recent conflicts between Chickamauga and Chattanooga.

The experiences of this army by land and water during the past two years give it some right to speak with weight on the subject of transportation. On the 14th of June we broke up our headquarters camp near Falmouth, and pursued the route by Dumfries, Fairfax, Leesburg, Edwards Ferry, and Poolesville, to Frederick City, on our second Maryland campaign. The army was in excellent condition, our transportation was perfect, and our sources of supply same as in first campaign. The officers of our department were thoroughly trained in their duties. It was almost as easy to maneuver the trains as the troops. It is, therefore, unnecessary to go further into the details of the march.

The rebel army had again invaded Maryland, and had even advanced as far as Carlisle and York, in Pennsylvania. The Army of the Potomac was again in pursuit of its inveterate foe, and finally met him in pitched battle of three days' fighting, and compelled him again to recross the Potomac.

General Meade, justly the conqueror and hero of Gettysburg, assumed command of the army on the 28th of June.

On the last day of the fiscal year, two days later, I was at Taneytown with headquarters of the army.

I have been in the battles of South Mountain, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville during the year ending June 30, 1863.

While on Peninsular affairs, I omitted to state that white laborers were soon found to give out from sickness and exhaustion at our depots on the Peninsula. While at White House I took effective measures to secure the services of contrabands, drawn mostly from the vicinity. They proved invaluable, though we thus became encumbered with many women and children. On the evacuation of White House I took away all my colored force, and increased it very considerably while at Harrison's Landing by sending for negroes to Williamsburg, Charles City, Norfolk, &c. On the evacuation of the Peninsula I must have taken away 2,500 males. The women and children were provided for near Fortress Monroe. Many of these negroes have other situations now; but we still retain, at our depots here, some 1,250; they are industrious, obedient, and tractable. They are considered free, and obtain \$20 per month for their services. This narrative covers the chief events of the fiscal year.

On the 30th of June, 1862, I had on deposit with the Treasury.....	\$172, 991 47
I received the year ending June 30, 1863.....	2, 509, 383 13
Total to be accounted for.....	2, 682, 374 60
Amount of disbursements during the year.....	2, 416, 237 60
Balance due United States June 30, 1863.....	266, 137 00

Of this balance \$265,687.51 was deposited in Washington with the Treasurer of the United States, and \$449.49 in New York City with the assistant United States treasurer. Of the \$2,416,237.60 disbursed during the year, \$2,406,285.21 was transferred to officers of my department for disbursements in corps. The balance, \$9,952.39, was expended for articles of stationery, &c., purchased, and payment of employés. To the great credit of the quartermasters of this army, I have to report only one instance of defalcation and want of integrity. That is the case of Capt. John Howland, assistant quartermaster volunteers, who received from me in March last \$16,470.04, as acting chief quartermaster of the Fifth Corps, for distribution to the subordinate officers to pay teamsters. He deserted and carried away with him the whole sum, but was subsequently arrested and brought to Washington by some of the acute and efficient agents of the provost-marshal of the War Department. Colonel Baker recovered \$10,279 of the sum embezzled, and turned the same over to me. Captain Howland has been brought before a court-martial for this offense. The sentence is not yet promulgated.

There were no outstanding debts in this army on the 30th of June, 1863. I do not mean unsettled claims for forage, &c., in Maryland. I left Capt. John McHarg, assistant quartermaster, at Frederick, with funds to pay all such legitimate accounts. He is still there on this duty.

There will be suggestions for the improvement of our means of transportation, workshops, &c., by some of my experienced subordinate officers. I request you will give the matter your attention. There should be at once, above all other things, a special wagon or caisson for carrying all extra or reserve ammunition. This matter is very important. It should be for small-arm as well as artillery ammunition.

I have the honor to include herewith a forcible letter on the subject, marked C, to which I invite your attention, from General Hunt, chief of artillery.*

I should not close this report without acknowledging the uniform generosity which you have extended to me, and the great support you have invariably given me. I wish also to acknowledge my great obligations to General Rucker, and the officers who have served under him. He has had daily contact and business with, and on account of, this army, and has, in all instances, fully met our expectations with much courtesy and forbearance. For all that has been accomplished there is credit due many who have labored together instead of arraying obstacles. I have not permitted myself to have difficulties with any one who exhibited any will or capacity to serve this army.

To the quartermasters of this army I feel much attached and under a weight of indebtedness, especially to those who have had charge of the great depots. I have referred to them in the body of this report; still, I would be doing much injustice if I did not mention Capt. P. P. Pitkin, assistant quartermaster, who, similar to Captain Peirce, has had charge of great depots, and whose business for the year has been

* To appear, under date of September 30, 1863, in Series I, Vol. XXIX.

extremely heavy. He is a most meritorious, energetic, and trustworthy officer. Capt. William G. Rankin, Thirteenth Infantry, and acting assistant quartermaster, has also served with much credit. He was in charge of land transportation at White House, and acquitted himself with satisfaction. Lieut. Col. Frederick Myers, assistant quartermaster, served with the army from Pope's retreat until after Fredericksburg. He was most of the time my chief assistant. Like Colonel Sawtelle, he is invaluable as a quartermaster and superior business man. I trust these officers will receive the advancement they merit.

The chief quartermasters of the corps are all finely educated gentlemen and highly experienced quartermasters, and there are many quartermasters now serving with divisions and brigades who are well qualified for higher positions.

In conclusion, I wish to bring to your notice the admirable administration and executive ability of Captains Ferguson and Stoddard, quartermasters at Alexandria. Their duties have been very onerous and accumulated, and have been most efficiently performed. They both occupy high and important positions, and the Army of the Potomac is indebted to them in part for many of its supplies.

I am, general, your most obedient servant,

RUFUS INGALLS.

General M. C. MEIGS.

No. 4.

Report of Surg. Jonathan Letterman, U. S. A., Medical Director, Army of the Potomac, of the operations of the medical department, Sept. 2—Nov. 7.

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., March 1, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with the directions contained in your communication of January 20, 1863, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the medical department of this army from July 4 to November 7, 1862, viz: *

* * * * *

From the date of the embarkation of the troops at Fortress Monroe up to the time when the general was placed in command of the defenses of Washington, I know personally but little of the medical department of the Army of the Potomac. It was not under my control. On the 2d of September, when the general was placed in command, it came once more under my direction, and I found it in a most deplorable condition. The officers were worn down by the labors they had in the mean time undergone; a large portion of their supplies, as I have stated, had been left at Fortress Monroe, and even much of that which they had brought with them was thrown on the roadside, I have been informed by commanding officers, whilst on their way to join General Pope. This state of things, taken in connection with the effects upon the medical department arising from the campaign of that officer, left it in a condition deeply to be deplored. The labor expended at Harrison's in rendering it efficient for active service seemed to have been expended in vain, and before it could be in a condition to render such service again it was

* That portion of report here omitted appears in Vol. XI, Part I, of this series, pp. 210-220.

necessary that it should be completely refitted. The circumstances under which the army was then placed made this simply impossible. There was not time to do it, for as soon as the troops reached the defenses of Washington they were marched into Maryland, and no time could be allowed for medical officers again to equip themselves with the medicines, instruments, dressings, and stores necessary for the campaign in that State.

In a few instances the medical officers who returned with the first troops were able to obtain a few supplies, but these opportunities were few. Some corps which did not belong to the Army of the Potomac whilst it lay at Harrison's Landing were also marched rapidly into Maryland, of the condition of whose medical supplies I could know nothing except on the way to meet the enemy. The medical department had to be, as it were, reorganized and resupplied, and this had to be done while upon a rapid march over different roads, in different sections of the country, and almost in face of the enemy. Before leaving Washington I had ordered a number of hospital wagons from Alexandria, Va., which reached me at Rockville, in Maryland, whence they were distributed to the different corps. While at this place I directed the medical purveyor in Baltimore to put up certain supplies and have them ready to send to such a point as I should direct. Upon our arrival at Frederick on the 13th of September (having left Washington on the evening of the 7th), directions were given for the establishment of hospitals at that place for the reception of wounded in the anticipated battles, and additional supplies to a large amount ordered to be sent from Baltimore at once. The Confederate troops had been in this city but the day before our arrival. Almost all the medical supplies had been destroyed or had been taken by them. Just previous to our arrival in Frederick, 200 ambulances were received from Washington, which I distributed to the corps as rapidly as the movements of the troops would permit. The failure of the railroad company to forward the supplies caused serious annoyance. The railroad bridge over the Monocacy Creek between Frederick and Baltimore having been destroyed by the Confederate forces, made it necessary to have all the supplies of the quartermaster's and commissary as well as the medical departments removed from the cars at that point. A great deal of confusion and delay was the consequence, which seriously embarrassed the medical department, and not from this cause alone, but from the fact that cars loaded with supplies for its use were on some occasions switched off and left for some time upon the side of the road to make way for other stores.

The battle of South Mountain took place on the 14th. The village of Middletown, about 4 miles in rear of the scene of action, was thoroughly examined before the battle began, to ascertain its adaptability for the care of the wounded. Churches and other buildings were taken as far as were considered necessary, and yet causing as little inconvenience as possible to the citizens residing there. Houses and barns, the latter large and commodious, were selected, in the most sheltered places on the right and left of the field, by the medical directors of the corps engaged, where the wounded were first received, whence they were removed to Middletown, the Confederate wounded as well as our own. The battle lasted until some time after dark, and as soon as the firing ceased I returned to Middletown and visited all the hospitals, and gave such directions as were necessary for the better care of the wounded. On the following morning Assistant Surgeon Thomson, U. S. Army, was directed to take charge of all the hospitals in the village, and

three skillful surgeons were sent to consult together and with him, and perform such operations as the cases demanded. The object in sending these officers was to have all necessary operations done as soon as possible, as it would be impossible for the surgeons in charge of the different hospitals to perform them all in season and at the same time attend to the other duties required of them. The work of these officers was very satisfactorily performed. The hospitals were soon put in good condition and the men well attended to. Supplies of medicines, &c., were in part obtained from the supplies in the army and in part from Frederick, from which place, owing to the causes already alluded to, it required no little exertion to obtain them. The difficulty was, however, overcome, and such as were needed were from time to time procured. The task of providing food for the wounded was one of still greater difficulty, but that was also accomplished by having it brought from Frederick and by purchasing from the people living in the village and in its vicinity. As was anticipated, the wounded, under the supervision of Dr. Thomson, who labored unceasingly, were attended to with great care and the hospitals placed in excellent condition. Great kindness was shown by the citizens, and especially the ladies, to our wounded, until the hospitals were broken up.

The battle of Crampton's Gap took place also on the 14th, at the same time that of South Mountain was in progress. The hospitals for the wounded were located in Burkittsville, about a mile in the rear of our troops. As in the village of Middletown, churches and other buildings were here appropriated for hospital purposes. A sufficient number of surgeons were detailed by Surgeon White, U. S. Army, the medical director of the Sixth Corps (which was the only corps engaged), who had charge of the medical department in this action. There was but short time given to prepare hospitals in either of these villages, as the troops left Frederick and fought both battles the same day. By the exertions of the medical officers in charge, the hospitals in Burkittsville were in a short time put in good order, and every care taken of the men brought to them. The surgeon who was placed in charge, having been guilty of improper conduct, was displaced and afterward dropped from the rolls, and Assistant Surgeon Du Bois placed in charge, under whose administration everything went on well. The same difficulty existed here as in Middletown regarding supplies of medicines, &c., and food, and was overcome in like manner. The most reliable reports that can be obtained show 1,214 wounded in these two engagements. While these figures are not deemed entirely accurate, they are thought to approximate very nearly the actual number wounded, those of the Confederate forces not being included.

Passing through the village of Boonsborough on the following day, it was examined to ascertain what accommodation it afforded for hospital purposes in the event they should be required there. Later in the evening we passed through the village of Keedysville, a few miles beyond, which was also subjected to a similar examination. Passing beyond this village, we came in sight, late in the evening, of what afterward proved to be the battle-field of Antietam. As soon as the nature of the country and its resources for hospital purposes could be ascertained, and when an idea was given of the nature of the anticipated battle and the position to be occupied by our troops, directions were given to the medical directors of corps to form their hospitals as far as possible by divisions, and at such a distance in the rear of the line of battle as to be secure from the shot and shell of the enemy; to select the houses and barns most easy of access, and such as were well supplied with hay

or straw and water; when circumstances would permit, to designate barns as preferable in all cases to houses, as being at that season of the year well provided with straw, better ventilated, and enabling the medical officers with more facility to attend to a greater number of wounded, and to have all the hospital supplies taken to such points as were selected. These directions were generally carried into effect, and yet the hospitals were not always beyond the range of the enemy's guns. Very few hospital tents were to be obtained, owing to the haste in which the army was marched from Virginia into Maryland, but the weather was such as to enable the wounded to be taken care of without them. A reference to the map accompanying this report will exhibit better than any description the location of these hospitals, which, from the length of the line of battle and the obstinacy with which the engagement was contested, required to be numerous. The battle lasted until dark. During the day I received valuable aid from Assistant Surgeon Howard, U. S. Army, who was busily engaged while the battle was in progress in riding to different parts of the field and keeping me informed of the condition of medical affairs. After night I visited all the hospitals in Keedysville and gave such directions as were deemed necessary.

The subject of supplies, always a source of serious consideration, was here peculiarly so. The condition of affairs at Monocacy Creek remained as heretofore described, and the action of the railroad was not commensurate with the demands made upon it. The propriety of obtaining the hospital wagons from Alexandria was evident, as these gave a supply for the emergency and enabled surgeons to attend to the wounded as soon as the battle opened. After the victory was won, supplies of medicines, stimulants, dressings, &c., were sent for and brought from Frederick, in ambulances, by officers sent for that purpose, and were distributed to the different hospitals as they were needed. The fear of the supplies becoming exhausted, for the difficulty in procuring them was well known, caused uneasiness on the part of some medical officers, who did not know the efforts that had been made before and were made during and after the battle to have enough furnished to supply their wants. I visited after the battle every hospital in the rear of our lines, although not always making myself known, and in no instance did I find any undue suffering for lack of medical supplies. Owing to the difficulty in having them brought from Monocacy Creek, for the first few days the supplies of some articles became scanty, and in some instances very much so; but they were soon renewed, and at the temporary depot established in Sharpsburg shortly after the battle a sufficient quantity of such articles as were necessary from time to time arrived, and when this temporary depot was afterward broken up, about the middle of October, a portion of the supplies remained on hand. Not only were the wounded of our own army supplied, but all the Confederate wounded which fell into our hands were furnished all the medicines, hospital stores, and dressings that were required for their use.

The difficulty of supplying the hospitals with food was a much greater one than that of providing articles belonging to the medical department, and was a matter of very great concern. This, a matter in all battles of moment, was in this particularly so on account of the distance of the depot of supplies. An order was procured from Colonel Ingalls for a number of wagons (12), to be turned over by the quartermaster at Frederick to an officer that I should send there, for the purpose of bringing up supplies of medicines and food. These wagons could not be obtained at Frederick. Two were then procured from

Colonel Ingalls at headquarters, and sent under an officer, who bought up supplies of coffee, sugar, and bread. The hospitals were afterward and in a short time abundantly supplied. The hospitals were thus provided with medical supplies, and for the first few days with food. They had all that was necessary for the wounded.

I have already mentioned that the ambulances had been left at Fortress Monroe when the troops embarked, and that no system existed except in the corps which belonged to the Army of the Potomac while at Harrison's Landing. A portion of the ambulances of some of the corps arrived just prior to the battle. A large number had been distributed in other corps, but were yet unorganized. It was not, therefore, expected that they would prove as efficient as could be desired. Notwithstanding these facts, the wounded were brought from the field on our right before 2 o'clock on the following day. The Second Corps was more fully equipped, and did most excellent service under the charge of Capt. J. M. Garland, who labored diligently and with great care until all his wounded were removed. The troops on our left were those among whom no ambulance system existed, but here, owing to the exertions of the medical officers, the wounded were removed by the evening of the day following the battle. When we consider the magnitude of the engagement, the length of time the battle lasted, and the obstinacy with which it was contested, causing this to be the greatest and bloodiest action that ever took place on this continent, it is a matter of congratulation to speak of the expeditious and careful manner in which the wounded were removed from the field.

Compiled from the most reliable sources at my command, the number of wounded amounted to 8,350. This number is not entirely accurate, as many who were slightly wounded were attended to, of whose cases no record could, under the circumstances, be taken.

The removal of so large a body of wounded was no small task. The journey to Frederick in ambulances was to wounded men tedious and tiresome, and often painful. It was necessary that they should halt at Middletown for food and to take rest; that food should always be provided at this place at the proper time and for the proper number; that the hospitals at Frederick should not be overcrowded; that the ambulances should not arrive too soon for the trains of cars at the depot at Frederick, and that the ambulance horses should not be broken down by the constant labor required of them. With rare exceptions this was accomplished, and all the wounded whose safety would not be jeopardized by the journey were sent carefully and comfortably away. The hospitals in Frederick were soon established and put in order by Surgeon Milhan, U. S. Army. In addition to the hospitals in the city, two large camps of hospital tents were formed on the outskirts of the city, capable of containing one thousand beds each. One hospital had been established in Frederick some months before our arrival there, but at that time it was filled, and chiefly with Confederate sick and wounded, who had been left there. All the available buildings in this city (six in number) were taken at once for hospitals for our own troops and those of the enemy who should fall into our hands. These were fitted up with great rapidity, particularly so when it is considered that the enemy was in possession of the city the day before we arrived there; that it had to be examined, the buildings selected and prepared, beds, bedding, dressings, stores, food, cooking arrangements made, surgeons, stewards, cooks, and nurses detailed and sent for. This was a great deal of labor, but it was done, and done promptly and well. On the 30th of September these hospitals contained 2,321 patients.

The camps to which I have just alluded were formed in October, in very eligible and pleasant locations on the outskirts of the city. In these hospitals and camps 62 surgeons, 15 medical cadets, 22 hospital stewards, 539 nurses, and 127 cooks were on duty during the month of October, when all were in operation. During this month 3,032 patients, chiefly wounded, were received into these hospitals, making, with those then under treatment, on the 30th of September, 5,353. Of this number 403 were returned to duty, 23 were discharged, 3 deserted, 4 were sent on furlough, 2,064 were sent to other hospitals, and 253 died, leaving on the 31st of October 2,603 remaining in the hospitals. A large number of wounded were sent from the hospitals on the battle-field, through Frederick, to other hospitals, of whom no record was kept, as they were not received into any of the hospitals in that city. No one seeing these hospitals after their establishment can form any conception of the labor required to put them in the good condition in which they were kept. The zeal and ability displayed by Dr. Milhau in their organization and management, and the hearty co-operation he at all times gave me, deserve especial mention. In addition to our own wounded, we had upon our hands from the battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antietam in all about 2,500 Confederate wounded. Those taken at South Mountain were taken to Middletown, and those at Crampton's Gap to Burkittsville.

When the general assumed command of the defenses of Washington, the hospitals in Washington and in its vicinity were placed under my control. We left that city for Maryland on the 7th of September, and a few days thereafter those hospitals and the medical affairs of the troops in and around Washington were placed in the immediate charge of Surg. R. O. Abbott, U. S. Army, assistant medical director of the Army of the Potomac. It is perhaps not desirable to go much into details concerning them, and I only give the following statement in order to exhibit the number of hospitals and other points of interest connected with them, which are necessary, as they belonged to the medical department of this army:

Number of hospitals, 38; medical officers, 224; remaining last report, 28,649; number of patients admitted, 23,298; total, 51,947. Returned to duty, 7,104; discharged, 2,100; deserted, 597; sent to other hospitals, 9,026; on furlough, 647; died, 1,498; remaining, 30,975.

It may be gratifying for the general commanding to know that never had these hospitals been in better condition. The excellent system introduced in their management, the complete system of records adopted and carried out, and the care taken to have everything connected with them in fine condition, reflect the highest credit upon the officer in charge, for to him it is due. The very great assistance Surgeon Abbott so uniformly and so unreservedly gave me upon all occasions requires especial notice, and it affords me the greatest pleasure to ask the attention of the commanding general to the richly deserving merits of this officer.

Immediately after the retreat of the enemy from the field of Antietam, measures were taken to have all the Confederate wounded gathered in from the field, over which they laid scattered in all directions, and from the houses and barns in the rear of their lines, and placed under such circumstances as would permit of their being properly attended to, and at such points as would enable their removal to be effected to Frederick and thence to Baltimore and Fortress Monroe to their own lines. They were removed as rapidly as their recovery would permit. The duty of attending to these men was assigned to Surgeon

Rauch, U. S. Volunteers, to whom assistants were given from our own officers and all the medical officers who had been left by the enemy to look after their wounded. A sufficient number of ambulances having been placed at his disposal and supplies given him, these wounded were collected in the best and most convenient places, and everything done to alleviate their sufferings that was done for our own men. Humanity teaches us that a wounded and prostrate foe is not then our enemy.

There were many cases both on our right and left whose wounds were so serious that their lives would be endangered by their removal, and to have every opportunity afforded them for recovery the Antietam hospital, consisting of hospital tents, and capable of comfortably accommodating nearly 600 cases, was established at a place called Smoketown, near Keedysville, for those who were wounded on our right, and a similar hospital, but not so capacious—the Locust Spring hospital—was established in the rear of the Fifth Corps for those cases which occurred on our left. To one or other of these hospitals all the wounded were carried whose wounds were of such a character as to forbid their removal to Frederick or elsewhere. The inspections made of these hospitals from time to time were a source of great gratification, as they made known to me the skillful treatment which these men received and the care with which they were watched over, and convinced me of the propriety of the adoption of this course in regard to them. Surgeon Vanderkieft, U. S. Volunteers, who was in charge of the Antietam hospital, was unceasing in his labors, and showed a degree of professional skill and executive ability much to be admired. Great care and attention were shown to the wounded at the Locust Spring hospital by Surgeon Squire, Eighty-ninth New York Volunteers, who had charge of it. Both hospitals were kept in excellent order.

Immediately after the battle a great many citizens came within our lines in order to remove their relatives or friends who had been injured, and in a great many instances when the life of the man depended upon his remaining at rest. It was impossible to make them understand that they were better where they were, and that a removal would probably be done only with the sacrifice of life. Their minds seemed bent on having them in a house. If that could be accomplished, all would, in their opinion, be well. No greater mistake could exist, and the results of that battle only added additional evidence of the absolute necessity of a full supply of pure air, constantly renewed—a supply which cannot be obtained in the most perfectly constructed building. Within a few yards a marked contrast could be seen between the wounded in houses and barns and in the open air. Those in houses progressed less favorably than those in the barns, those in barns less favorably than those in the open air, although all were in other respects treated alike.

The capacious barns, abundantly provided with hay and straw, the delightful weather with which we were favored, and the kindness exhibited by the people, afforded increased facilities to the medical department for taking care of the wounded thrown upon it by that battle. From the frequent inspections which I made from time to time, and from the reports of inspections made of the hospitals, and the manner in which the duties required in them were performed by medical officers, it gives me no little pleasure to say that the wounded had every care that could be bestowed upon them—that they were promptly, willingly, and efficiently attended to. And although I have more than once spoken to the general commanding concerning the conduct of medical officers on that battle-field, I cannot refrain from alluding here to the untiring devotion shown by them to the wounded of that day.

Until all the wounded were finally disposed of, no pains were spared, no labor abstained from, by day or by night, by the medical officers of this army, to alleviate the sufferings of the thousands of wounded who looked to them for relief. The medical directors of corps, especially Surgeons Dougherty and McNulty, were untiring in their exertions and unceasing in their labors, and were ably assisted by the staff under their commands. Very few delinquencies occurred, and these were swallowed up by the devotion exhibited by the rest of the medical staff during and long after the battle.

The surgery of these battle-fields has been pronounced butchery. Gross misrepresentations of the conduct of medical officers have been made and scattered broadcast over the country, causing deep and heart-rending anxiety to those who had friends or relatives in the army, who might at any moment require the services of a surgeon. It is not to be supposed that there were no incompetent surgeons in the army. It is certainly true that there were; but these sweeping denunciations against a class of men who will favorably compare with the military surgeons of any country, because of the incompetency and shortcomings of a few, are wrong, and do injustice to a body of men who have labored faithfully and well. It is easy to magnify an existing evil until it is beyond the bounds of truth. It is equally easy to pass by the good that has been done on the other side. Some medical officers lost their lives in their devotion to duty in the battle of Antietam, and others sickened from excessive labor which they conscientiously and skillfully performed. If any objection could be urged against the surgery of those fields, it would be the efforts on the part of surgeons to practice "conservative surgery" to too great an extent.

I had better opportunities, perhaps, than any one else to form an opinion, and from my observations I am convinced that if any fault was committed it was that the knife was not used enough. So much has been said on this matter that, familiar as I am with the conduct of the medical officers on those battle-fields, I cannot, as the medical director of this army, see them misrepresented and be silent.

After these battles the army remained some time in Maryland, preparing for the coming campaign in Virginia. During this time I was occupied in having the wounded well cared for and properly sent away, in making suitable provision for those whose safety required that they should not be removed, and in making such changes as experience and observation during those battles and the short time that I had occupied the position of medical director convinced me were necessary to render the medical department more efficient. Hitherto large amounts of medical supplies had been lost and in various ways wasted, and not unfrequently all the supplies for a regiment had been thrown away for want of transportation, and, of course, were not on hand when wanted. It was necessary that this should be remedied, and in order to do so it was necessary to diminish the amount that was furnished a regiment at one time, which would affect the whole existing system and make the change a radical one. The objects which it was considered as desirable to attain were to reduce the waste which took place when large supplies were at one time issued to regiments, to have a supply given them, small, but sufficient for all immediate wants, and to have these supplies easily obtainable and replenished without difficulty when required, and without a multiplicity of papers and accounts. It was necessary also that they should be transported with facility, and that no trouble should be experienced in having them in abundance at the

field hospitals in time of action and yet at the same time to preserve a proper degree of accountability.

To accomplish this, a system of supplying by brigades was adopted on the 4th of October, 1862. The following extract from a circular issued to the medical department of this army at that date, from the medical director's office, will show the main features of the system which since that time has been in existence in this army :

Hereafter in the Army of the Potomac the following supplies will be allowed to a brigade for one month for active field service, viz: One hospital wagon, filled; one medicine chest for each regiment, filled; one hospital knapsack for each regimental medical officer, filled. The supplies in the list marked A to be transported in a four-horse wagon.

The surgeon in charge of each brigade will require and receipt for all these supplies, including those in the hospital wagons, and will issue to the senior surgeons of each regiment the medicine chests and knapsacks, taking receipts therefor. The hospital wagon, with its horses, harness, &c., will be receipted for by the ambulance quartermaster.

The surgeon in charge of the brigade will issue to the medical officers of the regiments such of these supplies as may be required for their commands informally, taking no receipts, demanding no requisitions, but accounting for the issues as expended.

The surgeons in charge of brigades will at once make out requisitions in accordance with these instructions, and transmit them, approved by the medical director of the corps, to the medical purveyor of this army. These supplies being deemed sufficient for one month only, or for an emergency, medical directors of corps will see that they are always on hand, timely requisitions being made for that purpose.

Before the adoption of this system, one and sometimes two wagons were required to transport the medical supplies of a regiment, and, in addition, another wagon was required to transport cooking utensils, hospital tents, baggage of medical officers, &c. With this system one wagon suffices for the medical department of a regiment; one wagon is added to a brigade and at least one taken from each regiment, and, besides, should it become necessary to take away this one wagon from a regiment, the supplies are in such shape as will permit them to be carried on a horse, and not necessarily lost, as heretofore. The regimental surgeons have no trouble in replenishing their supplies, and the amounts expended in a regiment are always known to the surgeon-in-chief of a brigade, whose duty it is always to check any undue waste or improper expenditure. These supplies are easily transported, and are without difficulty made available on the field of battle, as events which have since transpired have demonstrated.

These instructions having been issued, my attention was given to the manner in which the wounded were attended to upon the field of battle. No system of field hospitals that I was aware of existed, and, convinced of the necessity of adopting some measures by which the wounded could receive the best surgical aid which the army afforded, and with the least delay, my thoughts were naturally turned to this most important subject. On the field of battle confusion is, above all other places, most prone to ensue, and unless some method is observed by which certain surgeons have specific duties to perform, and every officer has his place pointed out beforehand, and his duties defined, and held to a strict responsibility for their proper performance, the wounded must of course suffer. To remedy the want which existed, the following circular was issued :

CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Medical Director's Office, October 30, 1862.

SIR: In order that the wounded may receive the most prompt and efficient attention during and after an engagement, and that the necessary operations may be performed by the most skillful and responsible surgeons at the earliest moment, the

following instructions are issued for the guidance of the medical staff of this army, and medical directors of corps will see that they are promptly carried into effect:

Previous to an engagement there will be established in each corps a hospital for each division, the position of which will be selected by the medical director of the corps.

The organization of the hospital will be as follows:

1st. A surgeon in charge; one assistant surgeon to provide food and shelter, &c.; one assistant surgeon to keep the records.

2d. Three medical officers to perform operations; three medical officers as assistants to each of these officers.

3d. Additional medical officers, hospital stewards, nurses of the division.

The surgeon in charge will have general superintendence and be responsible to the surgeon-in-chief of the division for the proper administration of the hospital. The surgeon-in-chief of a division will detail one assistant surgeon, who will report to and be under the immediate orders of the surgeon in charge, whose duties shall be to pitch the hospital tents and provide straw, fuel, water, blankets, &c., and, when houses are used, put them in proper order for the reception of wounded. This assistant surgeon will, when the foregoing shall have been accomplished, at once organize a kitchen, using for this purpose the hospital mess chests and the kettles, tins, &c., in the ambulances. The supplies of beef stock and bread in the ambulances, and of arrowroot, tea, &c., in the hospital wagon, will enable him to prepare quickly a sufficient quantity of palatable and nourishing food. All the cooks, and such of the hospital stewards and nurses as may be necessary, will be placed under his orders for these purposes.

He will detail another assistant surgeon, whose duty it shall be to keep a complete record of every case brought to the hospital, giving the name, rank, company, and regiment; the seat and character of injury; the treatment; the operation, if any be performed, and the result, which will be transmitted to the medical director of the corps and by him sent to this office.

This officer will also see to the proper interment of those who die, and that the grave is marked with a head-board with the name, rank, company, and regiment legibly inscribed upon it.

He will make out two tabular statements of wounded, which the surgeon-in-chief of division will transmit within thirty-six hours after a battle, one to this office (by a special messenger, if necessary) and the other to the medical director of the corps to which the hospital belongs.

There will be selected from the division by the surgeon-in-chief, under the direction of the medical director of the corps, three medical officers, who will be the operating staff of the hospital, upon whom will rest the immediate responsibility of the performance of all important operations. In all doubtful cases they will consult together, and a majority of them shall decide upon the expediency and character of the operation. These officers will be selected from the division without regard to rank, but solely on account of their known prudence, judgment, and skill. The surgeon-in-chief of the division is enjoined to be especially careful in the selection of these officers, choosing only those who have distinguished themselves for surgical skill, sound judgment, and conscientious regard for the highest interests of the wounded.

There will be detailed three medical officers to act as assistants to each one of these officers, who will report to him and act entirely under his direction. It is suggested that one of the assistants be selected to administer the anæsthetic. Each operating surgeon will be provided with an excellent table from the hospital wagon, and, with the present organization for field hospitals, it is hoped that the confusion and the delay in performing the necessary operations so often existing after a battle will be avoided, and all operations hereafter be primary.

The remaining medical officers of the division, except one to each regiment, will be ordered to the hospitals to act as dressers and assistants generally. Those who follow the regiments to the field will establish themselves, each one at a temporary depot, at such a distance or situation in the rear of his regiment as will insure safety to the wounded, where they will give such aid as is immediately required; and they are here reminded that, whilst no personal consideration should interfere with their duty to the wounded, the grave responsibilities resting upon them render any unnecessary exposure improper.

The surgeon-in-chief of the division will exercise general supervision, under the medical director of the corps, over the medical affairs in his division. He will see that the officers are faithful in the performance of their duties in the hospital and upon the field, and that by the ambulance corps, which has heretofore been so efficient, the wounded are removed from the field carefully and with dispatch.

Whenever his duties permit, he will give his professional services at the hospital, will order to the hospital as soon as located all the hospital wagons of the brigades, the hospital tents and furniture, and all the hospital stewards and nurses. He will

notify the captain commanding the ambulance corps, or, if this be impracticable, the first lieutenant commanding the division ambulances, of the location of the hospital.

No medical officer will leave the position to which he shall have been assigned without permission, and any officer so doing will be reported to the medical director of the corps, who will report the facts to this office.

The medical directors of corps will apply to their commanders on the eve of a battle for the necessary guard and men for fatigue duty. This guard will be particularly careful that no stragglers be allowed about the hospital, using the food and comforts prepared for the wounded.

No wounded will be sent away from any of these hospitals without authority from this office.

Previous to an engagement, a detail will be made by medical directors of corps of a proper number of medical officers, who will, should a retreat be found necessary, remain and take care of the wounded. This detail medical directors will request the corps commanders to announce in orders.

The skillful attention shown by the medical officers of this army to the wounded upon the battle-fields of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and the Antietam, under trying circumstances, gives the assurance that, with this organization, the medical staff of the Army of the Potomac can with confidence be relied upon under all emergencies to take charge of the wounded intrusted to its care.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JONA. LETTERMAN,
Medical Director.

As both of these circulars met the approval of the commanding general and were issued under his auspices, it may not be amiss to say that at the battle of Fredericksburg, on the 13th of December, 1862, when they were first tried, and when from the nature of the action they were severely tested, they fulfilled in a great degree the expectations hoped for at the time of their adoption.

I have alluded to the loss of medical officers in battle. Two of them fell upon the battle-field of Antietam, whose devotion to duty I cannot pass over. Surg. W. J. H. White, U. S. Army, medical director of the Sixth Corps, under General Franklin, was killed on that field by a shot from the enemy. He was a skillful surgeon, a gallant officer, and a gentleman whose deportment was kind and courteous to all who had intercourse with him. These admirable traits, together with his familiarity with the medical affairs of that corps, made his loss, and especially on that day, deeply to be deplored. Assistant Surgeon Revere, of the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, accompanying his regiment into the midst of the fight, fell by the hands of the enemy, nobly and fearlessly discharging his duty to the wounded.

I cannot act justly without mentioning the faithful services of Hospital Steward Robert Koldeway, U. S. Army, who has been constantly with me. His attention to duty has been invariably most marked. Shrinking from no labor by day or by night, in everything he has acquitted himself to my entire satisfaction, and it gives me no little pleasure to bring to the notice of the general commanding a non-commissioned officer who has acted so well.

I may have gone more fully into the details of the operations of the medical department of the Army of the Potomac than will be considered necessary, but upon my first interview with the commanding general at Harrison's Landing, I perceived the deep interest taken by him in everything connected with it. Time only strengthened my convictions and continued to assure me of his constant solicitude for the welfare of the sick and wounded, and I feel the most grateful remembrance of the unvarying confidence and support he gave me in everything which I considered conducive to that end.

The efficiency of the medical department of this army owes much to the Surgeon-General. His advice and authority upon all occasions were freely given, and enabled me to act without restraint. I beg to

assure the commanding general that the administration of this department, which he has more than once approved, has depended to a great extent upon the chief of the Medical Bureau in Washington.

We crossed the Potomac and entered Virginia early in November, in anticipation of another battle soon taking place. Nothing of especial interest occurred in the medical department during our very rapid march through that portion of the State which was traversed by the army. My arrangements had been made, and the necessary instructions given to the medical directors of corps, and with the hearty co-operation they were affording me I felt that should the anticipated battle occur shortly after our arrival at Warrenton, the medical department would be more able than it had been hitherto to discharge the duties devolving upon it. The general was relieved; the battle did not take place.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JONA. LETTERMAN,

Surgeon, U. S. A., and Medical Director Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

No. 5.

Report of Maj. Albert J. Myer, U. S. Army, Chief Signal Officer, of operations August 30-September 20.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., October 6, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the Signal Corps of the Army of the Potomac, as in relation to the recent movements and battles in Maryland.

On Saturday, August 30, 1862, the Signal Corps of this army had, after some delays in transportation, just arrived at Alexandria from the Peninsula. On the next day there were verbal instructions from Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, that a party should report to Major-General Pope, then commanding an army near Centreville, Va. This army had then just met with some reverses.

On the night of September 1, twelve officers, with their flagmen, were reported for duty at Centreville.

At the formation of the line of battle near Fairfax Court-House, on the next day, these officers were assigned to stations, and when the army retired toward Washington, on that afternoon, they accompanied the rear guards, occupying different prominent positions for observation, and giving to general officers such information as came within their power. Among communicating lines established on this march was one extending from Annandale to Fairfax Seminary.

During the few days the army lay near Washington there was little opportunity for rest or re-equipment of the signal party. It was here joined by the officers who had been attached to the Army of Virginia, who had been scattered by the rapid movements in Virginia, and some of whom had lost both public and private property by the disasters then recent. The necessities of the time seemed urgent. Signal parties were posted on the dominant heights about Washington, and the country within telescopic range was all the time under their observation.

On Sunday, September 7, the Army of the Potomac took the field for the campaign in Maryland.

On Monday, September 1, it had become evident to the generals commanding near Centreville that the enemy were passing the right of the army commanded by General Pope near Fairfax Court-House, and menaced the crossings of the Upper Potomac. Under orders from Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, First Lieut. W. W. Rowley, chief signal officer of the party serving with the Eleventh [Twelfth] Army Corps, started on the afternoon of that day from near Manassas with a party consisting of Capt. L. R. Fortescue, Lieuts. B. N. Miner, and E. A. Briggs, acting signal officers, to reach, if possible, the summit of the Catoclin Mountains, near the Potomac, prior to the arrival there of the enemy, and to thence report their movements to General Banks.

Arriving on the Potomac, Captain Fortescue was ordered by Lieutenant Rowley to Maryland Heights, whence there is an extensive view of the Shenandoah and Pleasant Valleys. Lieutenant Briggs was stationed at Poolesville to receive communications by signals from Sugar Loaf Mountain, and to thence transmit them by electric telegraph to Washington, while Lieutenant Miner established a station upon the summit of that peak. The range of vision from this point is unequalled by that from any other in Maryland. It includes several prominent fords of the Potomac, the approaches to them in Virginia, and much of the country into which an army passing those fords would move. Lieutenant Miner occupied the summit of Sugar Loaf Mountain on the 3d of September. The position was exposed to an attack, but was courageously held by the officer, who thence reported the advance of the enemy and the direction taken by their trains in the vicinity of Leesburg, their approach to the river, their crossing the Potomac near the Monocacy, and the commencement of their movement into Maryland. He was last seen to send a message announcing the near approach of the enemy, and to then furl his flags as if to leave the station. There is unofficial information that he left the summit of the mountain, encountered and captured when near its base a courier with dispatches, and, while examining the prisoner, was, together with his flagman, taken by the enemy's cavalry. It seems probable that the first official information of the enemy's approach to and passage of the Potomac was received at Washington from this officer. Lieutenant Miner was faithfully aided in this service by Lieutenant Briggs, who only left Poolesville on the arrival of the enemy's cavalry at that place. The enemy at once occupied the mountain with infantry and artillery, and held it as a signal station.

On Saturday evening, September 6, signal officers from our army occupied stations on Seneca Ridge and near Great Falls, the line of stations thus reaching from Seneca Ridge to Fairfax Seminary, near Alexandria.

On Sunday, September 7, the signal party of the Army of the Potomac, under the immediate charge of Capt. B. F. Fisher, under whose supervision the stations of observation near Washington had been established, left their camp at Hall's Hill, Va.

On Monday, September 8, the party were reported for duty at the headquarters of the army at Rockville, Md. On Tuesday, September 9, Wednesday, September 10, and Thursday, September 11, signal officers took part in the operations of the advance of the army at Poolesville and near Sugar Loaf Mountain. At the latter place communication was maintained between General Franklin at Barnesville and General Hancock at the foot of the mountain, while preparations were making to occupy it. On Thursday, September 11, at about 3 p. m., the mount-

ain was retaken by our forces, and was soon after reoccupied as a signal station, communicating with Poolesville, to which place Captain Fisher had previously sent a party, and thence by electricity with the headquarters of the army. The earliest reports announced that two regiments of the enemy's cavalry were thence visible, but with no signs of the presence of the enemy in force on the east side of Catoctin Ridge. A force was reported encamped near Point of Rocks.

It had been particularly desired by the major-general commanding the army that the signal station upon Sugar Loaf, which kept under observation the country upon his left, and from which the presence of the enemy could be rapidly reported, should be occupied by careful and skilled officers. Lieuts. W. W. Rowley, J. H. Spencer, W. B. Roe, and J. S. Hall, acting signal officers, were assigned to this station, and from this time during the operations terminating in the defeat of the enemy at Antietam their duties were constant. From this station were transmitted to headquarters, while moving from Middlebrook to near Urbana, while at Urbana, at Frederick, at Middletown, and to the general commanding on the field during the battle of South Mountain, reports of observations made and the reports of the station established upon Point of Rocks on the advance of our army to that place. It was also used as a station for the transmission of some telegraphic correspondence of the General-in-Chief from Frederick and from the field at South Mountain to Point of Rocks, to which station the electric telegraph had been extended from Washington before that destroyed by the enemy near Frederick was repaired. It was still held, by direction of the General-in-Chief, during the battle of Antietam, thence communicating with Frederick.

On Friday, September 12, general headquarters moved from Middlebrook to a point near Urbana. At this point the occupation of Frederick by our troops was announced to the General-in-Chief by signals from Sugar Loaf as soon as the head of the column had entered that city. The presence of the enemy's pickets was reported as visible at the bridge of the Monocacy, and information was given of the occupation of Point of Rocks by a small party of our forces on this night. On the night of the 12th, Lieut. J. H. Fralick, who had gone forward with General Hancock, reached Point of Rocks, then not yet possessed by our troops. Lieutenant Fralick attempted to attract thence, by means of signals, the attention of the signal officer supposed to be at Maryland Heights. Rockets and red lights were fired, and the usual signals made by torch from Sugar Loaf for the same purpose. Point of Rocks is in easy signal distance from Maryland Heights, but no response was obtained from the latter post. It was afterward ascertained that Captain Fortescue had in so far misapprehended the position in which he could be of most service as to leave the Heights prior to their investment. It had not been indicated to Captain Fortescue in orders that he was to remain at that place. Lieutenant Fralick afterward first reported to General Franklin the occupation of Maryland Heights by the enemy. Of this fact he had evidence satisfactory to himself by seeing their signal flag at work upon that station.

On Saturday, September 13, the army occupied Frederick in force. A detail of officers was sent early on this day to occupy Point of Rocks, to report any approach of the enemy in that direction, and to gain information as to their presence on the west side of Catoctin Ridge, and of the condition of affairs at Harper's Ferry. The stations at Seneca and at Great Falls were ordered to be broken up.

The sounds of a cannonade attracting attention early in the morning,

the position of the guns at Catoctin Pass, west of Frederick, was at once reported to General McClellan, near Urbana. The cannonade proved to be our advance attacking the rear of the enemy. The pass was forced about noon. Lieuts. N. H. Camp and G. J. Clarke, who had been so fortunate as to be with the advance, were, by direction of Captain Fisher, stationed at the summit of the pass, and in communication with Lieut. W. H. Hill, stationed with General Burnside in Frederick. Messages relative to the movements of the troops were received and answered. Lieutenants Camp and Clarke being relieved at this station, proceeded with the forces under General Pleasanton to Middletown. The attempt was made by Captain Fisher to connect with a signal line Middletown and Frederick. This, although easily feasible, failed in the confusion and change of camps. At about 1 p. m. signal reports from Sugar Loaf Mountain to the general commanding the army at Frederick announced that no enemy was visible or apparently near our left. Later in the afternoon signal reports from Point of Rocks stated that the enemy were in Pleasant Valley; that a portion of their forces had been visible at Jefferson, and that they had cut the canal at Knoxville, to be able, if necessary, there to cross the Potomac into Virginia. No news had been received direct from Harper's Ferry at any station. A heavy cannonade had been heard in that direction. In the evening a message was received from Washington, transmitted through the signal station at Point of Rocks, from the President of the United States to General McClellan. A reply was in the same manner returned. The line of signal communication extended on this day and night from the left of our forces near Point of Rocks to those on the right near Catoctin Pass. On this day Lieut. F. N. Wicker took possession, on the summit of the ridge, of a rebel signal flag, which it is probable had been just used at one of their stations.

On Sunday, September 14, was fought the battle of South Mountain. It was the plan of the signal stations ordered this day that the general commanding the army should be enabled to receive on the field reports from the Valley of the Potomac by the stations at Point of Rocks and Sugar Loaf Mountain, and from Pleasant Valley by a station established on some commanding eminence in that valley. There would be thus information of any occurrences east of Catoctin Ridge or in the valley west of Catoctin Ridge on our right or left, or on the ridges which might be visible from these stations. It was also intended, as is customary, that signal officers should accompany the advance of our troops when attacking the enemy's position, to communicate to the general commanding the field any information they might be able to gain at points from which it was possible to work stations in his vicinity. This part of the plan was not executed as well as was practicable, for the reason that no signal officer had early information as to the plan of attack. The stations at Sugar Loaf and Point of Rocks were maintained.

As the general movement from Frederick to the pass at South Mountain commenced, a station was ordered to be located on Catoctin Ridge, and to communicate thence with Sugar Loaf and with the prominent tower of a church in Middletown, which was selected as a station of observation for the valley. With the advance of our troops to the gap and the planting of our batteries, a station had been opened, under the supervision of Captain Fisher, at the battery near General A. Pleasanton, communicating thence to the Tower station in Middletown. During the morning's cannonade messages were here received from the gap for Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside and for Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan, while

their headquarters were in the vicinity. When General McClellan took his position upon the field of battle, the headquarters station was that, then near him, which had previously been established near General Pleasonton.

With the advance of General Jesse Reno's division to the crest of the mountain south of the gap, a signal station was ordered, as I am informed by Captain Fisher, to be located upon the crest. Owing to some conflicting instructions from some officer, this station was not established. Later in the afternoon Lieuts. J. C. Paine and C. H. Carey were directed to open a station at this point. The flag was promptly carried to the position indicated, and the communication opened with both the station of observation on the tower and a station near General McClellan, then on the field. A few reports were received from this station, but it was feebly worked, soon ceased to reply to calls, and became of no importance. At noon the whole line of communication mentioned was fully opened, and during the progress of the engagement there were given to General McClellan on the field reports from Point of Rocks, Sugar Loaf Mountain, and the other stations established. There were announced, among other reports, the movements of our troops visible in the valley and on the ridge, and at the time of their occurrence the facts of General Franklin's engagement, then commencing at the gap near Burkittsville, the sounds and smoke as of a battle on Maryland Heights, and that no enemy was visible anywhere on our left or in the valley of the Potomac. A message was signaled from the field, addressed to General H. W. Halleck, at Washington. The stations were fully employed throughout the engagement until night. Some of them had been working from early morning. The officers remained at their posts throughout the night. There were, however, no occasions for night signals. At daylight on the following day it was found that the retreat of the enemy had rendered the further occupation of those upon and near the battle-field unnecessary.

On Monday, September 15, following the retreat of the enemy, commenced the advance of the army through the pass in South Mountain and toward the Antietam. Early in the morning the course of the enemy's retreat and the positions they would select were uncertain. Officers were sent to the summit of the Blue Ridge with instructions to select stations, and also to examine and report their observations of the country upon the west side of the Blue Ridge. A careful examination was made from the high peak of the Blue Ridge north of the gap known as Washington Monument, which overlooks all the valley between the North and South Mountains.

From this point the forces of the enemy were visible near Sharpsburg, and thence to Shepherdstown. The line of battle beyond Antietam, then just beginning to be formed, was seen, and a full report of this and other facts sent to General McClellan. The line was yet forming as this dispatch was forwarded by orderly. It is possible it contained as early information as any given as to the position of the enemy. A signal station was established at this point.

On the evening of this day it became evident that there would be an engagement of some magnitude, and preparations were commenced for the battle of Antietam. At this time and early on the following morning instructions were received from General McClellan that signal communication should be established between his position chosen for the field of battle to so far as practicable on the right and left within our lines; that our left should be observed with particular care, and

that from the most commanding points of view reports should be made of any information in regard to the battle. The station on Sugar Loaf was retained, to warn against any possible movement in that vicinity.

At 2 a. m. on September 16 orders were sent to Captain Fisher, in charge of the signal detachment then at Boonsborough, to bring the party forward as rapidly as practicable to near the Antietam. He was also directed to establish an officer on Washington Monument, the point above mentioned. The instructions of this officer were to report to the battle-field any movements of the enemy visible to him at any point in the valley, or clouds of dust, or signs of forces approaching or near the position held by our army. He was afterward instructed, by signals from the field during the progress of the battle at Antietam, to particularly notice any approach made in the valley behind the Elk Mountains, which, bordering the Antietam, touch the Potomac near the mouth of that creek. Additional instructions were given Captain Fisher upon his arrival at Keedysville.

At 10 a. m. there had been established on the field at Antietam a signal station communicating with the station on the monument, one on the left, on an elevation near the left of General A. E. Burnside's forces, which communicated with the station on Elk Mountain, and one on the right near General G. G. Meade. A station of observation had been previously established on the crest of Elk Mountain at the gap, afterward cut for the convenience of the officers there stationed, and now designated by the soldiers as "McClellan's Gap."

The extensive view from this position commanded Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown, with very many points of the battle-field, the approaches to it, and the country in the vicinity. A careful telescopic examination of all points thought to be of interest was made, and a full report of the enemy, then in front of Sharpsburg, and of such movements as were visible, was sent to the general commanding. Officers were kept at their posts on this station by day and night, with but a few hours' interval, from the commencement of the battle until the retreat of the enemy beyond the Potomac. The station was worked with peculiar labor, it being necessary to observe at times from the top of a tree, while the signals were made from a point beneath among the branches, where the flagman could only sustain himself by exertion. All stations communicated with a central or headquarters station. From these points reports and messages of various value were transmitted throughout the day. The movement of the enemy which seemed most to attract attention, and which was twice reported—once from Washington Monument and once from the station on Elk Mountain—was the apparent motion of large trains from behind the woods west of Sharpsburg to Shepherdstown, and into Virginia.

In the afternoon the enemy's line of battle seemed to have changed from in front of Sharpsburg. About dusk that evening commenced our attack upon their left. Lieuts. J. B. Brooks and W. H. Hill, ordered to move with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding the right, skillfully located their station this night near his headquarters, and close to the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, and were ready at this position at daylight.

On Wednesday, September 17, was fought the principal battle of the Antietam. The general plan of signal operations was similar to that of the preceding day, the reports from the station on the right and from the station on Elk Mountain being concentrated at what was known as the Headquarters station, near General McClellan. A station

was posted on the left at the position of General Burnside on the field, thence communicating with the mountain, and receiving reports for that officer. As our lines advanced on the west side of the Antietam, driving in the enemy's left, stations were established as closely as possible behind the lines, and near to the generals commanding in that portion of the field. A station was thus established, subject to artillery fire, by Lieuts. E. C. Pierce and W. F. Barrett, at the Miller house, near the position of General E. V. Sumner. The signal package carried on the saddle by one of the flagmen of this party was cut in two by a cannon-shot.

When the field near Roulette house was cleared by our troops, an advance station was ordered to that position. The point was reached by Lieuts. F. N. Wicker and G. J. Clarke. They had transmitted but few messages when the station was displaced by the breaking of a part of our line. The position was soon retaken by our troops, but these officers did not reoccupy it. The fire had been close, the horse of one of the officers being slightly wounded. An hour afterward this station was occupied by Lieuts. F. Wilson and F. W. Owen, sent to supply the places of the two officers first detailed, and was bravely and efficiently worked by them under a considerable artillery fire until night. These stations were kept in communication with general headquarters.

Throughout the battle the labors of the officers and men on some of these stations was almost incessant, and all exerted themselves zealously to gain and forward to headquarters any information or message to bear upon the result of the action. It was the fortune of Lieuts. J. B. Brooks and W. H. Hill to forward from the right some messages and reports of much importance. One of them, a message from General E. V. Sumner, announcing the wavering of the line and the need of re-enforcements, could probably have been sent so rapidly in no other manner. The reports from the mountain station so overlooking the field of battle were of peculiar interest, and the faithful manner in which this station was held and worked is worthy of commendation. All the stations were kept by the officers upon the field on the night of the 17th. Night signals were used, however, only between the mountain and general headquarters.

On the day and night of September 18 the stations were held in the same positions. There was constant observation and report in reference to the enemy, and movements noticed in different parts of the country. On this day the station communicating with Washington Monument, which had been withdrawn during the 17th, was reoccupied. At sundown and until dark the enemy's smoke distinctly marked the positions held by them on this side of the river and about Sharpsburg. During the night they hastily retreated.

On the morning of September 19, upon the advance of our cavalry, under General A. Pleasonton, in pursuit of the enemy, and the opening of the enemy's batteries in Virginia at the ford of the Potomac, officers who had accompanied the rapid movement of our troops established, under the direction of Captain Fisher, a station near Shepherdstown. This station communicated with the general commanding the army at headquarters until the occupation of Sharpsburg by our troops in force. On this day a signal party was ordered to Maryland Heights, whence, on the afternoon of the 20th, communication was opened with headquarters of the army at Sharpsburg. The earliest information was thus given on that day of the occupation of that place by our forces and of

the condition of Harper's Ferry as relating to the future movements of our army. From the day on which the enemy were driven from Maryland until the present time they have occupied points in Virginia partially visible from the stations of observation established upon our lines. These have been maintained upon the mountain at McClellan's Gap, east of Sharpsburg, on Headquarters Mountain, nearly east of Shepherdstown, on Maryland Heights, on Bolivar Heights, on Sugar Loaf Mountain, and on Fairview Heights, northwest of Martinsburg. The range of country brought within fair telescopic observation extends from the Seneca River on the east to Hancock, Md., on the west, far south into the Shenandoah Valley and north into Maryland. It has been difficult for any movement of importance to be made by the enemy without being noticed from some of these stations.

As a summary of the operations of the corps as connected with this campaign, I have to report that these operations have extended in the establishment of stations from Alexandria, Va., to Fairview Heights, in Maryland. There have been occupied in all fifty-one stations. I forward herewith a map and list of the stations occupied, and a map showing the plan of the stations at the battle of Antietam. From before the departure of this army from Washington to the present time, the country in which it was to operate, or through which it was to pass, has been always under observation from some of these positions. The duties of the signal officers require that their watchfulness and reports should embrace occurrences in the night equally with those in the day. In each of the engagements of the campaign, officers of the corps have taken some part. They claim to have announced the entry of the enemy into Maryland, and his retreat beyond the Potomac.

Of the value to this army of the watchfulness of these officers, of their observation, and the consequent reports made by them, and of their transmission of intelligence, the general who commands the army can best judge. Of the zeal with which the officers have tried to aid its successes, and of the willingness and endurance with which they have undergone hardships few officers are required to meet, it is my duty to make mention.

The following officers are mentioned for their services during this campaign:

For services at Sugar Loaf Mountain, September 4, 1862, observing and reporting the advance of the enemy into Maryland: First Lieut. B. N. Miner, Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers. The signal station was held so long by this officer that he was captured in leaving it.

For services at Sugar Loaf Mountain from the time of its recapture and during the engagement at Catoctin Pass, and the battles at South Mountain and Antietam: First Lieut. W. W. Rowley, Twenty-eighth New York Volunteers; First Lieut. J. S. Hall, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers; First Lieut. W. B. Roe, Sixteenth Michigan Volunteers; Second Lieut. J. H. Spencer, First Minnesota Volunteers.

For services at Point of Rocks prior to and during the battle of South Mountain: First Lieut. I. J. Harvey, Second Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps; Second Lieut. F. Horner, Sixth New Jersey Volunteers; Second Lieut. A. B. Jerome, First New Jersey Volunteers.

For services at the battle of South Mountain: First Lieut. J. C. Paine, Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers; First Lieut. C. F. Stone, Sixth Maine Volunteers; First Lieut. F. E. Yates, Fourth Excelsior; Second Lieut. W. F. Barrett, Twenty-seventh Massachusetts Volunteers, stationed at the tower at Middletown; First Lieut. S. Adams,

Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers; Second Lieut. R. Dinsmore, Fifth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, stationed at Catoctin Ridge, west of Frederick; Second Lieut. N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers; Second Lieut. G. J. Clark, Sixty-second New York Volunteers, stationed near the General-in-Chief.

For services at the battle of Antietam and on the pursuit to Shepherdstown, Va.: First Lieut. F. Wilson, Fifth Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps; Second Lieut. F. W. Owen, Thirty-eighth New York Volunteers, occupying the advance station near Roulette's house, and bravely maintaining it for some hours under an artillery fire; First Lieut. J. B. Brooks, Fourth Vermont Volunteers; Second Lieut. W. H. Hill, Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, occupying a station near the Hagerstown turnpike, and freely exposing themselves under fire in the discharge of their duties (this station was near the right of the army); First Lieut. E. C. Pierce, Third Maine Volunteers; Second Lieut. William F. Barrett, Twenty-seventh Massachusetts Volunteers, occupying a station near the position of Generals Sumner and Smith upon the field, and subject at times to artillery fire; First Lieut. J. Gloskoski, Twenty-ninth New York Volunteers; Second Lieut. N. H. Camp, Fourth New Jersey Volunteers, at the signal station at McClellan's Gap, on Elk Mountain, overlooking the field; First Lieut. William S. Stryker, Twelfth Virginia Volunteers; First Lieut. J. C. Paine, Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers; First Lieut. C. F. Stone, Sixth Maine Volunteers; First Lieut. P. A. Taylor, Forty-ninth New York Volunteers, at Headquarters station, near the general commanding the army; First Lieut. S. Pierce, Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers; First Lieut. C. S. Kendall, First Massachusetts Volunteers, near General Burnside's headquarters, on the left of the army; First Lieut. E. L. Halsted, Fortieth New York Volunteers, on Washington Monument, on Blue Ridge; First Lieut. J. A. Hebrew, Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers; Second Lieut. F. Horner, Sixth New Jersey Volunteers, with the advance on the 19th and at the attack on the enemy's batteries near Shepherdstown.

Capt. B. F. Fisher, acting signal officer, in immediate charge of the party with the Army of the Potomac, and under whose personal supervision many of the stations reported were established, is entitled to mention for the zeal which has characterized his conduct throughout the campaign, and the courage and ability with which he discharged his duties at the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

There are laid before the commanding general in this list the names of officers who have served in the presence of the enemy now for more than a year, and whose labors have elicited the official thanks of generals and other commanders. There is hardly one whose name has not been more than once officially mentioned for gallant or faithful service upon the Peninsula, in the Valley of the Shenandoah, or on the Rappahannock. There is yet no definite mode by which to give them substantial reward or promotion.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALBERT J. MYER,

Signal Officer, and Major, U. S. Army.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

No. 6.

Report of Capt. B. F. Fisher, Acting Signal Officer, U. S. Army, of operations September 4-30.

SIGNAL CAMP, NEAR THE MOUTH OF ANTIETAM,
September 30, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the manner in which the signal detachment of the Army of the Potomac has been employed since the 4th of September, upon which day I again resumed command of it, having been absent for a short time to recruit my health. For a detailed account of the messages sent and received and special services rendered, I refer you to the individual reports of the several officers composing this detachment.

The morning of the 4th September I joined the party, then encamped near Alexandria, Va. During the day I rode along the front, ascertained the manner in which our troops were stationed, and made the details for the next morning accordingly. Ordered Lieutenants Fralick and Kendall to Maryland Heights, and sent an order to Lieutenant Rowley to man Point of Rocks, Sugar Loaf Mountain, Poolesville, and Seneca with members of his party until I could send him assistance. Lieutenants Denicke and Daniels were ordered to Great Falls, Lieutenants Hebrew and Pierce to Fairfax Seminary, Lieutenants Jerome and Yates to Falls Church, Lieutenants Hill and Neel to Minor's Hill, Lieutenant Carey to Upton's Hill, Lieutenants Gloskoski and Owen to Hall's house, which was to be the center of all lines, to receive the reports and communications from all stations, and then transmit them by telegraph to Washington.

Friday, September 5, moved camp to the vicinity of Hall's Hill as being more central; ordered Lieutenants Hutchinson and Hall to Fort Pennsylvania. In the evening Lieutenant Herzog and I traveled over the hills in the neighborhood of Langley, to watch for the appearance of the signal torches of Lieutenants Denicke and Daniels upon the tower of Great Falls, according to prearrangements. Not discovering them, we returned to camp about 11 p. m. The next morning I rode up to Great Falls, and found that our lines were not extended to within a mile of our former station; was halted by Major-General Couch, and informed that it was not safe to go any farther in that direction; upon, however, being recognized by the general, I was permitted to use my own discretion, and proceeded to the station and opened communication with Lieutenant Spencer, then at Seneca, some 6 miles farther up the river, and learned through signals from him of the presence of the enemy in Maryland and the breaking up of the stations of Sugar Loaf and Poolesville and of the necessity to abandon Seneca for a short time. At 5 o'clock Lieutenants Daniels and Denicke arrived and occupied the station. Immediately upon giving my instructions, I rode rapidly back to Fort Pennsylvania, from which point communication was then opened with Great Falls.

Sunday, September 7, upon returning to camp, I learned that the troops generally were on the road to Rockville; whereupon I took steps to remove the camp at once to the north side of the Potomac, and received your order to report with the party to headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Rockville, Md. On Monday morning, at daylight, we were in the saddle and on the road for the Upper Potomac, and reported our arrival at Rockville to Colonel Colburn at 10 a. m., encamped

the party, and, with several companies, rode forward to learn the character of the country in which we were expecting our services to be required. We extended our ride, after visiting Seneca Station, to within a few miles of Poolesville, and then returned to camp.

Tuesday, 9th, I ordered Lieutenants Gloskoski and Owen to reopen the station at Seneca, and Lieutenants Camp and Clark to report to General Pleasonton, who had advanced to Poolesville, and open communication with Seneca. In the afternoon I received instructions to connect the headquarters of General Sumner on the right and those of Major-General Couch on the left with those of General Franklin near the center; succeeded in connecting the two latter, but it was late in the day to connect the two former.

Wednesday, September 10, moved forward to Barnesville, taking with me Lieutenants Wicker, Hill, Brooks, Taylor, Hebrew, and Pierce. The cavalry had considerable skirmishing during the day, but no opportunity offered for us to use our signals to any advantage. During the evening I was assured by General Pleasonton that our forces would occupy Sugar Loaf Mountain during the next day.

Thursday, September 11, connected the advance with General Franklin's headquarters. Sent Lieutenants Brooks and Taylor to Poolesville, with instructions to watch for the appearance of our flag on Sugar Loaf Mountain. About 2 o'clock, learning that the cavalry were on the mountain, I asked for a detail of 20 men, and started forward, passing the pickets about a half a mile from the foot of the hill.

We arrived on the summit about 3.30 in the afternoon, and opened communication immediately with the officers sent in the morning to Poolesville; also with officers stationed near General Franklin's headquarters. Sent official reports of our observations to General McClellan and General Franklin, requesting permission from the latter to retain our escort until the next morning. Lieutenants Roe and Hall, who joined us on our way up the mountain, were left in charge of the station, in accordance with your orders, though I had intended to leave Lieutenants Hill and Brooks with Lieutenant Wicker, who were acquainted with the country and its roads. Lieutenants Hill and Hebrew were then directed to select some point near General Sumner's headquarters, and open communication with the officers on the mountain, reporting the establishment of said communication to the general after it should be in successful operation.

Friday, September 12, joined the camp near Urbana, having established two several points along the route with the station on the mountain and headquarters as it passed by. Opened communication from a point near the camp-ground in the evening. During the day Lieutenants Rowley and Spencer were ordered by yourself to Sugar Loaf Mountain to assist in the management and working of said station. Received a message from Lieutenant Fralick, stating that he had arrived at Point of Rocks. I sent him Lieutenants Harvey, Jerome, and Horner, who were to establish a station under the direction of Lieutenant Harvey at the Point.

Saturday, September 13, went forward early in the morning to Frederick, which had been occupied by our troops the evening of the day before. Located two officers in the cemetery to open communication with the station on Sugar Loaf Mountain, while I rode out to the gap west of Frederick and reported to General Pleasonton. Having left two officers there, and sent two back to the city, I had with little delay the pleasure of seeing the line working satisfactorily. The enemy having been driven back and closely followed by our cavalry and artillery to the foot of the South Mountain, two officers, Lieutenants Camp and

Clark, accompanied General Pleasonton to the village, while Lieutenants Hebrew and Yates took position on the crest of the mountain, between Frederick and the former place, opening communication with the officers in Middletown, but failing to attract attention of the officers at the headquarters station. This line was a failure, though at one time it was working and several important messages were sent to General Burnside by General Pleasonton.

Sunday, September 14, moved forward to Middletown. Located Lieutenants Dinsmore and Adams on the crest of Short Mountain to communicate with the station on Sugar Loaf Mountain and the station at Middletown, near General McClellan's headquarters, thus connecting our advanced position with the telegraph station at Point of Rocks. Opened communication between General Pleasonton's position, upon the field of battle, then raging in the vicinity, where the Hagerstown pike crosses South Mountain, and that of General McClellan near Middletown. During the afternoon I ordered Lieutenants Hill and Wicker to select a point as far up the mountain as possible, and communicate back to Middletown. This detail, I was informed, was interfered with by General Pleasonton, and the officers returned to their old position near the batteries. In the afternoon, by your direction, Lieutenants Paine and Carey were sent to the field on the mountain, but did not succeed in working to advantage before night terminated the contest that raged at times fearfully along the side and summit of the mountain. During the day I sent Lieutenant Kendall to join Lieutenant Pierce, then with General Franklin's column, with instructions to communicate with Middletown, either directly or through the mountain station. Of these two officers I heard no more until they joined us at Keedysville.

Monday, September 15, by your direction, Lieutenants Camp and Clark took position on the crest of South Mountain to communicate with Lieutenants Wilson and Owen, near General McClellan's headquarters. Lieutenants Wicker and Gloskoski were ordered to report to General Burnside, who was crossing the mountain on a road about a mile south of the main road and leading directly toward Sharpsburg. Lieutenants Halsted and E. Pierce took position on the mountain near the main road, but were withdrawn during the day, and Lieutenant Halsted ordered to Washington Monument. We remained over night near Boonsborough, and next morning pushed forward to Keedysville, expecting a decisive battle to be fought during the day. According to instructions, I placed Lieutenants Camp and Clark to open communication with Lieutenant Halsted on the monument, on the summit of South Mountain; Lieutenant Wicker at a central point, near Keedysville, to communicate with Lieutenants Owen and Stone, on the extreme left; Lieutenants Hill and Carey at the center, and Lieutenants Wilson and Barrett on the right. During part of the day I was with General Meade's command, on the extreme right, making observations and reporting them to him and headquarters. In the afternoon I was at the central station, and in the evening receiving instructions from you to open communication with the mountain station, but received it too late for any effect that day. During the afternoon sent Lieutenant Hill to report to General Hooker, who had moved to the right beyond General Meade's position.

The next morning, Wednesday, September 17, the great battle of the Antietam opened. Placed Lieutenants Wilson and Barrett on the hill near the headquarters of General McClellan, to communicate with Lieutenants Hill and Brooks, near General Sumner's headquarters, on the extreme right. Established a station communicating with the station

on the mountain, and assisted Lieutenant Owen in receiving messages during the morning. In the afternoon I went out to Lieutenants Kendall and L. Pierce, on the extreme left, to assist in selecting a point from which we could communicate to headquarters; found that it was impossible to communicate direct, and therefore called the station on Elk Mountain, and through it opened communication from a point near General Burnside's position with the station at said headquarters. Lieutenants Pierce and Barrett were directed to go to the front, on the west side of the Antietam, and open communication with headquarters, which was successfully accomplished, and reported by them to the generals commanding troops in that vicinity. Lieutenants Wicker and Clark were also directed to take position in a certain field beyond the position selected by Lieutenants Pierce and Barrett. They arrived at the designated place, opened communication with Lieutenant Wilson at headquarters, but shortly afterward, our line being driven back at that point, their flag disappeared, and when next heard from they were somewhere beyond Lieutenant Hill's position. Lieutenant Clark states in his report that this to us unaccountable change of position was contrary to his understanding of instructions received, but he was overruled by Lieutenant Wicker's idea of what their instructions were, and thus yielded to the change. Lieutenants Wilson and Owen were afterward directed to take the position thus left vacant, which they did, and bravely held it until the enemy retreated.

Lieutenants Taylor and Stone, having charge of that part of Headquarters station communicating with the stations on the west side of the Antietam, were very prompt and attentive to all calls given. After Lieutenant Owen was ordered to the other side of the Antietam, Lieutenant Stryker was left in charge of the one branch of Headquarters station, and, with the exception of several intervals, remained during the two succeeding days, almost constantly employed in receiving messages from the station on Elk Mountain. I would here take the opportunity of stating that the officers at this station, which was during the 17th and 18th a most important one, were undivided in their attention to their duties, answering calls promptly, and reading, with few exceptions, with good success. During the day the officers from the stations along the road pursued during the advance of the army reported at Headquarters station, they having been called in for other duties, by an order that directed Lieutenants Dinsmore and Adams to establish a station in the vicinity of Frederick, open communication with the station on Sugar Loaf Mountain, and send forward by telegraph all reports received. The station on Elk Mountain, manned by Lieutenants Gloskoski and Camp, sent many important messages during the day. In the afternoon, you being present on the mountain in person, we had the benefit of your own observations. At the approach of night the wearied armies ceased their strife, and for the time the battle was over.

About 8 o'clock p. m. I returned to camp to attend to duties relating to the necessities and comforts of my command.

In the morning, expecting the battle to be renewed, 6 o'clock found me at the Headquarters station. During the morning a continued stream of messages flowed from the mountain stations, and were received by Lieutenant Paine and myself, Lieutenant Stryker having accompanied Lieutenants Wicker and L. Pierce, who were stationed on the left, near General Burnside's position, the other stations remaining as they were the day previous, Lieutenant Stryker having returned from the left and Lieutenant Paine receiving the messages from the mountain during the day, Lieutenants Kendall and Hebrew relieving them in the evening.

No attack was made by either army, both apparently gathering renewed strength for the battle we all felt must come. The night passed, and from the station on the mountain we learned next morning that the enemy had fallen back from Sharpsburg to the south bank of the Potomac. With Lieutenants Daniels, Fralick, Carey, Hebrew, and Horner, I joined the advancing cavalry, and opened communication from a position near, where a few hours afterward General Porter located his headquarters. Leaving the station in the charge of Lieutenants Hebrew and Horner, and sending Lieutenants Fralick and Daniels to Maryland Heights, I accompanied, by request, General Porter to the bank of the river, and received instructions that, as a battery would be quietly placed in position back of a hill, I should prepare my officers to direct the fire of the battery from my position on the bank of the river. I chose to take part myself in preference to sending others, and having been joined by Lieutenant Owen, I sent him to the battery while I resumed the forward position, where we remained during the entire afternoon, signaling the effect of the several shots as the battery played upon the opposite bank.

Saturday, September 20, communication was established with Maryland Heights, which has since been kept open from various points. Headquarters having moved forward, Lieutenants Stone and Taylor broke up their stations and established them near the new location. After which, changes were made which will be best understood by giving you a detailed account of the present disposition of the detachment. Commencing with the right, we have at Fairview Lieutenants Rowley and Roe, with instructions to send by signals to Hagerstown reports of observations made, to be received by Lieutenant Spencer and forwarded by telegraph to Major-General McClellan. Near Downsville are Lieutenants Denicke and Clark, communicating with the Headquarters station, through the station on Elk Mountain, at which latter station are Lieutenants Jerome, E. Pierce, and Owen. On the mountain, just east of headquarters, present camp, are Lieutenants Wicker and L. Pierce. At Headquarters station are Lieutenants Stone and Taylor, communicating with stations on the right, and Lieutenants Kendall and Gloskoski, communicating with stations on the left. On Maryland Heights are stationed Lieutenants Daniels and Hall. On Bolivar Heights, with General Sumner, are Lieutenants Hill and Brooks. On Loudoun Heights, with General Greene, are Lieutenants Halsted and Camp. On Sugar Loaf Mountain are Lieutenants Hebrew, Yates, and Carey, communicating with Lieutenants Dinsmore and Adams at Frederick, the two latter forwarding reports by telegraph. Lieutenant Harvey is on special duty, per order.

Lieutenants Fralick, Barrett, and Wilson are sick, the two latter not seriously. In camp are Captain Fortescue and Lieutenants Horner, Paine, and Collin. Many of the officers need equipments, and are anxiously awaiting the arrival of Lieut. L. B. Norton, in order to thoroughly prepare the party for another campaign, if called upon during the fall. I look forward to better success and more pleasant duties hereafter. The officers, gathered from different divisions of the army, and not accustomed to each other's mode of working, have become somewhat acquainted during the present campaign, and it can be expected that there will be an understanding and more harmony in the manner of communication.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. FISHER,

Captain, Commanding Signal Detachment, Army of the Potomac.

Maj. A. J. MYER,

Chief Signal Officer.

No. 7.

Report of Capt. Paul Babcock, Seventh New Jersey Infantry, Acting Signal Officer, U. S. Army, of operations October 17–November 6.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
November 7, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In obedience to orders from the Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac, I have the honor to make the following report:

On the 17th October I reported to Major-General Porter, at Sharpsburg, Md., Lieut. Thomas R. Clark and 4 men being with me ready for duty. General Porter immediately informed me of two points with which he desired communication, viz, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, and a point on the Potomac River overlooking a ford, over which he hourly expected a division of his troops. I immediately told him but one of the communications could be established that night, as there were but two officers in my party. Twenty-five minutes after his decision which to do, communication was established between his headquarters and the point indicated. Fifteen messages passed between the two points up to the time when Lieutenant Clark reported the division approaching the ford in good order, and no signs of any enemy. Upon receipt of this message, the general pronounced the station no longer necessary, and Lieutenant Clark came into camp. Early next morning (October 18) we opened with the station at White House, thus connecting General Porter with general headquarters. From this date to October 28 (the day on which you request a full report to commence), we kept General Porter in uninterrupted communication with the White House station, on Elk Mountain, the station of observation on Maryland Heights, and through it with headquarters Army of the Potomac, constantly receiving from Lieutenants Pierce and Fuller at one and Lieutenants Hall and Taylor at the other full and accurate reports of the positions and movements of the enemy, often in advance of any other, and generally confirmatory of that received from other sources. These reports seemed of great importance to the general, and he seemed much pleased with the facility and accuracy with which they were obtained. In addition to the foregoing, we frequently took observations from the river bank, and reported to General Porter the apparent position, force, &c., of the enemy opposite. On one occasion, Lieutenant Clark made such a report, upon which the general sent over and captured some 10 or 12 of their pickets. From October 28 to 30 we continued as before, and, I believe, to General Porter's entire satisfaction. October 30, at 3.30 p. m., we broke up camp and followed General Porter to Pleasant Valley, almost directly under the Maryland Heights station. Here we tried to communicate with Maryland Heights, but all our efforts were fruitless. Rockets and red lights were burned, and the torches swung from 7 to 11.30 p. m., and within 3 miles of the station, but no answer could be gotten. Fortunately we were not called upon that night to send any messages. Next morning, October 31, we moved with the general, and encamped at Sandy Hook, within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Maryland Heights station. We immediately proceeded to open with them, and tied both large flags to the long pole, swinging for two hours without an answer, when I sent a man up to notify them of our position. They then saw us with naked eyes. At their request, we read their reports to General McClellan and gave them to General Porter. These reports were very full and important, and reflected great credit on Lieutenants Hall and Taylor.

November 1, left Sandy Hook, crossed the Potomac, and marched to Neersville, Va., having requested Maryland Heights to look for us in that direction. Eighteen minutes after reaching Neersville we were in communication with Maryland Heights, and through them to General McClellan's headquarters. This instance of prompt opening of communication was entirely due to the vigilant watch kept up by Lieutenants Hall and Taylor. All that night and the next morning, up to the very minute of starting off, were employed in sending and receiving messages of great importance, eighteen lengthy messages passing between us during the night and morning.

November 2, started one hour after the general; overtook him on the road, and reached Snicker's Gap while the enemy were threatening it. On the road the day before, Lieutenants Pierce and Fuller joined me, having been sent for by General Porter at my request. Their presence enabled me to accomplish that which the general indicated immediately on arriving at Snicker's Gap, viz, the establishing of two stations, one at or near the front, connecting it with his headquarters. No sooner was this done than it was put in use by General Hancock, commanding the forces which held the gap, in communicating with Generals Couch and Porter. No fight occurred, but the stations were well placed to be of use in case of an attack, and did good service in facilitating the transmittal of orders and information for the arrangement and disposition of our forces. The position at the gap was also a good one to see or be seen by any station on Short Mountain or up the valley, where we thought stations would be placed.

November 3, we continued these two stations, and kept one officer seeking good points from which to observe enemy's position and movements, full reports of which were immediately sent to the general. At 12 m. Captain Fisher visited us and expressed himself entirely satisfied with what we had done. At 9 p. m. the mountain station was discontinued for the night, as Lieutenants Clark and Fuller had succeeded in finding general headquarters from their station at General Porter's headquarters, through Lieutenants Yates and Hebrew, who had been sent by the Chief Signal Officer to an intermediate point. This communication was kept up through the entire night and next day (November 4), up to about 2 p. m., and constantly used by General Porter in communicating important information to General McClellan, when it was suddenly destroyed by the breaking up of a station at Bloomfield, leaving several very important messages half way over the line, and several more at General Porter's headquarters waiting to be sent.

In the morning of November 4 we reopened the mountain station as one of observation, and also to endeavor to open with a station on Short Mountain. In reporting observations it was quite useful, but we did not succeed in attracting Short Mountain, although a man was sent there to notify them where we were. November 5 we were still unable to reopen with headquarters.

November 6, at 4 a. m., we started on the march and reached White Plains at 6 p. m., having seen during the day Lieutenants Brooks and Stone, Yates and Hebrew, all of whom were advised to report to headquarters Signal Corps immediately.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
P. BABCOCK, JR.,

Captain Seventh N. J. Volunteers, and Acting Signal Officer.

Lieut. WILLIAM S. STRYKER.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
White Plains, Va., November 7, 1862.

From the moment Captain Babcock and his party joined me near Sharpsburg to the present time, the party has been actively, energetically, and in many cases perseveringly engaged in opening communication with general headquarters and other points of observation, and has been of the best service to me and the corps. His difficulties are expressed in the within communication of Captain Babcock, and also his labors to some extent. Wherever there was a failure to communicate with general headquarters, it was not due to any want of exertion of Captain Babcock or his party, which was ever ready for duty and watchful at all hours.

If it were in the power of the commanding general to provide signal parties at each corps headquarters, the value of the system would be more highly appreciated and their presence always desired, if they work as faithfully and intelligently as Captain Babcock and his party. Their services at the present time, when there are so many prominent points of observation, are especially valuable in aiding communication with different points of the army, and inestimable in case of a general action.

F. J. PORTER,
Major-General, Commanding.

No. 8.

*Report of First Lieut. Peter A. Taylor, Forty-ninth New York Infantry,
Acting Signal Officer, U. S. Army, of operations September 11-30.*

SIGNAL STATION, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
October 1, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of signal duty in the month of September, 1862:

(Received.)

SEPTEMBER 11.—(At Poolesville Station, Md.)

To Major MYER:

We occupy Sugar Loaf.

FISHER AND OTHERS.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN, from Sugar Loaf:

We see two regiments of cavalry near Frederick. No other signs of enemy in Maryland. Opposite Point of Rocks is a large force encamped.

HALL.

(Sent.)

SEPTEMBER 12.

To B. F. FISHER:

Headquarters are at Middleburg. All right. Report any movement of enemy toward Frederick and Leesburg.

Major MYER.

(Received.)

To Lieutenants BROOKS and TAYLOR:

You will go to Urbana immediately.

FISHER.

15TH.

(Received.)

To OFFICERS AT POOLESVILLE:

You report to me immediately at Boonsborough.

FISHER.

(Received.)

17TH.—At Headquarters Station, near Sharpsburg, Md.

To Major MYER:

We have found General Slocum. He is near us.

PIERCE AND BARRETT.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

The infantry are not engaged on our right, but are preparing to do so.

WILSON.

(Received.)

17TH.

To General McCLELLAN:

There is no change in the position of troops. We are holding our own beautifully.

WILSON.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

We have just heard from the front. General Hooker is wounded. General Sumner is in command.

PIERCE AND BARRETT.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

Re-enforcements are badly wanted. Our troops are giving way. I am hunting for French's and Slocum's divisions. If you know where they are, send them immediately.

General SUMNER.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

Do you think it proper to countermand the order to send Slocum's division to Richardson's support, as I shall need it on the right if I advance?

General SUMNER.

(Received.)

18TH.

To General McCLELLAN:

The rebels sent flag of truce this morning, asking to bury their dead. Flag was sent back.

General SLOCUM.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

All quiet this morning so far. The enemy's pickets are in the front of me.

General SUMNER.

(Received.)

21ST.

To Major MYER:

We are in communication with General Sumner.

MBN STATION.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

The station at Maryland Heights reports a force of 5,000 infantry and 60 wagons at Charlestown.

MBN STATION.

(Sent.)

To MBN STATION:

Where is General Sumner?

Major MYER.

(Sent.)

To MBN STATION:

Look out for station near Williamsport. You will have to look from the tree.

Major MYER.

To General E. V. SUMNER :

(Sent.)

Have your command ready to move with your train to Harper's Ferry to-morrow morning at daylight. Order sent by orderly.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

To General SUMNER :

(Sent.)

Please acknowledge message sent to you as received.

Major MYER.

To General MARCY :

(Received.)

Dispatch received. Will come at daylight.

General SUMNER.

(Received.)

22D.

To Major MYER :

Order out of chaos. Communication with General Couch and Maryland Heights. All right.

FISHER.

(Sent to MBN Station.)

Can you send a message to General Couch now? Do not say yes unless you are certain.

Major MYER.

To Major MYER :

(Received.)

Yes.

MBN STATION.

To OFFICERS AT WILLIAMSPORT :

(Sent.)

Ascertain and report if any movements of the enemy have been visible near Williamsport to-day.

Major MYER.

(Received.)

To Major MYER :

There have been no movements visible. I reported to Couch. Franklin is in command.

OWEN.

(Sent.)

23D.

To CLARKE and BARRETT :

Any report from General Couch this morning? Try and get three reports per day of the state of affairs on the right and send them in.

FISHER.

(Sent to Maryland Heights.)

Cut trees down to see station at general headquarters, a mile and a half to your right of the river.

FISHER.

(Sent.)

To MBN :

Any signs of enemy from the MBN?

Major MYER.

(Sent.)

To General FRANKLIN, *Williamsport* :

I have just sent you an order to move your command to near Bakersville; General Couch to Downsville, on the same road. You can move at once. The orderly will meet you.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

(Sent.)

To PAINE :

Look out for a call from Wicker. Major Myer and I are going there, and will report to you.

FISHER.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

Clouds of dust running parallel with mountains a little north of west are seen. It goes north.

JEROME.

(Sent.)

To JEROME:

The general says can you give more definite information. How far off was the dust—this side of Martinsburg or the other?

P.

(Received.)

To General McCLELLAN:

The dust appears to be on a line between Williamsport and Martinsburg, about 11 miles from Sharpsburg, between the mountains and the river, going southwest, now extending a long distance.

JEROME.

(Received.)

To Captain FISHER:

Franklin and Couch are leaving. Any orders?

CLARKE.

(Sent.)

To CLARKE:

Go with them and open communication with the MBN, if possible, when they stop.

STRYKER.

(Sent.)

24TH.

To MBN:

You will daily send to these headquarters three reports and one during the night—at 7 a. m., 1 p. m., 6 p. m., and 12 p. m. If the state of the weather precludes the possibility of these reports being made precisely at these hours, they will be made as soon as possible thereafter. Give signatures to reports.

B. F. FISHER,

Captain, Commanding Signal Detachment.

(Received.)

25TH.

To General McCLELLAN:

A very considerable movement and much dust S. 15° W. from this mountain, apparently 5 miles distant southwest from Shepherdstown. Smoke of encampment and dust are seen in the vicinity of Martinsburg. The dust seen near Shepherdstown is close to a sharp cut in the woods, like one made for a railroad. I can see no enemy east of Shepherdstown or south of Martinsburg.

Major MYER.

(Received—12 and 6 report.)

All quiet. Fog precluded the possibility of any report sooner emanating from here.

JEROME.

(Received 1 p. m.)

Dust seen about 3 miles south of Shepherdstown.

JEROME.

(Sent.)

To MBN STATION:

Another exhibition of such gross negligence will compel me to prefer charges of incompetency. The guard must not be permitted to leave the glass until relieved.

FISHER.

(Sent.)

To MBN:

Send a full and concise report immediately.

FISHER.

(Received.)

To Captain FISHER:

No report. The smoke hides everything, and has all day.

(Received 7 a. m.)

27TH.

All quiet. Clarke not visible.

JEROME.

To General McCLELLAN:

28TH.

Saw to night, 3 miles northwest of Falling Waters, two squadrons of enemy's cavalry marching north. No signs of troops from this point except pickets half mile [of] river.
DENICKE.

To General McCLELLAN:

29TH.

Heavy dust seen south-southwest, about 10 miles from Shepherdstown. Cannot make out anything in it.

JEROME.

To Major MYER:

(Received.)

Great smoke at the foot of the mountain, southwest of your headquarters. Extends along several miles.

JEROME.

Lieutenant Jerome will report the distance and the bearings of the smoke from Shepherdstown.

Major MYER.

To Major MYER:

(Received.)

It must be about 8 or 9 miles south-southwest from Shepherdstown.

JEROME.

Cannonading heard 3^o northwest of Shepherdstown and about 5 miles from that place.

JEROME.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. A. TAYLOR,

First Lieut. Forty-ninth New York Vols., Actg. Signal Officer.

Capt. B. F. FISHER,

Commanding Signal Detachment.

No. 9.

Report of Lieut. J. Gloskoski, Twenty-ninth New York Infantry, Acting Signal Officer, U. S. Army, of operations September 16–November 29.

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, November 29, 1862.

SIR: Agreeable to your circular, requesting us to make report of the service performed by us, "the difficulties we have met," and "of all that may be necessary for the Chief Signal Officer to know," I have the honor to submit the following:

On the 16th of September I accompanied the Chief Signal Officer to the summit of Elk Mountain, Maryland, for the purpose to establish signal station there and observe the enemy's movements. The point chosen for observations was an excellent one, and messages sent from it very important. From there we had full view of the enemy's lines. We have reported immediately the positions and each change of position of all their batteries and their forces. From that point I have communicated to five different stations, viz, one at General McClellan's headquarters, one at General Burnside's (left wing), one at General Hooker's, and two in the center of our lines. Same day we reported to General McClellan:

An immense train of the enemy's wagons is moving on the road from Sharpsburg to Shepherdstown. They cross the Potomac and halt about a mile south of Shepherdstown.

September 17 we received from General Burnside this :

Can you see any movements of the enemy on the road or elsewhere?

General BURNSIDE.

To General B. :

Yes; they are moving now a strong force of infantry from Shepherdstown into the woods west of Sharpsburg and northerly to our right.

Y. Y. Y.

Can you see any movement of the enemy, particularly in rear of the corn-field in front of us?

General BURNSIDE.

I can see no movement, particularly in rear of that corn-field.

Y. Y. Y.

This last message, although insignificant now, was very important then, as it gave assurances that there was no immediate danger to be apprehended from that particular place. At 3 p. m. same day we sent:

To General BURNSIDE:

Look out well on your left; the enemy are moving a strong force in that direction.

Y. Y. Y.

This warning was in time, and it was noticed by General Burnside, as at that hour, I think, General A. P. Hill arrived with his forces from Harper's Ferry to re-enforce the enemy.

These are all the messages I could preserve from that day, as then we had no tents on stations, no wagons, exposed for days and nights to constant rain, and consequently all papers, as everything else in our possession, must have been wet and destroyed.

From that time until the 28th ultimo I was posted on different signal stations, changing them almost every day, until we came to Rector-town, Va. From that place I was ordered to proceed with Lieutenant Owen to Thorroughfare Gap, and "open communication with Water Mountain, Warrenton" (9 miles distant, air line), and "observe the line of railroad." The highest point in that vicinity is on the Bull Run Mountain, called the "Leather Coat Hill," north of the gap, but unluckily the woods on the mountains north and south of that gap were set on fire, and it was impossible for any one to ascend the summit without being roasted. The other hills there are of so almost equal height that it was no easy task to find the proper one to answer our purpose; still, I have found such, as I had the honor to report at that time. We have not sent any reports from that station, because there was nothing to report then; yet that station was very important, and, I think, if it had been allowed to remain there longer, our troops would not have left the gap in such a great haste as they did.

A signal flag is a great annoyance to the enemy, as we have seen from their reports after the battle of Antietam, and also inspires our troops with confidence; when seen by them on some high point, or near them, they know that those near that flag are on the lookout, and look with better eyes than they have. As a proof of this, I will relate a circumstance from the battle at Gaines' Mill, on the Peninsula. When the battle raged in its greatest fury, a few pieces of artillery from General Smith's division opened fire across the Chickahominy upon the enemy. All saw the smoke, but not many could tell where the shells fell or who fired, as the pieces were hidden by woods from our view. Our soldiers began to murmur, "The rebels are outflanking us." All eyes turned in that direction, when a signal flag emerged from the woods and began

to wave in answer to my call; every face then brightened up, and men exclaimed with smiles, "That's ours!"

November 15, I, in company with Lieutenant Owen, relieved the officers on Watery Mountain. Watery Mountain is a fine point of observation, and it is enough to ascend the top of it to find the desired place; there is a tree known to every one, called the "View tree," and the place where it stands affords view almost in all directions.

We reported from that station all we saw worthy of report, viz, smoke of the enemy's camp-fires at Manassas Gap.

From 19th to 24th instant we were posted on a station near Falmouth, close to Captain Pettit's battery in position, and opposite the enemy's guns. Our reports, then, if of any value, are of too recent a date to need repeating.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. GLOSKOSKI,

Lieut. Twenty-ninth Regiment N. Y. Vols., Acting Signal Officer.

Lieut. WILLIAM S. STRYKER,

Adjutant, Signal Corps.

No. 10.

Reports of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia, of operations September 2–November 15.

HEADQUARTERS, TWO MILES FROM FREDERICKTOWN, MD.,
September 7, 1862. (Received September 10, 1862.)

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Lieutenant-Colonel Funk reports that he took possession of Winchester at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 3d instant, the enemy having abandoned the town on the night of the 2d. They blew up their large magazine, burnt an enormous amount of quartermaster's and commissary stores, and about two squares of the city. Still, a quantity of stores, a large amount of ammunition, some fine guns, medical stores, tents, cooking utensils, &c., were left behind, which have been taken possession of by Colonel Funk. I have directed that he make reports of the captured articles to the proper departments, and I desire that they be secured. As I have directed that Winchester be made a depot for this army, and have sent there our disabled men, horses, batteries, and surplus wagon-trains, in order that they may be recruited and refreshed, I particularly want a good commander for that post, one of energy and experience, who will bring everything into order, give confidence to the community, and take advantage of the resources of the country. It has occurred to me that one of our gallant wounded generals, too enfeebled to take the field, might do valuable service in that position, and I would recommend that General Edward Johnson, if capable of performing the duty, be assigned to the post. His services have earned him promotion, which I earnestly recommend, and hope that circumstances may authorize it.

I inclose you a report* of General Julius White's command, lately in Winchester, whose troops retired in the direction of Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg, and, as I learn from rumor, have retreated to Pennsylvania.

I wish shops opened at Winchester for the repair of our batteries,

* Not found.

trains, &c., and request that the Ordnance and Quartermaster's Departments may give the necessary directions for the purpose.

I beg that you will endeavor now to gather in our conscripts to fill the reduced ranks of the Virginia regiments. Those in the Valley should be particularly attended to.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

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HEADQUARTERS,
Sharpsburg, Md., September 16, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: My letter to you of the 13th instant informed you of the positions of the different divisions of this army. Learning that night that Harper's Ferry had not surrendered, and that the enemy was advancing more rapidly than was convenient from Fredericktown, I determined to return with Longstreet's command to the Blue Ridge, to strengthen D. H. Hill's and Stuart's divisions, engaged in holding the passes of the mountains, lest the enemy should fall upon McLaws' rear, drive him from the Maryland Heights, and thus relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry. On approaching Boonsborough, I received information from General D. H. Hill that the enemy in strong force was at the main pass on the Frederick and Hagerstown road, pressing him so heavily as to require immediate re-enforcements. Longstreet advanced rapidly to his support, and immediately placed his troops in position. By this time Hill's right had been forced back, the gallant Garland having fallen in rallying his brigade. Under General Longstreet's directions, our right was soon restored, and firmly resisted the attacks of the enemy to the last. His superior numbers enabled him to extend beyond both of our flanks, and his right was able to reach the summit of the mountain to our left, and press us heavily in that direction. The battle raged until after night; the enemy's efforts to force a passage were resisted, but we had been unable to repulse him.

Learning later in the evening that Crampton's Gap (on the direct road from Fredericktown to Sharpsburg) had been forced, and McLaws' rear thus threatened, and believing from a report from General Jackson that Harper's Ferry would fall next morning, I determined to withdraw Longstreet and D. H. Hill from their positions and retire to the vicinity of Sharpsburg, where the army could be more easily united. Before abandoning the position, indications led me to believe that the enemy was withdrawing, but learning from a prisoner that Sumner's corps (which had not been engaged) was being put in position to relieve their wearied troops, while the most of ours were exhausted by a fatiguing march and a hard conflict, and I feared would be unable to renew the fight successfully in the morning, confirmed me in my determination. Accordingly, the troops were withdrawn, preceded by the trains, without molestation by the enemy, and about daybreak took position in front of this place. The enemy did not pass through the gap until about 8 o'clock of the morning after the battle, and their advance reached a position in front of us about 2 p. m. Before their arrival, I received intelligence from General Jackson that Harper's Ferry had surrendered early in the morning. I inclose his report.*

* Not found.

From a more detailed statement furnished by General Jackson's adjutant-general, it appears that 49 pieces of artillery, 24 mountain howitzers, and 17 revolving guns, 11,000 men fit for duty (consisting of twelve regiments of infantry, three companies of cavalry, and six companies of artillery), together with 11,000 small-arms, were the fruits of this victory.

Part of General Jackson's corps has reached us and the rest are approaching, except General A. P. Hill's division, left at Harper's Ferry to guard the place and take care of public property. The enemy have made no attack up to this afternoon, but are in force in our front.

This victory of the indomitable Jackson and his troops gives us renewed occasion for gratitude to Almighty God for His guidance and protection.

I am, with high respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

His Excellency President DAVIS.

HEADQUARTERS,

Sharpsburg, Md., September 18, 1862—6.30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT: On the afternoon of the 16th instant the enemy, who, you were informed on that day, was in our front, opened a light fire of artillery upon our line. Early next morning it was renewed in earnest, and large masses of the Federal troops that had crossed the Antietam above our position assembled on our left and threatened to overwhelm us. They advanced in three compact lines. The divisions of Generals McLaws, R. H. Anderson, A. P. Hill, and Walker had not arrived the previous night, as I had hoped, and were still beyond the Potomac. Generals Jackson's and Ewell's divisions were thrown to the left of Generals D. H. Hill and Longstreet. The enemy advanced between the Antietam and the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, and was met by General Hill's and the left of General Longstreet's division, where the contest raged fiercely, extending to our entire left. The enemy was driven back and held in check, but before the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and Walker—who, upon their arrival on the morning of the 17th, were advanced to support the left wing and center—could be brought into action, that portion of our lines was forced back by superior numbers. The line, after a severe conflict, was restored and the enemy driven back, and our position maintained during the rest of the day.

In the afternoon the enemy advanced on our right, where General Jones' division was posted, who handsomely maintained his position. General Toombs' brigade, guarding the bridge over Antietam Creek, gallantly resisted the approach of the enemy; but his superior numbers enabling him to extend his left, he crossed below the bridge, and assumed a threatening attitude on our right, which fell back in confusion. By this time, between 3 and 4 p. m., General A. P. Hill, with five of his brigades, reached the scene of action, drove the enemy immediately from the position they had taken, and continued the contest until dark, restoring our right and maintaining our ground.

* * * * *

R. E. LEE,
General, Commanding.

His Excellency President DAVIS,
Richmond, Va.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

September 20, 1862.

SIR: Since my last letter to you of the 18th, finding the enemy indisposed to make an attack on that day, and our position being a bad one to hold with the river in rear, I determined to cross the army to the Virginia side. This was done at night successfully, nothing being left behind, unless it may have been some disabled guns or broken-down wagons, and the morning of the 19th found us satisfactorily over on the south bank of the Potomac, near Shepherdstown, when the army was immediately put in motion toward Williamsport. Before crossing the river, in order to threaten the enemy on his right and rear and make him apprehensive for his communications, I sent the cavalry forward to Williamsport, which they successfully occupied. At night the infantry sharpshooters, left, in conjunction with General Pendleton's artillery, to hold the ford below Shepherdstown, gave back, and the enemy's cavalry took possession of that town, and, from General Pendleton's report after midnight, I fear much of his reserve artillery has been captured. I am now obliged to return to Shepherdstown, with the intention of driving the enemy back if not in position with his whole army; but, if in full force, I think an attack would be inadvisable, and I shall make other dispositions.

I am, with high respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Richmond, Va.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

Camp on the Opequon, near Smoketown, September 21, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: As stated to you yesterday, the march of the army toward Williamsport was arrested. General Jackson's corps was turned back toward Shepherdstown, to rectify occurrences in that quarter. Only one or two brigades of the enemy's infantry with cavalry had crossed the river, none of whom had entered Shepherdstown. They displayed a large force of artillery on the opposite bank. General A. P. Hill's division pushed forward, and soon drove them across the river, when this army resumed its march. Only four pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy, which they had carried across the river before they were attacked by A. P. Hill.

I regret also to report that on the night of the 14th instant, when I determined to withdraw from the gap in front of Boonsborough to Sharpsburg, a portion of General Longstreet's wagon-train was lost. When his division was ordered back from Hagerstown to the support of D. H. Hill, his train was directed to proceed toward Williamsport, with a view to its safety, and, if necessary, to its crossing the river. Unfortunately, that night the enemy's cavalry at Harper's Ferry evaded our forces, crossed the Potomac into Maryland, passed up through Sharpsburg, where they encountered our pickets, and intercepted on their line of retreat to Pennsylvania General Longstreet's train on the Hagerstown road. The guard was in the extreme rear of the train, that being the only direction from which an attack was apprehended. The enemy captured and destroyed 45 wagons, loaded chiefly with ammunition and subsistence.

The army is resting to-day on the Opequon, below Martinsburg. Its present efficiency is greatly paralyzed by the loss to its ranks of the numerous stragglers. I have taken every means in my power from the beginning to correct this evil, which has increased instead of diminished. A great many men belonging to the army never entered Maryland at all; many returned after getting there, while others who crossed the river kept aloof. The stream has not lessened since crossing the Potomac, though the cavalry has been constantly employed in endeavoring to arrest it. As illustrative of the fact, I inclose a report* just received from General J. R. Jones, who was sent to Winchester to arrest stragglers at that point while the army was at Sharpsburg. It occasions me the greatest concern in the future operations of the army, for it is still my desire to threaten a passage into Maryland, to occupy the enemy on this frontier, and, if my purpose cannot be accomplished, to draw them into the Valley, where I can attack them to advantage. Some immediate legislation, in my opinion, is required, and the most summary punishment should be authorized. It ought to be construed into desertion in face of the enemy, and thus brought under the Rules and Articles of War. To give you an idea of its extent in some brigades, I will mention that, on the morning after the battle of the 17th, General Evans reported to me on the field, where he was holding the front position, that he had but 120 of his brigade present, and that the next brigade to his, that of General Garnett, consisted of but 100 men. General Pendleton reported that the brigades of Generals Lawton and Armistead, left to guard the ford at Shepherdstown, together contained but 600 men. This is a woeful condition of affairs, and I am pained to state it, but you ought not to be ignorant of the fact, in order, if possible, that you may apply the proper remedy. It is true that the army has had hard work to perform, long and laborious marches, and large odds to encounter in every conflict, but not greater than were endured by our revolutionary fathers, or than what any army must encounter to be victorious. There are brilliant examples of endurance and valor on the part of those who have had to bear the brunt in the battle and the labor in the field in consequence of this desertion of their comrades. I hope by a few days' rest, if it is possible to give it, and the regular issue of rations, to restore the efficiency of the army for the work before it. The enemy I know has suffered on his side, especially his infantry, as they have been driven in all encounters. His artillery is numerous and powerful, and his re-enforcements arrive daily. I shall endeavor at least to detain him on this frontier and to give him sufficient employment. If re-enforcements, clothing, and shoes could be forwarded to the army, it would be of the greatest benefit.

I have not heard of General Loring for some time, nor do I know whether he is employed in the Valley of the Kanawha or where. From such information as I get, I believe the enemy has pretty much withdrawn from Western Virginia.

I am, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General, Commanding.

His Excellency President DAVIS,
Richmond, Va.

* Not found.

HEADQUARTERS, August 19, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward a report of the capture of Harper's Ferry and the operations of the army in Maryland (1862). The official reports of Lieutenant-General Jackson and the officers of his corps have only been recently received, which prevented its earlier transmittal. This finishes the reports of the operations of the campaign of 1862. They were designed to form a continuous narrative, though, for reasons given, were written at intervals. May I ask you to cause the several reports to be united, and to append the tabular statements accompanying each? Should this be inconvenient, if you could return the reports to me, I would have them properly arranged.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

CAPTURE OF HARPER'S FERRY AND OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND.

The enemy having retired to the protection of the fortifications around Washington and Alexandria, the army marched on September 3 toward Leesburg. The armies of Generals McClellan and Pope had now been brought back to the point from which they set out on the campaigns of the spring and summer. The objects of those campaigns had been frustrated and the designs of the enemy on the coast of North Carolina and in Western Virginia thwarted by the withdrawal of the main body of his forces from those regions. Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of Federal soldiers up to the intrenchments of Washington, and soon after the arrival of the army at Leesburg information was received that the troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. The war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be the transfer of the army into Maryland. Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the material of war, and feeble in transportation, the troops poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of them destitute of shoes, it was yet believed to be strong enough to detain the enemy upon the northern frontier until the approach of winter should render his advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable. The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies, which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberties. The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington Government than from any active demonstration on the part of the people, unless success should enable us to give them assurance of continued protection.

Influenced by these considerations, the army was put in motion, D. H.

Hill's division, which had joined us on the 2d, being in advance, and between September 4 and 7 crossed the Potomac at the fords near Leesburg, and encamped in the vicinity of Fredericktown.

It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battle-fields. Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into Western Maryland, establish our communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of supplies.

It had been supposed that the advance upon Fredericktown would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the Valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from those positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains. To accomplish this with the least delay, General Jackson was directed to proceed with his command to Martinsburg, and, after driving the enemy from that place, to move down the south side of the Potomac upon Harper's Ferry. General McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson's division, was ordered to seize Maryland Heights, on the north side of the Potomac, opposite Harper's Ferry, and Brigadier-General Walker to take possession of Loudoun Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah, where it unites with the Potomac. These several commands were directed, after reducing Harper's Ferry and clearing the Valley of the enemy, to join the rest of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

The march of these troops began on the 10th, and at the same time the remainder of Longstreet's command and the division of D. H. Hill crossed the South Mountain and moved toward Boonsborough. General Stuart, with the cavalry, remained east of the mountains, to observe the enemy and retard his advance.

A report having been received that a Federal force was approaching Hagerstown from the direction of Chambersburg, Longstreet continued his march to the former place, in order to secure the road leading thence to Williamsport, and also to prevent the removal of stores which were said to be in Hagerstown. He arrived at that place on the 11th, General Hill halting near Boonsborough to prevent the enemy at Harper's Ferry from escaping through Pleasant Valley, and at the same time to support the cavalry. The advance of the Federal Army was so slow at the time we left Fredericktown as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harper's Ferry would be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they would be called upon to meet it. In that event, it had not been intended to oppose its passage through the South Mountains, as it was desired to engage it as far as possible from its base.

General Jackson marched very rapidly, and, crossing the Potomac near Williamsport on the 11th, sent A. P. Hill's division directly to Martinsburg, and disposed the rest of his command to cut off the retreat of the enemy westward. On his approach, the Federal troops evacuated Martinsburg, retiring to Harper's Ferry on the night of the 11th, and Jackson entered the former place on the 12th, capturing some prisoners and abandoned stores.

In the forenoon of the following day his leading division, under General A. P. Hill, came in sight of the enemy strongly intrenched on Bolivar Heights, in rear of Harper's Ferry. Before beginning the attack, General Jackson proceeded to put himself in communication with the

co-operating forces under Generals McLaws and Walker, from the former of whom he was separated by the Potomac and from the latter by the Shenandoah. General Walker took possession of Loudoun Heights on the 13th, and the next day was in readiness to open upon Harper's Ferry. General McLaws encountered more opposition. He entered Pleasant Valley on the 11th. On the 12th he directed General Kershaw, with his own and Barksdale's brigade, to ascend the ridge, whose southern extremity is known as Maryland Heights, and attack the enemy, who occupied that position with infantry and artillery, protected by intrenchments. He disposed the rest of his command to hold the roads leading from Harper's Ferry eastward through Weverton and northward from Sandy Hook, guarding the pass in his rear, through which he had entered Pleasant Valley, with the brigades of Semmes and Mahone. Owing to the rugged nature of the ground on which Kershaw had to operate and the want of roads, he was compelled to use infantry alone. Driving in the advance parties of the enemy on the summit of the ridge on the 12th, he assailed the works the next day. After a spirited contest they were carried, the troops engaged in their defense spiking their heavy guns and retreating to Harper's Ferry. By 4.30 p. m. Kershaw was in possession of Maryland Heights.

On the 14th a road for artillery was cut along the ridge, and at 2 p. m. four guns opened upon the enemy on the opposite side of the river, and the investment of Harper's Ferry was complete.

In the mean time events transpired in another quarter which threatened to interfere with the reduction of the place. A copy of the order directing the movement of the army from Fredericktown had fallen into the hands of General McClellan, and disclosed to him the disposition of our forces. He immediately began to push forward rapidly, and on the afternoon of the 13th was reported approaching the pass in South Mountain, on the Boonsborough and Fredericktown road. The cavalry under General Stuart fell back before him, materially impeding his progress by its gallant resistance, and gaining time for preparations to oppose his advance. By penetrating the mountain at this point, he would reach the rear of McLaws and be enabled to relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry. To prevent this, General D. H. Hill was directed to guard the Boonsborough Gap and Longstreet ordered to march from Hagerstown to his support.

On the 13th General Hill sent back the brigades of Garland and Colquitt to hold the pass, but subsequently ascertaining that the enemy was near in heavy force, he ordered up the rest of his division.

Early on the 14th a large body of the enemy attempted to force its way to the rear of the position held by Hill by a road south of the Boonsborough and Fredericktown turnpike. The attack was repulsed by Garland's brigade, after a severe conflict, in which that brave and accomplished young officer was killed. The remainder of the division arriving shortly afterward, Colquitt's brigade was disposed across the turnpike road; that of G. B. Anderson, supported by Ripley, was placed on the right, and Rodes' occupied an important position on the left. Garland's brigade, which had suffered heavily in the first attack, was withdrawn, and the defense of the road occupied by it intrusted to Colonel Rosser, of the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, who reported to General Hill with his regiment and some artillery. The small command of General Hill repelled the repeated assaults of the Federal Army and held it in check for five hours. Several attacks on the center were gallantly repulsed by Colquitt's brigade, and Rodes maintained his position against heavy odds with the utmost tenacity. Longstreet, leaving one

brigade at Hagerstown, had hurried to the assistance of Hill, and reached the scene of action between 3 and 4 p. m. His troops, much exhausted by a long, rapid march and the heat of the day, were disposed on both sides of the turnpike. General D. R. Jones, with three of his brigades—those of Pickett (under General Garnett), Kemper, and Jenkins (under Colonel Walker)—together with Evans' brigade, was posted along the mountain on the left; General Hood, with his own and Whiting's brigade (under Colonel Law), Drayton's, and D. R. Jones' (under Col. G. T. Anderson), on the right. Batteries had been placed by General Hill in such positions as could be found, but the ground was unfavorable for the use of artillery. The battle continued with great animation until night. On the south of the turnpike the enemy was driven back some distance, and his attack on the center repulsed with loss. His great superiority of numbers enabled him to extend beyond both of our flanks. By this means he succeeded in reaching the summit of the mountain beyond our left, and, pressing upon us heavily from that direction, gradually forced our troops back after an obstinate resistance. Darkness put an end to the contest.

The effort to force the passage of the mountains had failed, but it was manifest that without re-enforcements we could not hazard a renewal of the engagement, as the enemy could easily turn either flank. Information was also received that another large body of Federal troops had during the afternoon forced their way through Crampton's Gap, only 5 miles in rear of McLaws. Under these circumstances, it was determined to retire to Sharpsburg, where we would be upon the flank and rear of the enemy should he move against McLaws, and where we could more readily unite with the rest of the army. This movement was efficiently and skillfully covered by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, and was accomplished without interruption by the enemy, who did not appear on the west side of the pass at Boonsborough until about 8 a. m. on the following morning. The resistance that had been offered to the enemy at Boonsborough secured sufficient time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harper's Ferry.

On the afternoon of the 14th, when he found that the troops of Walker and McLaws were in position to co-operate in the attack, he ordered General A. P. Hill to turn the enemy's left flank and enter Harper's Ferry. Ewell's division (under General Lawton) was ordered to support Hill, while Winder's brigade, of Jackson's division (under Colonel Grigsby), with a battery of artillery, made a demonstration on the enemy's right near the Potomac. The rest of the division was held in reserve. The cavalry under Major Massie was placed on the extreme left, to prevent the escape of the enemy. Colonel Grigsby succeeded in getting possession of an eminence on the left, upon which two batteries were advantageously posted. General A. P. Hill, observing a hill on the enemy's extreme left occupied by infantry without artillery, and protected only by an abatis of felled timber, directed General Pender, with his own brigade and those of [General] Archer and Colonel Brockenbrough, to seize the crest, which was done with slight resistance. At the same time he ordered Generals Branch and Gregg to march along the Shenandoah, and, taking advantage of the ravines intersecting its steep banks, to establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works. This was accomplished during the night. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, chief of artillery of A. P. Hill's division, placed several batteries on the eminence taken by General Pender, and, under the directions of Colonel Crutchfield, General Jackson's chief of artillery, ten guns belonging to Ewell's division were posted on the east

side of the Shenandoah, so as to enfilade the enemy's intrenchments on Bolivar Heights, and take his nearest and most formidable works in reverse. General McLaws in the mean time made his preparations to prevent the force which had penetrated at Crampton's Gap from coming to the relief of the garrison. This pass had been defended by the brigade of General Cobb, supported by those of Semmes and Mahone; but unable to oppose successfully the superior numbers brought against them, they had been compelled to retire with loss. The enemy halted at the gap, and during the night General McLaws formed his command in line of battle across Pleasant Valley, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Crampton's [Gap], leaving one regiment to support the artillery on Maryland Heights, and two brigades on each of the roads from Harper's Ferry.

The attack on the garrison began at dawn. A rapid and vigorous fire was opened from the batteries of General Jackson and those on Maryland and Loudoun Heights. In about two hours the garrison, consisting of more than 11,000 men, surrendered. Seventy-three pieces of artillery, about 13,000 small-arms, and a large quantity of military stores, fell into our hands. Leaving General A. P. Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops and secure the captured property, General Jackson, with his two other divisions, set out at once for Sharpsburg, ordering Generals McLaws and Walker to follow without delay. Official information of the fall of Harper's Ferry and the approach of General Jackson was received soon after the commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill reached Sharpsburg, on the morning of the 15th, and reanimated the courage of the troops. General Jackson arrived early on the 16th and General Walker came up in the afternoon. The presence of the enemy at Crampton's Gap embarrassed the movements of General McLaws. He retained the position taken during the night of the 14th to oppose an advance toward Harper's Ferry until the capitulation of that place, when, finding the enemy indisposed to attack, he gradually withdrew his command toward the Potomac. Deeming the roads to Sharpsburg on the north side of the river impracticable, he resolved to cross at Harper's Ferry and march by way of Shepherdstown. Owing to the condition of his troops and other circumstances, his progress was slow, and he did not reach the battle-field at Sharpsburg until some time after the engagement of the 17th began. The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, on their arrival at Sharpsburg, were placed in position along the range of hills between the town and the Antietam, nearly parallel to the course of that stream, Longstreet on the right of the road to Boonsborough and Hill on the left. The advance of the enemy was delayed by the brave opposition he encountered from Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, and he did not appear on the opposite side of the Antietam until about 2 p. m. During the afternoon the batteries on each side were slightly engaged.

On the 16th the artillery fire became warmer, and continued throughout the day. The enemy crossed the Antietam beyond the reach of our batteries and menaced our left. In anticipation of this movement, Hood's two brigades had been transferred from the right and posted between D. H. Hill and the Hagerstown road. General Jackson was now directed to take position on Hood's left, and formed his line with his right resting upon the Hagerstown road and his left extending toward the Potomac, protected by General Stuart with the cavalry and horse artillery. General Walker, with his two brigades, was stationed on Longstreet's right. As evening approached, the enemy opened more vigorously with his artillery, and bore down heavily with his infantry upon Hood, but the attack was gallantly repulsed. At 10 p. m. Hood's

troops were relieved by the brigades of Lawton and Trimble, of Ewell's division, commanded by General Lawton. Jackson's own division, under General J. R. Jones, was on Lawton's left, supported by the remaining brigades of Ewell.

At early dawn on the 17th the enemy's artillery opened vigorously from both sides of the Antietam, the heaviest fire being directed against our left. Under cover of this fire a large force of infantry attacked General Jackson. They were met by his troops with the utmost resolution, and for several hours the conflict raged with great fury and alternate success. General J. R. Jones was compelled to leave the field, and the command of Jackson's division devolved on General Starke. The troops advanced with great spirit, and the enemy's lines were repeatedly broken and forced to retire. Fresh troops, however, soon replaced those that were beaten, and Jackson's men were in turn compelled to fall back. The brave General Starke was killed, General Lawton was wounded, and nearly all the field officers, with a large proportion of the men, killed or disabled. Our troops slowly yielded to overwhelming numbers and fell back, obstinately disputing the progress of the enemy. Hood returned to the field, and relieved the brigades of Trimble, Lawton, and Hays, which had suffered severely. General Early, who succeeded General Lawton in the command of Ewell's division, was ordered by General Jackson to move with his brigade to take the place of Jackson's division, most of which was withdrawn, its ammunition being nearly exhausted and its numbers much reduced. A small part of the division, under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, united with Early's brigade, as did portions of the brigades of Trimble, Lawton, and Hays. The battle now raged with great violence, the small commands under Hood and Early holding their ground against many times their own numbers of the enemy, and under a tremendous fire of artillery. Hood was re-enforced by the brigades of Ripley, Colquitt, and Garland (under Colonel McRae), of D. H. Hill's division, and afterward by D. R. Jones' brigade, under Col. G. T. Anderson. The enemy's lines were broken and forced back, but fresh numbers advanced to their support, and they began to gain ground. The desperate resistance they encountered, however, delayed their progress until the troops of General McLaws arrived and those of General Walker could be brought from the right. Hood's brigade, greatly diminished in numbers, withdrew to replenish their ammunition, their supply being entirely exhausted. They were relieved by Walker's command, who immediately attacked the enemy vigorously, driving him back with great slaughter. Colonel Manning, commanding Walker's brigade, pursued until he was stopped by a strong fence, behind which was posted a large force of infantry with several batteries. The gallant colonel was severely wounded, and his brigade retired to the line on which the rest of Walker's command had halted.

Upon the arrival of the re-enforcements under General McLaws, General Early attacked with great resolution the large force opposed to him. McLaws advanced at the same time, and the enemy were driven back in confusion, closely followed by our troops beyond the position occupied at the beginning of the engagement. The enemy renewed the assault on our left several times, but was repulsed with loss. He finally ceased to advance his infantry, and for several hours kept up a furious fire from his numerous batteries, under which our troops held their position with great coolness and courage. The attack on our left was speedily followed by one in heavy force on the center. This was met by part of Walker's division and the brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, of D. H. Hill's command, assisted by a few pieces of artillery.

The enemy was repulsed, and retired behind the crest of a hill, from which they kept up a desultory fire. General R. H. Anderson's division came to Hill's support and formed in rear of his line. At this time, by a mistake of orders, General Rodes' brigade was withdrawn from its position during the temporary absence of that officer at another part of the field. The enemy immediately pressed through the gap thus created, and G. B. Anderson's brigade was broken and retired, General Anderson himself being mortally wounded. Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson and Brigadier-General Wright were also wounded and borne from the field.

The heavy masses of the enemy again moved forward, being opposed only by four pieces of artillery, supported by a few hundred men belonging to different brigades, rallied by General D. H. Hill and other officers, and parts of Walker's and R. H. Anderson's commands, Colonel Cooke, with the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, of Walker's brigade, standing boldly in line without a cartridge. The firm front presented by this small force and the well-directed fire of the artillery, under Captain Miller, of the Washington Artillery, and Captain Boyce's South Carolina battery, checked the progress of the enemy, and in about an hour and a half he retired. Another attack was made soon afterward a little farther to the right, but was repulsed by Miller's guns, which continued to hold the ground until the close of the engagement, supported by a part of R. H. Anderson's troops.

While the attack on the center and left was in progress, the enemy made repeated efforts to force the passage of the bridge over the Antietam, opposite the right wing of General Longstreet, commanded by Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones. This bridge was defended by General Toombs with two regiments of his brigade (the Second and Twentieth Georgia) and the batteries of General Jones. General Toombs' small command repulsed five different assaults made by greatly superior force, and maintained its position with distinguished gallantry.

In the afternoon the enemy began to extend his line as if to cross the Antietam below the bridge, and at 4 p. m. Toombs' regiments retired from the position they had so bravely held. The enemy immediately crossed the bridge in large numbers and advanced against General Jones, who held the crest with less than 2,000 men. After a determined and brave resistance, he was forced to give way, and the enemy gained the summit.

General A. P. Hill had arrived from Harper's Ferry, having left that place at 7.30 a. m. He was now ordered to re-enforce General Jones, and moved to his support with the brigades of Archer, Branch, Gregg, and Pender, the last of whom was placed on the right of the line, and the other three advanced and attacked the enemy, now flushed with success. Hill's batteries were thrown forward and united their fire with those of General Jones, and one of General D. H. Hill's also opened with good effect from the left of the Boonsborough road. The progress of the enemy was immediately arrested and his lines began to waver. At this moment General Jones ordered Toombs to charge the flank, while Archer, supported by Branch and Gregg, moved upon the front of the Federal line. The enemy made a brief resistance, then broke and retreated in confusion toward the Antietam, pursued by the troops of Hill and Jones, until he reached the protection of his batteries on the opposite side of the river. In this attack the brave and lamented Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch was killed, gallantly leading his brigade.

It was now nearly dark, and the enemy had massed a number of batteries to sweep the approaches to the Antietam, on the opposite side of

which the corps of General Porter, which had not been engaged, now appeared to dispute our advance. Our troops were much exhausted and greatly reduced in numbers by fatigue and the casualties of battle. Under these circumstances it was deemed injudicious to push our advantage further in the face of fresh troops of the enemy, much exceeding the number of our own. They were accordingly recalled and formed on the line originally held by General Jones. While the attack on our center was progressing, General Jackson had been directed to endeavor to turn the enemy's right, but found it extending nearly to the Potomac, and so strongly defended with artillery that the attempt had to be abandoned. The repulse on the right ended the engagement, and, after a protracted and sanguinary conflict, every effort of the enemy to dislodge us from our position had been defeated with severe loss.

The arduous service in which our troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches without shoes over mountain roads, had greatly reduced our ranks before the action began. These causes had compelled thousands of brave men to absent themselves, and many more had done so from unworthy motives. This great battle was fought by less than 40,000 men on our side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and hardships in the field and on the march. Nothing could surpass the determined valor with which they met the large army of the enemy, fully supplied and equipped, and the result reflects the highest credit on the officers and men engaged. Our artillery, though much inferior to that of the enemy in the number of guns and weight of metal, rendered most efficient and gallant service throughout the day, and contributed greatly to the repulse of the attacks on every part of the line. General Stuart, with the cavalry and horse artillery, performed the duty intrusted to him of guarding our left wing with great energy and courage, and rendered valuable assistance in defeating the attack on that part of our line.

On the 18th we occupied the position of the preceding day, except in the center, where our line was drawn in about 200 yards. Our ranks were increased by the arrival of a number of troops, who had not been engaged the day before, and, though still too weak to assume the offensive, we awaited without apprehension the renewal of the attack. The day passed without any demonstration on the part of the enemy, who, from the reports received, was expecting the arrival of re-enforcements. As we could not look for a material increase in strength, and the enemy's force could be largely and rapidly augmented, it was not thought prudent to wait until he should be ready again to offer battle. During the night of the 18th the army was accordingly withdrawn to the south side of the Potomac, crossing near Shepherdstown, without loss or molestation.

The enemy advanced the next morning, but was held in check by General Fitzhugh Lee with his cavalry, who covered our movement with boldness and success. General Stuart, with the main body, crossed the Potomac above Shepherdstown and moved up the river. The next day he recrossed at Williamsport, and took position to operate upon the right and rear of the enemy should he attempt to follow us. After the army had safely reached the Virginia shore with such of the wounded as could be removed and all its trains, General Porter's corps, with a number of batteries and some cavalry, appeared on the opposite side. General Pendleton was left to guard the ford with the reserve artillery and about 600 infantry. That night the enemy crossed the river above General Pendleton's position, and his infantry support giving way, four of his guns were taken. A considerable force took position on the right bank, under cover of their artillery on the commanding hills on the oppo-

site side. The next morning General A. P. Hill was ordered to return with his division and dislodge them. Advancing under a heavy fire of artillery, the three brigades of Gregg, Pender, and Archer attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him over the river with heavy loss.

The condition of our troops now demanded repose, and the army marched to the Opequon, near Martinsburg, where it remained several days, and then moved to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Winchester. The enemy seemed to be concentrating in and near Harper's Ferry, but made no forward movement. During this time the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was destroyed for several miles, and that from Winchester to Harper's Ferry broken up to within a short distance of the latter place, in order to render the occupation of the Valley by the enemy after our withdrawal more difficult.

On October 8 General Stuart was ordered to cross the Potomac above Williamsport with 1,200 or 1,500 cavalry, and endeavor to ascertain the position and designs of the enemy. He was directed, if practicable, to enter Pennsylvania, and do all in his power to impede and embarrass the military operations of the enemy. This order was executed with skill, address, and courage. General Stuart passed through Maryland, occupied Chambersburg, and destroyed a large amount of public property, making the entire circuit of General McClellan's army. He recrossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry without loss.

The enemy soon after crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and advanced southward, seizing the passes of the mountains as he progressed. General Jackson's corps was ordered to take position on the road between Berryville and Charlestown, to be prepared to oppose an advance from Harper's Ferry or a movement into the Shenandoah Valley from the east side of the mountains, while at the same time he would threaten the flank of the enemy should he continue his march along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge. One division of Longstreet's corps was sent to the vicinity of Upperville to observe the enemy's movements in front.

About the last of October the Federal army began to incline eastwardly from the mountains, moving in the direction of Warrenton. As soon as this intention developed itself, Longstreet's corps was moved across the Blue Ridge, and about November 3 took position at Culpeper Court-House, while Jackson advanced one of his divisions to the east side of the Blue Ridge. The enemy gradually concentrated about Warrenton, his cavalry being thrown forward beyond the Rappahannock in the direction of Culpeper Court-House, and occasionally skirmishing with our own, which was closely observing his movements. This situation of affairs continued without material change until about the middle of November, when the movements began which resulted in the winter campaign on the Lower Rappahannock.

The accompanying return of the medical director will show the extent of our losses in the engagements mentioned. The reports of the different commanding officers must, of necessity, be referred to for the details of these operations.

I desire to call the attention of the Department to the names of those brave officers and men who are particularly mentioned for courage and good conduct by their commanders. The limits of this report will not permit me to do more than renew the expression of my admiration for the valor that shrunk from no peril and the fortitude that endured every privation without a murmur. I must also refer to the report of General Stuart for the particulars of the services rendered by the cavalry besides those to which I have alluded. Its vigilance, activity, and

courage were conspicuous, and to its assistance is due, in a great measure, the success of some of the most important and delicate operations of the campaign.

Respectfully submitted.

R. E. LEE,
General.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

No. 11.

Extracts from Journal of Lieut. Col. E. P. Alexander, Chief of Ordnance, Army of Northern Virginia, October 1–November 15.

Army encamped on the turnpike between Winchester and Bunker Hill; ordnance office, with headquarters in camp, 6 miles from Winchester. During this period [?] the arms and accouterments captured at Harper's Ferry and collected at Winchester were issued to recruits and returned sick, and 2,000 serviceable arms from those collected on the field at Groveton were brought up and distributed.

Requisition made on Richmond for 3,000 arms and 4,000 accouterments.

Captain McPhail ordered to open ammunition depot in Staunton. Lieutenant Anderson to relieve him with ordnance reserve train. Sixteen wagon-loads issued from this train, and wagons sent to Staunton and returned loaded.

On the 7th, twenty-three more loads having been issued, the wagons were loaded with damaged stores, tools, &c., from the Winchester depot (which is being broken up), and sent to Staunton to unload and return with more ammunition, except three, which are to go to Strasburg for 75,000 rounds captured ammunition reported there. Application made by General Stuart, commanding cavalry, to exchange rifles for the Enfield carbines (artillery) in the hands of our infantry. Agreed to, where he could give rifles with bayonets, and in sufficient numbers to exchange the arms of an entire company and not mixed calibers.

Eighteen inefficient batteries broken up, and horses, men, and guns given where needed to other batteries. Extra guns turned in to Ordnance Department, and arrangements made for transporting them to Staunton.

Friday, October 10.—Position of army unchanged.

Saturday, October 11.—Position of army unchanged. Letter from and to General Pendleton on assignment of Parrott 20-pounders (coming from Richmond) to Lane's battery, and arrangements for sending to the rear light guns now in its possession. Note from General Jackson that all deficiencies of ordnance wagons in his corps should be made up. Requisitions for about twelve wagon-loads ammunition for Stuart's cavalry division.

Sunday, October 12.—Position of army unchanged.

Monday, October 13.—Position of army unchanged.

Tuesday, October 14.—Position of army unchanged. Cavalry under General Stuart returned from a raid into Pennsylvania and entirely around the army of the enemy, crossing the river at Hancock, going via Mercersburg, Chambersburg, Gettysburg, Hyattstown, and Urbana, and recrossing at White's Ford; thence to Leesburg and Snickersville,

destroying much property of the enemy and bringing back upward of 600 captured horses.

Wednesday, October 15.—Position of army unchanged. Telegram from Captain McPhail concerning disposition of guns turned in at Staunton. Reply: "Keep all serviceable rifle and Napoleon guns and send others to Richmond. Are any small-arms on road to Winchester?" Telegraphed to Colonel Gorgas for 2,000 arms additional to 6,000 already ordered. Telegraphed to Lieutenant Ward, Staunton: "How soon can you commence supplying arms for issue, and how many per day?" Note to Capt. John Lane, Irwin Artillery, advising retention in his battery of the 3-inch navy Parrott guns, and offering to have special ammunition prepared for them. Requisition from Lieutenant Fry, commanding battery, for four guns; referred to General Pendleton, to be filled from inefficient batteries; failing in this, from Staunton. Requisition from Captain Poague for 200 rounds 20-pounder Parrott ammunition; telegraphed for to Staunton. Following dispatch received 10 p. m. from Captain McPhail, Staunton: "The wagons have arrived, and nothing to load them with. I have repeatedly telegraphed for what is needed to Richmond. Will send special messenger to Colonel Gorgas in the morning. Will not you also telegraph him?" Telegraphed accordingly to Colonel Gorgas to fill all requisitions, telegraphic or written, from Captain McPhail.

Thursday, October 16.—Position of army unchanged. Requisition for 4,000 arms for General Longstreet's corps and 1,000 extra belts for cartridge-boxes; telegraphed to Captain McPhail to prepare the latter. Seventeen wagons returned from Staunton, bringing small amount of ammunition and cavalry equipments in default of more ammunition of proper kinds at Staunton. Application from Lieutenant Archer, ordnance officer, General A. P. Hill's division, to exchange ammunition unsuitable from exchange of armament of division for Enfield and 3-inch rifle ammunition; approved and ordered. Letter from McPhail on condition of depot at Staunton, and asking authority for the erection of sheds; referred to General Lee, who declined authorizing it. Enemy advancing apparently in force in the afternoon, driving in our pickets. Notice from General Lee, at 10 p. m., to be prepared for a fight or a march on to-morrow morning.

Friday, October 17.—Troops under arms in camp, and wagon trains loaded and harnessed up. Headquarters camp removed half a mile to a grove. Enemy in position in front of our pickets during the day, but withdrew near sundown. Telegram received from Gorgas: "McPhail's requisitions have all been filled." Telegram from Captain McPhail: "No accouterments on hand." Another: "Enough received to load train; sent to Richmond for more; 2,000 taken away by Jackson's ordnance officer on Sunday." General Jackson's ordnance officer arrived to-day with twenty wagon-loads of arms and accouterments. Telegraphed to Colonel Gorgas requisition for 600 rounds ammunition for Lane's 3-inch navy Parrotts, 300 percussion shell, and 300 spherical case.

Saturday, October 18.—Position of army unchanged.

Sunday, October 19.—Position of army unchanged. Report received from Colonel Manning of number of guns lost and abandoned in recent engagements by batteries now attached to Longstreet's corps, showing one 3-inch rifle, two 12-pounder howitzers (see October 21), one 6-pounder gun, three 10-pounder Parrotts, seven caissons, and one forge. Letters written to Captains Read, Maurin, and Moorman, by whom four of these guns were lost, calling for explanation of the circumstances

attending their loss, the loss of the other three being already understood. Telegram from Captain McPhail of arrival of 3,000 arms and accouterments in Staunton. Reply: "Forward immediately." General Lee orders reduction of corps ordnance reserve trains of Jackson and Longstreet to supply missing division wagons—41 missing in Jackson's and 55 in Longstreet's corps—but will order no more wagons to the divisions.

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Tuesday, October 21.—Telegram from Captain McPhail of arrival at Staunton of thirty-eight guns turned in by broken-up batteries, with chests full of ammunition. Reply: "Write to Colonel Gorgas for boxes and men to pack it." Colonel Corley requested to hurry quartermaster at Staunton in sending forward arms. Telegram from McPhail of arrival of heavy guns from Winchester. Replied: "Send to Richmond." Letter from Captain Read that the 3-inch gun lost by him was brought off the field by my reserve ordnance train and saved. From Captain Maurin that rifled piece lost by him was abandoned in woods at night, his road being lost and horses broken down; sent for next day, but had been removed; does not know by whom. From Captain Moorman, that Colonel Manning's report that he had lost two Parrotts and a caisson was incorrect; one Parrott only had axle cut, and was hauled to the rear, and taken by some one (probably my reserve train, which brought off several) while the men had gone for another carriage for it. This reduces Manning's report of losses by two Parrotts and one 3-inch.

Wednesday, October 22.—Position of army unchanged.

Thursday, October 23.—Position of army unchanged.

Friday, October 24.—Position of army unchanged.

Saturday, October 25.—General Walker's division moved to Paris Gap, of the Blue Ridge. General Jackson's corps tearing up Baltimore and Ohio Railroad beyond Martinsburg. Position of rest of army unchanged. Letter to Colonel Gorgas, asking 1,000 arms and 2,000 extra accouterments in addition to those already asked for; also for extra fuses, Whitworth shell, Manuals prepared by Ordnance Board, and recent edition of Ordnance Manual, mallets, Borman fuse-openers, concerning examination of Lieutenants Duffy and Ward, and recommending that a gun and two caissons lost by Captain Lloyd be charged to him. Report received from Captain Barnwell and Colonel Cutts of losses of ordnance in Maryland campaign and of ammunition on hand in reserve batteries. Colonel Cutts reports having been left on mountain at Boonsborough on the morning after the battle without orders, with four 6-gun batteries, and having found Captains Bondurant and Lloyd near by, also without orders. Not knowing where the army was, he withdrew as best he could, being nearly surrounded by enemy, and in retreating had to leave two guns, whose axles broke—one of Captain Lloyd's (iron 6-pounder) and one of Captain Ross' (12-pounder howitzer). Report submitted to General Lee.

Sunday, October 26.—Position of army unchanged.

Monday, October 27.—Position of army unchanged. Requisition from Capt. J. E. Cooke, chief of ordnance cavalry division, for 500 Sharps carbines, 6 Smith's carbines, 500 saddles, bridles, halters, &c. Reply: "None on hand. Requisitions will be made on Richmond for saddles, &c." Army *en route* for eastern slope of mountains. Orders received to move with reserve ordnance train between Pendleton's artillery and Longstreet's corps.

Wednesday, October 29.—Left General Lee's headquarters, and, joining ordnance train, marched to Nineveh, 11 miles from Winchester, and encamped. In passing through Winchester heard of arrival on another

road of ten wagon-loads of arms and accouterments from Staunton. Dispatched messenger to take them to Colonel Manning for General Longstreet's corps.

Thursday, October 30.—In camp at Nineveh, awaiting passage of Longstreet's corps.

Friday, October 31.—In camp, awaiting passage of Longstreet's corps.

Saturday, November 1.—Moved with reserve ordnance train from Nineveh across the Shenandoah, and encamped near Front Royal, in rear of General Pendleton's reserve artillery.

Sunday, November 2.—Moved with train across the Blue Ridge Mountains, and encamped near Gaines' Cross-Roads.

Monday, November 3.—Moved with train on road to Culpeper Court-House, via Sperryville, and encamped on pike 16 miles from Culpeper. Issued on road 200 rounds 3-inch ammunition and 500 friction-primers to Stuart Horse Artillery.

Tuesday, November 4.—Moved with train to Culpeper Court-House, and encamped with General Lee's headquarters train, encamping near town. Telegram from Captain McPhail, October 29, that Captain Stribling wanted two 24-pounder howitzers, captured at Harper's Ferry. Replied: "Issue them, and move everything to Gordonsville."

Thursday, November 6.—Longstreet's corps in position about Culpeper; Jackson across Blue Ridge, about Manassas Gap. Large force of enemy advancing toward the Rappahannock, and continued hot skirmishing of the cavalry in front. Moved ordnance train to camp nearer headquarters.

Friday, November 7.—Ordered to assume command of Col. S. D. Lee's battalion of artillery, but not relieved from ordnance duty until arrival of some officer to replace me.

Monday, November 10.—Reconnaissance in force made by General Stuart, causing heavy firing in front all day. Wagon trains and batteries harnessed up all day.

Saturday, November 15.—Report from Colonel Manning, chief [of] ordnance, First Corps, of probably 1,500 surplus arms, &c., on hand after arming recruits for whole corps. Requisition received at night (after telegraphing to General Jackson to know if he still wanted arms) for 4,500 arms and accouterments for General Jackson's corps (Second). Enemy's camp shelled by General Stuart.

SEPTEMBER 3-20, 1862.—The Maryland Campaign.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

- Sept. 3, 1862.—The Army of Northern Virginia marches toward Leesburg, Va.
Occupation of Winchester, Va., by the Confederate forces.
Skirmish near Martinsburg, W. Va.
Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Second Corps, Army of Virginia.
Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Ninth Army Corps.
- 3-4, 1862.—Skirmishes at Falls Church, Va.
Skirmish at Bunker Hill, W. Va.
Skirmish at Edwards Ferry, Md.
Reconnaissances from Harper's Ferry to Lovettsville and Charlestown, W. Va.
Skirmish at Monacacy Aqueduct, Md.
- 4-5, 1862.—Skirmishes at Poolesville, Md.
Skirmishes at Point of Rocks and Berlin, Md.
- 4-7, 1862.—The Army of Northern Virginia crosses the Potomac by the fords near Leesburg.
- 5, 1862.—The armies of the Potomac and of Virginia being consolidated, Maj. Gen. John Pope, U. S. Army, is relieved, and directed to report for orders to the Secretary of War.
- 7, 1862.—Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Third Corps, Army of Virginia, *vice* Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell.
Skirmish at Darkesville, W. Va.
Skirmish at Point of Rocks, Md.
- 8, 1862.—Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Defenses of Washington.
Skirmish at Poolesville, Md.
- 9, 1862.—Skirmishes at Monocacy Church and Barnesville, Md.
- 10, 1862.—Skirmish near Boonsborough, Md.
Skirmish near Frederick, Md.
- 10-11, 1862.—Skirmishes at Sugar Loaf Mountain, Md.
- 11, 1862.—Skirmish between Williamsport, Md., and Martinsburg, W. Va.
- 12, 1862.—The First, Second, and Third Corps, Army of Virginia, designated respectively as the Eleventh, Twelfth, and First Army Corps.
Skirmishes at Frederick, Md.
- 12-15, 1862.—Siege and capture of Harper's Ferry, W. Va., including actions on Maryland and Bolivar Heights.
- 13, 1862.—Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the Second Corps, Army of Virginia.
Skirmishes at Catocin Mountain, Middletown, Jefferson, and South Mountain, Md.
- 14, 1862.—Battles of South Mountain (Boonsborough, Boonsborough Gap, or Turner's Pass) and Crampton's Pass, Md.
Skirmish near Petersville, Md.
Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Ninth Army Corps.
- 15, 1862.—Maj. Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Second Corps, Army of Virginia.
Skirmish at Boonsborough, Md.
Skirmish on Antietam Creek, near Keedysville, Md.
- 16-17, 1862.—Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg, Md.

- Sept. 17, 1862.—Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, U. S. Army, resumes command of the Second Corps, Army of Virginia.
 Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Third Corps, Army of Virginia.
- 18, 1862.—Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Twelfth Army Corps.
- 18-19, 1862.—The Army of Northern Virginia recrosses the Potomac near Shepherdstown, W. Va.
- 19, 1862.—Skirmishes at Sharpsburg, Shepherdstown (Blackford's, or Boteler's) Ford, and near Williamsport, Md.
- 20, 1862.—Action near Shepherdstown, W. Va.
 Skirmish near Hagerstown, Md.
 Skirmish near Williamsport, Md.

REPORTS.*

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

- No. 1.—Organization of the Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding, September 14-17, 1862.
- No. 2.—Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, with congratulatory orders, &c.
- No. 3.—Return of casualties in the Union forces at the battle of Crampton's Pass, Md.
- No. 4.—Return of casualties in the Union forces at the battle of South Mountain (Turner's Pass), Md.
- No. 5.—Return of casualties in the Union forces at the battle of Antietam, Md.
- No. 6.—Return of casualties in the Union forces in the skirmishes at Sharpsburg, Shepherdstown Ford, and near Williamsport, Md., September 19, and action near Shepherdstown, W. Va., September 20, 1862, and general summary for the campaign.
- No. 7.—Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of operations September 5-20.
- No. 8.—Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division, of operations September 4-17.
- No. 9.—Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding First Army Corps, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, with congratulations of General McClellan.
- No. 10.—Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battle of South Mountain.
- No. 11.—Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 12.—Capt. J. Albert Monroe, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery First Division, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 13.—Lieut. James Stewart, Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 14.—Col. Walter Phelps, jr., Twenty-second New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 15.—Lieut. Col. J. William Hofmann, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 16.—Col. William P. Wainwright, Seventy-sixth New York Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.
- No. 17.—Lieut. Col. J. William Hofmann, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.

* See also general reports, pp. 4-139.

- No. 18.—Capt. Frederick Williams, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 19.—Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 20.—Lieut. Col. Theodore B. Gates, Eightieth New York Infantry (Twentieth Militia), of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 21.—Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 22.—Col. Solomon Meredith, Nineteenth Indiana Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.
- No. 23.—Capt. William W. Dudley, Nineteenth Indiana Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 24.—Col. Lucius Fairchild, Second Wisconsin Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.
- No. 25.—Lieut. Col. Edward S. Bragg, Sixth Wisconsin Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 26.—Capt. John B. Callis, Seventh Wisconsin Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 27.—Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 28.—Capt. James MacThomson, One hundred and seventh Pennsylvania Infantry, First Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 29.—Lieut. Col. Richard H. Richardson, Twenty-sixth New York Infantry, Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 30.—Lieut. Samuel A. Moffett, Ninety-fourth New York Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 31.—Capt. Henry R. Myers, Eighty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 32.—Col. Peter Lyle, Ninetieth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 33.—Brig. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 34.—Capt. James H. Cooper, Battery B, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, of the battle of South Mountain.
- No. 35.—Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of South Mountain.
- No. 36.—Col. Albert L. Magilton, Fourth Pennsylvania Reserves, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
- No. 37.—Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson, Ninth Pennsylvania Reserves, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of South Mountain.
- No. 38.—Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army, commanding Second and Twelfth Army Corps, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 39.—Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, Second Army Corps, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 40.—Capt. Rufus D. Pettit, Battery B, First New York Light Artillery, of skirmish on Antietam Creek and battle of Antietam.
- No. 41.—Lieut. Evan Thomas, Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 42.—Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 43.—Col. Edward E. Cross, Fifth New Hampshire Infantry, of skirmish at Boonsborough and battle of Antietam.
- No. 44.—Capt. Charles Brestel, Seventh New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 45.—Col. Francis C. Barlow, commanding Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

- No. 46.—Lieut. Col. Nelson A. Miles, Sixty-first New York Infantry, commanding Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 47.—Maj. H. Boyd McKeen, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 48.—Brig. Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 49.—Lieut. Col. Henry Fowler, Sixty-third New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 50.—Maj. James Cavanagh, Sixty-ninth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 51.—Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly, Eighty-eighth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 52.—Col. John R. Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 53.—Capt. David L. Stricker, Second Delaware Infantry, of skirmish on Antietam Creek and battle of Antietam.
- No. 54.—Col. Paul Frank, Fifty-second New York Infantry, of skirmish on Antietam Creek and battle of Antietam.
- No. 55.—Maj. Alford B. Chapman, Fifty-seventh New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 56.—Capt. Julius Wehle, Sixty-sixth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 57.—Lieut. Col. Richards McMichael, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 58.—Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 59.—Capt. John A. Tompkins, Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 60.—Lieut. George A. Woodruff, Battery I, First U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 61.—Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 62.—Lieut. Col. John W. Kimball, Fifteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 63.—Col. Alfred Sully, First Minnesota Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 64.—Col. James A. Suiter, Thirty-fourth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 65.—Col. Henry W. Hudson, Eighty-second New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 66.—Col. Joshua T. Owen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 67.—Brig. Gen. Napoleon J. T. Dana, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 68.—Col. Norman J. Hall, Seventh Michigan Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 69.—Capt. H. G. O. Weymouth, Nineteenth Massachusetts Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 70.—Brig. Gen. William H. French, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of the battle of Antietam.
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- No. 74.—Col. William Harrow, Fourteenth Indiana Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 75.—Lieut. Col. Franklin Sawyer, Eighth Ohio Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 76.—Lieut. Col. Vincent M. Wilcox, One hundred and thirty-second Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 77.—Col. Joseph Snider, Seventh West Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 78.—Col. Dwight Morris, Fourteenth Connecticut Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 79.—Lieut. Col. Sanford H. Perkins, Fourteenth Connecticut Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
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- No. 82.—Col. John W. Andrews, First Delaware Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.
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- No. 91.—Brig. Gen. George Sykes, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battle of Antietam, skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford, and action near Shepherdstown.
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- No. 94.—Lieut. William E. Van Reed, commanding Battery K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations September 11-22, including the battle of Antietam, skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford, and action near Shepherdstown.
- No. 95.—Lieut. Col. Robert C. Buchanan, Fourth U. S. Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam and skirmish at Shepherdstown Ford.
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- No. 97.—Capt. Hiram Dyer, Fourth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 98.—Capt. Matthew M. Blunt, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
- No. 99.—Capt. Thomas M. Anderson, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

- No. 100.—Capt. W. Harvey Brown, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
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- No. 104.—Capt. Levi C. Bootes, Sixth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam and action near Shepherdstown.
- No. 105.—Maj. DeL. Floyd-Jones, Eleventh U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam and action near Shepherdstown.
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- No. 110.—Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.
- No. 111.—Col. A. T. A. Torbert, First New Jersey Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.
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- No. 113.—Col. Samuel L. Buck, Second New Jersey Infantry, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.
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- No. 125.—Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

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- No. 171.—Maj. Isaac L. Haldeman, One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.
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- No. 256.—Col. E. M. Law, Fourth Alabama Infantry, commanding brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 257.—Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans, C. S. Army, commanding brigade and division, of operations September 14-17.
- No. 258.—Col. P. F. Stevens, Holcombe (South Carolina) Legion, commanding Evans' brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 259.—Capt. R. Boyce, commanding Macbeth (South Carolina) Light Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 260.—Col. F. W. McMaster, Seventeenth South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 261.—Col. W. H. Wallace, Eighteenth South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 262.—Maj. M. Hilton, Twenty-second South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 263.—Capt. S. A. Durham, Twenty-third South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 264.—Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps, of operations September 5-27.
- No. 265.—Capt. J. L. Bartlett, Signal Officer, C. S. Army, of operations about Harper's Ferry, W. Va.

- No. 266.—Maj. John A. Harman, C. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of captured property during the second and third quarters, 1862.
- No. 267.—Maj. W. J. Hawks, C. S. Army, Commissary of Subsistence, of captured property.
- No. 268.—Col. S. Crutchfield, C. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, of operations September 13-19.
- No. 269.—Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, commanding Ewell's division, of operations September 3-27.
- No. 270.—Maj. J. H. Lowe, Thirty-first Georgia Infantry, commanding Lawton's brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 271.—Col. James A. Walker, Thirteenth Virginia Infantry, commanding Trimble's brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 272.—Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays, C. S. Army, commanding First Louisiana Brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 273.—Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding Light Division, of operations September 2-November 3.
- No. 274.—Lieut. Col. R. L. Walker, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion, of operations September 13-17.
- No. 275.—Brig. Gen. James H. Lane, C. S. Army, commanding Branch's brigade, of operations September 2-20.
- No. 276.—Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan, C. S. Army, of operations of Gregg's brigade, September 3-December 3.
- No. 277.—Col. D. H. Hamilton, First South Carolina Infantry, of operations September 2-20.
- No. 278.—Lieut. Col. James M. Perrin, First South Carolina Rifles, of operations September 15-20.
- No. 279.—Maj. W. H. McCorkle, Twelfth South Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg and action near Shepherdstown.
- No. 280.—Col. O. E. Edwards, Thirteenth South Carolina Infantry, of operations September 15-19.
- No. 281.—Capt. Joseph N. Brown, Fourteenth South Carolina Infantry, of operations September 15-20.
- No. 282.—Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations September 14-20.
- No. 283.—Capt. F. M. Johnston, Nineteenth Georgia Infantry, of operations August 16-September 21.
- No. 284.—Maj. James H. Neal, Nineteenth Georgia Infantry, of operations September 4-October 19.
- No. 285.—Brig. Gen. William D. Pender, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations September 15-20.
- No. 286.—Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations September 14-20.
- No. 287.—Brig. Gen. John R. Jones, C. S. Army, commanding Jackson's division, of operations September 7-17.
- No. 288.—Capt. W. T. Poague, commanding Rockbridge Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 289.—Maj. H. J. Williams, Fifth Virginia Infantry, commanding Winder's brigade, of operations September 1-19.
- No. 290.—Capt. F. C. Wilson, Twenty-seventh Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 291.—Col. Leroy A. Stafford, Ninth Louisiana Infantry, commanding Starke's brigade, of operations August 31-October 5.
- No. 292.—Col. Edmund Pendleton, Fifteenth Louisiana Infantry, commanding Starke's brigade, of operations September 13-17.

- No. 293.—Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations July 23–September 17.
- No. 294.—Capt. Thomas H. Carter, commanding King William (Virginia) Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 295.—Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 296.—Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 297.—Col. D. K. McRae, Fifth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Garland's brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 298.—Capt. Thomas M. Garrett, Fifth North Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 299.—Lieut. Col. Thomas Ruffin, jr., Thirteenth North Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Boonsborough.
- No. 300.—Col. R. T. Bennett, Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Anderson's brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.
- No. 301.—Col. Bryan Grimes, Fourth North Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Boonsborough.
- No. 302.—Capt. A. J. Griffith, Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry, of operations September 14–17.
- No. 303.—Maj. William W. Sillers, Thirtieth North Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 304.—Col. A. H. Colquitt, Sixth Georgia Infantry, commanding brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.
- No. 305.—Confederate Roll of Honor.

No. 1.

*Organization of the Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan,
U. S. Army, commanding, September 14–17, 1862.**

[Compiled from the records of the Adjutant-General's Office.]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

ESCORT.

Capt. JAMES B. MCINTYRE.

Independent Company Oneida (New York) Cavalry, Capt. Daniel P. Mann.
4th U. S. Cavalry, Company A, Lieut. Thomas H. McCormick.
4th U. S. Cavalry, Company E, Capt. James B. McIntyre.

VOLUNTEER ENGINEER BRIGADE.†

Brig. Gen. DANIEL P. WOODBURY.

15th New York, Col. John McL. Murphy.
50th New York, Lieut. Col. William H. Pettes.

REGULAR ENGINEER BATTALION.

Capt. JAMES C. DUANE.

* On September 14 the right wing of the army, consisting of the First and Ninth Corps, was commanded by Major-General Burnside; the center, composed of the Second and Twelfth Corps, by Major-General Sumner; and the left wing, comprising the Sixth Corps and Couch's division (Fourth Corps), by Major-General Franklin.

† Detached at Washington, D. C., since September 7.

PROVOST GUARD.*

Maj. WILLIAM H. WOOD.

2d U. S. Cavalry, Companies E, F, H, and K, Capt. George A. Gordon.
 8th U. S. Infantry, Companies A, D, F, and G, Capt. Royal T. Frank.
 19th U. S. Infantry, Company G, Capt. Edmund L. Smith.
 19th U. S. Infantry, Company H, Capt. Henry S. Welton.

HEADQUARTERS GUARD.

Maj. GRANVILLE O. HALLER.

Sturges (Illinois) Rifles,† Capt. James Steel.
 93d New York, Lieut. Col. Benjamin C. Butler.

QUARTERMASTER'S GUARD.

1st U. S. Cavalry, Companies B, C, H, and I, Capt. Marcus A. Reno.

FIRST ARMY CORPS.‡

- (1.) Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER. §
 (2.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE.

ESCORT.

2d New York Cavalry, Companies A, B, I, and K, Capt. John E. Naylor.

FIRST DIVISION.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. RUFUS KING. ||
 (2.) Brig. Gen. JOHN P. HATCH. ¶
 (3.) Brig. Gen. ABNER DOUBLEDAY.

First Brigade.

Col. WALTER PHELPS, jr.

22d New York, Lieut. Col. John McKie, jr.
 24th New York, Capt. John D. O'Brian.
 30th New York, Col. William M. Searing.
 84th New York (14th Militia), Maj. William H. de Bevoise.
 2d U. S. Sharpshooters, Col. Henry A. V. Post.

Second Brigade.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. ABNER DOUBLEDAY.
 (2.) Col. William P. WAINWRIGHT. §
 (3.) Lieut. Col. J. WILLIAM HOFMANN.

7th Indiana, Maj. Ira G. Grover.
 76th New York:

Col. William P. Wainwright.
 Capt. John W. Young.

95th New York, Maj. Edward Pye.

56th Pennsylvania:

Lieut. Col. J. William Hofmann.
 Capt. Frederick Williams.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. MARSENA R. PATRICK.

21st New York, Col. William F. Rogers.
 23d New York, Col. Henry C. Hoffman.
 35th New York, Col. Newton B. Lord.
 80th New York (20th Militia), Lieut. Col. Theodore B. Gates.

Fourth Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN GIBBON.

19th Indiana:

Col. Solomon Meredith.
 Lieut. Col. Alois O. Bachman.
 Capt. William W. Dudley.

2d Wisconsin:

Col. Lucius Fairchild.
 Lieut. Col. Thomas S. Allen.

6th Wisconsin:

Lieut. Col. Edward S. Bragg.
 Maj. Rufus R. Dawes.

7th Wisconsin, Capt. John B. Callis.

* The composition of this command is not fully reported on the returns.

† Detached at Washington, D. C., since September 7.

‡ Designation changed from Third Corps, Army of Virginia, to First Army Corps by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General's Office, September 12, 1862.

§ Wounded September 17. || Relieved September 14. ¶ Wounded September 14.

Artillery.

Capt. J. ALBERT MONROE.

New Hampshire Light, First Battery, Lieut. Frederick M. Edgell.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery D, Capt. J. Albert Monroe.

1st New York Light, Battery L, Capt. John A. Reynolds.

4th United States, Battery B:

Capt. Joseph B. Campbell.

Lieut. James Stewart.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. JAMES B. RICKETTS.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. ABRAM DURYEA.

97th New York, Maj. Charles Northrup.

104th New York, Maj. Lewis C. Skinner.

105th New York, Col. Howard Carroll.

107th Pennsylvania, Capt. James Mac Thomson.

Second Brigade.

(1.) Col. WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN.

(2.) Col. PETER LYLE.

26th New York, Lieut. Col. Richard H. Richardson.

94th New York, Lieut. Col. Calvin Littlefield.

88th Pennsylvania:

Lieut. Col. George W. Gile.

Capt. Henry R. Myers.

90th Pennsylvania:

Col. Peter Lyle.

Lieut. Col. William A. Leech.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE L. HARTSUFF.*

(2.) Col. RICHARD COULTER.

16th Maine,† Col. Asa W. Wildes.

12th Massachusetts:

Maj. Elisha Burbank.

Capt. Benjamin F. Cook.

13th Massachusetts, Maj. J. Parker Gould.

83d New York (9th Militia), Lieut. Col. William Atterbury.

11th Pennsylvania:

Col. Richard Coulter.

Capt. David M. Cook.

Artillery.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Capt. Ezra W. Matthews.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery C, Capt. James Thompson.

THIRD DIVISION.

(1.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE.

(2.) Brig. Gen. TRUMAN SEYMOUR.

First Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. TRUMAN SEYMOUR.

(2.) Col. R. BIDDLE ROBERTS.

1st Pennsylvania Reserves:

Col. R. Biddle Roberts.

Capt. William C. Talley.

2d Pennsylvania Reserves, Capt. James N. Byrnes.

5th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

6th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. William Sinclair.

13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles):

Col. Hugh W. McNeil.

Capt. Dennis McGee.

Second Brigade.

Col. ALBERT L. MAGILTON.

3d Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieut. Col. John Clark.

4th Pennsylvania Reserves, Maj. John Nyce.

7th Pennsylvania Reserves:

Col. Henry C. Bolinger.

Maj. Chauncey A. Lyman.

8th Pennsylvania Reserves, Maj. Silas M. Baily.

* Wounded September 17.

† Joined September 9, and detached September 13 as railroad guard.

Third Brigade.

- (1.) Col. THOMAS F. GALLAGHER.*
 (2.) Lieut. Col. ROBERT ANDERSON.

9th Pennsylvania Reserves:

Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson.
 Capt. Samuel B. Dick.

10th Pennsylvania Reserves:

Lieut. Col. Adoniram J. Warner.
 Capt. Jonathan P. Smith.

11th Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieut. Col. Samuel M. Jackson.

12th Pennsylvania Reserves, Capt. Richard Gustin.

Artillery.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery A, Lieut. John G. Simpson.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Capt. James H. Cooper.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery G, † Lieut. Frank P. Amsden.

5th United States, Battery C, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom.

SECOND ARMY CORPS.

Maj. Gen. EDWIN V. SUMNER.

ESCORT.

6th New York Cavalry, Company D, Capt. Henry W. Lyon.

6th New York Cavalry, Company K, Capt. Riley Johnson.

FIRST DIVISION.

- (1.) Maj. Gen. ISRAEL B. RICHARDSON. ‡
 (2.) Brig. Gen. JOHN C. CALDWELL.
 (3.) Brig. Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN C. CALDWELL.

5th New Hampshire, Col. Edward E. Cross.

7th New York, Capt. Charles Brestel.

61st New York, { Col. Francis C. Barlow.
 64th New York, { Lieut. Col. Nelson A. Miles.

81st Pennsylvania, Maj. H. Boyd McKeen.

Second Brigade.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. THOMAS F. MEAGHER.
 (2.) Col. JOHN BURKE.

29th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Barnes.

63d New York:

Col. John Burke.
 Lieut. Col. Henry Fowler.
 Maj. Richard C. Bentley.
 Capt. Joseph O'Neill.

69th New York:

Lieut. Col. James Kelly.
 Maj. James Cavanagh.

88th New York, Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly.

Third Brigade.

Col. JOHN R. BROOKE.

2d Delaware, Capt. David L. Stricker.

52d New York, Col. Paul Frank.

57th New York:

Lieut. Col. Philip J. Parisen.
 Maj. Alford B. Chapman.

66th New York:

Capt. Julius Wehle.
 Lieut. Col. James H. Bull.

53d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Richards McMichael.

* Wounded September 14.

† Detached at Washington, D. C., since September 6.

‡ Wounded September 17.

Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery B, Capt. Rufus D. Pettit.
4th U. S., Batteries A and C, Lieut. Evan Thomas.

SECOND DIVISION.

(1.) Maj. Gen. JOHN SEDGWICK.*

(2.) Brig. Gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIS A. GORMAN.

15th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. John W. Kimball.

1st Minnesota, Col. Alfred Sully.

34th New York, Col. James A. Suiter.

82d New York (2d Militia), Col. Henry W. Hudson.

Massachusetts Sharpshooters, First Company, Capt. John Saunders.

Minnesota Sharpshooters, Second Company, Capt. William F. Russell.

Second Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.

(2.) Col. JOSHUA T. OWEN.

(3.) Col. DE WITT C. BAXTER.

69th Pennsylvania, Col. Joshua T. Owen.

71st Pennsylvania:

Col. Isaac J. Wistar.

Lieut. Richard P. Smith (adjutant).

Capt. Enoch E. Lewis.

72d Pennsylvania, Col. De Witt C. Baxter.

106th Pennsylvania, Col. Turner G. Morehead.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. NAPOLEON J. T. DANA.*

(2.) Col. NORMAN J. HALL.

19th Massachusetts:

Col. Edward W. Hinks.

Lieut. Col. Arthur F. Devereux.

20th Massachusetts, Col. William R. Lee.

7th Michigan:

Col. Norman J. Hall.

Capt. Charles J. Hunt.

42d New York:

Lieut. Col. George N. Bomford.

Maj. James E. Mallon.

59th New York, Col. William L. Tidball.

Artillery.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A, Capt. John A. Tompkins.

1st United States, Battery I, Lieut. George A. Woodruff.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. FRENCH.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. NATHAN KIMBALL.

14th Indiana, Col. William Harrow.

8th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Franklin Sawyer.

132d Pennsylvania:

Col. Richard A. Oakford.

Lieut. Col. Vincent M. Wilcox.

7th West Virginia, Col. Joseph Snider.

Second Brigade.

Col. DWIGHT MORRIS.

14th Connecticut, Lieut. Col. Sanford H. Perkins.

108th New York, Col. Oliver H. Palmer.

130th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry I. Zinn.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. MAX WEBER.*

(2.) Col. JOHN W. ANDREWS.

1st Delaware:

Col. John W. Andrews.

Lieut. Col. Oliver Hopkinson.

5th Maryland:

Maj. Leopold Blumenberg.

Capt. E. F. M. Faetzh.

4th New York, Lieut. Col. John D. McGregor.

UNATTACHED ARTILLERY.

1st New York Light, Battery G, Capt. John D. Frank.
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B, Capt. John G. Hazard.
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Capt. Charles D. Owen.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS.

FIRST DIVISION.*

Maj. Gen. DARIUS N. COUCH.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. CHARLES DEVENS, Jr.

7th Massachusetts, Col. David A. Russell.
 10th Massachusetts, Col. Henry L. Enstis.
 36th New York, Col. William H. Browne.
 2d Rhode Island, Col. Frank Wheaton.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. ALBION P. HOWE.

62d New York, Col. David J. Nevin.
 93d Pennsylvania, Col. James M. McCarter.
 98th Pennsylvania, Col. John F. Ballier.
 102d Pennsylvania, Col. Thomas A. Rowley.
 139th Pennsylvania,† Col. Frank H. Collier.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN COCHRANE.

65th New York, Col. Alexander Shaler.
 67th New York, Col. Julius W. Adams.
 122d New York, Col. Silas Titus.
 23d Pennsylvania, Col. Thomas H. Neill.
 61st Pennsylvania, Col. George C. Spear.
 82d Pennsylvania, Col. David H. Williams.

Artillery.

New York Light, Third Battery,† Capt. William Stuart.
 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery C, Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy.
 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery D, Capt. Michael Hall.
 2d United States, Battery G, Lieut. John H. Butler.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER.

ESCORT.

1st Maine Cavalry (detachment), Capt. George J. Summat.

FIRST DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE W. MORELL.

First Brigade.

Col. JAMES BARNES.

2d Maine, Col. Charles W. Roberts.
 18th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Joseph Hayes.
 22d Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. William S. Tilton.
 1st Michigan, Capt. Emory W. Belton.
 13th New York, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.
 25th New York, Col. Charles A. Johnson.
 118th Pennsylvania, Col. Charles M. Prevost.
 Massachusetts Sharpshooters, Second Company, Capt. Lewis E. Wentworth.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. CHARLES GRIFFIN.

2d District of Columbia, Col. Charles M. Alexander.
 9th Massachusetts, Col. Patrick R. Guiney.
 32d Massachusetts, Col. Francis J. Parker.
 4th Michigan, Col. Jonathan W. Childs.
 14th New York, Col. James McQuade.
 62d Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.

* Assigned to the Sixth Corps as the Third Division September 26, 1862.

† Joined September 17.

‡ Joined September 16.

Third Brigade.

Col. T. B. W. STOCKTON.

20th Maine, Col. Adelbert Ames.
 16th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Norval E. Welch.
 12th New York, Capt. William Huson.
 17th New York, Lieut. Col. Nelson B. Bartram.
 44th New York, Maj. Freeman Conner.
 83d Pennsylvania, Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward.
 Michigan Sharpshooters, Brady's company, Lieut. Jonas H. Titus, jr.

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, Battery C, Capt. Augustus P. Martin.
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C, Capt. Richard Waterman.
 5th United States, Battery D, Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett.

Sharpshooters.

1st United States, Capt. John B. Isler.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE SYKES.

First Brigade.

Lieut. Col. ROBERT C. BUCHANAN.

3d United States, Capt. John D. Wilkins.
 4th United States, Capt. Hiram Dryer.
 12th United States, First Battalion, Capt. Matthew M. Blunt.
 12th United States, Second Battalion, Capt. Thomas M. Anderson.
 14th United States, First Battalion, Capt. W. Harvey Brown.
 14th United States, Second Battalion, Capt. David B. McKibbin.

Second Brigade.

Maj. CHARLES S. LOVELL.

1st and 6th United States, Capt. Levi C. Bootes.
 2d and 10th United States, Capt. John S. Poland.
 11th United States, Capt. DeL. Floyd-Jones.
 17th United States, Maj. George L. Andrews.

Third Brigade.

Col. GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN.

5th New York, Capt. Cleveland Winslow.
 10th New York, Lieut. Col. John W. Marshall.

Artillery.

1st United States, Batteries E and G, Lieut. Alanson M. Randol.
 5th United States, Battery I, Capt. Stephen H. Weed.
 5th United States, Battery K, Lieut. William E. Van Reed.

THIRD DIVISION.*

Brig. Gen. ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. ERASTUS B. TYLER.

91st Pennsylvania, Col. Edgar M. Gregory.
 126th Pennsylvania, Col. James G. Elder.
 129th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob G. Frick.
 134th Pennsylvania, Col. Matthew S. Quay.

Second Brigade.

Col. PETER H. ALLABACH.

123d Pennsylvania, Col. John B. Clark.
 131st Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. William B. Shaut.
 133d Pennsylvania, Col. Franklin B. Speakman.
 155th Pennsylvania, Col. Edward J. Allen.

* This division was organized September 12, and reached the battle-field September 18.

Artillery.

Capt. LUCIUS N. ROBINSON.

1st New York Light, Battery C, Capt. Almont Barnes.
 1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Capt. Lucius N. Robinson.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.*

Lieut. Col. WILLIAM HAYS.

1st Battalion New York Light, Battery A, Lieut. Bernhard Wever.
 1st Battalion New York Light, Battery B, Lieut. Alfred von Kleiser.
 1st Battalion New York Light, Battery C, Capt. Robert Langner.
 1st Battalion New York Light, Battery D, Capt. Charles Kusserow.
 New York Light, Fifth Battery, Capt. Elijah D. Taft.
 1st United States, Battery K, Capt. William M. Graham.
 4th United States, Battery G, Lieut. Marcus P. Miller.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj. Gen. WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN.

ESCORT.

6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Companies B and G, Capt. Henry P. Muirheid.

FIRST DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. HENRY W. SLOCUM.

First Brigade.

Col. ALFRED T. A. TORBERT.

1st New Jersey, Lieut. Col. Mark W. Collet.
 2d New Jersey, Col. Samuel L. Buck.
 3d New Jersey, Col. Henry W. Brown.
 4th New Jersey, Col. William B. Hatch.

Second Brigade.

Col. JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.

5th Maine, Col. Nathaniel J. Jackson.
 16th New York, Lieut. Col. Joel J. Seaver.
 27th New York, Lieut. Col. Alexander D. Adams.
 96th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry L. Cake.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN NEWTON.

18th New York, Lieut. Col. George R. Myers.
 31st New York, Lieut. Col. Francis E. Pinto.
 32d New York:
 Col. Roderick Matheson.
 Maj. George F. Lemon.
 95th Pennsylvania, Col. Gustavus W. Town.

Artillery.

Capt. EMORY UPTON.

Maryland Light, Battery A, Capt. John W. Wolcott.
 Massachusetts Light, Battery A, Capt. Josiah Porter.
 New Jersey Light, Battery A, Capt. William Hexamer.
 2d United States, Battery D, Lieut. Edward B. Williston.

* Batteries detached from the reserve are embraced in the roster of the commands with which they served.

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH.

First Brigade.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.*
 (2.) Col. AMASA COBB.

6th Maine, Col. Hiram Burnham.
 43d New York, Maj. John Wilson.
 49th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. William Brisbane.
 137th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry M. Bes-
 sert.
 5th Wisconsin, Col. Amasa Cobb.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. W. T. H. BROOKS.

2d Vermont, Maj. James H. Walbridge.
 3d Vermont, Col. Breed N. Hyde.
 4th Vermont, Lieut. Col. Charles B. Stoughton.
 5th Vermont, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
 6th Vermont, Maj. Oscar L. Tuttle.

Third Brigade.

Col. WILLIAM H. IRWIN.

7th Maine, Maj. Thomas W. Hyde.
 20th New York, Col. Ernest von Vegesack.
 33d New York, Lieut. Col. Joseph W. Corning.
 49th New York:
 Lieut. Col. William C. Alberger.
 Maj. George W. Johnson.
 77th New York, Capt. Nathan S. Babcock.

Artillery.†

Capt. ROMEYN B. AYRES.

Maryland Light, Battery B, Lieut. Theodore J. Vanneman.
 New York Light, 1st Battery, Capt. Andrew Cowan.
 5th United States, Battery F, Lieut. Leonard Martin.

NINTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE.‡
 Maj. Gen. JESSE L. RENO.§
 Brig. Gen. JACOB D. COX.

ESCORT.

1st Maine Cavalry, Company G, Capt. Zebulon B. Blethen.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. ORLANDO B. WILLCOX.

First Brigade.

Col. BENJAMIN C. CHRIST.

28th Massachusetts, Capt. Andrew P. Car-
 raher.
 17th Michigan, Col. William H. Withing-
 ton.
 79th New York, Lieut. Col. David Morri-
 son.
 50th Pennsylvania:
 Maj. Edward Overton.
 Capt. William H. Diehl.

Second Brigade.

Col. THOMAS WELSH.

8th Michigan: ||
 Lieut. Col. Frank Graves.
 Maj. Ralph Ely.
 46th New York, Lieut. Col. Joseph Ger-
 hardt.
 45th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. John I.
 Curtin.
 100th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. David A.
 Leckey.

* Assigned to command of First Division, Second Army Corps, September 17.

† The Third Battery New York Light Artillery transferred to Couch's division Sep-
 tember 15.

‡ On the 16th and 17th Major-General Burnside exercised general command on the
 left, and Brigadier-General Cox was in immediate command of the corps.

§ Killed September 14.

|| Transferred from First Brigade September 16.

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, Eighth Battery, Capt. Asa M. Cook.
2d United States, Battery E, Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. SAMUEL D. STURGIS.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JAMES NAGLE.

2d Maryland, Lieut. Col. J. Eugene Duryea.
6th New Hampshire, Col. Simon G. Griffin.
9th New Hampshire, Col. Enoch Q. Fellows.
48th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. EDWARD FERRERO.

21st Massachusetts, Col. William S. Clark.
35th Massachusetts:
Col. Edward A. Wild.
Lieut. Col. Sumner Carruth.
51st New York, Col. Robert B. Potter.
51st Pennsylvania, Col. John F. Hart-
ranft.

Artillery.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery D, Capt. George W. Durell.
4th United States, Battery E, Capt. Joseph C. Clark, jr.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. ISAAC P. RODMAN.*

First Brigade.

Col. HARRISON S. FAIRCHILD.

9th New York, Lieut. Col. Edgar A. Kimball.
89th New York, Maj. Edward Jardine.
103d New York, Maj. Benjamin Ringold.

Second Brigade.

Col. EDWARD HARLAND.

8th Connecticut:
Lieut. Col. Hiram Appelman.
Maj. John E. Ward.
11th Connecticut, Col. Henry W. Kings-
bury.
16th Connecticut,† Col. Francis Beach.
4th Rhode Island:
Col. William H. P. Steere.
Lieut. Col. Joseph B. Curtis.

Artillery.

5th United States, Battery A, Lieut. Charles P. Muhlenberg.

KANAWHA DIVISION.

(1.) Brig. Gen. JACOB D. COX.
(2.) Col. ELIAKIM P. SCAMMON.

First Brigade.

(1.) Col. ELIAKIM P. SCAMMON.
(2.) Col. HUGH EWING.

12th Ohio, Col. Carr B. White.
23d Ohio:
Lieut. Col. Rutherford B. Hayes.
Maj. James M. Comly.
30th Ohio:
Col. Hugh Ewing.
Lieut. Col. Theodore Jones.
Maj. George H. Hildt.
Ohio Light Artillery, First Battery, Capt.
James R. McMullin.
Gilmore's company West Virginia Cavalry,
Lieut. James Abraham.
Harrison's company West Virginia Cav-
alry, Lieut. Dennis Delaney.

Second Brigade.

Col. GEORGE CROOK.

11th Ohio:
Lieut. Col. Augustus H. Coleman.
Maj. Lyman J. Jackson.
28th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Gottfried Becker.
36th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Melvin Clarke.
Schambeck's company Chicago Dra-
goons, Capt. Frederick Schambeck.
Kentucky Light Artillery, Simmonds' bat-
tery, Capt. Seth J. Simmonds.

* Wounded September 17.

† Assigned September 16.

UNATTACHED.

6th New York Cavalry (eight companies), Col. Thomas C. Devin.
Ohio Cavalry, Third Independent Company, Lieut. Jonas Seamen.
3d U. S. Artillery, Batteries L and M, Capt. John Edwards, jr.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.*

- (1.) Maj. Gen. JOSEPH K. F. MANSFIELD.†
(2.) Brig. Gen. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS.

ESCORT.

1st Michigan Cavalry, Company L, Capt. Melvin Brewer.

FIRST DIVISION.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS.
(2.) Brig. Gen. SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.‡
(3.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON.

First Brigade.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.
(2.) Col. JOSEPH F. KNIPE.

5th Connecticut,§ Capt. Henry W. Daboll.
10th Maine, Col. George L. Beal.
28th New York, Capt. William H. H. Mapes.
46th Pennsylvania:
Col. Joseph F. Knipe.
Lieut. Col. James L. Selfridge.
124th Pennsylvania:
Col. Joseph W. Hawley.
Maj. Isaac L. Haldeman.
125th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob Higgins.
128th Pennsylvania:
Col. Samuel Croasdale.
Lieut. Col. William W. Hammersly.
Maj. Joel B. Wanner.

Third Brigade.

- (1.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON.
(2.) Col. THOMAS H. RUGER.

27th Indiana, Col. Silas Colgrove.
2d Massachusetts, Col. George L. Andrews.
13th New Jersey, Col. Ezra A. Carman.
107th New York, Col. R. B. Van Valkenburgh.
Zouaves d'Afrique,|| Pennsylvania.
3d Wisconsin, Col. Thomas H. Ruger.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE S. GREENE.

First Brigade.

- (1.) Lieut. Col. HECTOR TYNDALE.¶
(2.) Maj. ORRIN J. CRANE.

5th Ohio, Maj. John Collins.
7th Ohio:
Maj. Orrin J. Crane.
Capt. Frederick A. Seymour.
29th Ohio,** Lieut. Theron S. Winship.
66th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell.
28th Pennsylvania, Maj. Ario Pardee, jr.

Second Brigade.

Col. HENRY J. STAINROOK.
3d Maryland, Lieut. Col. Joseph M. Sudsburg.
102d New York, Lieut. Col. James C. Lane.
109th Pennsylvania;†† Capt. George E. Seymour.
111th Pennsylvania, Maj. Thomas M. Walker.

* Designation changed from Second Corps, Army of Virginia, to Twelfth Army Corps, by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General's Office, September 12, 1862.

† Mortally wounded September 17.

‡ Wounded September 17.

§ Detached at Frederick, Md., since September 15.

|| No officers present; enlisted men of company attached to Second Massachusetts.

¶ Wounded September 17. . . ** Detached September 9. . . †† Detached September 13.

Third Brigade.

- (1.) Col. WILLIAM B. GOODRICH.*
 (2.) Lieut. Col. JONATHAN AUSTIN.

3d Delaware, Maj. Arthur Maginnis.
 Purnell Legion, Maryland, Lieut. Col. Benjamin L. Simpson.
 60th New York, Lieut. Col. Charles R. Brundage.
 78th New York:
 Lieut. Col. Jonathan Austin.
 Capt. Henry R. Stagg.

ARTILLERY.

Capt. CLERMONT L. BEST.

Maine Light, 4th Battery, Capt. O'Neil W. Robinson.
 Maine Light, 6th Battery, Capt. Freeman McGilvery.
 1st New York Light, Battery M, Capt. George W. Cothran.
 New York Light, 10th Battery, Capt. John T. Bruen.
 Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Capt. Joseph M. Knap.
 Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Capt. Robert B. Hampton.
 4th United States, Battery F, Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. ALFRED PLEASANTON.

First Brigade.

Maj. CHARLES J. WHITING.

5th United States, Capt. Joseph H. McArthur.
 6th United States, Capt. William P. Sanders.

Second Brigade.

Col. JOHN F. FARNSWORTH.

8th Illinois, Maj. William H. Medill.
 3d Indiana, Maj. George H. Chapman.
 1st Massachusetts, Capt. Casper Crowninshield.
 8th Pennsylvania, Capt. Peter Keenan [?].

Third Brigade.

Col. RICHARD H. RUSH.

4th Pennsylvania:
 Col. James H. Childs.
 Lieut. Col. James K. Kerr.
 6th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. C. Ross Smith.

Fourth Brigade.

Col. ANDREW T. McREYNOLDS.

1st New York, Maj. Alonzo W. Adams.
 12th Pennsylvania, Maj. James A. Congdon.

Fifth Brigade.

Col. BENJAMIN F. DAVIS.

8th New York, Col. Benjamin F. Davis.
 3d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Samuel W. Owen.

Artillery.

2d United States, Battery A, Capt. John C. Tidball.
 2d United States, Batteries B and L, Capt. James M. Robertson.
 2d United States, Battery M, Lieut. Peter C. Hains.
 3d United States, Batteries C and G, Capt. Horatio G. Gibson.

Unattached.

1st Maine Cavalry,† Col. Samuel H. Allen.
 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry (detachment), Col. William J. Palmer.

*Killed September 17.

† Detached at Frederick, Md.

No. 2.

Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, with congratulatory orders, &c.*

NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD.,

September 29, 1862—1.30 p. m.

I have the honor to report the following as some of the results of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam: At South Mountain our loss was 443 killed, 1,806 wounded, and 76 missing; total, 2,325. At Antietam our loss was 2,010 killed, 9,416 wounded, and 1,043 missing; total, 12,469. Total loss in the two battles, 14,794.† The loss of rebels in the two battles, as near as can be ascertained from the number of their dead found upon the field, and from other data, will not fall short of the following estimate: Major Davis, assistant inspector-general, who superintends the burial of the dead, reports about 3,000 rebels buried upon the field of Antietam by our own troops. Previous to this, however, the rebels had buried many of their own dead upon the distant portion of the battle-field, which they occupied after the battle—probably at least 500. The loss of the rebels at South Mountain cannot be ascertained with accuracy, but as our troops continually drove them from the commencement of the action, and a much greater number of their dead were seen on the field than of our own men, it is not unreasonable to suppose that their loss was greater than ours. Estimating their killed at 500, the total rebel killed in the two battles would be 4,000, according to the ratio of our own killed and wounded. This would make their loss in wounded 18,742, as nearly as can be determined at this time. The number of prisoners taken by our troops in the two battles will, at the lowest estimate, amount to 5,000. The full returns will no doubt show a larger number. Of these about 1,200 are wounded. This gives the rebel loss in killed and wounded and prisoners 25,542. It will be observed that this does not include their stragglers, the number of whom is said by citizens here to be large. It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops during their brief campaign in Maryland. From the time our troops first encountered the enemy in Maryland until he was driven back into Virginia, we captured 13 guns, 7 caissons, 9 limbers, 2 field forges, 2 caisson bodies, 39 colors, and 1 signal flag. We have not lost a single gun or color on the battle-field of Antietam. Fourteen thousand small-arms were collected, besides the large number carried off by citizens and those distributed on the ground to recruits and other unarmed men arriving immediately after the battle. At South Mountain no collection of small-arms was made, owing to the haste of the pursuit from that point. Four hundred were taken on the opposite side of the Potomac.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 30, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Commanding, &c.:*

GENERAL: Your report of yesterday, giving the results of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, has been received and submitted to the President. These were hard-fought battles, but well-earned and

* See also general reports, pp. 36-94.

† But see revised statement, pp. 184-204.

decided victories. The valor and endurance of your army in the several conflicts which terminated in the expulsion of the enemy from the loyal State of Maryland are creditable alike to the troops and to the officers who commanded them. A grateful country, while mourning the lamented dead, will not be unmindful of the honors due the living.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 19, 1862—8.15 p. m. (Received 8.30 p. m.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

As an act of justice to the merits of that most excellent officer, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, who was eminently conspicuous for his gallantry and ability as a leader in several hard-fought battles in Virginia, and who, in the battle of Antietam Creek, on the 17th instant, was wounded at the head of his corps while leading it forward in action, I most urgently recommend him for the appointment of brigadier-general in the U. S. Army, to fill the vacancy created by the death of the late Brigadier-General Mansfield. This would be but a fit reward for the service General Hooker rendered his country. I feel sure his appointment would gratify the entire army.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 22, 1862.

Brigadier-General THOMAS,
Adjutant-General, U. S. Army:

GENERAL: There will be sent to you, with other trophies of the engagement on Antietam Creek, a battle-flag which was taken by Private Thomas Hare, of Company D, Eighty-ninth Regiment New York Volunteers, in the most gallant manner. Private Hare was afterward killed.

I beg that a copy of this letter may be referred to the Commissioner of Pensions, with the request that he will extend every facility to the family of the deceased in obtaining readily the pension to which they are entitled under the law. I also request that this communication may be laid before the President, with the hope that he will be pleased to ask of Congress to mark their appreciation of the gallantry and devotion of Private Hare by some additional provision for his family, or in any other way in which they may see fit.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
No. 160. } *Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., October 3, 1862.*

The commanding general extends his congratulations to the army under his command for the victories achieved by their bravery at the passes of the South Mountain and upon the Antietam Creek.

The brilliant conduct of Reno's and Hooker's corps, under Burnside, at Turner's Gap, and of Franklin's corps at Crampton's Pass, in which, in the face of an enemy strong in position and resisting with obstinacy, they carried the mountain and prepared the way for the advance of the army, won for them the admiration of their brethren in arms.

In the memorable battle of the Antietam we defeated a numerous and powerful army of the enemy, in an action desperately fought and remarkable for its duration and for the destruction of life which attended it. The obstinate bravery of the troops of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, the dashing gallantry of those of Franklin on the right, the sturdy valor of those of Burnside on the left, and the vigorous support of Porter and Pleasonton, present a brilliant spectacle to our countrymen which will swell their hearts with pride and exultation. Fourteen guns, 39 colors, 15,500 stand of arms, and nearly 6,000 prisoners taken from the enemy, are evidences of the completeness of our triumph. A grateful country will thank this noble army for achievements which have rescued the loyal States of the East from the ravages of the invader and have driven him from their borders.

While rejoicing at the victories which, under God's blessing, have crowned our exertions, let us cherish the memory of our brave companions who have laid down their lives upon the battle-field. Martyrs in their country's cause, their names will ever be enshrined in the hearts of the people.

By command of Major-General McClellan :

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 3.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces at the battle of Crampton's Pass Md.

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
General staff			1				1
5th Maine Infantry	4	1	27				32
1st New Jersey Infantry	7	3	31				41
2d New Jersey Infantry	10	1	44				55
3d New Jersey Infantry	11	2	27				40
4th New Jersey Infantry	1	9	3	23			36
16th New York Infantry		20	1	40			61
18th New York Infantry	1	10	1	40		2	54
27th New York Infantry		6	2	25			33
31st New York Infantry		1		3			4
32d New York Infantry	1	10	3	37			51
95th Pennsylvania Infantry		1		14			15
96th Pennsylvania Infantry	2	18		71			91
2d Vermont Infantry				5			5
4th Vermont Infantry		1		10			11
6th Vermont Infantry			1	2			3
Total	5	108	19	399		2	533

OFFICERS KILLED.

Lieut. Josiah S. Studdeford, Fourth New Jersey.
Capt. William Horsfall, 18th New York.
Lieut. Louis R. Wright, 32d New York.

Maj. Lewis J. Martin, 96th Pennsylvania.
Lieut. John Dougherty, 96th Pennsylvania.

OFFICERS MORTALLY WOUNDED.

Col. Roderick Matheson, 32d New York. | Maj. George F. Lemon, 32d New York.

No. 4.

*Return of Casualties in the Union forces at the battle of South Mountain
(Turner's Pass), Md.*

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

Command,	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
RIGHT WING, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.							
Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE.							
FIRST ARMY CORPS.							
Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. JOHN P. HATCH.*							
(2.) Brig. Gen. ABNER DOUBLEDAY.							
Staff			1				1
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. WALTER PHELPS, Jr.							
22d New York.....		10	1	19			30
24th New York.....		1	3	22			26
30th New York.....		4		5			9
84th New York (14th Militia).....		5		15		8	28
2d U. S. Sharpshooters.....				2			2
Total First Brigade		20	4	63		8	95
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
(1.) Brig. Gen. ABNER DOUBLEDAY.							
(2.) Col. WILLIAM P. WAINWRIGHT.*							
(3.) Lieut. Col. J. WILLIAM HOFMANN.							
7th Indiana				12			12
76th New York.....		2	1	17			20
95th New York.....			3	8		1	12
56th Pennsylvania.....		1		11		3	15
Total Second Brigade		3	4	48		4	59
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. MARSENA R. PATRICK.							
21st New York.....		1		3			4
23d New York.....				6			6
35th New York.....		2		10		1	13
Total Third Brigade		3		19		1	23
<i>Fourth Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. JOHN GIBBON.							
19th Indiana		9	2	35		7	53
2d Wisconsin.....	1	5	1	18		1	26
6th Wisconsin.....		11	1	78		2	92
7th Wisconsin.....		11	2	114		20	147
Total Fourth Brigade.....	1	36	6	245		30	318
Total First Division.....	1	62	15	375		43	496

* Wounded.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. JAMES B. RICKETTS.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. ABRAM DURYEA.							
97th New York		2		3			5
104th New York				1			1
105th New York		1		2			3
107th Pennsylvania		2	1	9			12
Total First Brigade		5	1	15			21
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN.							
26th New York				2			2
94th New York		2	1	1			4
90th Pennsylvania				2			2
Total Second Brigade		2	1	5			8
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. GEORGE L. HARTSUFF.							
12th Massachusetts		1		1			2
83d New York		1		1			2
11th Pennsylvania				2			2
Total Third Brigade		2		4			6
Total Second Division		9	2	24			35
THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. TRUMAN SEYMOUR.							
1st Pennsylvania Reserves	3	7	3	27			40
2d Pennsylvania Reserves		5	1	11			17
5th Pennsylvania Reserves		1		9			10
6th Pennsylvania Reserves		11	1	42			54
13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles)	1	10	2	37			50
Total First Brigade	4	34	7	126			171
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. ALBERT L. MAGILTON.							
4th Pennsylvania Reserves		5		22			27
7th Pennsylvania Reserves		5		7			12
8th Pennsylvania Reserves	1	14	1	33	1		50
Total Second Brigade	1	24	1	62	1		89

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
(1.) Col. THOMAS F. GALLAGHER.*							
(2.) Lieut. Col. ROBERT ANDERSON.							
9th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		10	1	32			43
10th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		4	1	17			22
11th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	2	10	5	25			42
12th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		6	1	18			25
Total Third Brigade	2	30	8	92			132
Total Third Division.....	7	88	16	280		1	392
Total First Army Corps	8	159	33	679		44	923
<i>NINTH ARMY CORPS.</i>							
(1.) Maj. Gen. JESSE L. RENO.†							
(2.) Brig. Gen. JACOB D. COX.							
Staff	1						1
<i>FIRST DIVISION.</i>							
Brig. Gen. ORLANDO B. WILLCOX.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. BENJAMIN C. CHRIST.							
28th Massachusetts			1	6			7
8th Michigan				8			8
17th Michigan		26	4	102			132
79th New York.....				12			12
50th Pennsylvania				3			3
Total First Brigade		26	5	131			162
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. THOMAS WELSH.							
46th New York.....		2	1	6			9
45th Pennsylvania	2	25	5	102			134
100th Pennsylvania		8	2	35			45
Total Second Brigade.....	2	35	8	143			188
<i>Artillery.</i>							
Massachusetts Light, 8th Battery.....		1		4			5
Total artillery.....		1		4			5
Total First Division.....	2	62	13	278			355
<i>SECOND DIVISION.</i>							
Brig. Gen. SAMUEL D. STURGIS.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. JAMES NAGLE.							
9th New Hampshire.....				23		6	29
48th Pennsylvania				11		1	12
Total First Brigade				34		7	41

* Wounded,

† Killed.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. EDWARD FERRERO.							
21st Massachusetts				7			7
35th Massachusetts		3	4	33		23	63
51st New York	1	3		12			16
51st Pennsylvania		3	1	26			30
Total Second Brigade	1	9	5	78		23	116
Total Second Division	1	9	5	112		30	157
THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. ISAAC P. RODMAN.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. HARRISON S. FAIRCHILD.							
89th New York		2	1	17			20
Total First Brigade		2	1	17			20
Total Third Division		2	1	17			20
KANAWHA DIVISION.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. JACOB D. COX.							
(2.) Col. ELIAKIM P. SCAMMON.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
(1.) Col. ELIAKIM P. SCAMMON.							
(2.) Col. HUGH EWING.							
12th Ohio		13	3	44		5	65
23d Ohio		32	8	87		3	130
30th Ohio		17		53			70
Ohio Light Artillery, 1st Battery	1			6			7
Total First Brigade	1	62	11	190		8	272
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. GEORGE CROOK.							
11th Ohio		7	3	31		3	44
28th Ohio		3		12			15
36th Ohio		7		18			25
Total Second Brigade		17	3	61		3	84
Total Kanawha Division	1	79	14	251		11	356
Total Ninth Army Corps	5	152	33	658		41	889
Cavalry Division (Pleasanton)		1					1
Total	13	312	66	1,337		85	1,813

OFFICERS KILLED.

NEW YORK.

Lieut. Charles F. Springweiler, 51st Infantry.

OHIO.

Lieut. George L. Crome, 1st Battery.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Capt. Thomas P. Dwin, 1st Reserves.
 Lieut. John D. Saddler, 1st Reserves.
 Lieut. John H. Taylor, 1st Reserves.
 Lieut. William M. Carter, 8th Reserves.
 Capt. Evans R. Brady, 11th Reserves.

Lieut. Walter F. Jackson, 11th Reserves.
 Lieut. Charles Bitterling, 13th Reserves.
 Lieut. George D. Smith, 45th Infantry.
 Lieut. James M. Cole, 45th Infantry.

UNITED STATES.

Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno.

WISCONSIN.

Capt. Wilson Colwell, 2d Infantry.

OFFICERS MORTALLY WOUNDED.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Lieut. Charles F. Williams, jr., 35th Infantry.

MICHIGAN.

Lieut. George R. Galligan, 17th Infantry.

OHIO.

Capt. William W. Liggett, 12th Infantry.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Capt. Nathaniel Nesbitt, 11th Reserves.
 Capt. William P. Grove, 45th Infantry.

Lieut. Samuel Fair, 51st Infantry.

No. 5.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces at the battle of Antietam, Md.

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
FIRST ARMY CORPS.							
(1.) Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER.* (2.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE.							
Staff			1				1
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. ABNER DOUBLEDAY.							
First Brigade.							
Col. WALTER PHELPS, Jr.							
22d New York	1	1	1	27			30
24th New York		3	2	13		1	19
30th New York		6		5		1	12
84th New York (14th Militia)		6	1	20			27
2d U. S. Sharpshooters.	3	10	3	48		2	66
Total First Brigade	4	26	7	113		4	154
Second Brigade.							
Lieut. Col. J. WILLIAM HOFMANN.							
7th Indiana			1	3			4
76th New York			3	1			4
95th New York				1			1
56th Pennsylvania				1			1
Total Second Brigade			4	6			10
Third Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. MARSENA R. PATRICK.							
21st New York		12	2	55		2	71
23d New York		4	1	34		3	42
35th New York	1	7	5	50		4	67
80th New York (20th Militia)	1	5	2	38		8	54
Total Third Brigade	2	28	10	177		17	234
Fourth Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. JOHN GIBBON.							
10th Indiana	1	12	1	58			72
2d Wisconsin		19	6	61			86
6th Wisconsin	3	23	5	121			152
7th Wisconsin		10		23		5	38
Total Fourth Brigade	4	64	12	263		5	348
Artillery.							
Capt. J. ALBERT MONROE.							
New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery				3			3
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery D.		3		7		8	18

* Wounded September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Artillery—Continued.							
1st New York Light, Battery L.....				5			5
4th United States, Battery B.....		9	1	30			40
Total artillery.....		12	1	45		8	66
Total First Division.....	10	130	34	604		34	812
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. JAMES B. RICKETTS.							
First Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. ABRAM DURYEA.							
97th New York	1	23	2	72		9	107
104th New York	1	6	3	57		15	82
105th New York	1	8	3	51		11	74
107th Pennsylvania		19	1	44			64
Total First Brigade	3	56	9	224		35	327
Second Brigade.							
Col. WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN.							
26th New York		5		41		20	66
94th New York				12		1	13
88th Pennsylvania		10	8	54		5	77
90th Pennsylvania		13	5	77		3	98
Total Second Brigade.....		28	13	184		29	254
Third Brigade.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE L. HARTSUFF.*							
(2.) Col. RICHARD COULTER.							
Staff			1				1
12th Massachusetts	3	46	10	155		10	224
13th Massachusetts		14	3	116		3	136
83d New York (9th Militia).....		6	3	102		3	114
11th Pennsylvania		13	4	103		4	124
Total Third Brigade	3	79	21	476		20	599
Artillery.							
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F.....		3		8			11
Pennsylvania Light, Battery C.....				11		2	13
Total artillery.....		3		19		2	24
Total Second Division	6	166	43	903		86	1,204
THIRD DIVISION.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE.							
(2.) Brig. Gen. TRUMAN SEYMOUR.							
First Brigade.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. TRUMAN SEYMOUR.							
(2.) Col. R. BIDDLE ROBERTS.							
1st Pennsylvania Reserves.....		5	1	21			27
2d Pennsylvania Reserves.....	2	1	1	20			23

* Wounded September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
First Brigade—Continued.							
5th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	2		7			10
6th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		8	4	57			69
13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles).....	2	3	2	18			25
Total First Brigade.....	5	19	8	123			155
Second Brigade.							
Col. ALBERT L. MACILTON.							
3d Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	11	2	32			46
4th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		5	3	40			48
7th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	2	10	1	59			72
8th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		12	3	41			56
Total Second Brigade.....	3	38	9	172			222
Third Brigade.							
Lieut. Col. ROBERT ANDERSON.							
9th Pennsylvania Reserves.....	1	16		66			83
10th Pennsylvania Reserves.....			1	8			9
11th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		7	2	13			22
12th Pennsylvania Reserves.....		13	2	44		2	61
Total Third Brigade.....	1	36	5	131		2	175
Artillery.							
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery A.....		1		3			4
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B.....				2			2
5th United States, Battery C.....		2		13			15
Total artillery.....		3		18			21
Total Third Division.....	9	96	22	444		2	573
Total First Army Corps.....	25	392	100	1,951		122	2,590
SECOND ARMY CORPS.							
Maj. Gen. EDWIN V. SUMNER.							
Staff.....			2				2
ESCORT.							
9th New York Cavalry, Companies D and K.....				1			1
FIRST DIVISION.							
(1.) Maj. Gen. ISRAEL B. RICHARDSON.*							
(2.) Brig. Gen. JOHN C. CALDWELL.							
(3.) Brig. Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.							
Staff.....			2				2
First Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. JOHN C. CALDWELL.							
5th New Hampshire.....	1	7	10	92		1	111
7th New York.....	1	14	1	45			61
61st New York.....	1	5	2	32		1	41
64th New York.....		8	1	41			50
81st Pennsylvania.....	1	6	3	41			51
Total First Brigade.....	4	40	17	251		2	314

* Wounded September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. THOMAS F. MEAGHER.							
Staff			1				1
29th Massachusetts		7		29		3	39
63d New York	4	31	5	160		2	202
69th New York	4	40	6	146			196
88th New York	2	25	2	73			102
Total Second Brigade	10	103	14	408		5	540
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. JOHN R. BROOKE.							
2d Delaware		12	2	42		2	58
52d New York		4	3	9		2	18
57th New York	3	16	6	73		3	101
66th New York	1	10	1	90		1	103
53d Pennsylvania	1	5	1	17		1	25
Total Third Brigade	5	47	13	231		9	305
<i>Artillery.</i>							
1st New York Light, Battery B		1					1
4th United States, Batteries A and C				3			3
Total artillery		1		3			4
Total First Division	19	191	46	893		16	1,165
SECOND DIVISION.							
(1.) Maj. Gen. JOHN SEDGWICK.*							
(2.) Brig. Gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.							
Staff			2				2
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. WILLIS A. GORMAN.							
15th Massachusetts	3	54	7	231		23	318
1st Minnesota	1	14	4	56		15	90
34th New York	1	32	2	109	1	9	154
82d New York (2d Militia)		21	4	88		15	128
Massachusetts Sharpshooters, 1st Company	2	6		17		1	26
Minnesota Sharpshooters, 2d Company				21		3	24
Total First Brigade	7	127	17	522	1	66	740
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
(1.) Brig. Gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.							
(2.) Col. JOSHUA T. OWEN.							
69th Pennsylvania	2	17	3	55	1	14	92
71st Pennsylvania	1	25	8	87		18	139
72d Pennsylvania	2	36	5	158		36	237
106th Pennsylvania	1	9	3	60		4	77
Total Second Brigade	6	87	19	360	1	72	545
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
(1.) Brig. Gen. NAPOLEON J. T. DANA.*							
(2.) Col. NORMAN J. HALL.							
Staff			2				2
10th Massachusetts	1	7	7	101		80	146

* Wounded September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Third Brigade—Continued.							
20th Massachusetts	1	11	3	81		28	124
7th Michigan	3	36	12	166		4	221
42d New York	2	33	8	119	1	18	181
59th New York	3	45	10	143		23	224
Total Third Brigade	10	132	42	610	1	103	898
Artillery.							
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A		4		15			19
1st United States, Battery I				6			6
Total artillery		4		21			25
Total Second Division	23	350	80	1,513	3	241	2,210
THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM H. FRENCH.							
First Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. NATHAN KIMBALL.							
Staff			1				1
14th Indiana	2	28	9	141			180
8th Ohio	2	30	7	122			161
132d Pennsylvania	2	28	4	110		8	152
7th West Virginia	3	26	4	112			145
Total First Brigade	9	112	25	485		8	639
Second Brigade.							
Col. DWIGHT MORRIS.							
14th Connecticut	2	18	3	85		48	156
108th New York	3	23	2	120		47	195
130th Pennsylvania	1	31	8	138			178
Total Second Brigade	6	72	13	343		95	529
Third Brigade.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. MAX WEBER.*							
(2.) Col. JOHN W. ANDREWS.							
Staff			2				2
1st Delaware	3	28	10	172		17	230
5th Maryland	1	24	4	119		15	163
4th New York	2	42	6	136		1	187
Total Third Brigade	6	94	22	427		33	582
Total Third Division	21	278	60	1,255		136	1,750
UNATTACHED ARTILLERY.							
1st New York Light, Battery G		1		4			5
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G				5			5
Total unattached artillery		1		9			10
Total Second Army Corps	63	820	188	3,671	3	393	5,138

* Wounded September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
FOURTH ARMY CORPS.							
FIRST DIVISION.*							
Maj. Gen. DARIUS N. COUCH.							
Third Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. JOHN COCHRANE.							
65th New York.....				1			1
67th New York.....				1			1
122d New York.....							
23d Pennsylvania.....							
61st Pennsylvania.....			1	4			5
82d Pennsylvania.....				2			2
Total Third Brigade †.....			1	8			9
Total First Division.....			1	8			9
FIFTH ARMY CORPS. ‡							
Maj. Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER.							
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. GEORGE SYKES.							
First Brigade.							
Lieut. Col. ROBERT C. BUCHANAN.							
4th United States.....		3	1	28			32
12th United States, 1st Battalion.....		1		3			4
14th United States, 1st Battalion.....				2			2
14th United States, 2d Battalion.....				1			1
Total First Brigade.....		4	1	34			39
Second Brigade.							
Maj. CHARLES S. LOVELL.							
2d and 10th United States.....		8	1	45		1	55
11th United States.....				1			1
Total Second Brigade.....		8	1	46		1	56
Artillery.							
5th United States, Battery I.....				3			3
Total Second Division.....		12	2	83		1	98
ARTILLERY RESERVE.							
Lieut. Col. WILLIAM HAYS.							
1st Battalion New York Light, Batteries A, B, C, and D.....	1					1	2
1st United States, Battery K.....		4		5			9
Total Artillery Reserve.....	1	4		5		1	11
Total Fifth Army Corps.....	1	16	2	88		2	109

* Not engaged in the battle proper. It reached the field September 18.

† These casualties occurred September 18.

‡ In reserve; only a portion of the corps engaged.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SIXTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj. Gen. WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN.							
Staff.....	1						1
FIRST DIVISION.							
Maj. Gen. HENRY W. SLOCUM.							
First Brigade.							
Col. ALFRED T. A. TORBERT.							
1st New Jersey.....				6			6
2d New Jersey.....		2		7			9
3d New Jersey.....			1				1
4th New Jersey.....				3			3
Total First Brigade.....		2	1	16			19
Second Brigade.							
Col. JOSEPH J. BARTLETT.							
5th Maine.....				5			5
16th New York.....				2			2
96th Pennsylvania.....		1		1			2
Total Second Brigade.....		1		8			9
Third Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. JOHN NEWTON.							
18th New York.....				4			4
31st New York.....			1	2			3
32d New York.....				4			4
95th Pennsylvania.....		1		9			10
Total Third Brigade.....		1	1	19			21
Artillery.							
Capt. EMORY UPTON.							
Maryland Light, Battery A.....		1		11		2	14
2d United States, Battery D.....				2			2
Total artillery.....		1		13		2	16
Total First Division.....		5	2	56		2	65
SECOND DIVISION.							
Maj. Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH.							
First Brigade.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.*							
(2.) Col. AMASA COBB.							
6th Maine.....				2			2
49th Pennsylvania.....				4			4
Total First Brigade.....				6			6

* Assigned to command of First Division, Second Corps, September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Brig. Gen. W. T. H. BROOKS.							
2d Vermont.....				5			5
3d Vermont.....		1		3			4
4th Vermont.....			1	5			6
5th Vermont.....				2			2
6th Vermont.....				8			8
Total Second Brigade.....		1	1	23			25
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. WILLIAM H. IRWIN.							
7th Maine.....	2	10	7	56	2	18	95
20th New York.....	5	33	4	92		11	145
33d New York.....		6	3	38			47
49th New York.....		2	2	19			23
77th New York.....		6	3	23			32
Total Third Brigade.....	7	57	19	228	2	29	342
Total Second Division.....	7	58	20	257	2	29	373
Total Sixth Army Corps.....	8	63	22	313	2	31	439
NINTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE.*							
Brig. Gen. JACOB D. COX.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. ORLANDO B. WILLCOX.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. BENJAMIN C. CHRIST.							
28th Massachusetts.....	1	11	1	26			48
17th Michigan.....		18	9	80			107
79th New York.....		5	2	25			32
59th Pennsylvania.....	1	7	1	45		3	57
Total First Brigade.....	2	41	13	185		3	244
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. THOMAS WELSH.							
8th Michigan.....			4	25		2	31
46th New York.....		2	3	11			16
45th Pennsylvania.....		1		36		1	38
100th Pennsylvania.....				7		1	8
Total Second Brigade.....		3	7	79		4	93
<i>Artillery.</i>							
Massachusetts Light, 8th Battery.....				1			1
Total First Division.....	2	44	20	265		7	338

* General Burnside exercised general command on the left, and General Cox was in immediate command of the corps.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. SAMUEL D. STURGIS.							
First Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. JAMES NAGLE.							
2d Maryland	1	16	4	43	3	67	
6th New Hampshire		4		13	1	18	
9th New Hampshire		10	3	46		59	
48th Pennsylvania	1	7	1	50	1	60	
Total First Brigade	2	37	8	152	5	204	
Second Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. EDWARD FERRERO.							
21st Massachusetts	1	6	3	38		48	
35th Massachusetts	1	47	12	148	6	214	
51st New York	1	18	4	64		87	
51st Pennsylvania	3	18	5	94		120	
Total Second Brigade	6	89	24	344	6	469	
Artillery.							
Pennsylvania Light, Battery D				3		3	
4th United States, Battery E	1	1	1			3	
Total artillery	1	1	1	3		6	
Total Second Division	9	127	33	499	11	679	
THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. ISAAC P. RODMAN.*							
Staff			1			1	
First Brigade.							
Col. HARRISON S. FAIRCHILD.							
9th New York	1	44	8	168	14	235	
89th New York		18	4	73	8	163	
103d New York		24	3	65	25	117	
Total First Brigade	1	86	15	306	47	455	
Second Brigade.							
Col. EDWARD HARLAND.							
8th Connecticut	1	33	10	129	21	194	
11th Connecticut	2	34	1	102		139	
16th Connecticut	4	38	9	134		185	
4th Rhode Island		21	5	72	2	100	
Total Second Brigade	7	126	25	437	23	618	
Artillery.							
5th United States, Battery A				3		3	
Total Third Division	8	212	41	746	70	1,077	

* Wounded September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
KANAWHA DIVISION.							
Col. ELIAKIM P. SCAMMON.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. HUGH EWING.							
12th Ohio		7		26			93
23d Ohio.....		8	1	58		2	69
30th Ohio.....	3	10	1	48	2	16	80
Ohio Light Artillery, 1st Battery							
Gilmore's company West Virginia Cavalry							
Harrison's company West Virginia Cavalry							
Total First Brigade	3	25	2	132	2	18	182
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. GEORGE CROOK.							
11th Ohio.....	1	3	1	11		5	21
28th Ohio.....		2		19			21
36th Ohio.....	1	1		21		2	25
Kentucky Light Artillery, Simmonds' Battery			1	5			6
Total Second Brigade	2	6	2	56		7	73
Total Kanawha Division	5	31	4	188	2	25	255
Total Ninth Army Corps	24	414	98	1,698	2	113	2,349
TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.							
(1.) Maj. Gen. JOSEPH K. F. MANSFIELD.*							
(2.) Brig. Gen. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS.							
Staff	1						1
FIRST DIVISION.							
(1.) Brig. Gen. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS.							
(2.) Brig. Gen. SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.†							
(3.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON.							
Staff			1				1
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
(1.) Brig. Gen. SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD.							
(2.) Col. JOSEPH F. KNIPE.							
10th Maine.....	2	19	4	46		1	72
28th New York.....		2	1	8		1	12
46th Pennsylvania.....	1	5		13			19
124th Pennsylvania.....		5	2	40		17	64
125th Pennsylvania.....	1	27	7	108		2	145
128th Pennsylvania.....	2	24	1	85		6	118
Total First Brigade	6	82	15	300		27	430
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
(1.) Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON.							
(2.) Col. THOMAS H. RUGER.							
27th Indiana.....	1	17	5	186			209
2d Massachusetts.....		12	4	52		2	70
13th New Jersey.....	1	6	3	72		19	101
107th New York.....		7	2	49		5	63

* Killed.

† Wounded.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Third Brigade—Continued.							
Zouaves d'Afrique, Pennsylvania.....				2	1	3	
3d Wisconsin	1	26	7	166		200	
Total Third Brigade	3	68	21	527	27	646	
Total First Division	9	150	37	827	54	1,077	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. GEORGE S. GREENE.							
First Brigade.							
(1.) Lieut. Col. HECTOR TYNDALE.*							
(2.) Maj. ORRIN J. CRANE.							
5th Ohio		11	2	33	2	48	
7th Ohio		5	1	32		38	
66th Ohio		1	1	22		24	
28th Pennsylvania	2	42	9	208	5	266	
Total First Brigade	2	59	13	295	7	376	
Second Brigade.							
Col. HENRY J. STAINROOK.							
3d Maryland		1	2	23	3	29	
102d New York	1	4		27	5	37	
111th Pennsylvania	1	25	5	71	8	110	
Total Second Brigade	2	30	7	121	16	176	
Third Brigade.							
(1.) Col. WILLIAM B. GOODRICH.†							
(2.) Lieut. Col. JONATHAN AUSTIN.							
3d Delaware	1	5	2	9		17	
Purnell Legion, Maryland.....		3	3	20		26	
60th New York	1	3		18		22	
78th New York	1	7	1	18	7	34	
Total Third Brigade	3	18	6	65	7	99	
Total Second Division	7	107	26	481	30	651	
Artillery.							
Capt. CLERMONT L. BEST.							
1st New York Light, Battery M				6		6	
Pennsylvania Light, Battery E		1		6	1	8	
Pennsylvania Light, Battery F				3		3	
Total artillery		1		15	1	17	
Total Twelfth Army Corps	17	258	63	1,323	85	1,746	
CAVALRY DIVISION.							
Brig. Gen. ALFRED PLEASANTON.							
First Brigade.							
Maj. CHARLES J. WHITING.							
5th United States				1		1	
Total First Brigade				1		1	

* Wounded September 17.

† Killed September 17.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. JOHN F. FARNSWORTH.							
8th Illinois.....				1			1
3d Indiana.....				5			5
Total Second Brigade.....				6			6
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. RICHARD H. RUSH.							
4th Pennsylvania.....	1	2		7			10
6th Pennsylvania.....				3			3
Total Third Brigade.....	1	2		10			13
<i>Artillery.</i>							
2d United States, Battery A.....		1		3			4
2d United States, Battery M.....		2		3			5
Total Artillery.....		3		6			9
<i>Unattached.</i>							
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry (detachment).....		1					1
Total cavalry division.....	1	6		23			30

RECAPITULATION.

First Army Corps.....	25	392	100	1,951	122	2,590
Second Army Corps.....	63	820	188	3,671	393	5,138
Fourth Army Corps (First Division).....			1	8		9
Fifth Army Corps.....	1	16	2	88	2	109
Sixth Army Corps.....	8	63	22	313	2	439
Ninth Army Corps.....	24	414	98	1,698	2	2,349
Twelfth Army Corps.....	17	258	63	1,323	85	1,746
Cavalry Division.....	1	6		23		30
Total Army of the Potomac.....	139	1,969	474	9,075	7	12,410

OFFICERS KILLED.

CONNECTICUT.

Lient. Marvin Wait, 8th Infantry.	Capt. John L. Drake, 16th Infantry.
Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, 11th Infantry.	Capt. Newton S. Manross, 16th Infantry.
Capt. John Griswold, 11th Infantry.	Capt. Samuel Brown, 16th Infantry.
Capt. Samuel Willard, 14th Infantry.	Lieut. William Horton, 16th Infantry.
Capt. Jarvis E. Blinn, 14th Infantry.	

DELAWARE.

Capt. James Leonard, 1st Infantry.	Capt. Evan S. Watson, 1st Infantry.
Capt. James Rickards, 1st Infantry.	Capt. William H. Plunkett, 3d Infantry.

INDIANA.

Lieut. Porter B. Lundy, 14th Infantry.	Lieut. Col. Alois O. Bachman, 19th Infantry.
Lieut. Levins E. Bostwick, 14th Infantry.	Lieut. William Vanorsdall, 27th Infantry.

MAINE.

Lieut. Charles A. Goodwin, 7th Infantry.	Capt. Nehemiah T. Furbish, 10th Infantry.
Lieut. Harlan P. Brown, 7th Infantry.	Lieut. William Wade, 10th Infantry.

MARYLAND.

Capt. Malcolm Wilson, 2d Infantry.	Lieut. Magnus Moltke, 5th Infantry.
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MASSACHUSETTS.

Capt. John Saunders, 1st Company Sharpshooters.	Capt. Clark S. Simonds, 15th Infantry.
Lieut. William Berry, 1st Company Sharpshooters.	Capt. Richard Derby, 15th Infantry.
Lieut. Lysander F. Cushing, 12th Infantry.	Lieut. Frank S. Corbin, 15th Infantry.
Lieut. William G. White, 12th Infantry.	Maj. George W. Batchelder, 19th Infantry.
Aast. Surg. Albert A. Kendall, 12th Infantry.	Surg. Edward H. R. Revere, 20th Infantry.
	Lieut. Henry C. Holbrook, 21st Infantry.
	Lieut. Nichols J. Barrett, 28th Infantry.
	Capt. Albert W. Bartlett, 35th Infantry.

MICHIGAN.

Capt. J. Henry Turrill, 7th Infantry.	Lieut. John P. Eberhard, 7th Infantry.
Lieut. John A. Clarke, 7th Infantry.	

MINNESOTA.

Capt. Gustavus A. Holzborn, 1st Infantry.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Lieut. George A. Gay, 5th Infantry.

NEW JERSEY.

Capt. Hugh C. Irish, 13th Infantry.

NEW YORK.

Maj. Albert Arndt, 1st Battalion Light Artillery.	Capt. Manton C. Angell, 61st Infantry.
Capt. John S. Downs, 4th Infantry.	Capt. John Kavanagh, 63d Infantry.
Lieut. Henry K. Chapman, 4th Infantry.	Lieut. Patrick W. Lydon, 63d Infantry.
Lieut. Hugo Loetze, 7th Infantry.	Lieut. Cadwalader Smith, 63d Infantry.
Lieut. Edward C. Cooper, 9th Infantry.	Lieut. Henry McConnell, 63d Infantry.
Lieut. Gustav A. Lorenz, 20th Infantry.	Lieut. Frederick M. Crissey, 66th Infantry.
Lieut. Jacob Pabst, 20th Infantry.	Capt. Felix Duffy, 69th Infantry.
Lieut. Charles Voelker, 20th Infantry.	Lieut. John Conway, 69th Infantry.
Lieut. Adolph Frick, 20th Infantry.	Lieut. Patrick J. Kelly, 69th Infantry.
Lieut. Louis Kraus, 20th Infantry.	Lieut. Charles Williams, 69th Infantry.
Lieut. Charles Cushing, 22d Infantry.	Capt. Peter M. G. Mitchell, 78th Infantry.
Lieut. Clarence E. Hill, 34th Infantry.	Lieut. Martin H. Swarthout, 80th Infantry.
Capt. James R. Barnett, 35th Infantry.	Capt. John O'C. Joyce, 88th Infantry.
Capt. Charles McPherson, 42d Infantry.	Capt. Patrick F. Clooney, 88th Infantry.
Lieut. Samuel Dexter, 42d Infantry.	Lieut. Louis Delormi, 97th Infantry.
Lieut. Andrew L. Fowler, 51st Infantry.	Capt. M. Eugene Cornell, 102d Infantry.
Lieut. Col. Philip J. Parisen, 57th Infantry.	Capt. John Kelly, 104th Infantry.
Lieut. Henry A. Folger, 57th Infantry.	Lieut. Charles C. Buckley, 105th Infantry.
Lieut. Henry H. Higbee, 57th Infantry.	Maj. George B. Force, 108th Infantry.
Lieut. Col. John L. Stetson, 59th Infantry.	Lieut. David B. Tarbox, 108th Infantry.
Capt. Charles H. Whitney, 59th Infantry.	Lieut. Robert E. Holmes, 108th Infantry.
Lieut. William H. Smurr, 59th Infantry.	
Col. William B. Goodrich, 60th Infantry.	

OHIO.

Lieut. John Lantry, 8th Infantry.
 Lieut. Horace H. Bill, 8th Infantry.
 Lieut. Col. Augustus H. Coleman, 11th Infantry.

Lieut. Charles Duffield, 30th Infantry.
 Lieut. Reese R. Furbay, 30th Infantry.
 Lieut. Stephen B. Wilson, 30th Infantry.
 Col. Melvin Clarke, 36th Infantry.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Col. James H. Childs, 4th Cavalry.
 Lieut. Augustus T. Cross, 2d Reserves.
 Lieut. Max Weimpfheimer, 2d Reserves.
 Capt. Florentine H. Straub, 3d Reserves.
 Lieut. Hardman P. Petrikin, 5th Reserves.
 Capt. James M. Colwell, 7th Reserves.
 Lieut. Daniel L. Saunders, 7th Reserves.
 Lieut. John Langbien, 9th Reserves.
 Col. Hugh W. McNeil, 13th Reserves.
 Lieut. William Allison, 13th Reserves.
 Capt. Peter F. Laws, 28th Infantry.
 Lieut. Joseph L. Markley, 28th Infantry.
 Capt. George A. Brooks, 46th Infantry.
 Lieut. William Cullen, 48th Infantry.
 Capt. James B. Ingham, 50th Infantry.
 Lieut. Col. Thomas S. Bell, 51st Infantry.
 Lieut. J. Gilbert Beaver, 51st Infantry.
 Lieut. Davis Hunsicker, 51st Infantry.

Lieut. John D. Weaver, 53d Infantry.
 Capt. Francis V. Bierworth, 69th Infantry.
 Lieut. Joseph McHugh, 69th Infantry.
 Lieut. John Convery, 71st Infantry.
 Capt. Peter H. Willits, 72d Infantry.
 Lieut. Adolphus W. Peabody, 72d Infantry.
 Lieut. William H. Van Dike, 81st Infantry.
 Lieut. William Bryan, 106th Infantry.
 Capt. Arthur Corrigan, 111th Infantry.
 Lieut. Robert M. Johnston, 125th Infantry.
 Col. Samuel Croasdale, 128th Infantry.
 Capt. William H. Andrews, 128th Infantry.
 Lieut. William A. Givler, 130th Infantry.
 Col. Richard A. Oakford, 132d Infantry.
 Lieut. Anson C. Cranmer, 132d Infantry.

UNITED STATES REGULARS.

Lieut. William L. Baker, Battery E, 4th Artillery.

Surg. William J. H. White.

UNITED STATES VOLUNTEERS.

Maj. Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield.
 Lieut. Lewis C. Parmelee, 2d Sharpshooters.

Lieut. John I. Whitman, 2d Sharpshooters.
 Lieut. John W. Thompson, 2d Sharpshooters.

WEST VIRGINIA.

Capt. Daniel C. M. Shell, 7th Infantry.
 Lieut. James Schwarz, 7th Infantry.

Lieut. Benjamin L. Shriver, 7th Infantry.

WISCONSIN.

Lieut. Alexander N. Reed, 3d Infantry.
 Capt. Edwin A. Brown, 6th Infantry.

Capt. Werner von Bachele, 6th Infantry.
 Lieut. William J. Bode, 6th Infantry.

OFFICERS MORTALLY WOUNDED.

CONNECTICUT.

Lieut. Edwin G. Main, 8th Infantry.
 Lieut. George H. D. Crosby, 14th Infantry.

Capt. Frederick M. Barber, 16th Infantry.

INDIANA.

Lieut. Edward Ballenger, 14th Infantry.
 Capt. Peter Kop, 27th Infantry.

Lieut. Robert B. Gilmore, 27th Infantry.

MAINE.

Lieut. George W. True, 10th Infantry.

MARYLAND.

Capt. James A. Martin, 2d Infantry.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Lieut. Col. Wilder Dwight, 2d Infantry.
Maj. Elisba Burbank, 12th Infantry.
Lieut. George W. Orne, 12th Infantry.

Lieut. Thomas J. Spurr, 15th Infantry.
Capt. Horace Niles, 35th Infantry.
Lieut. William Palmer, 35th Infantry.

MICHIGAN.

Capt. Allen H. Zacharias, 7th Infantry. | Lieut. William M. Duffield, 17th Infantry.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Lieut. Charles W. Bean, 5th Infantry.

NEW YORK.

Capt. Charles Huesler, 7th Infantry.
Capt. Robert Merkle, 20th Infantry.
Lieut. Louis Roth, 20th Infantry.
Lieut. Christian Lohman, 20th Infantry.
Capt. Edward H. Wade, 59th Infantry.
Capt. Abraham Florentine, 59th Infantry.
Capt. Miller Moody, 59th Infantry.
Capt. Gould J. Jennings, 59th Infantry.
Lieut. Stephen C. Roosa, 59th Infantry.
Lieut. Benjamin Vansteinberg, 59th Infantry.

Lieut. James E. Mackey, 63d Infantry.
Lieut. George Lynch, 63d Infantry.
Capt. Timothy L. Shanley, 69th Infantry.
Lieut. Pierson B. Peterson, 78th Infantry.
Capt. David Myers, 84th Infantry.
Lieut. Garret Van Ingen, 89th Infantry.
Capt. Henry A. Sand, 103d Infantry.
Col. Howard Carroll, 105th Infantry.

OHIO.

Lieut. William Delany, 8th Infantry. | Lieut. Charles W. Barnes, 8th Infantry.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Capt. Daniel Kistler, jr., 11th Reserves.
Capt. John Reed, 11th Infantry.
Lieut. Arnold Lobaugh, 11th Infantry.
Lieut. James Dunn, 69th Infantry.
Lieut. William Wilson, 71st Infantry.

Capt. Edward G. Roussel, 72d Infantry.
Lieut. Robert I. Parks, 72d Infantry.
Capt. Philip R. Schnyler, 81st Infantry.
Capt. Timothy Clarke, 106th Infantry.
Lieut. Isaac Finch, 124th Infantry.

UNITED STATES VOLUNTEERS.

Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson. | Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman.

WEST VIRGINIA.

Lieut. John Garvey, 7th Infantry.

WISCONSIN.

Lieut. Oliver W. Sanford, 2d Infantry. | Lieut. Joseph P. Shepard, 3d Infantry.

No. 6.

Return of Casualties in the Union forces in the skirmishes at Sharpsburg, Shepherdstown Ford, and near Williamsport, Md., September 19, action near Shepherdstown, Va., September 20, 1862, and general summary for the campaign.

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
2d District of Columbia Infantry.....				2			2
2d Maine Infantry.....				2			2
20th Maine Infantry.....				3			3
18th Massachusetts Infantry.....		2		10	2		14
22d Massachusetts Infantry.....				2			2
32d Massachusetts Infantry.....				2			2
1st Michigan Infantry.....		1		1		2	4
4th Michigan Infantry.....		1	1	5			7
5th New York Infantry.....				1			1
12th New York Infantry.....				1			1
13th New York Infantry.....			1	5		12	18
25th New York Infantry.....				3		9	12
44th New York Infantry.....				2			2
83d Pennsylvania Infantry.....				1			1
118th Pennsylvania Infantry*.....	3	60	4	97	3	102	269
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Battery C.....						1	1
5th U. S. Cavalry.....				1			1
2d U. S. Artillery, Battery M.....				1			1
3d U. S. Artillery, Batteries C and G.....				1			1
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery I.....		1		1			2
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery K.....				1			1
1st and 6th U. S. Infantry.....				2			2
2d and 10th U. S. Infantry.....		1		2			3
11th U. S. Infantry.....				3			3
17th U. S. Infantry.....				1			1
1st U. S. Sharpshooters.....		2		5			7
Total.....	3	68	6	155	3	128	363

GENERAL SUMMARY.

Engagements, &c.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Skirmishes at Falls Church, Va., September 3 and 4.....		2		1			3
Skirmish at Poolesville, Md., September 8.....		1	1	11			13
Skirmishes at Sugar Loaf Mountain, Md., September 10 and 11.....		1		1			2
Skirmishes at Frederick City, Md., September 12.....		2		1	1	11	15
Skirmishes at Catoclin Mountain, Middletown, Jefferson, and South Mountain, Md., September 13.....		5	1	21		5	32
Battle of South Mountain (Turner's Pass), September 14.....	13	312	66	1,337		85	1,813
Battle of Crampton's Pass, Md., September 14.....	5	108	19	399		2	533
Skirmish at Boonsborough, Md., September 15.....		1	1	14		3	19
Battle of Antietam, Md., September 16 and 17.....	139	1,969	474	9,075	7	746	12,410
Skirmishes at Sharpsburg, Shepherdstown Ford, and near Williamsport, Md., September 19, and action near Shepherdstown, Va., September 20.....	3	68	6	155	3	128	363
Total.....	160	2,469	568	11,015	11	980	15,203

* Capts. Joseph W. Ricketts and Courtland Saunders and Lieut. Joseph Moro Moss killed at Shepherdstown September 20.

No. 7.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of operations September 5-20.

ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 6, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the general operations of the artillery of the Army of the Potomac, from the date of my appointment as chief of artillery, September 5, 1862, to the close of the Maryland campaign. The report, although it embraces the whole period of the campaign, must be necessarily brief, and, as regards battles, general, as the reports of action were made by battery commanders mostly to division and corps commanders.

On assuming the command, I found the artillery much disorganized. The batteries of the Army of the Potomac reached Aquia Creek from the Peninsula, drivers and horses in one class of transports, the batteries and cannoners in another; consequently Major-General Porter, who directed that every energy should be employed in organizing the troops to move up the Rappahannock, ordered that as rapidly as batteries could be equipped they should be pushed forward, without regard to the troops with which they belonged. They were accordingly forwarded as fast as completed to Falmouth, where they were assigned to whatever divisions were ready to march. A number of the batteries of the Artillery Reserve then became separated from their command, and attached to troops not only of the Army of the Potomac, but to those of the Army of Virginia; and when I reached Falmouth from Aquia Creek, where I had been left in charge of the debarkation, I found that General Porter had gone forward, and I reported to General Burnside with the remainder.

When the army left Washington, I was compelled to obtain on the roads the names and condition of the batteries and the troops to which they were attached. Not only were the batteries of the Army of the Potomac dispersed as stated, and serving with other divisions than their own, but I had no knowledge of the artillery of the corps that had joined from the other armies other than what I could pick up on the road. Many had not been refitted since the August campaign; some had lost more or less guns; others were greatly deficient in men and horses, and a number were wholly unserviceable from all these causes combined.

The first measures were directed to procuring supplies of ammunition, and several hundred wagon-loads were, when we were at Rockville, ordered to be forwarded from the arsenal at Washington. Batteries were supplied from the Artillery Reserve to the corps and divisions deficient in guns. Horses were taken from the baggage train and men temporarily detailed from the infantry, and by the time the artillery reached the Antietam it was (considering the condition in which the disastrous campaign in August had left it) very respectably provided. Like the rest of the army, the artillery may be said to have been organized on the march and in the intervals of conflict.

The horse artillery, consisting of Gibson's, Tidball's, Robertson's, and Hains' (late Benson's) batteries, were attached to the cavalry, and, under the orders of Brigadier-General Pleasonton, were actively and efficiently employed throughout the entire campaign. On the 13th of September the enemy attempted to stop the march of our columns between Hamburg and Middletown. His guns were silenced and his force driven off by Gibson's and Hains' batteries, and followed up to a point a mile beyond Middletown, where he again attempted to make a stand, with the

same results. The horse artillery was also partially engaged at South Mountain, on the roads to Boonsborough, Hagerstown, Sharpsburg, and in various affairs in front and on the flanks of the army, and always discharged its duties in a manner worthy of the reputation it had acquired in similar service. Its duties were arduous, requiring constant watchfulness, enterprise, and labor on the part of officers and men, and the horses, often on scant forage, were in harness for a week or ten days, day and night. For special information on these parts of their service, I beg leave to refer to the reports of the commanders of cavalry under whom they served.

At the battle of South Mountain (September 14), Gibson's, Benjamin's, Stewart's, and McMullin's batteries were engaged and rendered excellent service. Stewart's battery being attached to Gibbon's brigade in its attack on the enemy on the right of the National road, one of McMullin's sections was moved by hand to the top of South Mountain under a severe fire, and opened at close range on the enemy. In this affair Lieutenant Crome, commanding the section, was killed.

From the artillery of General Franklin's command in the battle at Crampton's Pass I have received no reports. They were made to division commanders.

On the evening of September 15, the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire on our advance near the Antietam, and were replied to by a portion of our own, particularly by Tidball's battery of horse artillery, which maintained a cannonade against a largely superior force of the enemy's guns from early in the afternoon until near dark.

At sunset I received orders from Major-General McClellan in person to select places for our guns of position. They were posted next morning, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, commanding the Artillery Reserve, on the positions indicated—the long ridge on the eastern branch of the Antietam, overlooking the field of battle of the next day. Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleiser's, and Wever's batteries were placed on the ridge between the turnpike bridge and the house occupied as general headquarters (Pry's). The enemy soon opened upon them. The fire was promptly returned, and the enemy ceased his fire and withdrew his guns. In this cannonade Maj. Albert Arndt, commanding the First (German) Battalion New York Artillery, an experienced and excellent officer, was mortally wounded while personally directing one of his guns, and died on the 18th.

During the afternoon Taft's and Von Kleiser's batteries were moved to the heights below the bridge. At daylight on the 17th, Hazlett's battery was placed in the position occupied on the day before by Taft's; Durell's and Weed's were stationed farther down on the crest; Kusse-row's on the height overlooking the bridge and sweeping its approaches; Benjamin's still farther to the left and rear, overlooking Sharpsburg and the country below it, and near Benjamin's were planted a couple of rifle boat howitzers. These completed the line of guns of position. They overlooked the enemy, and swept most of the ground between them and our troops. They were well served, especially the guns of Benjamin's battery. Their field of fire was extensive, and they were usefully employed all day, and so constantly that the supply of ammunition for the 20-pounders ran short.

In the course of the afternoon a rifled battery of the Reserve Artillery was asked for by General Hancock, who succeeded General Richardson in the command of his division when the latter was wounded. There was none disposable; all were actively engaged or had been detached to other points, but Graham's light 12's were sent instead. This bat-

tery was placed in position under difficult circumstances, and beautifully handled by Captain Graham under a severe fire, in which he lost heavily in men and horses. Colonel Hays, under whose observation the service was rendered, has recommended Captain Graham and Lieutenant Elder, his first lieutenant, for a brevet, in which I concur.

The horse artillery accompanied the cavalry, and occupied the gap in the center of the line of battle, between Hancock's division and Burnside's corps, and became warmly engaged with the enemy.

On the 19th instant the horse artillery accompanied the cavalry in pursuit of the enemy. They were closely followed by the Reserve Artillery under Colonel Hays, a number of whose batteries took part in the artillery combat between the batteries on opposite sides of the Potomac. The enemy's gunners and their supports being driven off, a small body of our infantry crossed the river and secured six of the abandoned guns. As these operations took place under the immediate orders of General Porter, I respectfully refer you to his report for the particulars.

The artillery attached to the divisions performed their duties creditably and gallantly, and there were many instances of desperate fighting. The enemy repeatedly attempted to carry our batteries, but were in every instance driven back, a circumstance due in a great degree to the care taken in posting their supports.

I have to acknowledge the services in this campaign of Lieut. E. R. Warner, Third Artillery, my assistant adjutant-general, and the only officer on my staff. He was zealous and indefatigable in his labors to ascertain and provide for the deficiencies of the batteries, and performed his duties gallantly on the field.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, commanding the Reserve Artillery and batteries of position, performed his duties with his usual skill, judgment, and effect. His reputation is too well established to require further commendation from me.

Lieut. W. D. Fuller, Third Artillery, in charge of the reserve ammunition column, is entitled to special credit for his energy in organizing the train and bringing it forward from Washington. Upon his labors depended the supply of ammunition not only to the reserve, but to most of the division batteries on the field, and he did his work thoroughly and efficiently.

The conclusion of the battle left the artillery of the army scant of men, of horses, of ammunition, of supplies of every description. The greater portion of the batteries had, before entering on this campaign, neither the time nor the opportunity to repair the losses and damages or replace the expenditures of the previous one. An almost complete reorganization and reassignment was necessary. All efforts were immediately directed to placing them in condition again to take the field. Notwithstanding these efforts, they were not fully prepared when the army crossed the Potomac, and large portions of the supplies they required were not received until after they reached this place. To the constant employment of the battery officers, chiefs of artillery, and myself in the performance of these, the most important and necessary duties at the time, must be attributed my inability to prepare a more complete or satisfactory report of the artillery operations of the campaign.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY J. HUNT,

Brig. Gen. Vols., Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,

(Late) Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

No. 8.

Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division, of operations September 4-17.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Camp near Sharpsburg, September 19, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of service performed by this division in the late operations of the Army of the Potomac, comprehending the expulsion of the enemy from Maryland:

On the 4th instant the command moved from Falls Church, on the south side of the Potomac, passed over the Aqueduct Bridge to Tenallytown, and from thence proceeded to reconnoiter all the fords on the Potomac as far as Seneca Mills, finally assuming a position at Muddy Run. This occupied the 4th, 5th, and 6th instant.

On the 6th instant the First New York Cavalry moved to Middleburg, and sent four companies to occupy Clarksburg, at the same time scouting the country to Hyattstown. The First U. S. Cavalry proceeded to Brookville, to scout in the direction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The Eighth Illinois and Third Indiana Cavalry moved the same day in advance of Darnestown, picketing the roads in the direction of Poolesville and the fords on the Potomac.

On the 7th instant two squadrons of the Eighth Illinois and two of the Third Indiana, under Major Chapman, of the Third Indiana, made a dash on Poolesville and captured two cavalry vedettes, all of the enemy in the town at the time. The next day, the 8th instant, Colonel Farnsworth moved his command—the Eighth Illinois, Third Indiana, and a section of horse artillery of Company M, Second Artillery, under First Lieutenant Chapin—to occupy Poolesville and picket the roads to Conrad's Ferry, Edwards Ferry, Barnesville, and the Monocacy. As this force neared Poolesville, the enemy's cavalry were observed retreating on the road leading to Barnesville, and some squadrons of the Third Indiana pushed after them. They had not proceeded far before the enemy opened a fire from some guns strongly posted on the right of the town. The section of artillery, under Lieutenant Chapin, soon silenced these guns, which made off in the direction of Barnesville. The squadrons of the Third Indiana, under Major Chapman, were now ordered to charge the battery, which was handsomely done, the enemy's cavalry and artillery being driven over 3 miles, when the Eighth Illinois coming up, under Major Medill, the chase was continued until after dark.

In this affair the Third Indiana lost 1 killed and 11 wounded; the Eighth Illinois 1 wounded. The rebel loss amounted to 8 killed, 16 wounded, and 6 prisoners—all cavalry.

On the 9th instant Farnsworth with his command proceeded toward Barnesville, and observing a squadron of the enemy's cavalry near Monocacy Church, he directed Captain Farnsworth's squadron, of the Eighth Illinois, to gain their rear and cut them off. This movement succeeded in dividing the enemy and in capturing their battle-flag (that of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, called the Ashby Cavalry), besides several prisoners. The march being continued toward Barnesville, Captain Kelley's squadron, Eighth Illinois, being in advance, encountered the enemy's vedettes on the edge of the village. A dash was made on them through the village and some 2 miles beyond, the troops being engaged twice in a hand-to-hand fight. The day's work resulted in killing 4 of

the enemy, wounding 5, and taking 27 prisoners, while we lost not a man or a horse.

On the 10th instant Captain Sanders, Sixth Cavalry, with a cavalry force and two guns, attempted to dislodge the enemy from the base of Sugar Loaf Mountain, but the latter was too strongly posted to be moved except by a larger force than was at my disposal. Franklin's corps arrived in the afternoon, and on the 11th instant the rebels were soon in retreat, Hancock's brigade, of Franklin's corps, and Farnsworth's brigade of cavalry being the forces engaged.

On the 12th instant Farnsworth's brigade moved by the way of Clarksburg to Frederick City, and also Robertson's and Hains' batteries. The Sixth Cavalry, and a section of artillery, under Captain Sanders, moved to the Monocacy, and was afterward under the orders of Franklin at Jefferson.

About 5 o'clock in the evening I entered Frederick with my command, having been joined by the First New York, under Colonel McReynolds, and a portion of the Twelfth Pennsylvania. The enemy's pickets were driven out of Frederick as we advanced on the Urbana road, while Burnside's corps pushed them on the New Market road, from which direction he entered about half an hour before my advance.

On the morning of the 13th instant McReynolds' brigade, with a section of artillery, was sent in the direction of Gettysburg by orders from your headquarters, while Rush's Lancers joined Franklin's corps at Jefferson. At the same time, after an arrangement with General Burnside as to the manner of proceeding, and in which he most generously offered every assistance, the remainder of my command started at daylight on the Hagerstown turnpike, and had proceeded some 3 or 4 miles when the enemy opened upon the advance with artillery from the ridge to the left of where the road passes over the Catoctin range of the Blue Ridge. Their batteries were supported by dismounted cavalry. A couple of sections from Robertson's and Hains' batteries were immediately opened on our side, and some squadrons of the Eighth Illinois and Third Indiana were dismounted, and sent up the mountain to the right as skirmishers. After a severe cannonading and several warm volleys with carbines, the enemy retreated hastily, having previously barricaded the road in several places. A rapid pursuit was made and a number of prisoners taken, when the enemy made a second stand on the east side of Middletown. Gibson's battery then came up, and soon in beautiful style induced another backward movement. Farnsworth's brigade then advanced, and engaged the cavalry until they were driven beyond the town about 1,000 yards, to a third position they had selected to defend. A section of Gibson's battery engaged them here, and in a few minutes the enemy retreated rapidly to Turner's Gap of the South Mountain; but before doing so they blew up the bridge on the Catoctin Creek, and set fire to the barn and other valuables of the persons residing at that point. As the creek was easily fordable, this did not prevent my advance to the foot of the mountain, which was found to be too strong a position to be carried by my force.

BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

Being soon satisfied that the enemy would defend his position at Turner's Gap with a large force, I sent back to General Burnside for some infantry, and in the intermediate time I caused a force of dismounted cavalry to move up the mountain on the right of the turnpike, to examine the position on that side. This produced some skirmishing

with the enemy, and induced him to mass a considerable force on that side during the night. I learned also that there were two roads, one on the right and the other to the left of the gap, both of which entered the turnpike beyond the gap, and would assist us materially in turning the enemy's position on both flanks. General Burnside's troops did not arrive in time to engage on the 13th, but on the morning of the 14th instant the general kindly sent me a brigade of infantry, under Colonel Scammon, and some heavy batteries. Scammon's brigade I directed to move up the mountain on the left-hand road, gain the crest, and then move to the right to the turnpike in the enemy's rear. At the same time I placed Gibson's battery and the heavy batteries in position to the left, covering the road on that side, and obtaining a direct fire on the enemy's position in the gap.

Shortly after this, General Cox arrived with a second brigade of infantry, and upon my explaining the position to him, he moved to the support of Scammon, who was successful in his movement to gain the crest of the mountain. During the cannonading that was then going on, the enemy's batteries were several times driven from the gap, but the contest assuming on each side large proportions, and Major-General Reno having arrived on the field, I pointed out to him the positions of the troops as I had placed them, giving him at the same time those of the enemy. He immediately assumed the direction of the operations, passed to the front on the mountain height, and was eminently successful in driving the enemy, until he fell at the moment he was gallantly leading his command to a crowning victory. The clear judgment and determined courage of Reno rendered the triumphant results obtained by the operations of his corps second to none of the brilliant deeds accomplished on that field. At his loss a master-mind had passed away.

During this action the First Massachusetts and Third Indiana Cavalry were detached to serve with Hooker's corps.

THE PURSUIT.

At daylight on the morning of the 15th, I started in pursuit of the enemy with a part of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry. The advance came up with the enemy's rear guard of cavalry on entering Boonsborough, charged them repeatedly, and drove them some 2 miles beyond the town. A section of Tidball's battery came up at this time and gave them a few shells, when they broke and ran in every direction, leaving two pieces of artillery behind them, 30 dead on the field, some 50 wounded, and a very large number of prisoners, among whom were several hundred stragglers. Our loss was 1 killed and 15 wounded. Among the latter was the brave Captain Kelley, of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, who was shot while gallantly charging at the head of his squadron. In this affair the enemy outnumbered us three to one, and the number of desperate personal encounters that day clearly shows the superiority of our cavalry. Colonel Farnsworth, Captains Kelley, Medill, and First Lieutenant and Adjutant Hynes, of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, were conspicuous for their gallantry on this occasion; also Captain Custer and First Lieutenant Martin, aides-de camp on the staff of General McClellan, and who were serving with me at the time. In obedience to my instructions, I then moved in the direction of Sharpsburg, and came up with Richardson's division in line of battle in advance of Keedysville, the enemy being in position this side of Sharpsburg. General Richardson having no batteries with him, requested of

me Tidball's four guns, to reply to the enemy's batteries, which had opened at four different points of their line. Tidball was soon placed in position, and returned fire, and this was continued at intervals on this and the succeeding day by numerous batteries engaged on both sides.

On the 16th instant my cavalry was engaged in reconnaissances, escorts, and supports to batteries.

THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.

On the morning of the 17th instant, after the commencement of the action on the right, I was directed by Major-General McClellan, verbally, to advance with my division of cavalry and horse batteries of artillery on the turnpike toward Sharpsburg, to some suitable position beyond the bridge over the Antietam Creek, and support the left of Sumner's line of battle with my force.

Finding the enemy had a cross-fire of artillery on the bridge, and that his sharpshooters covered it in front, I first threw forward some cavalry skirmishers, and then advanced Tidball's battery by piece, under a heavy fire, to drive off the sharpshooters with canister. This plan in a short time succeeded in clearing the front sufficiently to obtain positions for Gibson's, Robertson's, Tidball's, and Hains' batteries, who opened on the enemy with great effect, having a direct fire in front and an enfilading fire in front of Sumner's corps on the right, and supporting the right of Burnside's corps on the left, the distance to Sumner's corps being nearly a mile, and something greater to that of Burnside's, my force being the only one in front, connecting the two corps. The fire was kept up over two hours, when the enemy's fire had slackened very much, and my batteries, requiring ammunition, retired by piece and by section to supply themselves, being replaced by Randol's battery and Kusserow's battery, from Sykes' division. I was also indebted to General Sykes for five small battalions of infantry he kindly placed at my disposal, to assist in supporting my position.

The following cavalry supports were to the right and left of my position, viz: The Fifth Regular Cavalry, Farnsworth's brigade, Rush's brigade, and two regiments of the Fifth Brigade, under Colonel Davis, of the Eighth New York. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon three of my batteries, Tidball's, Robertson's, and Hains', returned to their positions, Randol's battery being relieved and Gibson's being placed in position on the right of the road, in rear, to cover the bridge.

The fight was then renewed with increased vigor and energy, the enemy's batteries being soon driven from their position in front of us. At the same time a heavy column of dust could be seen moving behind the Sharpsburg Ridge toward Sumner's left. I directed the fire of the batteries into this dust, and soon the development of the enemy's line of battle, fully a mile long, could be seen bearing down upon Richardson's division on Sumner's left, then commanded by Hancock, Richardson having been badly wounded. The enemy's batteries were also playing heavily upon this division.

At this time Hancock requested some guns to assist him. None could be spared at that moment, but I directed the fire of some eighteen guns upon the enemy's line in front of him for twenty minutes, when we had the satisfaction of seeing this immense line first halt, deliver a desultory fire, and then break and run to the rear in the greatest confusion and disorder. A section of Tidball's battery was immediately advanced to the crest of a hill several hundred yards to the front, and in front of

the infantry of Hancock's left. This was a most favorable position for operating on a battery then in full play upon the center of Sumner's line. The fire from this section contributed in no small degree toward silencing this battery.

It was now 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Burnside's corps had driven the enemy back upon the hill upon which his batteries were placed, and, in conjunction with the repulse of the enemy in front of Hancock, left the field open to the Sharpsburg Ridge, to which point I desired to forward my batteries, to obtain an enfilading fire upon the enemy in front of Burnside, and enable Sumner to advance to Sharpsburg. I was so satisfied that this could be done at that moment, that I sent a request to Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, asking for the assistance of some infantry to support my advance to the Sharpsburg Ridge. This request was not entertained by General Porter, and I have since been informed the force I needed was not then at his disposal. I held my position until 7 o'clock in the evening, when I was withdrawn, by the orders of Major-General McClellan, to the bivouac at Keedysville.

On the 18th instant my cavalry were engaged collecting stragglers and feeling the enemy on the different roads.

On the 19th instant I started in pursuit of the enemy, who had fled to the opposite side of the Potomac. Before reaching the river, I succeeded in capturing 167 prisoners, one gun left behind by the enemy in his haste, and one color.

On arriving near the river on the turnpike, the enemy's batteries opened a heavy fire from several positions below Shepherdstown, covering Blackford's Ford. Gibson's, Tidball's, and Robertson's batteries replied with such effect that the enemy drew off the greater part of his guns. This cannonade lasted about two hours, when, a part of Porter's corps coming up, my command was relieved from this position, and withdrew to camp.

The services of this division from the 4th of September up to the 19th of the same were of the most constant and arduous character. For fifteen successive days we were in contact with the enemy, and each day conflicts of some kind were maintained, in which we gradually but steadily advanced. The officers and men have exerted themselves to insure the success of every expedition, and their efforts have been fortunate, as no mishaps have occurred beyond the casualties incident to such service.

The losses of the division in the campaign were as follows: 17 killed, 78 wounded, and 13 missing, making a total of 108.

The distinguished service rendered by the officers of the horse artillery renders it proper to mention their several names in this report. In Gibson's battery, Third Artillery, there were Capt. H. G. Gibson, First Lieuts. E. Pendleton and H. Meinell, and Second Lieut. F. D. L. Russell, Fourth Artillery. In Robertson's battery, Second Artillery, there were Capt. James M. Robertson and Second Lieut. Albert O. Vincent. In Tidball's battery, Second Artillery, were Capt. John C. Tidball, First Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington, jr., Second Lieuts. William N. Dennison and Robert Clarke. In Hains' battery, Second Artillery, were First Lieut. Peter C. Hains and Second Lieut. Robert H. Chapin.

The officers of the cavalry who are entitled to mention, from their position and gallant service, are as follows:

First Brigade.—Maj. C. J. Whiting commanding, and Capts. J. E. Harrison and Wesley Owens, of the Fifth Cavalry. Sixth Cavalry, Capt. W. P. Sanders commanding, and Capts. George C. Cram and Henry B. Hays, and Lieut. Albert Coats, adjutant.

Second Brigade.—Col. J. F. Farnsworth, Eighth Illinois, commanding; Capts. W. H. Medill, E. S. Kelley, Alpheus Clark, E. J. Farnsworth, J. D. Ludlam; First Lieut. D. J. Hynes, Adj. Daniel W. Buck, Second Lieut. I. W. Trask, of the Eighth Illinois Regiment. Third Indiana Cavalry, Major Chapman; Captains Patton and Lemmon. Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Capt. Peter Keenan. First Massachusetts Cavalry, Captain Crowninshield.

Third Brigade.—Col. R. H. Rush commanding; Lieut. Col. O. Ross Smith, Sixth Pennsylvania Lancers. Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Col. J. H. Childs (who was killed); Lieut. Col. J. K. Kerr.

Fourth Brigade.—Col. A. T. McReynolds commanding, First New York Cavalry; Major Adams, First New York Cavalry; Maj. J. A. Congdon, Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

Fifth Brigade.—Two regiments of which were engaged in the battle of Antietam, under Colonel Davis; Eighth New York, Col. B. F. Davis; Third Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Owen commanding.

A portion of the First Regular Cavalry were under my command in the pursuit of the enemy to the river, and did good service under Capt. Marcus A. Reno.

To the following officers of my staff I am much indebted for their efficient and valuable services: Capt. A. J. Cohen, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieuts. Isaac M. Ward, Sixth Cavalry, and C. Thompson, First New York Cavalry, aides-de-camp; First Lieut. J. W. Spangler, Sixth Cavalry, division quartermaster; First Lieut. J. A. Hall, First Cavalry, division commissary of subsistence. Also to First Lieut. Leroy S. Elbert, Third Cavalry, acting aide-de-camp.

The five small battalions of regular infantry from Sykes' division on the 17th at the battle of Antietam kept a superior force from my guns for the greater part of the day. These men behaved splendidly throughout the fight, and Capt. Hiram Dryer, of the Fourth Infantry, who was in command, distinguished himself by his gallantry and good service. This command was composed of a battalion from each of the following regular regiments, viz: The Second, Fourth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Infantry.

To the Signal Corps and to the members of the special service I have been indebted for important information furnished at various times.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. PLEASANTON,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

No. 9.

Reports of Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army, commanding First Army Corps, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, with congratulations of General McClellan.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,

Washington City, D. C., November 7, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that the First Corps commenced its march from the camp on the Monocacy at daylight on the morning of the 14th September, and continued it over the National

turnpike to the vicinity of Middletown, which place it reached about 1 o'clock p. m. While here I was requested by the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac to ride to the front and examine the country in the neighborhood of where it was proposed to pass the army over South Mountain. The enemy had taken possession of the turnpike and the crests of the mountain, prepared to dispute its passage. On my way I passed Cox's corps, withdrawing from the contest,* and still farther on I came up with some of our batteries, exchanging shots at long distance with some of the rebel batteries posted near the turnpike, and apparently about half way up the slope of the mountain. Still farther on was Reno's corps, moving into position to the south of the turnpike, over what appeared to be a trail, his troops stretching from the summit to the base of the mountain. The general direction of this ridge is perpendicular to the line of the road.

From a point near to where our batteries were placed, I was enabled to make an excellent reconnaissance of the eastern slope, extending far to the north and south of the pike. While here, about 2 o'clock, Meade's division of my corps was ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno, to the right of the turnpike, and soon after I received instructions from the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac to hold my whole corps in readiness to support the First Division. Accordingly, they were all put *en route*, and marched to the base of the foot-hills, where the divisions were deployed for battle as rapidly as they arrived—Meade's division on the right, Hatch's on the left, that of Ricketts' being held in reserve.

The right of Meade's division rested nearly 1½ miles from the turnpike. Williams' First Regiment Massachusetts Cavalry was dispatched higher up the valley, to observe the movements of the enemy, if any, in that direction.

In front of us was South Mountain, the crest of the spinal ridge of which was held by the enemy in considerable force. Its slopes are precipitous, rugged, and wooded, and difficult of ascent to an infantry force, even in absence of a foe in front. The National turnpike crosses the summit of this range of mountains through a gentle depression, and near this point a spur projects from the body of the ridge, and running nearly parallel with it about a mile, where it is abruptly cut by a rivulet from the main ridge, and rises again and extends far to the northward. At and to the north of the pike this spur is separated from the main ridge by a narrow valley, with cultivated fields, extending well up the gentle slope of the hill on each side. Here the enemy had a strong infantry force posted, and a few pieces of artillery. Through the break in the spur at the base of the principal ridge were other cleared fields, occupied by the enemy. Cooper's battery was brought into position on high ground, and opened on the enemy visible on this part of the field. While this battery was moving to its position, and while the infantry were deploying, the enemy threw a few shot from a battery on the side of the mountain, but at long range, producing little or no effect.

As soon as these dispositions were made, and, from my observation, anticipating no important sequence from the attack to the south of the turnpike, it was resolved to move to the assault at once, [which was] commenced with throwing forward a heavy body of skirmishers along my whole line, and directions were given for Meade and Hatch to support them with their divisions. Meade moved forward with great vigor, and soon became engaged, driving everything before him. Every step

* See Burnside's report of January 20, 1863, p. 422.

of his advance was resisted stubbornly by a numerous enemy, and, besides, he had great natural obstacles to overcome, which impeded his advance but did not check it.

From its great elevation and the dense smoke which rose over the top of the forest, the progress of the battle on this part of the field was watched with anxious interest for miles around, and while it elicited the applause of the spectators, they could not fail to admire the steadiness, resolution, and courage of the brave officers and men engaged.

At this moment word was received that the enemy were attempting to turn Meade's right, when Duryea's brigade, Ricketts' division, was dispatched to thwart it, and reached there in good time to render substantial aid in this, and also in assisting their comrades in crowning the summit with our arms. This was taken possession of in fine style between sundown and dark, and from that moment the battle was won. From here we threatened the retreat of the rebels posted between the main ridge and the spur of the mountain, while it commanded the turnpike on both sides of the mountain. On reaching the summit, Meade was ordered to hold it until further orders.

Meantime Hatch had pressed into the forest on the left, and, after driving in their advanced pickets, encountered a heavy fire from the enemy massed in his front. The struggle became violent and protracted, his troops displaying the finest courage and determination. An excellent brigade had been withdrawn from this division by the major-general commanding the right wing without my knowledge, and ordered to advance to the turnpike, but as no report of their operations has been rendered me by General Gibbon, I can only call your attention to their list of casualties; it speaks for itself. Hatch being outnumbered, sorely pressed, and almost out of ammunition, Christian's brigade, Ricketts' division, was ordered forward to strengthen him, and in this rendered good service. On this part of the field the resistance of the enemy was continued until after dark, and only subsided on his being driven from his position. It being very dark, our troops were directed to remain in position, and Hartsuff's brigade was brought up and formed a line across the valley, connecting with Meade's left and Hatch's right, and all were directed to sleep on their arms.

At dawn Hartsuff's skirmishers were thrown forward, supported by his brigade, to the Mountain House, a mounted picket of the enemy retreating as they advanced. The enemy had been re-enforced by twenty regiments of Longstreet's corps during the early part of the night, but between 12 and 1 o'clock commenced a hurried and confused retreat, leaving his dead on our hands and his wounded uncared for.

Notwithstanding we had remained in the undisturbed possession of every foot of ground we had fought on, driven them from one end of our line to the other, and taken upward of a thousand prisoners, with shameful effrontery this field was heralded from the rebels' capital as a victory.

When the advantages of the enemy's position are considered, and his preponderating numbers, the forcing of the passage of South Mountain will be classed among the most brilliant and satisfactory achievements of this army, and its principal glory will be awarded to the First Corps.

I have omitted to mention that Brigadier-General Richardson had reported to me at the head of his splendid division at daylight on the morning of the 15th, and, as it was well in hand, he was directed to pursue the enemy in their hurried retreat, which was promptly executed by that distinguished officer.

The especial attention of the major-general commanding is called to the reports of division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders,

herewith transmitted, as they uniformly bear testimony to the noble conduct of our troops in this battle. To theirs I must add the heartfelt and grateful testimony of their commander.

I must also respectfully refer you to these reports for the evidences of signal and distinguished services on the part of individuals and of corps.

I desire to make special mention of Brigadier General Meade for the great intelligence and gallantry displayed by him. Also Brigadier-General Hatch, who was severely wounded, and Brigadier-General Ricketts and Brigadier-General Doubleday, who rendered me an enlightened and generous assistance.

The limits of a report only allow me to speak in general terms of my brigade, regimental, and battery commanders. Their services were eminently meritorious and satisfactory. I further desire to make my acknowledgments to Brigadier-General Marcy, chief of staff of the Army of the Potomac, for his valuable services. He remained with me throughout the greater part of the engagement. I am also under obligations to Major Hammerstein, aide-de-camp, at the same headquarters, for his assistance and support.

My staff, Lieut. Col. Joseph Dickinson, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. William H. Lawrence, Capt. William L. Candler and Alexander Moore, aides-de-camp, assisted me with their accustomed intelligence and courage.

The list of killed and wounded is herewith respectfully forwarded, numbering 878.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General, Commanding First Corps.

Lieut. Col. LEWIS RICHMOND,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Right Wing, Army of the Potomac.

—
ANTIETAM.†

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Washington, D. C., November 8, 1862.

GENERAL: At dawn the morning following the battle of South Mountain, September 15, Hartsuff's skirmishers, supported by his brigade, were thrown forward, when it was ascertained that the enemy had fallen back from our front, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands, toward Boonsborough, and from thence had taken the road to Sharpsburg.

Soon after Hartsuff's advance, General Richardson, with his brigade of Sumner's corps, was ordered to take the place of Hartsuff, and to proceed in vigorous pursuit, with no other instructions than not to engage the enemy if he overtook him, but await my arrival. Meantime my corps were ordered to make a little coffee and eat their breakfasts, which they had not been able to do since the beginning of their march from the Monocacy, the morning previous. Pleasonton's cavalry followed in the footsteps of Richardson's brigade, and soon after the First Corps resumed its march in pursuit of the enemy.

* But see revised statement, p. 184.

† Unfinished report, found in records of First Corps, Army of the Potomac.

About 10 o'clock a. m. word was received that he had made a stand a mile or more in front of Sharpsburg, and about that distance from Richardson's command. As General-Richardson was without artillery, he had borrowed a section from Pleasonton, and had already opened on the enemy when I reached the field. The rebels appeared to be ostentatiously deployed in two lines, perpendicular to the road leading to Sharpsburg, with his batteries posted to resist the passage of our forces over the bridge which crosses that stream. All of his troops appeared exposed to view, and numbered, as nearly as I could estimate, about 30,000 men. Fully conscious of my weakness in number and *morale*, I did not feel strong enough to attack him in front, even after the arrival of the First Corps, and it was only after the left of the enemy was observed to break into column and march to the rear, behind a forest, on which appeared to be the Williamsport road, that Maj. D. C. Houston, of the Engineers, was dispatched up the river to find practicable fords, by the means of which my troops might be thrown across the Antietam River to attack the enemy, and perhaps cut off his artillery, as soon as his numbers were sufficiently reduced to justify the movement. A bridge was found, and also two fords, which with little labor on the banks were rendered practicable for the passage of infantry and artillery. At 5 o'clock p. m. about one-half of the enemy's infantry force had passed to the rear, when I deemed it too late to make the detour, in order to come up with the enemy, without a night march through a country of which we were profoundly ignorant.

Meanwhile the bulk of the army was arriving in the valley of Antietam, and all the enemy's artillery, with a considerable portion of his infantry, remained in the position in which we had found them in the morning.

Between 1 and 2 o'clock the day following, I received instructions from the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac to cross the river with the First Corps, and attack the enemy on his left flank, Meade's and Ricketts' divisions crossing the bridge near Keedysville, and Doubleday's division at the ford just below it.

As soon as I saw my command under way, I rode to the headquarters of the commanding general for any further orders he might have to give me, when I was informed that I was at liberty to call for re-enforcements if I should need them, and that on their arrival they would be placed under my command, and I returned and joined my troops on their march. Our direction was nearly perpendicular to the river we had crossed, my object being to gain the high ground or divide between the Potomac and Antietam Rivers, and then incline to the left, following the elevation toward the left of the rebel army. Two regiments of Meade's division were thrown forward as skirmishers, followed by a squadron of Owen's cavalry, and all supported by Meade's division. We had not proceeded over a half a mile before the commanding general with his staff joined me, apparently to see how we were progressing. Among other subjects of conversation, I said to the general that he had ordered my small corps, now numbering between 12,000 and 13,000 (as I had just lost nearly 1,000 men in the battle of South Mountain), across the river to attack the whole rebel army, and that if re-enforcements were not forwarded promptly, or if another attack was not made on the enemy's right, the rebels would eat me up. Pretty soon after this interview, my skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's advanced post, and the firing was continued incessantly until dark, we advancing slowly, and the enemy retiring before us. During the last part of the time the

resistance became formidable, and we all slept on our arms that night. The cleared space between the forests necessitated a change in my front from a division to a brigade, and Seymour's command held the advance when night overtook us, and bivouacked in advance of my corps when operations were suspended.

The night becoming dark and drizzly, I sought shelter in Miller's barn, a few yards to the left of the Hagerstown pike (facing the south), and directly in the rear of Seymour's brigade. Desultory firing was kept up between the pickets almost throughout the night, and about 9 o'clock p. m. I visited them in order to satisfy myself concerning this firing, and found that the lines of pickets of the two armies were so near each other as to be able to hear each other walk, but were not visible to each other. I found Seymour's officers and men keenly alive to their proximity to our enemy, and seemed to realize the responsible character of their services for the night. Indeed, their conduct inspired me with the fullest confidence, and on returning to the barn I immediately dispatched a courier informing the commanding general of my surroundings, and assuring him that the battle would be renewed at the earliest dawn, and that re-enforcements should be ordered forward in season to reach me before that moment.

General Mansfield, with his corps, did cross the creek that night, and encamped his command about 1 mile in rear of my own, and in the morning participated actively in the battle. We were now 3 or 4 miles in advance of where we had crossed the Antietam Bridge. At daylight we were fully prepared to renew our march, which lay through orchards, corn-fields, and over plowed ground, skirted on either side by forests, the cleared space between which averaging not more than 400 or 500 yards in width, the field and the object in view narrowing my front to quite a limited degree. Doubleday's division was posted on the right, Ricketts' on the left, and Meade's in reserve. At daylight Gibbon's and Hartstuff's brigades were thrown forward, supported with the brigades of their respective divisions, while Meade followed them up in the center, instructed to spring to the assistance of either, as circumstances might require. Seymour continued to hold the advance, with the utmost firmness and resolution, until our troops had passed him. With these dispositions completed, the battle was soon renewed on the morning of the 17th. My object was to gain the high ground nearly three-quarters of a mile in advance of me, and which commanded the position taken by the enemy on his retreat from South Mountain; to prevent which he had been re-enforced by Jackson's corps during the night, and at the same time had planted field batteries on high ground on our right and rear, to enfilade our lines when exposed during the advance.

We had not proceeded far before I discovered that a heavy force of the enemy had taken possession of a corn-field (I have since learned about a thirty-acre field) in my immediate front, and from the sun's rays falling on their bayonets projecting above the corn could see that the field was filled with the enemy, with arms in their hands, standing apparently at "support arms." Instructions were immediately given for the assemblage of all of my spare batteries, near at hand, of which I think there were five or six, to spring into battery, on the right of this field, and to open with canister at once. In the time I am writing every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before. It was never my fortune to witness a more bloody, dismal battle-field.

Those that escaped fled in the opposite direction from our advance, and sought refuge behind the trees, fences, and stone ledges nearly on a line with the Dunker Church, &c., as there was no resisting this torrent of death-dealing missives. I have since been informed by a division commander of Jackson's corps that the latter was waiting for some stragglers to arrive which had been left during his night march from Harper's Ferry, in anticipation of delivering an attack on my command.

The whole morning had been one of unusual animation to me and fraught with the grandest events. The conduct of my troops was sublime, and the occasion almost lifted me to the skies, and its memories will ever remain near me. My command followed the fugitives closely until we had passed the corn-field a quarter of a mile or more, when I was removed from my saddle in the act of falling out of it from loss of blood, having previously been struck without my knowledge. While my wound was being examined by the surgeons, Sumner's corps appeared upon the field on my immediate right, and I have an indistinct recollection of having seen Sedgwick's division pass to the front. I do not think that I examined my watch that morning, but feel confident as to the time—10 o'clock a. m. I was carried to the rear at once, to the house of Mr. Pry, on the left bank of Antietam Creek.

Throughout the foregoing operations all of my officers and men of all arms, as well as the officers composing my staff, without a solitary exception, seemed to be emulous of each other in their eagerness to learn my wishes and execute my orders.*

[HOOKER.]

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862.

Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER,

Commanding Corps :

MY DEAR HOOKER: I have been very sick the last few days, and just able to go where my presence was absolutely necessary, so I could not come to see you and thank you for what you did the other day, and express my intense regret and sympathy for your unfortunate wound. Had you not been wounded when you were, I believe the result of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the rebel army, for I *know* that, with you at its head, your corps would have kept on until it gained the main road. As a slight expression of what I think you merit, I have requested that the brigadier-general's commission rendered vacant by Mansfield's death may be given to you. I will this evening write a private note to the President on the subject, and I am glad to assure you that, so far as I can learn, it is the universal feeling of the army that you are the most deserving in it.

With the sincere hope that your health may soon be restored, so that you may again be with us in the field, I am, my dear general, your sincere friend,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General.

* Not finished.

No. 10.

Report of Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battle of South Mountain.

MIDDLETOWN, MD., September 15, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division on the 14th instant, from the opening of the action on that day to the time I was compelled to leave the field by a painful, though not dangerous, wound:

On leaving the turnpike to take up position, Gibbon's brigade, the largest in the division, was detached by order of Major-General Burnside, leaving but three brigades, the total effective force of which could not have exceeded 3,500. The Twenty-first New York, under Colonel Rogers, was first thrown forward, deployed as skirmishers, with orders to move up a ravine leading to a low place on the crest of the mountain on my right. The Thirty-fifth New York, under Colonel Lord, was also deployed as skirmishers, and directed to move to the crest of the mountain, connecting on the right with the Twenty-first, and covering the whole front of the division. The remainder of Patrick's brigade was moved to the front, as a support for the two regiments deployed as skirmishers. Through some misunderstanding of the order, Colonel Rogers' regiment, instead of going to the point designated, moved up the mountain in front of the division. Of the further movements of this regiment I have no information up to the time of my leaving the field.

The error of Colonel Rogers being discovered, the Second U. S. Sharpshooters, Colonel Post, were detached from the First Brigade, and proceeded up the ravine to the point indicated. I have received no report from this regiment, but have been informed that it came early into action and rendered very important service during the day. The Thirty-fifth New York, supported by two regiments of Patrick's brigade, moved very slowly up the side of the mountain, followed by the First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Phelps, and the Second, General Doubleday, in line of battle of battalions in mass.

The cause of the delay in the first line can best be explained by General Patrick, whose report, I suppose, has been submitted to the present commander of the division.

To ascertain the cause of the delay, I proceeded to the summit of the mountain, where I was only able to find the Thirty-fifth New York. The two supporting regiments were not to be found. The Thirty-fifth New York was then advanced, supported immediately by the First Brigade. The enemy was found posted behind a fence at the edge of a wood, through which our attacking column was advanced, deployed in line of battle. The firing was very heavy, the enemy making a desperate resistance, and our troops advancing with determined courage.

After about fifteen minutes of heavy firing, a charge was made by the First Brigade, which succeeded in gaining and taking possession of the fence held by the enemy; but the resistance of the enemy being so much more determined than had been anticipated, Doubleday was ordered up to support the First Brigade. At the moment of carrying the fence I myself received a wound, which forced me to leave the field, the command of the division devolving upon General Doubleday. On arriving at the foot of the hill, I requested and obtained from General Ricketts a brigade as a support for General Doubleday.

Subordinate reports not having been received by me, I am only able to

mention as deserving of particular praise such individuals as attracted my own attention. Col. Walter Phelps, jr., Twenty-second New York, commanding First Brigade, displayed the most distinguished courage, bringing up and handling his brigade in the most gallant manner. Major De Bevoise, commanding Fourteenth New York State Militia, gallantly led a gallant regiment, which this day added fresh laurels to those already won. Capt. John D. O'Brian, commanding the brave Twenty-fourth New York, attracted the attention of all by his energy and activity. Capt. James Benkard, jr., additional aide-de-camp of General King's staff, and Lieut. James Lyon, Fourth New York Cavalry, my aide-de-camp, also rendered important services, bearing messages from point to point on the field, and in encouraging and urging on the troops. The latter officer has on several former occasions been mentioned for his gallant bearing under fire, and it is hoped may meet with the advancement he so well deserves.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. P. HATCH,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. JOSEPH DICKINSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, First Corps d'Armée.

No. 11.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FIRST ARMY CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 23, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that this division left the Monocacy at 6 a. m. September 14, and arrived at the Catoctin about 12.30 p. m. Here the column halted until 2.30 p. m., when Brigadier-General Hatch assumed the command, in place of General King, who was assigned to other duty. The enemy's position was on the summit of South Mountain. To avoid the fire of his batteries, the division now diverged from the main road and struck off into a by-road to the right, which led to a stone church at the foot of the mountain, where we found General Hooker and his staff. The division at this time consisted of Doubleday's, Patrick's, and Phelps' (late Hatch's) brigades, General Gibbon having been detached with his brigade on special service.

The general order of battle was for two regiments of Patrick's brigade to precede the main body, deployed as skirmishers, and supported by Patrick's two remaining regiments; these to be followed by Phelps' brigade, 200 paces in the rear, and this in turn by Doubleday's brigade, with the same interval. In accordance with this disposition, General Patrick deployed the Twenty-first New York, under Colonel Rogers, as skirmishers on the right, and the Thirty-fifth New York, under Colonel Lord, on the left, supporting the former with the Twentieth New York Militia, Lieutenant-Colonel Gates, and the latter with the Twenty-third New York, Colonel Hoffman.

By General Hatch's order, Phelps' brigade advanced in column of divisions at half distance, preserving the intervals of deployment. My brigade advanced in the same order. On reaching a road part way up the mountain, and parallel to its summit, each brigade deployed in turn and advanced in line of battle. Colonel Phelps' brigade, owing to an

accidental opening, preceded for a while our line of skirmishers, but soon halted, and advanced in line some 30 paces in their rear. General Patrick rode to the front with his skirmishers, drew the fire of the enemy, and developed their position. They lay behind a fence on the summit running north and south, fronted by a woods and backed by a corn-field, full of rocky ledges. Colonel Phelps now ordered his men to advance, and General Hatch rode through the lines, pressing them forward. They went in with a cheer, poured in a deadly fire, and drove the enemy from his position behind the fence, after a short and desperate conflict, and took post some yards beyond.

Here General Hatch was wounded and turned over the command to me, and as during the action Colonel Wainwright, Seventy-sixth New York Volunteers, was also wounded, the command of my brigade subsequently devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Phelps' brigade being few in number, and having suffered severely, I relieved them just at dusk with my brigade, reduced by former engagements to about 1,000 men, who took position beyond the fence referred to, the enemy being in heavy force some 30 or 40 paces in our front. They pressed heavily upon us, attempting to charge at the least cessation of our fire. At last I ordered the troops to cease firing, lie down behind the fence, and allowed the enemy to charge to within about 15 paces, apparently under the impression that we had given way. Then, at the word, my men sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley, from which the enemy fled in disorder, leaving their dead within 30 feet of our line.

I learned from a wounded prisoner that we were engaged with 4,000 to 5,000, under the immediate command of General Pickett, with heavy masses in their vicinity. He stated also that Longstreet in vain tried to rally the men, calling them his pets, and using every effort to induce them to renew the attack. The firing on both sides still continued, my men aiming at the flashes of the enemy's muskets, as it was too dark to see objects distinctly, until our cartridges were reduced to two or three rounds.

General Ricketts now came from the right and voluntarily relieved my men at the fence, who fell back some 10 paces and lay down on their arms. A few volleys from Ricketts ended the contest in about thirty minutes, and the enemy withdrew from the field—not, however, until an attempt to flank us on our left, which was gallantly met by a partial change of front of the Seventy-sixth New York Volunteers, under Colonel Wainwright, and the Seventh Indiana, under Major Grover. In this attempt the enemy lost heavily, and were compelled to retreat in disorder.

While the main attack was going on at the fence referred to, Colonel Rogers, with his own and Lieutenant-Colonel Gates' regiments (the Twentieth New York State Militia and Twenty-first New York Volunteers, of Patrick's brigade), rendered most essential service by advancing his right and holding a fence bounding the northeast side of the same corn-field, anticipating the enemy, who made a furious rush to seize this fence, but were driven back. Colonel Rogers was thus enabled to take the enemy in flank, and also to pick off their cannoneers and silence a battery which was at the right and behind their main body.

Our men remained in position all night, sleeping on their arms and ready for any attack; but with the dawn it was discovered that the enemy had fled, leaving large numbers of dead and wounded. Among them was Col. J. B. Strange, of the Nineteenth Virginia, and some other officers whose names I am unable to report.

I desire to mention in terms of just commendation General Patrick, whose long experience and cool bravery were never better attested; Colonel Phelps, commanding Hatch's brigade, and Colonel Wainwright and Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann, commanding in turn my own brigade. Their gallantry and good conduct did much toward winning the victory. I desire also to mention Capt. E. P. Halstead, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. B. T. Marten, aide-de-camp, who carried my orders faithfully into the thickest of the fight, and who each spent several hours in the night in the difficult and dangerous task of verifying the enemy's position. Also Capt. George F. Noyes, commissary of subsistence, who stood upon the fence during the hottest of the fire, cheering on the men, and otherwise rendered me valuable assistance.

I inclose herewith a tabular statement of the killed and wounded.*

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. DOUBLEDAY,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding Division.

Maj. JOSEPH DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FIRST CORPS,
Sharpsburg, Md., September —, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that this division crossed the Antietam near Keedysville, at a ford prepared by the pioneers, on the afternoon of the 16th instant, and marched on the left of, and parallel to, the divisions of Ricketts and Meade, Patrick's brigade leading the way.

Just at dusk, when within three-quarters of a mile of the road which leads from Sharpsburg to Williamsport, the Pennsylvania Reserves, under command of General Meade, became engaged with the enemy on our left. I immediately halted my division and closed it up in column in mass, after which I advanced at the head of the leading brigade to take the position assigned me by General Hooker, who commanded the corps. As we came on, we were assailed by one of the enemy's advanced batteries, the first discharge wounding several of Patrick's men and dismounting three orderlies behind me. General Ricketts' division having been ordered into the woods on my left, it cut my line of march and occasioned a long delay in the arrival of my other brigades. In the mean time I had posted Patrick's brigade in a small triangular piece of woods on our right, bordering the road already referred to. As soon as the other brigades came up, they were formed in line of battle to connect with General Meade's division, which was on our left at the edge of the woods, where he first encountered the enemy. General Patrick, as I have already stated, held the little piece of woods on our right. Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann's brigade was posted on Patrick's left, to connect with General Meade's right, and my two other brigades, those of Gibbon's and Phelps', were massed in reserve in rear. That night we slept on our arms. At dawn of day on the 17th the battle was opened with great spirit by the enemy's batteries, which were promptly answered by those of my division. Soon after I was directed by General Hooker to have my brigades in readiness to be sent as circumstances might require. I had previously designated Gibbon's brigade to take the advance, to be followed in succession by Phelps', Pat-

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 184.

rick's, and Hofmann's brigades. The latter, however, was left as a guard to our batteries in rear, which were opposing the attempt of some rebel batteries to enfilade our lines. Hofmann's brigade was ordered forward at a later period of the action, but General Hooker directed it to remain, as the guns there were doing excellent service in silencing the enemy's artillery. On this account two additional rifled guns were sent to him, and were supported in their advanced position by the Ninety-fifth New York Volunteers, under Major Pye, of that regiment.

I now sent General Gibbon's brigade forward to commence the attack on the enemy's position, followed by Phelps' brigade, as a support, and about twenty minutes afterward Patrick's brigade was also sent forward, by order of General Hooker. Gibbon advanced in column of division on the left of the Hagerstown turnpike until he reached an open space. He then deployed the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers on the right and the Second Wisconsin Volunteers on the left, and threw them forward into a corn-field in his front. A section of Campbell's battery, under Lieutenant Stewart, was also brought into action on an eminence in rear, to fire over the heads of the troops, in answer to the enemy's batteries in front. The two regiments pushed gallantly forward, supported by the Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers and the Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers. After a short engagement, General Gibbon saw that his line would probably be flanked on the right from the woods, which extended down in that direction. To meet this contingency, he ordered up a section of Campbell's battery, and directed the Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana Regiments to cross the road, deploy on the right of the others, and push forward rapidly into the woods. His entire brigade soon became hotly engaged. In the mean time Phelps' brigade had followed that of Gibbon, and when it reached the open space already referred to, beyond the woods where Campbell's battery was posted, it moved by the flank and deployed forward into a corn-field in rear of Gibbon's command. Phelps' position being some 90 paces in front of the battery, as soon as Gibbon's brigade became engaged, Phelps moved his line up, and formed about 25 paces in his rear. Observing that the enemy's line now formed a crotchet, which partially flanked Gibbon's line, Colonel Phelps ordered Colonel Post, who was in command of the Second Regiment of U. S. Sharpshooters, to move to the right and front, advance his left, and engage that portion of the enemy's line that flanked ours. In this engagement the Sharpshooters suffered severely, and Colonel Post was wounded, after capturing two battle-flags from the enemy. While this was going on, I sent Patrick's brigade to follow the two others. It advanced, and for a short time took post in the same corn-field as a support. A strong enfilading fire, as has already been stated, came from the woods against our troops in the corn-field. To meet this, I directed General Patrick to occupy and hold the woods, detaching, however, one of his regiments to support Campbell's battery, a section of which had moved forward to the road in the vicinity of a barn and some haystacks.

I stated in the first part of this report that the Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers and Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers moved into the woods to drive off the enemy, who were acting against our right flank. This movement was simultaneous with that of Patrick's brigade, all crossing the road and moving forward into the woods at the same time. The two regiments named took position in advance of, and parallel to, the rest of Gibbon's line. Patrick's three regiments had scarcely taken position in the woods before a body of the enemy appeared on their right, guarding a battery of light guns they had posted there. General Hooker directed that one of Patrick's regiments be sent to watch this battery, and the

Twenty-third New York Volunteers, under Colonel Hoffman, was detached for that purpose. The two remaining regiments, the Twenty-first New York Volunteers and Thirty-fifth New York Volunteers, closed up on the Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana, and all moved forward together. The enemy previous to this had kept up a brisk fire, but was sheltered by a series of rocky ledges, which afforded them almost perfect security; they poured in heavy volleys of musketry. To meet this increase of fire, Patrick's two regiments were thrown forward in the first line. To all appearance the enemy had been strongly re-enforced, and they not only resisted our farther advance, but moved to try and capture Campbell's battery and regain possession of the corn-field. This charge was handsomely repulsed by the fire of the Second Wisconsin and Sixth Wisconsin Regiments, by the rapid discharges of the battery, which fired double canisters, and by the flank fire of the Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana Regiments, of Gibbon's brigade, and the Twenty-first New York and Thirty-fifth New York Volunteers, of Patrick's brigade, these four regiments having taken up a position perpendicular to their former one, which enabled them to pour in a heavy fire upon the flank of the charging column. Patrick could not have changed position in this way under ordinary circumstances, but it was evident that a large part of the troops that had been in his front were detached to aid in the charge. These united agencies drove the enemy back, saved the guns, and gave us a renewed possession of the corn-field. General Patrick now pushed his regiments up to the road, which he held firmly for some time, capturing two battle-flags from the rebel regiments which advanced against him. He was finally attacked both on his right flank and rear, and compelled to fall back. He withdrew to a line of rocks at right angles to the general direction of the strip of woods, and about 15 rods from them. There he remained waiting for ammunition and re-enforcements to be sent him.

General Williams, of Mansfield's corps, now came up with re-enforcements. He sent a regiment at my request to watch the rebel force that supported the enfilading battery which was acting against the right of Patrick's line. The other regiments that he brought up with him were notified of the nature of the ground and of the position of the enemy, and were instructed by General Patrick as to the position they ought to assume to enfilade the enemy's line and drive him from his strong position, near the Dunker Church, which seemed to be the key of the battle-field. The re-enforcements sent us did not attack in the right place, and they were soon swept away by a terrific fire against their left and front from an enemy behind the rocks they could not see. Their line gave way, and the main body of the rebels advanced. We had no troops left to stem the shock. My own command had been fighting since daylight, and being out of ammunition was obliged to fall back. Patrick's brigade covered our retreat, resisting the enemy gallantly and retiring in perfect order. Campbell's battery having lost 38 men in killed and wounded, including its commander among the latter, and having had 27 horses killed, was no longer in a condition for active service, and was compelled to retire behind the supports of Sedgwick's division. It was soon followed by Gibbon's and Phelps' brigades, exhausted as they were by long-continued fighting, nearly out of ammunition, and too few in number to keep back the overpowering forces that were advancing. Colonel Phelps reports his whole brigade on the field as not numbering more than 150 men at this time. The division fell back in perfect order to a new line of defense. In the mean time General Hooker had been wounded and General Meade had assumed command

of the corps. Thirty guns had been concentrated on the right flank of the general line of battle, and my division was directed to join the remains of General Sumner's corps as a support to these guns. General Sumner assumed command in person, and I was directed by General Meade, who received the order from General Sumner, to assume special command of these thirty guns in addition to the command of my division. About 5.30 p. m. the enemy massed his infantry and opened fire with his artillery to force our position, but my thirty guns replied with such vigor and effect that the columns of attack melted away and the rebels gave up the attempt. After this we were not disturbed.

It only remains for me to speak in terms of just commendation of my brigade commanders, General Patrick, General Gibbon, Colonel Phelps, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann, each of whom displayed great personal gallantry and the ability to meet every contingency that occurred. In this, as on similar occasions, I was much indebted to the skill and bravery of Capt. E. P. Halstead, assistant adjutant-general, who was slightly wounded in the engagement; Capt. George F. Noyes, commissary of subsistence, acting aide-de-camp, and Lieut. B. T. Marten, aide-de-camp, who composed my personal staff. I inclose herewith a tabular statement of the killed, wounded, and missing, the aggregate amounting to 862.*

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ABNER DOUBLEDAY,

Major-General of Vols., Comdg. First Division, First Corps.

Maj. JOSEPH DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Corps.

NOTE.—The tabular statement referred to in report cannot now be found. Brigade commanders report their losses as follows: First Brigade, Colonel Phelps, reports 10 killed, 147 wounded, 29 missing; Second Brigade, Hofmann, few losses; Third Brigade, Patrick, 20 killed, 180 wounded, 17 missing; Fourth Brigade, Gibbon, 61 killed, 274 wounded, and 45 missing.*

MEMORANDA.—The date at which this report was originally sent on to the War Department is unknown, and therefore I have left it blank. Campbell's battery was in reality Gibbon's battery of the Regular Army, but, as Campbell commanded it, I styled it Campbell's battery to avoid confusion. A shell exploded under my horse's nose in the beginning of this action on the 17th. This caused him to run over some steep, sharp rocks. He fell, and I was very much bruised and unable to hold the reins in my hands for a long time.

No. 12.

Report of Capt. J. Albert Monroe, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery First Division, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. ARTILLERY, FIRST DIV., FIRST ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part the light batteries of this division took in the engagement of the 17th instant: Early in the morning the enemy opened upon us an exceedingly brisk

* But see revised statement, pp. 189, 190.

fire. In an extraordinarily short time all the division batteries except Company B, Fourth Artillery, were in position on the ridge upon which they had been during the night, and which ran nearly parallel with the position occupied by the enemy's guns, and about 800 or 1,000 yards from it. Before the enemy's batteries were silenced, which was done in about one hour and a quarter, Company L, First New York Artillery, was ordered through the wood at the left into the plowed land beyond, leaving in the position but Company D, Rhode Island Artillery, commanded by myself, and the First New Hampshire Battery, Lieutenant Edgell. But two batteries from another division came up and took position on the right.

Company B, Fourth Artillery, Capt. J. B. Campbell, accompanied General Gibbon's brigade through the wood to the open ground beyond, where Lieutenant Stewart's section was detached from the battery, and ordered to a position near the turnpike, to shell the woods beyond. Here the section suffered severely in men and horses, but it did excellent service, throwing a body of the enemy, 400 or 500 strong, into considerable confusion, so that they partially broke and ran through a hollow, gaining the cover of some fence-rails.

About this time Captain Campbell placed his other four guns in position on the left of Lieutenant Stewart's section. In the mean time the enemy had crept into a corn-field near the battery and on the left of the turnpike, and opened a murderous fire, which was replied to with canister with good effect. Captain Campbell was here severely wounded in the shoulder, and the command of the company devolved upon Lieutenant Stewart. The battery was supported by General Gibbon's brigade and the Twentieth New York. Being very much weakened, General Gibbon directed Lieutenant Stewart to change position to the right, out of range of the enemy's musketry, and to shell the woods in front; but only one section went into position, on account of the great number of wounded men and horses in the other two sections. Company L, First New York Artillery, Capt. J. A. Reynolds, after moving through the woods, was ordered to move forward into the plowed ground, where it took position and opened upon one of the enemy's batteries in the field beyond the turnpike, silencing it after a sharp fire of some time.

From this position Captain Reynolds was ordered by General Gibbon to move to the right and shell the woods in front. Company L and the section of Company B took this position about the same time, the section of Company B on the left of Company L. Soon after both of these batteries were ordered to the rear. Captain Reynolds went back to the ordnance train to obtain a supply of ammunition, and upon his return was ordered to the extreme right, where he had no opportunity to use his guns. Lieutenant Stewart retired to the rear of the wood through which he had advanced, removed his disabled horses, and regulated his men and horses throughout.

Shortly after the enemy's batteries upon the hill were silenced, and about the time Company B, Fourth Artillery, and Company L, New York Artillery, were ordered to the rear, Company D, Rhode Island Artillery, commanded by myself, was ordered through the wood, and immediately after the First New Hampshire Battery, Lieutenant Edgell, was ordered to follow. General Hooker directed me to move forward beyond the second corn-field, if possible, and take position as near the wood as the ground would admit. I advanced, followed by Lieutenant Edgell, First New Hampshire Battery, and went into battery about 50 yards from the wood, the New Hampshire battery taking position, and about 100 yards to the rear.

A battery of the enemy here opened upon me, but no attention was paid to it, and its fire was perfectly ineffective; but the battery with one section opened upon a body of the enemy, who was seen retreating at the left of their front, and about 125 yards distant, throwing them into great confusion. The other four guns opened with canister and case upon a large force advancing through the woods in front, which were very open, and, with the assistance of the other section, which had accomplished its object by a few shots, and the First New Hampshire Battery, checked the enemy, and he retired out of sight.

While engaged forcing back the enemy in the wood, a body of sharpshooters had, unobserved, crept along under a little ridge that ran diagonally to the front of the Rhode Island battery, and opened a most unerring fire upon it, killing and disabling many horses and men. As quick as possible, a section was directed to open upon them with canister, which, though it caused them no injury, they lying down under the ridge, kept them almost silent, they firing but an occasional shot, but without effect.

While this section was keeping the sharpshooters silent, the other four guns, with the guns of Lieutenant Edgell, opened upon the battery that was still firing, and soon silenced it. I then ordered my battery to limber to the rear. The sharpshooters took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded, and opened most briskly, severely wounding a number of men and killing and disabling a large number of horses. My own horse was pierced by six bullets. All the horses but one lead-horse of one piece were either killed or disabled, and the piece had to be drawn away by hand by means of a prolonge. The limber was left, but was subsequently recovered. The New Hampshire battery left its position at the same time, and went back to its original position.

After securing the piece that was drawn away by hand to its caisson, I moved my battery into the lot between the second corn-field and the plowed land beyond the first corn-field, and went into position with five guns, and shelled the woods beyond the turnpike. After firing a short time, I retired to my original position, when the disabled piece was sent to the rear. Soon after taking this position, the enemy's artillery opened from the same hill that it did in the early morning, but they were soon silenced by the New Hampshire and the Rhode Island batteries, with the assistance of the two other batteries that were still there. Lieutenant Stewart, after rearranging his horses, harness, and men, took position upon the same hill. There the batteries remained inactive until about 5 o'clock, when the enemy again opened a brisk fire upon the opposite hill, which was immediately replied to by all the guns we had in position on the hill, silencing the enemy in about ten minutes.

Lieutenant Stewart, Company B, Fourth Artillery, speaks with high praise of the following non-commissioned officers and privates of his company, and desires their names may be brought to the favorable notice of the general commanding: First Sergt. John Mitchell, Company B, Fourth Artillery; Sergt. Andrew McBride, Company B, Fourth Artillery; Sergt. William West, Company B, Fourth Artillery; Corpl. Frederick A. Chapin, Company B, Fourth Artillery; Lance Corpl. Alonzo Priest, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; Lance Corpl. Henry G. McDougal, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; Privates Henry A. Childs, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; James Cahoo, Company B, Fourth Artillery; William Kelly, Company B, Fourth Artillery; John B. Lackey, Company B, Fourth Artillery; William Green, Company B, Fourth Artillery;

Jeremiah Murphy, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; Charles Harris, Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers; Elbridge E. Packard, Second Wisconsin Volunteers.

Very respectfully,

J. ALBERT MONROE,
Capt., Comdg. Artillery, First Div., First Army Corps.

No. 13.

Report of Lieut. James Stewart, Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD.,
September 24, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, during the engagement of the 17th instant:

I was ordered by General Gibbon to bring my section forward and place it in position, about 75 yards distant from and to the left of the turnpike, for the purpose of shelling the woods, distant from 800 to 900 yards, directly in my front.

After shelling for some time, General Gibbon ordered the section to be still farther advanced to a position in front of some straw-stacks, about 30 yards to the right of the turnpike. As soon as I came into battery in this position, I observed large bodies of the enemy from 400 to 500 yards distant, and ordered the guns to be loaded with spherical case, $1\frac{1}{4}$ and $1\frac{1}{2}$ seconds, because the ground was undulating, and not suitable for canister. After firing two or three rounds from each gun, the enemy partially broke, ran across a hollow in front of the section, crossed to the left of the turnpike, entered a corn-field, and, under cover of the fences and corn, crept close to our guns, picking off our cannon-eers so rapidly that in less than ten minutes there were 14 men killed and wounded in the section.

About this time Captain Campbell, commanding the battery, brought the other four guns into battery on the left of my section, and commenced firing canister at the enemy in the corn-field, on the left of the turnpike. In less than twenty minutes Captain Campbell was severely wounded in the shoulder, his horse shot in several places, and the command of the battery devolved upon me.

General Gibbon was in the battery, and, seeing the advantage which the enemy had, ordered one of the guns which was placed on the turnpike to be used against the enemy's infantry in the corn-field, General Gibbon acting both as cannoneer and gunner at this piece. The fire was continued by the entire battery for about ten minutes longer in this position, the enemy part of the time being but 15 or 20 yards distant. The loss of the entire company whilst in this position was 1 captain wounded, 3 sergeants, 4 corporals, 32 privates killed and wounded, and 26 horses killed and 7 wounded. While in this position the battery was supported by General Gibbon's brigade and a part of the Twentieth New York Volunteers.

General Gibbon ordered me to limber to the rear and place the battery in battery in the same position my section first occupied in the morning. Here I found Captain Ransom's battery, of the Fifth Artillery, in posi-

tion, and immediately came in battery on his left, but had no opportunity to use my guns, as some of our infantry were formed 20 yards in front of the battery; so I limbered up and followed Captain Ransom's battery to the edge of the woods in rear, having my horse shot under me in two places in less than two minutes. Here I removed my wounded horses, and regulated the men and horses throughout the battery.

At this time I received an order from General Gibbon to place the battery in the same position my section first occupied in the morning, but to fire to the right. I immediately took a section to the point indicated, sending word to the general that I could not take the battery, as we had not men and horses to man the six pieces. I went into battery on the right of Captain Reynolds' New York battery, who was then under a very heavy fire from two of the enemy's batteries. After my section had been firing for some time, part of General Sumner's corps passed to the rear very much disorganized, through the woods on the right of my section, closely followed by the enemy. During this time I was in a very difficult position, as the enemy had ascertained my exact range, and I was utterly unable to get his on account of the smoke from the musketry. After carefully viewing the ground, I limbered to the rear, and came in battery upon Captain Reynolds' left, when one of my cannoneers reported to me that the turnpike directly in my front and about 75 yards distant was full of the enemy's infantry. I ordered my guns to be loaded. The enemy commencing to fall back on the same road, I waited until I saw four stand of the enemy's colors directly in front of my section, and then commenced firing with canister, which scattered the enemy in every direction. I kept up the fire until the enemy were out of sight.

In a few minutes Captain Clarke, chief of General Sumner's artillery, advised me to limber to the rear and cross the plowed field, as I had no infantry support, and he was going to retire his batteries, which were in my rear on the left, and the enemy then advancing on the left in force. I remained in the plowed field for some time, when, learning that General Gibbon had placed the other four guns of the battery in position, and seeing there was no use for me there, I joined them on an eminence in rear of the woods between 1 and 2 o'clock p. m., remaining there inactive until 5 p. m., when the enemy opened from two batteries. I opened with my entire battery on the nearest battery, which was on my right, and from 800 to 900 yards distant, and after firing two or three rounds from each gun, the enemy not responding, I ceased firing.

The behavior of my men was all that could be desired, but the men whose names are given below came under my immediate observation, and discharged their duties with such calm, cool courage and discretion that I would earnestly request that their conduct may be brought to the favorable notice of the general commanding.

Their names are as follows: First Sergt. John Mitchell, Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery; Sergt. Andrew McBride, Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery; Sergt. William West, Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery; Corpl. Frederick A. Chapin, Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery; Lance Corpl. Alonzo Priest, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; Lance Corpl. Henry G. McDougal, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; Privates Henry A. Childs, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; James Cahoo, Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery; William Kelly, Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, John B. Lackey; Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery; Jeremiah Murphy, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; William Green, Light Company B, Fourth U. S. Artillery;

Charles Harris, Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers; Elbridge E. Packard, Second Wisconsin Volunteers.

I desire to state that since the battery first went into action on the 26th of August, Benjamin N. Meeds, clerk at headquarters of General Gibbon, and private belonging to Company B, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, has voluntarily acted as cannoneer in my section in each and every engagement in which my section has participated, and although he has never been drilled with the battery, has rendered cheerful and very efficient service, so much so that I desire to bring his name particularly to the notice of the commanding general.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES STEWART,

Second Lieut. Fourth U. S. Artillery, Comdg. Light Company B.

Capt. JOHN P. WOOD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Gibbon's Brigade.

No. 14.

Reports of Col. Walter Phelps, jr., Twenty-second New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS HATCH'S BRIGADE,

In the Field, near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: I herewith submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the late engagement on South Mountain, Sunday, September 14, 1862:

In compliance with orders from General Hatch, I assumed command of his brigade Sunday, September 14, at 10 a. m. The column of General Hooker's corps was then moving through Frederick toward Middletown on the pike. About 4 p. m. General Patrick's brigade and this command were ordered to move to the right on a road running at right angles with the pike, and apparently following the chain of mountains some half mile from their base. General Patrick had the advance. About 1½ miles from the pike I received orders from General Hatch, then in command of the division, to move the brigade from the road to the base of the mountain, forming line of battle of column by division at half distance, at deploying distances.

This order was complied with, and the command moved to the left, where the woods and the nature of the ground afforded protection from the enemy's batteries, which were playing upon us from the left. I was then ordered by General Hatch to move forward some 80 rods to a road running parallel with the mountains, and deploy masses to move forward steadily toward the summit. I was advised of General Patrick's brigade in front, deployed as skirmishers, and ordered to support them. I moved the brigade forward, and unconsciously passed in advance of the skirmishers, through an interval in their line, which had become disconnected. I halted the brigade, and dispatched one of my aides to inform General Hatch of my position. He immediately rode to the front, ordering the skirmishers to advance, and this brigade to advance with them, about 30 paces in their rear. The nature of the ground afforded me an excellent opportunity to advance unobserved by the enemy, whom I discovered, by riding to the front, were posted behind a line of fence on the summit. The line of skirmishers, steadily moving forward, at length drew a scattering fire from the enemy, and perceiving that the distance

to their position was but about 80 paces, I ordered the brigade to advance in line of battle. Here General Hatch, riding through the lines, pressed the men forward, and with a cheer the brigade moved splendidly to the front, pouring in a deadly fire upon the enemy. Here General Hatch was wounded, and was obliged to leave the field, but the brigade, encouraged by his valor and inspiring orders, moved forward with unbroken front, and the engagement became general through my entire line.

Too much praise cannot be awarded to the officers and men of this brigade for their noble conduct on this occasion. Although the enemy were strongly posted behind a fence, and apparently in larger force than our own troops, they could not withstand the terrific fire and steady veteran advance of my line. The conflict at the fence became desperate, many of the enemy at this time being less than 8 rods in our front, but the undaunted bravery of officers and men enabled me to drive them from their position and capture a number of prisoners. The loss of the brigade at this point was much heavier than at any other on the field.

Having succeeded in forcing the enemy from their position, I advanced my line about 5 rods, where I obtained partial shelter for my men from an abrupt rise of ground. Perceiving that the right of my line extended beyond the enemy's left, I ordered the Fourteenth Brooklyn to advance their right, which being done enabled them to enfilade the enemy's ranks with a fire which did great execution. This brigade held its position until relieved by Doubleday's brigade, which was in turn relieved by General Ricketts, when I ordered this command to fall back slowly and in good order, when I formed the third line of battle, General Ricketts having the first and General Doubleday the second. These three lines occupied the battle-field at this point during the night of Sunday.

The regiments of this brigade engaged at this point were the Fourteenth New York State Militia, Twenty-second, Twenty-fourth, and Thirtieth New York Volunteers. The Second U. S. Sharpshooters, attached to this command, were ordered to the right of the general line by command of Major-General Hooker before I moved up the mountain, and were temporarily detached from the brigade.

I cannot allow the conduct of Lieutenant Cranford, Fourteenth New York State Militia, and Lieutenant Schenck, Twenty-second New York Volunteers, aides to myself, to pass unnoticed. I was often obliged to send them, through a galling fire, to different parts of the field with orders. Their conduct on this occasion was most gallant, and all that I could have desired. It was the more striking that their line of duty did not require their presence on the field at that time, the former being acting commissary of subsistence, and the latter regimental quartermaster. Captain Monroe, Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery, attached to this brigade, now acting chief of division artillery, will forward, at the earliest possible moment, a consolidated report of the casualties in the batteries in the engagements of September 14, 16, and 17.

The loss in this brigade at South Mountain, Sunday, September 14 (see report of casualties already forwarded you), was as follows: Enlisted men killed, 20; commissioned officers wounded, 4; enlisted men wounded, 63; missing, 8. Total, 95. I went into this action with less than 400 officers and men, and our loss on that day is a fraction less than 25 per cent.

Very respectfully, &c.,

WALTER PHELPS, JR.,

Colonel Twenty-second New York Volunteers, Comdg. Brigade.

Captain HALSTEAD,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS HATCH'S BRIGADE,
Near Sharpsburg, September 23, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I herewith transmit a report of the action of this brigade in the engagement near Sharpsburg, Wednesday, September 17:

I took position with the other brigades of the division (Brigadier-General Doubleday commanding) Tuesday night, September 16, and the men slept on their arms. At 5.30 a. m. Wednesday the enemy's batteries opened upon our lines, and I was ordered by General Doubleday to move to the support of Gibbon's brigade, which had already advanced to attack the enemy's lines. Advancing through a belt of woods, in which Major-General Hooker and staff were stationed, and which was directly in rear of Campbell's (late Gibbon's) battery, I was ordered by General Hooker, who in person designated the position for this brigade to occupy, to move by flank through the open field in which this battery had taken position, and, passing into a corn-field, to form line of battle and support Gibbon's brigade, which I observed was steadily advancing to the attack. The direct and cross artillery fire from the enemy's batteries playing upon this field was very heavy, but my brigade was moved without loss to a position some 90 paces in advance of Campbell's battery, where I deployed column, and in line of battle moved steadily forward some 50 paces in rear of Gibbon's infantry, who at this time had not engaged the enemy, but were cautiously advancing through the corn-field. This command consisted of the Second U. S. Sharpshooters (which was temporarily detached from the brigade during the engagement of Sunday), the Fourteenth New York State Militia, the Twenty-second, Twenty-fourth, and Thirtieth New York Volunteers.

Gibbon's brigade having engaged the enemy, who were posted in the road behind a line of fence, and sheltered by woods, I moved this brigade forward, and halted about 25 paces in rear of his line, ordering the men to lie down, and was prepared to move to his support when necessary.

Having ascertained that the enemy's line was formed with their left advanced, making a crotchet, and that they were in position to partially enfilade our lines, I ordered the Second U. S. Sharpshooters, Colonel Post, to move to the right and front, advancing his left, and to engage the enemy at that point. I immediately advised General Doubleday (in command of the division) of the enemy's position in front, on my right, and of the disposition of the Second U. S. Sharpshooters. General Doubleday approved the movement, and ordered a brigade to their right while the Sharpshooters were engaging them. The remainder of this brigade still held its position in the rear of Gibbon's line.

The effect of the engagement between the Sharpshooters and the enemy was to draw a very heavy fire from their advanced line, and I ordered the brigade forward to the support of the line in front. The musketry fire at this point was very heavy, but the two brigades appeared to hold their position easily. The loss of the Second U. S. Sharpshooters at this point was severe. The entire brigade suffered heavily in wounded, the proportion of killed being very small (see report of casualties in that engagement, already forwarded you), but, with General Gibbon's regiments, held their position until relieved by General Sedgwick's division, when I fell back slowly and in good order some 80 paces in rear of the corn-field, and again formed line of battle.

In this engagement Colonel Post was wounded, Adjutant Parmelee and Lieutenant Thompson killed—all of the Second U. S. Sharpshooters; Lieutenant Cushing, Twenty-second New York Volunteers, killed; Cap-

tain O'Brian, Twenty-fourth, lost a leg; Captain Myers, Fourteenth New York State Militia, lost a leg.

As I have already forwarded a list of killed and wounded, I will not enter into details here. The aggregate of killed, wounded, and missing is as follows: Commissioned officers killed and wounded, 10; enlisted men killed and wounded, 147; missing, 29. Total, 186.*

The brigade went into the action of Wednesday, September 17, with about 425 officers and men, and their loss in killed, wounded, and missing (the missing being about 29) is a fraction over 43 per cent. of those engaged. Their loss on Sunday, September 14, at South Mountain (see report of killed, wounded, and missing) was a fraction less than 25 per cent. of those engaged.

The conduct of officers and men was all that I could have wished. Major De Boise, commanding Fourteenth New York State Militia, had his horse shot, and was considerably injured by his fall, but remained on the field to the end, acquitting himself with great credit. Lieutenant Becker, Thirtieth New York Volunteers; Lieutenant Cranford, Fourteenth New York State Militia, and Lieutenant Schenck, Twenty-second New York Volunteers, acting aides to myself, conducted themselves gallantly on the field, and afforded me great assistance.

The brigade remained in line of battle until ordered by General Doubleday to fall back slowly and in good order, and, having gained the other brigades of the division, I stacked arms and allowed the men to rest. This was about 1.30 p. m.

Very respectfully, &c.,

WALTER PHELPS, JR.,

Colonel Twenty-second New York Volunteers, Comdg. Brigade.

Captain HALSTEAD,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 15.

Reports of Lieut. Col. J. William Hofmann, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., FIRST ARMY CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the operations of this brigade, late under the command of General Doubleday, since the afternoon of the 14th instant:

At about 6 p. m. on that day, the brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Doubleday, was deployed in line of battle and ascended the South Mountain on its eastern slope as a support to Colonel Phelps, commanding the brigade late under General Hatch, and then hotly engaged with the enemy at the summit of the mountain. The brigade was moving forward, and, when about entering the woods near the summit, General Hatch, who had been in command of the division, passed to the rear very severely wounded. This placed General Doubleday in command of the division, and myself, by Colonel Wainwright being subsequently wounded, in command of the brigade.

The brigade moved steadily on to the summit, relieved Colonel Phelps'

* But see revised statement, p. 189.

command, and immediately opened fire on the enemy, then posted in a corn-field, and only some 30 or 40 paces in front of our lines. The fire of the brigade was continued for an hour and a half, and evidently with terrible effect upon the enemy, who made several desperate efforts to approach our lines, but failed. The enemy then attempted to turn our left flank, but by a change of front then he was also foiled and repulsed with considerable loss. The ammunition of the brigade was fast giving out, when we were relieved by the arrival of General Ricketts' division. Our brigade was ordered by General Doubleday 10 paces to the rear, to allow room for the troops of General Ricketts to form line of battle. After the troops of this division (General Ricketts') had been engaged for thirty or forty minutes, the enemy withdrew. Whilst withdrawing our line to the position indicated by General Doubleday, the Seventh Indiana and a portion of the Ninety-fifth New York Volunteers withdrew to some 100 yards in rear of the brigade, having misunderstood the order, and unable in the darkness to see the new line formed by the brigade. They joined the brigade after daylight next morning.

Although it was quite dark when the brigade under my command took its position in front, so that the position of the enemy could be discerned only by the flashes of his firing, the morning revealed how well the fire of our troops had been directed. The enemy had retired without burying their dead or removing their wounded. The body of a colonel of the enemy was found next morning a distance of only 20 yards from our lines. The body was brought in and buried. The wounded were also cared for by the surgeons.

The conduct of the officers and men engaged in this action was such as to meet my hearty approval. A list of the casualties occurring is hereto appended.*

Very respectfully, yours,

J. W. HOFMANN,

Lieut. Col. Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Vols., Comdg. Brigade.

Captain HALSTEAD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Doubleday's Division.

HDQRS. 2D (HOFMANN'S) BRIG., 1ST (DOUBLEDAY'S) DIV.,
1ST (HOOKER'S) ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
In Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 23, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the operations of this brigade during the battle of the 16th and 17th instant:

At 2 o'clock p. m. on the 16th the brigade under my command left camp on the left bank of the Antietam Creek, about 2 miles north of Sharpsburg, and, having forded the creek, waited for the rear brigades to cross. During this time the skirmishers of the enemy opened a lively fire upon us. They were, however, soon driven back by a force sent from our division, and without having inflicted any loss upon this brigade. The whole division having crossed the creek, the march was renewed, General Patrick's brigade leading and this one following his.

In obedience to instructions from General Doubleday, I kept the head of this brigade within a few yards of the rear of the first. We had marched in a northwest direction for about 2 miles when we halted, and, in obedience to instructions, formed in columns of divisions closed in mass. In a short time we resumed the march, moving by the right

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 184.

flank. After marching a short distance there was a momentary halt. During this halt the division column was cut in front of this brigade by a body of troops moving to our left.

It was now quite dark. When the troops had passed, I found that the brigade of General Patrick had moved on unobserved by me in the darkness. After endeavoring in vain to ascertain the direction taken by his brigade, I applied to General Hooker for instructions, and was by him directed to take possession and hold a piece of wood extending along the Sharpsburg road. While in the act of placing my command in the position indicated, I was met by you and informed that the position was already occupied by General Patrick, by direction of General Doubleday, and that General Doubleday's instructions to me were to place my command near the road, my right resting on the left of General Patrick's command and my left connecting with the troops of General Meade. Having made these dispositions and thrown out pickets to the front, communicating with those of the troops on our right and left, the men were ordered to lie on their arms.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, I directed my brigade battery, the First New Hampshire, consisting of six 12-pounder howitzers, under the command of Lieutenant Edgell, to be placed on the right of the brigade; the left of the adjoining brigade breaking to the rear to allow room for the operation of the battery. I had five pieces placed in the field and one in the road, to enable us to enfilade the enemy should he approach from our right or left. The battery had scarce been placed in position when the enemy opened fire upon us from a battery placed in a corn-field, some 800 yards to our front and left. Our battery replied immediately, firing evidently with good effect for one hour, when the battery of the enemy was withdrawn beyond the range of the guns of ours. The firing ceased. At about 10 o'clock the battery was, by order of General Hooker, removed to a position beyond this brigade. During the time it was with us the officers and men acted with the utmost energy and spirit, whilst I observed at the same time that the best order pervaded the battery.

Before the First New Hampshire Battery was removed, a section of rifled guns, under command of Lieutenant ———, of ———, was, by order of General Hooker, posted in a corn field, about 200 yards in front of the right of this brigade. In compliance with an order from General Hooker, I sent the Ninety-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers, under command of Major Pye, to support these guns, which, as soon as they were in position, opened fire upon the enemy, who had withdrawn beyond the range of the howitzers, and soon drew the fire from the enemy—partially the object of stationing the guns in that position. During this time the brigade was stationed in the position assigned it the night before. They were lying close to the fence and well sheltered.

About 11.30 o'clock, by order of General Doubleday, I moved the brigade to our front and left about 300 yards, and posted the section of rifled guns in front of the line. As soon as the guns were in position, they opened upon the enemy, who replied with shell and musketry. The brigade had been in this position about half an hour, when a large cavalry force was passing in rear of a narrow strip of wood, evidently attempting to attack us in flank; on the right a heavy body of infantry, much larger than my own, immediately followed. Under these circumstances I retired to a corn-field in rear, some 200 yards, and reformed line of battle. This position I deemed a strong one, as it would have been necessary for the enemy to pass over a clear field, unprotected from our fire, had he advanced upon it.

Shortly after forming line in this place, I moved the brigade to the left about half a mile, by order of General Doubleday. Here we rested until late in the afternoon, when, by order of General Sumner, I placed the brigade in front line of battle—one of three lines then being formed. Our position was just below the crest of a hill, and immediately in rear of a long line of artillery. After being in position about half an hour, the enemy opened fire from a battery in front, throwing shell, several of which exploded over our line, but caused us no loss. The fire of the enemy was immediately responded to by our artillery, and was soon silenced. This ended the battle as far as our brigade was concerned. By my direction, the men lay on their arms until daylight, ready for action at a moment's notice.

The casualties in this brigade (a list of them is herewith transmitted*) were small. During the action the conduct of the officers and men under my command fully met my approbation. Major Grover, commanding the Seventh Indiana Volunteers; Major Pye, commanding Ninety-fifth New York Volunteers; Captain Williams, commanding Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Captain Young, commanding Seventy-sixth New York Volunteers, rendered very effective service in their respective commands. Lieutenant Healy, of the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, my acting assistant adjutant-general, was worthy of commendation.

I am, very respectfully, yours,

J. W. HOFMANN,

Lieut. Col. Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Vols., Comdg. Second Brigade.

Captain HALSTEAD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Doubleday's Division.

No. 16.

Reports of Col. William P. Wainwright, Seventy-sixth New York Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.

MIDDLETOWN VALLEY, SHEFFER'S HOUSE,
Near Mount Tabor, September 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of General Doubleday, that on the afternoon of the 14th instant, after the battalions had been moved up to the edge of the wood, the Seventy-sixth New York Volunteers passed through a line of troops under the command of General Patrick. The regiment formed with perfect steadiness on the extreme left. They were well in hand during the whole engagement, always obeyed the orders to fire and to cease firing readily, and although not many cartridges were expended, the repulse of an attempt to turn our left, which, in conjunction with the left wing of the Seventh Indiana Regiment, was brilliantly accomplished, and the orderly manner in which they afterward passed the line of troops coming up to relieve them, showed that they are fast becoming veteran soldiers.

I would again (as in a note sent yesterday afternoon by Surgeon Metcalfe) call the general's attention to the weakened state of the regiment. They went into action on this occasion with only forty files. Their loss was, so far as ascertained, 2 killed and 13 wounded—of the latter, 2 mortally.† I doubt whether they can now furnish more than thirty files,

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 189.

† But see revised statement, p. 184.

commanded by four lieutenants, in any line of battle that may be called for at present.

In the above action First Lieutenants Crandall and Goddard and Second Lieutenants Byram and Foster were the only officers present under me. They all conducted themselves admirably. I think it was Lieutenant Goddard who first called my attention to the enemy stealing through the corn in order to gain our flank.

Sergeant Stamp, just promoted for good conduct in a former battle, was shot through the head while gallantly carrying the national colors.

Owing to a wound in the arm received during the action, I am unable to join the regiment. First Lieutenant Crandall is next in command.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. P. WAINWRIGHT,

Colonel Seventy-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers.

Capt. E. P. HALSTEAD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Doubleday's Brigade.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *September 24, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: It was with great regret, after making my report on the battle of the 14th instant at South Mountain, that I remembered having omitted the name of First Lieut. Robert Story, Company II, as present during the action. The lieutenant was present and in command of his company, and conducted himself very meritoriously.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. P. WAINWRIGHT,

Colonel Seventy-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers.

Capt. E. P. HALSTEAD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Doubleday's Brigade.

No. 17.

Report of Lieut. Col. J. William Hofmann, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.

HDQRS. FIFTY-SIXTH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,

Camp at Hunter's Gap, September 15, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the operations of the Fifty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers since the morning of the 14th instant:

The regiment left camp on the left bank of the Monocacy Creek, near the National road, on the morning of the 14th instant, at 6 a. m. Present for duty: One field officer, 1 captain, 6 lieutenants, 239 enlisted men. The regiment passed over the National road toward the South Mountain. At Middletown our regiment, in common with the brigade under command of General Doubleday, verged to the right, marching in a northwesterly direction for about 2 miles, when we formed in line of battle and marched up the mountain. At the crest of it we found General Hatch's brigade warmly engaged with the enemy. General Hatch's troops forming the extreme right of our line, we formed in rear of them, and as soon as we had relieved them we opened fire on the enemy, posted some 40 yards in front of us, in a corn-field. It was now quite

dark, and the position of the enemy could be ascertained only from the flashes of his fire. Our men fired continually for about one hour and a half, when our ammunition gave out. We were at this moment relieved by the arrival of General Ricketts' division, and, by order of General Doubleday, we retired 10 paces to the rear, where the men slept on their arms, the enemy having retired shortly after the arrival of General Ricketts' troops. The conduct of the officers and men was all that could have been asked of them. There is every reason to believe that the fire of our regiment was very destructive to the enemy. This was made manifest by the number of dead that lay in the morning in front of the position that our regiment had occupied. The following is a list of casualties occurred during the action: Killed, 1; wounded, 11; missing, 3 (all enlisted men). I am under obligations to Lieutenant Healy, my acting adjutant, for valuable assistance rendered by him during the action. At 2 o'clock this morning, by direction of General Doubleday, I assumed, as senior officer, the command of the brigade, Captain Williams, of Company D, succeeding to the command of the regiment.

Respectfully, yours,

J. W. HOFMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Captain HALSTEAD,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Doubleday's Brigade.

No. 18.

Reports of Capt. Frederick Williams, Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. FIFTY-SIXTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 22, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 15th instant, while we still remained on the battle-field of the previous evening, I was placed in command of the Fifty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, in consequence of Lieut. Col. J. W. Hofmann, of this regiment, being in command of the brigade. About 8 o'clock a. m. we left the battle-field with the brigade, taking a southeasterly course. We soon struck the pike road to Hagerstown. Following the road for 1½ miles, we encamped in a field to the right. Here we cooked coffee, and rested about two hours. We then took up our line of march for Sharpsburg, via Boonsborough. Arriving at Boonsborough, we took the pike road for Sharpsburg, which runs a little to the south of west from Boonsborough. We followed this road to within about 3 miles of Sharpsburg, when we were drawn up in line of battle to the right of the road, where we remained until dark, when we changed our position to the ridge on the left bank of the Antietam Creek. Here we bivouacked for the night. About 10 a. m. Tuesday, after receiving rations, we changed our position some half a mile nearer the road. Here we rested until about 5 p. m., when we forded the creek. After crossing, we were halted some fifteen or twenty minutes, when we were marched in a northerly direction, and shortly after dark took our position on General Meade's right. We were here drawn up in line close to the fence which borders the road. We lay on our arms all night, the line of pickets being about 40 yards in our front. Just at daylight a rebel battery planted in the

woods on a ridge a little to the left of our front opened fire on us. Our batteries to the right, and those on the ridge almost directly behind us, returned the fire almost instantly. This was the opening of Wednesday's fight. The men lay flat on the ground close to the fence from this time (as both the rebel and our batteries were playing directly over our heads) until about 10 a. m., when we were marched out to support a battery of two pieces. We remained but a few moments, the battery being withdrawn, and we, receiving orders to fall back, moved to the rear in good order, and formed line of battle some 500 yards in rear of our former position. After remaining here about half an hour, we were marched off by the left flank, and, after some little maneuvering, finally took our post on the left of Gibbon's brigade, forming, with this brigade and Gorman's on its right, and the Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers on our left, a front line in support of some thirty-odd pieces of artillery. Here we bivouacked. Thursday, September 18, we remained in our position in support of the battery during the day and night. About 8 o'clock a. m. Friday we took up our line of march for this place, and finally encamped about 2 p. m.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. WILLIAMS,

Captain, Comdg. Fifty sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Lieut. S. HEALY,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Hofmann's Brigade.

HDQRS. FIFTY-SIXTH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,

Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 28, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that our regiment has, since the report made to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann (September 5), been engaged in two actions, one at South Mountain, Sunday, 14th instant, and that of Antietam, on the 16th and 17th instant. The conduct of officers and men was all that could have been asked. In the action at South Mountain the men stood under a galling fire from the enemy for an hour and a half, until their ammunition was exhausted. They were at this moment relieved by the arrival of General Ricketts' division. Having been ordered to retire 10 paces to make room for the formation of troops under General Ricketts, the regiment retained that position. The troops of General Ricketts had been engaged about thirty minutes, when the enemy retired. Our regiment was then ordered to lie down upon their arms, where they remained during the night.

The regiment sustained comparatively few casualties in this action, having 1 killed, 11 wounded, and 3 missing. The next morning the regiment was moved near and toward Sharpsburg, where they lay under the fire of the enemy's battery for several hours without sustaining any loss.

On the following afternoon the regiment forded the Antietam Creek, where they were fired upon by the skirmishers of the enemy, not, however, sustaining any loss; marched in a northeasterly direction about 3 miles, where they were placed in position, facing the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike. It was now quite dark, and the men were directed to rest upon their arms; when, on the 17th, at 5.30 a. m., the enemy opened upon us from a battery about 800 yards to our front and left. The brigade of which our regiment formed a part had since the afternoon of the 14th been commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann, of

this regiment, and on this occasion formed the extreme right of our lines. This position was held until after 12 o'clock, when they were relieved by fresh troops under General Franklin, and the regiment, in common with other regiments of the brigade, was moved to the left and rear a distance of about a quarter of a mile, where it rested for several hours. Between 4 and 5 o'clock p. m. the regiment, in common with other regiments of the brigade, was placed in the front line of battle, being one of the three lines formed by command of General Sumner in rear of a long line of artillery. The line had scarcely been formed when the enemy opened fire upon us, throwing shot and shell, several of the shells exploding over our lines, but caused no loss in this regiment. The battery of the enemy was soon silenced by our artillery. This finished the battle so far as this regiment was concerned. The men were ordered to sleep on their arms—to be prepared for action at a moment's notice. The conduct of officers and men on this occasion was such as to merit my approbation. The general commanding the division has expressed his approbation of the conduct of the officers and men in the various battles enumerated below, and recommends that application be made to the Governor of our State for permission to inscribe upon our flag the names of the following battles: Rappahannock, Sulphur Springs, Gainesville, Manassas, South Mountain, and Antietam.

Trusting this may meet the approbation of the Governor, I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. WILLIAMS,

Captain, Comdg. Fifty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.

A. L. RUSSELL,

Adjutant-General, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Harrisburg, Pa.

No. 19.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS PATRICK'S BRIGADE,

September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to the call from division headquarters, I have the honor to transmit the following report of the operations of this brigade on the 14th of September, in the affair on South Mountain:

The brigade marched with the division from the Monocacy at 6 o'clock a. m., and arrived at the Catoclin about 12.30 p. m., where the men made coffee, and about 2.30 p. m. resumed the march, under the orders of General Hatch, who had just relieved General King in command of the division. Striking off on a by-road to the right of the turnpike to avoid the fire of the enemy's batteries, we reached the stone church at the foot of the mountain at about 3.30 p. m., near which General Hooker and staff had halted. Under his direction, a regiment was ordered to ascend the ravine that partially divided the eastern slope of the mountain, throwing out skirmishers to the right and left.

Colonel Rogers, Twenty-first New York Volunteers, was assigned to this position, and went immediately forward. Subsequently General Hatch directed the other regiments forward to ascend the mountain in a line with the Twenty-first. Colonel Lord, commanding Thirty-fifth

New York Volunteers, deployed his entire regiment to the left, which eventually overlooked the pike at the foot of the southern and western slopes. This regiment breasted the mountain with a rapid step, and without unslinging knapsacks; but, in consequence of the previous advance of the Twenty-first, its left flank was lost sight of, and the right of the Thirty-fifth failed to connect with it. Just before reaching the top of the mountain, the Twentieth New York State Militia (Eightieth New York Volunteers), Lieutenant-Colonel Gates commanding (Col. G. W. Pratt having died of wounds received at Groveton), was thrown in to cover this opening until its extent could be ascertained by examination. The Twenty-third Regiment New York Volunteers, Colonel Hoffman commanding, supported the Thirty-fifth on its left and center. The point of direction for the left wing was now changed farther to the right, and, while this was in progress, I went to the right and front to reconnoiter, for the purpose of connecting the skirmishers of the Thirty-fifth with the left of the Twenty-first, and while thus engaged drew the fire of the enemy, which revealed their position and enabled me to make the necessary preparations to meet them. A few minutes only were occupied in connecting the line of skirmishers, when Lieutenant-Colonel Gates with the Twentieth (Eightieth New York Volunteers) was ordered to join Colonel Rogers on the right and support him.

At this moment the head of General Hatch's brigade, Colonel Phelps commanding, arrived in support of my line, and the whole moved forward. The firing commenced within a few rods of this point, and appeared to be concentrated near the top of the mountain in front and on our right. The skirmishers of the Thirty-fifth and their supports of the Twenty-third were drawn in from the left, and merged in the general line of battle that was now moving steadily toward the summit of the mountain, under a most galling fire from the enemy above us, posted behind the trees and among the rocks. Before reaching the top of the hill, we were joined by Doubleday's brigade, and pushed to the summit, where the enemy were posted in force behind the fences, in the corn-field, and behind the rocky ledge.

On the right of my line Colonel Rogers, with the Twentieth (Eightieth New York Volunteers) and Twenty-first, had advanced cautiously until the enemy's position in the corn-field was discovered and a battery still higher up and farther to the right. Arrived within 30 paces of the top (eastern slope) of the mountain, Colonel Rogers pushed his command, in double-quick, up to the fence of the corn-field just in time to seize and hold it against a strong force of the enemy advancing to take possession of it. From this point the cannoneers of the battery were picked off so effectually as to silence it, and these two regiments participated in the general engagement that ensued all along the lines of Hatch, Meade, and Ricketts, resulting in a complete victory over the rebels and the possession of the open fields upon the mountain-top.

Darkness came on long before the firing had ceased, and it was impossible to rally, as a brigade, a line which had extended nearly 2 miles over an exceedingly rough and rocky mountain side and crest, covered sparsely in some places with oak and in others densely wooded with young pines. The Twentieth (Eightieth New York Volunteers) and Twenty-first remained during the night by the corn-field on the mountain, while the Twenty-third and Thirty-fifth, after the firing had ceased, retired to an open wood on the mountain side, where the Twenty-third had thrown off their knapsacks when ascending the heights.

On the morning of the 15th the brigade was reunited, and scarcely one man had failed to find and join his regiment during the night. The

officers and men, although fatigued, pushed rapidly up the mountain, went into the engagement with spirit, and their conduct was such as to meet my entire approbation.

The casualties were as follows:*

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

M. R. PATRICK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. E. P. HALSTEAD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Division Headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS PATRICK'S BRIGADE,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to the call from division headquarters for a report of the operations of the brigade under my command on the 17th instant, I have the honor to report the following statement:

The brigade, composed of the Twentieth New York State Militia, Twenty-first, Twenty-third, and Thirty-fifth New York Volunteers, leaving its position with the main body of the army near Keedysville toward evening on the 16th, crossed the ford of the Antietam, and marched nearly parallel with the other columns, my brigade leading the division commanded by General Doubleday. Arrived within three-quarters of a mile of the road from Sharpsburg to Williamsport, the Pennsylvania Reserves, General Meade commanding, became engaged on our left and in the woods with the enemy, whom they drove about half a mile. Meantime, and just as darkness was coming on, I was directed by a staff officer of General Hooker to place my brigade in and hold an open wood, skirting the Sharpsburg road. Although taking no part in the action, several of my men were wounded by the enemy's fire before and while taking position in the wood. I was then directed to connect my pickets with those of General Meade on my left, but owing to the darkness it was some time before this could be accomplished.

At this time Lieutenant-Colonel Hofmann, of Doubleday's brigade, coming up with his command, was placed in the interval between the Reserves and my brigade. As Colonel Hofmann was directly exposed to the action of a battery in his front, he brought up in the night some guns, and placed them in position to meet the fire of the enemy. The whole command lay on arms during the night, and at daybreak next morning (17th) the enemy opened fire upon us with round-shot, shell, and canister, by which a few of our men were wounded. My brigade, having led the day before, was now ordered to follow and support Gibbon's brigade, which had remained over night at some distance on my left and rear.

Putting my brigade in motion, we marched across the open field and into the wood beyond, through the plowed field and orchard into a corn-field, where Gibbon's brigade lay, and where my own was placed in its support. We could not have remained here more than from five to seven minutes, when I received an order from General Doubleday to march my brigade rapidly across the road, and hold the woods at a little distance on the right of the road. This movement was rapidly executed, but while in progress an order from General Doubleday directed me to send a regiment to protect a battery in the corn-field near the straw-stack. The Twentieth Regiment New York State Militia, Lieu-

* Nominal list, omitted, shows 3 killed, 19 wounded, and 1 missing.

tenant-Colonel Gates commanding, was instantly countermarched, and reported to General Gibbon, at Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, where it remained until the battery was withdrawn, some hours after. The Seventh Wisconsin Regiment crossed the road at the same time with my brigade, and took position in the wood parallel with and in advance of the lines, on the other side of the road beyond the battery, where it joined the Nineteenth Indiana, which had preceded it by only a very few minutes.

Scarcely had my three regiments reached the woods when a body of the enemy was discovered filing off to our right and rear into a corn-field, where a small battery had already been placed, and, on reporting the fact to General Hooker, he directed that one of my regiments should be detached to watch and check the movement. Colonel Hoffman, with the Twenty-third Regiment, was dispatched to the right to head off the enemy in that direction, and the Twenty-first and Thirty-fifth moved forward into the wood, closing upon the two regiments of Gibbon's brigade, whose skirmishers were now at the brow of the little eminence above the low grounds, in front of which was a corn-field, from which came the enemy's fire.

The fire of the enemy up to this time was brisk, not heavy, but on reaching this point a most galling fire was poured in from the enemy, strongly posted behind the rocks on our left, and my two regiments, Twenty-first and Thirty-fifth, were thrown forward into the first line to meet it. The troops on the opposite side of the road and fields and along the edge of the woods were now being rapidly driven back, and to check this advantage of the enemy, as well as to protect Battery B, on my left, I threw my whole command, including the Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana, across the open space and under the rocky ledge, perpendicular to my former position and parallel to the road, when I was joined at double-quick by the Twenty-third, now relieved on the right by General Meade. We remained but a few minutes here before we had checked the enemy's advance sufficiently to push our lines up to the road, which we held firmly for some time, the Thirty-fifth Regiment capturing the colors of the rebel regiment advancing on our battery.

Rallying once more, the enemy drove us back to the rocky ledge, which we held until our ammunition being almost exhausted and the line attacked in flank and rear on the right, I directed my command to fall back to a line of rock at right angles to the road and about 15 rods from the woods, to hold there until ammunition and re-enforcements could be obtained. We remained here between the fires of our own and the enemy's batteries long enough for the men to make coffee, they having moved so early as to fail of breakfast. Meanwhile, re-enforcements having arrived, although without getting ammunition except by equalization, the brigade (except the Twentieth Regiment, which had retired with the battery) again moved into the wood, in support of the new troops that were coming in. These troops, which I understood belonged to General Williams' command, came in in succession and at considerable intervals. The first line (composed, I think, of the Sixtieth and Seventy-eighth New York) being first in, were informed of the nature of the ground and position of the enemy before advancing, which was done cautiously, but not without loss, Colonel Goodrich, commanding (brigade, I understood), being killed on the spot. The other regiments of General Williams filed in obliquely and in front of Colonel Goodrich's line with a rapid step, and under the impression that the enemy were being driven.

The whole force now in the wood moved forward, when its advance was suddenly checked by a terrific fire on the left and front. As before, the lines of our troops were broken and thrown into confusion. All were retiring rapidly before the enemy along the same line as in the preceding engagement, and I once more threw my brigade under the ledge, partly to rally the retiring troops and partly to hold with our remaining cartridges until order could be restored. But few of the troops rallied, however, and after holding my command here until the enemy were close upon our right flank, the brigade was withdrawn in an unbroken line to the wood on the other side of the road, and took position to arrest the flight of stragglers. From this wood, after about three-quarters of an hour, we retired to a position near to and supporting the batteries in the open field, where we were joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Gates, of the Twentieth, who had been serving with Campbell's battery and had captured the battle-flag of one of the rebel regiments.

The troops under my command behaved in the most satisfactory manner, being perfectly cool and obedient to every word of command. Here, as at South Mountain and Groveton, Captain Kimball and Lieutenant Beckwith, of my staff, were invaluable, making up by their activity and energy the loss of my aide, Lieutenant Bouvier, seriously wounded at Groveton.

The casualties are as follows: Killed, 20; wounded, 180; missing, 17. A list of names is hereto appended.*

I am, captain, very respectfully, yours,

M. R. PATRICK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. E. P. HALSTEAD,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Division Headquarters.

No. 20.

Reports of Lieut. Col. Theodore B. Gates, Eightieth New York Infantry (Twentieth Militia), of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. TWENTIETH REGT. NEW YORK STATE MILITIA,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

GENERAL: I beg leave to submit the following report of the operations of my command at South Mountain:

We marched with the brigade from the south bank of the Monocacy, Frederick, on the morning of the 14th instant, and reached Catoctin Creek about noon. Here we halted for an hour or more, when we were ordered forward, and, passing a short distance beyond the creek on the Great Western turnpike, we turned to the right and followed an obscure road along the foot of South Mountain for a mile, when we turned to the left, and I was ordered by General Patrick to support the Thirty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers, which was thrown forward and up the mountain side, on the right of the turnpike, as skirmishers. I deployed my regiment, and followed the movement of the line of skirmishers, who advanced over the ridge of the mountain at that point and descended nearly to the turnpike. The skirmishers were recalled, and I was ordered to join the Twenty-first Regiment New York Volunteers with my command, which I did, finding it on the mountain side and

* Omitted; see revised statement, p. 189.

about midway between the two roads crossing the mountain in front of Middletown. Forming on the left of the Twenty-first, the two regiments advanced up the mountain side in line of battle, preceded by a line of skirmishers. Arriving near the crest of the mountain, our skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's. Soon afterward the two regiments pushed forward, and, passing over the mountain crest at that point, my regiment passed the line of skirmishers, and poured a volley into the enemy, who were lying behind a fence and in a corn-field. About this time the Fourteenth Regiment New York State Militia marched upon my left and likewise became engaged. The action continued until some time after dark, when firing ceased. During the latter part of the action, the Twenty-sixth New York Volunteers came forward and relieved the Fourteenth, whose right was about 100 feet in rear of my left, and, not being advised of my position, fired a volley into my left, supposing it to be the enemy. No injury was sustained, however, and before its repetition I advised the officer commanding the Twenty-sixth of my own position and of that of the enemy. At daylight next morning it was discovered that the enemy had retired, leaving his dead and wounded on the field. I rejoined the brigade by your order the next morning, and soon afterward resumed our march toward Boonsborough.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THEODORE B. GATES;

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

General M. R. PATRICK,
Commanding Brigade.

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HDQRS. TWENTIETH REGT. NEW YORK STATE MILITIA,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

GENERAL: I beg leave to submit the following report of the operations at Sharpsburg, in the battle of the 17th instant:

Having been posted with the brigade during the night of the 16th in a piece of woods south of the Williamsport road, and on the right of our line of battle, I marched at 6 a. m. on the 17th with the other regiments of the brigade, which advanced in line of battle, and deployed across the fields and through the woods on the left of the road, until we reached a narrow meadow lot between an orchard and a corn-field, in the latter of which the enemy were posted and were keeping up a brisk fire of musketry. We were now in range of their fire. On the right of the road, and a little to the front of our position, were two sections of Battery B, Captain Campbell, posted between some stacks of straw and a barn, and within short range of the enemy's sharpshooters. Your brigade was soon ordered to cross the road and move toward the right.

Having crossed the road, my regiment was detached to support Battery B, which was said to be in great danger. I moved back at a double-quick, and took position with the right wing of my regiment (the whole command did not number 150) in rear of the battery, and ordered the major to advance along the road next to the corn-field with the left wing. The infantry fire was very heavy during all this time, commencing from the corn-field and over a knoll in front of the battery. Major H. [Hardenbergh] pushed forward down the road, driving the enemy from the fences and the edge of the corn-field, and supporting the Sixth Wisconsin, which was on his left and in some disorder. For a time the enemy were completely driven from their cover, and in their flight aban-

doned their battle-flag (the bearer being shot down by Isaac Thomas, of Company G), which was brought off by Major H., as was also the regimental colors of the Sixth Wisconsin, which they had been compelled to leave on the field. The Wisconsin regiment falling back, and the enemy advancing, strongly re-enforced, Major H. fell back with his small party to the right wing. The enemy advanced, apparently with the intention of taking the battery, and drove the gunners from their pieces for a time, but the steady fire of my battalion checked and drove them back until the other regiments of your brigade reached the field to my right and front, when the enemy were driven to the left and rear.

The battery being no longer of service here, was removed to the hill on the left of the road, and some half an hour afterward I fell back to a piece of woods on the same side of the road, and subsequently rejoined the brigade.

My loss was 1 officer and 6 men killed, and 3 officers and 37 men wounded.*

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THEODORE B. GATES,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

General M. R. PATRICK,

Commanding Brigade.

No. 21.

Reports of Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade in the action of the 14th instant at South Mountain, near Middletown, Md.:

On the afternoon of that day my brigade was detached from the division and ordered to report for duty to Major-General Burnside. Late in the afternoon I was ordered to move up the Hagerstown turnpike with my brigade and one section of Gibbon's battery, to attack the position of the enemy in the gorge. The Seventh Wisconsin and the Nineteenth Indiana were placed respectively on the right and left of the turnpike, to advance by the head of the company, preceded by two companies of skirmishers from the Sixth and Second Wisconsin, and followed by these regiments, formed in double column at half distance, the section of the battery under Lieutenant Stewart, Fourth Artillery, keeping on the pike a little in rear of the first line. The skirmishers soon became engaged, and were supported by the leading regiments, while our guns moved forward on the turnpike until within range of the enemy's guns, which were firing on our column from the top of the gorge, when they opened with good effect. My men steadily advanced on the enemy, posted in the woods and behind stone walls, driving him before them until he was re-enforced by three additional regiments, making five in all opposed to us.

Seeing we were likely to be outflanked on our right, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Bragg, of the Sixth Wisconsin, to enter the wood on his right, and deploy his regiment on the right of the Seventh. This was

* But see revised statement, p. 189.

successfully accomplished, while the Nineteenth Indiana, supported by the Second Wisconsin, deployed, and, swinging around parallel to the turnpike, took the enemy in the flank. Thus the fight continued until long after dark, Stewart using his guns with good effect over the heads of our own men. My men, with their ammunition nearly exhausted, held all the ground they had taken, and were late in the night relieved, with the exception of the Sixth Wisconsin, which occupied the battlefield all night, by General Gorman's brigade.

The conduct of the officers and men was during the engagement everything that could be desired, and they maintained their well-earned reputation for gallantry and discipline acquired in the engagements of the 28th and 30th of August. Lieutenant Stewart used his guns with good judgment and effect, and begged to remain upon the field after his section was relieved by the other four pieces of the battery under Captain Campbell. I beg to recommend him to the favorable notice of the authorities.

My aides, Lieutenants Haskell and Hildreth, were prompt and energetic in transmitting orders, as was also Captain Cutting, of General Burnside's staff, who kindly volunteered his services for the occasion.

The loss in the brigade was 37 killed, 251 wounded, 30 missing; total, 318.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN GIBBON,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieutenant-Colonel RICHMOND,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Burnside's Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE,
Camp near Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade during the action of the 17th near this place:

The brigade was, by direction of Major-General Hooker, detached from the division, and ordered to advance into a piece of wood on the right of the Hagerstown turnpike, toward the village of Sharpsburg. The brigade advanced in column of divisions on the left of the turnpike until the head of it reached an open space, when the Sixth Wisconsin was deployed and pushed forward into a corn-field in our front, the Second Wisconsin being deployed and formed on its left, while a section of Gibbon's battery, under Lieutenant Stewart, was brought into action in the rear, to fire over the heads of our men in reply to one of the enemy's batteries in their front. The Sixth and Second pushed gallantly forward, supported by the Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana, when, finding the enemy was likely to flank us on the right in the wood, which extended down in that direction, I ordered up Stewart's section, and directed the Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana to deploy to the right of the line, and push forward rapidly into the woods. The whole line soon became hotly engaged, and the enemy, heavily reinforced from the woods, made a dash upon the battery. This attack, however, was successfully repelled by heavy discharges of canister from the guns, the fire of the few remaining men of the Second and Sixth Wisconsin, and the flank fire poured in by the Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana, which had been brought around to sweep the front of the battery with their fire, Captain Campbell having in the mean time joined Stewart's with the other four pieces of the battery.

In this severe contest Lieutenant-Colonel Bragg, Sixth Wisconsin, and

Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, Second Wisconsin, both commanding their regiments, were wounded and taken from the field. The gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman, commanding the Nineteenth Indiana, fell mortally wounded, and Captain Campbell, while gallantly serving his guns, was stricken down by a ball through the shoulder. Thirty-eight of the battery men were killed and wounded, 27 of the horses killed, and, finding the guns almost deprived of support and of cannoneers to work them, I ordered them to limber to the rear and fall back, followed soon after by the infantry of my brigade, much reduced in numbers and scant of ammunition. The loss of the brigade is again an evidence of its well-earned honors.

While referring to the regimental reports for special mention of meritorious individuals, I beg leave to call attention to the steadiness and gallantry of both officers and men, and especially to the coolness and bravery of Lieutenant-Colonels Bragg, Bachman, and Allen; Major Dawes, Captain Callis, and Captain Campbell, and Lieutenant Stewart, of Gibbon's battery. My aides, Lieutenants Haskell and Hildreth, were, as usual, prompt and active in conveying my orders, and the former, while carrying a message to General Hooker, had his horse killed under him.

The loss in the brigade is as follows: 61 killed, 274 wounded, 45 missing; total, 380.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN GIBBON,
Commanding.

Capt. E. P. HALSTEAD,
Assistant Adjutant-General, King's Division.

No. 22.

Report of Col. Solomon Meredith, Nineteenth Indiana Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.

HEADQUARTERS GIBBON'S BRIGADE,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I most respectfully submit to you the following report of the part taken by the Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers in the battle of the 14th instant at South Mountain:

On the evening of the 13th we encamped 2 miles southeast from Frederick, Md. We left camp soon after sun-up, marched through Frederick, took the road toward Hagerstown, and marched 12 miles. On arriving near South Mountain, it was ascertained that the enemy was in force on the mountain and in the pass. I was ordered to form a line of battle about 3 o'clock p. m., which was done on the hill facing the mountain. Remained there until about 5 o'clock, when we were ordered to go forward. We went forward in line of battle on the left of the pike leading through the pass, supported by the Second Wisconsin, two companies of which (commanded by Captain Colwell) had been deployed as skirmishers. I also deployed Company B, Captain Dudley's, as flankers, to protect our left flank. We moved slowly and cautiously, but steadily, forward. The skirmishers were soon fired on, but pressed forward with caution.

On arriving near a house on our extreme left, surrounded on the southwest and north by timber, I discovered large numbers of the enemy in

* But see revised statement, p. 189.

and around the house. They had been annoying us as well as the skirmishers by firing from the house and outhouses; also from the woods near the house. I ordered Lieutenant Stewart, who commanded a section of Battery B, Fourth Artillery, to come forward and open fire upon the house. He moved forward his section of two pieces and threw several splendid shots, the first of which took effect in the upper story, causing a general stampede of their forces from that point, enabling us to go forward more rapidly, and with less loss from their sharpshooters. Their skirmishers soon opened a sharp fire upon ours, which made it necessary for us to push forward. We then opened fire on the enemy at short range, who were concealed in part under cover. The fire became general on both sides. The Nineteenth gave a shout, and pressed forward—continued a steady step forward, cheering all the time. It was a most magnificent sight to see the boys of the Nineteenth going forward, crowding the enemy, cheering all the time.

After driving the enemy about three-quarters of a mile, I discovered a stone fence in front, which the enemy had fallen back to. At that point they were annoying us very much. I then ordered Captain Clark, Company G, to wheel his company to the left, and move by the right flank until he could command the line of battle lying directly behind the stone fence. They then opened a flank fire upon the enemy, causing them to retreat precipitately, which gave us an opportunity of pouring upon them a raking fire as they retreated. Captain Clark here took 11 prisoners—1 major, 1 captain, and 1 lieutenant amongst them. The firing then ceased in front of us. The Second Wisconsin came to our support promptly as soon as the firing became general, and stood by the Nineteenth until the enemy fled over the mountain. After the firing ceased in front, we discovered the enemy, who was concealed behind a stone fence on the right of the pike, in front of the Seventh Wisconsin, annoying them by a deadly fire behind their breastworks. Colonel Fairchild, commanding Second Wisconsin, wheeled the left wing of his regiment, and opened an enfilading fire upon the enemy. After exhausting their ammunition, he withdrew them and ordered up his right wing to take their place, in which position they remained until they exhausted their ammunition, when they were withdrawn. I then took forward my regiment and occupied the same position, and continued an enfilading fire upon the enemy, who soon fell back from their strong position, the Wisconsin and Indiana boys giving three hearty cheers as the fate of the day was thus decided.

It was then after 9 o'clock in the night, and pursuit being considered dangerous, we lay down on our arms, holding the battle-field. Small detachments of my command were now engaged in bringing in wounded prisoners. We held the field until about 12 o'clock, when we were relieved by fresh troops. The loss in the Nineteenth Indiana was 9 killed, 37 wounded, and 7 missing, making an aggregate of 53.

It was a glorious victory on the part of General Gibbon's brigade, driving the enemy from their strong position in the mountain gorge. The boys of the Nineteenth Indiana behaved most gloriously. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon them for their courage and gallantry. The officers were active in the discharge of their duties. Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman was very efficient on this occasion, rendering me important service.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. MEREDITH,

Colonel Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers.

Lieut. FRANK A. HASKELL,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 23.

Report of Capt. William W. Dudley, Nineteenth Indiana Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP, GIBBON'S BRIGADE,
September 21, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers in the battle of the 17th instant:

Owing to the fall which Colonel Meredith received in the battle of the 28th of August, and the subsequent fatigue and exposure of the marches up to the 16th instant, he was unable to take command on our movement across the Antietam Creek. The command now fell upon Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman. Immediately on crossing the creek we were advanced in line of battle up the hill in a plowed field which covered the brow of the hill. Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman immediately deployed Company A, Sergeant Eager, forward as skirmishers through the corn-field, in order to protect our front and the crossing of our division, which, being accomplished, we were ordered to join the brigade and move farther up to the right. We stopped for the night, having closed column by division on first division, right in front.

Early on the morning of the 17th instant we were called up and prepared to go into action. We moved directly to the front, in column by division. Our first casualty occurred in a peach orchard near the destined battle-field.

We now moved to the edge of a corn-field near a stone house, which was immediately used as a hospital. Here we lay down, while our skirmishers were scouring the corn-field in front. We were soon ordered to the right, to a piece of woods which skirted the battle-field on the right. Here we deployed column and formed our line of battle on the right of the Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman ordered Company B, then my command, to deploy forward as skirmishers. This being done, the regiment moved slowly forward till the right was through the wood, when we halted. It was at this time that the attempt was made to take Battery B, Fourth Artillery, which was stationed at the straw-stacks near the stone house hospital. Upon seeing the advance of the enemy, Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman at once called in the skirmishers, and changed front forward on the tenth company, so as to front the left flank of the enemy.

As soon as it was practicable we opened fire on them, and we have every reason to believe that our fire was very effective in repulsing their attack on the battery. Soon we saw the enemy falling back in great disorder, and it was at this juncture that the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman, yielding to the urgent appeals of the men, gave the order to charge, and, hat in hand and sword drawn, he gave the order "double-quick," and bravely led on, the men following, cheering as they advanced. We charged across the pike and followed the retreating rebels to the brow of the hill, over which they had a strong reserve of infantry and three pieces of artillery, which pieces seemed to have been abandoned by horses and men. It was at this point that brave Lieutenant-Colonel Bachman fell, mortally wounded, and I took command immediately. As soon as we could carry his body to the rear, we fell back to the pike and rallied. Here we received an enfilading fire, the enemy having succeeded in approaching within 100 yards of our right,

under cover of the woods. We again fell back to our old position, and remained there until relieved by one of General Patrick's regiments. We then fell back in good order slowly about 30 rods into the open field.

In making the charge and retiring, our colors fell three times, the bearers severely wounded. When they fell the last time, they were picked up and carried off the field by Lieut. D. S. Holloway, of Company D. One of our men captured a rebel flag and took it to the rear. In this charge Lieut. William Orr, Company K, was severely wounded. At this time, about 2 o'clock p. m., we retired from the field in good order, and formed in a strip of woods to the rear of the battle-field with the other three regiments of our brigade, for the purpose of stopping stragglers.

Our loss was, killed, Lieut. Col. A. O. Bachman and 7 men; wounded, Lieut. William Orr, Company K, and 70 men; missing, 26 men.*

The officers all vied with each other in the performance of their duty, and too much praise cannot be awarded to the non-commissioned officers for their gallant conduct; and the men of this regiment are all brave men, if we except the few who found their way to the rear when danger approached.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM W. DUDLEY,

Captain Company B, Comdg. Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers.

Lieut. FRANK A. HASKELL,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Gibbon's Brigade.

No. 24.

Report of Col. Lucius Fairchild, Second Wisconsin Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.

CAMP, GIBBON'S BRIGADE,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following as the part taken by the Second Wisconsin Volunteers, under my command, in the battle of South Mountain, Maryland, on Sunday, September 14, 1862:

Soon after a large portion of Hooker's corps were in line, and advancing up the mountain on the right of the turnpike, Gibbon's brigade advanced on the pike to the foot of the mountain. On arriving there, the Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers and my regiment filed into the field on the left. Companies B and E of my regiment were deployed as skirmishers, and ordered to advance, their right resting on the pike. The Nineteenth Indiana followed, with my regiment in their rear about 200 yards. By order of General Gibbon, we moved thus in double column until well within the gap. While lying down in that position, a shell from the enemy struck and exploded in the ranks of the second division of the Second Regiment, killing 4 and badly wounding 3. Soon after, I deployed my column, the skirmishers being briskly engaged, and, when the Nineteenth Indiana opened fire, I moved forward to their right, the right of my regiment resting on the turnpike, and opened fire. After expending some 20 rounds of ammunition, I discovered the enemy had entirely disappeared from our front. Then I ordered the

* But see revised statement, p. 189.

men to fire by the right-oblique, on a line of the enemy who were firing on the Seventh Wisconsin. After a short time I ceased firing, and, the better to get at the enemy, changed direction with the right wing of my regiment. In that position good execution was done until their ammunition was all expended, when they were withdrawn to the line, and the left wing took their place. After the left wing had expended their ammunition and had been withdrawn, the Nineteenth took the same position, by wings. All were then ordered to lie down. The fire from the enemy ceased and all was quiet.

I ordered Company A to deploy as skirmishers to the extreme left of the Nineteenth Indiana, and sent a few men to the front a short distance, to prevent a surprise. Thus we lay until nearly midnight, when part of General Gorman's brigade took our ground, while we fell back a short distance for ammunition. The action was not resumed after my regiment left the front line.

Fortunately the Second suffered lightly in comparison with other regiments of the brigade, as the list of killed and wounded, heretofore forwarded, will show.

As usual, the officers and men behaved well. Captain Colwell, of Company B, was killed while in command of the line of skirmishers. His place can hardly be filled. He was a fine officer and beloved by the whole regiment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LUCIUS FAIRCHILD,

Colonel Second Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers.

FRANK A. HASKELL,

Lieut. and A. D. C., Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Gibbon's Brigade.

No. 25.

Reports of Lieut. Col. Edward S. Bragg, Sixth Wisconsin Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

GIBBON'S BRIG., HDQRS. SIXTH REGT. WISCONSIN VOLS.,
In the Field, September 20, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with circular from headquarters, I have the honor to report that at the battle of South Mountain, on the 14th instant, the Sixth Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers moved up the mountain gorge to the right of the turnpike, in support of the Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers, who were moving in front, supporting a line of skirmishers. The skirmishers soon found the enemy in front, and an irregular fire commenced. This was past twilight. The Seventh moved to the support of the skirmishers, and was soon engaged with the enemy, who was concealed in a wood on their left and in a ravine in front. So soon as the Seventh received the fire of the enemy and commenced replying, I deployed the Sixth, and with the right wing opened fire upon the enemy concealed in the wood upon the right. I also moved the left wing by the right flank into the rear of the right wing, and commenced a fire by the wings alternately, and advancing the line after each volley.

At this time I received an order from the general, directing me to flank the enemy in the wood. The condition of the surface of the ground, and the steepness of the ascent up the mountain side, rendered this movement a difficult one; but without hesitation the left wing moved by the

flank into the wood, firing as they went, and advancing the line. I directed Major Dawes to advance the right wing on the skirt of the wood as rapidly as the line in the wood advanced, which he did. This movement forward and by the flank I continued until the left wing rested its right on the crest of the hill, extending around the enemy in a semi-circular line, and then moved the right wing into the wood so as to connect the line from the open field to the top of the hill. While this was being done, the fire of the enemy, who fought us from behind rocks and trees, and entirely under cover, was terrific, but steadily the regiment dislodged him and kept advancing. Ammunition commenced to give out, no man having left more than four rounds, and many without any. It was dark, and a desperate enemy in front.

At this moment I received an order from General Gibbon to cease fire and maintain the position, and the battle was won. I directed my men to reserve their fire, unless compelled to use it, and then only at short range, and trust to the bayonet. No sooner did the time of fire cease than the enemy, supposing we were checked, crept close up in the wood and commenced a rapid fire. I directed a volley in reply, and then, with three lusty cheers for Wisconsin, the men sat cheerfully down to await another attack; but the enemy was no more seen.

I held the ground until daylight, when I threw out skirmishers, and soon found the enemy had withdrawn in the night, leaving a few dead on the field, and a large number of muskets also.

Soon after daylight my regiment was relieved by the Second New York, from Gorman's brigade, who had been lying in the field, under cover of a stone wall, at a safe distance in the rear, refreshing themselves with a good night's sleep, after a long and fatiguing march of some 10 miles.

The object accomplished, and the time and place of doing it, speak all that need be said for officers and men of the regiment.

Our loss was 11 killed and 79 wounded; total, 90.*

I have the honor to be, respectfully,

EDWD. S. BRAGG,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Sixth Wisconsin.

Lieut. FRANK A. HASKELL,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

GIBBON'S BRIG., HDQRS. SIXTH REGT. WISCONSIN VOLS.,
In the Field, September 21, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with circular from brigade headquarters, I have the honor to report that, early on the morning of the 17th, the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, under my command, supported by the brigade, commenced the attack upon the enemy's left flank. No sooner was the column in motion than the enemy opened fire on us with artillery, and so accurate was his range that the second shell exploded in the ranks, disabling 13 men, including Captain Noyes, Company A. Notwithstanding this shock, the column moved steadily forward until it reached the wood, when, by direction of General Gibbon, Company I was deployed to the left and Company C to the right in front of the line as skirmishers, and the regiment immediately deployed and advanced to their support.

* But see revised statement, p. 184.

The skirmishers soon found the enemy lodged in a corn-field and his advance concealed along fences and under cover, but rapidly drove in his advance, and the regiment moved up steadily in support, the right and center on and to the right of the Hagerstown turnpike, and the left across a corn-field. While advancing into the corn-field, Capt. Edwin A. Brown, Company E, a good officer and a genial gentleman, fell, killed instantly by a musket ball.

The portion of the line in the corn-field was under the immediate command of Maj. Rufus R. Dawes, who discharged his duty in watching and guiding its movements with signal courage and ability. This portion of the line was soon under heavy fire, and drove the enemy from his cover.

The advance of the right wing did not discover the enemy until it reached a rise of ground in front of the barn and stacks to the right of the road, when the enemy's skirmishers lying along the edge of a wood running down in a point to the right of the barn, where they were lying undisturbed—the right of my line of skirmishers having failed to advance, either from a failure to hear or heed commands. [*Sic.*]

At this moment a piece of artillery which had been stationed in front of my left changed its position and passed into the road in my front. I immediately ordered the company in the road to advance to the summit of a ridge of ground a few rods in front and open fire upon the horses attached to the piece, with a view of disabling and capturing it; and at the same time I ordered Companies G and K, on the right, to advance and occupy a basin between two ridges, and a few yards nearer the enemy. So soon as this was attempted I discovered the enemy in force, lying in line of battle along the fence and across the field to the wood, at right angles with the road, his line being then within musket range. At the same time he increased his fire from the woods on the right flank. This rendered the advance impracticable, and I ordered the company in the road to lie down under cover of the fence. No sooner had I given this order, and while it was being executed, than I received a slight but painful wound in the left arm, but still was able to direct the right companies, G and K, to draw back their line under cover of the fence and fronting the road, which was being executed when faintness compelled me to go to the rear, and I was unable to rejoin my regiment until it had been relieved.

At the request of Major Dawes, who was in command during my absence, I have the honor to report that the regiment conducted itself during the fight so as to fully sustain its previous reputation; that it did not abandon its colors on the field; that every color-bearer and every member of the guard was disabled and compelled to leave; that the State color fell into other keeping, temporarily, in rear of the regiment, because its bearer had fallen; but it was immediately reclaimed, and under its folds, few but undaunted, the regiment rallied to the support of the battery. The color lance of the National color is pierced with five balls, and both colors bear multitudes of testimony that they were in the thickest of the fight.

The regiment remained in the front of the fight until they had expended nearly their last round of ammunition. The enemy broke and ran before their advance, leaving his dead and wounded in large numbers on the field, and the regiment pursued, and only retired again in the presence of a host that it would have been madness to have opposed with a handful of men, brave though they were and fearless.

In this advance two stand of colors were captured and sent to the rear in charge of a wounded soldier, and have become lost or fallen

into the possession of some one desirous of military *éclat* without incurring personal danger, so that they cannot be reclaimed by the captors.

Here Captain Bachele, Company F, fell, leading his men in the pursuit. He was a true soldier, a gallant officer, and a faithful man. He never shrank from danger nor flinched from any duty. He fell as he desired, with his harness on, cheering his men to victory. His body rests underneath the sod he lost his life to win.

The loss of the regiment in the engagement was as follows: Commissioned officers, 3 killed, 5 wounded; enlisted men, 23 killed, 121 wounded; aggregate, 152.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWD. S. BRAGG,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers.

Capt. J. P. Wood,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Gibbon's Brigade.

No. 26.

Reports of Capt. John B. Callis, Seventh Wisconsin Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. SEVENTH REGIMENT WISCONSIN VOLUNTEERS,
Near Boonsborough, Md., September 15, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Seventh Regiment of Wisconsin Volunteers in the action of the 14th of September, 1862, at South Mountain, Md.:

About 5 o'clock p. m. the Seventh Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers formed in line of battle on the north side of the turnpike. Skirmishers were thrown in advance of us, and soon encountered the skirmishers of the enemy. A sharp skirmish fire ensued. The regiment then broke by the right of companies to the front, and advanced, keeping 100 paces in rear of the line of skirmishers. We advanced in this way through a corn-field for half a mile, and came out into an open field. Here the skirmishers met such a sharp fire from the sharpshooters of the enemy, that it was difficult for them to advance farther, the open field affording no shelter or protection against the sharp fire from the bank. The regiment then formed a line of battle, and advanced, our left touching the pike, our right extending north to the edge of the woods on the slope of the mountain. The enemy opened a destructive enfilading fire from a stone fence on our left, at a short range, which drew the fire from our regiment to the left. We kept advancing and firing until another enfilading fire from the woods on our right, and a direct fire from behind a stone fence in our front, showed our close proximity to the enemy's line of battle. Our men returned the fire with great vigor. The Sixth Wisconsin Regiment was then in line in our rear some 50 paces. Colonel Bragg, seeing the destructive fire under which we were fighting, double-quickened the Sixth Wisconsin Regiment to our right and opened on the enemy, thereby drawing the enfilading fire hitherto received by us from the woods on our right.

Colonel Fairchild, of the Second Wisconsin Regiment, at this juncture was a little to rear and left of the pike, with the Second Wisconsin Regiment. He also seeing our perilous condition, brought his regiment for-

ward on our left, and commenced a fire that relieved us from further annoyance from the left, thus leaving us to contend against a direct fire from behind a stone wall in our front. The firing was kept up without ceasing until about 9 o'clock at night, when our ammunition became exhausted. The fact was made known to General Gibbon. His answer was, "Hold the ground at the point of the bayonet." Our men were ordered to lie down; the cartridges were taken from the boxes of the dead and wounded, and distributed among the men who were destitute of ammunition. I then gave them orders to load, and reserve their fire for a close range. The enemy coming to know our condition, commenced advancing on us in line, whereupon I ordered the regiment to rise up, fix bayonets, and charge on the advancing column. Our regiment had not advanced farther than 20 feet when we fired. This broke the enemy's lines, and they retired in great confusion.

Our loss was heavy in killed and wounded. The aggregate of killed, wounded, and missing was about 147. The regiment went into the action with 375 muskets. The officers and men of the regiment all fought well, doing their whole duty. About 10.30 o'clock the regiment was relieved by part of General Gorman's brigade, the Fifteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

JNO. B. CALLIS,

Captain, Commanding Seventh Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers.

FRANK A. HASKELL,

Aide-de-Camp and Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Gen. Gibbon's Brig.

HDQRS. SEVENTH REGIMENT WISCONSIN VOLUNTEERS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 18, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Seventh Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers in the action of the 17th instant, at or near Antietam Creek, Maryland:

At or about 5 o'clock a. m. on the 17th day of September, 1862, the Seventh Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers lay near to and on the left and south side of the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg pike, between Keedysville and Sharpsburg, at which time and place the enemy commenced shelling our camp from our front and right. We marched in column by division in rear of the Sixth Wisconsin Regiment, until we came within some 300 yards of the enemy's line of battle, where we came to a halt and awaited further orders. We soon received orders to march by the flank across the pike into an open field on the right of the pike, and deploy into line of battle, and march in line into a belt of woods that lay in our front. I threw the regiment forward until it came up to the line of skirmishers which covered our front. They informed me that they could advance no farther into the woods; that the enemy lay massed in the timber in our front. We commenced removing the fence in front of us, when the enemy opened a destructive fire from the woods in our front. Our men returned the fire, and charged over the fence, vigorously keeping up the fire until the enemy retired from the woods and entered a corn-field in front of our left.

I then saw heavy columns advancing on the Sixth and Second Wisconsin Regiments, which lay on our left. I immediately changed front, so as to get a raking fire on the left flank of the enemy's column as they advanced in front of the Sixth and Second Wisconsin. As soon

as this was done, we opened a fire on their flank that broke them up badly, scattering them in great confusion. They, however, soon rallied and returned our fire, making sad havoc in our ranks. General Patrick came up in our rear with support, and ordered his men to advance through our line to the front, which they did, but not without suffering severely. The Seventh Wisconsin then marched by the flank to the place where we first entered the woods, the enemy showing signs of a flank movement on our right. The regiment lay in this position until the enemy, unseen by us, had planted a battery about 300 yards distant on our right, supported by infantry. They commenced throwing grape and canister into our ranks with terrible effect, whereupon we retired under cover of an elevation of land covered with timber, thereby rendering their fire harmless to us until we joined the balance of the brigade, which lay then to our rear.

Our men all stood and fought bravely. Our number on entering the field was about 190 men. We lost 9 killed, 26 wounded, and 5 missing.*

I have the honor, sir, to be your most obedient servant,

JNO. B. CALLIS,

Captain, Commanding Seventh Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers.

FRANK A. HASKELL,

Aide-de-Camp, and Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Gibbon's Brigade.

No. 27.

Report of Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, THIRD CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, September 21, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division:

On the morning of the 14th instant the division was under arms to march at daylight from its encampment near the Monocacy, and arrived at the east side of South Mountain, about a mile north of the turnpike, at 5 p. m., forming line of battle, First Brigade, Brigadier-General Duryea, on the extreme right; Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Hart-suff, in the center, and Second Brigade, Colonel Christian, on the left. The route of the First and Third Brigades extended over very rough ground to the crest of the mountain, which was gallantly won. On the left the Second Brigade was sent to the relief of General Doubleday's, which was hard pressed and nearly out of ammunition. It engaged the enemy with terrible effect, and drove him down the west side of the mountain.

It being now too dark to advance, and the men much exhausted, operations ceased for the night. The next morning, the enemy having fled during the night, the division moved forward and encamped near Keedysville. The artillery was not engaged.

The list of casualties is annexed: First Brigade, 5 killed, 16 wounded; Second Brigade, 2 killed, 6 wounded; Third Brigade, 2 killed, 4 wounded. Total killed and wounded, 35.

From Keedysville on the afternoon of the 16th the division crossed

* But see revised statement, p. 189.

the Antietam River and moved toward Sharpsburg, in direction of the enemy's left flank. Third Brigade was formed in line of battle while under fire from the enemy's artillery; Second Brigade toward the left of the Third, and First Brigade in reserve. The artillery, though within range, was placed as much under shelter as possible for the night.

The morning of the 17th your order to advance and occupy the woods in front was being carried out, when General Hartsuff, who was examining the ground, was severely wounded, and the services of this valuable officer were lost. The brigade moved forward, supported by Second Brigade on the left and First Brigade on the right, all advancing with the artillery, Battery F, First Pennsylvania, under Captain Matthews, and Captain Thompson's Independent Pennsylvania Battery, each consisting of four 3-inch rifled guns. Taking advantage of the ground, both batteries opened with destructive effect, officers and men displaying great coolness while exposed to a severe fire of artillery and infantry.

The division gained the outer edge of the wood, and kept up a fearful fire for four hours, until, the ammunition being exhausted and the supports coming up, it was compelled to retire to refill boxes, after which the division joined the rest of the corps on the right, near the turnpike, and, with the exception of a brisk fire from the enemy's artillery, under which they stood, was not employed again during the day only to hold that position.

I commend the general good conduct of the division, and would mention particularly Brigadier-General Duryea; Colonel Coulter, Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteers; Colonel Lyle, Ninetieth Pennsylvania Volunteers; Capt. E. W. Matthews, First Pennsylvania Artillery, and Capt. James Thompson, Independent Pennsylvania Artillery; also the names in the subjoined list, marked B. Indeed, both officers and men displayed courage under a severe fire.

Casualties as per annexed list, marked C*: Out of 3,158 taken into action, 1,051 were killed and wounded—153 killed and 898 wounded.

Of my staff I take pleasure in mentioning the distinguished gallantry of Capt. John W. Williams, assistant adjutant-general; also Capt. Benjamin W. Richards, aide-de-camp, and Capt. F. Gerker, commissary of subsistence.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES B. RICKETTS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER.

—
B.

*List of officers and men who behaved with gallantry in the engagements of
September 14-17, 1862.*

FIRST BRIGADE.

One hundred and fifth Regiment New York Volunteers:

Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll.

Maj. J. W. Shedd.

Captain Bradley.

Lieutenant Doolittle.

Assistant Adjutant-General Duryea.

* Nominal list omitted.

One hundred and seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers:

Captain Scheffer.
 Lieutenant Corcoran.
 Color-Sergeant Kehoe.
 Color-Sergeant Hough.
 Color-Sergeant Phillips.
 Color-Sergt. H. W. Smyser.
 Color-Sergeant Pike.

One hundred and fourth Regiment New York Volunteers:

Captain Tuthill.
 Lieutenant Dow.
 Color-Sergeant Cain.
 Color-Sergeant Rogers.
 Private Maurice Buckingham seized the colors when Color-Sergeant Rogers was shot.

Ninety-seventh Regiment New York Volunteers:

Lieutenant Carpenter.
 Lieutenant Hopkins.
 Lieutenant Spencer.
 Lieutenant Brennan.

A. DURYEA,
Brigadier-General.

To which should be added—

One hundred and seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers:

Captain MacThomson.
 Captain Roath.

One hundred and fourth New York Volunteers:

Captain Wing.

SECOND BRIGADE.

Ninetieth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers:

Lieut. Col. William A. Leech.
 Maj. A. J. Sellers.
 Adjt. D. P. Weaver.
 Capt. Charles F. Maguire.
 Capt. Jacob M. Davis.
 Capt. John W. Barnes.
 Capt. John A. Gorgas.
 Capt. William H. Warner.
 First Lieut. A. Morin.
 First Lieut. J. M. Moore.
 First Lieut. W. F. Myers.
 First Lieut. George W. Watson.
 First Lieut. F. A. Chadwick.
 Second Lieut. S. W. Moore.
 Second Lieut. G. E. Lindsley.
 Second Lieut. E. J. Gorgas.
 Second Lieut. W. H. Heulings.
 Second Lieut. R. W. Davis.
 Second Lieut. John T. Riley.
 Second Lieut. J. P. Mead.
 Second Lieut. William S. Ellis.
 Private Paul, who carried the colors, the color-bearer having been killed in the early part of the engagement.

P. LYLE,
Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade.

THIRD BRIGADE.

Eighty-third Regiment New York Volunteers:

Capt. John Hendrickson.

Captain Moesch.

Thirteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers:

Major Gould.

Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers:

Adjutant Uncapher.

Lieutenant Thomas.

Twelfth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers:

Captain Allen.

Lieutenant Clark.

Lieutenant Dehon.

Capt. B. F. Cook.

R. COULTER,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES B. RICKETTS,

Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Division.

No. 28.

Report of Capt. James MacThomson, One hundred and seventh Pennsylvania Infantry, First Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Camp near Mercerville, Md., October 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report respecting the One hundred and seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers in the two actions, September 14 and 17, at South Mountain and Antietam:

Arriving at the base of South Mountain, after a wearisome march of 17 miles, on September 14, at about 5.30 o'clock p. m., we found the enemy fiercely engaged with the Pennsylvania Reserves. Immediately, in compliance with orders from General Duryea, formed in line of battle near the foot of the hill, and gave orders to move forward with fixed bayonets. Nothing could exceed the promptness of both officers and men in the execution of this order; with enthusiastic cheers they dashed forward, and soon the enemy were scattered, and in much confusion were flying before us. Several times they rallied, and once in particular, having gained an admirable position behind a stone fence, they appeared determined to hold on to the last. Here it was they sustained their greatest loss. Colonel Gayle, Twelfth Alabama, fell dead, and the lieutenant-colonel Fifth South Carolina wounded and taken prisoner. Their stand at this point delayed not the onward movement of the One hundred and seventh a moment, but in a little while we were over the fence and among them, taking 68 prisoners, killing and wounding quite a number, and causing the remainder to fly precipitately to the top of the mountain. Following, we drove them across the narrow plain on the summit and part way down the other side. Night ended the pursuit; but, fearing a surprise, I directed officers and men to rest in line during

the night, prepared for any emergency, and threw 200 yards in advance a volunteer picket of 10 men. About 1 o'clock a. m. one of these pickets brought in a rebel adjutant-general, who had the temerity to venture close to our lines. In this engagement we lost 3 men killed and 18 wounded.* This small loss is accounted for by the fact that the rebels, being all the while located above us, shot too high. In evidence of the truth of this statement, our colors were completely riddled, while the color-bearer was in nowise injured. The next morning, September 15, we moved forward, and at night crossed the Antietam near Keedysville, bivouacking on the opposite side. On Tuesday afternoon we again moved forward, and, after a few miles' march, the advance of our corps engaged the enemy, who, located in a favorable position in the woods, made a stubborn resistance, but finally gave way, falling back, however, but a short distance.

The coveted ground gained by our force, and night coming on, no farther advance was made, and both armies lay on their arms, ready for the fierce fight of to-morrow, our brigade having reached a point less than half a mile in rear of the outer pickets.

At early dawn, agreeably to orders, I moved the One hundred and seventh Regiment by the flank to the field on the right. Here, forming column by divisions, we moved forward through a narrow strip of timber, gained the night previous, into a plowed field, in which, opposite side, Thompson's Pennsylvania battery had just gotten into position. Advancing half way across the field to within easy supporting distance of the battery, we halted for about five minutes, the enemy's shell and round shot flying about us like hail, killing and wounding some of our poor fellows, but not injuring the *morale* of the regiment in the least. Shortly we were again advancing and passing the battery, and over a clover field reached the spot so frequently mentioned in the reports of this battle—the corn-field. Deploying into line, we entered the field and pushed rapidly through to the other side. Here we found, in different positions, three full brigades of the enemy. We opened fire immediately upon those in front, and in fifteen minutes compelled them to fall back. Receiving re-enforcements, however, he soon regained his position, and an unequal conflict of nearly three-quarters of an hour resulted in forcing us back through the corn-field. Our brigade had, however, done its work. We had held at bay a force of the enemy numerically five times our superior for considerably more than an hour, and at one time driving them. We were now relieved by re-enforcements coming up, and retired to the rear. During the balance of the day we were constantly on the *qui vive*, but were not again called into action save to support batteries.

In the battle of Antietam the One hundred and seventh Regiment had 190 men engaged, and lost 19 men killed and 45 wounded, a total loss of 85 killed and wounded in both engagements. Too much cannot be said of the dashing bravery of both officers and men at South Mountain or of their heroic firmness and cool bearing when standing still in line of battle at Antietam. They, for more than an hour, received (and returned) the fire of a force infinitely superior.

With much respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,
JAMES MAC THOMSON,

*Capt., Comdg. One hundred and seventh Regt. Pennsylvania Vols.,
in the engagements of September 14 and 17, 1862.*

Lieutenant KENNY,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

* But see revised statement, p. 185.

No. 29.

Report of Lieut. Col. Richard H. Richardson, Twenty-sixth New York Infantry, Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 19, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with orders, this regiment marched from camp near Frederick at 6 o'clock a. m. Sunday, September 14, 1862, 12 miles to the gap, near Boonsborough, arriving on the battle-ground at 6 o'clock p. m., and formed in line of battle on the right of the brigade, and advanced up the slope toward the enemy, who occupied the corn-field and brush at the top of the hill. In going up we marched by the left flank, as ordered, for the purpose of gaining ground to the left and relieving regiments then engaged. On reaching the fence along the timber at the hill-top, we halted, and commenced firing from the left of the battalion, the right reserving their fire, not being in range of the enemy, until after some moments later. The left wing of the regiment fired some 20 rounds and right wing 4 rounds, when the order was given to cease firing, and lay on our arms in the same position until morning, with skirmishers advanced.

I would further report as casualties: Killed, none; wounded, 2.

Marched from camp near Keedysville about 3 o'clock p. m. September 16 to the battle-ground, near Sharpsburg, and took position in line at 8.30 o'clock p. m. Was not engaged that evening, but lay on our arms until morning, posting pickets as ordered. Marched at daylight September 17, under orders, across the fields, formed line of battle, occupying the left of the brigade, and halted some 400 or 500 yards from the wood, beyond which the enemy lay in position. I was directed to deploy in column by division, which I did, and advanced obliquely toward the wood under a heavy fire of shot and shell, and halted, as directed, 100 yards in rear of the brigade of General Duryea, that brigade moving to the right. I was ordered to advance in support of General Hartsuff, and did so. Under direction of General Seymour we deployed in line of battle along the fence, the left of the battalion connecting with the right of another regiment, the right with the left of the Ninety-fourth New York Volunteers.

The enemy were in sight, about 350 yards, engaged with Hartsuff's brigade. I gave the command to commence firing by file, and the battalion continued firing evenly and carefully for some 30 rounds, average, when the command ceased firing, saving ammunition. This cessation brought the enemy out more plainly in view on the open ground, and we again opened fire, driving the enemy again behind the fence, and under cover of the corn-field. I again gave orders to cease firing, being nearly out of ammunition, and sent word twice to the colonel commanding the brigade for ammunition or relief. We resumed our firing until every round of cartridge was expended, when, the relieving column advancing, we retired in good order to the point indicated for supplying the men.

Without particularizing, I can but say that every officer and man in the command performed his duty in the coolest manner, obeying every order with alacrity, and executing with determination, under fire, two hours and a quarter.

Casualties: 5 killed, 41 wounded, 20 missing; total, 66,

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to be, colonel, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. H. RICHARDSON,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Twenty-sixth New York Volunteers.

Lieut. DAVID P. WEAVER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Brigade.

No. 30.

Report of Lieut. Samuel A. Moffett, Ninety-fourth New York Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. NINETY-FOURTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
Saturday, September 20, 1862.

DEAR SIR: In compliance with general orders, I would respectfully report that on Sunday, September 14, our regiment marched from Frederick to South Mountain, arriving at that point at about 6 o'clock p. m. We continued the march until part way up the mountain, when we formed in line of battle, and for a short time remained at a halt. Very soon after we were ordered to march by the front toward the summit, which was continued but a short distance, when we were ordered to move by the left flank. In this direction we moved until far enough to join the right of our brigade upon the left of the First Brigade, when we were again ordered to move to the front, changing our direction by the right flank. We then continued our advance to the front until we occupied our position during the engagement, our regiment being upon the extreme left of the brigade. During the action Capt. D. C. Tomlinson was wounded in the back of his neck; also one private of Company D. Number of killed, 2.

Evening having so far set in, the engagement was soon brought to a close. We laid on our arms during the night. Monday, 15th, finding the enemy had retreated, we began a march in pursuit, which was continued to Keedysville, where we encamped for the night. 16th, during the latter part of the day, we again took up our march, and continued it to the battle-ground near Sharpsburg, Md., arriving there at about 11 p. m., when we rested on our arms until the morning of the 17th, between 5 and 6 a. m., when we moved from the position we then occupied to another piece of woods, and immediately formed in line of battle and marched to the front, where our men were engaged for little more than one hour. Our position occupied during this engagement was next to the extreme left of the brigade.

S. A. MOFFETT,

Lieutenant, Commanding Regiment.

Colonel LYLE,

Commanding Second Brigade.

No. 31.

Report of Capt. Henry R. Myers, Eighty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-EIGHTH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 19, 1862.

I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders detailing the regiment as wagon guard on the 14th instant, we marched from about a

mile east of Frederick City through that town, and halted about 2 miles west of it until near dark, when we received orders to join the brigade. We started on the march, passing through Middletown, and encamped on South Mountain late at night until daylight next morning (15th), when we continued our march in search of the brigade, which we reached about 10 a. m. About noon we started, passing through Boonsborough, and encamped about half a mile outside of Petersville [Keedysville]. Late in the afternoon on the 16th we moved forward on the left of the Ninetieth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, and laid on our arms all night in a woods.

Shortly after daylight our division advanced in line of battle, our brigade supporting General Hartsuff, the Ninetieth on our right and Ninety-fourth on our left, to the end of a woods, where we relieved the Ninth New York, and commenced firing, continuing for about two hours, when we were ordered to fall back, fill our cartridge-boxes, and draw rations. We then waited further orders.

During the engagement Maj. George W. Gile was badly wounded in the leg, and the command devolved upon Capt. H. R. Myers.

The loss is as follows: Killed, 10; wounded, 62; missing, 5.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

H. R. MYERS,

Captain, Commanding Eighty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Lieut. DAVID P. WEAVER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 32.

Report of Col. Peter Lyle, Ninetieth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. NINETIETH REGT. PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,

On the road to Sharpsburg, Md., September 19, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders received from brigade headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the regiment under my command in the recent engagements with the enemy on the 14th, 16th, and 17th instant:

At 4 a. m. on Sunday morning, the 14th, the regiment, then lying outside of Frederick, was under arms, and left Frederick about 9 a. m., taking the turnpike toward Middletown. We arrived at the latter place about 12 m., when we were halted on the road for some time, until Reno's division had passed us. We then took up the march; passed up the turnpike a mile; took the road to the right; passed up the mountains, and were formed in line of battle, with orders to support Hartsuff's brigade. While standing in this position we received orders to advance into the woods, where our troops in front were engaging the enemy.

The firing of musketry at this time being most terrific, we advanced in line of battle, moving obliquely to the left and front. Having received later orders to relieve Doubleday's brigade, who were running out of ammunition, we moved up to the crest of the hill, took the position occupied by Doubleday's brigade, and immediately engaged the enemy. The firing was kept up until darkness put an end to the engagement. We had but 3 men wounded slightly, who were by mistake included in the list furnished for the 17th instant. We lay on our arms all

night, and during the night we took some 15 prisoners, some of whom were wounded.

The next morning we found that the enemy had retreated during the night, leaving on the field, immediately in front of our position and within 20 yards of our lines, from 400 to 600 dead, the wounded, except those mentioned above, having been carried off.

The same morning we started off in pursuit, and on Tuesday, having crossed the Antietam the day before, we came up with the enemy, and having formed in close column under fire from their batteries, entered the wood, and formed in line of battle on the left of Hartsuff's brigade, the Pennsylvania Reserves being in the wood in front of us.

We again lay on our arms all night, and at daybreak the next morning (17th) we moved to the right, passed to the front through a corn-field, and took position on the left of Matthews' battery, First Pennsylvania, which we were ordered to support. Here we were exposed to a severe fire of musketry and shell, we being immediately in rear of the skirmishers, who were engaging the enemy in the corn-field in front. We were moved to the left behind a wood, and formed in close column. The shells falling around us, the battery was moved to the front, into the woods. Here we were subject to a raking fire of grape, canister, and shell. The battery fell back, and the regiment was deployed and moved to the front in line. We passed through the woods into a plowed field, where we engaged the enemy until our forces on the right and left gave way, when, having but about 100 men left, we fell back slowly and in good order, under cover of the woods, and then, being hard pressed by the enemy, we fell to the rear, finding that fresh troops were coming to our relief.

I again take the occasion to call your attention to Lieut. Col. William A. Leech, Maj. A. J. Sellers, and Adjt. D. P. Weaver, who throughout all these engagements behaved with great coolness and bravery.

I desire also to mention for their coolness on the field, Capts. Jacob M. Davis, William H. Warner, Charles F. Maguire (wounded), John W. Barnes, and John A. Gorgas; Lieuts. F. A. Chadwick, A. Morin (wounded), J. P. Mead, J. M. Moore (wounded), S. W. Moore (wounded), W. H. Hewlings, W. F. Myers, Lindsley, R. W. Davis, G. W. Watson, E. J. Gorgas, J. T. Riley, and W. S. Ellis; also Private W. H. Paul, who carried the colors, the color-bearer having been killed in the early part of the engagement.

Respectfully submitted.

P. LYLE,

Colonel, Commanding Ninetieth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Captain PALMER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 33.

Reports of Brig. Gen. George G. Meade, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION (MEADE'S), HOOKER'S CORPS,
September 24, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves under my command during the action of South Mountain Gap on the 14th instant:

The division left its camp at the Monocacy early on the morning of

the 14th instant, and marched to Middletown and beyond, where it was halted about 1 p. m. of that day. General Reno's corps being in front and engaged with the enemy, about 2 p. m. the division was ordered to the front to his support. The enemy was disputing our passage over the turnpike through the South Mountain; and had been attacked on the left by General Reno. After some consultation with the general commanding the right wing and the corps, I was directed to move the division on a road leading off to the right of the turnpike and toward the enemy's left. After advancing over a mile on this road, the division, which was the advance of the corps, was turned across the field to the left, and moved in an advantageous position to support Cooper's battery, which it was proposed to establish on an adjoining eminence.

The enemy, perceiving these dispositions, opened on the column from a battery on the mountain side, but without inflicting any injury. Captain Cooper's battery of 3-inch ordnance guns was immediately put in position on the ridge above referred to, and at the same time, by direction of the general commanding the corps, the regiment of First Rifles of the division was sent forward as skirmishers to feel for the enemy. Being well satisfied, from various indications, that the enemy occupied the mountain in force with his infantry, the general commanding the corps directed me to advance my division to the right, so as, if possible, to outflank them, and then to move forward to attack him. A slight description of the features of the ground is necessary to properly describe the movements of the division. The turnpike from Fredericktown to Hagerstown in crossing the mountains takes a general direction of northwest and southeast. The mountain ridge occupied by the enemy was perpendicular in its general direction to the road. Parallel to the mountain was another ridge, separated from it at the turnpike by a deep valley, but connected at the upper end by a very small depression. Over this second ridge there was a road, along which I advanced Seymour's brigade of the division, directing him to push forward and feel the enemy.

Soon after advancing, General Seymour reported that he could take the crest of the first ridge, along which ran the road, and could then advance across the ravine to the second ridge, which I immediately ordered him to do. At the same time I deployed Gallagher's (Third) brigade parallel to the mountain, and also Magilton's (Second) brigade on the same line, but down in the valley, and, when the line of battle was completely formed, directed a general advance of the whole. Seymour soon gained the crest of the first ridge, and then moved in the same direction as the other two brigades. Gallagher and Magilton advanced steadily to the foot of the mountain, where they found the enemy's infantry. In a short time the action became general throughout the whole line. Steadily the line advanced up the mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from whence he was slowly, but gradually, dislodged, Seymour first gaining the crest of the hill, and driving the enemy to the left along the ridge, where he was met with the fire of the other two brigades. Soon after the action commenced, having reason to believe the enemy was extending his left flank to outflank us, I sent to the general commanding the corps for re-enforcements, which were promptly furnished by sending General Duryea's brigade of Ricketts' division. Owing, however, to the distance to be traveled to reach the scene of action, Duryea did not arrive on the ground till just at the close of the engagement. His men were promptly formed in line of battle, and advanced on the left of Seymour, but only one regiment had an opportunity to open fire before the enemy retired and darkness intervened.

The conduct of the division on this occasion was such as to uphold its well-earned reputation for steadiness and gallantry, and, fortunately, was witnessed by the general commanding the corps, as well as by others. I am greatly indebted to Brigadier-General Seymour for the skill with which he handled his brigade on the extreme right flank, securing by his maneuvers the great object of our movements, viz, the outflanking the enemy. To Colonel McNeil, of the First Pennsylvania Rifles, who with his regiment has always been in the advance, I am indebted for ascertaining the exact position of the enemy.

Colonels Magilton and Gallagher, in command of the Second and Third Brigades, formed their men and carried them to the summit of the mountain in the most creditable manner. I regret to report that Colonel Gallagher, while gallantly leading his men, was wounded and compelled to leave the field. To my personal staff, consisting of Capt. E. C. Baird, assistant adjutant-general, Capt. J. Adair, commissary of subsistence, and Lieuts. William Riddle and A. G. Mason, Fifth Pennsylvania Reserves, acting aides-de-camp, I am indebted for the prompt execution of all my orders, carried under a severe fire across rocks, stone walls, and the most rugged country I almost ever saw.

The command rested on their arms during the night. The ammunition train was brought up and the men's cartridge-boxes were filled, and every preparation made to renew the contest at daylight the next morning should the enemy be in force. Unfortunately, the morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented any view being obtained, so that it was not till 7 a. m. that it was ascertained the enemy had retired entirely from the mountain.

I beg leave to refer to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders for the several parts taken by their commands. I also accompany this report with a consolidated return of the killed and wounded and missing, amounting, as will be seen, to 399 in all, or about 10 per cent. of the force taken into action.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. G. MEADE,

Brigadier-General, Comdg. Division Pennsylvania Reserves.

Maj. JOSEPH DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD (MEADE'S) DIVISION,

September 22, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of the division under my command in the actions of the 16th and 17th instant, on the Antietam:

The division left the mountain gap on the morning of the 15th, and marched beyond Keedysville, bivouacking on the forks of the Big and Little Antietam. On the afternoon of the 16th, about 2 p. m., the division, constituting the advance of Hooker's corps, moved, by direction of the general commanding the corps, on the road to Williamsport, where, after crossing the bridge over the main Antietam, the head of the column was moved to the left across the country, advancing on what was understood to be the enemy's left flank. Soon after leaving the road, the cavalry advance reported having been fired upon, when, by direction of the general commanding the corps, the regiment of First Penn-

* But see revised statement, p. 186.

sylvania Rifles (Bucktails) was advanced as skirmishers to a piece of woods on our left, and four companies of the Third Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves were deployed as skirmishers and sent into a piece of woods on our right, the main column formed of battalions in mass, division front, with the artillery moving over the open ground for a high ridge in front.

The Bucktails' skirmishers finding the enemy, General Seymour, with the First Brigade, was directed to advance to their support. This was promptly done, and soon Seymour was closely engaged with the enemy's infantry and artillery, Cooper's battery being posted by Seymour to reply to the enemy's artillery. In the mean time I had gained the crest with the head of the column, and entered a piece of woods, which proved to be in its direction perpendicular to the line along which Seymour had advanced. On entering these woods, the enemy's battery could be plainly seen in a corn-field, playing on Seymour's column in their front. The masses of his infantry deployed around the battery, and the fact that only one regiment—the head of my column—was deployed, deterred me from the endeavor to capture the battery by a charge. I, however, immediately ordered up Ransom's battery of light 12-pounders, who promptly came to the front and in battery at the edge of the woods, opening on the enemy's battery and infantry a destructive enfilading fire, which soon caused him to withdraw his guns to an eminence in the rear, from which he commenced shelling the woods we occupied, and the ridge immediately behind it.

In the mean time Magilton's and Anderson's (Second and Third) brigades came up, and were deployed in line of battle to support Ransom's battery. After driving the enemy from the woods, Seymour held his own, and, darkness intervening, the contest closed for the night, Seymour holding the woods immediately in front of the enemy, and Anderson and Magilton the woods on their flank. Ransom was withdrawn to the rear. Cooper remained in the position occupied in the commencement of the action, and Simpson's battery of howitzers, which had been posted on the ridge to the rear, replying to the enemy's battery in its second position, also remained there.

During the night the enemy made two attacks on Seymour's pickets, in both of which he was repulsed with, it is believed, severe loss.

At early daylight on the 17th the contest was warmly renewed by Seymour, the enemy attacking him with vigor. The general commanding the corps had sent Ricketts' division to Seymour's support, and had advanced Doubleday's division along the woods occupied by Magilton's and Anderson's brigades. These brigades were formed in column of battalions in mass, and were moved forward in rear of Doubleday. Seymour and Ricketts advancing through one piece of woods, and Doubleday, on their right, advancing along the Hagerstown pike, left an open space between, in which was a plowed field and an orchard; beyond this was a corn-field, the possession of which the enemy warmly disputed.

Ransom's battery was advanced into the open ground between the two advancing columns, and played with great effect on the enemy's infantry and batteries. The brigades of Anderson and Magilton on reaching the corn-field were massed in a ravine extending up to the pike. Soon after forming, I saw the enemy were driving our men from the corn-field. I immediately deployed both brigades, and formed line of battle along the fence bordering the corn-field, for the purpose of covering the withdrawal of our people and resisting the farther advance of the enemy. Just as this line of battle was formed, I received an

order from the general commanding the corps to detach a brigade to re-enforce our troops in the woods on the left. I directed Magilton's brigade to move in that direction, which order was promptly executed, notwithstanding the brigade, moving by the flank, was subjected to a warm fire from the corn-field.

Anderson's brigade still held the fence on the right, but the gap made by the withdrawal of Magilton was soon filled by the enemy, whose infantry advanced boldly through the corn-field to the woods. Seeing this, I rode up to Ransom's battery and directed his guns on their advancing column, which fire, together with the arrival of Magilton's brigade, in connection with Seymour and Ricketts, drove the enemy back, who, as they retreated, were enfiladed by Anderson, who eventually regained the crest of the ridge in the corn-field. At this time, about 10 a. m., my division had been engaged for five hours, and their ammunition was being exhausted. I therefore welcomed the arrival of Banks' corps, the left column of which, commanded by the gallant Mansfield, moved up to our support in the woods on the left, and a column under General Williams moved up to the woods on the right by the turnpike.

I should have mentioned previously that the Tenth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, was detached across the pike to watch our right flank, and was eventually, I believe, put in action by General Gibbon, rendering good service in that part of the field; also that Cooper's battery of 3-inch guns and Simpson's howitzers were early in the morning posted on the crest of the ridge we occupied the evening previous, from whence they had a command of the enemy's left flank, and were in action at various times during the day, opening whenever they saw any of the enemy's artillery or infantry, and doing good service in protecting our hospital and trains in the rear. Between 11 and 12 a. m., Mansfield's corps having reached the scene of action, also Sumner's, the corps had the misfortune to lose the services of its skillful and brave commander, who was wounded in the foot, and who did me the honor to direct me to assume the command of the corps on his leaving the field. I directed the various divisions to be withdrawn as soon as they were relieved, and to be assembled and reorganized on the ridge in our rear. By 2 p. m. the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, now commanded by General Seymour, were organized on this ridge, supplied with ammunition, and held in readiness to repel an attack if the enemy should attempt one on our right flank, and assist in any advance we might make.

I beg leave to refer to the reports of the several brigade and regimental commanders for the details of the operations. I desire particularly, however, to call your attention to the report of Brigadier-General Seymour, because, from the confidence I placed in the judgment and military skill of that officer, I left entirely to him the management and direction of his brigade, the first in action and the only one engaged with the infantry on the afternoon of the 16th, and the first to commence and the last to leave on the 17th. I desire to commend most particularly to your notice the gallantry and good conduct of this officer, which I have no doubt you observed yourself.

I feel it also due to the memory of a gallant soldier and accomplished gentleman to express here my sense of the loss to the public service in the fall of Col. Hugh McNeil, of the First Pennsylvania Rifles, who fell mortally wounded, while in the front rank, bravely leading on and encouraging his men, on the afternoon of the 16th. Many other brave and gallant soldiers were killed and wounded, for whose names I refer you to the accompanying list. The division went into action under

3,000 strong, and lost in killed and wounded over 570—20 per cent. The conduct throughout the action, both of officers and men, was such as to merit my warmest thanks, and to truly entitle them to the name of veterans.

To my personal staff, consisting of Capt. E. C. Baird, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieuts. William Riddle and A. G. Mason, aides, I am indebted, as heretofore, for the prompt execution of my orders, under the severest fire. Lieutenant Riddle received a painful wound in the hand just before the division was withdrawn from the field.

I cannot close this report without calling your attention to the skill and good judgment, combined with coolness, with which Captain Ransom, his officers (Lieutenants Weir and Gansevoort) and men, served his battery. In a previous part of this report I have described the advance of the enemy through the corn-field, and the check the column received from Captain Ransom's fire. I consider this one of the most critical periods of the morning, and that to Captain Ransom's battery is due the credit of repulsing the enemy. I also wish to mention particularly the efficiency and gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves, both in the actions at South Mountain and on the Antietam. He was detached with his regiment for special service, accomplished by him in the most creditable manner, and in the latter battle he was severely wounded. He is an officer whom I would be glad to see elevated to a higher position.

Surg. William King, the medical director of the division, was early on the field in both actions, and with his usual energy and promptitude brought up the ambulances and established the hospitals in such manner as to secure for our wounded the speediest assistance.

There are many other names that will be brought to your notice through the reports of subordinate commanders, as I have confined myself in this report exclusively to those that came under my special notice.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. G. MEADE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. JOSEPH DICKINSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 34.

Report of Capt. James H. Cooper, Battery B, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, of the battle of South Mountain.

* * * * *

At 3.30 o'clock p. m., by order of General Hooker, the battery was placed upon a high hill to the right of the turnpike and near the base of the mountain. Immediately on coming into battery, 25 or 30 case-shot were thrown among the enemy on the slope of the mountain, scattering them, but, eliciting no reply from the enemy's guns, I ceased firing, by General Hooker's order, that the infantry might advance. The position of our lines prevented any further firing during the evening, no order to change position being received.

No casualties attended the engagement. * * *

J. H. COOPER,

Captain Pennsylvania Artillery, Commanding Battery B.

No. 35.

Report of Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of South Mountain.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., PENNSYLVANIA RES. VOL. CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 24, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Of the movements and conduct of this command during the recent battles at South Mountain and near this place, I have the honor to report as follows:

The brigade is composed of the First Pennsylvania Rifles, better known as Bucktails, Colonel McNeil; First Regiment, Col. R. Biddle Roberts; Second, Captain Byrnes; Fifth, Colonel Fisher, and Sixth, Colonel Sinclair, all of which regiments are much reduced in numbers and strength by the battles and exposures of the Peninsula.

On the 14th instant, Hooker's corps being ordered to engage the left of the rebel position on South Mountain, this brigade was placed on the extreme right, and after being massed at the base of the slope, was advanced through open woods and over cultivated ground, on the right of a road leading up a ravine, and intersecting the turnpike in rear of the mountain. The Bucktails were thrown forward as skirmishers, supported by the Second and two companies of the First; the remainder of the brigade followed closely.

On a prominent hill on his extreme left, and on our right of the road alluded to above, the rebels had posted a regiment, the Sixth Alabama. A brisk fire was opened upon our skirmishers by this regiment, and by a battery on the mountain to our left. The exposure was great, and numbers fell under the accurate fire of the shell from these guns, but the enemy was rapidly driven, the hill won, and many prisoners taken. Looking to the left, an extended field of corn led directly to the main position on the mountain itself. The First, Second, and Fifth changed direction, and, supported by the Sixth in column of companies, continued the attack. A few volleys were fired, bayonets were leveled, three hearty cheers given, and the whole line moved quickly up the hillside with an impetus that drove the enemy from cover and gave us the crest in time to anticipate a fresh brigade which was advancing to support their line, but which then turned in retreat. Later other brigades came up on our left, and night coming on, the pursuit, from the rough nature of the ground, had to be abandoned.

Rodes' brigade of five Alabama regiments was understood to have been in our front on this occasion. The brigade lost many good officers and men, but the advance was superb in its steadiness and resolution, and was thoroughly successful in its results.

To Colonel Fisher, Colonel Sinclair, Col. R. Biddle Roberts, Colonel McNeil, of the Rifles, and Captain Byrnes, great praise is due for the energy and courage with which their regiments were led into action, and their promptness in carrying out my orders.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. SEYMOUR,

Brigadier-General U. S. Vols., Comdg. First Brigade.

Capt. E. C. BAIRD,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Meade's Division.

No. 36.

Reports of Col. Albert L. Magilton, Fourth Pennsylvania Reserves, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., PENNSYLVANIA RES. VOL. CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to make the following report of the Second Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, in the action of South Mountain, September 14, 1862:

The Second Brigade started from the Monocacy River Sunday, September 14, 1862, and traveled the Hagerstown turnpike until it reached the base of the South Mountain. Here the brigade was marched on a road leading to the right about 2 miles, and formed in line of battle facing the mountains. The Third Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps was then detached to watch the road we had just come out, about the distance of three-quarters of a mile to our right, and did not become engaged. The remaining regiments were then ordered to the front up the mountain. At the foot of the mountain we engaged the enemy, and we advanced steadily to the front, driving the enemy over the mountain. Becoming quite dark, and our ammunition giving out, I took up a position and remained sleeping on our arms for the night.

I have the pleasure to state that all did their duty well, and pushed forward with great courage, for which they deserve the highest praise. A list of the killed, wounded, and missing has been furnished.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. L. MAGILTON,

Col. Fourth Regt. Pa. Res. Vol. Corps, Comdg. Second Brig.

Lieut. CHARLES N. JACKSON,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Seymour's Division.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., PENNSYLVANIA RES. VOL. CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to make the following report of the Second Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, in the actions of September 16 and 17, 1862:

The Second Brigade marched from near Keedysville, on the Williamsport road, on the 16th of September, 1862. When near the Williamsport and Sharpsburg turnpike the enemy was discovered to our left. We immediately advanced toward the enemy; four companies of the Third Regiment were deployed as skirmishers, who advanced to our front and right. The other regiments were marched in column of battalions, of division front, until we came to a woods, directly in front of the enemy's position; here we deployed in line under cover of the woods and the night, for it was quite dark. Captain Ransom, with Company C, Fifth Regulars, United States Artillery, was ordered by General Meade immediately to our front, and he opened a fire upon the enemy's battery, which was firing upon the First Brigade, which soon silenced the enemy's guns. The battery was then withdrawn, and we slept upon our arms for the night, throwing out a picket to the front.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 185.

Early on the morning of the 17th instant the enemy attacked the First Brigade on our left and front, and King's division was thrown to our front and right. King's division giving way, the Second Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, was ordered to the front, and deployed, then moved by the left flank, under a dreadful fire, which caused the center and right of the brigade to give way; but rallying immediately, afterward advanced to the front, and drove the enemy after an obstinate resistance. Being immediately re-enforced by General Sumner's corps, the brigade withdrew in good order, and fell to the rear, where the remainder of the division had assembled.

I have to speak particularly of the gallant conduct of Major Baily and his regiment (the Eighth). It was this regiment that stood its grounds manfully, and served as the rally point for the rest of the brigade, that at one time had broken.

A list of killed, wounded, and missing has been furnished.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. L. MAGILTON,

Col. Fourth Regt. P. R. V. C., Actg. Brig. Gen. 2d Brig. P. R. C.

Lient. CHARLES N. JACKSON,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 37.

Report of Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson, Ninth Pennsylvania Reserves, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of South Mountain.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., PENNSYLVANIA RES. VOL. CORPS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, September 22, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the battle of September 14:

At daylight on the morning of the 14th this brigade broke camp near Frederick, and took up the line of march in the direction of Middletown. Having passed Middletown, the command halted on the banks of the creek and rested for about one hour, when the march was resumed, in the same direction as pursued in the fore part of the day, for the distance of about a mile. We here filed to the right along a road running at right angles with the turnpike. Pursuing this road the distance of half a mile, we entered the open fields to the right of the road, when we were immediately ordered to support Cooper's battery, which had taken position on a hill to the left and looking toward South Mountain, upon which the enemy had planted and opened a battery on us as we filed through the open fields. A few shots fired by Cooper elicited no response from the enemy, and we were ordered to form a line of battle, which was done in the following order: The Ninth on the right, the Eleventh in the center, the Twelfth on the extreme left, and the Tenth as a reserve 50 or 75 paces in the rear. Our brigade now began to move obliquely to the right and front under a severe fire of artillery posted on the mountain, but which did very little, if any, damage.

Moving on, we soon met the enemy, posted at the base of the mountain and sheltered by a stone wall. The firing immediately commenced on both sides. Here Colonel Gallagher, who had command of the bri-

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 191.

gade, and who had gallantly led it into action, was severely wounded in the arm by a musket ball, and forced to leave the field. Our line moved steadily on, not once giving way or faltering. The enemy were driven from their shelter, and steadily pursued up the mountain till the summit was nearly gained by our men, when, all our ammunition having been expended, Duryea's brigade having come up and taken its position in front of us, portions of the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth (through a misconception of orders) fell back to supply themselves with ammunition. The Tenth Regiment, which had been ordered forward to fill up the gap between our right and Seymour's left, and which had fought its way gallantly up to the other regiments of the brigade, was ordered to hold its position. When the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Regiments fell back it was dark, and 11 o'clock before they were supplied with ammunition. The firing having ceased before these regiments left, and our forces being in quiet possession of the crest of the mountain, it was not thought advisable to order them up the mountain again that night; another consideration being that the men were much fatigued by a long march and their exertions upon the field.

My report of the battle of South Mountain closes with the remark that it was a severe one, and that every officer and man of this command did his duty nobly.

Respectfully submitted.

ROBERT ANDERSON,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

No. 38.

Report of Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army, commanding Second and Twelfth Army Corps, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Harper's Ferry, October 1, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, on the evening of the 16th ultimo, I received an order at Keedysville to send the Twelfth Corps (Banks') to support General Hooker, and to hold my own, the Second Corps, in readiness to march for the same purpose an hour before daylight. Banks' corps, under General Mansfield, marched at 11.30 p. m., and my own corps was ready to move at the time ordered, but did not receive from headquarters the order to march till 7.20 a. m. on the 17th. I moved Sedgwick's division immediately in three columns on the receipt of the order, followed by French's division in the same order. Richardson was ordered to move in the same direction by the commanding general about an hour later. On arriving at the place where Hooker had been engaged, I found him wounded, and his corps, after a severe contest, had been repulsed. Banks' corps, under the immediate command of General Mansfield, had gone into battle on Hooker's left, and was engaged when I came upon the field. General Mansfield, a worthy and gallant veteran, was unfortunately mortally wounded while leading his corps into action. My First Division (Sedgwick's) went into battle in three lines. After his first line had opened fire for some time, the enemy made a most determined rush to turn our left, and so far succeeded as to break through the line between Banks' corps and my own until they began to appear in our rear. In order to repel this attack from the rear, I immediately faced Sedgwick's third line about,

but the fire at that moment became so severe from the left flank that this line moved off in a body to the right, in spite of all the efforts that could be made to stop it. The first and second lines after some time followed this movement, but the whole division was promptly rallied, took a strong position, and maintained it to the close of the battle. Richardson's and French's divisions maintained a furious and successful fight from the time they entered the battle till the end of it, highly to the honor of the officers and soldiers.

Major-General Sedgwick was severely wounded, but remained on the field for some time afterward, exerting himself to the utmost. Major-General Richardson was also seriously wounded while gallantly leading his division, and was obliged to be borne from the field. Brigadier-Generals Dana and Max Weber were also wounded at the heads of their brigades, and were obliged to leave the field.

I regret to report that the loss in my corps was very heavy, which is to be accounted for by the long and furious contest that my divisions had to maintain in the center against the most determined efforts of the enemy.

I cannot give too much praise to the regimental officers and soldiers of the Second Corps, and I adopt and indorse all the subordinate reports.

As the circumstances of the battle prevented me from witnessing the conduct of Banks' corps, I would refer to the report of General Williams for all that relates to that corps.

I would respectfully commend to the Government the following general officers who were distinguished for their zeal and devotion: Maj. Gen. I. B. Richardson, Maj. Gen. J. Sedgwick, Brig. Gen. A. S. Williams (commanding Banks' corps), Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard, Brig. Gen. W. S. Hancock, Brig. Gen. W. A. Gorman, Brig. Gen. N. J. T. Dana, Brig. Gen. W. H. French, Brig. Gen. N. Kimball, Brig. Gen. Max Weber, Brig. Gen. T. F. Meagher, and Brig. Gen. J. C. Caldwell.

I would also beg leave to recommend my staff officers, Lieut. Col. J. H. Taylor, adjutant-general; Lieut. Col. P. J. Revere, inspector-general; Lieut. Col. C. D. Blanchard, chief quartermaster, and my aides, Maj. L. Kip, Capt. W. G. Jones, Capt. J. C. Audenried, and Capt. S. S. Sumner. These young men behaved in the most gallant manner, and did all that men could do to aid me throughout this trying battle.

Lieutenant-Colonel Revere and Captain Audenried were both severely wounded, and obliged to leave the field.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. V. SUMNER,

Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

P. S.—The following batteries belonging to my corps were all engaged on the 17th ultimo, and all rendered distinguished services: Capt. J. A. Tompkins' battery, Rhode Island Artillery; Capt. R. D. Pettit's battery, First New York Artillery; Capt. J. D. Frank's battery, First New York Artillery; Capt. J. G. Hazard's battery, Rhode Island Artillery; Capt. C. D. Owen's battery, Rhode Island Artillery; Lieut. E. Kirby's battery, First U. S. Artillery; Lieut. E. Thomas' battery, Fourth U. S. Artillery.

E. V. SUMNER,

Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Harper's Ferry, October 4, 1862.

I accidentally omitted to mention in my report of the battle of Antietam the names of Maj. F. N. Clarke, chief of artillery, and Surg. A. N. Dougherty, medical director, of my corps. These officers were both highly distinguished for their zeal and ability.

I would request that this note may be annexed to my report.

Very respectfully,

E. V. SUMNER,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

General S. WILLIAMS.

No. 39.

Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, Second Army Corps, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, SECOND CORPS D'ARMÉE,
Harper's Ferry, September 29, 1862.

COLONEL: In obedience to instructions from the major-general commanding the corps, I have the honor to submit a narrative of the operations of this (Richardson's) division during the battle of Antietam, and the time subsequent thereto, until the enemy had retreated from the field, Major-General Richardson's wound being of such a nature as to render it impracticable for him to make the report as to the period during which he exercised the command.

About 9.30 o'clock a. m. on the 17th instant, the division, commanded by General Richardson, crossed the Antietam at the ford constructed by our engineers; then moved forward on a line nearly parallel to the creek, and formed line of battle by brigades in a ravine behind the high ground overlooking Roulette's house, the Second Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Meagher, on the right, his regiments being placed in the following order from right to left: The Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, commanded by Lient. Col. James Kelly; the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes; the Sixty-third New York Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Burke, and the Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, commanded by Lient. Col. Patrick Kelly; the Third [First] Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Caldwell, on his left, and the brigade commanded by Colonel Brooke, of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, in the rear. Meagher's brigade immediately advanced, and soon became engaged with the enemy, posted to the left and in front of Roulette's house. This brigade continued its advance under a heavy fire nearly to the crest of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the enemy being posted in strong force in a sunken road directly in its front.

A severe and well-sustained musketry contest then ensued, which, after continuing until the ammunition was nearly expended, this brigade, having suffered severely, losing many valuable officers and men, was, by direction of General Richardson, relieved by the brigade of General Caldwell, which until this time had remained in support. Caldwell's brigade advanced to within a short distance of the rear of Meagher's brigade. The latter then broke by companies to the rear, and the former by companies to the front, and in this manner passed their respective lines. Caldwell's brigade immediately advanced to the crest over-

looking the sunken road and about 30 yards distant from it, and at once became engaged in a most desperate contest, the enemy then occupying that position in great strength, supported by other troops in their rear toward Piper's house.

The regiments of this brigade were posted in the following order, from right to left: The Sixty-first New York and Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers, consolidated temporarily, under command of Colonel Barlow; the Seventh New York Volunteers, commanded by Captain Brestel; the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanded by Major McKeen, and the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Cross. At this time Colonel Brooke's brigade formed a second line in support of Caldwell's brigade, the regiments of General Meagher's brigade retiring to the rear to replenish their ammunition, having received an order to that effect from General Richardson.

The enemy having pierced the troops on the right of Roulette's house, belonging to some other division of our forces, Colonel Brooke, observing it, applied for orders to General Richardson to repair the accident, and immediately led three regiments in that direction, and formed line of battle on the crest in front of Roulette's house and inclosures, sending one regiment (the Fifty-third Pennsylvania, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel McMichael) to dislodge the enemy, who had then gained a foothold in the corn-field in rear of those buildings. The enemy was promptly driven out by this regiment, which held the ground until ordered subsequently to march to another part of the field. The enemy having retired on these demonstrations, the other two regiments (the Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Parisen, and the Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, commanded by Captain Wehle) were then led by Colonel Brooke to the support of General Caldwell's brigade, forming line on the same crest with it, that brigade being then hard pressed by the enemy, and a vacant space having been made in the line owing to the fact that the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers had been moved to the left by Colonel Cross to prevent a flank movement by the enemy toward our left, which was handsomely frustrated by that officer. A spirited contest arose between his regiment and a force of the enemy, each endeavoring to be the first to gain the high ground to the left, and each force delivering its fire as they marched by the flank in parallel lines. Colonel Cross captured one regimental color in this contest.

The two regiments of Colonel Brooke's brigade last referred to immediately became engaged on the left of the remainder of General Caldwell's, the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers being still farther to the left. The enemy was re-enforced by fresh troops during the contest, his first line having been driven off the field. Finally an advance was made from this position to Piper's house by the brigade of Caldwell and the two regiments under Colonel Brooke, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the enemy having a section of brass pieces in the front firing grape and a battery to the right throwing shell. This advance drove the enemy from the field and gave us possession of the house and its surroundings—the citadel of the enemy at this position of the line, it being a defensible building several hundred yards to the rear of the sunken road first referred to. This having been accomplished, the musketry firing at this point ceased. At the time the enemy broke the line on our right previously referred to, when Colonel Brooke advanced toward Roulette's house, Colonel Frank, of the Fifty-second New York Volunteers, then in command of that regiment and the Second Delaware, also observing a movement to our right and rear,

changed front obliquely to the right, and became engaged with the flank of the enemy's advance, and performed an active part in frustrating his intended movement. Colonel Barlow, commanding the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth Regiments of New York Volunteers, of Caldwell's brigade, observing the same movement of the enemy to the right, changed front and delivered his fire, performing good service in checking the attempt to turn our flank, causing the surrender of 300 prisoners and capturing two colors. Having possession of Piper's house, by direction of General Richardson the line was withdrawn a short distance to take position on a crest, which formed a more advantageous line.

Up to this time the division was without artillery, and in taking up the new position it suffered severely from artillery fire, which could not be replied to. A section of Robertson's battery of horse artillery (brass pieces), commanded by Lieutenant Vincent, of the Second Artillery, then arrived on the ground and did excellent service. Subsequently a battery of brass guns of Porter's corps, commanded by Captain Graham, also arrived, and was posted on the same line. A heavy fire then ensued between the enemy's artillery and our own, ours finally retiring, being unable to reach the enemy, who used rifled guns, ours being smooth-bores.

General Richardson was severely wounded, about this time, while directing the movements of the troops, and while personally directing the fire of one of our batteries. General Meagher's brigade having refilled their cartridge-boxes, returned at this time, and took its position in the center of the line. General Meagher had his horse shot under him in the action of his brigade, and, in falling, received bruises which prevented him from returning to the field until the next morning.

Early in the afternoon, after General Richardson had been removed from the field, I was directed to take command of his division by Major-General McClellan in person. Having received his orders and those of Major-General Sumner, I proceeded to the ground, and found that the division occupied the right center of our lines. My instructions were to hold that position against the enemy. I found the troops occupying one line of battle in close proximity to the enemy, who was then again in position behind Piper's house. The Fourteenth Connecticut Regiment and a detachment from the One hundred and eighth New York Volunteers, both under command of Col. Dwight Morris, were in reserve, the whole command numbering about 2,100 men, with no artillery. Finding a considerable interval at a dangerous point between Meagher's brigade, then commanded by Colonel Burke, of the Sixty-third Regiment New York Volunteers, and Caldwell's brigade, the Fourteenth Connecticut was placed there, and the detachment from the One hundred and eighth New York Volunteers on the extreme left. Application was made for two batteries of artillery to the different commanders within reach, and to the chief of artillery, but none could be spared at that time. I felt able, however, to hold the position as I had been instructed, notwithstanding this deficiency and the fact that the troops were already suffering severely from the shells of the enemy, relying upon the good qualities of the troops, but was too weak to make an attack, unless an advance was made on the right, as I had no reserves, and the line was already enfiladed from its forward position by the enemy's artillery in front of our right wing, which was screened from the fire of our artillery on the right by a belt of woods, which was yet in possession of the enemy.

Some time after arriving on the ground, a command of the enemy was

seen in line of battle, preceded by skirmishers, advancing in a direction parallel to our front, and toward a command of ours situated to the front of my left, whose line was formed nearly at right angles with mine. I immediately sent a pressing message for a battery of artillery, and Captain Hexamer, of Slocum's division of General Franklin's corps, was sent to me. The enemy, after a short cannonading, was forced to retire. In a short time an advance was made by some of our troops on my right toward the rear of Piper's house, the enemy appearing to make preparations to meet them. I assisted these troops by the fire of this battery, and subsequently seeing our troops returning, prevented pursuit. This advance proved to have been made by a single regiment, the Seventh Maine, without concert of action with other troops.

During this time and previously the entire command suffered a severe cannonading from the enemy's artillery, and was also much annoyed by his sharpshooters. The battery above referred to, having no ammunition, retired, and was replaced by Kirby's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff (12-pounder brass guns). Captain Tidball's battery had been in position a considerable distance from our extreme left, and toward evening that officer placed a section on the elevated ridge on the left of my line, which did material service by the precision of its fire in concealing the weakness of our position. This section was withdrawn about dark.

Affairs remained in this position during the night. Our pickets were thrown as far forward as practicable (a very short distance). The next morning a battery of light 12-pounders, commanded by Lieut. Evan Thomas, reported to me, and replaced the battery commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff. Captain Pettit's battery of rifled guns also reported, and was placed in a commanding position on our extreme left. The day passed in this position, I having been directed in the morning, by orders from the commander-in-chief, not to precipitate hostilities, as he expected some re-enforcements to arrive before he desired to recommence movements to the front. Receiving no further instructions during the day, I continued to await the operations of the other portions of the line. The enemy's sharpshooters commenced at an early hour on the morning of the 18th firing upon our troops, and so continued during the day. Their fire was replied to by our pickets and by others detailed for this service.

In the afternoon, being informed that a flag of truce from the enemy was in our front, I dispatched an aide to receive the message, and, on learning that General Pryor appeared on the part of the enemy, directed General Meagher to communicate with him and to ascertain his wishes. It was then learned that no flag had been sent by the enemy, and that a misunderstanding had arisen on account of an unauthorized arrangement which had been made by the pickets of the opposing forces (our own particularly in fault), ostensibly for the purpose of collecting the wounded between our lines. General Pryor was notified that as nearly all the wounded between the lines belonged to the enemy, any communication having for its object their collection must proceed from them, expressing a desire, however, that the wounded, who had been lying on the ground for thirty hours, might be removed. General Pryor had previously stated that he had no doubt a communication from us to the commanding general of the enemy's forces would result in a satisfactory arrangement. General Pryor stating that he had no authority to send such communication as indicated, on my part the conference closed.

Subsequently it was reported to me that another flag had appeared.

Again General Meagher was sent to meet the bearer, who proved to be a lieutenant-colonel in the rebel service, who stated that the flag was intended to cover the operations of collecting the wounded and burying the dead, it being supposed that a truce existed by an arrangement which had been made on our right. The officer was notified that it was an error, and in a few minutes hostilities recommenced. Subsequently a number of the enemy appeared in the corn-field in our front, apparently for the purpose of collecting the dead, five of whom approached our picket line. At that moment several shots were delivered by their own sharpshooters, when these five men were arrested and sent to the rear as prisoners of war. A good deal of this uncertainty, no doubt, arose from similar operations on our right, rendering it doubtful on both sides whether or not a truce existed. The troops remained in their position until the following morning, when it was found that the enemy had retreated. We then advanced to their position and commenced the operation of collecting the remaining wounded, burying the dead of both forces, and piling the captured arms.

Nine regimental colors and battle-flags were taken on the field from the enemy by this division, claimed as follows, and explained by the subordinate reports: The Fifth New Hampshire, Colonel Cross, captured one color. Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers, Colonel Barlow, captured two colors. Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Parisen (killed), subsequently by Major Chapman, and the Sixty-sixth New York, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, both at the time under command of Colonel Brooke, captured two colors. The Seventh New York, Captain Brestel, captured three colors. One other color was captured by the division, not now known by which regiment. About 400 prisoners were captured, and 4,000 muskets collected on the field in front of the division, and piled.

Our loss was as follows: 207 killed, 940 wounded, 16 missing; total, 1,163.*

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was very heavy. Our troops behaved in the handsomest manner, and performed the part assigned to them successfully and with promptness, and in passing through the trying ordeal exhibited the soldier's noblest qualities. I regret that some of the most valuable officers of the division were killed and many wounded, some of them of those who had distinguished themselves on many previous fields. For their particular services and for details of the deeds of the different brigades, and for the special meritorious services of individuals, officers and men, I respectfully refer you to the interesting reports of General Meagher, General Caldwell, and Colonel Brooke, commanding brigades, and to the reports of regimental and battery commanders. I have, however, obtained the names of some of those who, by their position and the occasions presented, had opportunities of acquiring the highest distinction and availed themselves thereof. I cannot overlook their claim to especial mention in this report, and herewith submit their names:

First [Third] Brigade, Col. J. R. Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanding brigade: Col. Paul Frank, commanding Fifty-second New York Volunteers; Lieut. Col. R. McMichael, commanding Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers; Lieut. Col. P. J. Parisen, commanding Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers, who was killed while gallantly leading his men in the final charge; Maj. A. B. Chapman, who

* But see revised statement, p. 192.

commanded the Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers after Lieutenant-Colonel Parisen had fallen; Capt. Julius Wehle, commanding Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers; Capt. D. L. Stricker, commanding Second Delaware Volunteers; First Lieut. Charles P. Hatch, acting assistant adjutant-general to Colonel Brooke; Second Lieut. John T. Potts, aide-de-camp, wounded; First Lieut. J. M. Faville, adjutant, Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers; Rev. Mr. Dwight, chaplain, Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers.

Caldwell's brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. C. Caldwell: Col. E. E. Cross, commanding Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers; Col. F. C. Barlow, wounded, commanding Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers; Lieut. Col. N. A. Miles, Sixty-first New York Volunteers, commanding Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers after Colonel Barlow was wounded; Maj. H. B. McKeen, commanding Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers; Capt. Charles Brestel, commanding Seventh New York Volunteers; First Lieut. D. R. Cross, First Lieut. C. A. Alvord, and First Lieut. G. W. Scott, of General Caldwell's staff; Corpl. George Nettleton, Company G, Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers, for bringing the colors of the Fourth (rebel) Regiment North Carolina Volunteers off the field, being badly wounded at the time.

Meagher's brigade, Brig. Gen. T. F. Meagher commanding the brigade: Lieut. Col. James Kelly, commanding Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, wounded; Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Barnes, commanding Twenty-ninth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers; Lieut. Col. Henry Fowler, commanding Sixty-third New York Volunteers, wounded; Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly, commanding Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers; Maj. James Cavanagh, commanding Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers after Lieut. Col. James Kelly had been wounded; Maj. Charles Chipman, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Volunteers; Maj. R. C. Bentley (wounded), commanding Sixty-third New York Volunteers after Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler had been wounded; Maj. James Quinlan, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers; Capt. Joseph O'Neill, Sixty-third New York Volunteers, commanding that regiment after Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler and Major Bentley had been wounded; Capt. James E. McGee, Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers; Capt. Felix Duffy, Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, killed; Capt. P. F. Clooney, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, killed; Capt. John O'Connell Joyce, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, killed; Capt. Timothy L. Shanley, Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, wounded; Capt. Jasper M. Whitty, Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, wounded; First Lieut. John H. Gleason, Sixty-third New York Volunteers; Capt. G. M. Miller, assistant adjutant-general to General Meagher; First Lieut. James E. Mackey (wounded), aide-de-camp; Second Lieut. John J. Gosson, aide-de-camp; Surg. Francis Reynolds, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers.

The staff officers of Major-General Richardson, Maj. J. M. Norvell, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. James P. McMahon, of the Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers; First Lieut. D. W. Miller, First Lieut. Wilber L. Hurlbut, First Lieut. C. S. Draper, badly wounded, acted with heroism. After General Richardson was wounded, Captain McMahon, Lieutenant Miller, and Lieutenant Hurlbut joined me, and were very efficient, and deserve the highest commendations for their good conduct.

My personal staff, First Lieut. W. G. Mitchell, aide-de-camp; First Lieut. I. B. Parker, aide-de-camp; Second Lieut. C. S. McEntee, acting assistant quartermaster, conducted themselves handsomely and with their usual gallantry.

Captain Hoyt, division quartermaster; Capt. C. S. Fuller, division commissary; First Lieutenant Rorty, division ordnance officer, and Surg. J. H. Taylor, medical director of the division, performed their respective duties with intelligence, bravery, and fidelity. Orderly bugler Private John Malone, Sixth Regiment Maine Volunteers, was with me during the day, and for his great gallantry deserves notice at my hands.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Lieut. Col. J. H. TAYLOR,
*Chief of Staff, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Hdqrs. Second Corps d'Armée, Harper's Ferry, Va.*

No. 40.

Report of Capt. Rufus D. Pettit, Battery B, First New York Light Artillery, of skirmish on Antietam Creek and battle of Antietam.

BOLIVAR HEIGHTS, VA., September 26, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with orders received, I have the honor to report that I received orders on the 15th instant to hasten with my command to the heights near Sharpsburg and join my division, which arrived there a few hours previous, there being a prospect of an engagement with the enemy at this point. I arrived at 11 a. m. and took position on an eminence about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Keedysville, and engaged the enemy's batteries, three in number, which were in position on the hills on the opposite side of the Antietam, supported by a considerable body of infantry, this engagement lasting until near night, I having expended about 400 rounds without sustaining any loss to my command. Was relieved at 5 a. m. of the 16th by a battery of 20-pounder Parrott guns, by order of chief of artillery of General Sumner's corps, and moved a short distance to the rear, remaining under a galling fire for four hours, having one man wounded by a piece of a shell. In the mean time one section of my battery was ordered to a position on the right, but took no part in the engagement.

At 1 p. m. my command was ordered to move across the Antietam and join the artillery in the flank movement on the enemy's left, and arrived at 6 p. m. and took position in battery on a hill near where the engagement commenced on the following morning. Remained in this position until firing commenced, when I was ordered forward into position on the field. Had one man killed, while coming into battery, by a ball; was buried on the field.

My command remained in this position until the morning of the 18th, subject to a raking fire from the enemy's artillery at times. At daylight on the 18th received orders to report to General Hancock, and took position on the left of his division, under fire of the enemy's sharpshooters. Here we remained until the division withdrew.

Hoping this will meet your approval, I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. D. PETTIT,
Captain, Comdg. Battery B, First New York Vol Artillery.

No. 41.

Report of Lieut. Evan Thomas, Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR HARPER'S FERRY, VA.,
September 24, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a report of the part Battery A, Fourth Artillery, now under my command, took in the action of the 17th instant.

On the 17th of September, 1862, I received orders to move to the front. I was halted in the woods the enemy had been driven out of that morning, and the right section was ordered into position. The rest of the battery was soon ordered into position, the same occupied by Lieutenant Kirby's battery, and joined the right section there. I remained there without firing a shot until our left was driven back. I then changed front to fire to the left, and opened on the advancing enemy with spherical case, and then, as they approached nearer, with canister. They came on, and I would undoubtedly have lost my battery had not Franklin's column come up at that time. I then changed to my original front, and opened with solid shot on a battery to my right, in the opposite woods, which was soon silenced. Another battery opened on me, which I saw was out of my range. A rifled battery coming up at that time, and seeing I could do no good and was only losing horses for nothing, I deemed it prudent to withdraw. I was shortly afterward ordered to the rear, to fill up, where I staid until ordered to my division. All the orders that I received were from Captain Clarke, chief of artillery, Sumner's Corps.

All my officers and men behaved with great coolness and bravery. Several of Baxter's Zouaves helped me considerably in carrying ammunition. One was killed and one wounded. I would state that I had no infantry support during the whole engagement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. THOMAS,

First Lieutenant Fourth Artillery, Commanding Battery A.

Capt. F. N. CLARKE,

Chief of Artillery, Sumner's Corps.

No. 42.

Report of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS CALDWELL'S BRIGADE,
Bolivar Heights, Harper's Ferry, September 24, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862:

After arriving on the field of action, about 9.45 a. m., I was ordered by General Richardson to form my brigade in line of battle on the left of General Meagher. This I executed, arranging my line in the following manner: On the right, the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Vol-

unteers, consolidated, under the command of Colonel Barlow, of the Sixty-first New York Volunteers; on the left, the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers. The Seventh New York Volunteers occupied the right center, and the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers the left center. After forming the line, and finding no enemy in our immediate front, I commenced to wheel the brigade cautiously to the right, when I received an order from General Richardson to relieve the line of General Meagher, which had fought the enemy gallantly and suffered severely.

The whole brigade then moved by right flank in the rear of General Meagher's line, and passed his line to the front in the most perfect order, under a severe fire of musketry. The brigade advanced steadily over the crest of a hill behind which the enemy were posted, receiving and returning a heavy fire. We broke the line of the enemy along our entire front, except on the extreme right. Here there was a deep road, forming a natural rifle-pit, in which the enemy had posted himself, and from which he fired on our advancing line.

After the enemy opposed to my left and center had broken and fled through the corn-field, Colonel Barlow, by a skillful change of front, partially enveloped the enemy on his right, and, after a destructive enfilading fire, compelled them to surrender. About 300 men and 8 commissioned officers, among them an aide to General Stuart, were here taken prisoners by Colonel Barlow, and conducted to the rear by my aide, Lieutenant Alvord. Two stand of colors also were captured by Colonel Barlow at this place.

Meanwhile the center and left of my brigade had advanced steadily in line into the corn-field, driving the enemy before them. Here the enemy opened upon us a terrific fire from a fresh line of infantry, and also poured upon us a fire of grape and canister from two batteries, one in the orchard just beyond the corn-field, the other farther over to the right. My regiments bore this fire with steadiness. The Seventh New York Volunteers wavered for a few minutes, but I rallied them and led them forward in person, and during the remainder of the battle they fought with the most determined bravery. The Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, ably led by Major McKeen, fought with the utmost steadiness. The Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Cross, formed the extreme left of my line, and behaved with the greatest gallantry. Colonel Cross, ever on the alert, detected a strong force of the enemy concealed behind a ridge in the corn-field, endeavoring to turn our left flank. Colonel Cross instantly changed front forward, and received the advancing enemy with a volley, which checked him and drove him back. He soon rallied, however, and, moving by the right flank, endeavored to turn our left. He was again confronted by Colonel Cross, who, with the assistance of the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, which had moved to the left to his support, drove back the enemy with great loss. In this conflict the Fifth New Hampshire captured the State colors of the Fourth North Carolina Regiment.

By moving to the left, to avoid being flanked, an opening had been made in my line, which was filled by one of the regiments of Colonel Brooke. On the right, Colonel Barlow, finding no enemy in his immediate front, saw a considerable force moving around his right. Moving by the right-oblique to a hill about 300 yards distant, he opened a severe fire upon them, when they broke and fled. Thus both attempts to turn our flanks had been foiled by the skill and quickness of Colonels Barlow and Cross and the determined bravery of the men.

The enemy made one more effort to break my line, and this time the attack was made in the center. Colonel Barlow hearing firing to his left, on our old front, immediately moved to the left, and formed in line with the rest of the brigade. The whole brigade then moved forward in line, driving the enemy entirely out of the corn-field and through the orchard beyond, the enemy firing grape and canister from two brass pieces in the orchard to our front, and shell and spherical-case shot from a battery on our right. While leading his men forward under the fire, Colonel Barlow fell, dangerously wounded by a grape-shot in the groin. By command of General Richardson, I halted the brigade, and, drawing back the line, reformed it near the edge of the corn-field. It was now 1 o'clock p. m. Here we lay exposed to a heavy artillery fire, by which General Richardson was severely wounded. The fall of General Richardson (General Meagher having been previously borne from the field) left me in command of the division, which I formed in line, awaiting the enemy's attack. Not long after I was relieved from the command by General Hancock, who had been assigned to the command of the division by General McClellan.

I cannot contemplate the action of my brigade in this battle without emotions of pride and satisfaction. It drove the enemy in its first attack, foiled two successive efforts by a superior force to turn its flank—the one made on the right, and the other on the left—routed a third line of fresh troops brought against its center, captured six stand of colors, 300 prisoners, and 8 officers.

All officers and men behaved in the most admirable manner. When the good conduct of all was so conspicuous, injustice may be done in the selection of individuals for especial commendation. I cannot forbear, however, to mention in terms of the highest praise the part taken by Colonel Barlow, of the Sixty-first New York Volunteers. Whatever praise is due to the most distinguished bravery, the utmost coolness and quickness of perception, the greatest promptitude and skill in handling troops under fire, is justly due to him. It is but simple justice to say that he has proved himself fully equal to every emergency, and I have no doubt that he would discharge the duties of a much higher command with honor to himself and benefit to the country. Colonel Cross, of the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers, handled his regiment in the most admirable manner, and is entitled to the sole credit of detecting and frustrating the attempt of the enemy to turn our left flank. He displayed in a high degree all the qualities of a good commander—bravery, readiness, coolness, and skill. Of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles it is perhaps sufficient praise to say that he added to the laurels he has acquired on every battle-field where he has been present. After the fall of Colonel Barlow he managed his two regiments in a masterly manner. Major McKen had command of the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Johnson being absent, sick. His bravery and coolness were conspicuous. Captain Brestel, commanding Seventh New York Volunteers, behaved bravely and well. All the company and line officers, with perhaps one exception, behaved admirably, and nobly seconded the efforts of their superior officers.

The members of my staff were indefatigable in their efforts, and did all I could wish in the transmission of orders. Lieutenants Cross, Alvord, and Scott were all particularly brave and active. Lieutenant Alvord captured several prisoners with his own hand, and conducted to the rear those taken by Colonel Barlow. By command of General Richardson he gave orders to the Irish Brigade, and assisted in form-

ing them into a second line. During the entire day all the members of my staff were incessantly active, and did most valuable service.

The casualties in the brigade were 43 killed and 280 wounded.* I furnished several days ago a nominal list of the killed and wounded.

JOHN C. CALDWELL,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

Lieut. W. G. MITCHELL,

Aide-de-Camp and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 43.

Reports of Col. Edward E. Cross, Fifth New Hampshire Infantry, of skirmish at Boonsborough and battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near the Battle-field, September 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the operations of my regiment on the march in pursuit of the enemy from Middletown Heights on the 15th instant:

On arriving within 1 mile of the village of Boonsborough, my regiment, which formed the rear guard of the division, suddenly received orders to march to the front as soon as possible. We passed the division at double-quick, and on reaching the front received orders from Major-General Richardson to deploy as skirmishers and cover the advance. I therefore threw four companies on each side of the road, keeping two companies in the center. We advanced through the village, taking quite a number of prisoners, and proceeded on the track of the enemy along the road to Sharpsburg. The cavalry of the enemy were soon encountered, and our line advanced, skirmishing briskly, until the enemy were driven over Antietam Creek, and their line of battle discovered. During the day my regiment held the front, exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. The latter we several times drove from their lurking places. We held our ground until 9 o'clock in the evening, when we were relieved, having lost during the day 1 officer and 3 men wounded—all slightly. We killed and wounded at least 12 of the enemy and took 60 prisoners. More might have been taken, but I could not spare the force to pursue them.

The next day four companies of my regiment were sent, under Major Sturtevant, to drive away the enemy's sharpshooters from the upper bridge and prevent the bridge from being burned. Two companies, under Captains Cross and Long, were sent to destroy a dam which backed up the waters of the creek, but were unable to perform this duty for want of tools.

I beg leave to mention particularly Major Sturtevant, Captains Pierce, Murray, Long, Cross, Perry, and Crafts, for excellent and skillful conduct while commanding their skirmishers, as they were under fire from a concealed foe for more than ten hours, and they report the conduct of their men as excellent throughout.

Very respectfully,

E. E. CROSS,

Colonel Fifth New Hampshire.

Captain CALDWELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

* But see revised statement, p. 191.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLUNTEERS,
On the Battle-field, September 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In reference to the part taken by my regiment in the battle of the 17th instant, I have the honor to report that, on arriving at the scene of action, I was ordered forward to relieve one of the regiments of the Irish Brigade, which was done under fire. We then advanced in line of battle several hundred yards and entered a corn-field. While marching by the right flank to gain our position in line of battle, we received a heavy fire of shell and canister-shot, which killed and wounded quite a number of officers and men, a single shell wounding 8 men and passing through the State colors of my regiment.

I had scarcely reached my position on the left of the first line of battle and opened fire, when it was reported that the enemy were cautiously attempting to outflank the entire division with a strong force concealed behind a ridge, and in the same corn-field in which I was posted. They had, in fact, advanced within 200 yards of the left of our lines, and were preparing to charge. I instantly ordered a change of front to the rear, which was executed in time to confront the advancing line of the enemy in their center with a volley at very short range, which staggered and hurled them back. They rallied and attempted to gain my left, but were again confronted and held, until, assistance being received, they were driven back with dreadful loss. In this severe conflict my regiment captured the State colors of the Fourth North Carolina Regiment, Corpl. George Nettleton, of Company G, although wounded, bringing them off the field, displaying great bravery and endurance.

My regiment remained on the battle-field all the remainder of the day, under fire of shot and shell, and picketed the field at night. Throughout the whole time my officers and men exhibited all the qualities of good soldiers, steady, brave, and prompt in action, although the forces of the enemy were more than three to one.

Major Sturtevant, Adjutant Dodd, Captains Pierce, Long, Murray, Cross, Perry, Randlett, and Crafts deserve especial mention for their gallant conduct; also Lieutenants Graves, George, and Bean, each commanding companies, and Lieutenants Livermore, Ricker, and Goodwin.

The following officers were wounded: Colonel Cross (slightly); Captains Long and Randlett; First Lieutenants Graves and Parks; Second Lieutenants Bean, George, Twitchell, Little, and Hurd. Lieut. George A. Gay, a gallant young officer, was killed. Sergeant-Major Liscomb was also wounded. Of enlisted men, as far as can be ascertained, 107 were killed and wounded. Our wounded were attended to by Drs. Knight, Davis, and Childs as rapidly and as well as possible, and were all made very comfortable.

Very truly,

EDWARD E. CROSS,
Colonel Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers.

Captain CALDWELL.

No. 44.

Report of Capt. Charles Brestel, Seventh New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. SEVENTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Seventh New York Volunteers on the 17th instant was ordered to take position in the battle-field

near Sharpsburg, Md. At about 10 o'clock a. m. the regiment received orders to advance. It drove back the enemy, taking three colors from him. Officers and men behaved bravely. The casualties were 1 commissioned officer and 14 men killed, 1 commissioned officer and 47 men wounded. Five men are missing.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES BRESTEL,
Captain, Commanding Regiment.

Brig. Gen. J. C. CALDWELL,
Commanding.

No. 45.

Report of Col. Francis C. Barlow, commanding Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

GENERAL HOSPITAL,
Keedysville, Md., September 22, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers in the battle of September 17 instant. Both these regiments were under my command on that day and had been for some time previous.

On going into action our brigade was formed on the left of the Irish Brigade, my regiments being the right of the brigade. We remained about fifteen minutes under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, which my sharpshooters returned with effect. I lost then Captain Angell and one or two men killed. By order of the staff officer of General Richardson, we then moved to the right in front, and formed behind the crest of a hill on the left of the Sixty-third Regiment, Irish Brigade, who were there briskly engaging the enemy. My regiments at once advanced over the crest of the hill, and bravely engaged the enemy and fired destructively. With the assistance of the fire of the regiments on our right and left, we broke the enemy on our front, who fled in disorder through a corn-field, suffering severely from the fire of our and the Irish Brigade.

The portion of the enemy's line which was not broken then remained lying in a deep road, well protected from a fire in their front. Our position giving us peculiar advantages for attacking in flank this part of the enemy's line, my regiments advanced and obtained an enfilading fire upon the enemy in the aforesaid road. Seeing the uselessness of further resistance, the enemy, in accordance with our demands, threw down their arms, came in in large numbers, and surrendered. Upward of 300 prisoners thus taken by my regiments were sent to the rear with a guard of my regiment, under charge of Lieutenant Alvord, of General Caldwell's staff.

On this occasion my own regiment, the Sixty-first New York, took two of the enemy's battle-flags, which have been forwarded to corps headquarters. A third flag was captured by the Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers, which was lost by the subsequent shooting of the captor when away from his regiment.

* But see revised statement, p. 191.

After these events my regiments, with the rest of our line, advanced into the corn-field through which the enemy had fled, beyond the deep road above referred to. No enemy appeared in this field. Our troops were joined together without much order—several regiments in front of others, and none in my neighborhood having very favorable opportunities to use their fire. Seeing quite a body of the enemy moving briskly on the right of our line, at no great distance, to attack us on the flank, my regiments changed front and moved to the crest of a hill on our right flank, occupying the only position where I found we could use our fire to advantage. This was to the right of the Fifty-second New York Volunteers, of Colonel Brooke's brigade. We engaged several regiments of the enemy with effect, some being posted on the edge of a corn-field, behind a stone wall surmounted by a fence; others were posted still farther to the right, on the edge of the corn-field. The enemy at length retreated quite precipitately under the fire of the troops on our side, together with another body of Federal troops, which attacked the enemy in turn on their flank and rear. I am unable to state who these last-named troops were. On retiring from this position, the enemy renewed their attack on our old front. My regiments again changed front, and advanced into the corn-field which we had left, to assist in repelling the flank attack of the enemy just mentioned. Beyond this corn-field was an orchard, in which the enemy had artillery (two pieces to the best of my knowledge). From these pieces, and from others still farther to our right, they had been pouring a destructive fire of shell, grape, and spherical-case shot during the above-mentioned engagement of our infantry.

After thus forming our line on the right of the Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers, of Colonel Brooke's brigade, I was wounded in the groin by a ball from a spherical-case shot and know nothing of what subsequently occurred. For these occurrences, and for list of casualties, I respectfully refer to the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, Sixty-first New York Volunteers, who immediately assumed command of my two regiments.

My own regiment, the Sixty-first New York Volunteers, behaved with the same fortitude and heroism, and showed the same perfect discipline and obedience to orders under trying circumstances, for which I have before commended them, and which causes me to think of them with the deepest affection and admiration. The Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers behaved steadily and bravely.

Of the officers in my own regiment I commend to special notice, for bravery, coolness, and every soldierly quality in action, Capt. Walter H. Maze, Company A; First Lieut. Willard Keech, Company G; Second Lieut. Theodore W. Greig, Company C; Second Lieut. Frederick W. Grannis, Company B. Lieut. Col. Nelson A. Miles, Sixty-first New York Volunteers, has been distinguished for his admirable conduct in many battles. The voice of every one who saw him in this action will commend better than I can his courage, his quickness, his skill in seeing favorable positions, and the power of his determined spirit in leading on and inspiring the men.

I have the honor to be, captain, your very obedient servant,

FRANCIS C. BARLOW,

Colonel 61st N. Y. Vols., and Comdg. 64th N. Y. Vols.

Capt. GEORGE H. CALDWELL,

Capt. and Asst. Adj. Gen., Caldwell's Brigade.

No. 46.

Report of Lieut. Col. Nelson A. Miles, Sixty-first New York Infantry, commanding Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTY-FIRST REGT. NEW YORK VOLS.,
Camp near Sharpsburg, September 19, 1862.

I have the honor to transmit the following report:

On the 17th instant, about 9 o'clock, the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers, under the command of Colonel Barlow, were ordered to form on the left of the Irish Brigade while they were engaging the enemy. We remained there about twenty minutes, during which time we lost one captain and several men. We were then ordered to move by the right flank in rear of the Irish Brigade until we came to their right. Here we came to the front, and moved up and over the hill under a heavy fire of musketry and a cross-fire of artillery. We found the enemy lying in a road or ditch just under the brow of the hill. The regiment, however, steadily moved up and over the hill in the most determined manner and spirit, breaking the center of the enemy's line, and killing or wounding nearly all that left the ditch to make their escape through the corn-field. Then we improved the advantage we had gained by changing front forward on first company, thereby flanking the rest of their line. The colonel gave the command, "Cease firing," when I called out to them to surrender. They at once threw down their arms and came in. I think by this movement we captured 275 or 300 prisoners. I detailed one company to guard them, and turned them over to Lieutenant Alvord, of General Caldwell's staff, with two stand of colors.

The enemy were then out of sight in the front, but were discovered moving around our right. The colonel then gave the order, "Right shoulder shift arms," and moved to the right oblique to another hill, about 300 yards distant, and commenced firing to the right upon the enemy. He fired about 20 rounds here, when the enemy's line broke in perfect disorder and ran in every direction.

About this time a sharp musketry firing commenced on our left, or old front, it being evident they were advancing another line through the corn-field. As we were of no more use in our present position, we went to the assistance of the other regiments of our brigade. We had so much changed the front that we moved by the left flank and filed left, connecting our left on the right of the Seventh New York, and again moved down through the corn-field. We then pressed forward, driving the enemy before us, until the order was given to halt. I immediately deployed skirmishers forward through the field to an orchard. While moving through the corn-field the enemy opened fire with grape and canister from two brass guns on our front, and shell from a battery on our right. It was by this fire that Colonel Barlow fell, dangerously wounded. He was struck by a small piece of shell in the face and a grape-shot in the groin. Thus far he had handled the two regiments in the most brave and skillful manner.

As we had advanced farther than the other regiments on our right and left, I was ordered to let the skirmishers remain and form in the open field on a line with Colonel Brooke's regiment, which position we held until relieved by one of the regiments of that brigade, when I marched them to the left of the line and formed on a line with the

Eighty-first Pennsylvania Regiment, and was not engaged again during the day.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the coolness and brave spirit with which both officers and men fought on that day. Colonel Barlow on this, as on other occasions, displayed qualities for handling troops under fire which are not often met. Captain Maze, Lieut. W. Keech, Lieut. Frederick W. Grannis, and Lieut. T. W. Greig were noticed as behaving in the most excellent manner; also Dr. Tompkins, who followed the regiment upon the field and rendered prompt assistance to the wounded.

NELSON A. MILES,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. Sixty-First and Sixty-Fourth N. Y. Vols.

Capt. GEORGE H. CALDWELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Caldwell's Brigade.

No. 47.

Report of Maj. H. Boyd McKeen, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on the 17th we marched into position on the battle-field near Miley's Springs about 10 a. m. We were ordered to advance, which was done. Having taken up our position in the corn-field near the orchard, we were again ordered to move, which the regiment executed most creditably under a heavy fire of grape. We formed at right angles to our old position.

In my new position I found the Second Delaware Regiment immediately in my front. For some cause the regiment broke out. We would not allow them to pass our line. They then returned to their old position and fought nobly. At this time I noticed the enemy's flags approaching from the orchard, and engaging the Fifth New Hampshire. The Fifth having taken up their position on the edge of the corn-field, and in the old road, I immediately changed the position of my regiment, taking position on their right, opening fire on the enemy with terrible execution. The Fifth New Hampshire and Eighty-first Pennsylvania thus completely frustrated an attempt to flank the division. We were then marched to the left of the corn-field, and remained under a heavy artillery fire the balance of the day. Our casualties are 8 killed and 44 wounded.* The officers and privates of the regiment that were in the engagement behaved with great coolness and bravery.

Yours, respectfully,

H. BOYD McKEEN,

Major, Commanding Eighty-first Pennsylvania.

General J. C. CALDWELL,

Commanding Brigade.

* But see revised statement, p. 191.

No. 48.

*Report of Brig. Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, U. S. Army, commanding
Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.*

HQRS. (IRISH BRIG.) 2D BRIG., SUMNER'S CORPS,
HANCOCK'S DIVISION, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
In Camp on Bolivar Heights, Va., September 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following statement of the part which the brigade under my command performed in the battle of the Antietam:

Being encamped 1 mile outside Frederick City, on this side, on the morning of the 14th of September the brigade received orders immediately to proceed to the support of General Hooker, who was at the time hotly engaged in the passes of the South Mountain with the enemy. Being halted for an hour or so, owing to the favorable reports from the headquarters of General Hooker, the brigade had an hour or so to take rest and refreshment, the first opportunity they had of doing so after a rapid and exhausting march over the rocky hills and through the tangled woods from their encampment outside Frederick City.

The Irish Brigade had the honor of leading the pursuit of the rebels from South Mountain through Boonsborough and Keedysville. Along this road and through these villages, in this pursuit, the brigade passed with the utmost alacrity and enthusiasm, Major-General Richardson, commanding the division, riding prominently at the head of the column and directing all its movements.

Early in the afternoon the enemy were discovered in full force, drawn up in line of battle on the heights near Sharpsburg and overlooking the Antietam. The brigade was halted and deployed in line of battle to the right and left of the Sharpsburg turnpike, the Eighty-eighth and Sixty-third Regiments New York Volunteers being on the left of the road and the Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers and the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Volunteers being on the right.

Whilst in this position, though greatly protected by the hill on the slope of which they lay, the regiments forming the right of my command were constantly annoyed by the well-directed artillery of the enemy. The Eighty-eighth and Sixty-third Regiments were also annoyed in a similar way, and the brigade lost several good men even in this comparatively safe position. In this position, however, we remained until the morning of the 17th, when, the men having breakfasted, a sudden order came for the brigade to fall in under arms, and take up the line of march, which Major-General Richardson would indicate. Filing by the right and proceeding at a rapid pace, the brigade crossed the ford of the Antietam a mile or so to the right of the bivouac of that morning, and as hastily, in compact order, following the lead of Major-General Richardson, who conducted the brigade to the field of battle, under cover of the rising ground and depressions which intervened between us and the enemy, we arrived at a corn-field, where Major-General Richardson ordered that everything but cartouch-boxes should be thrown off. The men of the Irish Brigade instantly obeyed this order with a heartiness and enthusiasm which it was rare to expect from men who had been wearied and worn by the unrelenting labors of a nine months' campaign.

Deploying from column into line of battle on the edge of this corn-field, they marched through it steadily and displayed themselves in

admirable regularity at the fence, a few hundred paces from which the enemy were drawn up in close column, exhibiting a double front, with their battle-flags defiantly displayed. Crossing this fence, which was a work slow and embarrassed, owing to the pioneer corps of the several regiments of the brigade having been reduced by their previous labors on the Peninsula, I had the misfortune to lose the services of many good officers and brave men.

Lieut. James E. Mackey, of the Sixty-third New York Volunteers, whom I had appointed on my staff in place of Lieut. Temple Emmert, whose death from typhoid fever the whole brigade affectionately and sincerely deplore, fell while the brigade was deploying into line of battle at this fence.

The enemy's column, with their battle-flag advanced and defiantly flying in front, was at this time within 300 paces of our line. A clover field of about two acres interposed. Then came the plowed field in which this column of the enemy was drawn up, and from which from their double front they had delivered and sustained a fire before which Sedgwick's forces on the right and French's on the left were reported at the time momentarily to have given way. The fact is, owing to some reason which as yet has not been explained, the Irish Brigade had to occupy and hold a gap in the line of the Union army, which the enemy perceiving had flung a formidable column to break through, and so take the two divisions last named on their flank and rear. This movement was suddenly checked by the impetuous advance of the Irish Brigade, which in a great measure filling up the gap through which the rebel column was descending to the rear of the Federal lines, drew up in line of battle within 50 paces of the enemy, the Sixty-ninth and Twenty-ninth being on the right of the line, and the Sixty-third and Eighty-eighth Regiments on the left. On coming into this close and fatal contact with the enemy, the officers and men of the brigade waved their swords and hats and gave the heartiest cheers for their general, George B. McClellan, and the Army of the Potomac. Never were men in higher spirits. Never did men with such alacrity and generosity of heart press forward and encounter the perils of the battle-field.

My orders were, that, after the first and second volleys delivered in line of battle by the brigade, the brigade should charge with fixed bayonets on the enemy. Seated on my horse, close to the Sixty-ninth Regiment, I permitted them to deliver their five or six volleys, and then personally ordered them to charge upon the rebel columns, while at the very same moment I ordered Captain Miller, assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, and Lieutenant Gosson, first aide on my staff, to bring up the Eighty-eighth and Sixty-third immediately to the charge. It was my design, under the general orders I received, to push the enemy on both their fronts as they displayed themselves to us, and, relying on the impetuosity and recklessness of Irish soldiers in a charge, felt confident that before such a charge the rebel column would give way and be dispersed.

Advancing on the right and left obliquely from the center, the brigade poured in an effective and powerful fire upon the column, which it was their special duty to dislodge. Despite a fire of musketry, which literally cut lanes through our approaching line, the brigade advanced under my personal command within 30 paces of the enemy, and at this point, Lieut. Col. James Kelly having been shot through the face and Capt. Felix Duffy having fallen dead in front of his command, the regiment halted. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Fowler and Maj. Richard Bentley, of the Sixty-third, on the left of our line, having been

seriously wounded and compelled to retire to the rear, the charge of bayonets I had ordered on the left was arrested, and thus the brigade, instead of advancing and dispersing the column with the bayonet, stood and delivered its fire, persistently and effectually maintaining every inch of the ground they occupied, until Brigadier-General Caldwell, bringing up his brigade, enabled my brigade, after having been reduced to 500 men, to retire to the second line of defense.

Of other transactions on the battle-field in connection with the Irish Brigade I will not presume to speak. My horse having been shot under me as the engagement was about ending, and from the shock which I myself sustained, I was obliged to be carried off the field. It was my good fortune, however, to be able to resume my command early next morning.

For what occurred subsequently to my being carried away from the field I refer you, with proud confidence, not alone to my regimental officers, who remained on the field, but also to many eye-witnesses of superior rank who noticed the opportune action of the Irish Brigade on that day. But I cannot close this communication without specially mentioning the names of Capt. Felix Duffy, of the Sixty-ninth; Captains Clooney and Joyce, of the Eighty-eighth, who, after distinguishing themselves by unremitting assiduity in the discharge of their duties in their commands throughout a very long and very exhausting campaign, fell with their feet to the rebels, with a glow of loyalty and true soldiership upon their dying features.

I have the honor to be, captain, yours truly and respectfully,

THOMAS FRANCIS MEAGHER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding the Irish Brigade.

Captain HANCOCK,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Division Headquarters.

No. 49.

Report of Lieut. Col. Henry Fowler, Sixty-third New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

Permit me, at this late day and in this apparently informal manner, to submit the following report of the action and conduct of the Sixty-third Regiment New York Volunteers in the late severe fight at Antietam on the 17th instant:

The official list of killed and wounded has, I understand, already been forwarded, but I deem it to be justice to the living and the dead that mention should be made of their heroism and bravery upon that fearful day. After the first advance from the meadow upon the plowed field, the colonel not being present, as a necessity I, without orders, assumed command.

It is now a solace to my mind, while suffering from my wound, to testify how gallantly and promptly each officer in his place and each company moved forward and delivered their fire in the face of the most destructive storm of leaden hail, that in an instant killed or wounded every officer but one and more than one-half the rank and file of the right wing. For a moment they staggered, but the scattered few quickly rallied upon the left, closing on the colors, where they nobly fought, bled, and died, protecting their own loved banner and their country's flag, until the brigade was relieved.

In the early part of the action Capt. P. J. Condon and Lieut. Thomas W. Cartwright, both of Company G, fell wounded while gallantly cheering on their men bravely at their post, as also Capt. M. O'Sullivan, Company F, while Lieut. P. W. Lydon, commanding Company D, Lieut. Cadwalader Smith, Company C, and Lieutenant McConnell, of Company K, bravely rallying the gallant remaining few, fell pierced by bullets, instantly fatal.

As the right wing had fallen before me, I hastened to the left, where I found the major (Bentley) close upon the line, and Capt. Joseph O'Neill, Company A, whose company had all fallen around him on the right, now assisting the major on the left. Here also was the stalwart Lieutenant Gleason, Company H, raising and supporting the repeatedly falling colors, with Lieut. John Sullivan commanding and pushing forward Company K; and here lay the slender form of Captain Kavanagh, Company I, cold in death; the brave and enthusiastic Lieut. R. P. Moore, Company E, passing from right to left, boldly urging his men to stand firm, and the gallant Lieut. George Lynch, second lieutenant Company G, bravely pressing on until he too fell, mortally wounded. The killed died as brave men, sword in hand, and amid the thickest of the fight. Major Bentley was now wounded, and retired to have his wound dressed. Our number now left was less than 50 men; our colors, although in ribbons, and staff shot through, were still there, sustained at a bloody sacrifice, 16 men having fallen while carrying them. I now received a severe wound, and was compelled to retire just as the lines of the enemy were breaking.

The officers and men all acted with a coolness and heroism worthy of honorable mention, yet I cannot close this meager report without recommending to your special notice Maj. Richard C. Bentley and Capt. J. O'Neill, whose cool and gallant conduct upon this trying and painful occasion merits the warmest commendation.

In conclusion, permit me to congratulate you that your gallant little brigade has once more crowned itself with fresh laurels, and given additional and bloody proofs of its devotion to the Constitution and the flag of our beloved country.

Very respectfully,

HENRY FOWLER,

Lieutenant-Colonel Sixty-third Regiment, Irish Brigade.

Brig. Gen. THOMAS FRANCIS MEAGHER,
Commanding Irish Brigade.

No. 50.

Report of Maj. James Cavanagh, Sixty-ninth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. 69TH REGT. N. Y. S. VOLS., IRISH BRIG.,
Camp on the Field, near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

GENERAL: Agreeably to request, I herewith transmit to you the following report of our participation in the late battle of the 17th instant:

As you are aware, Lieut. Col. James Kelly had command of our regiment up to the time he was wounded and borne from the field, which I deeply regret happened to so brave an officer, the fight being yet, so far as our regiment was concerned, only a short time in progress. The com-

mand thus devolving upon your humble servant, the control of the regiment was in the hands of myself, ably assisted by the adjutant, Lieut. James J. Smith. I may here mention the sorrow I felt, which extended to the whole of my command, when I heard that our acting major, Capt. Felix Duffy, had been mortally wounded in the early part of the engagement. Ably assisted by such of my line officers as had been spared me, we used our best endeavors to maintain our reputation and uphold the prestige of our flag. We remained upon the field in the front line until we had expended the last round of cartridges, and only left it when the fire of the enemy had ceased and the brigade was relieved by that of General Caldwell.

I hardly know in what terms to express my appreciation of our regiment, both officers and men, and in making any particular mention of bravery on the field, I speak of those who actually came under my own observation. Capt. James E. McGee, of Company F, most particularly distinguished himself by his coolness and bravery during the whole engagement, and while in the heat of battle, after his command had been almost entirely decimated, picking up the green flag, the bearer of which had been carried from the field wounded, and bearing its folds aloft throughout the battle. Capt. James Saunders, of Company A, and Capt. Richard Moroney, Company I, I am proud to say, acted most bravely, cheering on their men, and encouraging them throughout the battle. Lieut. Terrance Duffey, of Company G, and First Lieut. John T. Toal, of Company H, I am also happy to say, throughout that trying hour did all that could be expected in rallying their commands, which had become so greatly reduced in numbers. Of the many officers who entered the field, the above whom I have mentioned are all that were left me, the remainder having been either killed or wounded during the engagement.

I cannot forbear mentioning the deep sorrow that has been cast over our regiment by our great loss in officers and men. Those that were of us, and who are now numbered among the gallant dead, I can speak of as having been good soldiers, and an honor to our race—Capt. Felix Duffy, Lieut. Patrick J. Kelly, Lieut. Charles Williams, and Lieut. John Conway. I feel that our regiment has sustained a great loss, and one the recollection of which will be ever green in my memory. For those officers who have been wounded, and are for a time prevented from rejoining their commands, I can only speak as I have of the few that are left with me. Good soldiers, brave men, I cheerfully recommend for your consideration all of them, who in this fight stood nobly up for their country, and only left the field when borne away wounded. Among them I will mention the brave Captains Shanley and Whitty, both disabled for the second time, and Lieutenants Nagle and Patrick Kearney, who, until wounded, did the regiment good service by their gallant conduct.

Among the non-commissioned officers who particularly distinguished themselves on the field, I take occasion to mention the following as being most worthy of your consideration for promotion to a commission, viz: First Sergts. Murtha Murphy, Company C; Michael Brennan, Company B; Bernard O'Neil, Company C, and Soucoth Mansergh, Company H. Among the privates who also distinguished themselves during the action, I also recommend Patrick O'Neil, of Company C, and John Kelly, of Company —; and of the non-commissioned staff, Sergt. Maj. Patrick Callahan, who on the field behaved with great gallantry.

In conclusion, I beg to call your attention to the fact that we had with

us in the battle some forty-odd new recruits, who, considering all things, behaved well, and were of great assistance to us.

Congratulating you on your many narrow escapes from time to time during that memorable day, I have the honor to be, respectfully, yours,

JAMES CAVANAGH,

Major, Comdg. Sixty-ninth Regt. New York State Vols.

Brig. Gen. THOMAS FRANCIS MEAGHER,

Commanding Irish Brigade, Sumner's Corps.

No. 51.

Report of Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly, Eighty-eighth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-EIGHTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,

Camp on Bolivar Heights, near Harper's Ferry, October 5, 1862.

GENERAL: On the morning of the 17th of September the Irish Brigade, of which my regiment formed a part, crossed the Antietam Creek, and advanced in column until within sight almost of the enemy. The brigade then formed line of battle, and, after tearing down a fence, got into action at once. Shortly after this, General Meagher rode up along the line, encouraging the men, until his horse was killed and he himself got a severe fall.

During the engagement an aide rode up and ordered the Sixty-third and Eighty-eighth to charge and take the enemy's colors if possible. I at once gave the order, and my regiment advanced about 20 or 30 paces; but seeing that I had no support, I halted, and inquired for Colonel Burke, and asked why he did not advance. Captain O'Neill, of the Sixty-third, said he would advance with me if he had any one to command the regiment, but not knowing who was in command he did not wish to do so.

I know not exactly how long we were in action, but we were long enough there to lose, in killed and wounded, one-third of our men (bringing in 302 and losing 104).^{*} When relieved by the Fifth New Hampshire, I reported to General Richardson by order of one of his aides. On approaching the general, he said, "Bravo, Eighty-eighth; I shall never forget you." The rank and file responded by giving him three hearty cheers.

He (the general) then placed me in command of the One hundred and eighth New York, and ordered us to support a battery a little in advance of where we were previously engaged, and remained there during the night and next day.

With regard to the conduct of the officers of the Eighty-eighth on that occasion, I must say that they acted to my entire satisfaction—so much so that I cannot say one is braver than another. I have the same to say of the rank and file.

Wishing I had a little more time, I am, general, most respectfully, yours,

P. KELLY,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Eighty-eighth New York Vols.

Brig. Gen. THOMAS FRANCIS MEAGHER.

^{*} But see revised statement, p. 192.

No. 52.

Report of Col. John R. Brooke, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HQDQS. THIRD BRIGADE, RICHARDSON'S DIVISION,
On the Battle-field near Sharpsburg, Md., September 19, 1862.

SIR: On the morning of the 17th instant this brigade received orders to march. In a few moments we were on our way to the field of battle. Crossing the Antietam, we marched rapidly to the support of French, who was being hard pressed, and formed line of battle in a small valley in rear of Meagher's Irish Brigade, which pressed forward at once and soon became engaged. General Richardson then ordered me to move forward, which was done with great precision under a terrific fire of shot and shell. Caldwell's brigade having relieved the Irish Brigade on the front by a flank movement from the left, I here ordered the men to lie down. At this time the enemy charged and drove back the troops on our right, when the Fifty-second New York and the Second Delaware, under Colonel Frank, changed front to meet this attack, and, by direction of General Richardson, I led the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth New York and Fifty-third Pennsylvania to the right, to check any attempt the enemy might make to reach our rear.

The enemy having taken post in a corn-field in rear of Roulette's farm-house, I sent the Fifty-third Pennsylvania to dislodge them and hold the position, which was done with great gallantry. I then advanced the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth New York to relieve Caldwell's lines, which were now fiercely assailed by fresh troops of the enemy. Passing his line with steadiness and regularity, the two gallant regiments, Fifty-seventh and Sixty-sixth New York, drove the enemy from the field in great confusion, capturing two colors and covering the ground with dead and wounded. It was here the gallant Lieutenant Colonel Parisen fell while bravely cheering on his men to victory.

Finding that the enemy made no attempt to regain the field, I sought for and obtained the permission of General Richardson to withdraw my line from the now untenable position, being exposed to a cross-fire of the enemy's batteries. Taking post under the crest of the hill on the right of the battery, and throwing skirmishers to the front, I caused the ammunition to be replenished. It was at this time that the general commanding was dangerously wounded, while directing the fire of a battery on the left.

In a short time General Hancock arrived and took command. Nothing now occurred except an occasional interchange of shots on the line of pickets. It gives me pleasure to say that every man did his duty unflinchingly. About 2,000 stand of arms were captured, as also a great number of prisoners, who were sent through the ranks to the rear.

Of my staff, Lieut. Charles P. Hatch, acting assistant-adjutant general, did his duty bravely and well. Lieut. John T. Potts, aide-de-camp, was wounded in the thigh while in the performance of his duty. Lieut. J. M. Faville, adjutant Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers, after Lieutenant Potts was borne from the field, supplied his place with great gallantry. I would also mention the brave chaplain of the Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, Mr. Dwight, who was constantly upon the field

in the thickest of the fight. The lists of killed, wounded, and missing have been sent to your headquarters.*

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN R. BROOKE,

Colonel Fifty-third Pennsylvania, Commanding Brigade.

Lieut. W. G. MITCHELL,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 53.

Report of Capt. David L. Stricker, Second Delaware Infantry, of skirmish on Antietam Creek and battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. SECOND REGIMENT DELAWARE VOLUNTEERS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to tender this as my official report of the Second Regiment Delaware Volunteers, from the 15th day of September to the 18th, inclusive.

On the afternoon of the 15th we came up with the enemy on the hills near Antietam Creek, when the skirmishers of our division became engaged with those of the enemy. We were ordered to form forward into line at the bottom of the hill and lie down. We lay there until about 7 o'clock, when I received an order from Major Norvell to move my regiment over the hills about 300 yards in front of the battery, and throw out one company as pickets. I moved forward immediately, and detailed Company H as picket, which advanced to the bank of the creek. Everything was quiet during the night.

On the morning of the 16th General Richardson personally ordered me to withdraw my picket and return with my regiment to our former position in rear of the battery. We lay there all day and night, under a heavy artillery fire, losing 1 man killed and 1 wounded.

On the morning of the 17th we moved with the brigade across the creek and took position in a corn-field, where we lay about twenty minutes, losing 1 man killed and 1 man wounded. The brigade was then ordered to move forward, and soon became engaged with the enemy, driving them for some distance. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing foots up as follows: 12 killed, 43 wounded, 2 missing. †

I cannot particularize any one officer under my command, as all of them did their duty well. Their names are as follows: Company A, First Lieut. John Evans, Second Lieut. James W. Letherbury; Company B, Second Lieut. H. Warner Ottey; Company C, Second Lieut. Ephraim Jordon; Company D, Capt. William H. Helmbold, Second Lieut. John H. Davis; Company E, First Lieut. George C. Helmbold; Company F, Capt. Peter McCullough; Company G, Capt. John F. Heishley, First Lieut. Charles D. Foy, Second Lieut. Thomas J. Moore (wounded); Company H, Second Lieut. Henry Smith (wounded); Company I, Second Lieut. William H. Brady; Company K, Second Lieut. Charles Lynch, First Lieut. Lewis Nolen, acting adjutant.

Among the enlisted men I may favorably mention: Company D, First Sergt. John L. Ogden (killed); Company H, First Sergt. Thomas Russell, who, after Lieutenant Smith was wounded, took command of

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 192.

† But see revised statement, p. 192.

his company; First Sergt. Richard Fox (missing). The color sergeants deserve special mention. Their names are James Wier (wounded) and Robert Hanna.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. L. STRICKER,

Captain, Commanding Second Delaware Volunteers.

Lieut. CHARLES P. HATCH,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 54.

Report of Col. Paul Frank, Fifty-second New York Infantry, of skirmish on Antietam Creek and battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FIFTY-SECOND REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLTS.,
September 20, 1862.

This regiment arrived Monday, September 15, on a high ground in the first line, and, after the skirmishers had engaged the enemy, it was ordered by Major-General Richardson to take position on the right of a flying battery, which then opened fire. About one hour afterward the regiment was ordered to take its place on the right of the brigade, and remained there until Wednesday, September 17, morning. During all this time it was exposed to the artillery fire of the enemy, but fortunately lost only 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Wednesday, 17th, the regiment crossed the creek and was drawn up in line of battle in a corn-field, half an hour after which it advanced, forming the right of the brigade.

Advancing in close line for about half a mile under a heavy fire, it entered a corn-field on the crest of a hill, when I received intelligence that two rebel regiments were on our right, on a lower ground. Colonel Brooke, commanding brigade, was in the center of the line, but too far off for me to report for orders. I therefore took the Fifty-second on the high ground to our right and opened fire on the flank of the rebel regiments, the Seventh New York State Volunteers taking position on the left of my regiment, and supporting it most gallantly. After about half an hour's fighting the rebel lines broke, and seeing our forces deploying out of a corn-field in front of the rebels, I ceased firing, and shortly afterward was ordered back for a fresh supply of ammunition. I used an average of from 50 to 60 rounds per man. Having a fresh supply, I again brought the regiment to the front, where it was in position till Friday, September 19, morning, at which time it was ordered to take possession of an orchard, about a quarter of a mile in front, from which place it was withdrawn during the afternoon to its present camping-ground. During all this time I must say that the Fifty-second, as well as the Second Delaware, behaved very well, and stood firm under the most heavy artillery and musketry fire. It affords me great pleasure to report that the regiment kept up the reputation gained at Fair Oaks. The regiment went into action numbering 12 commissioned officers and 107 rank and file. The casualties are as follows:*

I remain, lieutenant, your obedient servant,

PAUL FRANK,

Colonel, Comdg. Fifty-second New York State Volunteers.

Lieut. CHARLES P. HATCH,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 192.

No. 55.

Report of Maj. Alford B. Chapman, Fifty-seventh New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP ON BOLIVAR HEIGHTS, September 24, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of my command during the action of the 17th instant near Sharpsburg:

About noon of that day we became actively engaged with the enemy, our brigade having relieved that of General Meagher. This regiment and the Sixty-sixth Regiment received orders to march on the enemy, who were at that time drawn up in a deep ditch at the foot of the hill on which we were, and from whence they were pouring a galling fire into our ranks. Animated by the presence of both their brigade and division commanders, the regiment moved forward with a determined enthusiasm I have never seen excelled. In a few minutes we had cleared the ditch of every living enemy, and were driving them in great disorder through the corn-field beyond. It was during this period of the action that we lost our noble and gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Parisen and several valuable line officers. We took the colors of the Twelfth Alabama and many prisoners. I am unable to form any very correct estimate of the number of the latter, but they considerably exceeded the number of men in the ranks of my regiment.

Remaining a short time in line at the farther end of this corn-field, I received orders to move the regiment to the support of a battery on our left and rear. I filed round the foot of the hill under a terrible fire of grape and canister, which fortunately caused us comparatively slight loss, being aimed too high. Arriving on the left of the battery, I found General Richardson, who was in the act of assigning me my position, when he was badly wounded and carried from the field. I then formed to the right of Caldwell's brigade, and remained in that position until I received orders from the colonel commanding this brigade to form on the left of the Second Delaware, then posted on the hill, on which we remained during the two succeeding days.

It is with gratification that I have to speak of the general conduct of my command, both officers and men. They acted nobly throughout. I would especially mention Capt. N. Garrow Throop (severely wounded); Capt. James W. Britt (who, although wounded, refused to leave the field); Captains Kirk, Curtiss, and Mott; Lieut. John H. Bell (severely wounded), Lieutenants Jones, Wright, Higbee (killed), and Folger (killed). The medical officers of the regiment, Surg. Robert V. McKim and Asst. Surgs. Henry C. Dean and Nelson Neely, are deserving of all praise for their care and attention to the wounded, and the promptness with which they caused them to be removed from the field.

Among the enlisted men I would especially mention First Sergeant Finlason, of Company F (killed); First Sergt. John S. Paden, Company A (wounded); Sergt. Henry W. Cooper, Company A (killed); Sergeant Stobbe, Company A (wounded), and Kelly, Company A; First Sergeant Hall, Company I, and Alcocke, Company K, and Sergeant Brower, Company K. These last three I placed in command of companies which had lost officers and sergeants.

I have considered it unnecessary to submit a more elaborate report, inasmuch as every movement was made under the immediate supervision of the colonel commanding this brigade, who on that day seemed omnipresent.

We took into the battle 309 officers and men, and lost during the day 97 killed and wounded and 3 missing. A detailed list of casualties has already been sent in.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

A. B. CHAPMAN,

Major, Commanding Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers.

Lieut. CHARLES P. HATCH,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 56.

Report of Capt. Julius Wehle, Sixty-sixth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. SIXTY-SIXTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
In Bivouac near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: I hereby respectfully submit to brigade headquarters a report of the casualties, conduct, &c., of the regiment under my command during the recent engagement of the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th:

At the commencement of the engagement we formed a portion of the support to the batteries on the hill. Up to the time of crossing the creek I have no casualties to report. It was not until we had ascended the hill for the purpose of relieving the Irish Brigade that my men commenced following. We pressed forward across the hill, and came in full sight of the enemy. We were here subjected to a destructive fire from the enemy's battery on the right. By a successful flank movement we here assisted in resisting the enemy's attempt to turn our right. Then came the order to drive the enemy from their strong position on the left in the corn-field. Here now was the terrific part of the engagement. The men were falling thick and fast, but never faltering. The battalion pressed forward and completely routed the enemy, who fled in a disorganized mass, leaving the field strewn with their dying and dead. It was here that we captured a rebel lieutenant of the Fifth Florida Regiment, together with his whole company and a stand of colors. We were subsequently ordered back to support the rear battery, which General Richardson was commanding in our rear. We remained until dark and the firing had ceased.

With reference to the conduct of the officers and men under my command during the battle, I cannot speak but in terms of the highest praise. We went into the fight with every company but one commanded by a second lieutenant, and consequently not a single commanding officer in the rank of file-closers.

I was ably assisted in my command by Captain Nelson, acting lieutenant-colonel, and Hammell, acting major of the battalion. These officers behaved in the most gallant and meritorious manner, and I would recommend them both as being very brave and efficient officers.

With regard to my line officers, they all acted unexceptionably, but I will report particularly Second Lieutenants McNeil and Munn, of Companies H and G, respectively.

The following is the report of killed, wounded, and missing: Killed, 11; wounded, 90; missing, 1.

Respectfully,

JULIUS WEHLE,
Captain, Commanding Battalion.

No. 57.

Report of Lieut. Col. Richards McMichael, Fifty-third Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY-THIRD PENNSYLVANIA,
Camp of Richardson's Division, September 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of this regiment in the several engagements near this place:

On Monday, the 15th ultimo, we arrived in sight of the enemy near Antietam Creek. My command being on the left of the brigade, I was ordered by Colonel Brooke, commanding the brigade, to halt in a corn-field, being then in rear of the Fifty-seventh New York. We were considerably exposed to the shells from the enemy's batteries while in that position. Some time afterward I was ordered to march by the right flank and follow the Fifty-seventh New York. My command was then placed in the second line, in rear of the Sixty-ninth New York, of General Meagher's brigade. I remained in that position until the morning of the 17th ultimo, when I was ordered to march by the right flank on left of the brigade.

After crossing Antietam Creek, I was ordered to halt in front of the Fifty-seventh New York, and have my men load and prime their pieces. Shortly afterward we were again advancing in same order as before, until we came near the scene of action. I was then ordered to form in line of battle on the left of the Sixty-sixth New York, which was done speedily and in good order. We were then in the second line. While in this position, General Caldwell's brigade passed through the line of this brigade on the right of my regiment. Shortly afterward we were ordered to advance to the front and take position on the left of the brigade. On arriving there, however, found the enemy, after repeated efforts, had succeeded in piercing the line of the division immediately on our right, leaving us in imminent danger of being flanked. Colonel Brooke at once saw that they must be held at bay at all hazards. Ordering the Fifty-third to file to the right, my regiment passed down the enemy's line to the right in perfect order, receiving their fire with entire composure. General Richardson ordered Colonel Brooke to send the Fifty-third Regiment forward, and hold in check the rebel brigade now on our right and in front; also to hold at all hazards the barn and orchard a short distance in front, the barn being used as a hospital. Steadily, under a shower of musketry, my regiment advanced to the orchard and gained the barn about 100 yards in front of the main line, and, still pressing onward, reached the crest of the hill and drove back the enemy. We moved forward until we formed a connection with General French's division, and held that position until ordered by Colonel Brooke to support a battery.

While in this position, First Lieut. John D. Weaver, acting adjutant of the regiment, was mortally wounded when nobly cheering the men on to victory. It was here, also, that First Lieut. Philip H. Schreyer was wounded. We were exposed to a murderous fire from the enemy's batteries during the whole time we were in this position. After we had supported the battery for some time, I was ordered to move my regiment and occupy the ground vacated by the Fifth New Hampshire Regiment, in front line, on right of the brigade. I moved my regiment there under a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, yet my men behaved splendidly and never once flinched. I sent out my left company (B), commanded by Captain Eicholtz, as skirmishers, to a corn-field

some distance in the front. During the balance of the day my regiment was continually exposed to the destructive fire from the enemy's batteries, yet I had not a man who left his post or went to the rear. My regiment remained in front line until the 19th ultimo, when I was ordered to be in readiness to march, the enemy having retreated.

My loss in killed is 6, including Acting Adjt. J. D. Weaver, who died on the 18th ultimo; wounded, 18; missing, 1. I cannot particularize any of my officers, from the fact that they all did nobly. Capt. S. O. Bull, acting major, ably assisted me during the whole engagement, as also did all the officers of the regiment.

Very respectfully,

R. McMICHAEL,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Fifty-third Regt. Pa. Vols.

Lieut. CHARLES P. HATCH,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

No. 58.

Report of Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SEDGWICK'S DIVISION,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by General Sedgwick's division in the battle of the 17th instant:

The division, consisting of General Gorman's, General Dana's, and General Burns' brigades, commanded by myself, left camp near Keedysville about 7 a. m., and proceeded in three lines, moving by the right flank in a westerly direction, forded the Antietam, ascended a gentle slope, continuing in the same direction for about a quarter of a mile beyond. At this point the lines were fronted, and established from 60 to 70 paces apart, facing toward the south and Sharpsburg. General Gorman commanded the front line, General Dana the second, and I the rear line. The advance was ordered for the three lines simultaneously. The three moved forward with very little wavering, under a fire from the enemy's batteries, which at first were concealed from us by a skirting of woods. The left of the third line was slightly disordered by fences, woods, and our own batteries. We passed through a large corn-field, skirting of woods, then a plowed field, a second skirting of woods more extended than the first, where I was ordered by an aide from General Sumner to detach a regiment to the support of General Mansfield. I halted the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Wistar, in the place indicated, on the right of the third line.

At this point the musketry fire began to tell upon us, and I received an order from General Sedgwick to move up my entire line. I delayed the third line for the detached regiment to come up, and then moved on across the Sharpsburg turnpike. Just after passing the turnpike, I noticed confusion on the left, and quite a large body of men falling back. I judged them to be troops that our division was relieving. To what brigade they belonged I did not know. I pushed the third line on a little farther, and into the woods beyond the turnpike, preserving about the distance first indicated. In these woods the first line had passed to the south opening, and near a dirt road engaged the enemy,

formed in line of battle not more than 60 yards distant. The second and third lines, so far as I could observe from my position near the center of the latter, were lying down as ordered.

Nearly the whole of the first line in good order stood and fired some 30 or 40 rounds per man, when word came that the left of our division had been completely turned by the enemy, and the order was given by General Sumner in person to change the position of the third line. He afterward indicated to me the point where the stand was to be made, where he wished to repel a force of the enemy already in our rear. The noise of musketry and artillery was so great that I judged more by the gestures of the general as to the disposition he wished me to make than by the orders that reached my ears.

The troops were hastily faced about, and moved toward the rear and right in considerable confusion, but at about 100 yards from the right of where the first line was engaged, and nearly perpendicular to the turnpike, a portion of General Gorman's brigade, with one regiment of Dana's brigade, was first halted in line, and by a sharp fire repulsed the enemy advancing at that point. On the left of the turnpike regiments of the second and third lines were rallied, facing in the same direction toward Sharpsburg, and here they fired.

General Gorman's brigade was a second time established on the right of the turnpike and behind a stone wall, where they remained until drawn in to the left, taking a new position, in conjunction with the rest of the division. In the mean time Kirby's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff, was placed in position by General Sedgwick himself, and the enemy, receiving the combined musketry and artillery fire, were not only checked but driven back with great slaughter.

At this time—about 11 a. m., I should judge—General Sedgwick having been severely wounded, and having remained on the field for upward of an hour afterward, until he was so weak he could scarcely stand, turned over the command of the division to me.

The next hour was spent by officers of every grade in this division in rallying and reorganizing their commands, all having suffered more or less confusion in the change of position. Meanwhile the batteries of the Pennsylvania Reserves, located on a high plat of ground near the house of Joseph Poffenberger, opened fire, and checked several attempts of the enemy to establish batteries in front of our right and turn our right flank. In accordance with General Sumner's instructions, I detached one regiment (Twentieth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee) to support a battery to our front and left. Afterward the remaining portion of General Dana's brigade was sent still farther to the left, to assist in supporting batteries of Smith's division. The rest of the division I posted as strongly as possible near the house of Joseph Poffenberger, with instructions to hold this point at all hazards. This portion of the general line of battle was now very quiet, except an occasional attempt of the enemy to locate a battery on a high point beyond the turnpike, near a corn-field.

About an hour before sundown the enemy succeeded in getting four guns in position, and opened fire upon us, somewhat enfilading my lines. General Sumner here ordered me to change front, placing the infantry in rear of the batteries, while the batteries, in a semicircular order, brought a concentrated fire from twenty-six pieces upon the enemy's guns just established, and in less than ten minutes the enemy was driven back, and did not appear again in this quarter. After sunset our front was thoroughly picketed, and the troops of this division slept upon their arms in order of battle at this point. The confusion of the

morning, so far as I observed, was occasioned by the three lines being simultaneously turned on the left.

The promptness in rallying their commands is creditable to the officers. I did not see one officer belonging to this division in any way misbehaving during the day. I noticed General Gorman at his post near his command while it was retiring, and he remained with it during the rest of the day, inspiriting his men by his remarks, and calling upon them to sustain the reputation they already had. General Dana was severely wounded in the early part of the action at his perilous post, manfully doing his duty.

By the direction of General Dana, Colonel Hall, Seventh Michigan Regiment, was placed in command of the brigade. Colonel Baxter, Seventy-second Pennsylvania, with a portion of his regiment, had fallen back considerably to our left, and did not find me till afternoon. As Colonel Owen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania, was the ranking colonel in his absence, he commanded my brigade; Colonel Baxter took command on his return. These brigade commanders were prompt and efficient in the execution of my orders. The following officers were especially successful in drawing off their regiments without breaking: Colonel Sully, First Minnesota; Colonel Hinks, and, after he was wounded, Lieutenant Colonel Devereux, Nineteenth Massachusetts, and Colonel Hall, Seventh Michigan.

In my brigade, Colonel Morehead, One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania, assisted by Major Stover, first rallied and made a stand against the enemy, and was placed in the exact position indicated by General Sumner. The next, Colonel Owen, rallied his men near me, exerting himself strenuously to make every man do his duty. Colonel Wistar, Seventy-first Pennsylvania, with his right arm nearly useless from a former wound, had his left disabled. He also was prompt and efficient. I wish specially to mention Major Mallon, Forty-second New York, for his gallantry in rescuing in person his fallen flag under a sharp fire. I shall trust to brigade commanders to do justice to others who are equally deserving. I will not omit to mention the two batteries attached to this division. Captain Tompkins' Rhode Island battery, for a long time almost unsupported, did terrible execution; and to the other, Kirby's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff, U. S. Army, I owe special thanks for the work it did, spoken of before.

What to me seemed a little remarkable is that my duplicate staff, consisting of General Burns' and my own, five in number, were neither of them injured, though all mounted and much exposed. Captain Hicks, assistant adjutant-general, had his horse shot under him. He and Lieutenant Blakeney, aide-de-camp, were actively engaged in bringing forward the left of my line during the advance. Captain Whittelsey, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Howard, aide-de-camp, were cool and brave, and afforded me every assistance in their power. Lieutenant Griffith had his horse wounded, and deserves high commendation for his good conduct.

The aides of General Sedgwick, Captain Howe and Lieutenant Whittier, reported to me immediately after the general retired, and faithfully assisted me during the day. Lieutenant Steele, division ordnance officer, stood by the general also, and, after the general left the field, was sent for the ammunition, which he brought up for distribution.

Major Sedgwick, division assistant adjutant-general, was most seriously wounded while in the execution of his duties, and left suffering upon the field till afternoon. No one's conduct as a cool and brave soldier, it is said by his comrades, deserves higher commendation.

The total loss of the division is as follows:

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
General Gorman's brigade.....	134	536	88
General Dana's brigade.....	128	650	124
General Burns' (or Howard's) brigade.....	89	370	109
Company A, 1st Rhode Island Artillery.....	4	15	-----
Company I, 1st United States Artillery.....		6	-----
Total*.....	355	1,577	321

The men of this division, already standing high as veteran soldiers, having endured hard marches, excessive fatigue and privation, receive from me my most hearty expressions of gratitude.

The above list stands for itself a record of almost unparalleled loss during a single battle. They have poured out their blood like water, and we must look to God and our country for a just reward.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. O. HOWARD,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

No. 59.

Report of Capt. John A. Tompkins, Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY A,
FIRST RHODE ISLAND LIGHT ARTILLERY,
Harper's Ferry, September 24, 1862.

GENERAL: Herewith I have the honor to hand you my report of the operations of my battery in the action on the 17th instant.

I left the division on the morning of the 16th instant, by order of Maj. F. N. Clarke, chief of artillery of the Second Corps, and crossed the Antietam Creek by the bridge on the Williamsport road, and camped that night on Hoffman's farm. Wednesday morning, at 8 o'clock, I moved my command to the front, and was ordered by Major Kip, of General Sumner's staff, to report to General Hooker. By General Hooker's order I placed my battery in position on a knoll on the left of the road, directly in front of some burning ruins, and opened fire about 9 o'clock upon a battery directly in front of my position. At 9.30 the enemy appeared upon my right front with a large column, apparently designing to charge the battery. I was not aware of their approach until the head of the column gained the brow of a hill, about 60 yards from the right gun of the battery. The pieces were immediately obliqued to the right, and a sharp fire of canister opened upon them, causing them to retire in confusion, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded, and abandoning one of their battle-flags, which was secured by a regiment which came up on my right after the enemy had retreated. The enemy now opened a fire upon us from a battery in front, and also from one on the right, near the white school-house. Two guns were directed to reply to the battery on the right, while the fire of the rest was directed upon the guns in front, which were silenced in about twenty minutes, and one of their caissons blown up. On my left the troops of General French were engaged with the

* But see revised statement, p. 193.

enemy, who occupied a corn-field, in front of which was a line of fence-rails. About 10.30 the enemy were re-enforced, and advanced their line to the edge of the corn-field. I at once ordered the battery to open on them with shell and case-shot, using $1\frac{1}{2}$ -seconds and 2-seconds fuses. Twice they advanced their flag to the edge of the field, but were forced to retire by the rapid and destructive fire of the battery. At 11.30, finding my ammunition running low, I sent to General Sumner for orders, and at 12 m. was relieved by Company G, First Rhode Island Light Artillery. I then withdrew my command to the ground occupied the night before, and at once refilled my ammunition-chests.

During the greater portion of the time I was engaged, the battery was without support, and exposed on its right flank to an enfilading fire from the rebel infantry. I report having expended 83 rounds of canister, 68 rounds of solid shot, 427 rounds shell, and 454 rounds of case shot—1,050 rounds in all. With the exception of the shots fired at the battery on my right, which was hid by a ridge, every shot was fired at a visible enemy, the guns pointed with care, and the accuracy of aim and length of fuse noticed. I report 4 killed and 15 wounded, a list of whom is annexed. Six horses were killed and 4 wounded. Three single sets of harness were lost by the horses getting among the burning timbers of the houses in rear of the battery.

The men of my command behaved nobly, and by their bravery and coolness prevented the loss of the guns. I would especially call your attention to Lieuts. Jeffrey Hazard and Charles F. Mason, who displayed great coolness during the engagement, and handled their guns with excellent effect.

Since the battle I have exchanged my Parrott guns for a new battery of 3-inch ordnance pieces, and now report the command as ready for any duty for which you may desire to use the battery.

I have the honor to remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. TOMPKINS,

Capt. First Rhode Island Light Art., Comdg. Company A.

Brig. Gen. O. O. HOWARD,

Commanding Division.

No. 60.

Report of Lieut. George A. Woodruff, Battery I, First U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., September 21, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that about 10 a. m. on the 17th instant, in obedience to an order from Major Clarke, chief of artillery of General Sumner's corps, I moved to the front with Light Company I, First U. S. Artillery, and took a position in an open field, in front of which, at a distance of about 300 yards, was a piece of woods occupied by the enemy in force. At the time when we came up, our line of infantry had been broken, and was retreating rapidly and in great disorder. Coming in battery, we opened fire with canister at once, and, though entirely without infantry supports, succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy. They still, however, remained in the woods, and we continued our fire, using spherical case or canister according to their distance at different times. At the end of about half an hour, a small body of cavalry advanced from the woods toward our right, but were broken up and driven back by a few rounds of canister at 200 yards. A few minutes

later, a large body of the rebels were seen forming in the woods and behind a small school-house or church opposite the left of the battery. At them I at once directed a fire of solid shot, with apparently considerable effect.

A heavy mass of rebel infantry soon moved to our left in such a way as to be almost entirely covered from our fire by the peculiar nature of the ground. A change of front was impracticable from the want of time, and the fact that while protecting one flank we should expose the other. Being still without supports, our only course was to retire, and accordingly I fell back about 200 yards to the edge of the woods, where we were supported on the right and could protect our left. After firing from this position a few rounds, the rebels, who by this time had met some of our infantry, were again driven back. Immediate danger being now over, Major Clarke directed me to retire and replace the ammunition we had expended, relieving us with a battery not before engaged.

We were not again in position until about 5 p. m., when Colonel Colburn, of General McClellan's staff, directed me to select a position for the battery on the right of our line, if needed there, otherwise to go farther to the left and get into the action as soon as possible. This I proceeded to do, but, while placing my pieces near the right, I received another order from the general commanding to go toward the left and report to General Hancock. This I did, and was placed by him on a hill on the right of his left brigade, with orders not to fire except in reply to a rebel battery or in case of an attack by them. Here we remained until 2 o'clock p. m. the following day, but without having occasion to fire. At this time we were relieved by one of the batteries belonging properly to General Hancock's division.

During the engagement we expended 168 rounds of canister, 75 rounds spherical case, and 27 rounds of solid shot. Two horses were killed and two wounded. The accuracy of the fire and our success generally are due in a very great measure to Lieutenants French, McCrea, and Egan, of the First Artillery, commanding sections, who throughout the engagement behaved with great coolness and gallantry. The conduct of the enlisted men, both those belonging to the company and those temporarily attached, was all that could have been wished. To mention an individual is almost an injustice to the rest, but I will name Sergt. Peter Blanchard, who, though too lame to ride his horse, rode on his caisson, and commanded his piece during the whole fight in the most creditable manner.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. A. WOODRUFF,

First Lieutenant First Artillery, Commanding Company I.

No. 61.

Report of Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HQRS. GORMAN'S BRIG., SEDGWICK'S DIV., SUMNER'S CORPS,
Battle-field near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of the 17th instant:

On the morning of that day I received orders to march, and at about twenty minutes past 7 o'clock a. m. of that day we took up the line of march. After crossing the Antietam Creek and arriving at an open

field about three-quarters of a mile from the enemy's position, three lines of battle were formed, my brigade being in the advance and front. The First Minnesota Regiment, Colonel Sully, occupied the right of the brigade; the Eighty-second New York Volunteers, Colonel Hudson, on their left; the Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball, next, and the Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers, Colonel Suiter, on the extreme left. In my rear about 50 yards was the second line (General Dana's brigade), and about the same distance in their rear General Howard's, late General Burns' brigade.

In this order we began the advance upon the enemy at a rapid pace, the lines being at a distance of 50 yards apart. Before we had advanced 50 yards, the enemy opened a rapid and well-directed fire upon us from one or more batteries, but, moving directly on, they retired rapidly before our advancing columns. Passing through a strip of timber, we entered a large open field, which was strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded, and passed over it at a rapid charge into an open woods, where the enemy's heavy lines of infantry first came into view, the front of which retired in considerable disorder before our advance. We pursued them until we passed the strip of woods and emerged into the edge of a field, where the Fifteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, of my brigade, captured from the hands of the enemy a battle-flag, wrenching it from the grasp of its wounded bearer, which has been duly turned over to the corps commander. Instantly my whole brigade became hotly engaged, giving and receiving the most deadly fire it has ever been my lot to witness. Although the firing was not so rapid, it was most deadly, and at very close range. We also had to stand the most terrific fire of grape and canister, which told fearfully on the three right regiments of the brigade.

After we had expended from 40 to 50 rounds at the enemy, it became evident that he was moving in large force on our left, where his firing became terrific. On our left, in the woods, there was a force that told me they belonged to General Crawford's brigade, that were posted there when we first entered it. They fought handsomely until the heavy force of the enemy turned their left, when they retired rapidly, and by this movement in five minutes the enemy's fire came pouring hotly on our left flank and rear. Being in front, and without orders of any kind from any one, and finding that the two rear lines were changing position and had already moved from their original place, I gave an order, which reached no one but Colonel Sully, to move quietly by the right flank so as to unmask the second and third lines, to enable them to direct their fire to check the rapid advance of the enemy on my rear, and to enable them to fire without endangering my left regiment.

Shortly before this, I heard Major General Sumner directing the third line to face about, in order to repel the enemy, which had broken our left, supposing the design to be to take up a better position than the one just previously occupied, I having informed the general that my left must be supported or I could not hold the position. The attack of the enemy on the flank was so sudden and in such overwhelming force that I had no time to lose, for my command could have been completely enveloped and probably captured, as the enemy was moving not only upon my left flank but also forcing a column toward my right, the two rear lines having both moved from their position before either of my three right regiments changed theirs. Perceiving this, after moving a short distance, my command faced about again toward the enemy and gave him another fire, which to some extent checked his advance. After moving a short distance farther, his forces were per-

ceived moving to our right, when the First Minnesota faced toward him and delivered another fire, which again checked his movement. I then ordered that my force be formed behind a stone wall at a distance of about 200 yards to the right and slightly to the rear of our first position. I was then ordered by General Sumner to hold the woods on the left and east of the turnpike, where I formed the entire brigade at a distance of about 400 yards from the original position. The Thirty-fourth New York, being upon the extreme left in the front line of battle, after having withstood a most terrible fire, and having lost nearly one-half of the entire regiment in killed and wounded, was ordered by Major-General Sedgwick, as will be seen by Colonel Suiter's official report, to retire and take up a new position behind a battery to the right and rear. I immediately ordered them to reform on the left of the brigade, which they did.

In this terrible conflict three regiments of the brigade, to wit, the Fifteenth Massachusetts, Thirty-fourth and Eighty-second New York Volunteers, lost nearly one-half their entire force engaged. The position of the First Minnesota was more favorable, owing to the formation of the ground. The coolness and desperation with which the brigade fought could not be surpassed, and perhaps never was on this continent. Captain Saunders' company of sharpshooters, attached to the Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, together with the left wing of that regiment, silenced one of the enemy's batteries and kept it so, driving the cannoneers from it every time they attempted to load, and for ten minutes fought the enemy in large numbers at a range of from 15 to 20 yards, each party sheltering themselves behind fences, large rocks, and straw-stacks. The First Minnesota Regiment fired with so much coolness and accuracy that they brought down three several times one of the enemy's flags, and finally cut the flag-staff in two. I have great satisfaction in saying that the three right regiments of the brigade kept their front clear and the enemy from advancing during the time they were engaged.

I do not deem it necessary to again commend the gallant conduct of the officers of this brigade, since many of them have now been under fire in nine of the hardest engagements of the war, and upon every occasion have acquitted themselves with honor. My personal staff in this battle bore my orders along the line and from point to point, constantly under fire and in great peril of life, with great promptness and courage.

The list of killed, wounded, and missing in action is herewith forwarded, showing the loss to be 758* out of 2,000 taken into the action.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,

W. A. GORMAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Captain WHITTELSEY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 62.

*Report of Lieut. Col. John W. Kimball, Fifteenth Massachusetts Infantry,
of the battle of Antietam.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH REGIMENT, MASS. VOLS.,
Camp near Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on Wednesday, 17th instant, at 7 o'clock a. m., I was ordered to hold my command in read-

* But see revised statement, p. 192.

iness to move at a moment's notice. At 7.30 o'clock we took up our line of march with 582 muskets, including First Company Andrew Sharpshooters, Capt. J. Saunders, attached to this command, being the third regiment in the brigade line. We moved in a direct line toward the ground held by the forces under command of General Hooker, fording, in the march, Antietam Creek. On reaching the field, a line of battle was formed, in which my command occupied the position of third regiment of the first line. We then moved forward in line under a severe artillery fire about one mile over the ground gained by General Hooker, passing fences, fields, and obstacles of various descriptions, eventually occupying a piece of woods, directly in front of which, and well covered by the nature of the ground, field of grain, hay-stacks, buildings, and a thick orchard, were the enemy in strong force.

At this time we were marching by the right-oblique, in order to close an interval between my command and that of Colonel Hudson, Eighty-second New York Volunteers, and as we gained the summit of a slight elevation my left became hotly engaged with the enemy, covered as before mentioned, at a distance of not more than 15 yards. A section of the enemy's artillery was planted upon a knoll immediately in front of and not more than 600 yards distant from my right wing. This was twice silenced and driven back by the fire of my right wing, concentrated upon it. The engagement lasted between twenty and thirty minutes, my line remaining unbroken, the left wing advancing some 10 yards under a most terrific infantry fire.

Meanwhile the second line of the division, which had been halted some 30 or 40 yards in our rear, advanced until a portion of the Fifty-ninth Regiment New York Volunteers, Colonel Tidball, had closed upon and commenced firing through my left wing on the enemy. Many of my men were by this maneuver killed by our own forces, and my most strenuous exertions were of no avail either in stopping this murderous fire or in causing the second line to advance to the front. At this juncture General Sumner came up, and his attention was immediately called by myself to this terrible mistake. He immediately rode to the right of the Fifty-ninth Regiment, ordered the firing to cease and the line to retire, which order was executed in considerable confusion.

The enemy soon appeared in heavy columns, advancing upon my left and rear, pouring in a deadly cross-fire on my left. I immediately and without orders ordered my command to retire, having first witnessed the same movement on the part of both the second and third lines. We retired slowly and in good order, bringing off our colors and a battle-flag captured from the enemy, reforming by the orders of General Gorman in a piece of woods some 500 yards to the rear, under cover of our artillery. This position was held until I was ordered to support a battery planted upon the brow of a hill immediately in our rear, the enemy having opened again with artillery. His fire being silenced, the position was held throughout the day.

I desire to say that my entire regiment behaved most gallantly during the engagement, evincing great coolness and bravery, as my list of casualties will show. Although suffering terribly from the fire of the enemy, it was with great surprise that they received the order to retire, never entertaining for a moment any idea but that of complete success, although purchased at the cost of their lives. The order forbidding the carrying wounded men to the rear was obeyed to the very letter.

Of my line officers, without exception, I cannot speak in too high praise. They were all at their posts, bravely and manfully urging on

their men, and equally exposed with them. Those wounded refused all assistance, ordering their men to return to the ranks and do their duty.

I desire to call your particular attention to Major Philbrick and Adjutant Hooper. They were with me during the entire engagement in the thickest of the fight, receiving and executing my orders with great coolness and promptitude.

I herewith append a list of the casualties in the late engagement.

Officers killed: Capt. C. S. Simonds, Capt. J. Saunders, First Lieut. R. Derby, First Lieut. William Berry, First Lieut. F. S. Corbin. Officers wounded: Capt. W. Forehand, slight; Capt. G. C. Joslin, severe; Capt. A. Bartlett, slight; First Lieut. Thomas J. Spurr, severe; First Lieut. L. H. Ellingwood, severe; Second Lieut. W. Gale, slight; Second Lieut. A. J. Bradley, slight. Enlisted men killed, 60; wounded, 238; missing, 58. Officers killed and wounded, 12. Enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing, 336. Total, 348.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. KIMBALL,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. J. W. GORMAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 63.

Report of Col. Alfred Sully, First Minnesota Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS, *Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part the regiment took in the action of the 17th instant:

We marched out of camp, the regiment on the right of the brigade. After crossing the creek and gaining the high ground on the opposite side, we were formed on the right of the front line of battle, under a very severe artillery fire from the enemy, and advanced under this fire over several fields, the distance of about three-quarters of a mile, into a woods close to the enemy and in front of our line of battle. Here we were posted behind a rail fence. The enemy soon appeared in force on the left of the brigade, opened a very severe fire of musketry on us, while some of their artillery in front of us also opened on us. Our loss here was very heavy, yet the men bravely held their position, and did not leave it until after the two brigades in rear had fallen back and the left regiments were moving, when they received the order to retire.

Retiring in line of battle, we again halted outside the woods, to hold the enemy in check while the rest were retiring. Here the Eighty-second New York with their colonel and colors reported to me, and formed on my right. The Nineteenth Massachusetts also reported, and formed on my left. We were soon again engaged with the enemy, but, seeing that the enemy were turning my right, I ordered the line to fall back in line of battle. The regiment here also suffered greatly in killed and wounded. We again made a stand near some farm-house for a short time, and there took up a strong position about 100 yards back, behind a stone fence, when a section of artillery was sent to assist us. We kept the enemy in check till they brought a battery of artillery on our flank, which compelled me to order the regiments back to join our line of battle.

The officers and men of the regiment behaved nobly, and it was with some difficulty I got some of them to obey the order to fall back. We marched into the action with 435 men. This includes the sharpshooters' (Second Minnesota) company, but not Company I. They were not with us. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing amounts to—Capt. G. A. Holzborn, Company K, killed; Captains Smith, Company D; Pomeroy, Company E; Adams, Company H, wounded. Enlisted men killed, 15; wounded, 79; missing, 24. Total enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing, 118.

Among the killed the regiment have to mourn the loss of a brave and useful officer, Captain Holzborn. Captain Smith was severely wounded; Captains Adams and Pomeroy and Lieutenant Shepley, slightly.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

ALF. SULLY,
Colonel First Minnesota.

Capt. J. W. GORMAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Gorman's Brigade.

No. 64.

Report of Col. James A. Suiter, Thirty-fourth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRTY-FOURTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
Battle-field near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: I would most respectfully make the following report of the battle of the 17th instant:

We lay in camp near Keedysville, Md., on the 16th instant. In the evening of that day I received an order to be prepared to march at daylight on the morning of the 17th instant. In obedience to said order, I was under arms with my command, and so remained until the order was given to move, which was about 7.30 o'clock a. m. We moved in a northwesterly direction. Having arrived within about 1½ miles of the battle-field, where General Hooker's forces had been engaged with the enemy, we were formed in line of battle by brigades, Gorman's to the front, First Minnesota Regiment on the right, Eighty-second Regiment New York Volunteers second, Fifteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers third, and my command, Thirty-fourth Regiment New York Volunteers, on the left. General Dana's brigade formed the second line, and General Howard's brigade formed the third line. We were moved at double-quick. Arriving near the battle-field, we were moved by the right flank through a piece of timber-land in three columns. At this point we were considerably crowded, the three columns occupying an extent of not more than 40 paces from our left to the right flank of General Howard's brigade, the Seventh Regiment Michigan Volunteers being crowded in my ranks, causing considerable confusion.

Arriving at the open field, we were again ordered in line of battle, being still at double-quick. We moved over this field to the pike road leading to Sharpsburg. Fronting this was a piece of timber land, into which I moved my command, still at double-quick, arriving at about 20 yards in rear of a school-house, when I discovered the enemy under the hill. I immediately ordered my command to fire, which they did in gallant order.

From some cause to me unknown, I had become detached from my brigade, the One hundred and twenty-fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers being on my right. On my left and rear I was entirely unsupported by infantry or artillery. The enemy were in strong force at this point, and poured a tremendous fire of musketry and artillery upon me. At this time I discovered that the enemy were making a move to flank me on the left. Lieutenant Howe arriving at this time, I informed him of my suspicions. He replied that he thought they were our friends. Lieutenant Wallace, of Company C, proposed going to the front, to make what discovery he could, which I granted. He returned, saying that the enemy were moving upon my left flank with a strong force. I turned and discovered Lieut. Richard Gorman, of General Gorman's staff, and requested him to inform the general that the enemy were flanking me. He immediately returned for that purpose. Presently General Sedgwick arrived upon the ground. Moving down my line, he discovered the situation of my command, and that the point could not be held by me, and gave the order for me to retire, which I did. Rallying my command, I formed them in line of battle, supporting a battery some 400 yards in rear of the battle-field.

In this engagement the casualties were as follows, viz: 32 killed, 109 wounded, and 9 missing. Commissioned officers: 1 killed, 2 wounded, 1 taken prisoner.

In connection with this I cannot speak in too great praise of my officers. When all acted gallantly it is impossible to single out any. I would therefore say that all did well and behaved in the most gallant manner. Of Major Beverly I would say that he was invaluable to me in assisting me on the left of my line in the most trying time. Of my color sergeant I cannot speak in too high terms. He (Sergt. Charles Burton) had carried the banner through all of the battles in which we had been engaged while on the Peninsula without receiving a wound. Here it was his fate to be struck five times, and when he was compelled to drop his colors he called upon his comrades to seize them and not to let them fall into the hands of the enemy. This was done by Corpl. G. S. Haskins, who nobly bore them from the field.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

JAMES A. SUITER,
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. J. W. GORMAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 65.

Reports of Col. Henry W. Hudson, Eighty-second New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HQRS. EIGHTY-SECOND REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

I have the honor to make the following report of the part this regiment took in the battle of the 17th instant:

We left camp about 7.30 a. m., the First Minnesota having the right of the brigade, the Eighty-second New York Volunteers second in line. After fording the creek and gaining the high ground, we were formed in line of battle, under a severe fire of artillery from the enemy, in the

following order: Gorman's brigade in the front line, Dana's in the second line, and Burns' in the rear. We steadily advanced under fire of artillery some one-half to three-quarters of a mile through fields, over fences, into a piece of wood near the enemy, in front of our line of battle. My two right companies were posted in rear of a rail fence in the outer edge of the woods, the rest of my command being in open ground. The enemy advancing in force, we opened a deadly fire upon them, and soon had the satisfaction of seeing their front line broken and in confusion under the incessant fire to which they were exposed from the First Brigade.

All this time we were exposed to a strong fire from a battery of the enemy. My regiment behaved nobly, and bravely held their ground until ordered to fall back, as we were being outflanked, nor did they then leave until the two brigades in our rear were falling back and the regiments on our left were moving. We then fell back to the outer edge of the wood, and formed on the First Minnesota to hold the enemy in check, till ordered by Colonel Sully, to whom I had reported, to fall still farther back, which we did in good order. We again made a stand behind a stone wall, and poured in our fire upon the enemy till they brought a battery of artillery on our flank, when we were obliged to fall back and join the other regiments of the brigade in good order on the edge of the wood, not more than 500 yards from the spot where our right rested. While in line of battle engaged with the enemy during the fight, the two lines in our rear were not engaged, and were not more than 20 or 25 yards from us.

We fortunately escaped without losing any commissioned officers by being killed, though we have 4 severely wounded. In some cases the wounds are so severe that amputation of limbs will be necessary.

Subjoined please find list of casualties.

Officers wounded, 4; men killed, 20; wounded, 93; missing, 16; total, 133.*

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HUDSON,
Colonel.

Capt. J. W. GORMAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EIGHTY-SECOND NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Bolivar Heights, September 28, 1862.

In reply to yours, I state that at the battle of Antietam, when my regiment was being outflanked by a large force of the enemy, I found the lines in our rear broken and the left of the brigade moving. Not seeing General Gorman, I reported to you, as senior officer present, and by your orders formed with a large portion of my regiment on your left, and with you slowly left the field, contesting the ground with the enemy.

Yours, truly, &c.,

H. W. HUDSON,
Colonel.

Col. ALFRED SULLY.

* But see revised statement, p. 192.

No. 66.

Report of Col. Joshua T. Owen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS BURNS' SECOND BRIGADE,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: Having assumed command of the brigade by direction of General Howard, subsequent to the wounding of General Sedgwick and General Howard's assumption of the command of the division, I have the honor to report that the brigade took up its line of march from its encampment on the south side of Antietam Creek on the morning of the 17th instant, about 8 o'clock, and, having forded the same, deployed into line and proceeded at a quick march to the front, constituting the third line of battle, and, together with the other two brigades, occupied the extreme right of General Sumner's corps. Upon arriving at within a quarter of a mile of the enemy's lines, a heavy fire of infantry was heard, showing that the first line was already hotly engaged. The men and officers eagerly pressed forward, yet the line advanced in good order. During most of this period the brigade was subjected to a cross-fire from a battery posted on the enemy's extreme left. As the brigade reached the top of the hill, I noticed many of the regiments to the left of Sedgwick's division falling back in great confusion, and immediately suggested the propriety of moving the brigade obliquely to the left. Orders having been received, however, to dress to the right, the brigade entered the woods in good order, and was dressed by the right of the second line of battle, to wit, Dana's brigade.

I beg here to mention the relative positions of the regiments of the brigade. The Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. Isaac J. Wistar, was posted on the right; the Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. D. W. C. Baxter, on the left; the One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. T. G. Morehead, on the right center; and the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. Joshua T. Owen, on the left center (Colonel Owen not having yet assumed command of the brigade). Immediately after the brigade was halted and dressed, it was subjected, in common with the other two lines, to a most terrific fire of infantry and artillery, notwithstanding which the officers and men behaved with remarkable coolness, and though the ranks were thinned by the enemy's deadly aim, the gaps were quickly filled and an unbroken front maintained.

The panic which I had observed on the left ultimately spread along the line, and the impetuous advance of the enemy's column threatened to turn our left flank. At this juncture, General Sumner appeared in person in the midst of a most deadly shower of shot and shell, and an order was received to fall back. With some confusion upon the left, the brigade retired. The Sixty-ninth, One hundred and sixth, and Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers retired in good order; the Seventy-second Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, however, being on the extreme left, subjected to a heavier fire, and the first to encounter the panic-stricken fugitives from the left, did not retire in the same good order as the other three regiments, nor was it reformed, nor did it rejoin the brigade until a late hour in the afternoon.

As speedily as possible I restored the brigade to order, and assumed a position in support of the reserve batteries. This position proved to be a most formidable one, and the enemy did not dare to attack it, except with artillery and at a great distance, and with ultimate defeat.

I take great pleasure in saying from my personal observation that the regimental commanders and field officers behaved with great coolness and courage, and that the line officers, with rare exceptions, acquitted themselves with credit.

I regret to say that the casualties were very great, amounting in all to a loss in killed, 89; wounded, 370; and missing, 109; total, 468 [568.]* I shall not here perform the mournful task of mentioning by name those of my comrades who fell upon this disastrous field; that shall hereafter be done in another form. Let me say here, however, their loss will be seriously felt in the brigade. "Green be their memories for ever."

As this is the first occasion of this brigade having fallen back in battle, I beg leave to state in its defense, and as a matter worthy of discussion in a military point of view, whether the disaster was not attributable to its having been placed in too great proximity to the other two lines, and thus, while intended to act as a reserve, subjected to as deadly a fire as those it was intended to support.

Respectfully submitted.

J. T. OWEN,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. E. WHITTELSEY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 67.

Report of Brig. Gen. Napoleon J. T. Dana, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., September 30, 1862.

I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of the Third Brigade, under my command, at the battle of Antietam, on the 17th instant, up to the time when, under the disability of a painful wound, I was compelled to leave the field:

During the night of the 16th I received orders to have my brigade get breakfast early on the following morning and to be ready to march at daylight.

The regiments were accordingly ready, but orders were not received to march till 6.30 o'clock a. m., when I proceeded, in company with the First and Second Brigades, on my left and right respectively, to the right wing of the Army, where Hooker's corps was already engaged with the enemy's left.

Having forded Antietam Creek and marched some distance beyond, the division was halted and formed in order of battle in three lines, the First Brigade composing the first line and my brigade the second. My line was composed from right to left as follows: Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, Fifty-ninth New York Volunteers, Forty-second New York Volunteers, Seventh Michigan Volunteers.

The division was ordered to advance, and I received directions to keep my line about 75 yards in rear of the first line.

After advancing through fields and inclosures under a fire of artillery

* But see revised statement, p. 192.

from the enemy, the division entered a piece of woods, on emerging from which another dense woods appeared in front, separated from us by a narrow clear space; and a line of troops lying on the ground, which I took to be the first line, was immediately in my front, and I accordingly halted and ordered my men to lie down, but they were hardly on the ground when I received an order to move forward at double-quick and enter the woods in front. The outline of the woods was irregular, presenting a salient point where the left of my line first entered.

The first line was now hotly engaged in front, and hardly had my left regiment entered the woods when a tremendous musketry fire opened on my left and front, apparently perpendicular to my line of march and flanking the first line. Almost immediately a regiment of infantry came running in great disorder from the woods on my left, and the Seventh Michigan Regiment commenced to deliver an oblique fire to the left.

There was no time to wait for orders; the flanking force, whatever it was, was advancing its fire too rapidly on my left. I permitted the three right regiments to move on, but broke off the Forty-second New York Volunteers, with orders to change front to the left and meet the attack which had apparently broken through the first line on my left and front, and was now precipitated with fury on my left flank.

The Forty-second moved nobly up to its work, but before it was formed in its new position, and whilst it was in disorder, the enemy was close up on it, and the fire which was poured upon it and the Seventh Michigan was the most terrific I ever witnessed.

I remained with these two regiments, and, although the shattered remnants of them were forced by overwhelming numbers and a cross-fire to retreat in disorder, I bear them witness that it was after nearly half the officers and men were placed *hors de combat*.

Having retired across the field to the woods on the right and rear about 300 or 400 yards, I ordered them to reform.

I had been struck by a musket-ball whilst in the woods, and now found that I could remain no longer on the field, and accordingly left directions for Colonel Hall, of the Seventh Michigan, to reform the two broken regiments and assume command of them until he rejoined the brigade, and I sent an aide to the senior colonel of the brigade, with information that I was wounded and had left the field.

In the absence of regimental reports I am unable to call attention to particular acts of good conduct on the part of officers and men, and must refer to those reports, but I desire to express my admiration of the gallant and meritorious conduct of Major Mallon, of the Forty-second New York Volunteers, who was distinguished for coolness and bravery and for his active endeavors to rally and reform the regiment under fire.

To the officers of my staff, Capt. William B. Leach, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenants Milton and Hallowell, Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, aides-de-camps, I am greatly indebted. Their conduct was unexceptionable, and I desire to commend them in unmeasured terms for coolness, bravery, and activity; but I beg leave to recommend Captain Leach especially for promotion for habitual industry, intelligence, and activity during the whole term of his service and for distinguished bravery on this field.

I had occasion in my report of the battle of Fair Oaks to speak in terms of high praise of Private John J. Brown, of Company G, Seventh Michigan. This man was bugler again for me at this battle, and I have again to report that his conduct challenged my admiration. This humble

soldier gives constant proofs of fidelity, gallantry, and force of character which would do honor to a higher rank. I ask that he be suitably rewarded. My thanks are due to Lieut. G. C. Ragnet, First Minnesota Volunteers, for services performed during the heat of the engagement, at a time when I had sent away all the officers of my staff with orders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. J. T. DANA,
Brigadier-General.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the Potomac.

No. 68.

Report of Col. Norman J. Hall, Seventh Michigan Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, SUMNER'S CORPS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with the directions of General Howard, commanding division, I have the honor to furnish the following report for this brigade during the time it was under my command in the battle of the 17th instant:

While falling back to a third position (on the Sharpsburg turnpike), selected for making a stand with my regiment, I saw General Dana riding slowly to the rear ahead of me. An officer of his staff, I think, rode to me and said General Dana was wounded, and that he directed that I should take command of the brigade, as I understood. I afterward learned that the general said, "This wing of the brigade." At this time the Seventh Michigan was the only regiment in my sight. The Forty-second New York, after having made a quite successful attempt to rally a few rods in rear of its first position in line of battle, was broken completely, and its colors carried to the rear by Lieutenant-Colonel Bomford, commanding the regiment. I observed the most efficient and fearless service on the part of Major Mallon, Forty-second New York Volunteers, in keeping the men in ranks under fire, and in gallantly recovering the fallen color from the advancing enemy.

As I had received no orders whatever on the field, I determined to attempt to hold the woods, a quarter of a mile in rear of the position of the line of battle when the attack commenced. I caused Captain Hunt, Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter having been disabled by wounds, to establish the Seventh Michigan near the edge of the woods, and went farther to the rear myself, to find and bring up other regiments which I supposed were there, as I had seen them file off under the immediate command of Major-General Sumner. I found troops in line of battle about 150 yards in rear of the edge of the woods, under command of Brigadier-General Gibbon, and judging it improper to form a line that could cover but a small portion of General Gibbon's front in advance of his line, I commenced to move the Seventh Michigan in rear, when General Gibbon objected, and I reformed in front and advanced to the edge of the woods. Here I received orders to file back upon the main portion of the division.

In a field behind the woods I found Colonel Lee with his regiment, Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, in perfectly good order and with

very full ranks. I informed Colonel Lee that he was in command of the brigade, being my senior; but he positively declined to relieve me, and repeatedly desired me to give such orders as I saw fit, and he would obey them. I reported this immediately to General Howard, commanding the division, and he directed me to continue in command. At this point I found Captain Leach, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Hollowell, aide-de-camp to General Dana. Captain Leach pointed out the position of the Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, and went in search of the Forty-second and Fifty-ninth New York Volunteers. A portion of the former was on the road a considerable distance farther to the rear, where it had been ordered to stop fugitives from the battle. A portion of the latter, under Colonel Tidball, was found in the direction of the camp left by the brigade in the morning. They were both ordered to rejoin the brigade. The Twentieth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, was sent to the front edge of the woods to support a battery which had been placed there. The Nineteenth Massachusetts, under Lieutenant-Colonel Devereux, Colonel Hinks having been seriously wounded, was brought up, and, shortly after, the brigade was ordered to support a line of batteries in the corn-field immediately in front of the woods, and I was directed to report to Major-General Smith, commanding division.

After being in position a few minutes, I received orders from General Smith to move to the left and support the batteries in the interval between the lines of the divisions of Generals Smith and Slocum. While passing to this last point I was joined by the One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Morehead. The Forty-second New York joined me some hours after. The Fifty-ninth New York was, I understood, sent to Colonel Lee on the right.

The Nineteenth Massachusetts, Seventh Michigan, One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania, and Forty-second New York were subjected to an annoying fire from the enemy's artillery for several hours during the afternoon of the 17th, during which time their conduct was unexceptionable. Lieutenant-Colonel Bomford, who had received much injury from a fall, I believe, was taken to hospital, and Lieutenant-Colonel Devereux, Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, had been struck on the left wrist by a bullet, inflicting a painful bruise. Colonel Lee assumed command on the 19th. The One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania was withdrawn to its own brigade on the 18th.

Without the services of Captain Leach, assistant adjutant-general, I do not know how it would have been possible for me to have brought together the regiments during the 17th, and I cannot speak too highly of his conduct during the action in endeavoring to cause the troops of the brigade to my left to stand fast, or recommend him too strongly for honorable mention or increased responsibilities.

Lieutenant Milton, aide-de-camp, though suffering from a painful wound, remained upon the field; and Lieutenant Hollowell, aide-de-camp, continued for duty, although scarcely able to stand. Lieutenant Knaggs, adjutant Seventh Michigan, was of much assistance during the time I was in command.

Very respectfully,

N. J. HALL,

Colonel Seventh Michigan Volunteers, Commanding.

Capt. E. WHITTLESEY,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 69.

*Report of Capt. H. G. O. Weymouth, Nineteenth Massachusetts Infantry,
of the battle of Antietam.*

HDQRS. NINETEENTH MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS,
Bolivar, Va., September 29, 1862.

COLONEL: At your request I forward to you the following report of the part taken by this regiment, in connection with the First Minnesota, during the engagement of Sedgwick's division on the 17th instant:

The Nineteenth Regiment was on the extreme right of the second line of battle, the Minnesota regiment being on the right of the first line, when the Minnesota was the last regiment in its line to leave the position, and was immediately followed by the Nineteenth. A stand was made by the latter regiment, at the command of Colonel Hinks, on a slight elevation, where it was directly joined by the former. Soon Colonel Hinks gave the order to fall back still farther, and immediately fell, severely wounded. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Devereux, who reported to Colonel Sully, as the superior officer then on the field, informing him of the wound of Colonel Hinks. Under command of Colonel Sully, both regiments were withdrawn to a close stone wall, where preparations were made to receive the enemy should he attempt an attack. Colonel Sully remained in command until the troops were withdrawn by command of General McClellan.

Believing the above statement to be correct, I remain, sir, respectfully, yours,

H. G. O. WEYMOUTH,

Captain, Commanding Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers.

Col. ALFRED SULLY,

First Minnesota Volunteers.

No. 70.

*Report of Brig. Gen. William H. French, U. S. Army, commanding Third
Division, of the battle of Antietam.*

HDQRS. FRENCH'S DIVISION, SUMNER'S CORPS D'ARMÉE,
Camp near Sharpsburg, on the Battle-field, September 20, 1862.

COLONEL: My division, composed of Brig. Gen. Max Weber's and Kimball's brigades, and three regiments of new levies under the command of Col. Dwight Morris (Fourteenth Connecticut), having been in readiness since daybreak on the 17th instant, was put in motion by orders of the general commanding the corps at about 7.30 o'clock a. m. The Antietam Creek was forded by the division, marching in three columns of brigades, Max Weber on the left, the new regiments in the center, and Kimball's brigade on the right. When my left flank had cleared the ford a mile, the division faced to the left, forming three lines of battle adjacent to and contiguous with Sedgwick's, and immediately moved to the front.

The enemy, who was in position in advance, opened his batteries, under which fire my lines steadily moved until the first line, encountering the enemy's skirmishers, charged them briskly, and, entering a group of houses on Roulette's farm, drove back the force, which had taken a strong position for defense. Whilst Max Weber was clearing his front and driving before him the enemy's first line, a sudden and

terrible fire was opened upon his right by the troops, which had succeeded in breaking the center division of the line of battle. At the same time a heavy column endeavored to turn my left and rear.

At this moment Captain Sumner communicated to me, from the general commanding the corps, that his right divisions were being severely handled, and directed me to press the enemy with all my force. Appreciating the necessity of the order, without waiting for the new regiments to recover from the disorder incident to their long march in line through woods, corn-fields, and over fences, I left them in reserve, and ordered Kimball to charge to the front. With an unsurpassed ardor this gallant brigade, sweeping over all obstacles, soon crowned the crests of the hills on our left and right, flaunting the regimental banners in defiance to those of the rebels who, flushed with a supposed victory, dared to face us.

I refer the general commanding to the reports of brigadiers and their colonels for the details of the battle maintained by my division.

The gallantry and coolness of General Max Weber excited the admiration of the whole command. With consummate skill and judgment he led the attack, and left the field reluctantly, severely wounded.

General Kimball, Second Brigade, brought his veterans into action, and fought the enemy on the front and either flank with such desperate courage and determination as to permit the arrival of the re-enforcements, which reached the field three hours after my division had sustained the conflict. After the arrival of re-enforcements, the exhaustion of ammunition brought my line from the crests it had carried to the second line, which, being supplied, my troops were ready to continue the action. Richardson's division supported me with that success which always distinguished that noble corps. Brooke's brigade was particularly conspicuous.

I particularly ask attention to the report of Brigadier-General Kimball, to whom the division is indebted for a brilliant display of courage never surpassed. Of my staff, Lieutenants Plume and French, aides-de-camp, who have been through every battle with myself fought by McClellan's army, it is sufficient to say did their duty.

Surgeon Grant organized his division hospital under fire. The division commissary, Lieutenant Schüffner, and Lieutenant Hale, Fourteenth Connecticut, division ordnance officer, were strenuous in their exertions to supply the command. The conduct of the new regiments must take a prominent place in the history of this great battle. Undrilled, but admirably armed and equipped, every regiment, either in advance or reserve, distinguished itself, but according to the energy and ability of their respective commanders.

The report of Colonel Morris, Fourteenth Connecticut, commanding brigade, exhibits the services of his command.

There never was such material in any army, and in one month these splendid men will not be excelled by any. Receiving orders from the general-in-chief (General McClellan) to hold my position to the last extremity, it was done, but not without terrible loss. My loss was 1,817: killed and wounded, 1,614; missing, 203.*

The flags, prisoners, and arms captured are detailed in the subordinate reports.

WM. H. FRENCH,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Lieut. Col. J. H. TAYLOR,

Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General, Sumner's Corps.

* But see revised statement, p. 193.

No. 71.

Report of Capt. John D. Frank, Battery G, First New York Light Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

LIGHT CO. G, BAILEY'S REGT. LIGHT ARTILLERY,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 18, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to state that about 8 or 9 o'clock yesterday morning I placed my battery in position to the right and center of our lines, supported by the Sixth Regiment of Maine Volunteers, Hancock's brigade. At about 9.30 o'clock one of the enemy's batteries opened a severe fire to the left and front of my battery, but was driven from its position in less than ten minutes by a well-directed fire of solid shot thrown from my battery. While engaged with this battery, another of the enemy's batteries was placed in a strip of woods unobserved, and opened a very destructive flank fire on my pieces; changing front forward on my left piece, and firing some 40 or 50 solid shot and shell, compelled this battery to withdraw. About 2 o'clock p. m. I opened a flank fire on a battery placed in a corn-field opposite my position, dislodging it with the assistance of a battery on my right.

The loss sustained by my battery was trifling: 1 man killed, 2 severely and 2 slightly wounded; 2 horses killed and 5 wounded; 1 pole cut in two, 1 pole-yoke broken by a shell, and 1 breech-sight disabled, is all the damage sustained by the carriages; all replaced except the breech-sight. Two hundred and forty rounds of solid shot, 48 shell, and about 30 rounds of spherical case were expended, but replaced to-day.

At 8 o'clock this morning I was relieved by Captain Hazard's Rhode Island battery, for the purpose of replacing my ammunition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN D. FRANK,

Captain, Bailey's Regt. Light Artillery, Comdg. Light Company G.

Maj. F. N. CLARKE, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, Sumner's Corps.

No. 72.

Report of Capt. Charles D. Owen, Battery G, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. BATTERY G, FIRST RHODE ISLAND ARTILLERY,
Bolivar Heights, September 23, 1862.

SIR: Agreeably to your orders received on the morning of the 17th, I proceeded with my battery toward the front of our lines, in search of some position where my guns could be employed to advantage. I went from the extreme right toward the center, and, after emerging from the woods opposite the church, was about to take a position on the open field across the road and in rear of the church, but the head of my column had hardly got into the field when our infantry came retreating over the hill, closely followed by the enemy, coming out of the woods. I therefore turned the head of the column and retired behind the burning ruins and reported to you for orders, and you informed me that there were more batteries than could be used, and I had better get my battery under cover, which I did by placing it in the open ground behind the orchard, in rear of the burning ruins.

While here, orders came from you to take the position then occupied by Captain Tompkins' battery, whose orderly informed me that Tompkins was out of ammunition, and that the enemy were flanking him on both sides. I relieved Tompkins, and engaged a battery about a mile off, which was then pouring in a heavy fire upon us. I got quickly into position and opened with shells at $4\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$ elevation and 8-second fuses with good effect, as far as we could judge, and the battery that engaged us ceased firing in about twenty minutes after we commenced.

As soon as the enemy had discontinued their firing at us, I ceased firing also, and was about to proceed toward the brow of the hill to engage the enemy's infantry, then in plain sight from that position, when a noise from my right attracted my attention, and I saw our infantry retreating in disorder toward me, and then about 150 yards off, closely followed by the rebels. I limbered up quickly and started on the trot into the road leading direct from the ruins, and when the last caisson left the ground the enemy were close upon us. I halted when a few hundred yards to the rear, and, after replenishing the ammunition in the gun-limbers, took the pieces alone of the right section and proceeded up behind the advance that retook the field, but the infantry was quite unsteady on the right and broke the second time, and not deeming it prudent to risk even the section under such circumstances, I withdrew and reported to General Sumner for orders, who ordered me to report to General ———, then just in front of General French's division. After looking at the position designed for me, the general deemed it not prudent to place me there, and I then reported to General French, who put me in position on rear of the lines, and directed me to fire two shots toward the corner of the woods near the church, and, although contrary to my own wishes, as expressed to him, I fired, with very poor success, as I afterward learned.

During the engagement I expended about 75 rounds of ammunition, and was engaged exactly forty minutes. The ammunition worked quite well, with the exception of Dyer's, which seldom takes the groove.

During the maneuvering two of the caissons' axles broke, making in all ten since the battery has been in the field.

My total loss is 4 horses killed. Five men were slightly wounded, but none are now unable to be about camp.

The officers and men behaved very well, and I cannot say too much of the conduct of the former. Lieutenant Torslow quite distinguished himself in rallying the infantry after they had broken.

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES D. OWEN,

Captain First Rhode Island Artillery, commanding Battery G.

Maj. F. N. CLARKE,

Commanding Artillery, Second Corps.

No. 73.

Report of Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. KIMBALL'S BRIG., FRENCH'S DIV., SUMNER'S CORPS,
On the Field of Battle, near Sharpsburg, September 18, 1862.

GENERAL: On the morning of the 17th instant, in obedience to your order, my brigade crossed Antietam Creek and was formed into

line of battle on the left of General Sedgwick's division, and in the third line, Generals Weber's and Morris' forming the first and second lines. In this position I moved directly forward about three-fourths of a mile, when General Weber encountered the enemy's pickets and drove them back, and soon came upon the enemy in force, posted in a strong position in an orchard, corn-field, ditches, and upon the hill-sides. At this moment, in obedience to your order, I moved my brigade forward and formed my line in front on the left of General Weber. My right wing, consisting of the Fourteenth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Harrow, and the Eighth Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Sawyer commanding, was posted on the hill-side in front of the orchard, their left resting on a lane running in the direction of Sharpsburg; my left wing, consisting of the Seventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Snider, and the One hundred and thirty-second Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Oakford commanding, resting on an extension of the same line, their right resting on the lane running toward Sharpsburg and their left extending toward the creek.

Directly on my front, in a narrow road running parallel with my line, and, being washed by water, forming a natural rifle-pit between my line and a large corn-field, I found the enemy in great force, as also in the corn-field in rear of the ditch. As my line advanced to the crest of the hill, a murderous fire was opened upon it from the entire force in front. My advance farther was checked, and for three hours and thirty minutes the battle raged incessantly, without either party giving way. The enemy, having been re-enforced, made an attempt to turn my left flank by throwing three regiments forward entirely to the left of my line, which I met and repulsed, with loss, by extending my left wing, Seventh Virginia and One hundred and thirty-second Pennsylvania, in that direction. Being foiled in this, he made a heavy charge on my center, thinking to break my line, but was met by my command and repulsed with great slaughter. I then, in turn, ordered a charge, which was promptly responded to, and which resulted in driving the enemy entirely from the ditches, &c., and some distance into the corn-field beyond. In this charge my command captured about 300 prisoners, the enemy in his flight leaving on the field several stand of colors, which were taken by some parties outside of my brigade whilst we were pursuing him.

At this time a brigade of General Richardson's division advanced to my relief on the left of my line, securing that flank from further assaults. In the mean time, the line on my right having been abandoned, the enemy made an attempt to turn that flank, and by that to gain my rear, and succeeded in gaining a corn-field directly on my right. To repulse them, a change of front was made by the Fourteenth Indiana and Eighth Ohio Volunteers, which resulted in driving the enemy from my right, and restored the line, which was afterward occupied by Smith's division of General Franklin's corps. For four hours and a half my command was under most galling fire, and not a man faltered or left the ranks until the field was left by the rebels in our possession, those who were sent with the wounded to the rear quickly returning to their places in line. For three and a half hours of this time we were upon the field, and maintained our position without any support whatever. My men having exhausted all their ammunition, the fight was maintained for some time with the supplies stripped from the bodies of their dead and wounded comrades.

Every man of my command behaved in the most exemplary manner, and as men who had determined to save their country or die. The

Fourteenth Indiana and Eighth Ohio Volunteers, in the change of front which saved our right, executed it as veterans and as only brave men could. The battle was fought under your own eye, general, and I need not tell you how terrible was the conflict. The loss in my command is a lasting testimony of the sanguinary nature of the conflict, and a glance at the position held by the rebels tells how terrible was the punishment inflicted on them. The corn-fields on the front are strewn with their dead and wounded, and in the ditch first occupied by them the bodies are so numerous that they seem to have fallen dead in line of battle, for there there is a battalion of dead rebels. We maintained our ground and drove the enemy from his. After the firing had ceased on my front, the enemy seemed to have concentrated his force on the force of General Richardson's command. Colonel Brooke, commanding a brigade, sent to me for assistance. You having previously ordered Colonel Morris, commanding Second Brigade, to take orders from me, I ordered him to Colonel Brooke's assistance.

The loss in my command is as follows: 121 killed, 510 wounded, 8 missing. This number embraces officers and men.

Lists from the several regiments, with name and rank, together with the reports of Colonels Harrow and Snider and Lieutenant-Colonels Sawyer and Wilcox, are forwarded herewith. Among the killed and wounded are many brave and gallant officers.

Col. R. A. Oakford, One hundred and thirty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, was killed while leading his regiment. He was a brave officer and died like a hero. Captain Coons, acting lieutenant-colonel, and Captain Cavins, acting major, Fourteenth Indiana Volunteers, were wounded while gallantly leading their commands.

Where every officer and man behaved with such signal bravery and coolness, it would be invidious to make distinction by mentioning the names of a part only.

I cannot speak in too high praise of the officers of my staff, to whom I am indebted for valuable services rendered to me on the field. My adjutant-general, Capt. E. D. Mason, behaved with great coolness, and received a very painful wound during the engagement. The conduct of Lieutenants Swigart, Marshall, and Burrell, throughout the entire fight, was highly commendable, and exhibited a high degree of gallantry, efficiency, and personal bravery. They were proved by a test such as it is seldom the lot even of veterans to encounter, and the result has been highly honorable to them. I recommend them to the consideration of the commanding general.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NATHAN KIMBALL,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Brigadier-General FRENCH,
Commanding Division.

No. 74.

Report of Col. William Harrow, Fourteenth Indiana Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

BATTLE-FIELD, NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD.,
September 19, 1862,

SIR: I report as follows:

On the morning of the 17th instant, in obedience to your order, my regiment moved forward on the right of the brigade, advancing rapidly

toward the enemy, who were then engaging our line. We passed through an orchard, emerging into a plowed field, receiving during the execution of this movement a rapid fire from the enemy; this about 8 o'clock a. m. We ascended the hill in our front and occupied the crest, from which position we engaged the enemy, sheltered under ditches, rocks, and fences, with a large reserved force in a field of corn in their rear. The contest here continued for near four hours, during all which time the enemy poured upon us a terrific and murderous fire from infantry, also of grape and shell, thrown from a battery on our right and front. In our immediate front as many as eight stand of rebel colors were exhibited at a time.

My regiment went into the fight with 60 rounds of ammunition, and, after firing the last one, the enemy were discovered moving in heavy force upon my right flank. At this moment my own regiment and the Eighth Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Sawyer commanding, on my left, immediately changed their front, and formed at a right angle to our original line. The line thus formed was held and the enemy repulsed, our men using the ammunition taken from their dead and wounded comrades. After 12 m. the enemy retired, and my regiment was not again engaged during the day, but lay upon their arms until night, under a hot fire of shot and shell from the enemy's batteries.

My officers and men without exception conducted themselves with a courage and daring seldom equaled and never surpassed. I cannot mention one without naming all. We went into the fight with 320 men, and lost in killed and wounded 181. A list of the names and rank of each is herewith furnished. My adjutant, J. J. P. Blinn, was with me during the day, and conducted himself as only a brave man can, bearing messages for me, and when not thus engaged remaining at my side witnessing the heroic conduct of his regiment. General, our record is a proud one, but one which can never be thought of save with feelings of the most intense sorrow for the brave dead and wounded.

Respectfully,

WM. HARROW,

Colonel Fourteenth Indiana Volunteers.

General KIMBALL,

Comdg. First Brigade, French's Division, Sumner's Corps.

No. 75.

Report of Lieut. Col. Franklin Sawyer, Eighth Ohio Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

ON THE FIELD, NEAR ANTIETAM CREEK, MD.,

September 18, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the killed and wounded of the Eighth Regiment Ohio Volunteers, and of the part taken by the regiment in the battle, on this field, of yesterday:

We left our bivouac on the east side of the creek with your brigade early on the morning of the 17th, and, moving in our proper position in the line, forded Antietam Creek and deployed in line of battle on the hills, our position being to the left of the Fourteenth Indiana. So soon as the line was formed, by your order we moved directly to the front and upon the enemy, who appeared to be masked behind fences, corn-fields,

and in ditches on the crests of a series of ridges. We gained the position assigned us under a perfect storm of the enemy's balls and shell, where, in connection with the other regiments of your brigade and French's division, we maintained, from 9 o'clock a. m. until near 1 p. m., our position under a most sanguinary fire of musketry and shell. The enemy were within 20 rods of our position in strong force, and were repeatedly re-enforced during the action, and had, besides, the advantage of considerable cover at points very near us. The position of the Fourteenth Indiana and the Eighth Ohio was greatly exposed, and the battle raged along our lines with such fury as to threaten our annihilation, but not a man faltered or fell back. Our ammunition being exhausted, the cartridge-boxes of the dead and wounded were rifled to supply our arms.

The enemy were finally driven from our front, but the lines to the right of the Fourteenth Indiana giving way, the enemy undertook to turn that flank, but the Fourteenth Indiana and Eighth Ohio rapidly and gallantly changed their front, and drove the enemy back with great slaughter. At this time, other troops going to the front, by your order I brought off the Eighth to replenish its ammunition, and then took position with the brigade to the right. We were not again engaged during the day, but were constantly annoyed, and suffered some from the enemy's shell, which continued to fall among us until dark.

During the entire engagement my officers and men behaved with the utmost bravery and gallantry; not a man gave way. Our colors received seventeen balls, but were never once depressed during the storm of battle. Major Winslow and Lieut. David Lewis, acting adjutant, were constantly at their posts, and performed their whole duty. All my officers and men who were present deserve especial mention, but as they fought under your own eye it is unnecessary now. Our record of losses is a long and sad one. We went into action with 17 officers and 324 men, of whom 2 officers were killed and 7 wounded. Of the non-commissioned officers and privates, 30 were killed and 122 wounded, and 5 missing, probably killed.* Appended hereto is a list of the killed and wounded, name and company; also the name of Corpl. W. W. Larner, killed the day previous.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

FRANKLIN SAWYER,

Lieutenant-Colonel Eighth Ohio Volunteers, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. NATHAN KIMBALL,

Commanding First Brigade.

No. 76.

Report of Lieut. Col. Vincent M. Wilcox, One hundred and thirty-second Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. 132D REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Battle-field, Nager Spring, Md., September 19, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I beg leave to submit to you the following account of the part which our regiment took in the great contest of the 17th instant:

We were ordered by you to take up the line of march about 6 o'clock

* But see revised statement, p. 193.

a. m., and were formed in line of battle at 7 o'clock. We were brought under fire a little before 8 o'clock, and although ours was a new regiment, not yet organized a month and never before in sight of the enemy, still they behaved like veterans and well-disciplined troops. We brought into action 750 men, and brought out 364 men, exclusive of officers. Quite early in the action Col. Richard A. Oakford fell, mortally wounded, and died in a few minutes. In his death the country has lost a noble, able, and experienced officer. The command then devolved upon me, and I cannot here too highly express my thanks and admiration for the assistance rendered me by Maj. Charles Albright and Adj. F. L. Hitchcock. They never left the field for a moment, but by their coolness and bravery assisted me greatly in inspiring the men with that courage which it was necessary for men to possess under so severe a fire as that to which they were subjected.

Where all do so well it would be invidious to show distinctions or particularize names, and hence, in justice to the line officers, I must say that all performed their duty nobly and well, exhibiting the greatest firmness and bravery. Lieutenant Cranmer, Company C, advanced, with musket in hand, at the head of his company to the front, and fell, mortally wounded, while setting a splendid example of coolness and courage to his men. Captain Abbott, Company G, fell, dangerously wounded, while fighting most gallantly at the very front of the line.

General, you directed me to hold the eminence in front of the rifle-pit at all hazards, and not to fall back until ordered by you, and I am happy to say that it was done, although at a fearful sacrifice. The men were supplied with 60 rounds of ammunition, and exhausted their supply, and took the cartridges from the dead and wounded, and kept up the fire against the enemy. He tried upon several occasions to out-flank us, but the sure and deadly aim of our men drove him back to his rifle-pits in disorder. At last he exhibited a white flag, but in violation of that flag kept up an incessant fire of shell and musketry, and quite a number were killed and wounded thereby. When our men were nearly exhausted of strength and ammunition, you directed me to fix bayonets and charge upon the rifle-pits, but at this moment the Irish Brigade came up and joined our men in the charge. They drove the enemy from their stronghold and captured some 300 prisoners, including a number of officers, among them Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet, of Macon, Ga., all of whom were sent to the rear. We stood up in front of the enemy for nearly four and a half hours, and when re-enforcements came (which must have been at about 12 o'clock m.), the tide of battle had turned, and I considered the field ours. Our colors were planted in advance of any on the field, and were finally waved over the enemy's rifle-pits, and brought back, riddled by his balls, in triumph. The men under my command are entitled to honorable mention, which I trust they will receive at your hands. Below I append a list of my killed and wounded.*

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

V. M. WILCOX,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Brigadier-General KIMBALL,

Commanding First Brigade, French's Division, Sumner's Corps.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 193.

No. 77.

Report of Col. Joseph Snider, Seventh West Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH VIRGINIA VOLUNTEERS,
September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have, in obedience to your order, the honor of submitting the following report:

In obedience to your order on the morning of the 17th instant, we took our position in line of battle on the extreme left of your brigade, and, in further obedience of your orders, moved forward at 8 o'clock, at which time we engaged the enemy, who were drawn up in large force. The fight was terrific during the whole engagement. The enemy endeavored to deceive us by hoisting a white flag, which for a moment caused our men to cease firing, during which time the enemy was discovered to be moving in large force with the view of flanking our left, which caused us to change the position of our left wing, this being done as speedily as possible, when we succeeded in driving the enemy back with great slaughter beyond their original position, where we held them until our ammunition was exhausted, when we were relieved by the Irish Brigade, commanded by General Meagher. During the engagement our colors were shot down three times, but were promptly hoisted each time, and were brought off the field with the regiment.

JO. SNIDER,

Colonel, Commanding Seventh Virginia.

Brigadier-General KIMBALL.

No. 78.

Report of Col. Dwight Morris, Fourteenth Connecticut Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FRENCH'S DIVISION,
September 19, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders, my brigade left camp at Keedysville on the morning of the 17th. After fording the Antietam, marching about 2 miles by the flank, we formed line of battle, the Fourteenth Connecticut on the right, the One hundred and thirtieth Pennsylvania center, and the One hundred and eighth New York on the extreme left. We marched forward, forming in front of William Roulette's house and farm, which was occupied by the enemy, and, having driven them from that position, the right rested in a corn-field and the center occupied a space in front of an orchard. We were here exposed to a galling cross-fire for three hours, but maintained the position. The Fifth Maryland Regiment fell back early in the action, passing through the right wing of the Fourteenth Connecticut. The right was immediately formed by Lieut. Col. S. H. Perkins, and the regiment three times formed under a severe cross-fire. Maj. C. C. Clark also rendered great assistance in forming the line. Adj. T. G. Ellis, who acted as my aide, constantly communicated with General French, and in so doing was greatly exposed in consequence of the position taken by the general amid a very hot fire.

Having received orders to support General Kimball, who was obtaining ammunition, I reported to him, and was ordered to take a position

near a stone wall and to hold it. This I did with the Fourteenth Connecticut alone until ordered to advance the Fourteenth to support Colonel Brooke, commanding First Brigade, Richardson's division. I took the position assigned, and was ordered by General Caldwell, temporarily in command of Richardson's division, to remain until further orders. The Fourteenth was here shelled by the enemy, until ordered by General Hancock, who relieved General Caldwell from the command, to the front, which position the Fourteenth held for thirty-six hours, constantly harassed by the enemy. From the time I was ordered to support General Kimball I remained with the Fourteenth and the One hundred and thirtieth Pennsylvania, now joined to the First Brigade, and the One hundred and eighth New York. For details I refer you to the reports of the colonels of regiments.

My brigade captured 2 stand of colors, 2 captains, 7 lieutenants, and about 400 privates, who were turned over to the provost-marshal at Boonsborough, besides wounding many field officers of the enemy. We also took over 400 stand of arms, which were turned over to the ordnance officer. I attribute our success in a great measure to the constant communication with the commanding general through the day, as well as to the unsurpassed bravery of our men. The men in my brigade were all new troops, hastily raised, and without drill or experience, and, although under fire for the first time, behaved with great gallantry. In front of the last position held by the Fourteenth Connecticut more than 1,000 of the enemy lie slain.

My loss in killed, wounded, and missing is 529.

Very respectfully, yours,

DWIGHT MORRIS,

Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade, French's Division.

Lieut. J. W. PLUME,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 79.

Report of Lieut. Col. Sanford H. Perkins, Fourteenth Connecticut Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH REGIMENT CONN. VOLS.,

Sharpsburg, Md., September 19, 1862.

We broke bivouac at camp near Keedysville, Md., on the morning of the 17th of September, taking position on the right of your command according to order, and marched about two hours by flank, when we formed line of battle and moved forward a distance of about one-half mile, where we became engaged, our position being in a corn-field west of William Roulette's farm-house, the enemy occupying a position on the summit of a hill to our front. The Fifth Maryland Regiment being slightly in our advance, I reserved my fire until they broke, which threw three companies of my right wing into confusion, when we opened fire from the left and immediately proceeded to rally the right, which having been effected, we held our position under a severe cross-fire for nearly three hours, during which time, my horse being disabled, I was obliged to continue with my command on foot.

I cannot omit saying that during the time above mentioned my right and center were broken twice, but rallied on the colors and formed in good order, and, when ordered to retire, moved from the field with precision, after which we accompanied you to support General Kimball,

who was retiring for ammunition, and took position near a stone wall east of the farm-house, holding the same until ordered to support Colonel Brooke.

During this movement, while marching by flank, a shell was thrown into our ranks, killing several of our men. The ranks were at once closed, the regiment moving forward at quick time and in good order. At this time and during the remaining thirty-six hours, being under your immediate command, requires no further detail.

Where all behaved so well it may seem invidious to particularize, but I feel bound to mention Captain Blinn, of Company F, and Captain Willard, of Company G, who fell at their posts gallantly cheering their commands. Also First Lieutenant Coit, commanding Company K, and Lieutenant Crosby, of the same company, were dangerously wounded, leaving that company without a commissioned officer. Acting Adjutant Lucas, Assistant Adjutant-General Ellis, together with Maj. C. C. Clark, rendered great assistance in rallying the command under a galling fire, at which time the horse of Assistant Adjutant-General Ellis was disabled. Sergeant Mills, color-bearer, was severely, if not mortally, wounded while bearing and waving aloft our standard, and his place was filled by Lieutenant Comstock, Company H, who, with Sergeant Foote, of Company I, retained them until the close of the action. Our colors are riddled with shot and shell, and the staff broken. Captain Gibbons, of Company B, deserves notice, who, finding the farm-house occupied by a large force of the enemy, ordered his company to advance and fire, scattering them and driving a portion of them into the cellar, where, by closing the door, a large number of them were captured.

As you are aware, our men, hastily raised and without drill, behaved like veterans, and fully maintained the honor of the Union and our native State.

Total killed, wounded, and missing, 156.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

SANFORD H. PERKINS,

Lieut. Col., Commanding Fourteenth Regiment Conn. Vols.

Col. DWIGHT MORRIS,

Commanding Second Brigade, General French's Division.

No. 80.

Report of Col. Oliver H. Palmer, One hundred and eighth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS 108TH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Near Sharpsburg, September 19, 1862.

I have the honor to report that on the 17th instant my command left camp near Keedysville about 6 o'clock in the morning, and, after marching about 2 miles, having formed into line of battle, entered into action on the crest of the hill on the left of the brigade in the front line of battle, and in front of the corn-field and rifle-pits occupied by the rebels. The action commenced about 7.30 o'clock in the morning. My command remained in line, and continued in position, firing with great rapidity and energy, in the face of a deadly fire of the enemy, who were stationed in the corn-field and rifle-pits, not more than 20 or 30 rods distant, until about 12.30 o'clock in the afternoon.

During the action a charge was made upon the rifle-pits, and we took

159 rebel privates and non-commissioned officers, 3 rebel captains, and 6 lieutenants, also one stand of regimental colors of the Fourteenth North Carolina Regiment. These colors were taken by Henry Niles, of Company K, of this regiment, but after taking the colors some officer of another regiment told him to give them up, stating that if he carried them he might be fired into by our own men. Not knowing any better, he handed them to such officer. The prisoners were taken under guard by Capt. E. P. Fuller, of Company H, of my regiment, and delivered to an officer of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, guarding at Boonsborough, Md., and a receipt taken, which has been delivered to General French. The prisoners were so taken and delivered by direction of an aide-de-camp of General Sumner.

At about 12.30 p. m. of the 17th my command was relieved for a time by the Irish Brigade, by order of General Richardson. It was then ordered to fall back about 100 rods. It did so, and was then reformed upon the colors, but I was only able then to collect about 100 men. I was then ordered by General Richardson to again march into line to the front, to fill a gap in the line of battle farther to the left and in General Richardson's division, and my command was marched there accordingly, and remained there under a severe fire from the enemy's batteries until the close of the action, at dark.

By order of General Hancock my command was then placed on the front line of pickets to do picket duty, and remained in that position until 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th, and until relieved by order of General French. During their picket duty a rebel prisoner was taken by a private in Company B, and delivered to General Caldwell.

During the action my officers and men conducted themselves with gratifying coolness and bravery. My loss has been severe, and I regret to report that early in the action my major, George B. Force, was instantly killed while in the fearless discharge of his duty. Lieut. D. B. Tarbox, of Company B, and Lieut. R. E. Holmes, of Company G, were also killed while leading their commands in action. Lieut. W. W. Bloss, of Company A, bravely took the colors, and, while advancing in the face of the enemy, was severely wounded. Lieutenant Porter, of Company F, was shot through the foot while bravely discharging his duty. Twenty-three privates were killed and 122 non-commissioned officers and privates were wounded. Forty-seven privates are missing—whether killed or wounded I am unable to report. My total loss in killed, wounded, and missing is 196.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. H. PALMER,

Colonel One hundred and eighth New York Volunteers.

Colonel MORRIS,

Commanding Second Brigade, General French's Division.

No. 81.

Report of Col. Henry I. Zinn, One hundred and thirtieth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. 130TH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
September 19, 1862.

COLONEL: In accordance with your order of this morning, I have the honor to report as follows:

About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 17th instant we left our camp, on the south side of the Sharpsburg pike, and marched by a flank move-

ment to a point about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north, where a line of battle was formed. We then moved forward a little west of south about half a mile to a farm-house, in and about which a small force of the enemy was posted, whose fire we received, wounding several men. After the enemy was driven from his position at the house, we advanced through a small orchard and plowed field to the crest of a hill, where the fight became general. The enemy had taken position with his first line in a ravine in front of and about 75 yards distant from our position, having two other lines in a corn-field in rear of his first. We received the fire of the enemy's first line and of the force on the right, together with that of a battery posted in the corner of the field on the enemy's right, and distant 200 yards. The firing on both sides continued for more than two hours, when the enemy was driven from his position by a force on our left.

About this time a force of the enemy advanced on a battery posted on our right, which was withdrawn. The enemy then changed front, and advanced on our right to the fence bounding the field in which we were posted. Changing our front to meet his advancing lines, we held him in check until a charge was made by a brigade on our right, which drove the enemy back in great disorder. By this time our ammunition was expended, when we withdrew and reformed our line at the farm-house first spoken of. Having become separated from our brigade, we were ordered by General Kimball to fall in with the brigade under his command, where we remained until this morning.

Owing to the circumstances in which we are placed at present, I am unable to give a more detailed account of all that occurred.

Our loss is 32 killed, 146 wounded.

I have the honor to remain, your very obedient servant,

H. I. ZINN,

Colonel, Commanding One hundred and thirtieth Pa. Vols.

Colonel MORRIS,

Commanding Second Brigade, French's Division.

No. 82.

Report of Col. John W. Andrews, First Delaware Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

BATTLE-FIELD OF THE 17TH INSTANT, *Near Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862.*

GENERAL: The Third Brigade met the enemy in a strong position, under cover of natural and artificial defenses. The command continued fighting until their ammunition was expended. They were exposed to a heavy fire and suffered severely. The survivors joined the second and third lines. We captured about 300 prisoners and sent them to the rear. Brig. Gen. Max Weber and Captain Burleigh, his assistant adjutant-general, were wounded while attempting to bring on the Fifth Maryland Regiment. I have no idea of the time further than the above; was myself employed in ordering men to join the second line and preventing too many from taking the wounded away.

The First Delaware Regiment lost in killed and wounded, out of 708, 264.* Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson wounded, 3 captains killed and 4 wounded, 4 lieutenants wounded. All the field officers' horses killed.

The Fourth New York lost 182* men out of 540; 2 officers killed and

* But see revised statement, p. 193.

5 wounded; color guards all killed or wounded. The same with the color guard of the First Delaware. The major commanding the Fifth Maryland was wounded, and I have received no report from this regiment.

The officers and men behaved with the coolness and bravery of veterans. A more formal report will be made on the first opportunity.

JOHN W. ANDREWS,

Colonel and Acting Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. WM. H. FRENCH,

Commanding Third Division, General Sumner's Corps.

No. 83.

Report of Col. John W. Andrews, First Delaware Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQES. FIRST DELAWARE INFANTRY,
THIRD BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, SECOND CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: The First Delaware Infantry, forming the right of Brig. Gen. Max Weber's brigade, after fording Antietam Creek, marched in column for a mile, then, facing to the left, advanced in line of battle, forming the first line of General French's division. The enemy's batteries now opened a severe fire. Having advanced steadily through woods and corn-fields, driving all before us, we met the enemy in two lines of battle, posted in a road or ravine 4 feet below the surface of the adjoining field, with a third line in a corn-field in the rear, the ground gradually rising so that they were able to fire over the heads of those in the ravine; our right was also exposed to the sudden and terrible fire from the troops who succeeded in breaking the center division of the line of battle. We were at this time about 20 paces off the enemy, and returned their fire for some time with much coolness and effect. A charge was then ordered and attempted, but our second line, composed of new levies, instead of supporting our advance, fired into our rear. We had now lost one-third of our men, and 8 officers commanding companies were either killed or wounded. Under these circumstances we fell back gradually to a stronger position until relieved by our third line, composed of veterans under General Kimball. This was our first battle, and I cannot speak in too high praise of the conduct of the officers and men.

The following officers, all commanding companies, were killed or wounded: Killed, Captains Watson, Leonard, and Rickards; wounded, Captains Yardley, Woodall, and Shortlidge, and Lieutenants Swiggett and Tanner. In fact, but few escaped. The color guard were all killed or wounded, the field officers' horses killed.

The command exhibited a degree of gallantry, efficiency, and personal bravery seldom equaled. I must also particularly mention the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson, Major Smyth, and Acting Adjutant Postles, who behaved with exemplary coolness and bravery.

JOHN W. ANDREWS,

Colonel First Delaware Infantry.

Captain BURLEIGH,

Assistant Adjutant-General on the Staff of Brig. Gen. Max Weber.

No. 84.

Report of Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter, U. S. Army, commanding Fifth Army Corps, of the battle of Antietam, skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford, and action near Shepherdstown.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., October 1, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to present the following report:

I received at Arlington, Va., about midnight on the 11th ultimo, orders from the General-in-Chief to report on the following day, with my corps, to Major-General McClellan at Brookeville, Md. The only portion of the Fifth Corps then under my control was Morell's division, thus distributed: One brigade at Upton's Hill, one at Hunter's Chapel, and one at Fort Corcoran. At 6 a. m. on the 12th, the division (about 6,000 strong) was in motion via Leesborough to join the active army. Tyler's and Allabach's brigades, constituting then Whipple's now Humphreys' division, were assigned to me on the 12th on personal application to the General-in-Chief, and on the morning of the 14th (having been delayed by exchanging unserviceable arms in five regiments and obtaining transportation and provision), that division, about 6,000 strong, marched to join me near Middletown, Md.

On the morning of the 14th September, I reported in person to the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac and troops engaged in the defense of Washington, and resumed command of Sykes' division and that portion of the Reserve Artillery not distributed to corps. This portion of the command was held in readiness to take part in the battle of South Mountain, but so gallantly and effectually was the enemy driven from the heights by Burnside's and Sumner's [Hooker's?] commands, that its services were not called for.

On the 15th, in compliance with instructions to pursue the enemy until I came upon him in large force or in position, and then to take position and await arrival of other corps, I passed through Burnside's command, which had halted for some hours on South Mountain, and moved on the direct road to Sharpsburg as far as the Antietam Bridge, where, on the right, I found a portion (Richardson's division) of Sumner's corps in line of battle opposite the enemy, then formed on the Sharpsburg Heights. Sykes at once took position behind commanding heights to the left of the road approaching the bridge, and, protected by him, artillery was posted to command the bridge, the roads, and the ground in front of both. The Reserve Artillery, having been accidentally cut off by infantry of another corps (Burnside's), arrived too late to be located that night.

Soon after daybreak of the 16th the enemy's artillery opened from the Sharpsburg Heights, and as soon as our guns were in proper position it was vigorously replied to, and the guns brought to bear throughout the day effectively upon the enemy in front of Sykes, Sumner, and Hooker. Morell's division arrived at about noon, and on the 17th replaced Richardson's division in support of the batteries on the right of Antietam Bridge. Two brigades of Morell's division were dispatched in the afternoon to the aid of General Sumner, then hard pressed. They were halted near their destination by the major-general commanding, who had sent for them. They returned after dark.

From early in the morning of the 17th till dark the artillery was engaged with great effect upon that of the enemy, or upon his infantry, whenever it showed itself. The men were in many cases driven from

their guns, and serious injury was inflicted upon the infantry, which in several instances broke and fled from our shot.

By the same authority a portion of Sykes' division was advanced to support the horse batteries and cavalry immediately in front of Sharpsburg, under Brigadier-General Pleasonton. I was also instructed to replace Pleasonton's batteries till their ammunition could be replenished. Having sent off to other corps all batteries of reserve artillery, they were relieved by Sykes' guns, the only ones available. Their range was too short and they were soon returned. On his call for more support, four more battalions were sent over in the afternoon. They were sent as support to the batteries and to keep the enemy's skirmishers from disturbing our cannoneers. They were, however, diverted from that service, and employed to drive the enemy's skirmishers to their reserves. Their many losses attest the serious work they had to perform.

Still later in the afternoon I received from General Pleasonton a call for a division to press the success obtained by this small band of regulars, accompanied by the statement that Burnside and Sumner were driving the enemy. Between the dispatching and receiving of that call the tide of battle had changed. Our troops on the left under Burnside had been driven from the heights which they had so gallantly crowned, while those on the immediate right, under Sumner, were held in check. The army was at a stand. I had not the force asked for, and could not, under my orders, risk the safety of the artillery and center of the line, and perhaps imperil the success of the day by further diminishing my small command, not then 4,000 strong—then in the front line and unsupported, and protecting all our trains. Before dark General Sykes had ordered Lieutenant Miller to report with his battery to General Burnside. Colonel Warren, with his brigade, had been sent earlier in the day.

Humphreys' division arrived on the 18th and relieved Morell, who was ordered to the left in support of Burnside. Sykes' and Humphreys' were held ready for any emergency, but were not called to active operations. The heavy batteries had expended their ammunition, and did not receive a supply until the 19th. Morell's division, on reporting to General Burnside, relieved his corps, which was at once recalled from its position in front of Antietam Bridge.

At an early hour on the 19th it was discovered that the enemy had nearly evacuated Sharpsburg, and the Fifth with other corps was directed to take up a position in line beyond the town, but afterward ordered to pursue the enemy and give aid to the cavalry brigade, then in advance. I found that the enemy, pressed by Pleasonton, had crossed the river, and was holding the right bank, defending the fords with artillery well posted. I determined to clear the fords, and, if possible, secure some of the enemy's artillery. With this view I caused the banks of the river and canal to be well lined with skirmishers and sharpshooters, supported by portions of their respective divisions (Morell's and Sykes'), while their artillery and that of the reserve was posted to control the opposite bank.

While these were driving from their guns the cannoneers and horses, and silencing the fire of the infantry, an attacking party from Griffin's and Barnes' brigades, composed of the Fourth Michigan and parts of the One hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania and the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiments, volunteers for the occasion, was formed under the immediate direction of General Griffin, and moved across the river in face of a warm fire from the enemy's infantry. Through some misunderstanding, an order for Sykes to move over a similar party

did not reach him. His skirmishers, under the immediate direction of Colonel Warren, were busy keeping down the fire of the enemy's infantry, and with the artillery effectually prevented the enemy's cannoners from manning their guns.

Darkness concealed the movements of the enemy and enabled them to remove a portion of their artillery before our attacking party scaled the heights. The result of the day's action was the capture of 5 pieces, 2 caissons, 2 caisson bodies, 2 forges, and some 400 stand of arms; also 1 battle-flag. Our loss was small in numbers. Some excellent officers and men were killed and wounded. The party was recalled during the night, and the whole command bivouacked within reach of the fords.

Cavalry having been directed to cross the river at daybreak and the commander to co-operate with me in an advance, I directed Generals Morell and Sykes to cross about 7 a. m. on the 20th their divisions, preceding their main columns by advanced guards thrown well forward on the roads to Shepherdstown and Charlestown. About 8 a. m. I was informed by General Sykes that the skirmishers of his advanced guard (cavalry not having then crossed) had met the enemy advancing in large force on the Charlestown road. I directed the recall at once of this force, and proceeded immediately to the ford, over which I found rapidly returning such of the cavalry as had crossed. Seeing the small force of infantry on the opposite bank (two brigades of Sykes' and a part of one of Morell's), and the impossibility of getting over and forming sufficient force in time to meet the attack, I ordered all to withdraw and take shelter within the canal, which afforded admirable protection and means of using effectually our own fire. At the same time the hills immediately on the banks of the river were well lined with skirmishers, and the artillery, well posted, commenced playing on the advancing foe. Under cover of our guns the whole command recrossed with little injury except to the One hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, a small portion of which became confused early in the action. Their arms (spurious Enfield rifles*) were so defective that little injury could be inflicted by them upon the enemy. Many of this regiment, new in service, volunteered the previous evening, and formed part of the attacking party which gallantly crossed the river to secure the enemy's artillery. They have earned a good name which the losses of the day did not diminish.

The attacking column was from a part of Jackson's corps, the main portion of which lay concealed in the adjacent woods. The loss of the enemy that day is not known. Under the fire of the artillery and a portion of the infantry which was poured into his advancing columns, it must have been heavy.

Some of the guns from which the enemy had been driven the day previous by the combined fire of the corps artillery and infantry, and whose supports were routed the evening previous, were secured and brought to this side. I am pleased to be able to state that Company D (Griffin's), Fifth Artillery, regained one of its guns lost at the first battle of Bull Run, and will retain it with the permission of the major-general commanding. A return of ordnance captured accompanies this report; also a list of casualties.†

I respectfully refer to the reports of Brigadier-General Sykes and Colonel Hays and their respective brigade and battery commanders for the details of the operations of their commands, and to commend to the

*These defective arms had been reported to the General-in-Chief, but all efforts to replace them had failed.—NOTE ON ORIGINAL REPORT.

†Embodied in revised statements, pp. 194, 204.

major-general commanding and to the Government the recommendations for promotion well earned by each on these as well here as on other fields of battle.

I desire to express my thanks to Brigadier-General Hunt, chief of artillery, for services rendered voluntarily, and to Captain Ingraham, Fourteenth Infantry, on provost duty at headquarters Army of the Potomac, who volunteered and accompanied the storming party on the 19th ultimo.

As soon as the reports of other commanders are received I shall take pleasure in bringing to notice the names of many other officers of my own command conspicuous for their gallant services.

I desire to call attention to the generous and brave conduct of a citizen, reported by Captain Graham, who took from under the fire of the enemy's artillery the wounded of Captain Graham's battery.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Army of the Potomac.

[Addenda.]

*Itinerary of the Fifth Army Corps, from September 1 to November 21, 1862.**

September 1, the corps marched to Fairfax Court-House and Flint Hill, at which latter place it arrived at 10 a. m., September 2, and left at 3 p. m. for Chain Bridge.

September 3, arrived and encamped at Minor's and Hall's Hills, by order of General McClellan, till September 6, on which evening Sykes' division marched to Rockville, and Morell's to Upton's Hill and the Seminary. The latter marched to Arlington on the 9th, and on the 12th to Leesborough, *en route* to the Army of the Potomac, near Frederick.

September 16, joined the main army. Sykes' division, Reserve Artillery, and Morell's division were again united, and were engaged in the battle of Antietam. Humphreys' division joined on the 18th, and on the 19th the corps was engaged with the enemy near Shepherdstown, and captured six guns and much ordnance material.

October 16 and 17, 6,000 men, under command of General Humphreys, made a reconnaissance from the vicinity of Shepherdstown, Va., to near Leetown, Va. The command returned on the 17th.

On October 30, left Sharpsburg, Md., at 7 p. m., and encamped near Hillsborough, Va., about 6 p. m. on the 31st.

November 2, left camp near Harper's Ferry and marched to Snickersville.

November 5, left Snickersville and marched to Middleburg.

November 6, encamped near White Plains.

November 8, left White Plains and encamped near New Baltimore.

November 9, marched to camp near Warrenton, Va.

November 17, from camp near Warrenton to Warrenton Junction.

November 18, from Warrenton Junction to Spotted Farm.

November 19, from camp near Spotted Farm to camp near Hartwood Court-House, Va.

November 21, marched from camp near Hartwood to camp near Potomac Creek, Va.

* From returns for September, October, and November.

No. 85.

Report of Lieut. Col. William Hays, U. S. Army, commanding Artillery Reserve, of the battle of Antietam and skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY RESERVE,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 30, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

Early on the morning of the 16th instant I placed Captains Taft's and Langner's and Lieutenant Von Kleiser's and Lieutenant Wever's batteries of 20-pounder Parrott guns in position on a hill in rear of and near the bridge over the Antietam Creek, the position being in rear of and about the center of our line of battle. Soon after getting into position the enemy opened upon us a heavy fire from several guns. The firing was returned, and kept up briskly until the enemy stopped firing and withdrew his guns. In this engagement Major Arndt, commanding the First Battalion, New York Artillery, was mortally wounded (died on the 18th) while personally assisting at one of the guns. During the remainder of this day there was occasional firing, and about sunset our guns were brought to bear on the enemy's troops in front of General Hooker's command. Some time in the afternoon Captain Taft's and Lieutenant Von Kleiser's batteries were moved to the heights some distance to the left. Lieutenant Hazlett's battery, D, Fifth Artillery, was placed at daylight on the 17th in the position occupied the previous day by Captain Taft's battery.

From early in the morning of the 17th, until late in the afternoon, Captains Taft's and Langner's, Lieutenants Von Kleiser's, Wever's, and Hazlett's batteries fired at the enemy's batteries and troops whenever and wherever it could be done without risk to our own troops. These batteries were well served and the fire very effective. On the 19th, Captain Kusserow's and Captain Langner's batteries were engaged firing across the Potomac. Captains Gibson's, Robertson's, Tidball's, and Lieutenant Hains' batteries of horse artillery served with General Pleasanton's command. Lieutenants Benjamin's and Muhlenberg's and Captain Edwards' batteries were on duty with General Burnside's army, Lieutenant Butler's battery with General Couch, and Van Reed's with General Sykes.

Captain Graham's battery, K, First Artillery, was sent by General Porter to General Richardson's division. The battery was actively and warmly engaged and did good service. His loss in men, horses, and material was very great. For a more detailed account of the services of this battery, I call attention to his report, herewith transmitted.

Lieutenant Miller's battery, G, Fourth Artillery, was on the 17th ordered to join General Sykes' division, but was not engaged with the enemy. All the officers acted with judgment and coolness, and the men were active and efficient. The behavior of all, both officers and men, was highly praiseworthy. The members of my staff, Dr. Gouley, medical director; Captains Sappington and Swift, assistant commissaries; Captain Suydam, quartermaster; Lieutenant Brownson, acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Gilliss, conductor of ambulances, all performed their respective duties well and efficiently.

The following is a list of the company officers present at the battle, viz:

Battery K, First Artillery, Capt. W. M. Graham, commanding battery; First Lieuts. S. S. Elder and W. M. Maynadier; Second Lieut. T. Von Michalowski.

Battery G, Fourth Artillery, Lieut. M. P. Miller, commanding battery; Lieut. G. Dickenson.

Fifth New York Battery, Capt. E. D. Taft, commanding battery; First Lieut. T. Henderson, Second Lieut. J. P. Denike.

Battery A, First New York Artillery, First Lieut. Bernhard Wever, commanding battery; Second Lieut. Bernhard Kohans.

Battery B, First New York Artillery, First Lieutenant Von Kleiser, commanding battery; Second Lieut. Charles Hausmann.

Battery C, First New York Artillery, Capt. R. Langner, commanding battery; Second Lieutenant [Michael] Lang.

Battery D, First New York Artillery, Capt. Charles Kusserow, commanding battery; Second Lieut. Gustave C. Blitscher, Second Lieut. George Gaston, Second Lieut. Adolph Reikert, First New York Artillery; Second Lieutenant [F. G.] Moller, acting adjutant.

I respectfully recommend Captain Graham and First Lieutenant Elder for promotion by brevet for their conduct in the battle of the 17th instant.

WILLIAM HAYS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Artillery Reserve.

Lieut. Col. FRED. T. LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps.

No. 86.

Report of Capt. William M. Graham, Battery K, First U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., October 4, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the participation of Light Battery K, First Artillery, under my command, in the action of the 17th September at the Antietam:

In obedience to your orders, I reported to Brigadier-General Richardson, commanding a division in Major-General Sumner's army corps, about noon. I was informed by General Richardson that his division was heavily pressed by a large force of the enemy's infantry and one battery, and by his direction came into position on the plowed ground occupied by General Meagher's brigade in the morning. Here I engaged one of the enemy's brass batteries at 700 yards, silenced, and drove him away in about ten minutes. At this time two heavy columns of the enemy's infantry moved upon the battery, getting within a few hundred yards of my guns before being discovered, by approaching through a heavy corn-field. A heavy fire of spherical case and shell was opened upon these troops immediately, which in a short time drove them from the field, with great slaughter, to the woods in their rear.

A very sharp fire of shot, spherical case, and shell was now opened upon my battery by two of the enemy's batteries of rifled guns, one of which enfiladed me. I returned this fire as rapidly as possible, but after firing some twenty minutes found that they were beyond my range, my solid shot falling short several hundred yards, and having called General Richardson's attention to this fact, was told by him that he wished me to save the battery as much as possible, in order that it might advance with his division at a signal then expected from Major-General Sumner. While communicating this to me, General Richard-

son was mortally wounded by a ball of a spherical case from the battery enfilading mine. After this I continued my fire some five minutes, and then retired over the crest of the hill to a point 200 yards in rear of my first position. I then returned and brought off two of my caissons, which were necessarily left at first, the horses being all killed, and having brought all the wounded off, I replaced the limbers of the pieces and sent two caissons to the ammunition supply-train, to be re-filled.

My loss in this engagement was 4 men killed, 5 severely wounded, 17 horses killed, and 6 horses wounded severely, some of which will probably die of the effects of their wounds. The officers and men behaved, without an exception, with perfect coolness; and I beg leave to mention particularly Lieutenants Elder, Maynadier, Michalowski, First Sergeant Cooney, Sergeants Regan and Boyd, and Corporal Walsh. Lieutenant Elder served his section with remarkable effect, and was principally instrumental in silencing the battery first engaged. His conduct, under an extraordinarily heavy fire, was cool and gallant in the extreme. Lieutenant Maynadier returned with First Sergeant Cooney and brought off the two caissons, under a heavy artillery fire. Lieutenant Michalowski for a long time served one of his pieces with but one cannoneer, alternating with this man in loading and firing. Some of my fuses, cut for 5 seconds, burst at the muzzle of the guns.

In closing this report I feel called upon to mention the conduct of a citizen, a Mr. ———, who resides near the battle-field. This gentleman drove his carriage to my battery while under a severe artillery fire, and carried off my wounded, who were suffering very much for the want of proper surgical attendance, and distributed ham and biscuit among the men of the battery. He also returned a second time to the battery. One of his horses was wounded while performing this service.

On the 18th the battery was not engaged. Brigadier-General Hancock, who relieved Brigadier-General Richardson, directed me to procure forage for my horses and have them cared for. On the morning of the 19th General Hancock relieved me from duty with his command, and ordered me to report to Colonel Hays, commanding Artillery Reserve. By Colonel Hays' order I proceeded to the camp, immediately in the vicinity of Sharpsburg.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. M. GRAHAM,

Captain First Artillery, Commanding Battery K.

Col. FRED. T. LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps.

No. 87.

Report of Capt. John B. Isler, First U. S. Sharpshooters, of skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., October 14, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report concerning the part taken by the regiment under my command in the skirmish of the 19th September:

At about 2 p. m. of the 19th September we were ordered to the front of our division, then marching through Sharpsburg, when I received verbal instructions from General Morell to form a line of skirmishers

toward the river Potomac, and wait for further orders from General Porter. This had been done, when General Porter sent a written order to me to keep my command well concealed, and not to begin firing until he opened with the heavy batteries to our right unless the enemy should limber up. Having my skirmishers advanced as far as practicable and our artillery commencing firing, I also gave the command to fire, which at the beginning was briskly returned by the enemy's sharpshooters.

It was about 5.30 p. m. when one of my officers announced to me that General Porter had ordered us to find a ford to cross the river and repulse the enemy at any hazard. This order was conveyed to us by Colonel Barnes. I then ordered to cease firing and advance. Owing to the extent of my line of skirmishers, only part of my command received the notice, and with it (about 60 men) I advanced. When in the canal which runs parallel with the river Potomac, the Fourth Michigan Volunteer Regiment marched down and acted as our support while we forded the river. The river being unknown to us, we found a ford with some difficulty. The enemy's musketry was very sharp during the crossing over, but occasioned only a loss of 4 men, as he was evidently retreating before us. While we were crossing, the Fourth Regiment Michigan Volunteers rendered us efficient support by firing volleys over our heads. My men as they crossed also fired several volleys. After we had crossed, the Fourth Michigan followed us, and when on the other side we jointly advanced up the bluff in front, where we expected to stay for the night. We established our picket lines, when two prisoners were brought in, one of them calling himself courier to General Hood, whose brigade, he stated, was in our proximity. This prisoner I sent under guard to General Porter. After about one hour I was ordered to withdraw my command and to recross the river, where we camped for the night.

My men behaved well. Of those who especially distinguished themselves I have to mention First Lieutenant Nash, whose company constituted the larger part of the body of skirmishers and who was most instrumental in urging the men to attempt the crossing, and Lieut. (now Capt.) W. W. Winthrop, who in leading the line was the first to set foot on Virginia soil. As to the exact list of killed and wounded, I beg leave to refer you to the documents already sent to you on the 21st of September.

I am, major, your most obedient servant,

JOHN B. ISLER,

Captain, Commanding First Regiment U. S. Sharpshooters.

Maj. FRANCIS S. EARLE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, General Morell's Division.

No. 88.

Report of Col. James Barnes, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division, of action near Shepherdstown.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, MORELL'S DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS,
September 25, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of Saturday last, the 20th September, on the opposite side of the Potomac, between this brigade and a very large force of the enemy:

On the morning of the 20th instant I received from division headquarters the following order:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, *September 20, 1862.*

Colonel BARNES,

Commanding First Brigade:

COLONEL: In pursuance of orders from headquarters of the corps, the commanding general directs that you push your brigade across the river to Shepherdstown and vicinity, and report what is to be found there.

By command of Major-General Morell:

F. S. EARLE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

In obedience to this order, I crossed the river at Blackford's Ford at about 9 o'clock a. m., the brigade, consisting of the Eighteenth Massachusetts, Twenty-fifth New York, Thirteenth New York, One hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania, First Michigan, Twenty-second Massachusetts, and Second Maine Regiments, numbering in all 1,711 men, including officers, some of the regiments having been very much reduced. As soon as the Eighteenth Massachusetts had crossed the ford, it was drawn up in order on the road running below the bluffs toward Shepherdstown, under the command of Major Hayes.

At this moment, and before the other regiments had crossed, Brigadier-General Sykes, who had previously crossed the river, and whose command consisted, as I was informed, of about 800 men, then in advance toward the west, came to me with the information that the enemy were in strong force about 2 miles in his front; that he had sent his aide forward to ascertain the facts in the case, and desired me to remain until his aide returned, in order to afford him support if the report should turn out to be true. I informed him that my orders required me to go to Shepherdstown, but that if he would give me an order to remain I would do so. He accordingly gave me the order for that purpose, and desired that Major Hayes, with the Eighteenth Massachusetts, then drawn up in the road, should take position near but below the top of the ridge, which ran in its general direction parallel to the road and on the left. Major Hayes immediately proceeded to occupy that position. The Twenty-fifth New York, Colonel Johnson, and the Thirteenth New York, Colonel Marshall, having crossed and formed in the road, were directed to take a similar position on the right of Major Hayes, but to reach which it was necessary to pass beyond the ravine by which the Eighteenth Massachusetts had ascended to another ravine a few rods distant, the interval forming a rocky bluff nearly perpendicular, up which it was impracticable to advance.

By this time the One hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania, Colonel Prevost, had crossed the ford and formed in the road. They were directed to follow the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth New York, and to take a similar position below the top of the ridge and to their left. They accordingly followed those regiments, and came into line below the top of the ridge, as directed. The remaining regiments of the brigade, namely, the First Michigan, Capt. E. W. Belton commanding, the Twenty-second Massachusetts, under the command of Lient. Col. W. S. Tilton, and the Second Maine, Col. C. W. Roberts, were directed to ascend the ravine by which the Eighteenth Massachusetts had ascended, and to form in a similar manner below the top of the ridge, the two former on the right and the latter on the left of Major Hayes, who was already posted there. These movements were all promptly executed, and in good order. The brigade being then in position, and suitably protected by the ground in front, skirmishers were advanced to the

front, and immediately commenced firing upon those of the enemy, who by this time had advanced within musket range, and were deployed along their whole front in large numbers and at very short intervals.

The information respecting the advance of the enemy as at first received was to the effect that the enemy were advancing from the left of the position occupied by my brigade. It was, however, soon perceived that he was not only approaching with a greatly superior force from that direction, but that they were also in equal numbers advancing on our front and on our right. Springing as it were from the bushes and corn-fields which had concealed them to this time, and making their first appearance within short musket range, a rapid and vigorous fire commenced immediately, and, notwithstanding the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, every man stood his ground firmly, and the line exhibited an undaunted front.

The action now becoming general, it was apparent that the greatly superior force of the enemy would make it necessary for us to retire. The batteries on the opposite side of the river having been brought into position, opened a heavy fire with good effect upon the enemy, though, from the close proximity of the contending forces, it was difficult for them to avoid some damage to our own troops. Some of their shot and shell struck in our rear, and some of the casualties of the day may be attributed to that source.

It was soon perceived that the command of General Sykes on our left was retiring, and they had reached nearly to the foot of the hill when I received orders to retire in good order, and to recross the river. I immediately gave the necessary orders to fall back to the regiments posted, as above described, on the left of the brigade, where I then was, and at once dispatched the orderly to convey the same instructions to those upon the right of the line. I immediately followed him to prevent mistake. On my way thither I met Colonel Prevost, of the One hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania, retiring from the field, disabled by a severe wound in the shoulder. I passed rapidly on to the ground occupied by his regiment, and repeated the orders to retire in good order. This order had already been communicated to them by Lieutenant Davis, my aide.

The regiment, then under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gwyn, had commenced falling back, but, owing to their large numbers and the uneven character of the ground, not without some degree of confusion. Lieutenant-Colonel Gwyn, although deprived of the assistance of the colonel of the regiment, and laboring under the disadvantage of having under his command a regiment but little drilled, succeeded in withdrawing them from their perilous position, not without loss, indeed, but in a manner creditable to himself and to the character of his command, both of officers and men, for courage and coolness. They had advanced in the excitement of the contest from the cover of the ridge where they had first formed in line, and were exposed to a galling fire from the enemy, who were protected by a ravine in front of them. The brigade being thus withdrawn, the several regiments recrossed the river in good order, and with but little loss in crossing. A few, however, were fatally wounded on the passage.

After crossing, the brigade was reformed in rear of the Second Brigade upon this side of the river, but after remaining in this position for the greater part of the day, and no further attempts being made by the enemy with the view of crossing, the several regiments withdrew to their respective encampments.

It is difficult to do full justice to the gallantry displayed by both

officers and men on this occasion without appearing to overstate it. Finding themselves suddenly and unexpectedly attacked by a force so vastly superior, there was no sign of intimidation on the part of any one, and when the order to retire was given it was received with evident disappointment.

I have already submitted in detail the loss in killed, wounded, and missing, to which I beg leave to refer. A summary of the list shows as follows: 92 killed, 131 wounded, and 103 missing.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

JAMES BARNES,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. FRANCIS S. EARLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 89.

Report of Lieut. Col. James Gwyn, One hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania Infantry, of action near Shepherdstown.

HDQS. 118TH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 30, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In accordance with instructions, I have the honor to make the following report of this regiment in the action of Saturday, 20th instant:

Early on Saturday, 20th September, while in camp at this place, the regiment, under command of Colonel Prevost, was ordered to be in readiness to march with the brigade, and, with entire force of officers and men of 737, at about 8 o'clock a. m. took up the line of march in rear of Thirteenth New York, down the ravine, and forded the Potomac River at Blackford's Ferry, when the column filed to the right, and after marching about 300 yards was halted, and about 9 o'clock a. m. the One hundred and eighteenth was ordered to file left up a ravine and form line of battle on the top of a bluff, and under cover, supported on the right by Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Regiments New York, and on the left by First Michigan, Twenty-second and Eighteenth Massachusetts, and Second Maine Regiments. Owing to the nature of the ground the regiment came in line in right by file. Seven companies only had got in line when firing was heard on our right flank, and on advancing in line to the crest of the hill, we found the enemy advancing in heavy force in front and on our left. Colonel Prevost posted in person the three left companies to meet a flank movement of the enemy on a knoll on the left of the regiment, who became almost immediately engaged with the enemy; about the same time the right was fired on from a heavy force in front, and commenced by my orders to fire by file. Owing to the worthlessness of our pieces (condemned Enfield), not more than 50 per cent. of which could be discharged, the line began to waver, when Colonel Prevost advanced with the colors to the front, and was almost immediately severely wounded by a rifle shot from the enemy, and went to the rear.

The command now devolving upon me, and the enemy threatening us in front, I rallied, with the assistance of Maj. C. P. Herring, about 200 men, and charged over the slope of the hill in front, where a heavy fire was poured on us from the left. I fell back under the brow of the hill with my command, and reformed with the intention of repeating the

charges. At this moment one regiment of the enemy, with colors displayed, crowned the hill on our left and commenced firing on us. I ordered a fire to the left in response, and was going through the line pointing out the proper direction for the fire, when Adjutant Perot, of my regiment, came to me and said by Colonel Barnes' order I was to withdraw the regiment and retreat in good order, our right and left flanks being both turned. Our only way of retreat was over the bluff, and it was very precipitous. I sent word along the line to fall back, get into the road, and retreat across the river. On getting on the road under the bluff, we were immediately fired on by the enemy from the summit, with great effect.

The regiment crossed at the dam opposite the ferry under a galling fire of the enemy, and reformed about 2 p. m. in the same camp vacated in the morning.

The loss on this first essay of the regiment in killed, wounded, and missing was 277.* I have furnished a detailed list of the casualties, to which I have the honor to refer you.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES GWYN,

Lieut. Col., Commanding 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Lieut. W. S. DAVIS,

*A. D. C. and A. A. A. Gen. First Brig. Morell's Div.,
Porter's Fifth Army Corps.*

No. 90.

Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, First Division, of operations September 17-27, including skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,

October 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second Brigade, in compliance with the above order:

On the 17th the brigade was not in action. About 4 p. m. an order was received from Major-General Porter to move to the support of General Franklin's command. The brigade moved about half a mile to the right, where it was halted, together with the Third Brigade, same division, by General McClellan, with directions to remain there until further orders, and returned to the position occupied in the morning, just before sunset, by direction of the general commanding, and encamped for the night.

On the morning of the 18th the brigade moved and occupied a position in rear of General Burnside's forces, where it remained until the morning of the 19th, when it took up its march in the direction of Shepherdstown, arriving in position near that place about 1 o'clock p. m. The enemy occupying the opposite side of the river with artillery and sharpshooters, the Fourth Michigan Regiment was moved forward as skirmishers and to drive the enemy from the banks. Our artillery, having been massed, opened a sharp fire on the enemy's guns, causing him to abandon them. By direction of Major-General Porter, the Fourth Michigan was ordered to cross the river and take them. This

* But see revised statement, p. 204.

duty was handsomely performed, the regiment, about 300 strong, fording the river (some 300 yards in width and 3 feet in depth) in face of the enemy's infantry fire, and forming on the opposite side, advancing and delivering its fire with such effect and determination as to cause the brigade opposing it to fall back in great confusion.

It was now getting quite dark, and the regiment only succeeded in finding two pieces of artillery and several caissons, or parts of caissons. After remaining on the opposite bank some two or three hours it was recalled. The regiment lost 1 man killed (Corpl. John Gordon) and 7 men wounded.

The next morning (the 20th), as soon as it was light enough to see, the Fourth Michigan and Sixty-second Pennsylvania crossed the river with some horses from Battery D, Fifth Artillery, commanded by First Lieutenant Hazlett, and brought back three guns, several caissons, and one battle-flag, picked up on the field, returning to camp about 8 o'clock a. m. On the 21st, 23d, and 24th two more pieces, several caissons, and two forges were brought into camp from the other side of the river, the enemy having been compelled to leave them here and there through the woods, in the fields, and along the roads, and some 300 stand of small-arms.

On the 27th, four regiments of the brigade, not far from 2,000 strong, crossed the river as guard to three mule teams, for the purpose of obtaining hay, by order of Major-General Morell, commanding division, but nothing of importance occurred, the command returning in the afternoon, having succeeded in safely escorting the three wagons back with small loads of hay.

Nothing save the usual guard and picket duty occurred from this date up to the period calling for the operations of the Second Brigade.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. GRIFFIN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Brigade.

Maj. FRANCIS S. EARLE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Morell's Division.

No. 91.

Report of Brig. Gen. George Sykes, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battle of Antietam, skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford, and action near Shepherdstown.

HEADQUARTERS SYKES' DIVISION,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 30, 1862.

SIR: My division left Middletown about 10 a. m. on the 15th instant, crossed the South Mountain, and, reaching the east bank of the Antietam River, took position behind some hills on the left of the turnpike leading direct to Sharpsburg. My skirmishers were thrown at once to the front and occupied the crest of the river bank. The batteries were massed in rear of Buchanan's brigade. Some apprehension being entertained that the enemy would destroy the bridge over the Antietam, the officer in command of the skirmishers was directed to watch it closely and frustrate any attempt thus made.

Early on the 16th Weed's and Benjamin's batteries (3-inch and 20-pounders) were established on the heights behind which my infantry lay, and opened a lively cannonade upon such of the enemy as could be seen. The return fire ranging near Warren's camp, I moved his

brigade and Randol's battery farther to the left, occupying a piece of woods and covering the approaches in the direction of Harper's Ferry. This brigade subsequently connected with Burnside's corps on their left. During the day the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters and his scattering shot and shell were the only annoyances we received.

On the 17th some light batteries and cavalry, under General Pleasonton, were thrown across the Antietam via the turnpike bridge. Their position being one of great exposure, and General Pleasonton desiring some infantry to protect his guns, I sent the battalion of the Second and Tenth U. S. Infantry, under Capt. J. S. Poland, Second Infantry, to his support. Subsequently, the ammunition of Pleasonton's batteries having been exhausted, I was ordered to relieve his guns by my own, and accordingly (against my judgment) sent Randol's and Van Reed's batteries across the Antietam, and with them four additional battalions of regular infantry, under the command of Capt. H. Dryer, Fourth Infantry. Randol, finding his horses exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters and his position untenable, very properly withdrew his battery. Van Reed was posted farther to the right. The battalion of the Second and Tenth Infantry was thrown forward as skirmishers, and, occupying a line far in advance of our artillery, compelled the cannoneers of the rebel battery to leave their guns. Few in number and unsupported, we were unable to bring them off. Soon after the enemy recovered them by the advance of a large infantry force. Dryer's infantry and Van Reed's battery were held across the Antietam until dark, when both were withdrawn to the east bank. The remainder of my division was unengaged on the 17th. The troops under Captain Dryer behaved in the handsomest manner, and, had there been an available force for their support, there is no doubt he could have crowned the Sharpsburg crest.

On the 18th of September my command continued in position on the east bank of the Antietam. On the 19th the division and batteries moved through Sharpsburg and bivouacked near the Potomac opposite Blackford's Ford. Skirmishers were thrown out in front of each brigade and a desultory fire maintained with those of the enemy on the Virginia side. In the course of the day, Weed's battery was brought within easy range of the enemy's cannon covering the ford, and had the satisfaction of driving his gunners off, compelling the abandonment of several pieces, which subsequently fell into our hands.

On the 20th I was directed to cross the Potomac with a brigade and push it on the Charlestown road. I immediately put Major Lovell, Tenth Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, in motion, and, passing with him to the Virginia side, caused skirmishers to be deployed and the brigade to advance. I was also informed that cavalry had or would precede me in this movement. That arm of the service did not, however, reach the Virginia shore until my pickets were in close proximity to the advancing foe. Major Lovell occupied some woods a mile from the river, and had scarcely done so when a dispatch from him gave the intelligence that the enemy, about 3,000 strong, with artillery, was rapidly approaching. I at once directed him to fall back slowly to the crest of the river bank and hold it.

I then ordered the Second and Sixth U. S. Infantry to occupy a belt of woods in front, sent for my Third Brigade, under Colonel Warren, to cross, and regiments of Morell's division, under Colonel Barnes, coming over at this time, I requested the colonel to occupy the crest on the right of the road leading from the river and to connect with Lovell's right. These troops were making their way to Shepherdstown, to which point the colonel informed me he had been ordered.

In the mean time Colonel Warren crossed his brigade, took post on the left of Major Lovell, and covered his front with light troops. Weed, Randol, and Van Reed, commanding batteries of my division, got in position on the heights on the Maryland side, and opened a destructive fire on the enemy, which impeded the advance of his masses and turned his skirmishers above the ford in the direction of Shepherdstown.

Knowing that the Virginia side of the river was no place for troops until a proper reconnaissance had been made, and several reports from citizens inducing the belief that a large force of the enemy was moving upon us, I expressed my opinion to General Porter, who, agreeing with me, directed the immediate recrossing of the troops. Lovell and Warren effected the movement in excellent order and without loss. Colonel Warren, on regaining the Maryland side, threw his brigade behind the embankment of the canal, and occupied it until relieved the following day.

In all these operations my batteries under Weed, Randol, and Van Reed did most excellent service. Captain Weed was especially active and distinguished as usual. My acting brigadiers, Colonels Buchanan and Warren and Major Lovell, were ever zealous and vigilant. The two latter in a very delicate position on the 20th handled their troops with great skill and success.

I desire to call the attention of the major-general to the services of Captains Dryer, Fourth Infantry, Poland, Second Infantry, and Carlton, Fourth Infantry, who were in command of the advance troops on the 17th and 19th September. The two former were under a very severe fire, and with extended lines of skirmishers protected our artillery, gained ground upon the enemy, and held it until ordered to withdraw.

My personal staff, Lieut. H. Cutting, Tenth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. James A. Snyder, Third Infantry, and George T. Ingham, Eleventh Infantry, aides-de-camp, gave me every assistance possible, and were active and zealous.

Several cases of particular merit among non-commissioned officers being mentioned by battalion commanders, I trust their claims to promotion may be regarded. This is not the first or second occasion in which they have been noticed.

I inclose the reports of brigade, regimental, and battery commanders, and unite in the recommendations therein offered.

A list of casualties accompanies this report.*

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. SYKES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Lieut. Col. FRED. T. LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps.

No. 92.

Report of Lieut. Alanson M. Randol, Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam, and skirmish at Shepherdstown Ford (Blackford's or Boteler's Ford).

ARTILLERY CAMP, SYKES' DIVISION,

Near Sharpsburg, Md., September —, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 16th instant I was ordered by General Sykes to report to Colonel Warren, commanding Third

* Embodied in revised statements, pp. 194, 204.

Brigade, to be posted by him, but was not engaged with the enemy during the day. On the 17th I was ordered by General Sykes to report to General Pleasonton, by whom I was directed to relieve Captain Robertson's battery (B and L, Second Artillery), which was in position in advance of the Antietam Creek and on the left of the Sharpsburg road. As soon as possible I opened a fire of spherical case on the flank of one of the enemy's batteries, which, after a few rounds, retired to a position beyond the range of my guns. Being somewhat annoyed by the sharpshooters of the enemy, a portion of the Second Infantry was deployed as skirmishers in advance of the battery and drove them beyond range. As my position was an unfavorable one for the use of artillery, on account of the nature of the ground and its proximity to a large corn-field and other covers, by means of which the enemy could approach to within a very short range unperceived, and as none of the enemy except pickets were visible, I reported for further orders to General Pleasonton, and was ordered to return to my former position, where I remained till the close of the engagement.

On the 19th one gun of my battery was engaged for a short time at Shepherdstown Ford, and on the 20th the whole was placed in position near the ford, but was not regularly engaged.

I lost neither men nor material during the various actions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. M. RANDOL,

First Lieutenant First Artillery, Commanding Battery.

Capt. S. H. WEED,

Fifth Artillery, Chief of Artillery, Sykes' Division.

No. 93.

Report of Capt. Stephen H. Weed, Battery I, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of the battle of Antietam, skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford, and action near Shepherdstown.

FORD OF THE POTOMAC NEAR SHEPHERDSTOWN,

September 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the services of my battery since the 15th instant:

On the evening of that date one section, under command of Lieutenant Watson, was in position to dislodge the advance skirmishers of the enemy from the corn-field and wood on the height occupied by us the next morning. On the 16th the battery was planted on a prominent height near the center of our line, where it remained until the morning of the 19th. Four 20-pounder Parrott guns, commanded by Lieutenant Wever, were also placed under my orders by the chief of artillery, and remained until I left. Some good practice was made by those guns. On the 16th and during the battle of the 17th the batteries under my command had several opportunities, which were improved, of opening with effect upon the artillery and infantry of the enemy at ranges varying from 1,200 to 2,500 yards. Nothing but case-shot was at any time fired from my own guns.

On the 19th my battery was in position near the ford, and engaged and silenced at least four guns opposed to it. It is believed that one or two of these guns were abandoned by the enemy, and taken by some of our people the next day. It is a matter of slight consequence,

perhaps, that they are claimed by others, but no battery fought them except my own.

On the 20th my guns commanded the opposite approaches to the ford, and assisted to check the enemy in his attack upon our troops who had crossed. I had a considerable body of his infantry under my fire for several minutes at a distance of not more than 1,000 yards. The fire was effective. Since the morning of the 20th I have held the same position, but have had no occasion to fire a shot.

On the 19th I remounted a 10-pounder Parrott gun which had been abandoned, and have since sent it to the general commanding the corps. I furnished, to mount it, a spare limber, two wheels, and an axle.

Since the 15th instant my battery has fired about 1,000 rounds, but it is believed it has not wasted ammunition. My officers and men have behaved as usual—well.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEPHEN H. WEED,

Captain Fifth U. S. Artillery, Commanding Battery I.

Lieut. HEYWARD CUTTING,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Sykes' Division.

No. 94.

Report of Lieut. William E. Van Reed, Battery K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, of operations September 11–22, including the battle of Antietam, skirmish at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford, and action near Shepherdstown.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., September 24, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of my battery (K, Fifth Artillery) since leaving Rockville, Md.:

On the 11th of September the battery marched from Rockville and proceeded about 7 miles on the Frederick road.

12th. Passed through Clarksburg about 11 a. m.; arrived at Hyattsville about 2 p. m.

13th. Marched from Hyattsville about 6 a. m.; passed through Urbana at 9; arrived at Frederick at 4 p. m.

14th. Marched to Middletown.

15th. Marched about 6 miles; passed a number of the enemy's dead on the mountain.

16th. In camp near the Antietam Creek. One spoke of the wheel of the battery wagon was broken by a shot from the enemy.

17th. Went into position across the creek about 2 p. m.; fired about 400 rounds at the enemy, and withdrew at dusk.

18th. Remained in camp.

19th. Marched at 10 a. m.; passed through Sharpsburg about 12 m. One man was wounded (afterward died), and 2 horses had their legs broken by a shot from the enemy.

20th. Went into position near the Potomac, and fired about 50 rounds at the enemy.

21st. Remained in position.

22d. Remained in position.

I have the honor to remain, sir, yours, &c.,

WM. E. VAN REED,

Lieutenant, Commanding Battery K, Fifth Artillery.

First Lieut. HEYWARD CUTTING,

Assistant Adjutant-General, General Sykes' Division.

No. 95.

Report of Lieut. Col. Robert C. Buchanan, Fourth U. S. Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam and skirmish at Shepherdstown Ford.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE REGULAR INFANTRY,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the First Brigade, consisting of the Third and Fourth Infantry, First and Second Battalions of the Twelfth, and First and Second Battalions of the Fourteenth, since leaving Middletown, Md., on the 15th instant.

The brigade crossed South Mountain and reached Porterstown on the 15th, and was placed in position in advance of that place on its arrival. The Third Infantry was thrown out as skirmishers to cover the position. The next morning the Fourth was advanced to the bridge on the turnpike to Sharpsburg crossing the Antietam, to hold it and prevent any attempt of the enemy to destroy it, the Third being brought back to the brigade. Three companies of the Fourth were thrown across the bridge and deployed as skirmishers, the remaining companies being posted on the left of it.

On the morning of the 17th the First Battalion of the Twelfth relieved the Fourth, which then rejoined the brigade. In the afternoon the Fourth and both battalions of the Fourteenth were sent across the bridge, under the command of Capt. H. Dryer, commanding Fourth Infantry, who was directed to take with him also the First Battalion of the Twelfth from its position at the bridge, and to take command of any other regular infantry that might be there, to support some batteries of artillery on that side, under the command of Brigadier-General Pleasonton, Volunteers, which was done. At night this command was relieved by a portion of Morell's division of Volunteers, and rejoined the brigade. During the 18th the brigade remained in its first position in front and to the left of Porterstown. On the 19th the brigade moved forward across the bridge and through Sharpsburg to the bank of the Potomac, in pursuit of the retreating enemy. Lieutenant Carlton, Fourth Infantry, with two companies of that regiment, was moved forward in advance, in order to ascertain whether any force of the enemy was in our front, but found none, though he succeeded in capturing several prisoners.

Detailed reports of the operations of the several portions of the brigade are herewith inclosed.

During the afternoon of the 16th many shot and shells were thrown into the brigade, but they did no damage. The officers and men of my command behaved, as usual, with coolness and courage, and are deserving of all praise for the cheerful manner in which their duties were discharged.

To my staff, First Lieut. S. Van Rensselaer, Twelfth Infantry, acting aide-de-camp, and Second Lieut. William H. Powell, Fourth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general, my thanks are due for the cheerful alacrity and coolness with which they carried my orders to the different portions of the brigade.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBT. C. BUCHANAN,

Lieutenant-Colonel Fourth Infantry, Commanding Brigade.

First Lieut. HEYWARD CUTTING,

Tenth Infantry, Acting Asst. Adjt. Gen., Sykes' Division.

No. 96.

Report of Capt. John D. Wilkins, Third U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD U. S. INFANTRY,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 26, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to your instructions, I have the honor to report that on our arrival at the Antietam River the Third Regiment of Infantry was ordered forward as skirmishers, and deployed on the right and left of the bridge crossing the same. We remained in that position all night and until relieved, about 10 a. m. on the 16th. The remainder of that day and the 17th we remained in position, as also on the 18th. On the 19th moved forward with the brigade and passed through Sharpsburg, and on the 20th reached the Potomac at our present encampment.

During the morning of the 16th the regiment was under a severe fire from the enemy's artillery, but I am happy to report no casualties.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN D. WILKINS,
Captain Third Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. POWELL,
Acting Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Regular Brigade.

No. 97.

Report of Capt. Hiram Dryer, Fourth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., September 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part that the Fourth Regiment of Regular Infantry took in the battle of Antietam, on Tuesday and Wednesday, the 16th and 17th instant:

At about 7 o'clock a. m. of the 16th, I received an order from Colonel Buchanan to march the regiment down to take possession of and hold the bridge on the turnpike over the Antietam, distant from where we had bivouacked for the night about 600 yards. On arriving within 200 yards of the bridge, we passed the last of the pickets belonging to the Third Infantry, which were posted behind a stone wall in an orchard to the left of the pike.

I here detached Lieutenant Buell, temporarily commanding Company G, with his company, with orders to advance rapidly on the bridge, which was done without opposition. I marched the remainder of the regiment down, and made the following disposition of them: Companies B, G, K, and I were thrown across the bridge, and posted under cover of a large barn on the left of the pike and under the bank on the right, where we remained quiet for two or three hours, when it was discovered that the enemy was advancing on our position with his pickets on both sides of the turnpike. Companies G and K were thrown out as skirmishers, one to the right and the other to the left of the pike, with orders to hold the enemy's pickets in check, if possible.

It was about this time that the enemy commenced a vigorous shelling of our position and the batteries on the heights in our rear, which lasted but a short time and did but little damage, wounding 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 3 privates, 2 of whom were wounded by the enemy's skirmishers.

The regiment was relieved by the First Battalion, Twelfth Infantry, about sundown, and we returned to our old ground to bivouac for the night. We remained on this ground until about 2 o'clock on Wednesday, when General Sykes gave me an order to cross the Antietam with the Fourth and First Battalion of the Fourteenth, and to take command of all the regular infantry of his division on that side of the creek, consisting in all of the Second and Tenth, commanded by Lieutenant Poland; Fourth, and First Battalion Twelfth, Captain Blunt; First Battalion Fourteenth, Captain Brown; and Second Battalion Fourteenth, Captain McKibbin, and support certain batteries which were then under the command of General Pleasonton, and to dislodge the enemy from certain hay-stacks in a field on the right of the pike.

On arriving on the right of Lieutenant Poland's command, which was deployed as skirmishers, with his right resting on the pike and near the crest of the hill that the batteries occupied, I ordered him to advance with his skirmishers to the left and front, and to take possession of some hay-stacks situated in a field about 150 yards to the front and about 400 yards to the left of the pike. I at the same time directed Lieutenant Carlton to deploy the three leading companies of the Fourth, G, I, and K, to the right of the pike, with his left resting on the pike, and to advance near the crest of a hill, about 250 yards to the front, using the remaining five companies of the regiment as his support. I then ordered Captain Brown to march his battalion of the Fourteenth in line of battle under cover of a hill, and Lieutenant Poland's skirmishers to a fence near a lane running at right angles with the pike, where he halted and put his men under cover.

I there received an order from Colonel Buchanan to draw in my pickets, which I did about 75 yards, putting my whole line under cover, where we remained until near sundown, when we received an order to return to the other side of the Antietam, which we accomplished about 7.30 o'clock, carrying in our dead and wounded.

The following is a list of the officers present with the regiment during the engagement: Capt. Hiram Dryer, commanding regiment; Asst. Surg. J. R. Gibson, medical department; First Lieut. Caleb H. Carlton, Company A, acting field officer; First Lieut. Abner R. Benedict, commanding Company B; First Lieut. Thomas A. Martin, commanding Company H; First Lieut. Alexander Carolin, commanding Company F; First Lieut. Avery B. Cain, commanding Company I; First Lieut. John L. Buell, commanding Company G; Second Lieut. Alexander E. Sheldon, commanding Company A; Second Lieut. Robert P. McKibbin, commanding Company K; Second Lieut. George M. Randall, commanding Company C; Second Lieut. Henry W. Patterson, Company D, acting adjutant; Second Lieut. Samuel T. Crowley, Company F; Second Lieut. George S. Williams, Company I.

Very respectfully,

HIRAM DRYER,

Captain Fourth Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

Second Lieut. WILLIAM H. POWELL,

Adjutant Fourth Infantry, Acting Asst. Adj. Gen.

No. 98.

Report of Capt. Matthew M. Blunt, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, September 25, 1862.

SIR: Having been ordered to report on the operations of the First Battalion Twelfth U. S. Infantry, since leaving Middletown on the 15th, I have the honor to state that we continued our march, crossing the range of mountains (Blue Ridge) by South Mountain Pass over the battle-field of the previous day. After going through the pass, General Sykes' division took up the advance, Colonel Buchanan's brigade leading. We followed the enemy, and came up with him a short time before sunset, our batteries exchanging shots with theirs, and their rear-guard (infantry) showing itself, to dissolve as we advanced. This was kept up until dark, when the enemy had crossed the bridge over Antietam Creek, on the Baltimore turnpike. On the following day (16th) our artillery engaged that of the enemy, who shelled our brigade considerably.

At 5 p. m. on the 16th the battalion was ordered to relieve the Fourth Infantry in guarding the bridge over Antietam Creek, which it did until about 12 m. on the following day (17th), when the tide of battle uncovering the country on the other side of the bridge, our horse artillery and cavalry crossed the bridge at a gallop. The enemy opened a very heavy fire of artillery on the artillery and cavalry crossing the bridge, from which we lost 1 wounded (enlisted man). The sharpshooters of the enemy annoying Captain Tidball's battery, General Pleasonton asked me to advance a line of skirmishers to drive them back, which was immediately done under command of Captain Winthrop. Shortly after, General Sykes ordered the battalion to advance as a support to Tidball's battery. This was done, skirmishers being thrown out to the left of the battery.

The regular infantry on the field was at this time under the command of Captain Dyer, Fourth Infantry.

I received no further orders during the rest of the afternoon, and remained in the position assigned me until ordered to join the brigade at about 7 p. m. Our loss was 1 killed and 3 wounded.

The following officers were present guarding the bridge, and afterward on skirmish duty or supporting Tidball's battery: Capt. M. M. Blunt, commanding battalion; Capt. H. R. Rathbone, acting field officer, commanding Company C; Capt. William Sergeant, commanding Company F; Capt. Francis Wister, commanding Company G; Capt. F. Winthrop, commanding Company B; First Lieut. M. H. Stacey, battalion adjutant; Second Lieut. J. A. Duvillard, commanding Company H; Second Lieut. T. H. Evans, commanding Company D; Second Lieut. E. C. Allen, commanding Company A; Second Lieut. T. D. Urnston; Second Lieut. R. H. Pond, commanding Company E. Acting Assistant Surgeon Grant attended the battalion.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. M. BLUNT,

Captain Twelfth Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. POWELL,

Acting Asst. Adj. Gen., First Brigade, Regular Infantry.

No. 99.

Report of Capt. Thomas M. Anderson, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP, SYKES' DIVISION,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth Infantry marched from Middletown, Md., on the 16th of this month, with your brigade, to Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg. During the battle of Antietam we were held in reserve, and took no part in the engagement or in the operations which immediately preceded or followed it. We therefore suffered no loss of officers or men.

The officers serving with the battalion at the time were Captains Dallas and Dunn, of the Twelfth; Lieuts. J. N. Andrews, of the Eighth; Newbury, Perkins, Wells, Bootes, and Vanvalzah.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. M. ANDERSON,
Captain, Commanding Second Battalion Twelfth U. S. Infantry.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. POWELL,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Brig., Sykes' Div., Army of the Potomac.

No. 100.

Report of Capt. W. Harvey Brown, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FIRST BATTALION FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 24, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with instructions this day received, I have the honor to report the part taken by the First Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, in the recent battle:

The battalion was first posted in line of battle at 6 p. m. on the 15th, on the left of the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, and in rear of the Second Battalion of the Twelfth Infantry. In this position I bivouacked.

September 16, occupied the same ground under heavy artillery fire for several hours, and remained in this position all day.

September 17, occupied the same ground under very heavy artillery fire until 3 p. m., at which time I received orders to cross the Antietam Creek in company with the Fourth Infantry, Captain Dyer, Fourth Infantry, in command.

I then continued up the road nearly 1 mile toward Sharpsburg, under heavy artillery fire and musketry firing from the enemy's sharpshooters. At this place the Fourth Infantry were deployed as skirmishers, and I received orders to hold the battalion in reserve near a wagon road which crossed said pike about 1 mile from the position I had occupied during the early part of the day. The battalion remained here about three hours, 2 men being wounded by scattering shots from the enemy's skirmishers. At dark two companies (F and G) were thrown forward as skirmishers about 100 yards to the edge of a corn-field occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters. In a short time thereafter I received orders to withdraw my command, and in company with

the Fourth Infantry returned to camp, where I remained until the morning of the 19th, when I received orders to march in the direction of the Potomac, and bivouacked 1 mile from Sharpsburg. On the morning of the 20th marched about three-fourths of a mile nearer the river, for the purpose of supporting some batteries. On the evening of the 21st the battalion was on picket along the Potomac River; returned on the 22d.

The following commissioned officers were present with the battalion, viz: Capt. W. Harvey Brown, acting field officer, commanding battalion; Asst. Surg. W. H. Forwood, U. S. Army, attending battalion; First Lieut. Daniel Loosley, adjutant; Capt. H. W. Keyes, acting field officer; Capt. Guido Ilges, commanding Company E; Capt. W. R. Smedberg, commanding Company F; Capt. C. B. Watson, commanding Company H; Capt. S. W. Burbank, commanding Company A; First Lieut. D. M. Brodhead, commanding Company G; First Lieut. J. H. Walker, commanding Company B; First Lieut. Pat. Collins, commanding Company C; First Lieut. J. Henton, on duty with Company A; Second Lieut. A. J. Bellows, commanding Company D; Second Lieut. T. S. Doebler, on duty with Company C; Second Lieut. P. H. Moroney, on duty with Company F.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. HARVEY BROWN,

Captain Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. POWELL,

Acting Asst. Adj. Gen., First Brigade, Sykes' Division.

No. 101.

Report of Capt. David B. McKibbin, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., *September 25, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the colonel commanding, the operations of the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, since September 16, on which day we left Middletown, Md. During the march to the next camp nothing of importance occurred save a few shells passing over the battalion. Bivouacked on bluff near Antietam Creek.

September 17, at 1 o'clock, ordered over Antietam Creek, to support several batteries of artillery. Sent one company to the front as skirmishers under Captain Thatcher, Fourteenth Infantry, who were actively engaged during part of the afternoon. We were under a heavy fire of shell and shot for two hours. But 1 man was wounded (in the arm by piece of shell), as the men were placed under the crest of a small knoll.

At 8 in the evening we returned to our bivouac.

September 18, remained in camp.

September 19, moved to the front and camped on bluffs above the Potomac River.

The officers of my battalion acted with the utmost coolness.

D. B. McKIBBIN,

Captain Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion.

WILLIAM H. POWELL,

Second Lieut. and Adj. Fourth Inf., Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.

No. 102.

*Report of Maj. Charles S. Lovell, Tenth U. S. Infantry, commanding
Second Brigade, of action near Shepherdstown.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SYKES' DIVISION,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to the instructions of the general commanding division, I crossed the Potomac River on the morning of the 20th instant, in command of the Second Brigade, composed of the following four battalions: Second and Tenth Infantry, commanded by Capt. J. S. Poland; First and Sixth Infantry, Capt. L. C. Bootes; First Battalion Eleventh Infantry, Maj. De L. Floyd-Jones, and First Battalion Seventeenth Infantry, Maj. G. L. Andrews.

Soon after getting across, Lieutenant Ingham, aide-de-camp, told me the general's orders were for me to advance to the second belt of woods in front, which was about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant. On arriving there, Major Floyd-Jones' battalion being in advance to act as skirmishers, a portion were deployed up to within 30 or 40 paces of the outer edge of the woods, when it was soon after discovered that the enemy were in force in our front and on the right. This fact was immediately communicated to the general, and I was directed to fall back to the crest of the river bluff.

To march down the road in column of fours would have subjected my command to great loss, if fired on. The leading battalion, Seventeenth (the brigade being left in front), was filed off to the right of the road to watch the movements of the enemy, while the other three battalions marched into the woods on the left in column by battalion, with intervals of 60 or 70 paces. Finding the enemy approaching in greatly superior numbers, the battalions were faced about, and retired slowly and in most excellent order until reaching the open ground on the hill near the river, when the enemy opened a heavy fire upon us, fortunately but few shots taking effect. The Second and Sixth were then thrown into the woods on our left, by the orders of the general. Soon after the fire from our own batteries rendered it absolutely necessary to withdraw these two battalions from the woods, and they fell back to the crest of the hill, by my directions, in fine order.

The conduct of officers and men during the march back and while under the fire of the enemy was admirable. Lieut. E. E. Sellers, Tenth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general, was very active in transmitting my orders to the different parts of the field. Assistant Surgeon Woodhull very kindly offered his services to act as aide so long as his professional services were not required, and is entitled to my warmest thanks, as I had but one staff officer, Lieutenant Sellers. I inclose a list of casualties. The enemy's force, when I first discovered them advancing upon us, could not have been less than 3,000. My brigade numbered about 1,060.

Respectfully submitted.

CHAS. S. LOVELL,

Major Tenth Infantry, Commanding Second Brigade.

Lieut. HEYWARD CUTTING,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Sykes' Division.

No. 103.

Reports of Lieut. John S. Poland, Second U. S. Infantry, commanding battalion Second and Tenth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam and action near Shepherdstown.

BIVOUAC OPPOSITE SHEPHERDSTOWN, W. VA.,
September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the battalion of Second and Tenth Infantry in the engagement on the 17th instant at Sharpsburg, Md.

My command consisted of nine companies Second Infantry, commanded as follows: Company A, First Sergt. Thomas Byrne; Company B, First Lieut. William F. Drum, Second Infantry; Company C, Second Lieut. Abraham Grafius, Second Infantry; Company D, First Lieut. George H. McLoughlin, Second Infantry; Company E, First Lieut. Charles M. Freeman; Company G, Second Lieut. Claude S. Robertson, Tenth Infantry; Company F, First Lieut. J. W. Gray, Eleventh Infantry; Company I, First Lieut. S. A. McKee, Second Infantry; Company K, Second Lieut. Robert G. Welles, Tenth Infantry, and three companies Tenth Infantry, united under command of First Lieut. George S. Lauman, Tenth Infantry.

By order of Major Lovell, Tenth Infantry, commanding Second Brigade Regulars, I moved across Antietam Creek by the turnpike bridge to support Captain Tidball's battery, then hard pressed by the enemy's sharpshooters. On arriving near the battery on left of the turnpike I halted the command, being ordered to report to General Pleasonton for further instructions. While seeking him, I received his order through Lieutenant Cutting, acting assistant adjutant-general to Brigadier-General Sykes, to throw forward a line of skirmishers to drive back the enemy. Captain Tidball, who was relieved by Captain Robertson's battery, then retired. Four companies from the left were deployed as skirmishers, when Captain Robertson withdrew his battery. A lieutenant-colonel of cavalry desired me to relieve a party of his command with my infantry, which I did. Captain Randol, First Artillery, brought up his battery of Napoleon guns, and occupied the position formerly occupied by Captains Tidball and Robertson. My skirmishers were advanced in front of this position from 300 to 400 yards. Five companies were held as reserve; and for any disposition that might be required. Captain Randol, finding his battery could effect nothing, withdrew it, and advanced Lieutenant Van Reed's battery to the right of the turnpike.

I then sent a note to Major Lovell explaining my position. Captain Dryer, Fourth Infantry, came up, stating he had an order to take command of all the skirmishers. By his direction I deployed the force held in reserve, and advanced them on the line occupied; then threw forward the whole line to a fence along a road running perpendicularly to the turnpike and to the left. Lieutenant McKee, commanding Companies I and A, Second Infantry, while deploying to the front, was severely wounded and compelled to leave the field. The command of these companies devolved on First Sergt. Francis E. Lacey, Company I, Second Infantry, who handled them well. In advancing to the fence, at which our line was to rest, the skirmishers were obliged to pass over a ridge completely commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters and battery posted to the left of the corn-field in front of the right of my line. When we appeared above its crest the enemy opened with a heavy fire of case-shot and canister. The line did not waver, but rapidly

moved to the fence. The right advanced beyond, however, before I could convey the order to them to halt at the fence, and by a well-directed fire compelled the enemy's cannoneers to leave their guns. At this juncture the fire from our own batteries compelled them to fall back to the fence, as their shells fell short. Lieutenant McLoughlin and Sergeant Lacey commanded the companies on the right. Sergeant Lacey was soon after wounded, and unwillingly compelled to leave the field. Our position was held until all the ammunition had been expended on the left and nearly all on the right. I reported our wants to Captain Dryer, and after the Seventeenth Michigan Regiment Volunteers arrived on our line, by his direction I assembled the battalion on the center files. The Fourteenth Infantry, First Battalion, came up on the right. I next quietly withdrew a short distance, halted the battalion under shelter to await a supply of ammunition. Before assembling the command, the enemy advanced a regiment to protect the withdrawal of their guns from the hill directly in front of our left. This regiment was driven back, but their object had been effected. About dusk I received an order to fall back to the bridge. On the way received another order to return to camp, which I did.

I must express my indebtedness to First Lieuts. J. W. Gray, Eleventh Infantry; A. W. Kroutinger, adjutant, Second Infantry; George S. Lauman, Tenth Infantry; William F. Drum and George H. McLoughlin, Second Infantry, for important assistance in handling successfully a very extended line of skirmishers. I would again bring to your notice First Sergt. F. E. Lacey as worthy a recommendation for a commission; also Sergt. Maj. William Fouck, Second Infantry. Those who most distinguished themselves for excellent behavior are First Sergt. Francis E. Lacey, Company I; First Sergt. Thomas Byrne, Company A; First Sergt. James Butler, Company C; Sergt. William Mitchell, Company D; First Sergt. Daniel W. Burke, Company B; First Sergt. Michael Dolan, Company E; First Sergt. John Trueman, Company F; Sergts. Martin Walsh and Timothy Hays, Company A. Private De Witt C. Burke, Company C, was crippled slightly by a wound in the foot, but remained with the regiment until the close of the action. He is a brave soldier. Musician George Miller, Company G, seized a musket on the field and used it with good effect during the hottest part of the engagement.

Respectfully submitted.

J. S. POLAND,

First Lieut. 2d Infantry, Comdg. Batt. 2d and 10th Infantry.

Second Lieut. E. E. SELLERS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Brigade Regulars.

HDQRS. BATTALION SECOND AND TENTH INFANTRY,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 24, 1862.

SIR: As directed, I report that I marched my regiment with the Second Brigade Regulars, Maj. C. S. Lovell commanding, across the Potomac River at the ford below Shepherdstown, W. Va., and about a mile beyond the river, when the enemy was discovered in force. A halt was ordered. The enemy advanced upon us. Our brigade retired in good order to an open space bordering the river, then halted. The enemy's skirmishers continued to advance. The Sixth and Second Regiments U. S. Infantry were formed on the left of our position, the Second occupying the extreme left and the edge of a heavy wood, with

orders to hold the position at all hazards. The strength of the enemy forbade our remaining in this position. Timely orders from Major Lovell were received to fall back near the river and take position as well as I could under cover of the hill, which I obeyed promptly and in good order. I then threw out skirmishers on the flanks to keep the enemy's skirmishers at bay. This position was held but a short time, when we were ordered to recross the river. This was accomplished in admirable order.

I append a list of casualties; also certificate of First Lieut. Wm. F. Drum, Second Infantry, of the gallant conduct of First Sergt. D. W. Burke, Company B, Second Infantry. I would call the attention of the brigade commander to this paper particularly.

Respectfully submitted.

J. S. POLAND,

Captain Second Infantry, Comdg. Second and Tenth Infantry.

Lieut. E. E. SELLERS,

Acting Asst. Adjutant-General, Second Brigade, Sykes' Division.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD., *September 25, 1862.*

SIR: I respectfully call to the notice of the officer commanding the gallant conduct of First Sergt. Daniel W. Burke, Company B, Second Infantry, on the 20th instant. When our troops were falling back across the Potomac, on hearing that a piece of artillery had been left unspiked, he volunteered to go back and do it, and, on getting permission, did go back and assist in spiking said gun in the face of the enemy's sharpshooters.

Hoping that the case will be noticed as it deserves, I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. F. DRUM,

First Lieutenant Second Infantry, Commanding Company B.

Capt. J. S. POLAND,

Second Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully forwarded. This non-commissioned officer has been mentioned before for good conduct in face of the enemy.

GEO. SYKES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

No. 104.

Report of Capt. Levi C. Bootes, Sixth U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam and action near Shepherdstown.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH U. S. INFANTRY,

Camp at crossing near Sharpsburg, Md., September 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report, in obedience to instructions received, the part taken from the 16th to the 20th instant by the Sixth Regiment of Infantry and Company G, First Infantry, attached to the regiment, and forming a part of the Second Brigade of General Sykes' division.

The regiment was on picket duty from the evening of the 16th to the 17th. On the following morning I received orders to march. Made a short march, and camped near a ford on the Potomac River. On the 20th, as soon as all the regiments had crossed the river, I followed after the Second and Tenth U. S. Infantry, then a short distance ahead. About a mile from the ford, Maj. C. S. Lovell, of the Tenth U. S. Infantry, commanding the Second Brigade, gave the command to halt and load. This being done, the brigade was formed in line of battle in the wood, the right resting on the road. We remained in this position for about thirty minutes, when I received an order to fall back in line to the brow of the hills near the river. After taking this position in line, I ordered a company to cover the front of the regiment as skirmishers. While acting thus, the enemy's pickets were advancing very fast, supported by a battery, cavalry, and a large force of infantry. This fact being known to the commanding officer of the brigade, I soon after received an order through his adjutant to fall back across the river, which was done in good order. The casualties between these periods were 2 men wounded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEVI C. BOOTES,

Captain Sixth Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Second Brigade, Sykes' Division.

No. 105.

Report of Maj. DeL. Floyd-Jones, Eleventh U. S. Infantry, of the battle of Antietam and action near Shepherdstown.

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH INFANTRY,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 24, 1862.

SIR: In accordance with instructions from brigade headquarters, I beg to submit the following report of the movements and casualties of the regiment from the 16th instant up to the present time:

The regiment moved from camp near Middletown Heights on the morning of the 16th instant, crossed Middletown Heights, and in the evening camped near Sharpsburg; distance marched, about 8 miles.

On the 17th instant remained in the same position. Private Patrick Clark, of Company G, was struck in the head by a spent grape-shot and wounded slightly. On the 18th remained in the same place without meeting with any casualties. On the morning of the 19th moved forward about 3 miles in the direction of Shepherdstown, and encamped about half a mile from the Potomac River.

On the 20th instant we crossed the Potomac near Shepherdstown, and, after advancing a short distance into the country, Company D was ordered to advance as skirmishers, under command of Lieut. George E. Head. They advanced to the edge of the woods and discovered the enemy in large force moving toward us. We were then ordered to fall back, which we did in good order, the skirmishers of the enemy keeping up a brisk fire during the movement. We halted on a hill close to the river, and replied to the fire of the enemy for some minutes with good effect. At this time Private John J. Boddy, of Company E, was wounded slightly; Private V. S. Wheeler, of Company B, wounded in the groin,

and Private John H. Ransom, Company B, wounded in the thigh. The two latter-named men, I regret to add, have since died. We then recrossed the river, pursuant to orders, and encamped a short distance in the woods, where the regiment has remained up to the present date.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

DE L. FLOYD-JONES,

Major Eleventh Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. E. E. SELLERS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 106.

Report of Maj. George L. Andrews, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, of action near Shepherdstown.

HDQRS. FIRST BATTALION, SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY,
Camp near Shepherdstown, W. Va., September 24, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report that, on the 20th instant, the battalion under my command advanced with the brigade across the Potomac River, and, after crossing, was instructed to act as support to the Eleventh Infantry, who were to be deployed as skirmishers.

Having advanced nearly 2 miles from the ford, the enemy was discovered in considerable force, and I was ordered to take position in line of battle in a corn-field on the west side of the road. Immediately after taking this position, I discovered a strong line of the enemy's skirmishers immediately in my front, extending beyond my right flank, and followed at a short distance by a large force in line of battle. Upon reporting these facts, I was ordered to fall back quietly, and again take position on the first favorable ground. This I did, when the enemy advancing more rapidly, and in a manner to soon outflank the battalion, I was again ordered to retire, and finally took a third position under the edge of the bluffs on the south banks of the river.

I remained here some time, the enemy continually advancing in a way to turn my right flank, but apparently without discovering my position, as the attention of their skirmishers appeared to be occupied exclusively by the other battalions of the brigade, who were on the east side of the road and upon whom they opened fire. I was unable to fire upon them to any extent, as on my left they were almost entirely concealed by the timber, and on my right some distance in front a line of skirmishers from some of our volunteer troops at that moment made their appearance.

I soon received word that the rest of the brigade was retiring across the river, and, going to the top of the hill on my way toward my left, I noticed a line of battle of our own troops rise as it were out of the ground to my right, and where I had before observed a line of our skirmishers. Continuing my course toward my left, I met the acting assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, with orders for me to retire and place my command on the opposite side of the river as speedily as possible. Marching the battalion in line of battle, faced by the rear rank until we reached the bottom of the hill, I then moved out by the left flank, and crossed the river under a brisk fire of musketry, without the

loss of a man and with but one man slightly wounded, and took up position in line of battle within the timber on the north side of the river, and in which position I still remain.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE L. ANDREWS,

Major Seventeenth Infantry, Commanding.

Lieut. E. E. SELLERS,

Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Second Brigade, Sykes' Division.

No 107.

Report of Capt. Cleveland Winslow, Fifth New York Infantry, Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam, skirmish at Shepherdstown Ford, and action near Shepherdstown.

HDQRS. FIFTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 24, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with a circular dated September 24, requiring a report of the movements of the Fifth Regiment New York Volunteers since the 16th of September, 1862, together with the casualties, I have the honor to report the following:

Tuesday, September 16, at 10 o'clock a. m., having bivouacked all night in line of battle near Sharpsburg, Md., in rear of General Sykes' division, I moved to the left, and took up a position on the edge of an oak grove, remaining in line of battle all night.

Wednesday, September 17, at 4 o'clock p. m., I deployed my regiment in front of the wood into an open field, stopping all stragglers from going to the rear, forming them as they came from the battle-field in two ranks, irrespective of regiment or division, in three lines, covering the front of the battalion. Remained on guard all night in rear of stragglers.

Thursday, September 18, we retained the same position all day until 5 o'clock p. m., when I moved into the wood and encamped by column of division. Occupied the day in drilling the recruits.

Friday, September 19, left camp in pursuit of the enemy. Crossed the Antietam Creek, and formed line of battle on the left of General Sykes' division. At 1 o'clock p. m. I moved the regiment forward in support of three batteries of artillery, throwing out two companies of skirmishers on the right and left. Company I, in command of Captain Burnett, in compliance with orders from me, moved forward to the bank of the Potomac River. I then moved the balance of the regiment forward to the edge of a hill commanding Blackford's Ford, where, in support of a section of Randol's battery, I fired several volleys at the opposite bank of the river, in order to give the recruits, composing the greater part of my command, an opportunity to discharge their pieces. On finding that the enemy had evacuated their position near the opposite bank of the river, I moved forward, and went into bivouac on the bank of the river, posting a strong guard.

Saturday, September 20, crossed the river in line of battle at 10 a. m., and took up position on top of the bluff, on the left of General Sykes' division. My skirmishers reported the enemy in force in front, which was apparent, as they opened a heavy fire of musketry upon us. In compliance with orders from Colonel Warren, I withdrew my men from

the bluff, leaving one company deployed as skirmishers to cover our recrossing the river, which was accomplished without loss. Formed the regiment behind the canal bank, on the north side of the river, where I remained until dark. At 4 o'clock p. m. I ordered one company (E) to recross the river and protect a party of stragglers from my command, sent over to take a 6-pounder brass howitzer, which had been abandoned by the enemy. This was accomplished with the loss of one sergeant (Crowley), wounded in the leg, who was brought over the river at dusk in the evening, when the company rejoined the regiment. At dark I moved my position 900 yards to the left, establishing pickets at intervals of 10 paces, connecting on my left with the Fourteenth Regiment Regular Infantry, and on my right with the Tenth Regiment New York Volunteers.

Sunday, 21st, remained on picket all day. Nothing (with the exception of a few sharpshooters) was seen of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Duryea returned, and relieved me in command of the regiment.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CLEVELAND WINSLOW,

Captain, Commanding Fifth Regiment New York Volunteers.

Lieut. HEYWARD CUTTING,

Aide-de-Camp, and Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Sykes' Division.

No. 108.

Report of Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division, with application for a Court of Inquiry.

HDQRS. 3D DIV., 5TH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

March 28, 1863.

MR. SECRETARY: I beg leave to ask your attention to the inclosed statement, and to request that my conduct in the matter may be made the subject of investigation by a court of inquiry, as soon as it can be done without withdrawing from active service in the campaign myself and other officers. I make this request because, after having been strongly recommended for promotion for services in the field by Major-General Burnside, my promotion has not taken place, and I am led to conclude that some statement prejudicial to my character as a soldier or as a man must have been made to the War Department.

As in the course of a service of thirty years I have received many marks of esteem and confidence from the highest authorities in the land, and was never censured by a superior officer but once, I have concluded that the obstacle to my promotion must originate in the same source from which that censure emanated. I refer to a note received by me from Major-General Halleck, Commander-in-Chief, about 4 o'clock p. m. on Saturday, the 13th of September, 1862, in which I was informed that if I did not immediately join my division in the field I would be arrested. As I did not, because it was impracticable, march my division before the hour named by me in a communication to Major-General Halleck's chief of staff, which I supposed to be the occasion of the note (if it did not refer to personal acts), and as I was not arrested, I had reason to conclude that a subsequent acquaintance with the circumstances had induced a change of opinion on the part of the Commander-in-Chief. Soon after joining the Army of the Potomac with my division, I brought the

subject to the attention of the commander of the corps, mentioning my intention to take official action upon it. From this, however, I was dissuaded as unnecessary, since every one of my acts had received the full approval of the commander of the corps and of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, nor did the time appear to me to be suitable for such matters, expecting, as I did, that active operations would be continued. Subsequently, during the month of October, I was intrusted with an important and difficult reconnaissance to Leetown, in face of nearly the whole army of the enemy. The duty was executed with entire success, and received the cordial approbation of the corps and army commanders. With such marks of confidence, and absorbed in the duties of the campaign, the note of Major-General Halleck had almost entirely passed out of my remembrance. It is now recalled with a meaning attached to it that, in my opinion, renders it incumbent upon me to ask that the subject be investigated. I know what my standing is in the estimation of those with whom I have been associated, and I cannot silently permit that reputation to be dimmed in the faintest degree by the expression of opinion of any one, whatever his official rank may be.

As the statement accompanying this communication is lengthy, I beg leave to add, as a synopsis of it: That, on Friday, the 12th September, about noon, I was ordered, without any previous intimation, to take command of a division of new troops, about 7,000 strong, which would pass through the city that day about 3 o'clock p. m., and march on the road to Rockville; to see that it was well supplied with rations, forage, and ammunition; that all baggage that could be dispensed with should be stored, and that the command should be kept fresh on the march; that I was not informed of the position of our army or that of the enemy, or of the probability that a battle would soon take place; that I had no staff officers, and could get none at the Departments; that the troops did not begin to reach the city until 7 o'clock p. m., and did not reach their bivouac near Columbia College until from midnight to morning; that one brigade (3,600 strong) had no rations whatever and an insufficient supply of forage; that all its arms were unserviceable; that it had no wagons for ammunition and no supply train, and that its regimental wagons, five per regiment, did not arrive until near midday Saturday; that it had no ambulances, or but one per regiment; that it had no shelter-tents, but full regulation allowance of common tents, which it could not transport, and that its officers and men had a heavy supply of personal baggage; that the other brigade (3,600 strong) had an insufficient supply of rations and forage, and but eight wagons for supply train, and one ambulance per regiment; that the arms of one of the regiments were unserviceable; that the brigade had no shelter-tents, but the allowance of common tents; that officers and men had a heavy supply of personal baggage; that I made every effort possible to supply the deficiencies and march on Saturday, but found it impracticable, but that on Saturday night all deficiencies were supplied through my personal efforts, and that my command marched at daylight, Sunday, 14th September; that by orders received at Monocacy Station Tuesday evening, my command halted near Frederick during Wednesday to protect that city, marching again under new orders received at 3.30 o'clock p. m. of that day, and by additional orders continued that march during the night, and was in position at Antietam at an early hour the next morning, Thursday, 18th September, having marched more than 23 miles.

With this *résumé* of the statement, I submit that paper, and have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS,
March 28, 1863.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:

MR. SECRETARY: I beg leave to submit the following statement in connection with my request for a court of inquiry to investigate the subject to which the statement refers. I will endeavor to be as brief as a complete representation of the facts will admit.

On Friday, the 12th of September, 1862, being in Washington, I was sent for at 11.30 o'clock a. m. by Major-General Halleck, and asked by him if I was ready to take command of a division in the field (of new troops) to pass through Washington that day. I expressed my readiness gladly to do so, and march within an hour. I was referred to the commander of the corps of which the division was to form a part, General Porter, with whom I had two or three minutes' conversation in the street, being informed in that time that I should take command of the division as it passed through Washington that day, which it would do about 3 o'clock p. m., entering the city by the Long Bridge; that staff officers of the brigade commanders would report to me as the brigades (two in number, eight regiments, about 7,000 men) entered the city; that I should march on the road to Rockville, and would receive further orders on the march; that I must see that my command was provided with rations, forage, and requisite ammunition, and something was said about defective arms of part of the command. It was enjoined on me to keep my troops fresh on the march, and this point was dwelt upon in almost every order I received on the route. The position of our army and that of the enemy I was not informed of, nor of the degree of probability of a battle. I had no staff officers, but assumed the authority to take with me Lieut. C. McClellan, New York Volunteers, and took also my son, Mr. H. H. Humphreys, as an aide. I made application for staff officers, but could obtain none. At 3 o'clock p. m. I was ready to move, but the troops did not begin to reach the city until 7 o'clock p. m., and the First Brigade was not bivouacked near Columbia College, where I ordered them, until near midnight. The Second Brigade was not bivouacked until between midnight and morning, the last regiment reaching the ground at day-break. Upon learning from the staff officer sent to report to me from the First Brigade, Captain Quay, assistant adjutant-general, that it had an insufficient supply of rations, I ordered that they should be obtained at daylight, that knapsacks and overcoats and surplus officers' baggage should be stored, and the brigade be prepared to march at sunrise. Colonel Allabach, commanding Second Brigade (who had no brigade staff), reported to me in person near 9 o'clock p. m., and from him I learned that his brigade had no rations whatever; that at least two regiments had arms utterly unserviceable; that there were 900 stand of arms in the brigade with nipples or hammers broken, and that they were breaking every day, and were in other respects defective. Part of this I had learned already by telegraphic dispatch from General Whipple,

and had immediately obtained authority from the ordnance officer, Captain Benton, to exchange as many as it was necessary. I took Colonel Allabach to Captain Benton and arranged that the two regiments should be supplied with new arms and accouterments from the arsenal, the regiments to march there at daylight. Colonel Allabach was ordered to send for rations as well as arms at daylight, store knapsacks, extra baggage, a large camp equipage, and be ready to march at sunrise. Both brigades were ordered to obtain as much forage as they could carry, and both drew forage. At sunrise Saturday, the 13th, I sent Lieutenant McClellan to see if my orders were complied with; he returned, informing me of the facts I have just stated in regard to the time of arrival of the regiments at their bivouac, and that none of the supplies I had ordered had yet been obtained; further, that there were other deficiencies than those I had learned, of a serious character, among them that the Second Brigade had no wagons for ammunition and no supply train, and the First Brigade but eight wagons for supply train. Some regiments had one ambulance and others none. None of the wagons of the Second Brigade had arrived, nor did they arrive until near midday. By my representations to the chief quartermaster, Colonel Rucker, eight wagons were furnished during the day to the First Brigade. Twenty wagons were sent from Alexandria to the Second Brigade, reaching it late Saturday afternoon. Upon proceeding to the brigades, I found that one of the regiments of the Second Brigade, the one that reached bivouac at daylight, had had no rations the day before, and had none then. Its arms and those of another regiment, of the same brigade, were as unserviceable as those of the two regiments whose arms I had directed to be changed. I found this by inspection. I found a regiment of the First Brigade, the One hundred and thirty-fourth [Pennsylvania], with the same unserviceable arms, Austrian rifles; these were represented to me as unserviceable by General Tyler, commanding the brigade, and I found them to be so.

I immediately obtained authority from the War Department to change all these arms, and it was done, but not until late at night. The ammunition for the five regiments had also to be changed with the arms; nor were the rations obtained, knapsacks, overcoats, camp equipage, and private property, with which the regiments were overloaded, stored until 8 or 9 o'clock p. m. Several of the regiments had no shelter tents, but a full regulation supply of common tents, which it was impossible to transport. Some got shelter tents, others could not obtain them. I was ordered to store knapsacks, overcoats, extra camp kettles, &c., officers' baggage, and everything that would impede the march.

The Second Brigade, I was informed afterward, was on the march from near one fort to another when it received the order to march to Washington and report to me, and had left from one-half to two-thirds of its provisions, ammunition, forage, &c., at the old camp, and when it reported to me had no ammunition but what the men carried on their persons, from 50 to 60 rounds each. Finding how unprepared the command was, I first postponed the march to 9 o'clock a. m., then to noon, but afterward found it was impossible to move the command that day. I received communications during Saturday from the corps commander respecting my line of march, and enjoining upon me the great desideratum of keeping the troops fresh on the march, and to have plenty of rations and forage.

I was requested also to endeavor to obtain two squadrons of cavalry from General Heintzelman. I informed the corps commander of all I had done, and received his unqualified approval of it. It must be recollected that all these troops (except one regiment, the Ninety-first Penn-

sylvania Volunteers) were new troops that had just entered the service, and that the five regiments I have noted regarded their arms as worthless. Four of the regiments had been inspected by Colonel Torbert, New Jersey Volunteers (now brigadier general, Volunteers, I understand), under General Casey's order; and I learned from the colonels of the regiments that he had reported them worthless; in fact, he pronounced them no better than clubs. These same arms were subsequently inspected by another officer, by General Casey's order, who pronounced the same opinion upon them. Raw troops, with arms they had no confidence in, could be of no service.

I marched at daylight Sunday, the 14th of September, and reached Monocacy Depot, near Frederick, Tuesday afternoon. Here I obtained (as ordered) such supplies of rations and forage (very little of the latter) as could be obtained, and, upon sending to Frederick, found orders awaiting me to take a position in front of Frederick, to protect it, and to watch the approach from the left (from Harper's Ferry, then in possession of the enemy). On Wednesday morning, the 17th, I examined the country in front of Frederick, selected a position for the division, arranged with the military commander of Frederick to station vedettes on certain roads in advance; arranged at the telegraph office to have the earliest information from the telegraph toward Harper's Ferry, and was returning to camp to move my division to the position selected, when I received, about 3.30 o'clock p. m., orders from General McClellan to move forward. This I did immediately, and had marched 5 miles, when, at sunset, I received another order to join the army (then at Antietam) the next morning, at daylight if possible. The men were unaccustomed to marching, and were foot-sore; but I marched all night, and at an early hour the next morning was in position at Antietam, having marched more than 23 miles. I was cordially greeted by the commander of the corps and by General McClellan, both of whom fully approved all I had done.

I beg leave now to return for a moment. On Friday night, as soon as I learned the condition of the division, as to rations, arms, means of transportation, and lateness of arrival, I wrote to General Cullum, chief of staff of Major-General Halleck, informing him of it, and kept him advised of everything I did on Saturday. I had in reply at least two notes, but no indication of dissatisfaction with what I had done until 4 o'clock p. m., when I received a note, written by General Halleck, stating, in substance, that if General Humphreys did not join his division in the field immediately he would be arrested for disobedience of orders. I had just finished everything it was possible for me to do; nevertheless, I examined the condition of the command to see if it was possible to move that night, but, finding it impracticable, I did not march until daylight the next morning, the hour at which I had stated to General Cullum I should march. Whether the note referred (in connection with a recent order) to the fact of my being about the Departments in the city, or to my being at my house in the city to get lunch, or to my action in supplying the division, I did not, and do not now, distinctly understand. As soon as I found we should be encamped a few days at Sharpsburg, I went to the corps commander, and, repeating what I had done, asked that if there was anything in which I had erred that he would point it out to me. I was assured that all I had done was fully approved as the very best the circumstances admitted. I then laid before him the note I had received from Major-General Halleck and stated my intention to take official action upon it. From this, however, I was dissuaded. Further, my conduct had met with unqualified approval from the army as well as the corps commander, and I was under the impres-

sion also that the campaign was to be immediately continued, and that there was no time then for such investigations.

The reason for making, at the present time, a request for an investigation is given in the letter transmitting this statement.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS,

April 3, 1863.

Mr. SECRETARY: I have read, with great surprise, in the Daily Morning Chronicle of this day's date, that portion of the report of Major-General McClellan upon the battle of Antietam, in which, when giving his reasons for not renewing the battle on the morning of the 18th, he refers to the time of arrival of re-enforcements, and states:

And Humphreys' division of new troops, fatigued with forced marches, were arriving throughout the day, and were not available until near its close.

This statement of General McClellan is irreconcilable with the facts, and I am at a loss to understand how such a misapprehension on his part could have occurred.

I have stated in a recent communication to the War Department that the evening (Tuesday) of my arrival at Monocacy Station (3 miles from Frederick) I received orders from General Porter to take a position in front of that town, to cover it, and to watch my left; that the next day, after carefully examining the approaches to the town, I had selected a position, arranged with the military governor of Frederick to post vedettes at certain points in advance, and arranged at the telegraph office to receive the earliest intelligence from the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, and was returning to camp to move my division, when, at half past 3 o'clock in the afternoon, I received orders from General McClellan to join the army; that, after having marched about 5 miles, I received, at sunset, information of the battle, and instructions to march all night, and be up with the army by daylight, if possible; that I did so, and was up with the army at an early hour the next morning.

I now beg leave to state further, that I arrived at General McClellan's headquarters not later than 7 o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the 18th, and halted my division at a suitable place near by, where those who had been unable to keep up could rejoin the command, while I reported my arrival, received instructions, ascertained what ground I should occupy, &c.

I reported to the adjutant-general (General Williams) immediately, but about fifteen minutes elapsed before I could see General McClellan. In the interview with him I stated where I had halted my division; its condition; the number of my infantry and artillery; the state of the ammunition, &c.; was informed that the question of attack that day was not yet decided upon; and was directed to move my command to the ground occupied by General Porter as soon as I could. I had been in constant communication with General McClellan during the night and early morning, and he knew within an hour the time when I would be up. During the rest of an hour or an hour and a half that I gave the division before moving it again, a large part of those who had fallen out came up, making the division not less than 6,000 strong. All my artillery, eight pieces, was of course present. It is well known that

even with old troops, on such a march as my new troops had just made, large numbers would be unable to keep up. It must have been anticipated, then, when the order was sent to me to be up at daylight, if possible, that I would arrive with my division of nearly 7,000 men reduced considerably in numbers; yet, when we moved to the expected field of battle, there were at least 6,000 present. Upon recurring to my morning report of the 20th September, I find that upward of 500 men, sick and others, had been left at the old camps of the regiments on the south side of the Potomac, near Washington, before the brigades reported to me; and of the 500 who were not up the morning of the 18th, 240 were sick, and were so reported on the morning of the 20th.

To resume. During this halt I remained at headquarters to receive the earliest intelligence of the decision whether the battle would be resumed. I then moved my command (delayed some thirty minutes in Keedysville by other troops), and about half past 9, or at latest 10 o'clock, placed it in position, by General Porter's orders, about 400 yards in rear of Morell's division. Here it remained about an hour, when it occupied Morell's position upon his vacating it, and supported the batteries upon the height above.

General McClellan rode through or past my division on his way out from his headquarters; and it filed past him in moving down to Morell's position. Notwithstanding the long night march they had made of over 23 miles (our only forced march), the men were in good heart, and, refreshed by their rest and coffee, would have fought well. Had they been wanting in spirit, a large portion of them might have remained behind, for the night was very dark. When I saw the long lines of the regiments as they filed into their position, in rear of Morell, I knew the kind of men I commanded, and their conduct on the field since that time has justified my confidence in them.

Mr. Secretary, the efforts of my officers and men and of myself, that anxious night, entitled us at least to the simple justice of an exact statement.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

No. 109.

Reports of Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS, *Camp near Bakersville, Md., September 30, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the corps under my command in the battle of the 14th instant, at Crampton's Pass:

In compliance with the instructions of the commanding general, the corps advanced on the morning of the 14th instant from a point 3 miles east of Jefferson, in the direction of the Blue Ridge. At Jefferson a halt was ordered, to afford General Couch an opportunity of coming up. After a short delay, upon learning that this division was still some distance in the rear, I advanced to the vicinity of the village of Burkittsville. Upon ascertaining that the pass over the mountains at this

point, which I was directed to secure and hold, was occupied by the enemy in force, I caused immediate preparations to be made for an attack. The enemy was strongly posted on both sides of the road, which made a steep ascent through a narrow defile, wooded on both sides, and offering great advantages of cover and position. Their advance was posted near the base of the mountain, in the rear of a stone wall, stretching to the right of the road at a point where the ascent was gradual, and for the most part over open fields. Eight guns had been stationed on the road, and at points on the sides and summit of the mountain to the left of the pass.

It was evident that the position could be carried only by an infantry attack. Accordingly, I directed Major-General Slocum to advance his division through the village of Burkittsville, and commence the attack upon the right. Wolcott's First Maryland Battery was stationed on the left and to the rear of the village, and maintained a steady fire on the positions of the enemy until they were assailed and carried by our troops. Smith's division was placed in reserve on the east side of the village, and held in readiness to co-operate with General Slocum, or support his attack, as occasion might require. Captain Ayres' battery, of this division, was posted on a commanding ground to the left of the reserves, and kept up an uninterrupted fire on the principal battery of the enemy until the latter was driven from its position.

The advance of General Slocum was made with admirable steadiness through a well-directed fire from the batteries on the mountain, the brigade of Colonel Bartlett taking the lead, followed at proper intervals by the brigades of General Newton and Colonel Torbert. Upon fully determining the enemy's position, the skirmishers were withdrawn, and Colonel Bartlett became engaged along his entire line. He maintained his ground steadily under a severe fire for some time at a manifest disadvantage, until re-enforced by two regiments of General Newton's brigade upon his right, and the brigade of Colonel Torbert and the two remaining regiments of Newton's on his left. The line of battle thus formed, an immediate charge was ordered, and most gallantly executed. The men swept forward, with a cheer, over the stone wall, dislodging the enemy, and pursuing him up the mountain side to the crest of the hill and down the opposite slope. This single charge, sustained as it was over a great distance, and on a rough ascent of unusual steepness, was decisive. The enemy was driven in the utmost confusion from a position of strength, and allowed no opportunity for even an attempt to rally until the pass was cleared and in the possession of our troops.

When the division under General Slocum first became actively engaged, I directed General Brooks' brigade, of Smith's division, to advance upon the left of the road, and dislodge the enemy from the woods upon Slocum's flank. The movement was promptly and steadily made, under a severe artillery fire. General Brooks occupied the woods after a slight resistance, and then advanced, simultaneously with General Slocum, rapidly and in good order, to the crest of the mountain. The victory was complete, and its achievement followed so rapidly upon the first attack that the enemy's reserves, although pushed forward at the double-quick, arrived but in time to participate in the flight, and add confusion to the rout. Four hundred prisoners from seventeen different organizations, 700 stand of arms, 1 piece of artillery, and 3 stand of colors were captured, while numberless articles of equipment, knapsacks, haversacks, blankets, &c., were abandoned by the enemy in their flight.

The gallantry of the officers and the spirit and dash displayed by the troops are worthy of the highest praise, and I respectfully call attention to the recommendations made in the accompanying reports of Major-General Slocum and the commanders of brigades, and solicit for them the favorable notice of the commanding general. I also respectfully refer to the reports in question for a detailed account of the operations of the respective brigades, and for the names of such officers as have won honorable mention for their gallant bearing in the field. While fully concurring in the recommendation offered in behalf of Colonels Bartlett and Torbert, who have certainly earned promotion on this as on other occasions, I respectfully and earnestly request that Brigadier-General Newton may be promoted to the rank of major-general for his conspicuous gallantry and important services during the entire engagement.

The prompt and energetic action of Dr. White, the medical director of the corps; of Dr. Bradley, his assistant, and of the medical staff of the different organizations engaged in bringing off and caring for the wounded, is worthy of the highest praise.

Our total loss in killed and wounded is 530. Of these, 16 are officers, 5 of whom were killed. The total loss, killed, was 110; wounded, 420.* The losses of the enemy are not accurately known. We buried 150 of their dead, and took charge of more than 300 of their wounded, who were left upon the field.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major-General, Commanding Sixth Corps.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Bakersville, October 7, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of this corps, under my command, in the battle of Antietam, on the 17th ultimo:

For the preceding two days I had been encamped in rear of Rohrer'sville, in Pleasant Valley. During the night of the 16th I received orders to move toward Keedysville in the morning with two divisions, and to dispatch General Couch's division to occupy Maryland Heights. I started at 5.30 a. m. General Smith's division led the column, and its head arrived at the field of battle about 10 o'clock. This division was ordered to take post in a wood on the left of the stone bridge across the Antietam, and I was directed to place Slocum's division on the right of the same bridge. Before the arrival of Slocum's division, General Smith was ordered to go to the assistance of General Sumner, forming on his left. He at once obeyed this order, and arrived on the field at a most opportune moment. His first brigade (Hancock's) formed as the support of two of General Sumner's batteries, then severely pressed by the enemy, drove away his skirmishers, who had already advanced close to the batteries, and occupied some buildings and fences in front of his position. This brigade was the means of saving two

* But see revised statement, p. 183.

batteries, and occupied its position during the remainder of the action, sometimes under very heavy cannonading.

The Second Brigade (General Brooks') was for a short time retained on General Sumner's right, by his orders, but just after my arrival on the field General French reported his ammunition exhausted, and General Brooks was ordered to re-enforce him. His brigade took position on the right of General French. It remained in this position during the action. General Brooks was slightly wounded in the face by a musket-ball.

The Third Brigade (Colonel Irwin's) was placed by General Smith between Generals Hancock's and Brooks' positions, and was scarcely in line when it was ordered forward to meet a charge of the enemy. It drove the enemy handsomely as far as the wood which had already been so hotly contested, suffering severe loss. Its success insured the safety of that part of the field during the remainder of the day, as no other infantry attack was made there. This brigade was relieved early next morning by one of General Couch's.

Slocum's division arrived on the field about 11 o'clock. Immediately after its arrival two of his brigades (Newton's and Torbert's) were formed in column of attack, to carry the wood in the immediate vicinity of the white church. The other brigade (Bartlett's) had been ordered by General Sumner to keep near his right. As this brigade was to form the reserve for the column of attack, I waited until it came up. About the same time General Sumner arrived on the spot, and directed the attack to be postponed, and the enemy at once proceeded to fill the wood with infantry, and planted a battery there, which opened a severe fire upon us. Shortly afterward the commanding general came to the position and decided that it would not be prudent to make the attack, our position on the right being then considerably in advance of what it had been in the morning. The division, therefore, held its place until it was finally removed on the 19th. On two occasions during the afternoon of the 17th the enemy opened upon us from the wood with an artillery fire. In each case their fire was soon silenced, and, it appeared from an examination of the ground afterward, with heavy loss of artillery and men.

General Couch's division had been ordered by the commanding general to repair to the field after it had made a long march toward Maryland Heights, and accordingly arrived there early on the morning of the 18th. It was posted on the left of General Slocum's division, and one of his brigades (General Cochrane's) relieved Colonel Irwin's, of Smith's division.

In this position, suffering severe cannonading at intervals, which they bore like the veterans they are, my command remained without change until daylight on the 19th, when a general advance was made by the pickets, under orders from headquarters. This advance revealed the fact that the enemy had retreated during the night.

The batteries of the corps, under command of Captain Ayres and Lieutenant Upton, were splendidly served and did excellent execution.

I regret to announce the death of Surgeon White, medical director of the corps, who was killed while we were examining the point of woods which we expected to attack. He had been attached to my staff, and his loss will be severely felt by the medical corps. His place was taken by Assistant Surgeon Bradley, U. S. Army, who fulfilled the arduous duties brought on by the battle in the ablest and most efficient manner. A list of the other casualties has already been transmitted to headquarters.

My staff was very efficient and behaved well. Without any previous knowledge of the field, and with a large extent of ground covered by my command, its duties were arduous in the extreme. The names of my staff officers who were present, all of whom I commend to the favorable notice of the commanding general, are: Lieut. Col. O. D. Greene, assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff; Lieut. Col. E. R. Platt, assistant inspector-general; Capt. M. T. McMahon, aide-de-camp to commanding general; Capt. J. P. Baker, aide-de-camp; Capt. J. C. Jackson, aide-de-camp. Capt. W. P. Sanders, Sixth Cavalry, was temporarily on my staff during the action, and rendered efficient service. I also commend him to the notice of the commanding general on account of the able manner in which the cavalry under his command guarded and watched the country on the left and front of Jefferson, and filled up the void left by the advance of the infantry column.

I append a list of the reports of division and brigade commanders and chief of artillery, which are transmitted with this report.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

[Addenda.]

*Itinerary of the Sixth Army Corps, September 1-30, 1862.**

FIRST DIVISION.

September 1, left Centreville at sundown, and marched to Fairfax Court-House, Va.

September 2, marched to Seminary, near Alexandria.

September 6, marched, via Long Bridge, to Georgetown.

September 7, marched to Rabbit's farm, beyond Tennallytown, D. C.

September 8, marched to Muddy Run.

September 9, marched to Seneca Run, beyond Darnestown.

September 10, marched to Barnesville.

September 12, marched to near the Monocacy River, via Urbana.

September 13, marched to the foot of the Catoclin Mountains, near Jefferson.

September 14, marched across the mountains, and passed through Jefferson to Burkittsville, where we met the enemy's pickets at 3 p. m. Found the enemy strongly posted at Crampton's Pass, South Mountain. The division at once formed for attack, and, after a severe engagement, carried the pass by storm, losing 114 men killed and 397 wounded, completely routing the enemy, and capturing 400 prisoners, 700 stand of arms, 4 stand of colors, 1 piece of artillery, &c.

September 17, left pass at daylight, and marched, via Rohrer'sville and Keedysville, to the battle-field of Antietam, where we took position about noon, relieving a portion of General Sumner's corps. The division was not actively engaged, losing only 68 men killed and wounded.

September 19, moved to the Potomac, opposite Shepherdstown.

September 20, about midnight ordered to Williamsport.

September 23, moved to our present camp, near Bakersville.

* From "record of events," in division returns.

SECOND DIVISION.*

The Third Brigade left Camp California, near Alexandria, Va., August 28, on the Fairfax and Alexandria turnpike. Arrived at Centreville the night of the 30th, where it encamped until the night of September 1. Took up the march again, and encamped near Fairfax for the night. Reached Camp California, Va., again on September 2, and pitched tents and remained until September 6.

Marched across Long Bridge; encamped on September 7 near Georgetown, and marched through Tennallytown, Rockville, Barnesville, and Darnestown, to the right of Sugar Loaf Mountain, through Jefferson, towards the Catoctin Mountain. Marched through Burkittsville on the 15th, to support Brig. Gen. W. T. H. Brooks at Crampton's Pass. Remained here until Wednesday morning, the 17th. Moved with the division toward Sharpsburg, arrived at the battle-field of Antietam Creek about 10 a. m., went into action, and was under fire until 12 noon, the 18th, when relieved by Couch's division.

The total loss of the different regiments composing this brigade was as follows:

The Thirty-third New York Volunteers, 6 killed, 41 wounded; Forty-ninth New York Volunteers, 2 killed, 21 wounded; Seventh Maine, 12 killed, 63 wounded, and 20 missing; Seventy-seventh New York Volunteers, 6 killed, 26 wounded; Twentieth New York Volunteers, 38 killed, 96 wounded, and 11 missing. Total, 64 killed, 247 wounded, and 31 missing; in all, 342.

Remained near Sharpsburg until the 22d, and moved up near Bakersville, where the brigade is now encamped.

THIRD DIVISION.

September 1, a. m., bivouacked between Alexandria and Centreville, moved to within 2 miles of Centreville, and returned to Germantown.

September 2, 5 p. m., brought up the rear of army on the retreat to Alexandria.

September 3, 2 a. m., bivouacked near Alexandria.

September 4, moved to vicinity of Chain Bridge, on the Virginia side.

September 5, 5 p. m., crossed Chain Bridge, and moved by river road 3 miles beyond Tenallytown.

September 6, reached Offutt's Cross-Roads.

September 9, moved to Seneca.

September 10, moved to Poolesville.

September 12, moved to Barnesville.

September 13, moved to Licksville.

September 14, moved to Jefferson, at 8 p. m., near Burkittsville, and joined General Franklin's corps.

September 15, moved to vicinity of Rohrsersville.

September 17, moved to Sandy Hook and back to vicinity of Sharpsburg.

September 18, in line of battle at Sharpsburg.

September 19, through Sharpsburg.

September 20, moved to cross-roads near Williamsport, skirmishing in front.

September 21, enemy retreated across the river from Williamsport.

September 23, moved to Downsville.

September 30, at Downsville.

* Third Brigade only reported.

No. 110.

Reports of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, SIXTH CORPS,
Camp in the Field, September 24, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor of submitting the following report of the action of this division in the engagement at Crampton's Pass on the 14th instant:

The division encamped on the night of the 13th about 3 miles east of Jefferson, on the road leading from Urbana to Jefferson. At daylight on the 14th instant the division left camp, moved through Jefferson, and at 12 m. met the pickets of the enemy near Burkittsville. Colonel Bartlett, commanding the leading brigade, at once deployed the Ninety-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers as skirmishers, who drove in the enemy's pickets and advanced to the village. The other regiments of the division were then advanced to a position about half a mile east of the village, where they were completely concealed from the view of the enemy and covered from the fire of his artillery. Wolcott's First Maryland Battery was then advanced to a point to the left of the infantry, and replied to the enemy's artillery until preparations for the attack of the infantry were completed.

At 3 p. m. the column of attack was formed in the following order: The Twenty-seventh Regiment New York Volunteers deployed as skirmishers, followed at a distance of 200 yards by the Fifth Maine and Sixteenth New York Volunteers in line of battle; the brigades of General Newton and Colonel Torbert followed, each brigade being in two lines, the regiments in line of battle and the lines 200 yards from each other; the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, of Bartlett's brigade, which had advanced into the village, formed in rear, and joined the column as it advanced; the One hundred and twenty-first New York Volunteers was held as a reserve at the point where the column was formed. As soon as the advance began, the enemy opened with a heavy and well-directed artillery fire, but the troops advanced steadily, every line in the entire column preserving its alignment with as much accuracy as could have been expected at a drill or review. The line of skirmishers soon drew the fire of the enemy's infantry, which appeared in strong position in rear of a stone wall, which afforded them an admirable cover.

The position and strength of the enemy having been ascertained, the skirmishers were withdrawn, and Colonel Bartlett led the first line to a point within 300 yards of the enemy's line. A severe engagement ensued, the enemy having greatly the advantage in position, and being aided by at least eight pieces of artillery posted on the sides of the mountain. The position of this pass and its approaches rendered it evident that in the attempt to carry it reliance was to be placed mainly upon the infantry. I had, therefore, left all the artillery of the division in rear, but fearing that the stone wall behind which the enemy had taken cover would prove an insurmountable obstacle to the advance of my lines, I at once used every effort to bring forward a battery, with the view of driving the enemy from his position. But before the battery was fairly in position this obstacle had been overcome by a most gallant charge of the infantry, and the enemy were fleeing in confusion up the mountain, closely pursued by every regiment of the division except the one in reserve, each vying with the other in the pursuit. The enemy made another stand at the crest of the mountain, but was speedily dispersed

and pursued through the pass and into the plain below. The victory was complete, and resulted not only in the utter rout and dispersion of the forces opposed to us, but in the capture of over 300 prisoners, 3 stand of colors, over 700 stand of arms of the most approved pattern, 1 piece of artillery, and a very large number of knapsacks, haversacks, blankets, &c. The advance of General Brooks' brigade, of Smith's division, on the left of the pass, simultaneously with the advance of my division, did much toward the accomplishment of the work assigned to the corps, and rendered our victory more complete than it would otherwise have been.

Of the gallantry of the officers and men under my command I cannot speak too highly. Although greatly reduced in numbers by losses on the Peninsula, although fatigued by long marches and constant service since the opening of the spring campaign, each regiment—indeed, every man—did his whole duty, not reluctantly, but with that eagerness and enthusiasm which rendered success certain.

To attempt to designate any regiment, or any regimental or line officer, as being entitled to particular notice would be an act of injustice to all others. I cannot, however, without great injustice omit to call attention to the conduct of the brigade commanders, General Newton, Colonel Bartlett, and Colonel Torbert, all of whom led their brigades in the action, and gave renewed evidences of their skill and courage. Colonel Bartlett, commanding the leading brigade, was on this, as on all former occasions, conspicuous for his gallantry and the skill with which he handled his troops under a most galling fire. I sincerely trust that both Colonel Bartlett and Colonel Torbert, commanding their respective brigades, both of whom have given abundant proofs of their qualifications for the positions which they now occupy as brigade commanders, may be rewarded by the promotion they have so well earned.

I append a list of casualties, showing the number of officers killed, 5; wounded, 16; men killed, 109; wounded, 381. Total killed, 114; wounded, 397; aggregate loss, 511.

This list embraces many of the bravest and most gallant officers and soldiers of the division, for a more particular reference to whom I respectfully refer to the reports of the brigade commanders, which are herewith inclosed.

I am greatly indebted to the members of my staff, Major Rodgers, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenants Guindon and Shannon, aides-de-camp, and to Captain Urquhart, of Colonel Bartlett's staff, for the zealous manner in which their respective duties were discharged.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,

Major-General Volunteers, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. OLIVER D. GREENE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Sixth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, SIXTH CORPS,

Camp near Bakersville, September 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, early on the morning of the 17th instant, the division under my command left Crampton's Pass to join the main army, then already engaged with the enemy near Sharpsburg. We reached the battle-field about 12 m., and immediately took position in front of the white church, on the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg turn-

pike, relieving a portion of General Sumner's corps. Our infantry, though not actively engaged, were exposed to a heavy artillery fire from the enemy until sundown, and are entitled to great credit for their gallantry under a severe fire, which they were unable to return. The artillery of the division, under command of First Lieut. Emory Upton, Fifth U. S. Artillery, was well served and did good execution. The batteries of Captain Hexamer, First New Jersey Volunteer Artillery; Captain Wolcott, First Maryland Volunteer Artillery, and Lieutenant Williston, Battery D, Second U. S. Artillery, were all engaged, and their fire proved very accurate and effective, twice silencing the enemy's guns, and holding in check a large force of his infantry.

The officers and men of the division lay or rested upon their arms in line of battle for over forty hours without leaving their position, and deserve great credit for their fortitude displayed on that occasion.

I append a list of casualties, showing a loss of 5 men killed, 2 officers and 56 men wounded, and 2 men missing, making a total loss of 65.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,

Major-General Volunteers, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. OLIVER D. GREENE,

Asst. Adj. Gen. and Chief of Staff, Sixth Army Corps.

No. 111.

Report of Col. A. T. A. Torbert, First New Jersey Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., FIRST DIV., SIXTH CORPS,

Camp in Crampton's Pass, near Burkittsville, Md., Sept. 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following as the part taken by the First Brigade in the action on the 14th at Crampton's Pass, Md.:

It being decided to attack the enemy posted in the pass, the division was ordered to advance in six lines, two regiments front, the First Brigade being in rear. About 3 o'clock I marched my brigade in two lines by the right flank under cover till we gained the open ground, when the advance was made in line of battle as follows: First line, First and Second Regiments New Jersey Volunteers; second line, 150 paces in rear, Third and Fourth Regiments New Jersey Volunteers. They advanced about a half mile with great regularity through clover and corn fields, intersected by high wood and stone fences, being exposed the greater part of the time to the enemy's artillery fire. Arriving within supporting distance of Colonel Bartlett's brigade, which was engaging the enemy, I halted. Soon after I ordered the Second Regiment New Jersey Volunteers forward to relieve one of Colonel Bartlett's regiments, which was out of ammunition, which they did with promptness. The enemy was posted behind a stone wall at the base of the mountains, with a wood just behind them.

At this time the distance between the contending parties was between 300 and 400 yards, an open field intervening. Thinking the distance too great, General Newton ordered me to charge forward to the wood. Accordingly, I ordered forward my second line, Third and Fourth Regi-

ments New Jersey Volunteers, to charge across the open field into the woods. The front line was ordered to cease firing. A cheer, and the men went forward at double-quick in a most gallant manner, jumping the fence, on the way, behind which our men had been fighting. When they had advanced about 150 yards, I ordered the second line, First and Second Regiments, to charge in the same manner as the first, which they did in a handsome manner. The enemy, although holding a very strong position, and having the advantage of artillery, could not stand these charges, so broke and fled up the mountain side in great disorder, closely pursued by our men, who drove them through the pass, and some distance in the valley on the other side, when night put an end to the pursuit.

Too much cannot be said in praise of the bravery and gallantry of both officers and men, for they certainly did credit to themselves and the State they represent.

I am pleased to make particular mention of Lieutenant-Colonel Collet, Third Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, commanding First Regiment New Jersey Volunteers; Colonel Buck, Second Regiment; Colonel Brown, Third Regiment, and Colonel Hatch, Fourth Regiment, for their bravery, coolness, and the admirable manner in which they handled their regiments.

Where officers and men all behave with such gallantry, it would be invidious to particularize.

A great many of the enemy were taken prisoners, and among them several officers. The brigade captured nearly enough Springfield rifled muskets to arm the Fourth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, who were before armed with the smooth-bore musket.

I am happy to state that the Fourth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, which lost its colors before Richmond, captured two colors during this engagement.

I take great pleasure in making honorable mention of my staff, Lieut. Henry P. Cooke, Second Regiment, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. James G. Fitts, brigade commissary, and Lieut. Charles Wilson, Third Regiment, acting aide-de-camp, for their bravery, coolness, promptness, and correctness in carrying my orders to different parts of the field.

I regret to mention the death of Josiah S. Studdeford, first lieutenant and adjutant Fourth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, who fell while gallantly cheering on his men, just as we had gained the top of the pass.

The loss to the brigade has been as follows: One officer killed, 9 officers wounded; total, 10. Thirty-nine non-commissioned officers and privates killed, 125 non-commissioned officers and privates wounded; total, 164. Aggregate, 174.

I cannot pay too high a compliment to the medical staff of the brigade for the manner in which they performed their duty.

The chaplains of the different regiments deserve great credit for their assistance in conveying the wounded to the rear, and administering to their wants.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. T. A. TORBERT,

Colonel First Regiment New Jersey Vols., Comdg. Brigade.

Major RODGERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 112.

Report of Lieut. Col. Mark W. Collet, Third New Jersey Infantry, commanding First New Jersey Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FIRST REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS,
September 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report:

The First Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, with the Second Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, was in the first line of the brigade. The advance across the fields, under a heavy fire of shell and solid shot from the enemy's batteries, was steady and unwavering. When the order was given to "Charge, and drive the rebels from the hill," the regiment, with cheers, started, and halted only when the enemy was driven from the hill and entirely dispersed.

Where officers and men all behaved with such distinguished gallantry, it is impossible to single out one for particular mention.

The killed and wounded in the First New Jersey, as far as yet ascertained, are as follows:

* * * * *

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. W. COLLET,

Lieut. Col. Third N. J. Vols., in command of First N. J. Vols.

First Lieut. H. P. COOKE,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, New Jersey Brigade.

No. 113.

Reports of Col. Samuel L. Buck, Second New Jersey Infantry, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HDQRS. SECOND REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS,
Camp in Crampton's Pass, September 16, 1862.

SIR: The movements of this regiment previous to, and in action of, 14th instant are as follows:

Marched from camp near Buckey's Station at 6 a. m., Second Regiment in column; arrived at Jefferson at 11 o'clock; bivouacked about one hour; then advanced within 2 miles of Crampton's Pass; there rested one hour and thirty minutes; advanced by the flank under cover of rising ground until within musket-range of the enemy; formed in line of battle (having the left of the advance line of the brigade), and moved forward to relieve one regiment of Bartlett's brigade, posted in rear of a rail fence. We occupied the same position which they had left, and opened fire on the enemy. After firing about twenty minutes, the Fourth Regiment of the second line advanced through our lines and made a charge across an open field, followed immediately by us, both reaching the stone fence about the same time, behind which the enemy were in position. The enemy broke and fled, we pursuing them up the hill and through the pass. As we advanced, the regiment wheeled to the right, the left resting on the crest of the hill on the left of the road. At this point the enemy were re-enforced by fresh regiments, but they could not withstand our fire, and, without getting into position, broke and fled, we following them down the hill and along the road a distance of about a quarter of a mile, where we could see the baggage train of the enemy, protected by two pieces of artillery, in full retreat. As we

appeared, they opened on us with grape and canister. If our men had been fresh at this point, we could easily have taken the artillery and part of the baggage train, but the men were so fatigued, and darkness coming on, the enemy made good their escape. Being relieved by the Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, by order of Colonel Torbert we fell back about a quarter of a mile, encamping in a field on the left-hand side of the road, which position we occupy at the present time.

As regards the conduct of officers and men, I would state it was all that could be desired or expected. Where all exhibited so much determination and gallantry, it would be invidious to particularize, but I cannot close without calling your attention to the brave conduct of Color-Corpl. Joseph Donovan, of Company A, who bore our colors through the thickest of the fight in the most gallant manner, and justly merits promotion.

Herewith find list of casualties.*

Trusting the above will meet your approbation, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAML. L. BUCK,
Colonel, Commanding.

Lient. H. P. COOKE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. SECOND REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS,
September 21, 1862.

In compliance with your request for a report of the part this regiment took in the late battle near Sharpsburg, on the 17th instant, I respectfully report the following:

On the morning of the 17th instant we marched from Crampton's Pass and arrived at the scene of contest about noon. Immediately after our arrival we were ordered to the front by Colonel Torbert, to support Captain Ayres' battery (D), First U. S. Artillery, which at that time was sharply engaging the enemy. We remained in position in rear of the battery until night, exposed at intervals to a heavy fire, our loss on this occasion amounting in all to 2 killed and 7 wounded.

In regard to the conduct of the men, I am happy to state they behaved with unusual coolness and bravery. Below please find list of casualties.†

Hoping the above may meet your approbation, I remain, very respectfully,

SAML. L. BUCK,
Colonel, Commanding.

Lient. H. P. COOKE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 114.

Report of Col. Henry W. Brown, Third New Jersey Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS,
Camp in Crampton's Pass, Md., September 15, 1862.

SIR: On Sunday morning, the 14th instant, about 6 o'clock, we left our bivouac, and marched through a pass over the mountains to Jeffer-

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 183. † Embodied in revised statement, p. 195.

son, where we halted in a field by the town for some time. A little before noon we again marched to a point about half a mile to the rear of the village of Burkittsville, where we formed line of battle on the slope of a wooded height, a little on the right of the enemy's position. After remaining a few minutes, we moved forward into a swampy hollow, and there remained until about 4 o'clock p. m., when we marched by a flank side by side with the First Regiment, followed respectively by the Fourth and Second, keeping as well concealed as the nature of the ground permitted from the fire of the enemy's artillery, which was strongly posted on a road which leads nearly parallel to the hillside from Burkittsville, and turned suddenly to the left through the gap (artillery was also posted on the steep, rocky, and woody height), until we came directly in front of the enemy's position, where we halted.

The First and Second Regiments moved forward, forming the first line of the brigade. The Third and Fourth followed to the front at a distance varying from 100 to sometimes only 30 paces in rear, according to the nature of the ground. We moved thus over an open country intersected by high fences, the men clambering over as best they could, and quickly regaining their position in line, marching with great steadiness and precision, and so through a corn-field, still exposed to a hot fire of shell from the enemy, for a distance of one-fourth of a mile. At the verge of the corn-field we were ordered to halt. Here we lost some men from their shell.

Ten minutes after, we were ordered forward, and moved rapidly and steadily across a grass field under cover of a slight rise in front. The men were here ordered to lie down in line. The first line was now hotly engaged, as we could hear from the incessant fusillade intermingled with the roar of the enemy's guns, now throwing grape and canister as well as shell. In five minutes the Third and Fourth were ordered in to relieve the first line, and the men, springing up, went in with a cheer up to, over, and through the high fence held by the enemy at the base of the wooded heights and strongly lined by his sharpshooters, who delivered their fire with great rapidity. But nothing could withstand the onset of our men. The enemy broke and fled, pursued by our men without halt up the sides of the mountain, climbing up the shingly sides of the hill until they reached the road before mentioned.

Here it was observed that a battalion of the enemy were forming on the right of our line, now become the first line of the brigade, when we changed front forward and delivered a destructive fire on his half-formed line, followed up by a renewal of the charge, when he broke utterly and the pursuit continued. A party of my regiment, under command of Lieutenant Fairly, my acting adjutant, and Lieutenant Hufty, consisting of about 20 men, moved off from the regiment by my order, and circling round by the road to the right, got in rear of and around the heights up which the body of the regiment was pursuing the retreating foe. They moved with such rapidity that many of the party fell out exhausted, and on their arrival at the point desired in rear the adjutant found he had but 5 men. With these he succeeded in capturing 4 of the enemy's officers and many of their men. This party, being out of ammunition, was obliged to abandon the pursuit, though they delivered their last remaining fire into the enemy's artillery, now in full retreat, and which could easily have been captured had there been cavalry to pursue.

Thus ended a sharp and well-contested action, in which the enemy had every advantage of numbers, position, and artillery. In his utter and complete rout, my men showed here what they could do when they

had a fair chance, and they here well sustained the honor of New Jersey on this field. I have not to regret the loss of any officer killed. Captain Stickney, of Company F, and Second Lieutenant Lambson, of Company E, are both slightly wounded. My officers and men behaved most gallantly. Those officers who had received their commissions the previous day (all in command of companies) showed by their conduct how well they had deserved their promotion. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, late captain of Company E, in my regiment, and of the acceptance of whose resignation I have not yet received official notice, was my only acting field officer, and though where all have distinguished themselves it might seem invidious to particularize, I should be acting unjustly did I not mention how nobly he assisted me. I must also mention First Lieut. David Fairly, my acting adjutant, for his promptness in repeating my commands, as well as for his perfect coolness and daring intrepidity. Lieutenant Hufty also behaved remarkably well.

One of my officers captured the colors of the Cobb Legion at the same time with a private, but seeing the man belonged to the Fourth Regiment of our brigade, he gave up his claim to the colors, and gave Colonel Hatch the sling in the evening. Both color-bearers of my regiment, Sergeant Haggerty, of Company A, and Corporal Westcott, of Company B, behaved with distinguished gallantry, waving their colors continually in advance, and I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Acting Sergeant Dalziel, of Company D, who accompanied my acting adjutant with the party detailed and brought down many of the enemy with his unerring rifle.

My entire loss was 11 killed and 28 wounded.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. BROWN,
Colonel, Commanding.

Lieut. H. P. COOKE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 115.

Report of Col. William B. Hatch, Fourth New Jersey Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

CRAMPTON'S PASS, MD., September 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with orders received on the 16th instant from Col. A. T. A. Torbert, then in command of the brigade, I took position with the Fourth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers in rear of the Second Regiment, forming part of the second line of battle. The Second Regiment had engaged the enemy, who held a strong position behind a stone wall at the foot of the mountain with a large force of infantry. I then received orders to charge the enemy. I advanced across a plowed field of 400 yards in extent under a heavy cross-fire from the enemy's artillery, which was planted on the mountain slope, driving him from every point in front of us. We leaped the walls and continued in pursuit over the mountain into the gorge and up the next ascent to its summit, the enemy retreating in disorder into the valley below. We took many prisoners, including a large number of officers, among whom was Colonel Lamar, wounded, and his adjutant; also two stand of colors. In the eagerness of pur-

suit we ran over two other rebel flags, which were picked up by a New York regiment. Among the spoils of the engagement obtained by us were a sufficient number of Springfield rifled muskets to equip my whole command, who were previously armed with an imperfect smooth-bore musket.

Where officers and men fought with such determination it is impossible for me to make an exception for brave and gallant conduct during the engagement. My officers bravely cheered on their men, who advanced with unflinching steadiness, and maintained their alignment with almost the precision of a battalion drill. On the list of casualties of the day the most to be regretted is Adj. Josiah S. Studdeford, who was instantly killed after we had reached the gorge between the mountain cliffs. He had borne himself gallantly, everywhere cheering the men to victory. Ten killed, 27 wounded; total, 37.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. B. HATCH,

Colonel Fourth New Jersey Volunteers.

Lieut. H. P. COOKE,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, First New Jersey Brigade.

No. 116.

Report of Col. Joseph J. Bartlett, Twenty-seventh New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., SIXTH CORPS,

—, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of Crampton's Pass, Sunday, September 14, 1862:

My command, after a march of nearly 10 miles, arrived opposite the village of Burkittsville and Crampton's Pass about 12 o'clock m., with the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Cake commanding, deployed as skirmishers. The enemy's pickets retired from the town and opened an artillery fire from two batteries upon my line of skirmishers. I was ordered by Major-General Slocum to halt until he could mass his troops and arrange the plan of the assault, as the appearance of the mountain pass convinced all that artillery was of no avail against it, and that nothing but a combined and vigorous charge of infantry would carry the mountain.

It being decided that the attack should be made on the right and flank of the road leading over the mountains, I was ordered to lead the column, under cover from artillery fire and as secretly as possible, to a large field near its base, where the column of attack was to be formed, each brigade in two lines, at 200 paces in rear. About 4 o'clock p. m. I ordered forward the Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers, Lieut. Col. A. D. Adams commanding, to deploy as skirmishers, and, upon their placing the interval ordered between the column of attack and their line, I advanced at quick time the Fifth Maine Volunteers, Col. N. J. Jackson commanding, and Sixteenth New York Volunteers, Lieut. Col. J. J. Seaver commanding. My line of skirmishers found the enemy at the base of the mountain, safely lodged behind a strong stone wall. Their entire line, being now developed, exhibited a large force. My first line

advanced rapidly and steadily to the front under a severe fire of artillery from the heights above and musketry from behind the wall and the trees on the slope above it. Halting behind a rail-fence about 300 yards from the enemy, the skirmishers were withdrawn and the battle commenced.

By some unexplained and unaccountable mistake, more than 1,000 yards intervened between the head of the column of General Newton's brigade and my own line, and nothing but the most undaunted courage and steadiness on the part of the two regiments forming my line maintained the fight until the arrival of the rest of the attacking column. On their arrival, the Thirty-second New York Volunteers, Colonel Matheson commanding, and the Eighteenth New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Myers commanding, were sent to report to me by order of General Newton, commanding Third Brigade. The Fifth Maine and Sixteenth New York Volunteers having expended their ammunition, I relieved them, and formed them 20 paces in rear.

The New Jersey brigade, Colonel Torbert commanding, now arrived on the left of the line, and commenced firing by its first line, and the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers having joined my command, and been positioned by me on the extreme right, it became apparent to all that nothing but a united charge would dislodge the enemy and win the battle. A moment's consultation with Colonel Torbert decided us to make the charge immediately at a double-quick, and the order was passed along the line to "Cease firing," the command given to "Charge," and our whole line advanced with cheers, rushing over the intervening space to the stone wall and routing the enemy. The charge was maintained to the top of the mountain, up an almost perpendicular steep, over rocks and ledges, through the underbrush and timber, until the crest overlooking the valley beyond was gained. The victory was decisive and complete, the routed enemy leaving arms, ammunition, knapsacks, haversacks, and blankets in heaps by the roadside.

The great natural strength of the enemy's position, supported by his well-served batteries, made it absolutely necessary that the first attempt should be successful or great confusion and slaughter must ensue. The success was fully and clearly established by the masterly arrangement of the column of attack by Major-General Slocum, and circumstances seemed to have been controlled by some master-hand to enable us to carry out the clear instructions received before the assault. All orders were carried out in detail. No more and no less was done than to execute the plan during the fiercely contested assault which was so clearly expressed in the bivouac.

I have the honor of reporting the capture of one battle-flag by the Sixteenth New York Volunteers.

The action of my own regiments, and of the Thirty-second and Eighteenth New York Volunteers, who were under my command, recommend them to the highest consideration of their general officers. There were no officers, field or line, who did not distinguish themselves upon this occasion, and the highest praise should be awarded the soldiers under their command.

It is with sorrow I have to report the death of Major Martin, Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, who fell gallantly leading his wing of the regiment to the charge.

My warmest thanks are due to the brave, able, and gallant assistance rendered me on this as on all former occasions by Lieut. R. P. Wilson, acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. M. E. Richards, acting aide-de-camp. Among the surgeons of the several regiments, Surg. N. S.

Barnes, Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers, I wish particularly to mention for gallantry in following his regiment into battle, and establishing his field hospital close to the scene of action, thereby rendering immediate and invaluable assistance to the wounded.

I herewith annex an official list of the killed and wounded in my brigade.*

JOS. J. BARTLETT,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. H. C. RODGERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, Sixth Corps.

No. 117.

Report of Col. Nathaniel J. Jackson, Fifth Maine Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MAINE REGIMENT,
Camp near Williamsport, Md., September 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of events that transpired on the 14th instant at the battle of Crampton's Pass, as far as relates to this regiment:

About 3.30 o'clock p. m., in company with the remainder of the brigade, we received orders to move forward. We were formed in the first line of battle, in company with the Sixteenth New York Volunteers, our position being upon the left. We immediately moved forward in line to assault the enemy's lines, under a severe and galling fire. Arriving within about 500 yards, we became engaged with the enemy's infantry. Our line rested behind a rail fence, which position we maintained for upward of an hour, when our ammunition became completely exhausted. We then fell back a short distance, our position being occupied by a portion of General Newton's brigade. We then received orders to fix bayonets and charge upon the enemy, which we did at double-quick. We remained upon the battle-field during the night. Both officers and men behaved in a noble manner.

Our loss was 4 killed and 28 wounded.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. J. JACKSON,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Lient. R. P. WILSON,
Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., Hdqrs. Second Brig., Gen. Slocum's Div.

No. 118.

Report of Lieut. Col. Joel J. Seaver, Sixteenth New York Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HDQRS. SIXTEENTH REGIMENT NEW YORK STATE VOLs.,
Camp near Williamsport, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on Sunday, September 14, instant, this regiment, preceded by the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, marched from its bivouac, crossing the Catoctin Mountain, and passing the little village of Jefferson at about 12 m., soon after which

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 183.

we were halted for a brief rest. On resuming the march, the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Regiment, under Colonel Cake, was thrown forward as an advance guard, and, on approaching the village of Burkittsville, a portion of the Ninety-sixth was deployed as skirmishers. On gaining the immediate vicinity of Burkittsville, and within sight of the enemy's pickets, the brigade was drawn up on the left of the road, and the Sixteenth Regiment was ordered to support the Second U. S. (Captain Up-ton's) Battery.

From this position the brigade was again moved forward, and I received an order to follow in rear of the One hundred and twenty-first New York Regiment, which I did until we reached the outskirts of the village, when I was assigned a position in rear of the Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers, and the brigade moved to the right of the road, and rested in a ravine until about 2.30 p. m., when we were again ordered to advance, for the purpose of storming Crampton's Pass, on South Mountain, where the enemy had taken up his position. Advancing a few hundred yards under cover of a hedge and corn-field, we were formed in line of battle, with the Fifth Maine Regiment on our left, and the Twenty-seventh New York Volunteers thrown forward as skirmishers. In this position we advanced about 600 yards to the crest of a knoll, and to within short rifle-range of the enemy, who were in force behind a stone wall and in the wood skirting the base of the mountain, the enemy's cannon in the mean time keeping up a steady fire upon our lines. Here we opened upon them, and continued a brisk fire for nearly three-quarters of an hour, suffering severely from the fire of the enemy in their superior position, when we were relieved by the Thirty-second New York Regiment, of General Newton's brigade. We had rested but a few minutes when Colonel Torbert's brigade was brought up, and ordered to charge upon the enemy. They were immediately followed by General Newton's brigade and the Sixteenth New York and Fifth Maine Regiments.

Now the third line immediately advanced with fixed bayonets and ringing cheers. The enemy opened with great fury upon us with cannon and musketry as we gained the base of the mountain. I found myself directly opposed to the enemy, who were pouring upon us a deadly fire from the cover of the woods. Rallying my men with the aid of Major Palmer, who behaved in the most heroic and commendable manner, I ordered them to charge into the woods, which was done, driving the enemy before us. The troops on our right and left advancing at the same time, we soon cleared the first slope of the mountain, and pressed forward toward the pass.

As we gained the crest of the first hill, I observed a line of battle formed in a road which led around the brow of the hill, and ordered the men to cover themselves and fire as rapidly as possible. This was done with good effect. Our fire, increasing as the men came up, soon broke the rebel lines, and they fled precipitately. They were pursued as rapidly as the men could climb the hill, and at sundown we had carried the pass and won the day.

As night closed upon the scene I found myself on the heights on the right of the pass, in company with Colonel Cake, Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania; Lieutenant-Colonel Myers and Major Meginnis, Eighteenth New York, and a portion of the Thirty-second New York Volunteers. These, with Major Palmer, Sixteenth New York, were the only field officers present at that point. Subsequently, and in obedience to orders, the Sixteenth Regiment was moved to a point on the road passing through the gap, where we bivouacked for the night.

As this regiment gained the skirt of the wood, one of the enemy's battle-flags was borne immediately in front of my right wing. The color-bearers were fired upon, and one of them wounded, and a private, James Allen, of Company F, rushed forward, securing the colors, and taking the bearer prisoner. The flag has been forwarded to General McClellan's headquarters, in obedience to an order to that effect.

The loss of the regiment in this action was 20 enlisted men killed, 1 commissioned officer (Lieut. C. L. Jones) and 41 enlisted men wounded.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOEL J. SEAVER,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. R. P. WILSON,

Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Second Brigade, Slocum's Division.

No. 119.

Report of Lieut. Col. Alexander D. Adams, Twenty-seventh New York Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,

In the Field near Williamsport, Md., September 23, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this regiment in the action of Crampton's Pass, September 14, 1862:

On leaving Jefferson, the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania was sent out in advance as skirmishers, and soon after the Sixteenth New York was assigned to support a battery, so that the Twenty-seventh had the advance on approaching the pass. The presence of the enemy having been discovered, the brigade was drawn into a ravine in column by battalion to avoid his artillery, and to prepare for storming the gap. Shortly after, the Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania having been recalled and placed in the column, the brigade moved under cover as far as practicable toward the pass, and at 3.30 the Twenty-seventh, still leading the column, was ordered by Colonel Bartlett, commanding brigade, to deploy as skirmishers, advance on the pass, and develop the enemy's position, the center of the line, which was in all at least a mile long, being directed a little to the right of the pass. Almost as soon as the deployment was completed, and the flank companies had been thrown forward a little, bringing the line into the form of an arc, the skirmishers became briskly engaged simultaneously on the right and left with a superior force of the enemy posted at the base of the mountain, behind stone fences and houses.

The firing at once became general along the whole line, and was very rapid and at close range. In ten or fifteen minutes the first line of attack of this brigade had advanced to the left of the center of the line of skirmishers, and opened a fierce fire on the enemy in the woods in front. After considerable interval, the musketry continuing fiercely, the Second Brigade, in column, General Newton's having been brought up to support the attack, and the skirmishers, as well as the first line of Colonel Bartlett's brigade, having expended their ammunition, the colonel commanding directed that the skirmishers should retire and rally on the center, for the purpose of reforming the regiment. This was done in good order, though, owing to the extent of the line, it necessarily occupied some time, the charge which carried the pass being made when but three or four companies had formed. As soon as the flank companies had come in, the regiment was placed in the position pre-

viously indicated by General Bartlett, where it remained until the next morning. The action had terminated in the total rout of the enemy before this position was taken up.

The conduct of this command during the entire engagement was most admirable. Though exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery while advancing over the open fields, there was no faltering or hesitation, and the severe musketry fire of the enemy was returned with the cool deliberation and steady aim of experienced marksmen. It is reported by prisoners that the manner and steadiness of the advance convinced the enemy that he had not raw troops to deal with. The great extent of the line rendered the transmission of orders difficult, and I am greatly indebted to Major Bodine and Adjutant Thompson for the aid which maintained the proper disposition and unbroken continuity of the line. All the officers save one (whose case has been laid before the colonel commanding) maintained and added to the reputation they have won in the previous history of the Twenty-seventh. It would not be proper to conclude this report without mentioning the efficient conduct of Surgeon Barnes, of this regiment, whose hospital was established nearest to the field, and who was the first surgeon to visit the wounded, collected in the houses at the foot of the mountain and on the field after the action was over.

The casualties are 6 killed and 27 wounded; among the latter Lieutenants Seeley and Christman, and Color-bearer Sergeant McMahon. The detailed report has been forwarded.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

ALEX. D. ADAMS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Lieut. R. P. WILSON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Brigade.

No. 120.

Report of Col. Henry L. Calk, Ninety-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HDQRS. NINETY-SIXTH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Camp near Williamsport, Md., September 23, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagements of the 14th and 17th instant so far as participated in by this regiment:

After marching through Jefferson on Sunday morning, I was ordered out upon the road to Burkittsville, the regiment having been indicated as the advance guard. When within 2 miles of the latter village, the cavalry advance came in and reported a skirmish with a superior force of the enemy's cavalry. Companies A and F were deployed at once as skirmishers, and moved forward, the balance of the regiment steadily moving on within easy supporting distance. The enemy retired to the South Mountain through Burkittsville, our two companies of skirmishers penetrating to within 1,000 yards of the base, the balance of the regiment halting at the entrance of the village a little after 1 o'clock p. m. As the skirmishers entered the village they drew the fire of the artillery posted on the heights, which was kept up during the day, the shot being divided between the skirmishers and the main body of the Ninety-sixth, drawn up in line on the Knoxville road, the enemy revealing the position of at least five of their pieces.

At about 4 o'clock I was ordered to draw in the skirmishers and re-join the brigade with the regiment. Having posted a picket down the Knoxville road, this required some time, and the brigade had commenced to move, as had also the other two brigades of the division. Receiving an order from Major-General Slocum to move on in the rear of the New Jersey brigade, I did so, forming where they formed and moving on the field to their right. At about 5.30 o'clock the Ninety-sixth had marched to the line of skirmishers, and I was ordered by Colonel Bartlett, commanding the brigade, to take my position on the extreme right. The base of the mountain was now about 1,000 yards distant. At that point the road ran parallel to the mountain. On one or the other side of this road a substantial stone fence furnished good cover for the enemy's infantry, to say nothing of the wood on the side of the mountain. Brisk musketry firing was in progress on our left, but the good cover in possession of the enemy and the distance at which we stood rendered it quite certain that we could gain nothing at a stand-off fight, while the artillery posted in the mountain was punishing us severely.

It was evident that nothing but a rush forward would win. The order to charge came at last, and with a shout the entire line started. The fields through which the Ninety-sixth charged presented many obstacles, and, in order not to meet the enemy with broken lines, I twice halted momentarily, with a stone fence for a cover, for a great portion of my regiment to form. The last of the series of fields through which we had to charge was meadow and standing corn. As we emerged from the corn the enemy met us with a murderous fire.

We were within 20 paces of the road, at the base of the mountain, the stronghold of the enemy. It was here we met our great loss. Shocked, but not repulsed, the men bounded forward, determined to end it with the bayonet. The road was gained in a twinkling, the enemy leaving for the mountain. Those of the enemy who were not hurt, and who seemed too much surprised to get away, begged lustily for mercy. I had seen Lieut. John Dougherty, one of my best officers, fall, but without waiting to see who were down or who were up, I hastily formed my line, Major Meginnis, of the Eighteenth New York, promising to form on my left and follow, and dashed on up the hill, keeping the line formed as well as possible, to guard against a probable stand of the enemy at the crest of the hill. I let the men advance nearly as fast as they could and wanted to.

It was a most exhausting charge. By the time we had ascended half way the cannon had ceased firing on our left, and the enemy seldom replied to our fire with their muskets. We made captures at every step. After passing the crest of the mountain, a lieutenant of the Fifteenth North Carolina delivered himself up. I sent, during the charge, 42 prisoners to the rear, including the captain of Company G, Sixteenth Georgia, wounded, and other officers and men, most of them unhurt. Sergeant Anderson, of Company K, shot the color-bearer of the Sixteenth Georgia, but did not stop to secure the colors, which were secured by some of our forces afterward.

After advancing beyond the crest of the hill, I formed my line for the purpose of resting the men, who were much exhausted by the march of the day and the furious dash up the mountain. It is with much gratification that I can report my companies all present in line, fully and fairly represented.

Colonel Seaver, of the Sixteenth, as also the officers commanding portions of the Eighteenth and Thirty-second New York, joined their lines to the Ninety-sixth, and reported to me for orders. Having thrown our skirmishers to the right and front, I rested until the recep-

tion of orders to return to the foot of the mountain and go into camp, which order was promptly obeyed, the brigade going into camp on the western side of the pass.

During the charge, and just at the moment when a splendid victory was opened, Maj. Lewis J. Martin was mortally wounded by a musket-ball in the head, and died while being carried off the field. He was an accomplished and brave soldier; an unassuming and perfect gentleman, beloved by all the regiment, and regretted beyond expression. One of the first to volunteer in this war, he has at last laid down his life while gallantly and bravely fighting for his country—the only son of his mother, and she a widow. A minute before, First Lieut. John Dougherty, commanding Company F, was shot through the breast, at my side, while bravely leading his company to the final struggle at the road. Sergeant Casey, seizing his sword as he fell, valiantly raised it over his head and dashed forward at the head of his company, which never faltered. There was no better or braver soldier than Lieut. John Dougherty. The loss of these two officers falls heavily upon the regiment. During the charge I had 2 color-bearers killed and 3 wounded. Casualties: 20 killed, 71 wounded; total, 91.

The conduct of the regiment was excellent, my orders under fire being obeyed promptly and with great cheerfulness. Captain Lessig, Company C, deserves especial mention for brave conduct. The prospect of a fight in the wood and among the rocks on the side of the mountain stimulated him to great exertions to gain that point, and he cheered on his fine company most bravely. Captain Hay, Company A, also preserved his excellent reputation as a fighting officer, holding his company well in hand, always cool and in line. His services were invaluable in the fight, as they always are on the march, on picket, or in command of skirmishers. Captain Budd, Company K, also fought gallantly, leading his men bravely in the fight, capturing prisoners with his own hands. Captain Haas, Company G, also fought with coolness and courage, leading his men into the fire with promptness. Captains Filbert, Boyle, and Royer, of B, D, and H, also did their duty. I must also make special mention of Lieut. George G. Boyer, acting regimental adjutant, who bravely encouraged the men throughout the lines up to the time the road was gained. Upon the fall of Major Martin, Lieutenant Boyer was charged with his removal, hoping that prompt attention might save his valuable life.

The conduct of Lieutenant Byrnes, commanding Company I, and Lieutenant Oberrender, commanding Company E, was most praiseworthy. At the head of their companies their courageous example was most conspicuous. Upon the fall of Lieut. John Dougherty, Sergeant Casey assumed command of Company F, and conducted it through the balance of the day with the coolness of a veteran officer. Lieutenant Sailor, Company A; Lieutenant Hannum, Company D; Lieutenant Russell, Company C, and Lieutenant Huber, Company B, rendered marked services on the field. Lieutenant Russell, Company C, dispatched to bring Company B forward to the regimental line on the side of the mountain, displayed promptness, courage, and zeal in the discharge of his duty. Sergt. Maj. John Harlan deserves especial mention for the great coolness he displayed in the fight. In forming the lines to renew the charge after the enemy had been routed at the foot of the hill his services were invaluable. It is truly gratifying to be able to make this truthful statement. Companies A, F, I, C, K, and G were the first in the road, Companies C, A, and K first and simultaneously. In taking the road we lost 2 color-bearers killed and 3 wounded.

The names of those killed with the colors in their hands are Solomon M. Minzi, Company C, color-bearer, and Charles B. Zeigler, Company H. The wounded are Thomas Oliver, Company C, color-bearer; Sergeant Johnson, Company H, and William Ortner, Company H.

I regret being compelled to report that our surgeons invariably leave upon the bursting of the first shell near the regiment. This has always heretofore deprived us of their services on the field, though I believe it is the custom to report for duty at the hospitals after engagements. This regiment would be quite as well off if its surgeons were left at hospitals, Dr. Nugent having been promoted to the One hundred and twenty-sixth.

Very respectfully, lieutenant, your obedient servant,

H. L. CAKE,
Colonel, Commanding.

Lieut. R. P. WILSON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 17th the regiment moved from camp at daylight and crossed the Antietam at 11 o'clock. With the balance of the brigade, it was sent to the front to support batteries. While lying in position, a round shot struck in Company G, killing Private Frank Treon and wounding Private McCoy Sargent. I have, happily, no other casualties to record.

H. L. C.,
Colonel, Commanding.

No. 121.

Report of Brig. Gen. John Newton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
September 24, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Third Brigade at the battle of Crampton's Pass, September 14, 1862:

My brigade arrived upon the field soon after 3 p. m., formed in two lines of battle, the Eighteenth and Thirty-second New York Volunteers forming the front line, and the Thirty-first New York Volunteers and Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers the rear line. In getting into their positions they were shelled with great precision by the enemy's batteries, but I am happy to say that but few casualties resulted from this fire.

Finding Colonel Bartlett's brigade, which had preceded mine, actively engaged with the enemy, I supported him upon the right with the Eighteenth and Thirty-second New York Volunteers, and subsequently upon the left with the Thirty-first New York Volunteers and Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers. The troops were under a very severe fire from the enemy's musketry and artillery, they (the enemy) being covered by woods, stone walls, ledges of rock, &c.

After a fusilade of about one hour and a half, with but little impression being made upon the enemy, the order to charge was given, in which the entire infantry of the division, with the exception of the One hundred and twenty-first New York Volunteers, were engaged. The charge was short and decisive, and the enemy was driven from his stronghold in a very few moments, although our loss was severe in accomplishing this object. The Eighteenth and Thirty-second New York

on the right of our line, aided by other regiments of the division, charged up the almost inaccessible mountain to its summit, driving the enemy before them. In this charge I regret that Col. R. Matheson, Maj. George F. Lemon, and Second Lieutenant Collins, of the Thirty-second New York, were severely wounded, and Second Lieutenant Wright killed; also, in the Eighteenth New York, Capt. William Horsfall killed and Lieutenants Daley and Ellis wounded severely.

The Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers and Thirty-first New York Volunteers, on the left, swept through the gap, and although their loss is trifling compared with the other two regiments of the brigade, their position was important. The Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, after passing through the gap, received the fire from a battery of the enemy, which they bore steadily, and advanced in the face of, until the guns were drawn off. It is supposed the rapidity of their charge, together with that of the regiments on their left, compelled the enemy to abandon the cannon, which was afterward brought in by the pickets of the Second Division. The enemy's train of wagons also barely escaped. The rout of the enemy was complete, and we needed but a small body of cavalry to have doubled their loss.

I take great pleasure in again noticing the gallantry and efficiency of Col. R. Matheson, Thirty-second New York Volunteers, and who has been repeatedly recommended for promotion; also that of Maj. George F. Lemon, Thirty-second New York Volunteers; of Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, commanding Eighteenth New York Volunteers, and Major Meginnis and Captain Horsfall, killed; Capt. A. Barclay Mitchell and Lieutenants Daley and Ellis, wounded, of the Eighteenth New York Volunteers, as behaving with great coolness and gallantry; of Col. G. W. Town, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Lieut. Col. F. E. Pinto, commanding Thirty-first New York Volunteers, as performing their duties with great efficiency.

I again call attention to the gallantry and efficient services of Lieutenant Russell, aide-de-camp, and of Lieut. Charles E. Heisler, acting aide-de-camp. Capt. E. M. Tilley, brigade quartermaster, and Lieut. D. Tarbell, Thirty-second New York Volunteers, acting brigade commissary, accompanied me on the field, rendering efficient and gallant services.

I was entirely satisfied with the conduct of the officers and men of the brigade.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN NEWTON,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. H. C. RODGERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division.

No. 122.

*Report of Lieut. Col. George R. Myers, Eighteenth New York Infantry,
of the battle of Crampton's Pass.*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Near Bakersville, Md., September 24, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to make the following report of the part my regiment took in the battle of Crampton's Pass, September 14, 1862:

About 3 o'clock p. m. on September 14 I received orders from General Newton to advance my regiment across the field and silence a battery

that was stationed upon the road, about half-way up the hill. I advanced my regiment, under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, to within about 50 yards of the line of Colonel Bartlett's brigade (who was engaging the enemy), when I was ordered to halt, and a few moments after I received an order to form on the right of Colonel Bartlett's line. I moved my regiment by the right flank into the position indicated, and engaged the enemy from behind a stone wall, but perceiving that our fire was ineffectual, the enemy being ensconced behind a high stone wall, I gave the order to cease firing. The whole line was then ordered forward, we going through the corn-field and orchard at a double-quick to the road at the foot of the hill, where I halted and reformed the regiment, which had become somewhat broken. I then gave the order to charge, the Thirty-second New York being on my right and the Sixteenth New York on my left. On rising the hill to the road which ran along its side, we received a terrific volley from the enemy. It was here that I met with my heaviest loss, the fire of the enemy being well directed and fatal. At this point the lamented Capt. William Horsfall was killed while gallantly leading his men to the charge, and Lieuts. Daniel Daley and William Ellis severely wounded while at the head of their companies, in the same charge. The men staggered for a moment, but, at the command, immediately rushed on the enemy, killing and wounding many of the same.

We then reached the crest of the hill, where I halted and reformed the regiment. I then sent my adjutant for orders, the enemy having fled in the utmost disorder. He received instructions from Major Rodgers, of General Slocum's staff, to rest the regiment where it was. After remaining there about an hour, I was ordered by Colonel Cake (the senior officer on the hill) down the hill to the gap, where the division was being formed. I marched my regiment to the point indicated, and camped on the left of the road.

It gives me great pleasure to state to you that my entire command behaved with the greatest coolness and bravery, the men receiving the enemy's fire and charging his position with the steadiness of veterans. I would particularize Capt. A. Barclay Mitchell and Lieut. D. Daley among the line officers as being brave and courageous to a fault, rallying and encouraging their men under the heaviest fire. The field and staff were of great assistance, and all behaved with great gallantry. Major Meginnis displayed at all times the greatest coolness and energy, and deserves the highest commendation.

My regiment lost in this action 1 captain and 10 men killed, 2 lieutenants and 43 men wounded, and 2 men missing, being a total loss of 55.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

GEORGE R. MYERS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Eighteenth New York Vols.

Lieut. WILLIAM RUSSELL, Jr.,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 123.

Report of Lieut. Col. Francis E. Pinto, Thirty-second New York Infantry, commanding Thirty-first New York Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HEADQUARTERS. THIRTY-FIRST REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLTS.,
Crampton's Pass, September 16, 1862.

SIR: I respectfully report the part taken by the Thirty-first Regiment New York State Volunteers, which I had the honor to command

in the storming of Crampton's Pass in the afternoon of September 14, 1862:

I was ordered to deploy my regiment in line of battle on the left of the Thirty-second Regiment New York State Volunteers, which placed me on the extreme left of the storming force, and advanced to the attack. The regiment advanced in good order, notwithstanding the numerous fences in their way, and the heavy fire of shell and musketry had no effect to disorder my line.

I took up position on the left of the Sixteenth Regiment New York Volunteers, skirmishers of the Twenty-seventh Regiment New York Volunteers falling back to the rear, who were receiving a heavy fire from the enemy, concealed behind a stone wall on the road and barn back of the road. I remained in this position until I saw the troops on my right moving forward, when I instantly gave the order to charge, which was promptly obeyed by jumping a fence and passing through a corn-field with an unearthly yell. The enemy before us broke, and fled right and left.

Seeing a movement on my left by troops of General Smith's division, I expected those who had fled in that direction would be turned back upon me. I changed my front to receive them. They were either captured by General Smith's troops or made their way over the mountains to the left of the gap.

While in this position, I received orders to push on through the gap to my right. I faced about, marched the regiment down to the road, my previous position having brought my right up to an inaccessible part of the mountain, and with all possible haste arrived at the summit, where, by your orders, I was placed in line to defend the fork of the roads, in which position I remained until after dark, when I was ordered down the road leading to the right, on picket duty for the night.

The officers and men without an exception behaved in a most gallant manner. I am well satisfied that the Thirty-first Regiment New York State Volunteers can be relied upon for any work that any troops can perform.

The casualties are 1 killed and 5 wounded. During the afternoon and the next morning we captured 130 prisoners, many of them officers.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS E. PINTO,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

WILLIAM RUSSELL, Jr.

Aide-de-Camp and Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brig.

No. 124.

Report of Col. Gustavus W. Town, Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

HDQRS. NINETY-FIFTH REGT. PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Camp near Bakersville, Md., September 25, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report the movements of my regiment during the engagement with the enemy at Crampton's Pass on Sunday, the 14th instant:

About daylight of that day we left our camp, and, marching through Jefferson, halted in sight of the enemy near Burkittsville. During the earlier part of the engagement, in compliance with orders, we took

position in the second line, in rear of the Thirty-first Regiment New York Volunteers, and moved forward in column of divisions. Becoming a mark alike for the artillery and skirmishers of the foe, we deployed, and continued advancing in line of battle, and took up position a short distance in rear of the Thirty-first Regiment New York Volunteers, thus being enabled to act toward the left or front.

At this time the left of our position was held solely by a line of skirmishers, most of whom were forced to retire before an attack of the enemy in force along the road leading to Burkittsville, many passing through our line and reforming in the rear. I was about changing front to resist this assault on the left, when a regiment, understood to be attached to Major-General Smith's division, advanced out the road from Burkittsville, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, rendering the contemplated movement unnecessary. Ascertaining from their movements that the force on the right of us had orders to charge, we moved forward and took position on the road at the base of the mountain from which the enemy had just retreated. We then received orders from Brigadier-General Newton in person to march by flank toward the right, and, under his direction, charged up the mountain, reaching the road near its crest. At this time we were on a line with the most advanced of our troops, and received orders to continue the charge out the main road across the mountain.

Advancing in line of battle, the wings extending to the right and left of the road, we were soon joined on the left by a portion of the First New Jersey Brigade, under command of Colonel Torbert. The enemy being here in line to oppose our farther progress, we attacked them immediately, driving them from their position and sending a number of prisoners to the rear. Continuing the pursuit close upon them, they made another stand, but were again driven from it. Halting for a few moments to reform line of battle, in connection with the New Jersey troops upon our left, we again advanced to attack the enemy, who were hoping to reform to protect their wagon train, then in sight of us. To assist this endeavor, they had placed a battery in position on the road, which opened upon our line with canister immediately upon our advancing. The line recoiled but for a moment, and then, with shouts, charged upon it, firing as it advanced, the shots being directed by the flash of the artillery, as it was now too dark to distinguish the gunners at that distance. Getting close upon them, the artillerymen, fearing the loss of their entire battery, fled, leaving one of their pieces on the road, merely disabling it temporarily by throwing off one wheel from the limber, which was left with the horses near at hand. We learned that it had belonged to the Troup Artillery of Georgia, the piece being a 12-pounder howitzer, and marked "Jennie" on the axle each side of the gun. The infantry which supported the battery fled with it.

Here orders were brought to us by Colonel Bartlett in person to halt, it being then dark, and retire to the woods at the foot of the mountain, and take up position until further orders. At the same time Colonel Torbert retired up the road with his command. Although we had thus been subjected to a severe fire from artillery, at close range, with canister, as well as to that of the infantry, our loss was comparatively slight, accounted for by the extraordinary want of skill in the enemy in endeavoring to fire up hill, their fire passing continually over our heads, tearing and screeching through the trees, and showering the limbs upon us.

Upon taking up our new position, my regiment being some distance in advance, a picket was thrown out on the road, which remained there

until ordered by General Newton to rejoin their regiment, General Brooks having in the mean time moved his brigade to the front, forming a connection with our left. Shortly afterward I received orders to remain in the position during the night. Such was the suddenness of their flight that the enemy had thrown away knapsacks, haversacks, and canteens, and everything which could impede it, and scattered along the road the ammunition of their artillery. From prisoners taken next morning we learned that they burned the wagon train which we had endeavored to seize, not knowing that we had ceased pursuit.

Casualties: 1 killed, 13 wounded, 1 missing; total, 15.

Very respectfully,

GUSTAVUS W. TOWN,
Colonel Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Lieut. WILLIAM RUSSELL, Jr.,
Aide-de-Camp and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 125.

Reports of Maj. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Sharpsburg, September 23, 1862.

COLONEL: I have to make, for the information of the general commanding the corps, the following report of the operations of my division at Crampton's Pass, Sunday, September 14, 1862:

The troops arrived near Burkittsville about 1 o'clock p. m., and were massed in a wood at long artillery range, and remained there until just after General Slocum's division became engaged in front of the pass. I was then ordered to throw a brigade to the left of the pass, to create a diversion, and, if possible, to turn the right flank of the enemy. The Second Brigade, under General W. T. H. Brooks, was detailed for this purpose, and marched by the flank to Burkittsville under a heavy artillery fire. At that point skirmishers were thrown out and the line of battle formed, and General Brooks advanced, under a sharp fire of skirmishers, across the opening and into the woods. The brigade crossed the mountain at one of its steepest points, and passed down the western face near to the valley, at which point they found a gun and stand of colors left by the retreating enemy. They also took many prisoners, and seem to have added materially to the day's result by carrying out General Franklin's idea of threatening the enemy's right flank.

As soon as General Brooks' brigade became engaged, the Third Brigade, under Colonel Irwin, was ordered to support it. I also ordered forward a battery, by direction of General Franklin, and Captain Ayres, my efficient chief of artillery, arrived on the ground in time to post it before dark for defensive purposes.

I inclose reports with reference to the operations of the troops that maneuvered in presence of the enemy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,
Major-General, Commanding Division.

Lieut. Col. OLIVER D. GREENE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Sixth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, SIXTH CORPS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 30, 1862.

COLONEL: I have to report, for the information of the general commanding the corps, that my division left camp near Crampton's Pass at 6 o'clock a. m. September 17, and, making a march of 10 miles, arrived on the field of battle near the Antietam Creek about 10 o'clock a. m., and I was at first ordered to mass the troops on the road to Sharpsburg, ready to support the attack on the right or left, as might be required. In a short time I was ordered to form my division to command the ford across the creek, and shortly after was ordered to occupy a point across the creek, and in rear of where it was then supposed our troops were engaged with the enemy.

On arriving at the designated point, I was ordered by General Sumner to form the division in rear of some batteries on our extreme right. Before the division was formed, I learned from Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of General Sumner's staff, that a battery on our right center was unsupported, and I ordered two regiments from the First Brigade (General Hancock's) to its support. Shortly after, on visiting the ground, I ordered the remaining regiments and two batteries forward to the threatened point; and, finding that the enemy were advancing, I ordered forward the Third Brigade (Colonel Irwin's), who, passing through the regular battery, then commanded by Lieutenant Thomas (Fourth Artillery), charged upon the enemy, and drove them gallantly until abreast the little church at the point of woods, the possession of which had been so fiercely contested.

At this point a severe flank fire from the woods was received by the Thirty-third and Seventy-seventh New York Regiments, which threw both regiments slightly into confusion. They were immediately rallied by their officers and faced by the rear rank, and ordered to lie down behind the crest of a slope facing toward the woods. The rest of the brigade was ordered to form behind a crest nearly at right angles to the other, facing to their proper front. The brigade remained in this position, subjected to a heavy artillery fire and practice from sharpshooters, for twenty-four hours, until relieved by a brigade from General Couch's division.

I refer to the report of Colonel Irwin to show with what determination this exposed position was held. I also refer particularly to the report of Major Hyde, Seventh Maine Volunteers, with reference to the gallant conduct of that regiment, acting under the orders of Colonel Irwin. These orders were not made known to me till after the regiment had moved.

I beg leave here to mention the following-named officers belonging to this brigade, whose conduct was particularly gallant under my own observation:

Col. W. H. Irwin, commanding Third Brigade; Col. E. von Vegesack, commanding Twentieth New York Volunteers; Lieut. Col. J. W. Corning, commanding Thirty-third New York Volunteers; Capt. E. Martindale, commissary of subsistence, Third Brigade; Lieut. John J. Carter, Thirty-third New York Volunteers.

As soon as the Third Brigade was established in its position, I sent back for the Second Brigade (General Brooks') to act as a support, but it had, without my knowledge or consent, been ordered away. It is not the first or second time during a battle that my command has been dispersed by orders from an officer superior in rank to the general commanding this corps, and I must assert that I have never known any

good to arise from such a method of fighting a battle, and think the contrary rule should be adopted of keeping commands intact.

I inclose the reports of Generals Brooks and Hancock and Colonel Irwin and Captain Ayres. General Brooks himself was slightly wounded, and General Hancock during the day was assigned to a higher command.

The artillery, under Captain Ayres' judicious management, assisted very materially in silencing the fire of the enemy, which was so destructive to our infantry, and I must call to the attention of General Franklin the gallant and skillful conduct of Lieutenant Martin, commanding Ayres' battery, who on this, as on several previous occasions, has shown himself worthy of promotion.

I must also call to mind the fact that the troops of my division were mostly for forty hours constrained to lie down in line of battle, ready at any moment to repel an attack, and subjected most of that time to a fire of artillery and to the fire of the sharpshooters of the enemy.

I beg leave to mention the following officers on my staff, who served faithfully and gallantly through the battle: Maj. Charles Mundee, assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. M. Berry, Samuel Carey, James A. Serymser, J. F. S. Gray, aides-de-camp, and P. C. F. West, acting topographical engineer. Capt. C. R. Crane, Fifth Vermont, ordnance officer of my division, had his ammunition train not only close behind the troops and in good order, but gave material aid in supplying General Sumner's corps and General Slocum's division with ammunition when the supplies of their respective batteries were exhausted. My orderly, Private William Heckler, Company G, Rush's Lancers, behaved gallantly.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,

Major-General, Commanding Division.

Lieut. Col. OLIVER D. GREENE,

Asst. Adjt. Gen. and Chief of Staff, Sixth Army Corps.

No. 126.

Reports of Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS LIGHT ARTILLERY, SMITH'S DIVISION,
September 30, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that the artillery of the division was employed on the 14th instant at Crampton's Pass, as follows:

The enemy having placed two guns in the road about half-way down the mountain side, my battery was posted in the plain below, on the left of the road, and opened upon them. Slocum's division advancing on the right of the road, the firing was continued till the attack progressing, the enemy withdrew his pieces. Later in the afternoon, Brooks' brigade advancing on the left of the road, I proceeded with Cowan's battery along the road and up the mountain side. I notified General Brooks of my presence there with a battery, and so continued up the mountain a little in rear of the general line.

Passing the crest and down into the valley, I selected a position in conjunction with General Brooks, and posted the battery in the fork of two roads leading from the valley up the pass, Brooks' brigade on its

left and troops of Slocum's division on its right. The battery was thus posted for the night. Being the only one over the mountain, its presence and position were valuable. After passing the crest of the mountain, the enemy were driven down the side rapidly, leaving a brass 12-pounder howitzer, horses, and harness in their flight. This was taken and brought forward by my command (turned in to the chief of artillery of this army about the 28th instant).

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. AYRES,

Captain Fifth Artillery, Commanding.

Maj. CHARLES MUNDEE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

HEADQUARTERS LIGHT ARTILLERY, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Williamsport, Md., September 23, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to transmit the reports of the operations of Snow's and Cowan's batteries during the battle of the 17th instant. Stuart's battery was detached for the time, serving with Couch's division. My own battery was brought upon the line under a heavy fire at about 11.30 o'clock a. m. The position was favorable and important. I ordered fire opened by it at once upon the enemy's batteries. From this time it was mostly under the immediate command of First Lieut. L. Martin, my duties calling me to other points on the field. The fire from the battery was continued, with intervals, throughout the day. The enemy's batteries during those intervals are supposed to have been replaced, owing to damage received. Several batteries played upon them from our line at once, and a subsequent examination of the ground showed that they had suffered severely. The position of my battery being very important, it was retained in it until the enemy were found to have retreated.

The officers and men performed their duties with entire composure.

First Lieutenant Harn, of Frank's battery, *en route* to join it, served with mine for several days and during the battle, doing his duty with zeal and credit.

Second Lieut. James A. Sayles, Fifth Vermont Volunteers, adjutant of my command, performed his duties under fire with gallantry and judgment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. AYRES,

Captain Fifth Artillery, Commanding.

Maj. CHARLES MUNDEE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

No. 127.

Report of Lieut. Theodore J. Vanneman, Battery B, Maryland Light Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP, September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: On the 17th instant, as per orders received from General Franklin, we were placed to the right and in front of headquarters, in a corn-field, and ordered to shell the woods in our front, which we did. A battery of the enemy opened upon our lines from near the school-

house in the corner of the woods, when we opened fire, and, with the assistance of others, silenced it. We fired at from $2\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ to 3° elevation, using from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 second fuses, and expended during the engagement about 300 rounds of ammunition. I am happy to report the loss of only one horse, which was killed by a 6-pound shot. The officers and men during the action behaved with commendable bravery.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE J. VANNEMAN,

First Lieutenant, Comdg. Battery B, Maryland Artillery.

Captain AYRES,

Commanding Artillery, General Smith's Division.

No. 128.

Report of Capt. Andrew Cowan, commanding First New York Battery, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR WILLIAMSPORT, MD.,

September 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 17th instant I took a position with Hancock's brigade on the field near Sharpsburg, Md. A battery of the enemy opened on me as soon as I came into battery. I returned the fire, and after two hours' firing compelled it to leave the field. During the time that I had been thus engaged, a battery of the enemy farther to the left had been quite troublesome, having brought a partial cross-fire upon me. I directed my fire upon it and silenced it. At about 4 p. m. the enemy brought up two pieces on my right in a corn-field, and opened on Sumner's batteries. I changed front to fire to the right and prevent the possibility of a cross-fire from them. For some reason Sumner's fire did not appear to reach them. I then opened. The enemy fired less than six rounds apiece, limbered up, and retired. Our fire was quite accurate. Nothing further occurred that day, except that I threw an occasional shell into the woods when I saw any considerable body of the enemy moving there.

On the 18th a flag of truce prevented further action. At 10 o'clock p. m. we heard the enemy removing his artillery. The movement lasted till 1 a. m.

My loss was 1 private wounded, Private John Lanning; 1 horse killed, and 2 wounded.

I am, sir, very respectfully, yours,

ANDREW COWAN,

Captain First New York Battery.

Capt. R. B. AYRES,

Commanding Artillery, Smith's Division.

No. 129.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION.

Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that during the operations before Crampton's Pass on the 13th instant my brigade was held in reserve and was not engaged with the enemy.

On the morning of the 14th we crossed the mountain and reached a point about 1 mile from Brownsville. Here the Sixth Regiment Maine Volunteers, under command of Col. Hiram Burnham, together with the Fourth Regiment Vermont Volunteers, of General Brooks' brigade, was ordered to reascend the mountain and to take possession of the pass about 1 mile below that above referred to, which was known to be in possession of the enemy. This was accomplished, the command only receiving the fire of the pickets of the enemy. Two pieces of artillery were also added to the command.

Later in the day, the enemy having withdrawn their forces in front of us, the force in question was ordered to pursue, which was accomplished, until a halt was ordered, the artillery firing into the enemy's retreating cavalry. The remainder of the brigade, together with a battery of artillery and the Third Brigade, all under command of Major-General Smith, pursued the enemy on the main road toward Harper's Ferry, firing a few shots from the artillery into the retreating cavalry. The pursuit was then abandoned, the enemy having entirely withdrawn, and having so much the advance toward Harper's Ferry that further pursuit seemed unnecessary in connection with subsequent operations to be carried out by the command.

A list of casualties has been transmitted.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. CHARLES MUNDEE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

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HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., SECOND DIV., SIXTH CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 21, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that on the 17th instant my brigade, leading Smith's division, arrived on the battle-ground in front of Keedysville about 9 o'clock a. m., and subsequently led the advance of Franklin's corps to support the right wing under command of Major-General Sumner, then fiercely engaged and hard pressed by the enemy. Arriving on the ground, the regiments of my brigade were placed in position supporting three batteries—Cowan's, of Smith's division, on the right (3-inch guns); Frank's, of French's division, in the center (12-pounder brass guns), and Cothran's battery, of Banks' corps (rifled guns), on the left, the regiments being placed in the following order: The Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Lieut. Col. William Brisbane, on the right of Cowan's battery; the Forty-third New York Volunteers, under command of Maj. John Wilson, and a detachment of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Col. Henry M. Bossert, between Cowan's and Frank's batteries; the Sixth Maine Volunteers, under Col. Hiram Burnham, and the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, under Col. Amasa Cobb, between Frank's and Cothran's batteries, the whole line being parallel to the woods in front, then occupied in force by the enemy, and at canister distance therefrom.

Skirmishers were immediately thrown forward, who met those of the enemy advancing through the corn-field separating us. The houses and inclosures in front of our position were occupied by detached com-

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 183.

panies from my command. Very soon the enemy placed two batteries in front of the woods, their infantry in the edge of it in support, and opened a heavy fire with shell, round shot, shrapnel, and grape. I applied to General Sumner for another regiment to place in the woods on my extreme right. The Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers, Col. W. R. Lee commanding, was sent to me, and posted by Brigadier-General Howard. After a severe cannonading, our skirmishers doing good execution at the same time, the enemy's batteries were silenced by our artillery, and withdrawn from the field with the loss of several limbers and many men. At the same time a portion of the Third Brigade of Smith's division assaulted the enemy's advancing column on our extreme left. In this position the field was maintained throughout.

The conduct of the batteries and the troops under my command was excellent without exception. Our loss in the infantry was slight, as the men were lying down during the cannonading. The batteries in question met some losses in men and horses, but the reports have not been made to me. A list of the casualties in the brigade has been transmitted. Early in the afternoon of the 17th I was directed by Major-General McClellan in person, who was on the field, to take command of Richardson's division, and to command the center of our forces, General Richardson having been so seriously wounded as to require his removal.

Herewith please find a copy of the order* relieving me from the command of my brigade, which was transferred to Col. A. Cobb, Fifth Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers, the senior colonel, who conducted the subsequent operations of the brigade.

My staff officers, Capt. John Hancock, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. William G. Mitchell, aide-de-camp; First Lieut. I. B. Parker, aide-de-camp, behaved with gallantry, and rendered very efficient service in carrying orders under the fire of the enemy. The commanders of regiments and batteries above mentioned deserve especial mention for their good conduct.

Maj. F. N. Clarke, chief of artillery of Sumner's corps, was present, and had general direction of the artillery in these operations.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILL'D S. HANCOCK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. CHARLES MUNDEE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Smith's Division.

No. 130.

Reports of Brig. Gen. W. T. H. Brooks, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SMITH'S DIVISION,
Hagerstown, September —, 1862.

SIR: I have to report the operations of this brigade in the battle of Crampton's Pass, September 14:

The brigade was ordered to pass through the town of Burkittsville, with the view of supporting Slocum's main attack on the right, by fol-

* Not found.

lowing the main road that crossed the mountain. After passing through the town, under a heavy fire of artillery from the crest of the mountain on the left, we found the enemy in position behind a stone wall at right angles with the road. From this position they kept up a harassing fire, not only on this brigade, but upon Slocum's left. Skirmishers were thrown out to dislodge them, with little effect. As soon as the nature of the ground and the exact position of the wall could be determined, the Fourth Vermont, Lieutenant-Colonel Stoughton, was deployed with the Second Vermont, under Major Walbridge, in support in second line, and the other three regiments in support on the edge of the town. In this position an advance was made against the wall, which was carried immediately, and some 15 or 20 prisoners captured. The advance was continued by the Fourth and Second without further opposition, until the top of the mountain was reached, when the Fourth was ordered to take the crest to our left, toward the battery that fired upon us as we passed through the town. The Second continued on down the other slope of the mountain and reached the base as the troops of Slocum's division had scattered the enemy. The Fourth proceeded on the crest of the mountain about a mile, and captured another party of prisoners, all belonging to the Sixteenth Virginia. In the last party was the major of the regiment, who commanded, and the battle-flag of this regiment was also captured. The other regiments followed the above movements by the main road. The brigade bivouacked at the point where Slocum's division ceased the pursuit, and, on throwing out pickets, a 12-pounder howitzer, with horses, &c., complete, and but slightly disabled, was found abandoned by the enemy, which was turned over to Captain Cowan.

The conduct of the troops on this occasion is worthy of commendation. Exposed to a plunging fire of artillery while passing over a space of a mile and more, and afterward to that of the enemy's sharpshooters, not the least hesitancy was observed. It gives me pleasure to call especial notice to the good conduct of Lient. Col. C. B. Stoughton, commanding Fourth Vermont, and Major Walbridge, commanding Second Vermont; also to Lieutenants Parsons and Wheeler, of my personal staff, who were active in the discharge of their respective duties.

Very respectfully,

W. T. H. BROOKS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Division Headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,
September 28, 1862.

SIR: On arriving on the battle-field of Antietam, about 10 a. m. on the 17th instant, this brigade was sent to the support of French's division, then reported heavily pressed. On gaining French's right, I found that the enemy had been checked and repelled. The brigade then took up a position on French's right, which brought us on the left of the Third Brigade of this division. This position was maintained the rest of the day and the next, the men lying literally on their arms near forty-eight hours. While in this constrained situation they were subjected to quite a galling fire of both artillery and sharpshooters, causing

numerous casualties, a list of which and of the battle of Crampton's Pass has been already furnished.

The conduct of the troops on this occasion, as at Crampton's Pass, is worthy of commendation.

Very respectfully,

W. T. H. BROOKS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Smith's Division.

No. 131.

Report of Col. William H. Irwin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., SECOND DIV., SIXTH CORPS,
Camp near Williamsport, Md., September 22, 1862.

MAJOR: In obedience to a division order, I have the honor to report that on the 14th instant this brigade was ordered to support Brigadier-General Brooks, who was engaged with the enemy at Crampton's Pass. It moved rapidly and steadily through Burkittsville. The shells thrown at its flank from the battery south of the pass did no injury. The crest of the mountain was reached after dark, and finding that the enemy had broken and that General Brooks had marched in pursuit into the valley, I reported to him just beyond the pass, and by his order established the Seventh Maine, Twentieth, Thirty-third, and Seventy-seventh New York Volunteers close in rear of Captain Ayres' battery, and sent forward the Forty-ninth New York Volunteers as skirmishers by the road leading to the Catoctin Mountain. Several prisoners were taken during the night.

We were encamped at the pass until Wednesday, the 17th, when we moved with the division toward Sharpsburg, near which very heavy and continuous firing was heard, and about 10 o'clock a. m. we formed on the field of battle near Antietam Creek, on the left of the First Brigade, and were instantly ordered into action by Major-General Smith, two of the regiments, the Thirty-third and Seventy-seventh New York, as skirmishers on the right, the Seventh Maine, Forty-ninth and Twentieth New York in line. The brigade, animated by the words and example of General Smith and by its own officers, dashed at the enemy in high spirits and good order, and was soon hotly engaged with them, but they could not endure our charge, and broke in confusion. A severe and unexpected volley from the woods on our right struck fall on the Seventy-seventh and Thirty-third New York, which staggered them for a moment, but they closed up and faced by the rear rank, and poured in a close and scorching fire, driving back and scattering the enemy at this point. As soon as my line was formed, facing the belt of the woods and the open ground to its right, the men were ordered down. Pickets were posted on the crest of a small hill along our front, and all kept in readiness to hold firmly to the position or to attack. A battery of the enemy advanced and played with severity along my flank and through the line of the Twentieth New York, which, from the nature of the ground, was compelled to refuse its left, and thus received the fire along its entire front. Sharpshooters from the woods to the right and to the

extreme left also opened upon us. Shell, grape, and canister swept from left to right. The practice of the enemy was rapid and very accurate, and in a short time our loss was very heavy, and the dead and wounded encumbered our ranks. They were carried to the rear to a temporary hospital, where Asst. Surg. Richard Curran, Thirty-third New York Volunteers, was assiduous in his attention to the wounded.

About 4.30 o'clock Captain Upton, chief of artillery of Slocum's division, rode to my line, and after we had examined the ground in front of the left attentively, I decided to accept the battery which he earnestly advised me to have planted there. Not a minute could be lost; the enemy were massing in front with the evident design of throwing a powerful column against my left, and they could not be seen, except from that part of the line. I instantly sent word to Major-General Smith, who approved the movement, and I requested Captain Upton to order up the battery, which came into action very promptly, and opened with three rifled guns, which, after playing on the masses of the enemy with great effect for half an hour, were withdrawn, and their places supplied by a battery of Napoleon guns, the fire of which was terribly destructive. These guns were of inestimable value to us, and the coolness and precision with which they were served deserve the highest commendation. It gives me very great pleasure to acknowledge how much I was indebted to Captain Upton, and to the officers and men under his command.

When the battery was in full play, a skirt of wood on my left and front was occupied by sharpshooters, whom, for the protection of the battery, it was necessary to dislodge. The Seventh Maine, under its gallant major (Thomas W. Hyde), was sent forward for this purpose, which they executed in admirable style. The regiment advanced in front of the skirmishers of the brigade on the left. The major threw out skirmishers, who soon drove in those of the rebels from the edge of the corn-field, and the hollow lying this side the timber. The battalion was ordered forward, and as the enemy opened fire on it from the front and left flank, a charge was ordered, and, with fixed bayonets, the men rushed forward in line with a cheer, advancing nearly a quarter of a mile at the double-quick. The body of the enemy in the orchard to the left being flanked, broke and ran. Those directly in front, behind hay-stacks and outbuildings, also broke, and their colors having fallen, this gallant regiment pushed on up the hill to secure them, when a rebel regiment suddenly rose from behind a stone wall on its right, poured in a volley, and at the same time they double-quickened around to the left, to cut off the retreat. Those in front, seeing the small numbers of the enemy, had rallied, and the enemy advanced in force. Four of their rebel flags were seen, and a battery opened upon the regiment with grape, from which, however, they were partly shielded by the trees in the orchard.

Finding the regiment so severely engaged, I was very anxious to support them, but my orders were positive not to advance my line. I rode rapidly forward, and requested the officer commanding the right regiment of the Second Brigade to support Major Hyde, which he declined to do without orders from General Brooks. I then returned to my own line to ask for a support from the rear, but in a few minutes I had the extreme pleasure of seeing the shattered but brave remnant of the Seventh Maine in good order return to my lines.

No words of mine can do justice to the firmness, intelligence, and heroic courage with which this regiment performed its dangerous task. Their killed and wounded and their colors riddled by balls are the

proud, yet melancholy, witnesses of their valor. Alone and surrounded by the enemy, they fought until nearly all their cartridges were expended. They then delivered one fierce parting volley, closed their ranks around their colors, and fell slowly back to the line of battle.

I cannot forbear calling the attention of the major-general commanding the division to the gallant soldier and gentleman, Maj. Thomas W. Hyde, who commanded the Seventh Maine. He led his regiment into action with spirit and courage, handled it under severe fire with judgment, and retired in compact order and with a steady front. Conduct like this requires soldierly qualities of the highest order.

The Twentieth New York Volunteers by its position was exposed to the heaviest fire in line, which it bore with unyielding courage and returned at every opportunity. The firmness of this regiment deserves very great praise. Colonel Von Vegesack was under fire with his men constantly, and his calm courage gave an admirable example to them. Each of their stand of colors is rent by the balls and shells of the enemy, and their killed and wounded is 145. This regiment was under my own eye in going into action and frequently during the battle, and I take pleasure in strongly testifying to its bravery and good conduct.

The Forty-ninth New York, led by its brave lieutenant-colonel, W. C. Alberger, charged with the brigade in the morning of the 17th, driving the enemy before it, and then took its place in line of battle, which it firmly held until it was relieved on the 18th. I greatly regret that Colonel Alberger was severely wounded in the face by a splinter of shell. This officer commanded his regiment with spirit and courage, of which no better evidence can be given than his honorable wound.

The Seventy-seventh New York and Thirty-third New York, under Capt. N. S. Babcock and Lieut. Col. Joseph W. Corning, on my right, repulsed the enemy handsomely, and then took and held firmly their respective places in line of battle until relieved.

The splendid service of the battery of Lieutenant Martin, Fifth Artillery (part of the command of the often-distinguished soldier, Capt. R. B. Ayres), which was posted near my right, attracted the admiration of all who saw it in action. For several hours it engaged the enemy at short range and with deadly effect. It is but a matter of course that Captain Ayres and his command should receive the most marked and complimentary notice when under fire, but in this action I felt a particular interest in Lieutenant Martin's battery, for to its fire the safety of my brigade may be largely imputed. Had he not checked the heavy fire from the batteries of the enemy, they would have destroyed the greater part of my command.

This brigade charged the enemy at 10 a. m. on the 17th, drove them from their ground, which before had been severely contested, occupied and held it for twenty-six hours until relieved at noon the next day by General Couch's division. It was under fire constantly during this time in a most exposed position, lost 311 in killed and wounded, yet neither officers nor men fell back or gave the slightest evidence of any desire to do so. My line was immovable, only anxious to be launched against the enemy. I forbear comment on such conduct. It will commend itself to the heart and mind of every true soldier.

The commandants of regiments deserve the warmest commendation. They bore all the peril with their men. They constantly encouraged them, and gave them the noblest example of steady bravery. The line officers emulated their superiors, and the list of casualties among them tells how faithfully they did their duty.

Asst. Surg. Richard Curran, Thirty-third New York Volunteers, was

in charge of our temporary hospital, which unavoidably was under fire; but he attended faithfully to his severe duties, and I beg to mention this officer with particular commendation. His example is but too rare, most unfortunately.

I beg to call the particular attention of Major-General Smith to the distinguished gallantry of my aide, Capt. E. Martindale, and my assistant adjutant-general, Lieut. William H. Long. Both of them were constantly under the enemy's fire, and gave me the greatest assistance during the battle, and set an excellent example of courage and endurance to the troops. These gentlemen were everywhere that they could be of service, and I beg to commend their intelligence, activity, and courage in the highest terms.

Herewith I present a list of the commissioned officers who were present and engaged in the battle of the 17th instant.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

W. H. IRWIN,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade, Smith's Division.

Maj. CHARLES MUNDEE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 132.

Report of Maj. Thomas W. Hyde, Seventh Maine Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. SEVENTH MAINE VOLS., SECOND DIVISION,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 19, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 17th instant, about 5 o'clock p. m., I was ordered by Colonel Irwin, commanding the Third Brigade of this division, to send a company to dislodge some of the enemy, who were annoying one of our batteries. Hardly was the company detached from the regiment when Colonel Irwin rode along and exclaimed in near these words: "That is not enough, sir; go yourself; take your regiment and drive them from those trees and buildings." I asked him to repeat his order and point out the ground again. He did so, quite emphatically, in near the same words, and added with an oath, "Those are your orders, sir." He repeated the order several times.

I took the regiment in front of the skirmishers of the brigade next on our left, formed them behind a fence, sent out my skirmishers, who drove the rebel skirmishers in fine style from the edge of the corn-field and the hollow lying on this side of the timber I was ordered to clear. I ordered the battalion forward, and as they opened fire on us from front and left flank I ordered a charge. With fixed bayonets the men dashed forward in line with a cheer, advancing nearly a quarter of a mile at the double-quick. The body of the enemy in the orchard to our left being flanked, broke and ran. Those directly in front, behind haystacks and outbuildings, also broke, and their colors having fallen, we dashed on up the hill to secure them, when a rebel regiment rose suddenly from behind a stone wall on our right, poured in a volley, and at the same time I saw them double-quickening around to the left to cut off our retreat. Those in front, seeing our small numbers, had rallied. Looking back and seeing no support, to escape being surrounded I

marched the regiment by the left flank, formed them on a crest in the orchard, poured a volley into those who were endeavoring to cut off our retreat, and faced those in front. Here we received a severe fire from three directions, and the enemy advanced in force. I saw four battle-flags. A battery opened on us with grape. Here we met a heavy loss, but were shielded some by the trees of the orchard. Having disposed of most of our cartridges, we retreated through the orchard, gave them another volley as they attempted to follow, which drove them back, and, closing up on the colors, I marched the regiment back in good order to their old position on the left of the Third Brigade.

The affair lasted perhaps thirty minutes. The color-sergeant was killed, and all the guard shot but one, who brought off our flag riddled with balls. Fifteen officers and 166 men went into the fight, and our loss was as follows: Enlisted men known to be killed, 12; wounded and brought off, 60; fate still unknown, 16. Lieutenants Brown and Goodwin and Sergeant-Major Parsons, killed; Captains Jones, Cochrane, and Cook and Adjutant Haskell, wounded; Lieutenant Butler, missing; Lieutenant Warren, wounded and missing; Lieutenants Shorey, Benson, and Emery, wounded.

But one officer, Lieutenant Nickerson, escaped untouched in clothes or person, and but very few men. Captain Channing and Lieutenant Webber had each three bullets through their clothes. The adjutant and myself both had our horses shot under us.

The troops of the enemy engaged were the Seventh Georgia, First Texas, Second Mississippi Battalion, and a fragment of a Louisiana regiment. Their loss I find, on visiting the field, to be much heavier than ours.

I drove the enemy from the trees and buildings Colonel Irwin ordered me to clear, but for want of support was unable either to push on after his line was pierced or to hold the position that was gained.

I cannot make exception for special mention. Where all behaved so nobly, and obeyed orders so readily, distinction would be invidious.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS W. HYDE,

Major, Commanding Seventh Maine Volunteers.

Maj. CHARLES MUNDEE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 133.

Report of Col. Ernest von Vegesack, Twentieth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. TWENTIETH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
Camp in the Field, near Sharpsburg, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to verbal orders from Colonel Irwin, commanding Third Brigade, the regiment formed in line of battle in the woods on this side of Antietam Creek at about 11 o'clock a. m. on the 17th of September, 1862. Advancing through the woods the regiment came into an open field, where they attacked the

enemy and drove him across the field and the adjoining heights. The regiment occupied these heights until relieved the next morning.

The casualties in the fight were 38 killed, 96 wounded, and 11 missing; total, 145.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ERNEST VON VEGESACK,

Colonel, Comdg. Twentieth Regiment New York Volunteers.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. LONG,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

No. 134.

Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph W. Corning, Thirty-third New York Infantry, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

CAMP IN THE FIELD, September 20, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to report that the Thirty-third Regiment New York Volunteers, near sunset on the 14th instant, marched from their position east of Burkittsville, with the other troops of the Third Brigade, for Crampton's Pass. During a portion of the march we were briskly shelled from the rebel battery on the mountain. The regiment continued the march steadily and in admirable order. We ascended the mountain and marched to the left to support the Second Brigade, but were soon ordered to return to the road, and crossed over to the west side of the mountain, and bivouacked at the base for the night. On the 15th took 7 prisoners. Remained at Pleasant Valley until the morning of the 17th. Marched at 6 o'clock a. m. Upon arriving in front of the battle-field of Antietam Creek, I was ordered to form in rear of and support the left of the brigade line, but just as they were engaging the enemy I received orders from the commanding division general to support the right, and was ordered to march near the woods in front. When near the woods the enemy suddenly and unexpectedly opened on the regiment a heavy fire from their infantry, who were in the woods, being in columns at the time, marching by the right flank. This sudden and unexpected attack caused a momentary unsteadiness in the ranks, which was quickly rectified. The battalion faced by the rear rank and returned the fire, when, by order of the commanding general, the regiment retired a short distance, under cover of a ridge, and formed the right of the line of the brigade, where they remained during the day, under very severe cannonading from the enemy. We were relieved from this front on the 19th, about 10 o'clock.

The officers and men under my command behaved as well as could be expected of any troops under such trying circumstances, and with great steadiness kept their position during the day.

The casualties of the 17th were 6 killed and 41 wounded. Among the killed I have to regret the loss of Sergt. Maj. George W. Bassett, a very efficient and gallant officer.

Respectfully submitted.

JOS. W. CORNING,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding the Regiment.

Lieut. WILLIAM H. LONG,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 135.

Report of Maj. George W. Johnson, Forty-ninth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FORTY-NINTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
September 20, 1862.

In compliance with orders, I beg to report as follows:

The Forty-ninth Regiment left, with the division, the camp near Christian [Crampton's] Pass, about 7 o'clock, and arrived on the battle-field near Sharpsburg at about 11 o'clock on the 17th. After changing position several times, the regiment, with other regiments in brigade, was ordered to move into a field held by the enemy, which it did, driving the enemy over the crest of a hill, and into a piece of woods just under the crest. The regiment took up position, and held it for twenty-four hours, being relieved the next day at noon.

The casualties mostly resulted from the shells thrown from the enemy's batteries. They are as follows: Killed, 2; wounded, 21; total 23.

Respectfully submitting the above,

GEO. W. JOHNSON,
Major, Commanding Regiment.

Lient. WILLIAM H. LONG,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 136.

Report of Capt. Nathan S. Babcock, Seventy-seventh New York Infantry, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam.

HDQRS. SEVENTY-SEVENTH REGT. N. Y. STATE VOLS.,
In the Field, September 20, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to report to you some of the casualties and incidents connected with my command during the recent sanguinary battles of Crampton's Pass and Antietam Creek.

In the battle of Sunday, the 14th, at Crampton's Pass, we suffered no injury, although leading your brigade through Burkittsville and up the pass under the tremendous shelling of the enemy's guns. I entered the battle of Antietam Creek on the 17th instant with not more than 175 men all told, most of the regiment having been on picket for two days, a part of which joined us just as the brigade was ordered to charge upon the rebels and drive them from the field. In this charge we suffered severely considering the number engaged. I was first ordered to support the Thirty-third New York, but subsequently, and while advancing in the charge, I was ordered to the front for the purpose of cutting off the flying enemy, already routed by the left of your columns; and it was while endeavoring to execute this order that our position became critical, and in which most of the casualties occurred. A large force of the enemy had advanced on our right under the cover of the woods, and were about to cut us off from the rest of your command, as your gallant aide, Lieutenant Long, discovered the danger and ordered us to fall back to the cover of a hill about 50 yards.

We received a severe and galling fire from the enemy's infantry and artillery, but my men only wavered a moment, and then retired and re-

formed in good order, after delivering two well-directed volleys into the enemy. I think there was nearly if not quite a brigade of the enemy so near the right of my regiment that you could see the white of their eyes at the time of retiring, and that they disappeared again so soon under the cover of the timber convinces me that the well-directed volleys of the Seventy-seventh and the Thirty-first New York, which was on my right, dealt destruction to their souls.

After getting our new position, the enemy's shot and shell fell thick around us, and quite a number of my men were wounded, but my officers and men behaved nobly through the entire day, even amidst the most galling fire and shelling of the enemy. To particularize the bravery and manly conduct of every one of my officers would do injustice to those not mentioned, and so I leave it to you to judge, after giving you the casualties of my command, what portion of the honors of that victorious battle we are entitled to. Killed, 6; wounded, 26; total, 32.

Your obedient servant,

N. S. BABCOCK,

Captain, Commanding Seventy-seventh New York.

Colonel IRWIN,

Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 137.

Reports of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, commanding right wing, Army of the Potomac, of operations September 7-19.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Near Antietam Bridge, September 30, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following operations of my command during the late campaign of the Army of the Potomac in Maryland:

On the 7th day of September I was placed in command of the right wing of the army, composed of the Third and Ninth Army Corps, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Hooker and Reno, and, under the direction of the general commanding, I moved upon Frederick City by way of Leesborough, Brookville, and Damascus, arriving at the Monocacy Bridge in the afternoon of the 12th instant, which bridge was carried after a slight resistance on the part of the enemy. Very soon after, a charge was made by Cox's division upon Frederick City, then occupied by a small force of the enemy, which force was driven out, and the place and suburbs occupied by our troops.

Our loss in the skirmish was 2 killed and 7 prisoners, including Colonel Moor, of the Thirtieth [Twenty-eighth] Ohio Regiment (Volunteers), who led the charge into the town. General Pleasonton's brigade of cavalry entered the town simultaneously with General Reno's corps, and the two commands at once occupied all the approaches to the place.

On the following morning General Pleasonton, being directed by the general commanding to move his forces in the direction of Middletown and Jefferson, with a view to reconnoitering the South Mountain passes and communicating with General Franklin, called upon me for infantry support to carry out the movements. A portion of General Rodman's division was sent to the main body under General Pleasonton, and the

remainder sent to report to Colonel Rush, who was in command of the force ordered to communicate with General Franklin by way of Jefferson. The valuable assistance rendered by these forces is set forth in the reports of General Pleasonton and Colonel Rush.

After General Pleasonton had driven the enemy from the gap in Catocin Mountains on the main pike, I ordered General Reno's corps to move at once to Middletown, and, by direction of the general commanding General Hooker's corps, was ordered to proceed next morning at daylight to the same place, and I moved my headquarters up to General Reno's corps.

Early on the morning of the 14th, General Pleasonton commenced his reconnoissance of Turner's Gap and South Mountain, assisted by Cox's division, supported by Willcox's division, of General Reno's corps, and found the enemy in force. General Pleasonton had reconnoitered the ground fully, and, after posting Benjamin's and Gibson's batteries on the high grounds immediately in front of the gap, indicated to Cox's division the road that should be taken in order to turn the enemy's right. This division and Willcox's division became engaged immediately.

Soon after, I arrived on the ground with General Reno, and directed him to order up General Rodman's and General Sturgis' division to support Cox's division, which had passed up to the left of the main gap by the Sharpsburg road over the South Mountain. After these divisions had passed on to the front, General Reno moved on and took the immediate command of his corps. Soon after, General Hooker's corps arrived, composed of the divisions of Generals Meade, Ricketts, Hatch, and Doubleday, and I ordered it to move up to the right of the main pike, by the Old Hagerstown road, and, if possible, turn the enemy's left and get in his rear. At the same time I detached from his corps General Gibbon's brigade, with Captain Campbell's battery, for the purpose of making a demonstration upon the enemy's center, up the main pike, as soon as the movements of Generals Hooker and Reno had sufficiently progressed. At the same time I sent orders to General Reno, whose corps had been sharply engaged all the morning, to move upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as I informed him that General Hooker was well advanced up the crest of the mountain on our right.

About this time the general commanding arrived on the ground, and I repeated to him my dispositions, which he fully approved. He remained at my headquarters during the remainder of the engagement, and I reported to him, personally, all the orders that I gave from that time.

The orders given to both Generals Hooker and Reno were most skillfully and successfully executed, after which General Gibbon was ordered forward just before sunset, and succeeded in pushing his command up the main road to within a short distance of the crest of the main pass, during which movement he had a most brilliant engagement after night-fall, our forces gradually driving the enemy before them.

At this time, say 8 p. m., the enemy had been driven from their strong positions, and the firing ceased, except upon our extreme left, where General Reno's division, then under command of General Cox (General Reno having been killed about 7 p. m.), were partially engaged till 10 o'clock.

My command, having been engaged for a greater part of the day upon the crests of the mountain without water, and many without food, were very much exhausted. Nevertheless they maintained their posi-

tions, and were ready on the following morning for an advance on the enemy, who had retreated in the direction of Sharpsburg during the night.

For the details of the movement I respectfully refer the general commanding to the reports of the division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders.

From Generals Reno and Hooker I have received no reports, the former having been killed during the action, and the latter severely wounded three days after at the battle of Antietam. To these two gallant generals, with the officers and soldiers under their commands, the country is indebted for this day's victory, in achieving which many gallant men were lost to our cause.

I will not attempt in a public report to express the deep sorrow which the death of the gallant Reno caused me. A long and intimate acquaintance, an extended service on the same field, and an intimate knowledge of his high and noble character had endeared him to me, as well as to all with whom he had served. No more valuable life than his has been lost during this contest for our country's preservation.

Our loss during this engagement was 312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 missing, among whom were some of our most valuable officers and men.* The losses of the enemy far exceeded our own in killed, and probably in wounded, and we captured 1,500 prisoners. Their force present was probably not as large as our own, but they were posted in strong positions—behind stone fences, in thick woods, on the tops of crests, and in ravines.

A topographical survey is being made, which will show the nature of the country and the disposition of the troops, and I feel sure that history will demonstrate this to have been one of the many brilliant engagements of the war.

On the morning of the 15th instant General Hooker's corps was temporarily detached by the general commanding and ordered in pursuit of the enemy by way of Boonsborough, and I was ordered in pursuit with the remainder of the command by the Sharpsburg road, reaching about sundown the neighborhood of Sharpsburg, where the enemy was found to be in position, when my command was ordered by the general commanding into position on the extreme left, under the crest of the mountain opposite the middle Antietam Bridge.

On the next day (16th) I was ordered by the general commanding to place our batteries on the crests of the hills near the bridge, the infantry being moved forward in support, and the commands were immediately placed in their proper positions.

The accompanying maps will give accurately the positions taken at this time, as well as the successive positions, which avoids the necessity of a more detailed description.†

General Cox was still retained in temporary command of the Ninth Army Corps, which was the only portion of my command then with me, and my orders were to a great extent given directly to him, and I would respectfully refer the general commanding to his very excellent and minute report. The distribution of the forces was as follows: On the crest of the hill immediately in front of the bridge was Benjamin's battery of six 20-pounders, with the remaining batteries in rear of the crest under partial cover; in rear of Benjamin's battery on the extreme right, joining on to General Sykes' division, was General Crook's brigade, with General Sturgis' division in his rear; on the left, and in rear of

* But see revised statement, p. 187.

† To appear in Atlas.

Benjamin's battery, was Rodman's division, with Scammon's brigade in support; General Willcox's division was held in reserve. The whole command bivouacked in these positions in three lines on the night of the 16th.

On the morning of the 17th the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire on our lines, but did us little harm. Our batteries were soon brought to bear on their batteries, which were soon silenced and two of his caissons blown up.

About this time I received an order from the general commanding to make my dispositions to carry the stone bridge over the Antietam nearly opposite our center, but to await further orders before making the attack. I accordingly threw my lines forward.

The disposition of the troops at this time was as follows: General Crook's brigade and General Sturgis' division immediately in front of the bridge and the ford, a short distance above, their front covered by the Eleventh Connecticut, Col. H. W. Kingsbury, thrown out as skirmishers; General Rodman's division, with Scammon's brigade in support, opposite the ford, some three-quarters of a mile below the bridge; General Willcox's division in the woods at the left of Benjamin's battery, in rear of the other lines. Benjamin's battery retained its original position, and the following batteries were placed in advance on his right and left, those on the left overlooking the bridge and the heights above it; Clark's and Durell's on the right; Muhlenberg's, Cook's, and McMullin's on the left, and one section of Simmonds' with Crook's brigade and one section with Benjamin's battery. The battery of Dahlgren boat howitzers, attached to the Ninth New York, covered the crossing of Rodman's division at the ford below.

At 10 o'clock I received an order from the general commanding to make the attack. I directed Colonel Kingsbury, of the Eleventh Connecticut, to move forward with his line of skirmishers, and directed General Cox to detail General Crook's brigade to make the assault. General Rodman was directed to cross over at the ford below the bridge, and join on to the left of the command, which was to be thrown over the bridge. From General Crook's position it was found to be almost impossible to carry the bridge, and General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his division for that purpose. He immediately sent forward the Second Maryland (Lieutenant-Colonel Duryea) and the Sixth New Hampshire (Colonel Griffin), which regiments made several successive attacks in the most gallant style, but were driven back by the galling fire of the enemy. I then directed the batteries on the left to concentrate their fire on the woods above the bridge, and sent word to General Sturgis to detail the Fifty-first Pennsylvania (Colonel Hartman) and the Fifty-first New York (Colonel Potter) to assault the bridge and carry it at all hazards. In the mean time Colonel Crook had brought a section of his battery to bear upon the heights just above the bridge. General Sturgis, by a judicious posting of these two regiments in rear of a spur which fronted the bridge, succeeded in protecting them from the enemy's fire until they reached the crest of the spur, at which point they commenced their charge and carried the bridge at the point of the bayonet at about 1 o'clock, the whole division following immediately.

The regiments separated at the head of the bridge to the right and left, and moved up the steep bank crowning the heights immediately beyond. Our loss at this place was fearful, the enemy being posted in rifle-pits and behind barricades, within easy musket range of our men, and almost entirely concealed and covered from our shots. We lost at

this point some of our most valuable officers. Among them was Col. H. W. Kingsbury, of the Eleventh Connecticut, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania.

Colonel Crook's brigade crossed immediately after Sturgis' division, and took its position in support in rear. General Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the fords below, after a sharp fight of musketry and artillery, and joined on to the left of Sturgis, Scammon's brigade crossing after him and taking his position in rear and in support. General Willcox's division was ordered across to take position on the right of General Sturgis. In describing the ground here and the bridge, I cannot do better than to copy that contained in the excellent report of General Cox:

The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches, with stone parapet above, this parapet to some extent flanking the approach to the bridge at either end. The valley in which the stream runs is quite narrow, the steep slope on the right bank approaching quite to the water's edge. On this slope the roadway is scarped, running both ways from the bridge end, and passing to the higher lands above by ascending through ravines above and below, the other ravine being some 600 yards above the bridge, the turn about half that distance below. On the hill-side immediately above the bridge was a strong stone fence, running parallel to the stream; the turns of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks made of rails and stone, all of which defenses, as well as the woods which covered the slope, were filled with the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters. Besides the infantry defenses, batteries were placed to enfilade the bridge and all its approaches. The crest of the first hill above the bridge is curved toward the stream at the extremes, forming a sort of natural *tete-de-pont*. The next ridge beyond rises somewhat higher, though with less regularity, the depression between the two being but slight, and the distance varying in places from 300 to 700 yards.

The dispositions being completed, about 3 o'clock, in accordance with instructions received from the general commanding, I directed General Cox to move forward with the whole command, except Sturgis' division, which was left in reserve, in the order in which they were formed, and attack the town of Sharpsburg and the heights on the left.

The following batteries accompanied their divisions, the remainder being left on the heights to cover the movement: With Sturgis' division, Clark's and Durell's; with Willcox's division, Cook's battery; with Cox's division, part of Simmonds'; and Muhlenberg's battery, of Rodman's division, was over the river during a part of the engagement.

This order was obeyed in the most cheerful and gallant manner, the officers and soldiers moving forward with the greatest enthusiasm, driving everything before them. General Willcox, with General Crook in support, moved up on both sides of the Sharpsburg road, and succeeded in reaching the outskirts of the village. General Rodman succeeded in carrying the main heights on the left of the town, one of his regiments (the Ninth New York) capturing one of the most formidable of the enemy's batteries; but at this juncture the enemy was largely reinforced by General A. P. Hill's light division, which had just arrived from Harper's Ferry, and by numerous batteries from their extreme left. During the attack General Rodman was forced to bear more to the left than was intended when the advance was ordered, and General Cox was forced to move him more to the right with a view to strengthening the line, during which movement General Rodman was mortally wounded while gallantly leading his command to the assault.

At this time Colonel Harland's brigade was driven back, leaving the battery which they had captured. Colonel Scammon's brigade changed its front to the rear on its right, thus protecting our left flank. It was now nearly sundown. I at once ordered General Sturgis' division forward in support, and, notwithstanding the hard work in the early part

of the day and a lack of ammunition, they moved with the greatest alacrity and enthusiasm, holding the enemy at bay and fighting him at close quarters till long after dark.

It being apparent that the enemy was strongly re-enforced, and that we could not be re-enforced, the command was ordered to fall back to the crests above the bridge, which movement was performed in the most perfect order under cover of the batteries on the height, the same formation being adopted that was made before the attack.

Receiving an order from the commanding general to hold the bridge and the heights above at any cost, this position was maintained till the enemy retreated, on the morning of the 19th, during which time our skirmishers maintained a line well in advance. General Morell's division was ordered to join me on the 18th, and to it we are much indebted for the valuable assistance rendered on the following night by relieving our line of skirmishers, thus enabling our officers and men to cook their food and obtain a good night's rest.

On the morning of the 19th we were ordered in pursuit of the enemy down the road leading from our position to the mouth of the Antietam, and, finding that he had succeeded in crossing the river, we were ordered into camp.

In closing this report, I desire to express my hearty appreciation of the gallant services of the officers and soldiers in my command during this engagement. Individual cases of merit and true heroism have been alluded to in the reports of the general officers, but in a report like this it would be impossible to particularize. When it is remembered to what privations and what long and weary marches they had previously been subjected, their constancy, bravery, and endurance shine forth with additional brilliancy.

To Brigadier-Generals Cox, Willcox, and Sturgis I desire to express my obligations for the prompt and efficient manner in which all my orders were executed, and to each and all of the officers and soldiers under them, as well as to the officers and soldiers of the much-lamented General Rodman's division, for their full and hearty response to their commands.

The battery commanders are deserving of special mention for the efficient service rendered by them during the day. I beg to call the attention of the general commanding to the valuable services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Getty, chief of artillery, who posted the batteries, and also to Lieutenant Benjamin, whose batteries were detached from their divisions, and, therefore, had no place in the reports of their division commanders.

To my personal staff I am under renewed obligations for their constant and unwearied efforts and their faithfulness and courage, exhibited in the various duties required of them. They are as follows: Maj. Gen. John G. Parke, chief of staff; Lieut. Col. George W. Getty, chief of artillery; Lieut. Col. Lewis Richmond, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. Col. E. R. Goodrich, commissary of subsistence; Surg. W. H. Church, medical director; Maj. William Cutting, aide-de-camp; Maj. J. L. Van Buren, aide-de-camp; Capt. R. S. Williamson, topographical engineer; Capt. T. E. Hall, quartermaster; Captain Read, assistant quartermaster; Capt. P. Lydig, aide-de-camp; Capt. J. M. Cutts, aide-de-camp; Capt. G. R. Fearing, aide-de-camp; Captain Holden, assistant quartermaster; Lieut. D. W. Flagler, ordnance officer; Lieut. W. H. French, aide-de-camp; Lieut. S. Pierce and Lieut. C. S. Kendall, signal officers.

It is but just to the members of the staffs of Generals Reno and Rodman that their gallant services should be acknowledged in this

report of the two engagements, as they were constantly and heroically engaged till after the fall of their brave commanders.

Of the staff of Major-General Reno, I may mention the following: Capt. Edward M. Neill, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. C. Cutter, division surgeon; Capt. T. E. Hall, quartermaster; Captain Read, commissary of subsistence; Lieut. B. F. Reno, aide-de-camp; Lieut. John A. Morris, aide-de-camp; Lieut. T. B. Marsh, aide-de-camp, and Lieut. Charles G. Hutton, aide-de-camp. And of the staff of Brigadier-General Rodman the following: Capt. Charles T. Gardner, assistant adjutant-general; Dr. H. W. Rivers, acting division surgeon; Capt. M. A. Hill, commissary of subsistence; Lieut. Robert H. Ives, jr., aide-de-camp, who fell mortally wounded while gallantly seconding his commanding general, and Lieut. Robert Aborn, aide-de-camp.

The loss in the Ninth Army Corps during this engagement was 322 killed, 1,359 wounded, and 194 missing.* The enemy's loss was probably not as large as ours, owing to their strongly fortified positions. A full list of the casualties in both engagements will be forwarded to you. Among the many valuable officers killed after crossing the bridge was Lieut. Col. A. H. Coleman, commanding the Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteers, and Lieut. Col. M. Clarke, commanding the Thirty-sixth Regiment Ohio Volunteers.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General, Comdg. Right Wing, Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Adjutant-General.

FALMOUTH, VA., *January 20, 1863.*

GENERAL: When I sent in my report of the part taken by my command in the battle of South Mountain, General Hooker, who commanded one of the corps of my command (the right wing), had not sent in his report, but it has since been sent to me. I at first determined to pass over its inaccuracies as harmless, or rather as harming only their author, but upon reflection I have felt it my duty to notice two gross misstatements made with reference to the commands of Generals Reno and Cox, the former officer having been killed on that day, and the latter now removed with his command to the West.

General Hooker says that as he came up to the front, Cox's corps was retiring from the contest. This is untrue. General Cox did not command a corps, but a division; and that division was in action, fighting most gallantly long before General Hooker came up, and remained in the action all day, never leaving the field for one moment. He also says that he discovered that the attack by General Reno's corps was without sequence. This is also untrue, and, when said of the movements of an officer who so nobly fought and died on that same field, it partakes of something worse than untruthfulness. Every officer present who knew anything of the battle knows that Reno performed a most important part in the battle, his corps driving the enemy from the heights on one side of the main pike, whilst that of General Hooker drove them from the heights on the other side.

General Hooker should remember that I had to order him four sepa-

* But see revised statement, p. 198.

rate times to move his command into action, and that I had to myself order his leading division (Meade's) to start before he would go.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
[A. E. BURNSIDE,]

Major-General.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 17. } *Mouth of Antietam, Md., September 20, 1862.*

The commanding general announces to the corps the loss of their late leader, Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno.

By the death of this distinguished officer the country loses one of its most devoted patriots, the army one of its most thorough soldiers. In the long list of battles in which General Reno has fought in his country's service, his name always appears with the brightest luster, and he has now bravely met a soldier's death while gallantly leading his men at the battle of South Mountain.

For his high character and the kindly qualities of his heart in private life, as well as for the military genius and personal daring which marked him as a soldier, his loss will be deplored by all who knew him, and the commanding general desires to add the tribute of a friend to the public mourning for the death of one of the country's best defenders.

By command of Major-General Burnside:

LEWIS RICHMOND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 138.

Report of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U. S. Army, commanding Ninth Corps, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Mouth of Antietam, September 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the Ninth Army Corps on the 16th instant, and their part in the battle of Sharpsburg on the 17th:

On the evening of the 15th instant the Ninth Army Corps, having been ordered away from the remainder of the right wing, was encamped in the rear of the extreme left of the whole line of the Army of the Potomac, close to the hills on the southeast side of the valley of the Antietam, and on the left of the road from Rohrersville to Sharpsburg.

On the afternoon of the 16th the whole corps, except Willcox's division, was moved forward and to the left and front, by command of Major-General Burnside, in three columns, and took up a new position upon the rear slope of the ridges on the left bank of the Antietam, the center of the corps being nearly opposite the stone bridge over the stream on the above-mentioned road.

The positions assigned the divisions of the command were as follows: The right front to be occupied by Crook's brigade, of the Kanawha Division, supported in rear by Sturgis' division; a commanding knoll in the center to be occupied by Battery E, Second U. S. Artillery, First Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin commanding, consisting of 20-pounder Par-

rott guns; the left front to be occupied by Rodman's division, supported in rear by Ewing's brigade, of the Kanawha Division, the whole of the latter division being under the command of Col. E. P. Scammon. The columns were conducted to their positions by staff officers of the personal staff of General Burnside. The artillery of the command, except Benjamin's battery, was held in reserve.

Shortly after daybreak on the 17th the enemy's batteries opened upon the batteries of our line, and a brisk artillery fight began, in which Benjamin's battery and Durell's battery (the latter sent forward a little to the right of our position, under charge of Captain Rawolle, by General Sturgis) took an active part, co-operating with batteries of other corps on our right. Two of the enemy's caissons were exploded, and many of their guns silenced. The shot and shell fell thickly in our bivouac, but little damage was done us.

About 7 o'clock orders were received from General Burnside to move forward the corps to the ridge nearest the Antietam, and hold it, in readiness to cross the stream, carrying the bridge and the heights above it by assault. The command was moved forward in column as it had been formed the previous night, and promptly took position as directed, and the light artillery was ordered to cover the movement; McMullin's, Durell's, Clark's, Muhlenberg's, and Cook's batteries being placed on the heights to right and left and somewhat to the front of Benjamin's battery, to which a section of 20-pounders from Simmonds' battery was also temporarily attached. Willcox's division was also brought up and held as a reserve.

About 9 o'clock the order was received to cross the stream. Immediately the Eleventh Connecticut Infantry, Colonel Kingsbury commanding, was detailed from Rodman's division to deploy as skirmishers and drive the enemy from the head of the bridge. The column on the right (Crook's brigade, of the Kanawha Division, supported by Sturgis' division) was ordered to march under cover of the Eleventh Connecticut, and attempt to carry the bridge by assault, deploying to right and left as soon as the bridge should be carried, and taking the heights above it. The column on the left (Rodman's division, supported by Ewing's brigade, of the Kanawha Division) was ordered to cross, if possible, by a ford about one-third of a mile below the bridge, take the heights above it, and join the column crossing the bridge.

The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches, with stone parapet above, this parapet to some extent flanking the approach to the bridge at either end. The valley in which the stream runs is quite narrow, the steep slope on the right bank approaching quite to the water's edge. On this slope the roadway is scarped, running both ways from the bridge end, and passing to the higher land above by ascending through ravines above and below; the other ravine being some 600 yards above the bridge, the turn about half that distance below. On the hillside immediately above the bridge was a strong stone fence running parallel to the stream. The turns of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks, made of rails and stone, all of which defenses, as well as the woods which covered the slope, were filled with the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters. Besides the infantry defenses, batteries were placed to enfilade the bridge and all its approaches. The crest of the first hill above the bridge is curved toward the stream at the extremes, forming a sort of natural *tete-de-pont*. The next ridge beyond rises somewhat higher, though with less regularity, the depression between the two being but slight, and the distance varying in places from 300 to 700 yards.

In accordance with the order mentioned above, the Eleventh Connecticut advanced to the stream and warmly engaged the enemy across it. Crook's brigade in moving forward was brought under so lively an infantry fire, as well as that of artillery, that it was forced to halt and open fire in return, and Sturgis' division, passing by the rear, came first to the bridge, and was ordered to cross under protection of the artillery fire. General Sturgis ordered forward the Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire, which charged at double-quick with fixed bayonets, but the concentrated fire upon the bridge forced them to fall back. After repeated brave efforts these regiments were withdrawn, and the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania, from the same division, were ordered up.

About the same time Colonel Crook, of the Second Brigade, Kanawha Division, succeeded in getting a section of Simmonds' battery, supported by the Twenty-eighth Ohio Infantry, in position to bear directly upon the enemy's positions at the farther end of the bridge, and, aided by these guns, the fresh troops charged with great enthusiasm, bearing down all opposition, and, at 1 o'clock, planted their banner on the opposite bank. In this desperate fight in the valley, Colonel Kingsbury, of the Eleventh Connecticut, fell, cheering his men on to duty.

General Sturgis' division immediately marched over, deploying one brigade to the right and the other to the left of the bridge, and advanced up the slope, driving the enemy before them. This division was followed by Colonel Crook's brigade of the Kanawha Division, which took position on the right.

Meanwhile General Rodman's division and the First Brigade of the Kanawha Division, under Colonel Scammon, had succeeded in crossing at the ford below, after a sharp engagement and under a heavy musketry and artillery fire, and successfully took the position assigned at the left of the line of the crest above the bridge. The three divisions of the corps at this time on the right bank of the Antietam occupied the exact positions assigned them before the commencement, except that on the right the division of Sturgis was in front, and Crook's brigade in support of it, the order being reversed by the causes before stated.

The stubbornly contested fight at the bridge having almost exhausted the ammunition and greatly fatigued the troops engaged, I sent a request to General Burnside that Willcox's division, which had been held in reserve on the left bank, might be sent over and take its place on the right front, putting Sturgis' division in reserve at the head of the bridge. This was immediately ordered by General Burnside, and General Willcox came promptly forward with his command. During the interval the enemy kept up an incessant cannonade, and, having the exact range of the valley and the ravines, his shells came in very fast, annoying us a good deal and causing numerous casualties, notwithstanding the men were kept lying on the ground near the crests of the hill while the changes in the line and the partially new formation after the arrival of Willcox's division were being made.

At about 3 o'clock, the necessary changes in the line having been completed, the order to advance was received from General Burnside, and the whole force, except Sturgis' division, was put in motion. General Willcox on the right, his whole division in line and supported by Colonel Crook, was ordered to move on Sharpsburg, which lay about a mile distant to the right of our front. General Rodman, supported by Colonel Scammon, was ordered to move in the same direction, first dislodging the enemy from his front, and then changing direction to the right, bringing his command *en échelon* on the left of General Willcox. The

advance was partly covered by Simmonds', Muhlenberg's, Clark's, and Cook's batteries, the other batteries of the corps being in part out of ammunition, and part being necessarily kept in position on the commanding ground on the left bank of the stream. The troops moved forward in perfect order and with great enthusiasm. On the right, General Willcox and Colonel Crook quickly repulsed the enemy and drove back their artillery, pushing victoriously forward nearly to the village. On the left, General Rodman and Colonel Scammon likewise advanced rapidly, driving the rebels before them. The enemy, however, were manifestly in much greater force than ours, and massed their troops heavily on the extreme left. This necessarily made the line of march of our left wing diverge from the course intended, and opened a gap between it and the right, which it was necessary to fill up by the troops of the second line. Batteries were accumulated against us upon the semi-circular ridge in advance, and the advancing line was subject to a most trying and destructive cross-fire of artillery. The enemy now brought up still more fresh troops upon the left, and while General Rodman was making disposition to meet them by a change of front of a part of his command, he fell, desperately wounded by a ball through his breast. The loss of their commander at a critical period caused confusion in a portion of the division on the extreme left.

The Second Brigade of his division, Colonel Harland commanding, was forced to retire after an obstinate contest, in which they suffered terribly.

Colonel Scammon, of the Kanawha Division, being ordered to make dispositions of the brigade with him to oppose the rebel force on the left, caused the Twelfth and Twenty-third Ohio Regiments to execute a perpendicular change of front, which was done with precision and success, the other regiment of the brigade (Thirtieth Ohio) maintaining its proper front. The whole line was now engaged, the supports being brought to the front, except the reserve division of General Sturgis at the bridge. This was now ordered up, and came promptly, though much exhausted and weakened by its previous exertions during the day.

The mass of the enemy on the left still continued to increase; new batteries were constantly being opened upon us, and it was manifest the corps would, without re-enforcements, be unable to reach the village of Sharpsburg, since the movement could not be made to the right whilst the enemy exhibited such force in front of the extreme left, and the attack both to the right and left at once would necessarily separate the wings to such an extent as to imperil the whole movement unwarrantably.

The attack having already had the effect of a most powerful diversion in favor of the center and right of the army, which by this means had been able to make decided and successful advances, and no supports being at the time available for our exhausted corps, I ordered the troops withdrawn from the exposed ground in front to the cover of the curved hill above the bridge, which had been taken from the enemy earlier in the afternoon. This movement was effected shortly before dark, in perfect order and with admirable coolness and precision on the part of both officers and men.

The line as then constituted was formed by Sturgis' division in front on the left, supported by Fairchild's brigade, of Rodman's division; the Kanawha Division, under Colonel Scammon, in the center, and Willcox's division on the right. The enemy did not venture an attack upon the position, but kept up a brisk artillery fire until night-fall.

The bravery and soldierly conduct of the men was most striking, and becomes still more noticeable when it is considered that for several days they had been marching and fighting, with scarcely any rest, by night or day, and the rapidity of the movement had prevented their having any regular supplies of food, the supply train being delayed at the rear by the advance of other troops.

The batteries on the left bank of the Antietam were used not only to assist in the movement of the corps, but also were most efficiently turned upon the enemy in his attacks on the center and right of the army. They were all very well served, and the 20-pounder battery, under Lieutenant Benjamin, was especially efficient.

In their reports (which are transmitted herewith) the commandants of divisions and separate brigades speak in the highest terms of their troops, and make special mention of numbers of officers and men who distinguished themselves. These are too numerous to be named in this report, but the whole list will very shortly be published in a special order from these headquarters. I must confine myself to the expression of my great satisfaction with the manner in which all the subordinate commands of the corps were handled. The movements were accurate as those of a parade, and the systematic order with which they were executed made the spectacle in the heat of the battle a grand and imposing one. Permit me also to express my obligations to the gentlemen on General Burnside's staff for the intelligence, courage, and unwearied industry they exhibited in the constant communication between him and the headquarters of this corps.

The casualties in the corps during the day were 2,222; of which 357 were killed, 1,742 wounded, and 123 missing.* Among numerous officers killed and wounded we have to mourn the loss of Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, Eleventh Connecticut; Lieut. Col. A. H. Coleman, commanding Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteers; Lieut. Col. M. Clarke, commanding Thirty-sixth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, commanding Fifty-first Pennsylvania. All these gallant officers were killed in the action whilst heroically leading their men, under a terrible fire of shell, canister, and musketry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. D. COX,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. LEWIS RICHMOND,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Right Wing, Maj. Gen. Burnside Comdg.

No. 139.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: I respectfully submit a report of my division for the 14th instant at South Mountain.

In compliance with orders from General Reno, we left camp, 1½ miles beyond Middletown, and marched to the base of South Mountain to support General Cox's division. Communicating with General Cox, he ad-

* But see revised statement, p. 198.

vised me to keep my command where it was, near the main pike or Cumberland road, and consult with General Pleasonton as to taking a position. Found General Pleasonton near his batteries on the left slope of the mountain. The general indicated an attack along the slope of the mountain on the right of the main pike, and, leaving Benjamin's battery with him, I marched my division to the front, and there formed, Welsh's brigade, the One hundredth Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Leckey, leading as skirmishers, and was about to march Christ's brigade through the woods higher up the slope, when I was ordered by General Burnside to withdraw my division and march up by the Sharpsburg road, and take up a position near Cox. Found the latter to the left of the road some few hundred yards, skirmishing on the wooded slope with the enemy. The Sharpsburg road here crosses South Mountain near a hollow called Shriver's Gap. The mountain inclines down toward the main pike, and just where the Sharpsburg road crosses the slope it winds around to the left, but up to this point it runs straight. The right of the road looks down on the main pike; the left is covered by the eastern slope of the mountain.

At General Cox's request I sent two regiments, viz, Eighth Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel Graves, and Fiftieth Pennsylvania, Major Overton, to follow up his line, and was proceeding to take up a position on his right, when I was ordered by General Reno to take position overlooking the main pike to our right. I planted a section of Cook's battery near the turn of the road, and opened fire on enemy's battery across the main pike. After a few good shots, the enemy unmasked a battery on his left, over Shriver's Gap, from a small field enveloped by woods. He threw canister and shell, and drove Cook's cannoneers and drivers down the road with their limbers. Cook gallantly remained with his guns. Cook here lost 1 man killed, 4 wounded, and 2 horses killed. The attack was so sudden, the whole division being under this fire (a flank fire), that a temporary panic occurred until I caused the Seventy-ninth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, and Seventeenth Michigan, Colonel Withington, on the extreme left, to draw across the road, facing the enemy, who were so close that we expected a charge to take Cook's battery. The Seventy-ninth and Seventeenth here deserve credit for their coolness and firmness in rallying and changing front under a heavy fire.

I now made a new disposition of the division, viz: The rear, Seventy-ninth up in front and left of Cook's pieces, and Seventeenth on right and little in rear; Seventy-ninth as skirmishers along whole line, supported by Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Curtin; connected Welsh's brigade with Cox's right, and stretched Christ's brigade from Welsh and across the road, holding the One hundredth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Leckey, in reserve, and moved up my whole command under cover of the hillside.

Meantime the enemy's guns continued to play on us, killing and wounding at all points, but few in number. We lay silent and kept concealed. Our picket officers reported the enemy in heavy force of regiments in rear of their skirmishers.

I soon received orders from Generals Reno and McClellan to silence the enemy's battery at all hazards. Sent picket report to Reno, and was making disposition to charge, moving the Seventeenth Michigan so as to cross the hollow and flank the enemy's guns, when the enemy charged out of the woods on their side directly upon our front in a long, heavy line, extending beyond our left to Cox's right. I instantly gave the command "Forward," and we met them near the foot of the hill,

the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania in front. The Seventeenth Michigan rushed down into the hollow, faced to the left, leaped over a stone fence, and took them in flank. Some of the supporting regiments over the slope of the hill fired over the heads of those in front, and after a severe contest of some minutes the enemy was repulsed, followed by our troops to the opposite slope and woods, forming their own position. Their battery in front of us was withdrawn, but the guns across the main pike played upon us heavily with shot and shell. Cook reopened his fire. Reno and Sturgis came up. The firing, except from artillery, had about ceased. Sturgis' regiments relieved my division in the front as soon as our ammunition was exhausted.

Sturgis opened with his artillery on the enemy's battery and troops across the main pike, and night came on. A large number of prisoners and the wounded were collected. After dark the enemy opened fire on Sturgis with musketry, in which the gallant and beloved Reno was killed, and a temporary confusion occurred until Sturgis' troops were handsomely rallied, and my division took position close up in their support. Still later a heavy fire of musketry opened on us, the enemy (as was learned from a prisoner) being re-enforced by a brigade of Whiting's division, and the troops were engaged until 10 o'clock, our soldiers firmly holding the ground they had won. Before 12 o'clock the enemy was in full retreat, abandoning his wounded.

In mentioning names for commendation I would say that the coolness and gallantry of the commanding officers of brigades and regiments alike shine brightly. Colonel Welsh handled his brigade handsomely, and Colonel Christ performed his duty coolly and well. The Seventeenth Michigan, Colonel Withington, performed a feat that may vie with any recorded in the annals of war, and set an example to the oldest troops. This regiment had not been organized a single month, and was composed of raw levies. Scarcely less praise is due to the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Curtin, for its bravery and dash-ing spirit, meeting the enemy's charge in front in full career. Captain Cook deserves credit individually for his courage and perseverance under a disorganizing fire, for his activity in repairing the disaster to his battery, and bringing it to bear upon the enemy's infantry at the right moment. I am specially indebted to the assistance of Capt. Robert A. Hutchins, assistant adjutant-general, and to Lieut. Levi Brackett, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, aide-de-camp, in my efforts to keep the troops in hand and changing front under fire, and for their rapid delivery of orders.

Appended is a list of casualties.*

Respectfully,

O. B. WILLCOX,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Lieut. Col. LEWIS RICHMOND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit my report for the 17th instant.

This division marched out of camp to the hills overlooking the Antietam, near the stone bridge, Sharpsburg road. My orders, received

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 186.

from General Burnside in person, were to cross over after Sturgis should have carried the bridge, and after Cox's and Rodman's divisions should have crossed. My orders then were to take the right of the corps in the attack on Sharpsburg.

After crossing the bridge, the road turns sharply to the right, runs up the stream about 200 yards, then to the left along an open hollow or ravine, which winds along to the village, overlooked by heights to the right and left. Once on the heights, the country is rolling and intersected with field fences, many of which are of stone. The enemy's sharpshooter's were posted behind these fences as well as hay-stacks, which also, with orchards and corn-fields, served to conceal their lines. A battery of field guns also commanded the road and hollow down to the river, and the whole plateau above was swept by cross-fire of artillery. Christ's brigade was filed across the hollow and drawn up along the crest on the right of the road, his left resting near the road, the Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders), Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison commanding, deployed as skirmishers, and the other three regiments of the brigade in line of battle. These regiments were the Fiftieth Pennsylvania, Major Overton; the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, Captain Caraher, and Seventeenth Michigan, Colonel Withington.

The Second Brigade, under Colonel Welsh, formed on the heights to the left of the road, deploying the One hundredth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Leckey, as skirmishers, and forming his other three regiments in line of battle, viz: Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Curtin, on the right; Forty-sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerhardt, in the center; Eighth Michigan, Captain Ely, on the left. I brought with the division Cook's battery, Eighth Massachusetts, and left Benjamin's battery, Second U. S. Artillery, doing good work in a commanding position across the river in our rear, against the enemy's guns on the plateau and heights in front of us.

My division now formed part of a line which Generals Burnside and Cox were commanding, and all moved forward about — o'clock. We were under fire from the moment a man appeared at the crest of the plateau or crossed the hollow. Taking two pieces of Cook's battery, under Lieutenant Coffin, I moved up the road, while the two brigades gallantly advanced over the plateau toward Sharpsburg.

The rest of Cook's battery was posted on a hill near the bridge. Crook's brigade, of Cox's division, followed in support of my line. Christ's brigade attacked a force of the enemy's infantry along his front, and drove them steadily before him. In following them up, his brigade got in advance of the rest of the line; his supports were not up. While halting, the enemy turned their battery on him from their right (our left), and for a few moments his troops were exposed to the fire of their battery, a fire of infantry from a corn-field in his front protected by a stone fence, and from a battery farther up in front, beyond the corn-field. The left coming up, soon attracted the attention of the flanking battery. Lieutenant Coffin directed his pieces on the battery beyond the corn-field, and at the same time Christ threw forward the Seventeenth Michigan, with supports, to charge the battery, seeing the guns were withdrawn.

Meantime Welsh conducted his brigade against the enemy in his front and drove them before him with the same success, his right following the crest of the hollow, gradually approaching Christ's left, so that by the time we entered Sharpsburg the quarter part of my division was on the right of the road and extended across the hollow, up the side hill, and on the plateau. On this side hill was an orchard, in which a large

force of the enemy was posted and firing heavily at both Welsh and Christ.

In finding a position for Coffin's two guns at the head of a lane, which turned up at the first house we passed, I was now able both to see and assist my division at every part of the ground, and Coffin threw solid shot, shell, and canister with great precision and effect into the enemy's ranks. The force in the orchard were dislodged, and fled up the hill-side, followed by our fire of both infantry and artillery, and Welsh occupied the orchard.

Our musket ammunition was now exhausted. We had carried the heights of Sharpsburg, and rested partly in the town and partly on the hills. The enemy kept up a desultory fire along our line, but at a respectful distance, so that when Sturgis on the extreme left became heavily pressed, and I was ordered to withdraw to the place where my division formed near the river, every regiment marched back in perfect order. To assist the struggling left, I had already detached Coffin, with his two guns. He moved across the field to the left and rear, and opened upon the enemy within 300 yards. Here he remained, doing signal execution, until he also exhausted his ammunition and withdrew.

As Lieutenant Benjamin was detached from the division, I inclose a copy of his report separately.

I have particularly to notice the good conduct of Cols. B. C. Christ and Thomas Welsh, commanding brigades, and all the officers and men under their commands. There is no officer or man among them who cannot feel proud of having been engaged in the battle of Sharpsburg, and I recommend that all the regiments of my division be allowed to inscribe "Sharpsburg" on their colors as well as "South Mountain." I would also commend the cool, skillful, and gallant conduct of Lieutenant Benjamin and his officers and men, and the efficiency of Lieut. John N. Coffin, of Cook's battery, who, with his section, acted under my own eyes, moving up in the most dashing manner into the village, and striking with his shot on every side. He mentions his two chiefs of pieces, Sergts. William Davis and Newell B. Allen, and all his men. Of my personal staff, I have particularly to commend Capt. Robert A. Hutchins, assistant adjutant-general, and my aides, Lieutenant Brackett, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Volunteers, and Lieut. James W. Romeyn, Fourth Michigan, for promptness and fearlessness in carrying orders, and Lieutenant [Orrin M.] Dearborn, aide-de-camp, also in charge of the ammunition train, for following up the command with ammunition and delivering it to all the troops of the corps at a critical time.

This report is with the supplementary battle reports. I append a list of casualties.*

Respectfully,

O. B. WILLCOX,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Captain BASCOM,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Addenda.]

Itinerary of the First Division, Ninth Army Corps, September 1-October 31, 1862.†

September 1, division left camp west of Centreville, Va., proceeding toward Fairfax, and met the enemy at Chantilly about 5 p. m. A severe

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 196.

† From "records of events," on monthly returns.

engagement ensued, lasting until after dark, in which the enemy were driven from the field. Brig. Gen. Isaac I. Stevens, commanding the division, was killed, bearing the colors of the Seventy-ninth New York Volunteers, which he took up after two color sergeants had been shot. On the death of General Stevens, Col. Benjamin C. Christ, Fiftieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, took command, and remained in charge until relieved by Brig. Gen. O. B. Willcox. Division remained on the battlefield during the night.

September 2, marched to Alexandria.

September 4, marched at 9 p. m., crossed Long Bridge, and encamped on Meridian Hill, Washington, at 4 a. m. of the 5th.

September 7, struck camp at 8 a. m., marched to Leesborough, Md., 10 miles, halting at 7 p. m.

September 8, General Willcox arrived and took command of the division.

September 9, moved at 6.30 a. m., arriving at Brookville, Md., at 2 p. m.

September 10, the Seventeenth Michigan Infantry Volunteers joined the division.

September 11, moved at 5 a. m. toward New Market; encamped at Forer's Creek.

September 12, resumed march at 9 a. m., and marched to the Monocacy, within 2 miles of Frederick City.

September 13, moved at 2 p. m.; camped within 1½ miles of Middletown.

September 14, division ordered to South Mountain by Boonsborough road, left of main pike, and engaged the enemy at Shriver's Gap, on the right of Cox's division. Enemy dislodged with heavy loss, and collected 1,100 stand of arms and some hundred prisoners.

September 15, marched a short distance after crossing South Mountain, and halted until 11 p. m., at which time resumed march and continued to near Porterstown.

September 16, an artillery engagement occurred, in which Benjamin's battery took part. Christ's brigade on picket duty.

September 17, division marched to Antietam Creek, crossed to the west bank by the stone bridge, and took position on Rodman's right and on both sides of road, toward Sharpsburg, and engaged the enemy at 5 p. m. Charged up the hill toward the village, broke the rebel lines, driving them in confusion from their position opposite our front, and held the position till ordered by General Burnside to fall back a short distance, holding the west bank of the Antietam, near a ford, and the road to the bridge.

September 18, remained all day in the position taken on the 17th until 5 p. m., when the division, being relieved by other troops, recrossed the Antietam.

September 19, recrossed to the west bank of the Antietam, and marched toward the Potomac, encamping within 1 mile of the Shepherdstown Ford.

September 21, Thirty-sixth Massachusetts Volunteers joined the division.

September 24, Twentieth Michigan Infantry Volunteers joined the division.

September 26, moved to east side of Antietam Creek, near Antietam Iron Works, and encamped, where the division remains, drilling and doing picket duty.

The division was stationed on October 1 at Antietam Iron Works,

Md. Broke camp on the 7th and marched to Pleasant Valley.* The division remained in camp at Pleasant Valley until October 26, when camp was broken, and marched to Berlin, and there crossed the Potomac River over the pontoon bridge, reaching Lovettsville, Va., the same day. Remained at Lovettsville until the 29th, when the division moved to its present station at Waterford, Va.

The several brigades of this command were ordered for a time away from their encampment during the time in Pleasant Valley, as follows:

The First Brigade was ordered to Frederick, Md., on the 11th, leaving camp equipage and baggage behind. The brigade remained at Frederick until the 15th, when it returned to Pleasant Valley.

The Second Brigade was ordered to guard fords between Knoxville and mouth of Monocacy River. Headquarters was established at Point of Rocks, Md.

The Fiftieth Pennsylvania Volunteers and one company Twentieth Michigan Volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brenholtz, were ordered to guard Mock's Ford. Nine companies of the Twentieth Michigan Volunteers and the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Volunteers, under Colonel Williams, were stationed to guard Noland's Ferry.

On October 29 brigade moved from Point of Rocks, forded the Potomac at Heedle's Ford, and joined remainder of the division at Waterford at 5 p. m. the same day.

The Third Brigade was ordered to Frederick, Md., on October 11, leaving camp equipage and baggage behind.

On the 12th the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania and Thirty-sixth Massachusetts Volunteers, of the brigade, moved to Point of Rocks, Md. The One hundredth Pennsylvania was ordered to Monocacy Junction. The Thirty-sixth Massachusetts Regiment remained at Point of Rocks, and the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania moved to Noland's Ferry. At midnight of the 13th the One hundredth Pennsylvania, having arrived at the Point of Rocks from Monocacy Junction, was ordered to Noland's Ferry, and on the 15th all the brigade returned to camp at Pleasant Valley.

No. 140.

Reports of Capt. Asa M. Cook, Eighth Massachusetts Battery, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY, *Mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 21, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows concerning the operations of my command in the battle of South Mountain September 14:

Having proceeded with the rest of the division from camp near Mid-dletown to the foot of South Mountain on the morning of September 14, the Eighth Massachusetts Battery was ordered to take up a position in the extreme advance on the left of the army. The command proceeded up the road to a point about 400 yards from the summit of the mountain, where, at about 12 o'clock m., two pieces were brought into battery and commenced firing on a battery of the enemy on an elevation about a mile to the right. After firing about four rounds one of the pieces became disabled, and was withdrawn. While another piece was

* Col. Daniel Leasure, One hundredth Pennsylvania Infantry, relieved General Willcox, in command of the division, October 8, the latter assuming command of the Ninth Army Corps.

coming forward to replace it, the enemy opened a very heavy fire of canister upon us from a masked battery of 12-pounders, about 150 yards off, on our flank. The column of caissons and the disabled piece were ordered to the rear, when the enemy's fire became so heavy, 1 man having been killed and 4 wounded in one section by the first discharge, that the cannoneers were directed to retire to cover. The men consequently fell back to shelter in the woods until a later hour in the day, when the enemy's attention being diverted by our infantry, firing was resumed with the two pieces before mentioned, and they were worked with good effect after night-fall.

I append a list of the casualties in the command.*

I have the honor to remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. M. COOK,

Commanding Eighth Massachusetts Battery.

Capt. ROBERT A. HUTCHINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Eighth Massachusetts Battery in the action near Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862:

My command took up a position in the morning of that day on an eminence east of Antietam Creek, and the battery fired for an hour or more on two rebel batteries on the hills to the right and left of the village of Sharpsburg. After the object of this firing (the protection of our infantry in the passage of the bridge) was accomplished, the battery was ordered forward over the stream. While the command was halted in the road on the western bank of the creek, the enemy reopened a murderous fire of shot and shell into the ravine. The left section, under Lieut. J. N. Coffin, was ordered forward to the heights on the right, and was therefore temporarily detached from the command. The right and center section, after remaining for some time, under fire, necessarily inactive, proceeded up the road on the left of the stone bridge and opened fire from the heights above. Here they were subjected to a cross-fire from the enemy's batteries in front and on both flanks. After discharging several rounds they were compelled by the approach of darkness to suspend operations. The battery still continued, however, to hold the position, and remained upon the heights throughout the night and during the next day (the 18th) until about 5 o'clock p. m., when it returned to the eastern bank of the creek, having been relieved by other troops. For the operations of the left section, I beg to refer you to the report of its commanding officer, Lieutenant Coffin, which I inclose herewith. I desire to speak in terms of especial commendation of the conduct of Lieut. John N. Coffin, whose gallantry on all occasions during the day was worthy of the highest praise.

I have the honor to remain, yours, very respectfully,

A. M. COOK,

Captain, Commanding Eighth Massachusetts Battery.

Capt. ROBERT A. HUTCHINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 186.

No. 141.

Report of Lieut. John N. Coffin, commanding left section Eighth Massachusetts Battery, of the battle of Antietam.

CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, MD.,
September 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows concerning the movements of my section while temporarily detached from your battery during the action of September 17 near Antietam Creek:

In crossing the stone bridge the battery marched left in front, bringing my section in advance. On the enemy's commencing to shell the ravine, I was ordered to take a position about 200 yards in advance of the column, where I was enabled to shell the enemy on our right until they were driven from their position. I was then ordered to advance farther up the road to fire canister. Coming to a turn in the road, I ordered the section to turn to the left and take a position on an elevation about 200 yards to the right of the enemy's guns. I opened on them with canister, discharging both guns to the right, when the enemy disappeared. I then turned my guns to the left against the rebel infantry.

Not deeming the position a good one, I ordered my pieces to be limbered up and take a position on a high eminence overlooking the enemy's infantry, and held this position, my guns telling with terrible effect upon the rebel lines. This position I held until my ammunition was exhausted. I then limbered to the rear and left the field for more ammunition, carrying with me one private, William H. Callinton, wounded in the knee.

I wish to mention favorably especially the chiefs of the two pieces under my command, Sergts. William Davis and Newell B. Allen, who, with the rest of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the section, behaved with the greatest bravery and coolness throughout the engagement.

Very respectfully, yours,

JOHN N. COFFIN,
Senior First Lieutenant.

Capt A. M. Cook,
Commanding Eighth Massachusetts Battery.

No. 142.

Reports of Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin, Battery E, Second U. S. Artillery, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of Battery E, Second U. S. Artillery, during the action of South Mountain, Sunday, September 14:

The battery was ordered to report to General Pleasonton at about 8 a. m. After reporting, it was placed in position to the left of the turnpike, on a high knoll, commanding a portion of the pass. We engaged three batteries in the course of the day, one on a knoll to the right of the turnpike, about 2,600 yards from us, the others on the right and left

of the pike on the hills. The first two commanded our position, the third we commanded. The first we silenced twice, after which it did not open again. The second and third we fired at to draw the fire from our infantry. We also shelled the wood in several places, and shelled a column far up the pass, apparently with some effect. A detachment of the Seventy-ninth New York Volunteers, temporarily attached to the battery, did their duty well throughout the day. The officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates all behaved well. We had no casualties, no projectiles of any kind coming near us.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL N. BENJAMIN,

First Lieutenant Second Artillery, Commanding Battery E.

Capt. ROBERT A. HUTCHINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Div., Ninth Army Corps.

NEAR BLACKFORD'S FORD (ON THE POTOMAC),
September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of Battery E, Second Artillery (Carlisle's), during the engagement near Sharpsburg on the 16th and 17th instant:

On the 16th instant, on being ordered to the front at about 9 o'clock, the battery was placed in position by Lieutenant-Colonel Getty, Fifth U. S. Artillery. After firing a few shots at bodies of the enemy, we opened on a brigade marching in column toward our right, and soon drove them in confusion into a ravine.

At about 10.30 a. m. the enemy opened fire on us, and on some heavy guns some distance on our right, with ten or twelve pieces. We returned fire, the batteries on the right also returning it, and in about an hour the enemy's batteries were silenced. In the afternoon we changed position, taking position on a knoll some distance to the left, and back from the stone bridge.

On the morning of the 17th we opened fire early on a battery which was shelling General Rodman's division, soon silencing it. Several times during the day we engaged a battery of eight guns to the right of Sharpsburg, each time driving the cannoneers from their guns. We also fired on batteries to the left of the town, to draw their fire from our infantry.

After the firing on the 16th instant I replenished my caissons, and on the morning of the 17th I sent for ammunition, but only received 40 rounds, being all that there was on the train. The battery changed position at about 3 p. m., in order to fire more to the left. Several times in the course of the day we shelled bodies of rebel infantry. At about 5 or 5.30 p. m., the enemy opened with some very heavy guns from their left. I fired my last six rounds at them. After my ammunition was exhausted I remained in position some time.

Two of my horses being killed by their shell, I returned to my first position in order to cover my horses, and, by order of General Burnside, fired blank cartridges to draw the enemy's fire from our infantry.

The men attached to the battery behaved well. Sergeants Keefe, Kaiser, and Ferris, and Corporal Bidleman, managed their guns and detachments well. My officers, Lieutenants Graves and Lord, worked well and faithfully. A detachment of the Seventy-ninth New York Volunteers, temporarily attached to the battery, did their duty coolly

and well. On the 16th the firing of the enemy for some time was pretty sharp, but no one was injured. On the 17th we were fired at but little, and without effect, except two horses killed. Private Drimer was accidentally wounded in the hand by a piece of friction-primer. Two guns became unserviceable from the vent-pieces wearing out.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL N. BENJAMIN,

First Lieutenant Second Artillery, Commanding Battery.

Capt. ROBERT A. HUTCHINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 143.

Reports of Col. Benjamin C. Christ, Fiftieth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., FIRST DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Near Antietam Creek, Md.

SIR: I respectfully submit the following report of the action of my command at the battle of South Mountain, on Sunday, September 14, 1862:

Leaving our encampment on the morning of the 14th, we proceeded along the Hagerstown road to a point near the base of the mountain, where we were considerably annoyed by the shot and shell of the enemy until we filed off on the road to the left that led us directly to the top of the mountain. Before reaching the summit, I was ordered to form in line of battle on the right of the road, but before this movement was completed the enemy opened a battery, which commanded this road. Cook's battery, which was just being placed in position at this time, received this fire directly in front, and from its great severity they were obliged to retire with their caissons, leaving two of their pieces in danger of being taken by the enemy. The Seventy-ninth New York Volunteers, Colonel Morrison, was immediately ordered to the front on the left of the road, and the Seventeenth Michigan, Colonel Withington, on the right of the road, to protect these pieces.

The enemy held their position for some considerable time, and fired their shot and shell with terrible effect until about 2 o'clock, when he commenced the attack with his infantry. From the previous disposition of my command, it was impossible for me to give my attention to the whole. I therefore led forward the Seventeenth Michigan on the right of the road, while Colonel Welsh advanced on the left with the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania and Forty-sixth New York Volunteers. Supported by the Seventy-ninth New York, the Seventeenth Michigan moved steadily forward until they arrived within good range, and then opened a fire on the enemy with terrible effect, piling the road and field with his dead and wounded, and finally completely routing him, driving him in the utmost confusion across the field into the woods, and capturing a number of prisoners.

Under any circumstances the conduct of both officers and men of this regiment was worthy of the highest commendation, but especially so when taking into consideration that they were mustered into service as late as the 21st of August, 1862, and that this was their first engagement.

Later in the day the Seventy-ninth New York and Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Volunteers were ordered to the front, and assisted in repulsing the enemy in his second attempt to force our lines. The Fiftieth Pennsylvania and Eighth Michigan Volunteers were ordered in the early part of the afternoon to the position held by General Cox, where they contributed largely in maintaining that position, and twice assisted in repulsing the enemy.

With few exceptions, both officers and men discharged their whole duty. I append a list of casualties.*

All of which is respectfully submitted.

B. C. CHRIST,

Colonel, Commanding First Brigade.

Captain HUTCHINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., FIRST DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Antietam Creek, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: I respectfully submit the following report of the part borne by my command in the engagement near Sharpsburg, on Wednesday, September 17, 1862:

About 10 o'clock a. m. I was ordered to support some batteries covering our advance near the stone bridge across Antietam Creek. During the afternoon I crossed the bridge and marched to the right, and parallel with the stream, for several hundred yards. I here deployed the Seventy-ninth New York Volunteers as skirmishers, supported by the Fiftieth Pennsylvania, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, and Seventeenth Michigan Volunteers, and then moved forward in front of the enemy's battery (heavily supported by infantry), in the rear of a corn-field, on the right of the road. On reaching the crest of a hill, about 350 yards in front of the battery, I discovered that my support on my left had not come up. Deeming my force alone inadequate for the attack on both artillery and infantry, I was obliged to halt until supported on my left.

While halting under cover from the enemy directly in front, he opened a battery on my left which commanded my whole line from left to right, and for thirty minutes we were under a most severe fire of round shot, shell, grape, and canister, and suffered severely. It was impossible to move forward for the reason before stated—no place in the neighborhood that afforded any cover—and the alternative presented itself either to retire from a good and only position from which to advance on the enemy in front, or to wait patiently until some demonstration on the left would compel him to change the direction of his fire. Again, I could not get under cover without retiring at least 250 yards, in full view of the enemy, and if there would have been the least confusion the men might have retreated in disorder, and exposed a larger and more disordered front to his fire, which would have largely increased the list of casualties. I chose the former, and was gratified by having my expectations realized.

A demonstration on the left compelled the enemy to change the direction of his fire, and my supports coming, we moved to the front, where we engaged the enemy on his left, and in about one hour succeeded in driving both his artillery and infantry from the position. I charged on the battery with the Seventeenth Michigan Regiment (this being the regiment immediately in front), supported by the Fiftieth Pennsylvania

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 186.

and Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Volunteers, but when within 100 yards of his guns (and while he was covered by a hill which prevented my advance column from shooting either his horses or their riders), he limbered up his pieces and retired. I did not deem it prudent to advance after his artillery had retired, for the reason that the woods were lined with his sharpshooters, and I would only have exposed my command to their fire without gaining anything. I retired with my charging party to my line of battle, and maintained my position until ordered to take another farther down and near the bridge, where the men slept on their arms for the night.

In this engagement it is impossible to particularize regiments, officers, or men, for, from the moment we were brought under fire until ordered to retire near the bridge, all displayed the utmost coolness and courage, ready and prompt to move forward at the word of command, and both officers and men vying with each other in the discharge of their duty. My especial acknowledgments are, however, due to my acting assistant adjutant-general, Capt. William F. Lusk, for the assistance rendered me not only during this but also during the engagement of the 14th.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

B. C. CHRIST,
Colonel, Commanding First Brigade.

Captain HUTCHINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 144.

Reports of Col. Thomas Welsh, Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. 2D BRIG., WILLCOX'S (1ST) DIV., 9TH ARMY CORPS,
Near Sharpsburg, Md., September 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that the brigade under my command, consisting of the Forty-fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Maj. J. I. Curtin commanding; One hundredth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Leekey commanding, marched from camp east of Middletown early on Sunday morning, the 14th of September, 1862. Arriving in front of and within range of the enemy's guns, in position on the South Mountain, commanding the turnpike road leading to Hagerstown, I received orders to lead and attack the enemy's batteries on the right of the turnpike from Brigadier-General Willcox, commanding division. The One hundredth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Leekey, were then advanced as skirmishers along the road. The other troops of the brigade were ordered to the right, with the view to crossing the fields and ascending the mountain on the right of the battery to be attacked.

After having advanced a short distance, an order was received recalling my command and directing me to follow Christ's brigade to the support of General Cox's division, then being engaged with the enemy a considerable distance to the left of the turnpike, near the Sharpsburg road. Leaving orders for the One hundredth to be recalled, I hurried forward with my two regiments along the Sharpsburg road, running nearly parallel with and about 1,000 yards distant from the turnpike.

Arrived at the foot of the mountain, I placed my troops in position on the left of Christ's brigade, the right of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania

resting on the road and the left of the Forty-sixth New York Regiment extending toward the command of General Cox. I then caused two companies of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiment Volunteers to be moved forward to the top of the hill as skirmishers, who soon discovered the enemy's infantry in great force and his artillery completely commanding and shelling the woods. Heavy masses of infantry, covered by trees and stone fences, supported the artillery.

At — p. m. we received an order from General Willcox to advance and silence the battery on the road at all hazards. At this time the firing between the skirmishers and the enemy becoming very rapid, I immediately put the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiment in motion at double-quick up the hill. Arriving in the crest, it encountered the enemy, also advancing. The battle became very fierce at this juncture. The Seventeenth Michigan Volunteers, of Colonel Christ's brigade, and also a part of Willcox's division, advancing on our right, also became hotly engaged, and took the rebels in flank. The Forty-sixth New York moved on the left of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, connecting with the troops of General Cox's command. The One hundredth Pennsylvania were held in reserve, and followed up in support of our front.

Notwithstanding the terrific fire from infantry and artillery, together with a raking fire from a battery near the turnpike, our troops continued to advance, utterly regardless of the slaughter in their ranks, until, having destroyed the advanced troops of the enemy, he was compelled to give way and retreat with his artillery and infantry in great confusion down the hill. Many prisoners, a number of whom were wounded, were captured by my command at the stone fence near the road, and were turned over for safe-keeping to the supporting forces on our left and rear—say 150 prisoners. The ammunition of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers having become expended, they used the bayonet with success, and having become considerably exhausted by their extraordinary exertions, I withdrew my command as fast as relieved by troops of General Sturgis' command.

I append herewith the reports of the regimental commanders, with lists of the killed and wounded.* My officers and men were enthusiastic and brave. Where all are so meritorious it would be unjust to designate individuals. I will only add that the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, of my brigade, and the Seventeenth Michigan, of the First Brigade, sustained the brunt of the battle with a bravery and constancy seldom equaled in modern warfare.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. WELSH,

Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade.

Capt. ROBERT A. HUTCHINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

—
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,

September 19, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that the brigade under my command, comprising the Forty-fifth and One hundredth Pennsylvania, the Forty-sixth New York, and the Eighth Michigan Volunteer Regiments, left camp on the morning of the 17th of September, 1862, and marched in the direction of the bridge across the Antietam Creek

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 186.

on the road to Sharpsburg. The brigade, being held in reserve to the force engaged in storming the bridge, was not brought directly in contact with the enemy until past meridian. Our victorious comrades having meanwhile driven the enemy from the bridge and banks of the creek, I was ordered to cross with my brigade to their relief. Arriving on the opposite side of the stream, and in compliance with verbal instructions from Brigadier-General Willcox, I moved my whole command over a steep hill, immediately charging the enemy and driving them rapidly in the direction of Sharpsburg, my troops advancing to the edge of the town and capturing the rebel Captain Twiggs and several soldiers.

Discovering that we had advanced beyond our supporting forces on our right, and also on our left, I withdrew my command to an orchard directly on the left of Colonel Christ, First Brigade of the division. We remained in this position until ordered back by the general commanding the division to the support of the forces then desperately engaged with the enemy, who were endeavoring to outflank us on our left. My command was exposed for several hours to a tremendous cross-fire from the artillery of the enemy, as well as a direct fire from their infantry and riflemen in our front, yet they advanced with steadiness and rapidity, driving the enemy at all points and performing strictly the great duty devolved on them by the commanding general.

I had great difficulty in restraining the ardor of my troops, who seemed anxious to charge through the town and capture the batteries beyond. Fighting as we did directly under the eyes of the general, I trust our conduct merited his approval. I commend my entire command for their gallantry and good conduct. Officers and men seemed to vie with each other in their deeds of bravery. A list of killed and wounded,* with reports of regimental commanders, are herewith inclosed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. WELSH,

Colonel Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Vols., Comdg. Second Brigade.

Capt. ROBERT A. HUTCHINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 145.

*Reports of Lieut. Col. Joseph Gerhardt, Forty-sixth New York Infantry,
of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.*

HDQRS. FORTY-SIXTH REGT. NEW YORK STATE VOLS.,
Camp near South Mountain Pass, September 16, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders of this day, I have the honor to report that the Forty-sixth Regiment New York State Volunteers moved from Middletown on the 14th instant in the morning at 8 o'clock, 369 enlisted men strong, besides 23 officers. The regiment was with the brigade and marched to the South Mountain, where it arrived about noon. Here the Forty-sixth Regiment formed in line of battle on the left of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, under a very heavy fire of shot and shell. The regiment covered themselves behind fences and hills till the order was given to advance. The regiment was ordered by mistake to the extreme left, but was soon recalled and took again their former position on the left of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers. As soon as the enemy commenced to assail us with musketry

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 196.

fire, the regiment went up to a stone fence, where it remained until further orders. Receiving orders, the regiment went over the fence under a very heavy fire of musketry and advanced in line of battle to the woods, where the Twenty-eighth Ohio Regiment were lying behind a rail fence. I ordered the regiment to assist our brothers in the fight, and with hurrah and double-quick they came to the relief of the Thirtieth Ohio, leaving the Twenty-eighth Ohio Volunteers behind us, who had been relieved by the Thirtieth Ohio Regiment. Both officers and men behaved gallantly in this engagement, taking proper advantages of coverings at hand, to which is attributable the small loss we sustained. After having spent nearly all our ammunition, we were relieved by the Ninth New Hampshire Volunteers. This regiment commenced firing before they had taken our position, thereby greatly endangering the lives of our soldiers, who only saved themselves by throwing themselves down on the ground. After a while the regiment advanced again over an open field, exposed to the raking fire of the enemy's batteries, and went in with the Ninth New Hampshire Regiment in pursuit of the enemy. Having been ordered back, we retired slowly and took up our position behind the Twenty-eighth Ohio Regiment; whereupon we were ordered back to camp.

The regiment lost 1 man killed in the afternoon in the corn-field by a shell; Major Parcus and 6 men were wounded in the woods shortly after having relieved the Thirtieth Ohio Regiment. The required roster of officers liable for duty is respectfully inclosed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH GERHARDT,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Colonel WELSH.

HDQRS. FORTY-SIXTH REGT. NEW YORK STATE VOLS.,
Camp near Antietam Creek, September 18, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to order of this day, I have the honor to report that the regiment left camp at 9 o'clock in the morning of the 17th instant, and after several halts passed over the bridge at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. About one-fourth of a mile on the other side of the creek the regiment was ordered to ascend a steep hill on the left side of the road, and came under a galling fire of shot and shell as soon as it was in sight of a battery posted by the enemy on a hill to our right. After having laid a while behind a rail fence, on the next hill close to a line of skirmishers, the regiment advanced over several hills, being constantly fired upon by the aforesaid battery, and took position behind a rail fence in front, passing several regiments, who remained passive behind us. Here the regiment was engaging the enemy's infantry for about two hours, and, receiving no support, the regiment had to fall back before superior numbers of the enemy, who tried to flank our left wing. The regiment fell back behind a stone fence near the road, and was afterward ordered to march farther back toward the river, where it encamped for the night. The regiment went into battle with 16 officers and 262 enlisted men. The loss, as far as could be ascertained, is 2 men killed, 3 officers and 12 men wounded, and 2 men missing.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH GERHARDT,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Colonel WELSH.

* But see revised statement, p. 191.

No. 146.

Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Antietam, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my division in the battles of South Mountain and Sharpsburg:

About 1 o'clock p. m., on the 14th instant, my division moved from its camp near Middletown to the support of General Willcox, then hotly engaged on the slope of the mountain to the left of the main Hagerstown road. The distance to be traveled was about 5 miles, and it was not until 3.30 p. m. that we reached the scene of action. At the foot of the mountain one of my batteries (Captain Clark's) was detached by Major-General Reno, and sent to support the left of General Cox's division, then supposed to be hotly pressed. Two regiments (the Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire) had previously been detached by Major-General Reno, and sent forward on the Hagerstown turnpike.

Arriving near the crest of the mountain, the brigade of Colonel (now General) Ferrero was deployed to the right and left of the road, and immediately became engaged with the enemy. The First Brigade, Colonel (now General) Nagle, was held in reserve. Discovering a battery of the enemy some 1,500 yards to our right, and so posted as to expose our line to a flank fire, I directed my aide-de-camp, Captain Rawolle, to open upon it with Captain Durell's battery. The enemy's battery was silenced in a few moments, and withdrawn from the field. These batteries, under the able direction of Captain Rawolle, rendered material aid afterward, and from the same point, to the troops of General Hooker while hotly pressed on the hills to the right of the Hagerstown road.

The infantry fire had now become so warm and the ground so stubbornly disputed that General Nagle's brigade was brought forward, and the whole line engaged. The enemy made several charges with the hope of driving our brave troops from their position, but were driven back with great slaughter behind a stone fence, where he reformed, but was driven again even from that shelter, and we occupied the highest point of the mountain. The firing ceased altogether about 9 o'clock, and our valiant troops slept on the ground and on their arms. When morning broke the enemy had withdrawn, leaving his dead in ghastly numbers scattered on the field.

Our loss in the engagement was 151.* At noon of the next day (15th) we marched again and encamped near Sharpsburg, taking no part in the affair of that day, but being held in reserve on the left of the whole line.

On the morning of the 16th we again moved a mile or two and took position on the extreme left, in column of brigades, in an open field, but covered from view of the enemy by a corn-field in front. The batteries were placed in a wood to the rear. Toward evening I withdrew the batteries a little farther to the rear, for convenience of forage, &c., while the division slept on their arms in the position occupied during the day.

On the morning of the 17th the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire, from which their projectiles fell thick in our camp, and I sent Captain Rawolle forward with Captain Durell's battery, which took position on

* But see revised statement, p. 187.

an eminence and to the left of Captain Weed's battery, already engaged. Several of the enemy's batteries were soon silenced, and two of the caissons blown up, yet he made heavy demonstration toward our center and right, and it became necessary to send Captain Clark's battery up, which soon got into position on the left of Captain Durell's.

I now received orders from General Burnside to move still farther to the left and front, and cross Antietam Bridge. The batteries were, therefore, withdrawn and placed in new positions, so as to aid in clearing the wood on the opposite bank, strongly occupied by the enemy. One section was placed on the right of Benjamin's battery, in rear of the corn-field, through which the division moved toward the bridge. Another section was placed on the right of the road, about 400 yards from the bridge, but did not open. Captain Clark's battery was ordered to a position on the right of the woods, near the slope occupied by the division the previous night, and one section held in reserve. The First Brigade, General Nagle, now moved toward the bridge, while the Second Brigade, General Ferrero, was formed in line of battle in the corn-field some 200 yards in rear. The bridge was strongly defended by the enemy, and the approaches to it exposed to a murderous fire from behind breastworks. The importance of carrying it without delay was impressed upon me by General Burnside, and I went in person to the vicinity of the bridge, and ordered the Second Maryland, Colonel Dureya, and Colonel Griffin, Sixth New Hampshire, to move over at a double-quick and with bayonets fixed. They made a handsome effort to execute this order, but the fire was so heavy on them before they could reach the bridge that they were forced to give way and fall back.

Meantime orders arrived from General Burnside to carry the bridge at all hazards. I then selected the Fifty-first New York and the Fifty-first Pennsylvania from the Second Brigade, and directed them to charge with the bayonet. They started on their mission of death full of enthusiasm, and taking a route less exposed than the regiments which had made the effort before them, rushed at a double-quick over the slope leading to the bridge and over the bridge itself with an impetuosity which the enemy could not resist, and the Stars and Stripes were planted on the opposite bank at 1 o'clock p. m., amid the most enthusiastic cheering from every part of the field from where they could be seen. Having crossed the bridge, the Second Brigade filed to the right, the First Brigade to the left, and both moved up and occupied the high grounds at once, throwing out skirmishers on all sides, who soon became hotly engaged, yet held their ground, though with considerable loss on both sides.

The enemy had by this time been re-enforced, and had their batteries placed on still higher ground, and within 500 or 600 yards of our position, and all concentrated on it. Too weak to advance, we could only lie down and await re-enforcements, and here the troops displayed their heroism more, if possible, than on any former occasion, for the enemy opened with canister and grape, shell and railroad iron, and the vehicles of destruction fell like hail among them, killing and wounding large numbers and fairly covering us with dust, yet not a man left his place except to carry off his wounded comrade. Toward evening we were re-enforced by the division of Cox, under Colonel Scammon, Rodman, and Willcox. These divisions were formed into line of battle and moved forward, my division being held in reserve, except the batteries, which reported to General Rodman. The enemy, however, had received large re-enforcements, and at twilight my division was ordered forward, General Ferrero on the right, to the support of Willcox, and General

Nagle on the left, to the support of Rodman. For the part taken in this affair by the Second Brigade, I have to refer you to the report of General Ferrero, as I was with the First Brigade. This latter moved forward in fine order, and drove the advancing foe beyond the corn-field on the left, and slept upon the ground throughout the night.

It is impossible to refer to the many individual acts of heroism displayed by the officers and men throughout these few eventful days without extending this report to too great a length. When, however, it is considered that during all this time they were without food (or had but little), marching and fighting almost continually, with but little rest or sleep, it may well be said they sustained in an eminent degree the undying reputation they had already earned under the lamented Major-General Reno in the brilliant victories of Roanoke, Camden, New Berne, and Chantilly. In order, therefore, to prevent, as far as may be, injustice being done to any deserving officer or soldier, I would respectfully refer you to the reports of the brigade commanders, inclosed.

To Capt. H. R. Mighels, assistant adjutant-general; Capts. C. H. Hale, J. K. Casey, H. B. Sturgis, and First Lieut. A. H. Hosmer, aides-de-camp, I am under many obligations for the bravery and zeal with which they carried my orders in the hottest of the contest. The three last-mentioned officers were separated from me after the battle of South Mountain by sickness and orders for other service, and could not join again in time to take part in the battle of Sharpsburg. My aide-de-camp and ordnance officer, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, I cannot commend in too high terms. He was invaluable at all times, carrying orders, placing the artillery in favorable positions, bringing up ammunition, and making himself useful in every department. I would commend this officer to special consideration, as I look upon him as one of the most promising young officers in the service. Capt. N. Plato, assistant quartermaster, and Capt. F. E. Berier, commissary of subsistence, rendered good service also in their respective departments, and exhibited great energy and zeal. Surg. A. T. Watson labored night and day in ministering to the wounded, and is deserving of the gratitude of the country.

Accompanying the reports of the brigade commanders you will find the list of killed, wounded, and missing; also the number of the enemy's prisoners taken, as follows: Killed, 140; wounded, 619; missing, 45; total, 804.* One of my orderlies, Private John Dohmeyer, Company D, Fifth Cavalry, was severely, perhaps mortally, wounded by one of our own shells while at my side near the bridge. Prisoners taken, about 100.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. D. STURGIS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters Ninth Corps.

No. 147.

Reports of Brig. Gen. James Nagle, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., SECOND DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Antietam, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that previous to arriving at South Mountain, September 14, in compliance with orders, two of my regi-

* But see revised statement, p. 197.

ments were ordered to report to General Reno toward the right, to support several other regiments advancing into position. The regiments selected were the Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire Volunteers. The other regiments were the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers and Ninth New Hampshire Volunteers, both of which advanced in line of battle up the South Mountain as reserve.

Soon afterward the advance deployed to the right and left, and both the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania and Ninth New Hampshire Volunteers were then brought into action. Large fields of corn were filled with the enemy, so concealed that only a bayonet charge could clear the fields, and the Ninth New Hampshire Volunteers charged bayonets through these fields of corn, clearing them of a regiment of South Carolina infantry, and pursuing them through a heavy wood, and then joining by a flank movement the remainder of the brigade. The Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers did excellent service on the left, where a sharp engagement took place. The Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire Volunteers were held in reserve, and lay under a galling fire on the right. My whole brigade rested on their arms after the battle closed at 9 p. m., having driven the enemy at every point. The contest was spirited, and both my officers and men behaved with good cheer and true courage while under fire.

The loss in the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania stands 11 wounded and 1 missing, and in the Ninth New Hampshire Volunteers, 23 wounded and 6 missing.

Captain Clark's battery did good execution on the left, and punished the enemy severely.

I have the honor to transmit the inclosed list of killed, wounded, and missing in my brigade.*

All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,

JAMES NAGLE,

Brigadier-General, First Brigade, Second Division.

Brig. Gen. S. D. STURGIS.

HQRS. FIRST BRIG., SECOND DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Antietam, Md., September 20, 1862.

GENERAL: On the morning of September 17 my brigade received orders, while encamped near Sharpsburg, to advance on the enemy at a point he had selected where the stone bridge crosses the Antietam Creek, about 2 miles from Sharpsburg. The position was a strong one for the enemy, as he was posted in strong force on the bank of Antietam Creek, on the wooded banks of this stream, with precipitous banks that afforded them shelter from our artillery and infantry. Two roads diverge from this bridge, and the approach to it is through a narrow ravine, admitting not more than one regiment at a time, upon which a deadly volley could be easily poured from the enemy in ambuscade on the other side of the bridge. The topography being of such a nature that the whole brigade could not be posted to advantage, a front was selected on the left, on the banks of the stream, from which an oblique range upon the bridge could be had, while my right occupied the bluff overlooking the bridge, behind which two regiments of the enemy were concealed in the heavy underbrush.

From this strong position the enemy poured a terrific fire upon our infantry, which was replied to in a very spirited manner by all the regiments in my brigade. The Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers,

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 186.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sigfried commanding, passed through a field skirted by a forest, in which the enemy was posted, and with the other regiments soon cleared it of the rebel sharpshooters, placed there in concealed positions. The Ninth New Hampshire Volunteers, Col. E. Q. Fellows, was placed near the bridge, and opened a destructive fire directly upon the enemy, and expended nearly all their ammunition during a gallant resistance of an hour, in which they were between the fires of two regiments of the enemy, and sustained themselves nobly. Lieut. Col. H. B. Titus, of Ninth New Hampshire Volunteers, fell, badly wounded, at this point, with several of the commissioned officers of the regiment. The Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire Volunteers were placed in a perilous position near the bridge, and are entitled to commendation for their soldier-like bearing and bravery displayed.

When the most of the ammunition in my brigade was expended, my brigade fell back; the Second Brigade was ordered up to storm the bridge, which they did, and my brigade ordered to follow for the possession of the heights on the opposite side of the river. With cheers and great enthusiasm my brigade passed the bridge and planted our flag on the heights in a few moments. After other re-enforcements arrived we advanced and drove the enemy from their position on the range of hills near the river, where a severe battle took place, in which my brigade maintained their ground, though they were somewhat cut up in this position by the grape and shell of the enemy. Skirmishing was kept up on the 18th between our heavy picket force and the skirmishers of the enemy.

Where all behaved so gallantly, it is difficult to particularize in regard to the conduct of both officers and men, as all behaved courageously and nobly in this terrific contest of arms. I cannot refrain, however, from speaking of Captain Clark, of Battery E, Fourth Artillery, who did excellent service, and received four wounds during the day. First Lieut. William L. Baker was killed in the engagement while his battery was doing great damage to the enemy.

I also take pleasure in saying that my staff officers rendered me all the assistance in their different departments that could be expected of them, and particularly Dr. Reber, in aiding the sick, wounded, and dying, and Lieutenant Hinkle, aide-de-camp, who was by my side at all times. In short, my whole command has given me entire satisfaction, and I feel proud to acknowledge this fact.

The loss in my brigade on the 17th and 18th was 35 killed, 154 wounded, 15 missing; total, 204.

Inclosed please find the names of all killed, wounded, and missing, and the regiments to which they belong.

All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,

JAMES NAGLE,

Brigadier-General, First Brig., Second Div., Ninth Army Corps.
Brig. Gen. S. D. STURGIS.

No. 148.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Antietam, September 19, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on Sunday, 7th instant, according to your orders, my brigade marched from Washington; that

our march was renewed daily without noticeable incident until Sunday, 14th instant, when we arrived at South Mountain, and engaged the enemy. At 3 o'clock we marched up the Hagerstown road, leading over the mountain, almost to its summit, and there formed line of battle, to support other lines then engaged. At about 3.30 o'clock I advanced, by your orders, to the top of the heights in advance of our other forces, and was unexpectedly fired upon from the woods by a large force of the enemy. The sudden fire produced temporary confusion in one of my new regiments. It quickly recovered, however, reforming under a severe fire. My command then advanced, and after a long and hard fight, lasting until 9 p. m., drove the enemy from their position and occupied the field. We retained possession of the battle-field during the night, having our whole force on guard, momentarily expecting a renewal of the attack.

The enemy posted their pickets within a few yards of our lines, and during the night quietly withdrew their main body. We captured above 100 prisoners.

In this battle all the troops of my command behaved with the greatest bravery. I have to mention as worthy of particular praise the conduct of the Fifty-first New York Volunteers, commanded by Lieut. Col. R. B. Potter; the Fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanded by Col. J. F. Hartranft, and the Twenty-first Massachusetts Volunteers, commanded by Col. W. S. Clark. Col. E. A. Wild, of the Thirty-fifth Massachusetts Volunteers, was wounded severely in the arm while forming his regiment under the enemy's fire.

I append a list of the killed and wounded in this engagement, amounting to 10 killed, 83 wounded, 23 missing; total, 116.

On the 15th instant, at 1 o'clock, we resumed our march in pursuit of the enemy, coming up with them near Antietam Creek, and bivouacking in front of their lines. During the morning of the 16th we remained in line of battle, the shells from the enemy dropping thickly in our midst. At 2 o'clock we changed front, moving nearer to the creek, in readiness to attack the enemy in the morning.

On the morning of the 17th, at about 9 o'clock, by your order, I advanced my forces toward the stone bridge crossing Antietam Creek, a bridge naturally almost impregnable, and very strongly fortified by the enemy. We formed line of battle in a corn-field near the bridge, and awaited the result of the attack of some of our other forces that had preceded my brigade in the attempt to cross the creek. The passage of the bridge was, however, very obstinately disputed, and at length I received orders from you to move forward my brigade, and carry the bridge at all hazards. I accordingly moved forward my command, and carried the bridge at the point of the bayonet at 1 o'clock, losing in doing so a large number of officers and men. The Fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanded by Col. J. F. Hartranft, led the charge, followed by the Fifty-first New York Volunteers, Lieut. Col. R. B. Potter; the Thirty-fifth Massachusetts Volunteers, Lieut. Col. Carruth, and the Twenty-first Massachusetts Volunteers, Col. W. S. Clark.

After carrying the bridge I moved forward one regiment to the summit of the hill, to retain the position gained until re-enforcements should arrive, holding the rest of my command on the banks of the creek.

During the afternoon, the enemy being re-enforced, and with heavy supports of artillery, advanced to drive our forces from their position. According to your orders, I moved forward my brigade to resist this movement, and, forming line, advanced under a storm of shot and shell. My troops, when entering this second battle, were nearly out of ammu-

nition, but, firing every round they had in their boxes, they quietly placed themselves on the ground in their position, and remained until other regiments had formed in front to relieve them, when by my orders they retired in good order from the field, and again marched to the banks of the creek.

I cannot sufficiently commend the bravery of the troops of my command during these engagements. Both officers and men behaved with the greatest gallantry, and I cannot help expressing the pride I feel in commanding such valiant soldiers as they have proved themselves.

I have to mourn the loss in the last battle of Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, a gallant and efficient officer and amiable gentleman, killed at the stone bridge by a shell. Lieutenant-Colonel Carruth, of the Thirty-fifth Massachusetts, was slightly wounded.

I annex a list of killed, wounded, and missing, amounting to 95 killed, 371 wounded, 6 missing; total, 472. Loss in both engagements, 588.

I have the honor to be, general, your most obedient servant,

EDW. FERRERO,
Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. S. D. STURGIS.

HDQRS. FERRERO'S BRIG., STURGIS' DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, September 29, 1862.

GENERAL: In my report of the late battles I neglected to mention several officers particularly worthy of notice for their valuable service on the field:

Lieut. G. H. McKibbin, acting assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. A. F. Walcott and Lieut. J. M. Hudson, aides, behaved with great gallantry and coolness during both actions. Captain Durell, commanding Battery A, One hundred and fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers, is especially worthy of praise for the gallant and efficient serving of his battery.

I desire that the above be added to my report.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

EDW. FERRERO,
Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. S. D. STURGIS,
Commanding Second Division, Ninth Army Corps.

No. 149.

Report of Col. Harrison S. Fairchild, Eighty-ninth New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Third Division, of skirmish near Jefferson and battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., THIRD DIV., NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Md., September 23, 1862.

On Saturday morning, the 13th of September, 1862, I was ordered by General Rodman, commanding Third Division, to detail the Ninth New York Volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball, to support Col. R. H. Rush's regiment of lancers in the road from Frederick to Jefferson. Subsequently the remainder of the brigade, comprising the Eighty-ninth and One hundred and third New York Volun-

teers, and the battery company of the Ninth New York Volunteers, was ordered by General Parke, chief of staff, as an additional support to said regiment. On our arrival at the position held by the lancers and New York volunteers, we found that they had had a skirmish about 5 miles from Frederick.

It was reported that the enemy were in position in front with artillery and cavalry. Company B, of the Ninth New York Volunteers, was thrown forward to reconnoiter on the left, and reported the enemy as having left the position they had occupied the previous night with three guns and a small cavalry force, and the road clear.

Companies C and H, Captain Parisen and Lieutenant McKechnie, were sent to the right in the woods, who discovered, engaged, and drove the enemy's pickets across the fields toward Middletown, the lancers and the remainder of the Ninth New York Volunteers advancing toward Jefferson. At the request of Colonel Rush, I detached two companies from the One hundred and third New York Volunteers to support the skirmishers of the Ninth, then in the woods on the right, and subsequently detached four companies, the balance of the One hundred and third, under the command of Major Ringold, to support Captain Haseltine's company of the lancers, who were skirmishing toward Middletown.

I took position on the hill $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles this side of Jefferson with the Eighty-ninth and the battery, formed line of battle, and remained in that position until sunset, when I received an order from General Reno to return with the brigade to Frederick, where we arrived at 7 o'clock of the same night, the enemy having retreated toward Middletown, followed by Captain Haseltine, of the lancers, and the four companies of the One hundred and third, under Major Ringold.

We received orders after our arrival at Frederick to be prepared to march the next morning (Sunday) at 3 o'clock. In compliance with the same, we began our march, and arrived at Middletown about 10 o'clock a. m., where we bivouacked for a few hours, and then moved to South Mountain Gap, the four companies of the One hundred and third, under Major Ringold, having joined us at Middletown, where we were ordered to the left, and to form line of battle on General Cox's division, to support Battery E, Fourth Artillery.

While forming line of battle we were attacked on the left by the Second, Third, Thirteenth, and Thirtieth North Carolina Regiments, their object being to capture the battery, it having been in position some time without support. The Ninth and One hundred and third Regiments were in line of battle ready for action. The Eighty-ninth immediately got into line and opened fire (being the only regiment engaged), with Battery E, Fourth Artillery. The enemy were repulsed, the left saved from being turned, and also the battery from being taken.

Our loss was 2 killed and 18 wounded. We captured 30 prisoners and 150 stand of arms, holding our position during the night, the enemy retreating, the One hundred and third having been thrown to the front of the line as pickets after the battle.

On the afternoon of the 15th we marched until late at night, and encamped a little beyond Mount Carmel. On the afternoon of the 16th we were ordered forward again, taking up a position on the hill in a corn-field on the eastern shore of Antietam Creek, this being the extreme left of the line. Placing two guns of the Ninth Battery in position on our left flank, we slept on our arms. The enemy having at daylight discovered our position, we were saluted by the bullets of their sharpshooters, who were stationed in the woods on the hill on the op-

posite shore of the creek. This was followed by a brisk shelling from the enemy's battery, also stationed on the opposite side of the creek.

By order of General Rodman, we left this exposed position under a heavy fire, having 36 men wounded, and took position to the left and rear, up the gorge of the mountain. After resting some two hours and refreshing the men, we were ordered to advance, and formed line of battle on the crest of the hill to the left of the position vacated in the morning. I then ordered the Ninth Battery to the left, placed them in position, and commenced shelling the road and woods on the opposite side of the creek, driving the enemy from their position. The enemy then advanced their skirmishers, and were forced to retire by the timely execution of this battery.

The brigade then moved by the left flank down to the ford; crossing the creek, and forming in the woods, advanced and took a position opposite the bridge; there formed line of battle on the crest of the hill in the rear of ——— Battery, remaining in position under a heavy fire of shell. Though the fire was severe, the brigade remained firm in its position for nearly an hour, until ordered to advance. General Rodman then ordered us to advance to the support of General Sturgis' command. We continued to advance to the opposite hill under a tremendous fire from the enemy's batteries up steep embankments. Arriving near a stone fence, the enemy—a brigade composed of South Carolina and Georgia regiments—opened on us with musketry. After returning their fire, I immediately ordered a charge, which the whole brigade gallantly responded to, moving with alacrity and steadiness. Arriving at the fence, behind which the enemy were awaiting us, receiving their fire, losing large numbers of our men, we charged over the fence, dislodging them and driving them from their position down the hill toward the village, a stand of regimental colors belonging to a South Carolina regiment being taken by Private Thomas Hare, Company D, Eighty-ninth New York Volunteers, who was afterward killed. We continued to pursue the enemy down the hill. Discovering that they were massing fresh troops on our left, I went back, and requested General Rodman to bring up rapidly the Second Brigade to our support, which he did, they engaging the enemy, he soon afterward falling badly wounded. It was then discovered that the enemy were moving up from the corn-field on our left to flank us, and I ordered the brigade to retire about 250 yards to the rear of the position we now held, which movement was executed in good order and without confusion. The large force advancing on our left flank compelled us to retire from the position, which we could have held had we been properly supported. We remained in this position until we were positively ordered to withdraw from the field, the officers and men regretting such a necessity. Thus ended one of the hardest contested battles of the day.

Great praise is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball, commanding the Ninth; Major Jardine, commanding Eighty-ninth, and Major Ringold, commanding One hundred and third Regiment, for their coolness, gallantry, and bravery on the field; also to the line officers of the several regiments and the steadiness of the men.

I inclose a list of the casualties of this brigade on that day.*

I remain, very respectfully,

H. S. FAIRCHILD,

Colonel, Comdg. First Brig., Third Div., Ninth Army Corps.

Col. EDWARD HARLAND,

Commanding Third Division.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 197.

No. 150.

Report of Maj. Edward Jardine, commanding Eighty-ninth New York Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division, of colors captured at Antietam.

HDQRS. EIGHTY-NINTH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLS.,
September 20, 1862.

SIR: Accompanying please find colors of the —— Regiment South Carolina Troops, taken in the engagement of the 17th instant at the stone wall on the front of the First Brigade, Third Division, by Private Thomas Hare, Company D, Eighty-ninth Regiment New York Volunteers, afterward killed.

Respectfully, yours,

E. JARDINE,

Major, Comdg. Eighty-ninth Regiment New York Vols.

Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding Ninth Army Corps.

No. 151.

Report of Col. Edward Harland, Eighth Connecticut Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, RODMAN'S DIVISION,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 22, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the Second Brigade, of General Rodman's division of the Ninth Army Corps, during the engagement with the enemy on the 17th instant:

About sunset on the 16th instant the brigade was placed in line of battle by order of General Rodman on the left of Colonel Scammon's division, supported on the left by the First Brigade, of General Rodman's division. The line was formed behind a range of hills running nearly parallel with Antietam Creek and about one-quarter of a mile directly back from the bridge across the creek. Strong pickets were placed at the distance of 300 yards in front of the line, and in this position we remained until morning. At daylight the enemy commenced shelling the position, and as they had obtained the exact range our loss was considerable.

About 7 o'clock, in accordance with an order received from General Rodman, I moved the brigade into a position to the rear and to the left of the one formerly occupied, facing to the left, the new line of battle forming nearly a right angle with the old one. In this position we remained between one and two hours. Our next movement was a change of front formed on first battalion. This brought the line of battle in a position parallel to the one occupied at first, the right resting about 200 yards in the rear of the first position to the left. Shortly afterward I received orders from General Rodman to move the brigade, with the exception of the Eleventh Regiment Connecticut Volunteers, which was left to support a battery, to the left, forming a line of battle on the prolongation of the old line. I then sent out two companies of skirmishers from the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers to discover, if possible, a ford by which the creek could be crossed. After the ford was

found, I followed in the rear of the First Brigade for the purpose of crossing the creek. I sent an aide-de-camp to bring the Eleventh Regiment Connecticut Volunteers to join the rest of the brigade, who reported that the regiment was not in the position in which it was left, and that he was unable to find it. I saw nothing more of the Eleventh Regiment Connecticut Volunteers until about sunset, when I met the remnant of the regiment near the bridge.

General Rodman ordered me to detach one regiment for the support of the battery belonging to the Ninth New York Volunteers, and to send the remaining regiments of the brigade across the creek in rear of the First Brigade, and, when I had placed the regiment in proper position, to join the balance of the brigade. I found the battery on the hill just below the ford. I detached the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers, placed it in what I considered the strongest position for the defense of the battery, and then crossed the ford. I found the rest of my command placed behind a stone wall, with orders from General Rodman to wait there for orders.

Shortly after my arrival the enemy opened an enfilading fire from a section of a battery which had been placed on our left flank. In order to protect the men, I moved the command more to the right, behind the crest of a hill, and awaited in that position the orders of General Rodman. While in this position the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers rejoined the brigade, and I moved still more to the right, in the direction of the bridge, and halted in the woods, just under the brow of the hill. From this point I was conducted by an aide of General Rodman, and placed in position in the rear of the First Brigade. Shortly after, General Rodman ordered me to form on the left of the First Brigade, ready for an advance on the enemy. Major Lion, acting aide-de-camp, who went to the left of the line to carry my orders, on his return reported that a brigade of the enemy's infantry was forming on the left, which fact I reported to General Rodman. When the order was given by General Rodman to advance, the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers, which was on the right of the line, started promptly. The Sixteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers and the Fourth Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers, both of which regiments were in a cornfield, apparently did not hear my order. I therefore sent an aide-de-camp to order them forward. This delay on the left placed the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers considerably in the advance of the rest of the brigade. I asked General Rodman if I should halt the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers and wait for the rest of the brigade to come up. He ordered me to advance the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers, and he would hurry up the Sixteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers and the Fourth Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers. I advanced with the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers and commenced firing. The Sixteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers and the Fourth Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers not coming up, I turned to see if they were advancing, and saw some infantry belonging to the enemy advancing upon our left flank. Knowing that if they were not checked it would be impossible to hold this part of the field, without waiting for orders, I put the spurs to my horse to hasten the arrival of the Sixteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers. My horse was almost immediately shot under me, which delayed my arrival. I found that the Sixteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers had changed their front, by order of General Rodman. The line was formed facing to the left, and was nearly a prolongation of the enemy's lines, except that they faced in opposite directions. I immediately ordered Colonel

Beach to change his front, so as to attack the enemy on the right flank. This change was effected, though with some difficulty, owing to the fact that the regiment had been in service but three weeks, and the impossibility of seeing but a small portion of the line at once.

Almost as soon as the change was effected, the right of the enemy's lines, which was concealed in the edge of the corn-field, opened fire. Our men returned the fire and advanced, but were forced to fall back. Colonel Beach rallied them and returned to the attack, but they were again driven back, this time out of the corn-field, beyond the fence. Here they were again rallied, but as it was impossible to see the enemy; and the men were under fire for the first time, they could not be held. The Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers, which had held their position until this time, now, by order of Major Ward, commanding, moved more to the right, where they were sheltered in a measure from the fire in front, and changed front, so as to reply to the enemy on the left. After a few rounds, as most of the men were out of ammunition, the order was given to fall back. On the road leading to the bridge I found part of the Eleventh Regiment Connecticut Volunteers. At the bridge I collected the shattered remnants of the brigade, in hopes of making a stand, but, owing to the large loss of officers and the failure of ammunition, it was impossible to render the men of any material service. I therefore conducted the brigade across the bridge, and bivouacked for the night in front of the position held by a portion of General Sykes' command.

Battery A, Fifth Artillery, was assigned to my brigade. General Rodman, however, assumed the immediate command the night before the action, and the battery did not report to me again until after the battle.

The regimental reports not being in, it is impossible to give a more detailed account of the movements of the different regiments composing the command.

I append a list of casualties,* with the strength of the brigade before going into action.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD HARLAND,

Colonel, Comdg. Second Brig., Third Div., Ninth Army Corps.

Capt. CHARLES T. GARDNER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 152.

Report of Maj. J. Edward Ward, Eighth Connecticut Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH CONNECTICUT VOLUNTEERS,
Mouth of Antietam, Md., September 19, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the report of the proceedings of the Eighth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers during the late engagement near Sharpsburg:

Lieutenant-Colonel Appelman having been wounded in the engagement, I am unable to state what orders he may have received, but can speak only from the time I took command. The Second Brigade, Third

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 197.

Division, Ninth Army Corps, with which we were connected, held the extreme left of our line, and about 4 o'clock p. m. were ordered to advance to the support of General Willcox, on our right, who had been repulsed. We did so, and held our position far in advance, until ordered to retire by General Rodman, but not until we had lost over 50 per cent. of our regiment. The fire from artillery and musketry was very severe, the regiment receiving fire in front and on both flanks. The conduct of both officers and men was all that could be asked for, and I have to thank the officers for their active co-operation with me in the performance of their several duties. I will notice particularly the conduct of Private Charles Walker, of Company D, who brought the national colors off the field after the sergeant and every corporal of the color-guard were either killed or wounded.

Our loss was 34 killed, 139 wounded, and 21 missing; total, 194.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. EDWARD WARD,

Major, Commanding Eighth Connecticut Volunteers.

General J. D. WILLIAMS.

No. 153.

Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph B. Curtis, Fourth Rhode Island Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FOURTH REGIMENT RHODE ISLAND VOLUNTEERS,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this regiment in the battle of Sharpsburg on the 17th instant:

On the afternoon of the 16th, Harland's brigade, consisting of the Eighth, Eleventh, and Sixteenth Connecticut and Fourth Rhode Island, left the bivouac it had occupied on the left of the Sharpsburg road, and proceeded in a southwesterly direction, following the general course of the Antietam Creek, for 3 or 4 miles, and took up a position behind a range of hills covering a stone bridge which crossed the creek. The regiment lay upon its arms all night, having its front covered by its own pickets. The Fourth had the left of the brigade line, and upon its left lay Fairchild's brigade, of Rodman's division. About an hour after light on the morning of the 17th, the enemy's pickets commenced firing upon those of the regiments upon our left, and shortly after they began shelling the whole division line, their range being very accurate. As soon as the firing commenced, the ranks were dressed and the men directed to lie down in their places. The three left companies, being in a more exposed position, were brought in rear of the rest of the battalion.

Orders were received from Colonel Harland to follow the other brigade to the left, but before that brigade could move, the enemy opened another battery on our right, enfilading our position with a fire of round shot, and completely commanding a little rise of ground on our left, which we should have been obliged to cross to reach the ground occupied by the other brigade. This fact was reported to Colonel Harland by an officer, who returned with orders for the regiment to move to the left and rear, through some woods, in a direction to be indicated by Lieutenant Ives, of General Rodman's staff, who came back with him. The order was executed, the regiment moving by the left flank to the rear through a wooded gully, but partially concealed from the enemy,

who continued their heavy fire of shell and solid shot. The regiment was then drawn up in a farm lane, well protected by a hill. As the brigade filed through the wooded gully, a battery placed in rear of our original position commenced replying to the enemy, too late, however, to cover our retrograde movement, which was almost completed. Our loss in this affair was 2 killed and 8 wounded, among the latter the color-bearer and two color-corporals.

After about an hour the brigade advanced in line of battle to the top of the hill in front, making a right half-wheel, and, after crossing several fields, finally took a position on the top of the hills, at the foot of which ran the Antietam Creek, on the opposite side of which was the enemy. The action on our right was now very sharp, both artillery and infantry being engaged. Our division constituted the extreme left of the line. After a halt of some duration, the division moved by the left flank to the creek, and crossed at a ford under fire from the enemy's skirmishers, who were sheltered behind a stone wall. The Fourth, after crossing the ford, filed to the left (the other brigade going to the right, and the rest of Harland's brigade not yet having crossed), and, after throwing out Company H as skirmishers to cover the front, and Company K to the left, advanced in line toward the stone wall, the enemy retiring, but shortly after opening a fire of musketry on our left, which was soon silenced by the fire from our battery covering the ford.

The enemy then commenced a fire of grape and shell upon us, and the Sixteenth Connecticut, which had just crossed the ford and was taking a position to support our left, retired, passing along our rear. After it had passed, this regiment, by Colonel Harland's orders, took a more sheltered position at right angles to our original one. From here we moved to the right, in the direction taken by Colonel Fairchild's brigade, through a wooded ravine, through which ran the creek. The steepness of the hill-side, the thickness of the wood, and the accurate range of the enemy's batteries made the passage through this defile a matter of considerable difficulty. Upon clearing the woods we lay waiting orders for a short time under a hill-side, which the enemy were shelling, the rest of the brigade having passed on while we were in the woods. From here the regiment was ordered by Colonel Harland's aide to cross the hill behind which it was lying (a plowed field), and to form in line in a corn-field, and to move to the support of the Sixteenth Connecticut, which lay in a deep valley between two hills planted with corn. The regiment moved forward by the right flank in fine order, although subjected to the fire of rebel batteries, of which it was in full view. Descending into the valley to its support, it found the Sixteenth Connecticut giving way and crowding upon its right, compelling it to move to the left, and rendering it almost impossible to dress the line, which an advance in line of battle across two fields of full-grown corn had slightly deranged. It was now subjected to sharp musketry fire from the front, but as the enemy showed the national flag (the corn concealing their uniform), and as our troops had been seen in advance on our right, moving diagonally across our front, the order to cease firing was given, and a volunteer officer to go forward to ascertain who was in our front was called for. Lieuts. George E. Curtis and George H. Watts immediately stepped forward, and placing themselves one on each side of the color-bearer (Corporal Tanner, Company G), carried the flag up the hill within 20 feet of the rebels, when the enemy fired, killing the corporal. Lieutenant Curtis seized the colors and returned, followed by Lieutenant Watts. The order to commence firing was then given,

and Colonel Steere sent me to the Sixteenth Connecticut to see if they would support us in a charge up the hill, but the corn being very thick and high, I could find no one to whom to apply. I returned to tell the colonel that we must depend upon ourselves. He then sent to the rear for support. Before they could arrive, the enemy outflanked us with a brigade of infantry, which descended the hill to our left in three lines, one firing over the other and enfilading us. The regiment on our right now broke, a portion of them crowding on our line. Colonel Steere ordered the regiment to move out of the gully by the right flank, and I left him to carry the order to the left, of which wing I had charge, the colonel taking the right (the major being sick, and no adjutant, there were only two field officers to handle the regiment). The regiment commenced the movement in an orderly manner, but, under the difficulty of keeping closed up in a corn-field, the misconception of the order on the left, and the tremendous fire of the enemy, consisting of musketry, shell, and grape, the regiment broke. Colonel Steere, as I afterward learned, was severely wounded in the left thigh, immediately after I left him to repeat on the left the order to leave the corn-field. An attempt was made to rally the regiment to the support of a battery at some distance back from the corn-field, but before many had been collected the battery retired, when the efforts became unavailing.

I desire to bring to your notice Lieutenants Curtis and Watts, who volunteered to carry the colors forward in the corn-field, and the following non-commissioned officers and privates: Sergeants Wilson, Company A; Coon, Company B; Morris, Company C; Corporals Leonard, Company A; Farley, Company C, and Privates McCann, Company B, and Peck, Company C, who rallied, after the regiment was broken, on the left of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, and continued fighting until all their ammunition was gone, when I ordered them to recross the river to regain the regiment. All the food the men had during the entire day was the very small quantities of salt pork and hard bread they were able to find in an abandoned camp, during the short rest after the shelling out in the morning.

The entire loss during the day was 21 enlisted men killed, 5 officers and 72 enlisted men wounded, and 2 missing. A list of the names, as furnished by the captains of companies, has been forwarded to the Adjutant-General.

Colonel Steere commends in the highest terms the conduct of the regiment upon that day. I can only add that throughout the day I never saw an officer but that he was encouraging and directing his men.

The men fought well, as is proved by the fact that they were engaged constantly with the enemy during nine or ten hours, all of which time they were under arms; that they finally broke, under such a very severe fire, and the pressure of a broken regiment, is not surprising, although much to be regretted. Of the present state of the regiment I have only the most favorable report to give.

By direction of Colonel Steere, I have organized the regiment into eight companies, the members of Companies I and K being divided among the others temporarily, although in all reports and musters they will be borne upon their own rolls. In this way officers are gained to officer the other companies, and the companies are made practically larger. The three days just spent in camp, although broken by marching orders, have in part rested the men from the fatigues of the two battles and constant marches to which they have been subjected since the 4th of this month.

The temporary loss of its commanding officer at the time when his experience can be of so much use is a severe blow to the regiment.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH B. CURTIS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Fourth Rhode Island.

His Excellency WILLIAM SPRAGUE,

Governor State of Rhode Island.

No. 154.

Report of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, U. S. Army, commanding Kanawha Division, of the battle of South Mountain.

HDQRS. KANAWHA DIVISION, NINTH ARMY CORPS,

September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Kanawha Division, Ninth Army Corps, Major-General Burnside's command, in the battle of South Mountain:

At 6 o'clock in the morning of September 14 the division marched from Middletown under an order received by me from Major-General Reno, directing me to support with my division the advance of General Pleasanton, who, with his brigade of cavalry and artillery, was moving up the Hagerstown turnpike toward the positions of the enemy in the pass of South Mountain. The First Brigade of the division, Col. E. P. Scammon commanding, consisting of the Twelfth, Twenty-third, and Thirtieth Ohio Regiments, McMullin's Ohio battery, and Gilmore's and Harrison's troops of cavalry, was ordered to proceed by the Boonsborough road, moving to the left of the Hagerstown turnpike, and to feel of the enemy, ascertaining whether the crest of South Mountain on that side was held by any considerable force. The Second Brigade, Colonel Crook commanding, consisting of the Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-sixth Ohio Regiments, and Simmonds' battery, with Schambeck's cavalry troop, was ordered to follow on the same road to support the First Brigade.

It soon became evident the enemy held the crest in considerable force, and the whole division was ordered to advance to the assault of the position, word being received from Major-General Reno that the column would be supported by the whole corps. Two 20-pounder Parrott guns from Simmonds' battery and two sections from McMullin's battery were left in the rear, in positions on the turnpike where they were most efficiently served during the action in opposition to the enemy's guns in the center of the line along the Hagerstown road. The First Brigade being in advance, the Twenty-third Ohio Regiment, Lieut. Col. R. B. Hayes commanding, was deployed to our left, and ordered to move through the woods to the left of the road and up to the crest of the mountain, gaining, if possible, the enemy's right, so as to turn it and attack his flank. The Twelfth Ohio Regiment, Col. C. B. White commanding, occupied the center of the line, and the Thirtieth Ohio Regiment, Col. Hugh Ewing commanding, was on the right.

These movements were successfully made and the troops brought into position by Colonel Scammon before the arrival of the rest of the division.

The Second Brigade marched in column of reserve, and within sup-

porting distance. The whole line in advancing was well covered with skirmishers, whose duty was very effectively performed.

The Twenty-third Ohio having reached the crest on the left, established itself there in spite of a most vigorous resistance on the part of the enemy. On the right the Thirtieth Ohio also succeeded in reaching the top of the slope, in the face of showers of canister and spherical case from a battery of the enemy commanding that part of the line. A section of McMullin's battery was immediately advanced to the front and opened an effective fire upon the enemy, but its position was necessarily so near the enemy's infantry as to be greatly exposed, and after losing Lieutenant Crome, commanding the section, and the wounding of 6 gunners of the section, it was withdrawn, having rendered good service, however, in enabling the infantry to gain tenable positions along the ridge. In the center of the line the Twelfth Ohio was obliged to advance several hundred yards over open pasture-ground, under a most galling fire from the edge of the wood which crowned the slope, and behind stone fences.

The skirmishers of this regiment, advancing with admirable courage and firmness, drove in those of the enemy, and the regiment with loud hurrahs charged up the slope with the bayonet. The rebels stood firmly, and kept up a murderous fire until the advancing line was within a few feet of them, when they broke and fled over the crest into the shelter of a dense thicket skirting the other side. The Eleventh Ohio, of the Second Brigade, Lieut. Col. A. H. Coleman commanding, was now sent to support the left, and formed on the left of the Twenty-third. The enemy made several attempts to retake the crest, advancing with great obstinacy and boldness. In the center they were at one time partially successful, but the Thirty-sixth Ohio, of the Second Brigade, Lieut. Col. M. Clarke commanding, was brought forward, and, with the Twelfth, drove them back by a most dashing and spirited charge. The whole crest was now held by our troops, as follows: The left by the Eleventh and Twenty-third Ohio, the center by the Twelfth Ohio, supported by the Thirty-sixth formed in line in reserve, and the right by the Thirtieth Ohio, supported by the Twenty-eighth, Lieut. Col. G. Becker commanding.

Two 10-pounder Parrotts, of Simmonds' battery, under Lieutenant Glassie, were pushed forward to an open spot in the woods, and, supported by the infantry, did good service throughout the rest of the action. The enemy withdrew their battery to a new position upon a ridge more to the front and right, forming their infantry in support and moving columns toward both our flanks.

Such was the situation about noon, when a lull occurred in the contest, which lasted some two hours, during which our supports from the remainder of the corps were arriving and taking position. General Willcox's division being the first to arrive, took position on the right, sending one regiment, however, to the extreme left, which was threatened to be turned by a column of the enemy which moved in that direction. General Sturgis' arriving subsequently supported General Willcox's, and General Rodman's was divided; Colonel Fairchild's brigade being posted on the extreme left, and Colonel Harland's (under General Rodman's personal supervision) being placed on the right.

- While these supports were arriving the enemy made several vigorous efforts to regain the crest, directing their efforts chiefly upon our right, which was exposed not only to the fire in front, but to the batteries on the opposite side of the gorge beyond our right, through which the Hagerstown turnpike runs.

About 4 o'clock p. m., most of the re-enforcements being in position, the order was received to advance the whole line and take or silence the enemy's batteries immediately in front. The order was immediately obeyed, and the advance was made with the utmost enthusiasm. The enemy made a desperate resistance, charging our advancing lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere routed and fled with precipitation. In this advance the chief loss fell upon the division of General Willcox, which was most exposed, being on the right, as I have said above; but it gallantly overcame all obstacles, and the success was complete along the whole line of the corps. The battery of the enemy was found to be across a gorge and beyond reach of our infantry, but its position was made untenable, and it was hastily removed and not again put in position near us.

General Sturgis' division was now moved forward to the front of General Willcox's position, occupying the new ground gained on the farther side of the slope. About dark a brisk attack was made by the enemy upon the extreme left, but was quickly repulsed by Colonel Fairchild's brigade, of Rodman's division, with little loss.

About 7 o'clock still another effort to regain the lost ground was made by the rebels in front of the position of General Sturgis' division and part of the Kanawha Division. This attack was more persistent, and a very lively fire was kept up for about an hour, but they were again repulsed, and, under cover of the night, retreated in mass from our entire front.

Just before sunset Major-General Reno was killed while making a reconnaissance at the front, and by this lamentable occurrence the undersigned was left in command of the corps. Early in the engagement Lieut. Col. R. B. Hayes, commanding Twenty-third Ohio, was severely wounded in the arm whilst leading his regiment forward. He refused to leave the field, however, until weakness from loss of blood compelled him. Maj. E. M. Carey, of the Twelfth Ohio, was shot through the thigh later in the action, in which he had greatly distinguished himself by his gallantry and cool courage. Captains Skiles and Hunter, and Lieutenants Hood, Smith, Naughton, and Ritter, of the Twenty-third Ohio, and Captains Liggett and Wilson, of the Twelfth Ohio, were also wounded in this engagement. Captain Liggett has since died. Lieutenant Crome, commanding a section of McMullin's battery, was killed whilst serving a piece in place of the gunner, who had been disabled.

In the Kanawha Division the casualties were 528, of which 106 were killed, 336 wounded, and 86 missing, of all of which a full list will be immediately forwarded.*

I take pleasure in calling attention to the gallantry and efficiency displayed in the action by Colonels Scammon and Crook, commanding the brigades of the division. The manner in which their commands were handled reflected great credit on them, and entitles them to the highest praise.

I beg leave also to mention my indebtedness to Capt. E. P. Fitch, Capt. G. M. Bascom, and Lieuts. J. W. Conine and S. L. Christie, of my personal staff, for the devotion and courage displayed by them in the laborious and hazardous duties of the day. Also to Brig. Surg. W. W. Holmes, medical director of the division, for his tireless activity and efficiency in his department.

The conduct of both officers and men was everything that could be desired, and every one seemed stimulated by the determination not to be excelled in any soldierly quality.

* But see revised statement, p. 187.

I cannot close this report without speaking of the meritorious conduct of First Lieut. H. Belcher, of the Eighth Michigan, a regiment belonging to another division. His regiment having suffered severely on the right, and being partly in confusion, he rallied about 100 men and led them up to the front. Being separated from the brigade to which he belonged, he reported to me for duty, and asked a position where he might be of use until his proper place could be ascertained. He was assigned a post on the left, and subsequently in support of the advanced section of Simmonds' battery; in both of which places both he and his men performed their duty admirably, and after the repulse of the enemy in the evening he carried his command to their proper brigade. About 600 prisoners were taken by the Kanawha Division and sent to Middletown under guard. The losses of the enemy in our immediate front were not definitely ascertained, but it is known they very greatly exceeded our own.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. D. COX,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieutenant-Colonel RICHMOND,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Gen. Burnside's Hdqrs., Right Wing, A. P.

No. 155.

Report of Col. Eliakim P. Scammon, Twenty-third Ohio Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of South Mountain, and, commanding Kanawha Division, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS KANAWHA DIVISION,
Camp near Harper's Ferry, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: This is the earliest moment at which it has been practicable to make a report of the killed, wounded, and missing of the First Brigade of the division under my command, in the battles which have occurred since we left the city of Washington.

In the battle of South Mountain, Md., the First Brigade, having left its bivouac at 6 a. m. of the 14th, reached the immediate vicinity of the scene of action at about 9 o'clock. I ordered the Twenty-third Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, to move through the woods on the left of the road, crossing the mountain so as to attack the enemy on the right and rear of the right flank. The regiment moved up promptly and effectively. Early in the encounter, Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, commanding the regiment, who had gallantly and skillfully brought his men into action and charged the enemy in his front, was severely wounded and carried to the rear. He remained on the field a considerable time after receiving his wound, and left it only when compelled to retire.

On arriving at the foot of the slope in front of the enemy, I sent the Thirtieth Regiment, commanded by Col. Hugh Ewing, to attack the left of that position of the enemy which was immediately opposed to us, with orders, if practicable, to seize a battery in that part of the enemy's lines. In executing this order it was ascertained that the battery was beyond our reach, and that its infantry support far outnumbered the force opposed to it; but the Thirtieth Regiment attacked vigorously, and drove the enemy from their immediate front. They were assailed by a

shower of grape from the battery, whose real position and strength were not previously known, but they seized and held the crest of the mountain until they nobly bore their part in the charge by our whole line.

In all this I am happy to say there was no faltering. It was the thorough work of good soldiers. The Twelfth Regiment being in the center of the brigade, was moved directly to the front, and briskly engaged the enemy. Its first advance, deployed as skirmishers, told upon the enemy with marked effect. It was more like a charge than an advance of skirmishers. They soon gained the crest, and drove the enemy back to the cover of the thicket behind it.

Meantime a section of artillery, under Lieutenant Crome, took position on the top of the slope, and opened an effective fire upon the enemy. It was, of necessity, advanced so near the enemy's lines as to expose the men to a most effective fire from his infantry. Lieutenant Crome was mortally wounded while serving a piece whose gunners had already fallen. The two pieces of artillery were, in fact, silenced by the killing of the men who served them.

Captain McMullin, commander of the battery, had previously been sent to the right of the road by which we approached the enemy, and kept up a most effective fire while the infantry advanced upon the enemy's lines.

At about 5 o'clock p. m. a general charge of the whole line was ordered by the general commanding, when the First Brigade moved forward to the work, and the enemy was driven at every point of our front.

Total of First Brigade taken into action, 1,455.

The killed of the enemy far outnumbered our own, besides which the First Brigade sent to the rear a number of prisoners fully equal to its total loss.

Very respectfully, &c.,

E. P. SCAMMON,

Colonel, Commanding Kanawha Division.

Capt. G. M. BASCOM,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS KANAWHA DIVISION,

Camp near mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I herewith transmit the reports of Col. Hugh Ewing, commanding First Brigade, and Col. George Crook, commanding Second Brigade of the Kanawha Division, in the battle of the 17th instant. To these reports and accompanying papers I have little to add.

The general commanding is fully aware of the fact of our being opposed by greatly superior numbers, and that, though we were unable to drive the enemy from our front and flank, we successfully resisted his advance and maintained our position. I confess to have been deeply chagrined at being left so weak as to be unable to make an advance upon the enemy, but am satisfied with the consciousness that we succeeded in doing all that was expected of us, and fully answered the purpose of the commanding general.

While I leave it to brigade and regimental commanders to make special mention of their officers and men, I must claim the privilege of testifying to the energy and skillful bravery of Colonels Ewing and Crook, and I cannot refrain from paying the poor tribute of honorable mention to the memory of Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, commanding Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry. He had acted the part of

a hero at the recent fight at Bull Run Bridge and at the battle of South Mountain. He met a hero's death in the battle of the 17th of September.

I beg leave again to make honorable mention of the coolness and efficiency of Lieutenants Botsford and Kennedy, of my staff, feeling assured that all who were witnesses of their conduct will pronounce this mention well deserved.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

E. P. SCAMMON,

Colonel, Commanding Kanawha Division, Ninth Army Corps.

Capt. G. M. BASCOM,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 156.

Report of Col. Hugh Ewing, Thirtieth Ohio Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, KANAWHA DIVISION,
Mouth of Antietam, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit the reports of regimental commanders in my brigade relating to the battle of the 17th instant:

We crossed the ford of the Antietam under a shower of grape, and after being held under a trying fire from the enemy's batteries for some time, made, under order of Colonel Scammon, commanding division, a charge upon his advancing columns, and checked and held his largely superior force at bay until the battle ceased on the ensuing day, and he was driven from the field. One of my aides, Lieutenant Furbay, the memory of whose gallantry and worth is written in the hearts of his comrades, was shot, by three balls, through the body. Another, Lieutenant Headington, had his horse killed under him. Lieutenant Duffield, who had been acting as my aide temporarily, was also killed, being twice shot. A soldier more conscientious in the discharge of every duty did not live.

The troops of the brigade behaved with gallantry. For details I have the honor to refer you to the accompanying reports of the commanders of regiments.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HUGH EWING,

Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

R. P. KENNEDY,

Lieut. and Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Kanawha Division.

No. 157.

Report of Capt. James R. McMullin, First Ohio Battery, of the battle of South Mountain.

FIRST BATTERY OHIO ARTILLERY,
Camp in the Field, September 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit an outline report of the part taken by my battery in the engagement of the 14th instant:

In obedience to orders from you, my battery took position about half-

way up South Mountain and to the left of the National road, when I immediately engaged a six-gun battery of the enemy for some thirty-five or forty minutes, when he opened another battery to the left of the first, the range being nearly or quite 1,700 yards. In about an hour the enemy's first battery was silenced. My guns then continued to play upon the enemy's second battery until late in the afternoon, when it was moved out of range.

About 11 o'clock, in obedience to an order from yourself, I sent one section, under command of First Lieut. George L. Crome, to take position on the top of South Mountain, which Lieutenant Crome reached with difficulty, being compelled to move his pieces by manual force, and opened on the enemy, in position behind a stone wall, with canister at a distance of 40 yards. After expending four double rounds, Lieutenant Crome was struck in the breast with a musket-ball while engaged in loading one of his pieces, three of his cannoneers being wounded. The enemy was driven from his position, and the section remained on the field. Lieutenant Crome lived about two hours, when he expired. His loss is to be deeply regretted, for he was a brave and noble man, who at the first call of his country left the endearments of home for its defense. Yet it is a consolation to his friends and companions in arms to know that he died at his post in the discharge of more than his duty.

Lieutenants McClung, Fair, and Channell (the latter on detached duty from the Twelfth Ohio Volunteer Infantry), and the men of my battery, all did their duty. Not a single exception came under my observation or to my hearing.

I am, colonel, with respect, your obedient servant,

J. R. McMULLIN,

Captain First Battery, Ohio Artillery.

Col. E. P. SCAMMON,

Commanding Kanawha Division.

No. 158.

Reports of Col. Carr B. White, Twelfth Ohio Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. TWELFTH REGIMENT OHIO VOLUNTEERS,
Battle-field, Summit of South Mountain, Md., September 14, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, after leaving our camp at Catocin Creek this morning at 6 o'clock, we marched with the column to a point about half-way up the side of South Mountain, and some distance to the left of the National turnpike, from which point, in conformity with your order, we proceeded farther to the left and up the mountain through a pine wood, until within a quarter of a mile of the summit. Here we saw, about 300 yards in front, an infantry regiment of the enemy drawn up on the crest of the mountain. We opened fire and then charged forward. The enemy fled, leaving 15 to 20 dead and wounded, and we occupied his ground. Here it was found necessary to order the regiment to lie down, in order to screen the men from the fire of the enemy, and to give time for the Twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry to join our left, and the Thirty-sixth and Thirtieth to join our right. While these regiments were coming into position, a section of Captain McMullin's battery, under command of Lieutenant Crome, was advanced to our front, and did good service until the guns were silenced by the enemy's sharpshooters, posted in a thick wood in front. Lieutenant Crome was killed while loading a piece, and nearly all his men wounded.

The Thirty-sixth Ohio had now joined us on the right and the Twenty-third Ohio on the left, when a general charge was ordered, in which my regiment gallantly dashed over the crest and into a thicket of laurel under a severe fire. In this charge we drove the enemy in great confusion and inflicted serious loss upon him, killing several with the bayonet. After pursuing about a quarter of a mile, I halted the regiment and lay some time under a sharp fire of canister and shell. Receiving your order to charge the enemy's battery, posted at a stone wall about 600 yards to our front and right, I moved the regiment forward through a dense laurel under a heavy fire, and gained the rear of the battery at a garden inclosed by a stone fence, where a severe fight ensued, in which we were completely successful. Here we captured one national color and two battle-flags. The ground was literally covered with the enemy's dead and wounded, while we took off the field about 200 prisoners, mostly Carolinians. The enemy escaped with his battery during the obstinate contest with the Carolina regiment.

I should fail to do justice to my gallant regiment were I to omit mentioning the efficient service rendered by Lieut. Col. J. D. Hines and Maj. E. M. Carey, the last of whom received a severe flesh wound in the thigh near the close of the action. To these gallant officers I am greatly indebted for assistance throughout the trying contests of the day. Nor must I fail to make honorable mention of Capt. W. W. Liggett, of Company H, who fell mortally wounded while fighting at the head of his company, and of Capt. R. Wilson, who was wounded and captured, but managed to escape and take his captors. Of my adjutant, W. B. Nesbitt, and my sergeant-major, James H. Palmer, and, indeed, of every officer and every man of the Twelfth Ohio Regiment of Infantry, I can only say that they did their whole duty, and I only regret that the restricted limits of this report will not admit of a special mention by name.

Our loss, as might be expected from the desperate nature of the service performed, is unfortunately large, being about 35 killed, 100 wounded, and 30 missing.* This loss is from less than 500 men.

Respectfully submitted.

C. B. WHITE,

Colonel, Commanding Twelfth Ohio Volunteers.

Col. E. P. SCAMMON,

Commanding Kanawha Division.

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HDQRS. TWELFTH REGIMENT OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp at Mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to forward the following report of the movements of the Twelfth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, under my command, in the late actions along the Antietam:

Late in the evening of the 16th of September the regiment was placed in line of battle on the Miller farm, to support Lieutenant Benjamin's battery. At 2 a. m. of the 17th I moved the regiment to the left and front of the bridge over Antietam, and in line with the Twenty-third and Thirtieth, and in supporting distance of McMullin's battery. We occupied this position from one to two hours, when we moved with the brigade, under command of Colonel Ewing, to a ford about 1 mile down the stream. While fording the stream the enemy opened on the column with artillery, fortunately inflicting but little injury. After crossing

* But see revised statement, p. 187.

the stream, we moved up along its bank to the left and front of the bridge over Antietam, to within supporting distance of General Rodman's division. While lying in this position the enemy shelled us severely for about two hours.

By order of Colonel Ewing, we were then moved forward and put in line of battle with the brigade, to charge the enemy's lines posted on and beyond the hill. Before the line moved forward to the charge, it was discovered that the enemy was moving two columns around our left flank. My regiment was then ordered to form a line at right angles with the main line, to advance and engage a flanking column of the enemy, which was promptly done under a shower of shell and canister that threatened the destruction of the regiment. With a view to a better position, the regiment was withdrawn to a fence 50 yards in the rear, and put in position. Finding this position equally exposed with the former, both to musketry and artillery, the regiment was ordered back to the position just abandoned, which was held in the face of a heavy fire until ordered back by Lieutenant Kennedy, acting assistant adjutant-general of the Kanawha Division, to the brow of the hill in front of the bridge, where it remained by your order during the night.

Our loss on this day was 6 killed and 24 wounded out of about 200 engaged, and occurred mainly from the enemy's artillery while engaged in holding in check the force endeavoring to turn our left.

On the 18th we were advanced to a hill in front, and threw forward a heavy line of pickets, which kept up a fire all day on the enemy's skirmishers. Our loss on this day was 1 man killed and 2 men wounded.

Among so many officers who did their whole duty it might seem invidious to particularize, but I cannot refrain making honorable mention of Lieut. Col. J. D. Hines, to whose aid I am so much indebted for the conduct of the regiment; also of William B. Nesbitt, my adjutant, and Sergt. Maj. James H. Palmer. And though it may swell this report beyond a reasonable limit, I must bear testimony to the good conduct of Capts. Joseph L. Hilt, W. B. Smith, and John Lewis; of Lieuts. John Wise, J. W. Ross, T. J. Atkinson, W. A. Ludlum, H. F. Hawkes, J. A. Yordy, W. H. Glotfelter, and H. G. Tibbals; also of Sergts. W. B. Redmon, Maurice Watkins, Jonathan McMillen, and M. B. Mahoney, with others whose names cannot at present be mentioned for want of space, whom I recommend as deserving promotion. Captains Wilson, Williams, and Pauley were absent. The first named was wounded at South Mountain. The last two were sick and in hospital.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. B. WHITE,

Colonel Twelfth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Lieut. G. LOFLAND,

Lieut. and A. A. A. G., First Provisional Brig., Kanawha Div.

No. 159.

Reports of Maj. James M. Comly, Twenty-third Ohio Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HQDQS. TWENTY-THIRD OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,

September 15, 1862.

SIR: The Twenty-third fell in with the enemy about 9 o'clock a. m. yesterday, near the summit of the mountain. We immediately formed

and advanced to meet him. The order was given to charge, and the regiment advanced to the charge in as good order as possible through the thick woods into a corn-field. The enemy was behind the stone fence at the crest of the hill, five regiments, with one piece of artillery. As soon as our approach was discovered, a deadly fire was opened from the enemy's whole line. Most of our loss occurred at this point. Colonel Hayes was wounded and carried off the field; also Captain Skiles, Company C; Lieutenant Naughton, Company F, slightly, and Lieutenant Hood, supposed mortally. I soon afterward received information that the enemy were flanking us on the left, and swung our line to face the new direction. About the same time you arrived with support, since which time the occurrences were under your own eye.

Our loss was 32 killed, 95 wounded, 3 missing; total, 130. Of the wounded are Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, 2 captains, and 5 lieutenants, all except one seriously.

Very respectfully,

J. M. COMLY,
Major, Commanding.

Col. E. P. SCAMMON,
Commanding, &c.

HDQRS. TWENTY-THIRD REGIMENT OHIO VOL. INFANTRY,
September 21, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with orders, I submit the following report of the part taken by this regiment in the charge of Wednesday evening near the stone bridge:

The Twenty-third Regiment occupied the right of the First Brigade, and advanced at double-quick as the charge was made up to the position where the halt was made. Soon after gaining our position, a heavy enfilading fire was opened upon our whole line, when I received orders from Colonel Ewing in person to change front perpendicularly to the rear, which was done. We were soon after relieved, and left the field.

The conduct of the officers and men was beyond praise. Captain Lovejoy, who commanded the left wing, was wounded early in the action, and carried from the field. Captain Drake, of Company H, was wounded slightly. Color-Sergeant Armstrong was killed and Color-Corporal Morgan was badly wounded at about the time we reached our first position.

Our loss in this affair was much less than in the one of Sunday last. Casualties have already been reported.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. COMLY,
Major, Commanding.

Lieut. G. LOFLAND,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. TWENTY-THIRD REGIMENT OHIO VOL. INFANTRY,
Antietam Creek, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with orders from Colonel Ewing, commanding brigade, I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of this regiment in the charge made on the evening of the 17th instant:

The Twenty-third Regiment was on the extreme right of the First Brigade, and advanced at double-quick as the charge was made, with the balance of the line, up to the stone fence, where the halt was

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

ordered. The advance was under fire from a battery and infantry in our front. Immediately after we had gained our position, the whole left of the brigade seemed to be falling back, and from the right of the Twenty-third, where I was, I discovered what seemed to be a heavy body of our troops advancing toward our left through the corn-field which flanked us on our left, and from which our position was enfiladed.

About the same time I discovered that the Thirtieth Regiment was still in the corn-field, and that they had opened fire upon what I supposed was our own troops, advancing from the left. It seems proper to state that this supposition did not rest entirely upon the fact that the enemy had uniforms similar to ours, and which (I have since been informed by a prisoner) were taken at Harper's Ferry, but upon the fact that they used the national colors on the occasion. I had heard an aide-de-camp, who rode up as we were forming for the charge, assert that General Sturgis' division had taken a battery from the enemy, and earnestly requesting Colonel Ewing to move forward rapidly to their support; consequently I felt convinced that the advancing troops were our friends, and gave the order not to fire upon them, although they were rapidly approaching our left and we were within easy range. Soon after all doubt vanished, upon the furious attack which was made by them, almost at feeling distance, upon the Thirtieth Regiment and our left. Almost immediately a heavy enfilading fire was opened upon our whole line, and Colonel Ewing gave the order to me in person to change front perpendicularly to the rear, which was done. From some cause (probably from the death of the aide bearing the order) we did not receive the order to fall back with the remainder of the brigade, and we consequently held our position until relieved by our division commander.

The men behaved with the same reckless bravery which characterized the fight of the preceding Sunday, and the conduct of officers and men was beyond praise. Color-Sergeant Armstrong was killed and Color-Corporal Morgan badly wounded at the same time, early in the action, when Private Wert, of Company C, and Private McMillan, of Company H, sprang from the ranks and rescued the colors. They were both made corporals, and assigned to the color-guard on the field. Captain Lovejoy, of Company D, who commanded the left wing, was wounded and carried off the field early in the action. Captain Drake, of Company H, was also wounded slightly.

Casualties have already been reported.*

After leaving the field, the colors of some regiment were discovered near the wheat-stack on our left. Supposing them to be abandoned, I called for volunteers to rescue them; when Lieutenant Bacon, Company K, with 10 men, went back for the purpose. A small remnant of a New York regiment was with the colors, and refused to leave them or allow them to be carried off, saying they had no orders. I regret not being able to state the number of the regiment. They were ordered off the field by Colonel Scammon, commanding our division.

Having been separated from the brigade from the cause already stated, I was ordered by Colonel Scammon, at the request of General Sturgis, to support a battery to the left of your new position, and no opportunity to report until the next morning.

Very respectfully,

J. M. COMLY,

Major, Comdg. Twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Lieut. G. LOFLAND,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

No. 160

Report of Col. Hugh Ewing, Thirtieth Ohio Infantry, of the battle of South Mountain.

HDQRS. THIRTIETH REGIMENT OHIO VOL. INFANTRY,
Battle-field, September 14, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with orders from Colonel Scammon, commanding, I moved at 10 a. m. with the Thirtieth Regiment to turn the enemy's left, and assist in taking the battery planted on the crest of the mountain. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, in command of a heavy body of skirmishers, covered the advance of the column, and immediately began to drive in their outlying sentries. At the same time a battery on a spur to our right opened upon us a heavy fire of shell. We took possession of the crest without halt or deployment, and formed line of battle to move upon the support in rear of the battery. At this moment the enemy developed himself in force on our right flank, and we changed front and increased and pushed our line of skirmishers against him. Soon he showed himself in force passing down a lane in front, and in a moment opened a heavy fire from a thicket on our left, which we soon silenced. In five minutes he, having changed his battery 600 yards to our right front, sent in on us a hail of grape, and we fell a few yards back, under cover.

We lay here supporting a battery, which was soon sent up, until 5 o'clock, when, supported on the right and left, under your orders, we, with the entire line, charged over the rise through the woods and thickets to the cleared fields which lay before the battery, and in and beyond which, behind stone walls and in coverts, lay the enemy's supports in heavy masses. Here a spirited engagement ensued, which was kept up with great animation until, our ammunition beginning to fail, the second line was ordered up, and we fell back slowly and in perfect order to our former position. The officers and men, under an unceasing fire of eight hours of musketry, grape, and shell, obeyed all orders with alacrity, intelligence, and skill, and stood at the close under an excessive fire of musketry and grape with a hardihood which elicited the applause of all who saw them.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jones exposed himself repeatedly, and exhibited great judgment in carrying out the delicate duties assigned him.

Our killed, as so far handed in, is 21; wounded, 65.*

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

HUGH EWING,

Colonel, Commanding Thirtieth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

R. P. KENNEDY,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Kanawha Division.

No. 161.

Report of Maj. George H. Hildt, Thirtieth Ohio Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRTIETH OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp Antietam, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to your order, I have the honor to submit the

* But see revised statement, p. 187.

following report of the action of the Thirtieth Regiment on September 17, 1862:

During the morning we were held under the fire of the enemy's batteries as a reserve corps, and, although under a perfect hail of shot and shell, by carefully covering I have no casualties to report from the effects of the enemy's batteries to this time. Near 4 o'clock in the evening we were ordered to charge the enemy, who were distant one-half mile, on the slope of a cleared hill facing us, a part of which was planted in corn, and served to screen both the enemy and ourselves. We moved forward by brigade at double-quick, the Twenty-third Ohio Volunteer Infantry on our right, and the Twelfth Ohio Volunteer Infantry on our left, some distance in rear, receiving a severe fire from the enemy the moment we moved over the brow of the hill, which continued and increased until we reached the stone wall, distant only 100 yards from the enemy, when we delivered our fire with great precision, and for a time checked the advancing enemy.

Our men were at this time utterly exhausted from the effect of the double-quick step across the plowed field, and their fire was necessarily slow and desultory for several minutes. As soon, however, as our first volley had been given, and our colors erected at the wall, a withering fire was directed upon us from our left flank, and from which we suffered most severely. We continued at the wall until our men had fired from 12 to 15 rounds each, directing their fire to the front and left, when our supports on the right fell back, and that on the left had not yet come to our assistance, leaving both of our flanks exposed and enduring a fire from the front and left. Colonel Jones, on the right, gave the order to move by the right flank to join the right wing of the Twenty-third, which was still in position, which order was not heard, except by the four companies on the right (A, F, D, and I), which moved in that direction, the remaining companies still occupying their first position at the wall. A few minutes later and the enemy's fire from the flank could not be borne, and we fell back across the plowed field and over the brow of the hill.

Captain Fowler, of Company D, was wounded in the right arm a short distance from the wall, but made his way out. Lieutenant Furbay, of Company K, was mortally wounded near the same place by two balls passing through his body, and died on the field. Adj. Charles Duffield was wounded in the leg, in the corn-field, and, while being borne off, was mortally wounded in the back. Lieutenant Wilson, of Company I, was mortally wounded in the neck, and died while borne off. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, after giving the order to move by the right flank and afterward to fall back, has not been seen, and must have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Captain Brown, of Company F, is also missing, and is, no doubt, a prisoner. Sergeant White, bearer of the national color, stood amidst the rain of bullets and defiantly waved the color toward the advancing enemy, when he received a shot in the breast and fell dead. Corporal Howerth, of Company D, seized them and bore them off the field. Sergeant Carter, who bore the regimental color, was shot through the head near the edge of the corn-field, and Corporal Buchanan, of Company C, bore them off.

Too much praise cannot be given the officers and men for their coolness, courage, and gallant conduct on the field, and, having scarcely recovered from the terrible contest on Hagerstown Heights, they stood up and bravely bore a fire upon their front and left, of which veterans might well be proud.

Before closing, allow me to recommend a change of arms of all the

companies except A and B, as the men found great difficulty in loading their pieces after the fifth round, and could scarcely ram their balls home.

A report of the killed, wounded, and missing in both battles has already been given.

With much respect, I am your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. HILDT,

Major, Comdg. Thirtieth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Col. HUGH EWING,

Commanding First Brigade, Kanawha Division.

No. 162.

Reports of Col. George Crook, Thirty-sixth Ohio Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, KANAWHA DIVISION,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, Md., September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Second Brigade, Kanawha Division, in the battle of South Mountain, on the 14th instant:

This brigade, consisting of the Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-sixth Regiments Ohio Volunteers, arrived on the south slope of the mountain just after the First Brigade of the same division had dispossessed the enemy of it, when I was informed the enemy were trying to flank us on the left. I at once detached the Eleventh Regiment in that direction as skirmishers, forming the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-sixth Regiments in rear of the First Brigade as reserve. I was then ordered by the general commanding to send the Thirty-sixth Regiment to the right of the First Brigade, to help drive the enemy by a charge from the crest of the hills, which was done, the regiment making a gallant charge; this regiment again fell to the rear as reserves. The Twenty-eighth Regiment was sent to the right and front, participating in the charge of the division in the evening, the Eleventh Regiment being detached from my command at the second charge, and did not join me until after the battle. All under my command, so far as I know, behaved nobly.

The following is a list of the killed, wounded, and missing of the brigade: Eleventh Regiment—7 killed, 34 wounded, 3 missing; Twenty-eighth Regiment—3 killed, 12 wounded; Thirty-sixth Regiment—7 killed, 18 wounded.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE CROOK,

Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade, Kanawha Division.

R. P. KENNEDY,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Kanawha Division.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, KANAWHA DIVISION,
Mouth of Antietam Creek, September 20, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 17th instant I received orders from the general commanding corps to cross the bridge over Antietam Creek after General Sturgis had taken the

bridge; but upon my arrival in the vicinity of the bridge I found that General Sturgis' command had not arrived; so I sent the Eleventh Regiment ahead as skirmishers in the direction of the bridge, and conducted the Twenty-eighth Regiment above the bridge to reconnoiter the enemy's position, leaving the Thirty-sixth Regiment as reserve. After a labor of two hours, I succeeded in establishing two pieces of Simmonds' battery in a position to command the bridge and getting five companies of the Twenty-eighth across the stream. I then intended taking the bridge with the Thirty-sixth Regiment, but soon after my battery opened on the bridge General Sturgis' command crossed the bridge. The brigade also participated in the charge on the enemy.

I regret to have to report the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, of the Thirty-sixth Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, of the Eleventh. These gallant officers fell while gallantly leading their men.

The following is a list of the killed, wounded, and missing during the engagement, viz: Eleventh Regiment—4 killed, 12 wounded, and 5 missing; Twenty-eighth Regiment—1 killed, and 19 wounded; Thirty-sixth Regiment—3 killed and 21 wounded. Total, killed, 8; wounded, 52, and missing, 5.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE CROOK,

Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade, Kanawha Division.

Lieutenant KENNEDY,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Kanawha Division.

No. 163.

Reports of Maj. Lyman J. Jackson, Eleventh Ohio Infantry, of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

HDQRS. ELEVENTH REGIMENT OHIO VOL. INFANTRY,
Antietam Creek, Md., September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry at the engagement of the 14th instant on South Mountain, Md., Lieut. Col. A. H. Coleman, since deceased, being then in command:

The First Brigade made the advance up the hill. After our ascent to the open field on the left of the principal batteries of the enemy, we were ordered to skirmish the woods beyond the field. The right wing, under Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, deployed and advanced, and, on reaching within a few rods of the woods, a heavy fire of musketry was opened in his rear and to the right from the enemy in the woods and behind a stone wall. We moved rapidly forward to the protection of the woods, suffering heavily from their fire until a charge from two other regiments of our division drove them away.

We then fell back to the hill-side in the open fields, where we were out of reach of their guns, and remained here with the rest of our brigade until an advance was made against the enemy by the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island troops on our right. We then, in conjunction with them and the other troops of our division, made a bayonet charge through the woods on the battery and over the stone fences held by the enemy, driving them from it with fearful slaughter.

* But see revised statement, p. 198.

Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman took down the enemy's colors with his own hands. Our men behaved most gallantly. Three of our officers were wounded.

Inclosed I transmit our loss.*

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

LYMAN J. JACKSON,

Major, Comdg. Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Col. GEORGE CROOK,

Commanding Second Brigade, Kanawha Division.

HDQRS. ELEVENTH REGIMENT OHIO VOL. INFANTRY,
Maryland, September 20, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by the Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the engagement of the 17th instant:

We were ordered and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, then commanding the regiment, to move toward a bridge across Antietam Creek, then occupied by the enemy. I do not know the duty assigned, but as two of our companies had been sent forward as skirmishers to the woods and hill-side on our side of the creek, I suppose it was to support them. Advancing in line across a plowed field and hill, the right and left divided, under conflicting orders, the right moving to our skirmishers forward on the right, the left moving to the base of hill by the creek. Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman, moving with the left under a severe fire, was shot through the right arm by a sharpshooter, and died in about an hour after. I must say of him that no better, braver, truer officer ever served our country, and no regiment can feel a loss more sorely.

At the base of the hill I found myself in a useless position with a part of the regiment, and recrossed the field to a point of the hill opposite the bridge, formed my men under cover, and kept up a fire against the enemy until our ammunition was exhausted. I was then ordered to fall back and reform the regiment on the left of the Thirty-sixth, which I did, and moved up with that regiment, participating with it in the last charge made from the hills by the creek. Our army had then driven the enemy from the creek. We charged across the open fields west of the creek, where we were halted close to a stone fence. The movement was made in conjunction with troops on our right and left. Those on our left, being unexpectedly attacked in flank by a superior force, were compelled to fall back. Under some indications that the enemy were about to follow up the charge on our flank, I wheeled the regiment left and backward, the right standing fast on the line of battle, so as to oppose a front to any such flank movement. Shortly after, our left was re-enforced by one regiment, and I resumed the first position, to follow up the charge. The re-enforcement was insufficient, was in a situation exposed to a terrible fire of infantry and artillery, and, after a fearful loss of life, fell back. I then resumed a position fronting the left, at right angles to and resting on our line. Shortly after, our whole line fell back, and I followed in rear of the Thirty-sixth to the eastern slope of the hill west of the bridge. We formed there on right of the Thirty-sixth, and to the left of the road, and remained until about 3 o'clock p. m. of the next day, when we were both relieved by the One hundred and eighteenth Regiment Pennsylvania Infantry.

I thank my officers and men for their coolness and courage during the

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 187.

whole engagement. It is the more creditable, because the death of a commanding officer would naturally tend to weaken confidence and diminish courage.

Capt. J. B. Weller was wounded at the time Lieutenant-Colonel Coleman was killed, which left his company without a commissioned officer. Companies A, E, and B were without officers, and yet the men did their duty well.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

LYMAN J. JACKSON,

Major, Comdg. Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Col. GEORGE CROOK,

Commanding Second Brigade, Kanawha Division.

No. 164.

Report of Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, U. S. Army, commanding Twelfth Army Corps, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. TWELFTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Sandy Hook, Md., September 29, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this corps in the recent action near Sharpsburg, Md., on the 17th instant:

Two days before the action, Brigadier-General Mansfield, U. S. Army, assumed command of the corps while in bivouac in the South Mountain Pass. The composition and organization of the corps was then as follows:

First Division, Brig. Gen. A. S. Williams commanding.

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. W. Crawford commanding: Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. J. F. Knipe commanding; Tenth Maine Volunteers, Col. G. L. Beal commanding; Fifth Connecticut Volunteers, Capt. H. W. Daboll commanding (detached and not in action); Twenty-eighth New York Volunteers, Capt. W. R. H. Mapes commanding; One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. J. W. Hawley commanding; One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. J. Higgins commanding; One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. S. Croasdale commanding.

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon commanding: Third Wisconsin Volunteers, Col. T. H. Ruger commanding; Second Massachusetts Volunteers, Col. G. L. Andrews commanding; Twenty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, Col. S. Colgrove commanding; One hundred and seventh New York Volunteers, Col. R. B. Van Valkenburgh commanding; Thirteenth New Jersey Volunteers, Col. E. A. Carman commanding.

Second Division, Brig. Gen. George S. Greene commanding.

First Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale commanding: Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Pardee commanding; Seventh Ohio Volunteers, Maj. O. J. Crane commanding; Fifth Ohio Volunteers, Maj. J. Collins commanding; Sixty-sixth Ohio Volunteers, Lieut. Col. E. Powell commanding; Twenty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, Lieut. T. S. Winship commanding (detached and not in action).

Second Brigade, Colonel Stainrook, One hundred and ninth Pennsylvania, commanding: One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, Maj. T. M. Walker commanding; Third Maryland Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Sudsbury commanding; One hundred and ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Stainrook commanding (detached and not in action); One hundred and second New York Volunteers, Lieut. Col. J. C. Lane commanding.

Third Brigade, Colonel Goodrich, Sixtieth New York Volunteers, commanding: Sixtieth New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Brundage commanding; Seventy-eighth New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Austin commanding; Third Delaware Volunteers, Maj. A. Maginnis commanding.

The First District of Columbia Volunteers, nominally attached to this brigade, has wholly disappeared from the command by desertion and sickness.

About 2 o'clock the night before the action, the corps took up position about 1½ miles in rear of General Hooker's corps, near the farm of J. Poffenberger, bivouacking in columns of companies. At the first sound of cannon at daylight on the morning of the 17th instant, the command was put in movement, each regiment, by order of General Mansfield, marching in column of companies, closed in mass. In this order the corps moved to the front by battalions in mass, the First Brigade, First Division, leading, over ground of intermingled woods, plowed fields, and corn-fields. Before reaching the position of General Hooker's corps, information was brought that his reserves were all engaged and that he was hard pressed by the enemy. The columns were hastened up and deployed in line of battle with all the rapidity that circumstances would permit. Five of the regiments of the First Division were new and wholly without drill.

The massed battalions had been moved with such haste that the proper intervals for deployment had not been carefully attended to. The old regiments, however, deployed promptly, and the new regiments (both officers and men of which behaved with marked coolness) soon got into line of battle, with more promptitude than could have been expected.

While the deployment was going on, and before the leading regiments were fairly engaged, it was reported to me that the veteran and distinguished commander of the corps was mortally wounded. I at once reported to Major-General Hooker on the field, took from him such directions as the pressing exigencies would permit, and hastened to make a disposition of the corps to meet them. Crawford's brigade was directed to deploy to the right, its right regiment extending to the Williamsport [Hagerstown] and Sharpsburg stone pike. Gordon held the center, while Brigadier-General Greene's division, following the first division in column, was directed to the ridge on the left, extending its line from the lane on Gordon's left to the burned buildings, a few rods northerly of the brick church.

While General Greene was moving into position, I was strongly solicited by Brigadier-General Gibbon to send re-enforcements to the right to support General Doubleday's position. I accordingly detached the Third Brigade of General Greene's division, with orders to report to any general officer found on the field indicated. At the same time I ordered the One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers (Crawford's brigade) to push forward past the farm-house of Mr. Miller, cross the pike into the woods beyond, and hold the ridge as long as practicable.

In the mean time the whole line had formed in good order, and were pushing the enemy from the woods and open fields. The requisitions made upon the corps would permit of no reserves, and it may be truly stated that, to cover the points threatened or pressed, every regiment (save Thirteenth New Jersey, held in reserve for a while by General Gordon) was, as early as 6.30 to 7 o'clock a. m., engaged with the enemy.

The enemy at this time had pushed his columns into the open fields in advance of a strip of woods, a few hundred yards wide, which extended along a gentle ridge from the brick church, on the Sharpsburg road, to the farm-house of J. Miller, and extending beyond in the same direction to a distance not discernible from my position.

In the rocky ravines of these woods, and in a considerable valley in the rear of them, the enemy covered his supports and brought up his re-enforcements. A prominent hill beyond was a strong position for his artillery. Into these woods, after a severe struggle of an hour and a half to two hours' duration, we drove the enemy. A line of high post-and-rail fence on each side the public road between the church and the farm-house before named, a few rods from and nearly parallel with the inner edge of the woods, proved a great obstruction to our rapid pursuit, checking up our line until the enemy could bring up his strong re-enforcements.

All the regiments of this corps were engaged, and had been under arms from daylight, without food; still, they held their position, exposed part of the time to an enfilading fire from an enemy's battery on the right, and all the time to a tremendous fire of musketry and artillery in front. In the mean time Brigadier-General Greene, on the left, with two small brigades of his division, numbering only about 1,700 men, had successfully resisted several attacks, and at about 8 o'clock a. m., making a dash, had seized upon the woods where they abut upon the road at the brick church before mentioned. These he gallantly held for several hours.

I greatly regretted that his repeated calls for aid could be answered only by sending the Thirteenth New Jersey, and subsequently the Twenty-seventh Indiana and the Purnell Legion, of the Third Brigade. Impressed with the importance of holding this position, I made several efforts to recall the residue of the Third Brigade of his division to his assistance, as well as to procure re-enforcements from other sources, but did not succeed.

At nearly 9 o'clock a. m., it being reported that a portion of the Second Corps (Major-General Sumner's) was advancing to our support, I dispatched a staff officer to apprise him of our position and the situation of affairs. Soon after, the firing on both sides wholly ceased. Some of the old regiments had emptied their boxes of ammunition, and all were greatly exhausted by the labors of the day and of the preceding night. As the line of General Sedgwick's division appeared, the regiments of the First Division of this corps were withdrawn to the first line of woods in the rear, within supporting distance of several batteries, and directed to replenish their cartridge-boxes and to rest the men. A portion of the One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers continued, however, to hold the woods near Miller's house until it was ordered, without my knowledge, to withdraw, by some officer unknown to the commanding officer of the regiment. Greene's command had also the possession of the woods at the other end near the church.

General Sedgwick's gallant division and the veteran commander of the Second Corps were received by hearty cheers of our men. This

division pushed forward without a halt, and dashed against the strong position of the enemy. The resistance was, if possible, more formidable than ever, and, after a brief but severe contest, I was ordered, through a staff officer, to send to the front all of my command immediately available.

As General Gordon held his brigade in line most convenient for a movement to the point indicated, he was ordered to advance at once, which was done cheerfully and promptly. The troops which the support was intended for had, however, withdrawn, or changed position toward the right. The regiments of Gordon's brigade brought into action this second time, I regret to add, suffered severely, and were obliged to retire after a stubborn contest. The enemy did not follow, and Gordon's regiments again took position, in good order, behind our batteries.

The enemy, gathering his strongest columns in the woods, made several efforts to dislodge General Greene's command in the left extremity of the woods, as well as to seize upon our batteries in front. All were unsuccessful until about 1.30 p. m., when, by a desperate effort, they forced our wearied forces to retire from the woods, making, at the same time, a rapid dash for our batteries. They met with terrible slaughter by canister at point-blank range, as well as by musketry from the supports, fell back in confusion, and gave up all further efforts to advance beyond their stronghold.

Soon after this, General William F. Smith arrived with his division, and, moving through our lines to the front, gave me an opportunity to withdraw those of this corps which had been most engaged a few rods to the rear, where they could find refreshment and rest. Several of the new regiments were left in support of batteries.

General Greene's division and Gordon's brigade were subsequently sent to the front in support of a portion of General Franklin's corps, and remained in that position through the night. Of the batteries of this corps, two (Fourth and Sixth Maine) were posted by Captain Best, U. S. Army, chief of artillery, under orders of General Mansfield, on hills adjacent to general headquarters. Knap's Pennsylvania, Cothran's New York, and Hampton's Pittsburg batteries were ordered to the front as soon as the command of the corps devolved on me. Knap and Cothran took post in front of the woods occupied by the enemy, Hampton farther to the left, near General Greene's position. These batteries were bravely and excellently served from morning till late in the afternoon. The enemy repeatedly attempted to seize them, but always met with bloody punishment. One section of Knap's, temporarily detached for the aid of General Greene, unfortunately was ordered into the woods, where it fell under a heavy infantry fire, by which men and horses were lost and one piece necessarily abandoned. This battery subsequently brought from the field a 12-pounder howitzer of the enemy.*

I refer to the report of Captain Best, forwarded herewith, for more specific mention of the valuable services of these batteries. I append hereto a list of the casualties of the corps, showing a loss of 1,744, of which 85 are reported missing.* This long record (at least one-fourth of the number actually engaged) is a sufficient testimonial to the gallantry and persistent valor of both officers and men of the regiments, old and new.

Among the officers killed or mortally wounded, besides the accomplished and distinguished commander of the corps, I regret to have to

* But see revised statement, p. 199.

enroll Colonel Goodrich, Sixtieth New York, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, killed; Colonel Croasdale, of One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight, of Second Massachusetts Volunteers, mortally wounded. Other names of gallant dead, of subordinate rank, with fitting tributes from their immediate commanders, will be found in the reports forwarded herewith. Brigadier-General Crawford, who succeeded me to the command of the First Division on the fall of General Mansfield, was wounded near the close of the action, but not so severely as to oblige him to leave the field.

Colonel Ruger, Third Wisconsin Volunteers; Colonel Hawley, One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania; Colonel Beal, Tenth Maine; Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, Sixty-sixth Ohio; Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania; Lieutenant-Colonel Hammersly, One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, and Major Maginnis, Third Delaware, were wounded.

The officers commanding divisions and brigades (Brigadier-Generals Greene, Crawford, and Gordon, and Colonels Knipe, Ruger, and Stainrook, and Lieutenant-Colonels Tyndale and Brundage) were active and constant in the discharge of their responsible duties, and merit more than this feeble acknowledgment.

My personal staff present, Captain Best, Fourth Artillery, chief of artillery; First Lieut. S. E. Pittman, aide and acting assistant adjutant-general, and Captain Morgan, Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, division provost-marshal and acting aide, discharged their arduous duties faithfully and capably, and I beg leave to recommend them to the favorable consideration of the major-general commanding.

Surgeon Antisell, medical director of the corps, and Surgeon Chapel, medical director of First Division, are entitled to high commendation for their excellent preparations made for the wounded, and their faithful attention to them at the hospital depots.

I forward such subordinate reports as have been received, and respectfully refer to them for the commendations due to individuals and commands. The report of Brigadier-General Crawford, commanding First Division (absent, wounded), and other officers of his command have not been sent in.

I have the honor to be, colonel, with much respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. WILLIAMS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. J. H. TAYLOR,
Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Addenda.]

Itinerary of the Twelfth Army Corps, September 1–November 30, 1862.

FIRST DIVISION.

September 1, division moved from Bull Run and encamped near Fairfax.

September 2, moved toward Alexandria, Va., arriving on the morning of the 3d instant, and halted outside the city.

September 3, moved to Georgetown, D. C., and bivouacked in rear of Fort Richardson.

September 4, crossed the Potomac at Georgetown, and moved to near Tennallytown, and encamped.

September 5, the division moved to near Rockville, Md., and encamped.

September 6, moved a short distance, formed in line of battle, and lay upon the field.

September 7, lay upon the field.

September 8, the One hundred and twenty-fourth, One hundred and twenty-fifth, and One hundred and twenty-eighth Regiments Pennsylvania Volunteers assigned to First Brigade.

September 9, moved to Middlebrook and bivouacked.

September 10, moved to Damascus, Md.

September 11, remained in camp.

September 12, moved to near Ijamsville and bivouacked.

September 13, moved to near Frederick and encamped.

September 14, division moved to South Mountain and bivouacked.

September 15, moved to Keedysville and bivouacked.

September 16, lay in line of battle.

September 17, battle of Antietam, in which the division took an active part, under General Mansfield, on the right.

September 18, division lay upon the field in line of battle.

September 19, moved, via Sharpsburg, to Brownsville.

September 20, moved over Maryland Heights, down the mountain, and to near Sandy Hook, and encamped.

September 22, moved upon Maryland Heights.

September 28, moved down the mountain, and again encamped near Sandy Hook, Md., where the division remained until the end of the month.

October 1, the First Brigade encamped near Sandy Hook, Md.

October 2, moved to Maryland Heights, and encamped. The Tenth Maine Volunteers ordered to Berlin, Md., to do picket and guard duty. The Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, Twenty-eighth New York, and One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiments remained on the Heights to the end of the month, doing heavy picket duty up the river from Harper's Ferry to Antietam Creek, and fatigue duty on the mountain.

October 26, by General Orders, No. 5, from corps headquarters, the One hundred and twenty-fourth and One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiments were assigned to the Second Brigade, First Division, Twelfth Corps. The Second Brigade remained at Pleasant Valley, near Sandy Hook, Md., until October 30, when they moved over to Loudoun Heights, Va., the Twentieth Connecticut Volunteers being stationed on the Heights, and also the One hundred and twenty-third New York and the One hundred and twenty-fourth and One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers on the eastern slope.

The Third Brigade remained on Maryland Heights until October 29, when it was ordered to occupy the position held by General F. J. Porter, near Sharpsburg, Md.

October 30, ordered by General McClellan to report to General Morell, commanding Army of the Upper Potomac.

During the month of November no movement was made by the First Brigade. The regiments were stationed and employed as follows: The Twenty-eighth New York stationed near Sandy Hook, Md., and employed on the fortifications upon Maryland Heights, by Special Orders No. 129, Division Headquarters. The Fifth Connecticut Volunteers,

temporarily detached at Frederick, Md., doing provost duty, by order of General McClellan. The Forty-sixth Pennsylvania stationed on Maryland Heights, and employed on picket duty and upon fortifications. The Tenth Maine Volunteers stationed at Berlin, Md., doing picket duty along the Potomac. The One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania stationed on Maryland Heights, on picket duty and upon fortifications. The Sixth Maryland Volunteers assigned to the brigade by Special Orders, No. 12, Headquarters Twelfth Corps, November 3, 1862, and the entire regiment has since been employed on fortifications. The Twentieth Connecticut and One hundred and twenty-third New York Volunteers, of the Second Brigade, moved from Loudoun Heights to Keys' Ford, on the Shenandoah, November 3; thence to Keys' Gap, November 4; from thence to Loudoun Valley on the 8th, where they rejoined the remainder of the brigade.

SECOND DIVISION.

September 1, division left Bull Run, and took up the line of march for Fairfax, encamping at the forks of the road.

September 2, marched toward Alexandria, halting near Fort Worth.

September 3, marched beyond Alexandria, and halted in the rear of Fort Richardson.

September 4, marched through Georgetown, and encamped near Tennallytown.

September 5, marched through Tennallytown, and encamped near Rockville.

September 6, moved up and took position in line which had been formed about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Rockville.

September 9, marched to Middlebrook.

September 10, marched toward Damascus, and encamped within 2 miles of that place.

September 11, moved on to Damascus.

September 12, took up line of march toward Frederick, gaining 7 miles, and encamped.

September 13, crossed the Monocacy River and encamped near Frederick.

September 14, marched toward the South Mountain, encamping near there.

September 15, passed through Boonsborough and halted near Sharpsburg, encamping.

September 16, at night, moved up and took position on the left of General Mansfield's corps, on the right of the line of battle.

September 17, engaged in the battle of Antietam.

September 19, marched in the direction of Harper's Ferry, Va., being on the road all night, and arrived near Sandy Hook, Md., at 3 p. m., on the 20th.

September 22, took position on Loudoun Heights, Va., where the division lay until the end of the month.

Pursuant to General Orders, No. 5, Headquarters Twelfth Army Corps, October 26, the One hundred and fortieth, One hundred and forty-fifth, One hundred and thirty-seventh, and One hundred and forty-ninth New York Volunteers were transferred from the First to the Second Division; the Sixtieth New York Volunteers, Third Delaware Volunteers, and the Purnell Legion from the Third to the Second Brigade of this division;

the One hundred and ninth and One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteers from the Second to the Third Brigade of this division, and by General Orders, No. 24, October 26, Headquarters Second Division, Col. T. H. Ruger was assigned to the command of the First Brigade, General N. J. Jackson to the Second, and Col. G. L. Andrews to the Third Brigade. By Special Orders, No. 7, Paragraph IV, Headquarters Twelfth Army Corps, October 27, 1862, the One hundred and second New York Volunteers was transferred from the Second to the Third Brigade. General G. S. Greene assumed command of the Third Brigade, in obedience to Special Orders, No. 9, Paragraph I, Headquarters Twelfth Army Corps, October 31, 1862. By Special Orders, No. 9, Paragraph IV, Headquarters Twelfth Army Corps, October 31, 1862, the One hundred and fortieth New York Volunteers was transferred to Porter's corps. In pursuance of General Orders, No. 6, Headquarters Twelfth Army Corps, October 28, 1862, three batteries were assigned to this division.

A reconnaissance in Loudoun Valley was made by a detachment of the First and Second Brigades, with 300 of the Sixth New York Cavalry and Knap's Pennsylvania battery, under the general commanding the division, October 21. A number of prisoners were captured and an official report made to Major-General Burnside, commanding defenses of Harper's Ferry.

Pursuant to orders from corps headquarters, October 26, the division left Loudoun Heights, and encamped in the valley on the east side of the Heights.

In obedience to orders from corps headquarters, October 29, 1862, the command was moved to Bolivar Heights, on October 30, relieving General Sumner's corps, and picketing from the Shenandoah to the Potomac River.

November 9, a reconnaissance in force was made by the division, under brigadier-general commanding, to Rippon, within 6 miles of Berryville, driving the enemy before them, capturing prisoners, arms, horses, and cattle, and ascertaining the location and strength of the enemy in the valley between this point and Front Royal.

A second reconnaissance, with 600 infantry and two pieces of artillery, under the general commanding the division, was made on the 26th as far as Charlestown, having a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry at Cockrall's Mill, on the Shenandoah, routing them, wounding several, and taking a number of prisoners, arms, and horses, together with a quantity of flour, and destroying at that place a cloth-mill in the employ of the rebels. Thence the command marched to a point opposite Shannondale Spring, and thence to Charlestown, between which and Halltown a rebel camp was broken up, and the Seventh and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry put to flight. No enemy was discovered, other than cavalry parties, in the immediate front. Returned on the same day without any casualties.

The command has been actively employed in picketing 3 miles of front, from the Potomac to the Shenandoah, occasionally harassed by small parties of rebel cavalry, without any serious casualties. A large portion of the division has also been arduously engaged in fatigue duties, felling timber, and constructing and improving the fortifications of the position.

No. 165.

Report of Capt. Clermont L. Best, Fourth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, BANKS' CORPS,
September 22, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to forward herewith briefly, but fully as needs be, the operations of the artillery of the Twelfth Corps in the engagement of the 17th near Sharpsburg:

At 2 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, the corps being then near the battle-ground, I was ordered by General Mansfield to proceed in person to the rear, to post two batteries of the corps on some hills adjacent to the headquarters of General McClellan, to be pointed out by a staff officer. After performing this service, posting the Fourth Maine Battery and the Sixth Maine Battery, I proceeded to the field, and found that General Mansfield and General Williams, succeeding him, had already posted the rifled batteries of Knap and Cothran in front of the infantry and near the enemy. Captain Knap commenced fire at 7 a. m. slowly and deliberately, the enemy advancing against him several times between that and 12 m., but each time repulsed with canister. At 12 m. one section of his battery, under Lieutenant McGill, was ordered by General Greene forward to assist Colonel Tyndale in holding a wood. Colonel Tyndale ordered one piece of this section to enter the wood, in the act of which it was met with such a destructive fire from the enemy, wounding 4 cannoneers and killing 3 horses, that the piece had to be abandoned, and was lost. Captain Knap continued working the remaining five guns till 3 p. m., at which time he withdrew from the field, wanting ammunition.

Captain Cothran was assigned a position near the center of the line of battle, supported by the One hundred and seventh New York Volunteers, and was exposed to the enemy's fire from 9 a. m. till 3 p. m., using, at times, canister rapidly. He also withdrew, out of ammunition. Captain Hampton's battery was placed in position near the Dunkard Church, and expended 217 rounds against the woods in which said church is located.

The respective captains named speak in confident terms of the gallantry of their officers and men during the varied fortunes of that day. The gallantry of the captains themselves has been established on this as well as on previous fields.

Captain Knap brought from the field on the 19th one iron 12-pounder howitzer and caisson abandoned by the enemy.

Respectfully, yours,

C. L. BEST,
Captain and Chief of Artillery, Banks' Corps.

S. E. PITTMAN,
First Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

 No. 166.

Report of Capt. George W. Cothran, Battery M, First New York Light Artillery, of the battle of Antietam.

ON THE BATTLE-FIELD,
Near Keedysville, Md., September 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: About 9 a. m., on the 17th instant, I was ordered to pro

ceed with my battery to the front. I arrived at the scene of action while the contest was raging the fiercest, and took the most favorable position I could in the open field to the right of the woods, near the center of our line of battle. My battery was supported by the One hundred and seventh Regiment New York Volunteers, Col. R. B. Van Valkenburgh. I maintained my position—a very important one—from 9 a. m. until near 1 p. m., when I was relieved by a battery sent for that purpose by General Franklin, who just came up with his command. When I gave way our last shot had been fired. Twice the enemy attempted to charge us in front, but we drove them back each time, without calling upon our support to rise from the ground or to fire a gun.

During the whole time we occupied our position we were subjected to a galling fire from the enemy's infantry and artillery. The enemy were frequently within canister range, when we used canister upon them freely and with telling effect. During the day's engagement two batteries opened fire upon us, which were soon silenced, and when we retired from the field for ammunition the enemy's fire was slow and irregular. I have just returned from the scene of yesterday's conflict, and I found the ground where we fired canister literally strewn with the enemy's dead. Our fire was very destructive to the enemy.

Our loss consisted of 1 corporal and 5 men wounded. We also lost 4 horses killed. My officers and men behaved with the utmost coolness, and manfully worked the guns amidst the most terrific musketry. But two of my officers (Second Lieutenants Hodgkins and Robinson) were with me, and they were very courageous and efficient.

The One hundred and seventh Regiment New York Volunteers, Col. R. B. Van Valkenburgh, is entitled to great credit for both coolness and courage, and the admirable manner in which it supported my battery during the fight. This being the first time this regiment was under fire, I most cheerfully bear testimony to the excellent bearing of both officers and men while occupying the uncomfortable position of being the recipients of the enemy's fire while they were unable to return it.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. COTHRAN,

Captain Battery M, First New York Artillery.

Capt. H. B. SCOTT,

Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., General Gordon's Brigade.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, BANKS' CORPS,
Sandy Hook, September 20, 1862.

In forwarding the within report of Captain Cothran of the action of his battery during the severe contest of the 17th instant, near Sharpsburg, I take great pleasure in bearing testimony to the gallant conduct and efficient service of this battery in action. From the most unimpeachable testimony, I am convinced that this battery, unaided by its supports, kept at bay a furious but futile charge of the enemy. In this, as in many other cases, Captain Cothran has shown what a judicious artillerist can accomplish when he devotes himself to the service of his country and throws himself energetically into the discharge of his duties.

GEO. H. GORDON,

Brigadier-General, Commanding First Division.

No. 167.

Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of the battle of Antietam.

CHAMBERSBURG, PA., October 21, 1862.

GENERAL: The condition of my health, consequent upon the wound I received at the battle of Antietam on the 17th of September last, has prevented the transmission of an earlier report of the part taken by my command in that action. Upon the assignment of General Mansfield to the command of the corps (Twelfth), on the 14th of September, I resumed the command of the First Brigade of your division (First). My command consisted of the following regiments: Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, Col. J. F. Knipe; Tenth Maine, Col. G. L. Beal; Fifth Connecticut, Capt. H. W. Daboll; Twenty-eighth New York, Capt. W. H. H. Mapes commanding; One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania, Col. J. W. Hawley commanding; One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania, Col. J. Higgins; One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, Col. S. Croasdale. The last three mentioned regiments were new organizations from the nine months' levy, and had seen no field service whatever. The Fifth Connecticut was not in action.

On the night of the 16th of September, while lying massed with the army on the Antietam, orders were received to proceed by the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg road toward the position occupied by the corps of Major-General Hooker, which had been engaged with the enemy. My brigade led the march of the corps, when, leaving the main road, before daylight we took up a position on Poffenberger's farm, to the rear and left of General Hooker's force. At early dawn on the 17th my command was moved forward in column of companies, still leading the corps. Passing through strips of woods, and open ground and corn-fields, we were suddenly halted, and a deployment ordered without delay. While in the act of executing the order I received orders from General Mansfield, in person, to suspend the deployment and again to mass my command, although the command was then exposed to an artillery fire. A third order to again deploy was brought to me by one of the officers of the division staff, and I at once deployed, my command being on the right of the line, which rested on a turnpike, and moved forward through the woods and open space, driving before us a thin line of the enemy's skirmishers. The new regiments from Pennsylvania (One hundred and twenty-fourth, One hundred and twenty-fifth, and One hundred and twenty-eighth) moved with great promptness and with the coolness of old troops, although they had not before been under fire. During this movement the One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania, Colonel Hawley, was detached from my brigade by some superior order unknown to me, and sent in advance through the woods on our right to Miller's farm, to hold that position.

The struggle for the skirt of the woods to which the enemy clung, and the open space and corn-fields opposite and along the turnpike on the right, was long and determined. Finally the enemy was driven out of the woods across the fields, and into the opposite woods beyond the rocky ridges, to his supports. There he rallied, and bringing up fresh troops, our lines were exposed not only to a severe fire of his infantry, but also to an effective fire of his artillery on our right. While engaged in the struggle for the corn-field, Colonel Croasdale, of the One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, was killed, and Lieutenant-Colo-

nel Hammersly, of the same regiment, severely wounded. The One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania, Colonel Higgins, in the general movement had pushed on into the woods beyond our lines, and had become seriously engaged with the enemy while much exposed, but returned in good order with great loss to our lines.

Shortly before our movement, Major-General Hooker had come to examine my position, and I received orders from him to hold the woods (Miller's) at all hazards, as otherwise the right of the army would be seriously imperiled. General Mansfield, the corps commander, had been mortally wounded, and was borne past my position to the rear. Shortly afterward I received an order from a staff officer of Brigadier-General Williams to assume command of the First Division, he having assumed command of the corps. Sending orders to Colonel Knipe, of the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, the senior colonel of my brigade, to assume command at once of the brigade, I rode forward to find the Third Brigade (Gordon's), which had moved into action on the center of our line, and had been gallantly pushing the enemy before it. Our line had driven the enemy from Miller's woods across the wheat-fields into the woods beyond the Dunkard Church and Hagerstown road. A fine wooden fence which skirted the road had proved a very serious obstacle to our farther advance. The regiments of the Third Brigade had become separated. In the absence of the brigade commander, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, commanding the Second Massachusetts, to maintain his position until the line could be formed.

It was now nearly 9 o'clock. The enemy had brought up his reserves, and was contesting the possession of the woods around the Dunkard Church and the Hagerstown road, when Major-General Sumner arrived on the field with his corps. Immediately the division of General Sedgwick was deployed, and I received orders to withdraw the troops of my division to the woods held in the morning, to rest my troops and replenish their exhausted ammunition. Meantime Sedgwick's division moved forward promptly upon the enemy's position, but, unable to dislodge the enemy, gave way under the attack and were falling back, when I received orders from Brigadier-General Williams to move forward all my available troops to the support of our troops under Sedgwick. The Third Brigade had received direct orders from the corps commander, and had moved gallantly forward, but under the severe fire had been compelled to fall back. While endeavoring to rally part of this command, I received a gunshot wound in the right thigh, but I did not at the time consider it sufficiently severe to leave my command, and I remained until night.

Our whole line now retired to the position occupied in the morning, and my exhausted command held the woods known as the "Miller woods," the Third Brigade in the rear and left. A section of a battery under Lieutenant Thomas, and also Knap's Pennsylvania battery, were stationed at the point of these woods upon a road running across toward the Dunkard Church. The enemy continued his fire upon the woods, and at noon advanced his infantry to take possession of them. Being present with the batteries mentioned, I assumed the control, and sent back a staff officer (Captain d'Hauteville) to hasten to their support any infantry he might find. Major-General Franklin arriving with his corps, I indicated to him the position and movement of the enemy, when, by the prompt movement of Major-General Smith's command, and the effective fire of the batteries, the enemy was repulsed and driven back to his lines, and made no further attempt on the right of our line. In obedience to the orders of the corps commander, I directed Brigadier-

General Gordon, commanding Third Brigade, to proceed with his command to the support of Major-General Franklin.

It was now night; the action had ceased; when, exhausted from the loss of blood and the state of my wound, I reported to the general commanding the corps, and left the field. The regiments composing my command did their duty nobly, but it is my duty to call the special attention of the corps commander to the bearing and conduct of the new regiments that had so recently joined the command. Their services in the field were most valuable, and, considering the fact that they were for the first time under fire, their conduct merits the warmest commendation. In my absence the subordinate reports will be made to my successor, and officers and men who have distinguished themselves will be specified, doubtless, by their commanding officers. Brigadier-General Gordon, commanding Third Brigade, was active and efficient during the whole day, and his brigade rendered important service. Colonel Knipe, of the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, who commanded my brigade after I had assumed command of the division, will undoubtedly report to you the services of the First Brigade after I left it. Of my staff officers, I desire to mention Capt. Frederick d'Hauteville, my assistant adjutant-general, who was indefatigable in rendering me the most important services on the field; also to Captain Livingston, aide-de-camp; to Lieutenant Witman, aide-de-camp, who conveyed my orders most intelligently, and often under circumstances of great personal exposure, from first to last. Our casualties were 1,076 killed, wounded, and missing.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. W. CRAWFORD,

Brig. Gen. U. S. V., late Comdg. 1st Div., 12th Corps, Army of Va.

Brig. Gen. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS,

Comdg. Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac.

No. 168.

Report of Col. Joseph F. Knipe, Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., FIRST DIV., TWELFTH (BANKS') CORPS,
Sandy Hook, Md., October 1, 1862.

In the absence of Brigadier-General Crawford, who commanded this brigade in the action of the 17th ultimo, I presume it becomes my duty, as senior officer in the command, to forward a report of the part taken by it in the engagement. My whole time during the action was principally occupied in maneuvering my own regiment, and I had but little leisure to observe the movements of others composing the brigade, with the exception of those in the immediate vicinity of my own. A *résumé*, therefore, of the parts taken by all the regiments it is impossible for me to give, and it is only left me, to fill this vacuum, to refer you to the reports of the different commanders, which you will find herewith inclosed.

At an early hour of the morning of the 17th September the different regiments were set in motion. The Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, Tenth Maine, Twenty-eighth New York, One hundred and twenty-fourth, One hundred and twenty-fifth, and One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania took position in the rear of a belt of woods, the other side of which our troops were engaged with the enemy; the Tenth Maine, the

* But see revised statement, p. 199.

Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, and Twenty-eighth New York constituting the right, with the new regiments (One hundred and twenty-eighth, One hundred and twenty-fifth, and One hundred and twenty-fourth) on the left. It was the understanding that the latter three regiments should move to the front when wanted, and the old ones (the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, Tenth Maine, and Twenty-eighth New York) should follow at a proper distance in the rear, constituting, as it were, a reserve for the brigade. This plan was not carried out, and after remaining for upward of thirty minutes in the position described, the entire brigade was marched to the front, in column of division, to relieve the troops of General Hooker, who had up to this time borne the brunt of battle on the right. In this march of half a mile, the Tenth Maine, which had been on the right of the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, by some means for which I cannot account got on the left of it, and both, with the Twenty-eighth New York, in advance of the One hundred and twenty-fourth, One hundred and twenty-fifth, and One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania. On emerging from the woods, the columns of the three advance regiments were deployed, and immediately opened upon the enemy, who were in strong force in a corn-field about 250 yards from our front.

While in this position, the One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania came up and took position on the right of the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, still massed in column of company. Colonel Croasdale, its commander, fell dead while endeavoring to deploy it into line of battle, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hammersly was so severely wounded in the arm at the same time as to be obliged to leave the field. At this moment, seeing the uselessness of a regiment in that position, I took the responsibility of getting it into line of battle the best way circumstances would admit. When this was accomplished, I returned to my own regiment and ordered an advance, which was gallantly made as far as the fence of the corn-field. This position would have been held, and the advance continued in face of the leaden hail which was fast decimating our ranks, had it not been for the Twenty-seventh Indiana forming in our rear and exposing us to a fire from a quarter unexpected. I immediately ordered my command to fall back to the woods, when I met General Williams, then in command of the corps (General Mansfield having been carried to the rear mortally wounded), who ordered the regiments to retire to the rear of the woods and then reform. On our march to the position designated, we were met by re-enforcements of General Sumner's command, I think, hastening to the front. My regiments (what was left of them) formed in their immediate rear, and, with them, went into and through the corn-field and into the one lying beyond it. Having by this movement completely driven the enemy out of the open fields into the woods beyond, it was deemed inexpedient to proceed farther, and the whole force reclined upon the ground to avoid the fire of the enemy's artillery.

While in this position, I noticed that the One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers had advanced into the field beyond our position and into the woods occupied by the enemy. At the same time a brigade came out of them to our rear, and, passing us, joined the One hundred and twenty-fifth, and engaged the enemy, who had been re-enforced to such an extent as to compel our troops to retrace their steps in confusion if not in panic. At this juncture a battery was placed in position to cover the retreat of our forces, and poured in the advancing and dense masses of the enemy a tremendous fire of grape and canister. Notwithstanding the huge gaps made in their ranks, the rebels continued to advance, and threatened the capture of the battery.

I was in the immediate rear of the battery at the time with my colors and a few more men than its guard, when I was requested by some general, to me unknown, to form a rallying point for our retreating regiments. I was successful so far as to get the One hundred and seventh New York to form on my flag, and believe that it was this show of front that saved the guns from the enemy's hands. Fresh troops having arrived on the ground, I ordered my men to retire to the position they marched from in the morning, where they were joined by the Twenty-eighth New York, Tenth Maine, and One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

It was shortly after this and late in the afternoon that I was advised of the wounding of Brigadier-General Crawford, and ordered, in consequence, to take command of the brigade. Ordering my own and the three regiments last named to remain where they were, I hastened to the front to look out the whereabouts of the One hundred and twenty-fourth and One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiments. I found them in the woods where our first line of battle had been formed, and, by order of Major-General Franklin, whose corps then formed our advance line, placed the two regiments to the rear of his center, where they bivouacked for the night.

In concluding this report, I would remark that the delay in sending it forward has been occasioned partly by the inexperience of some of the colonels commanding new regiments, recently added to the brigade, and partly to the doubt I entertained as to my duty in the premises, not having assumed command until a late hour in the day, and occupying but a subordinate position during the battle. For the same reasons it is impossible for me to mention by name the officers who most distinguished themselves by their gallantry on this hotly contested field, other than those under my immediate command. Of my own regiment (the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers) I can cheerfully bear testimony to the bearing of Lieutenant-Colonel Selfridge. He displayed coolness and a bravery that distinguished the true soldier, and is worthy of promotion. Capt. George A. Brooks fell, pierced by a bullet through the brain, while gallantly leading his men into the very thickest of the fight. The country has lost no better man, nor one more devotedly attached to its cause than he.

A list of the casualties has already been forwarded.*

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. F. KNIPE,

Colonel Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Comdg. Brigade.

Capt. H. B. SCOTT,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division.

No. 169.

Report of Lieut. Col. James S. Fillebrown, Tenth Maine Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS TENTH MAINE REGIMENT,

Maryland Heights, September 25, 1862.

COLONEL: In the absence of Colonel Beal, who is away on account of wounds, and the illness of Major Walker, it devolves upon me to forward a report of the acts performed by the Tenth Maine Regiment in

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

the recent engagement with the enemy near Sharpsburg, Md., on Wednesday, September 17, 1862, and which is respectfully submitted.

The regiment went on to the field in column by division, closed in mass on first division, right in front, and was ordered to deploy while under fire, by General Mansfield, the only general officer present, to the left of the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and, before we were in line, had some few men killed or wounded. Before we received orders to commence firing, we were obliged to oblique to the left the length of our regiment, and at once commenced the engagement with a regiment of the enemy, which afterward proved to be the Twentieth Georgia. The men went into the woods some few rods, when I was knocked from my horse by Colonel Beal's horse, which had been twice mortally wounded, and, returning, gave me a severe kick in the stomach, entirely disabling me for three days. Colonel Beal received a shot, after his horse was twice wounded, in the legs, passing through one and entering the other slightly. Leaving the field at so early a stage of the fight, I am unable to give a more exact detail of the subsequent proceedings, but our officers are uniform in ascribing to their men many acts of coolness and personal courage, conspicuous among them being Corpl. Reuben Viel, of Company K, who, with other men, rushed upon the enemy, and took, among other prisoners, the colonel and a second lieutenant of the Twentieth Georgia Regiment, and, after conducting them to the rear, again returned to the contest, where they remained till after the regiment had exhausted its ammunition and, being relieved by General Greene's command, was ordered to retire.

A list of casualties has already been forwarded to brigade headquarters, and recent returns of company reports prove it to have been nearly correct.

Very respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,

J. S. FILLEBROWN,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Tenth Maine Regiment.

Col. J. F. KNIPE,

Forty-sixth Pa. Vols., Comdg. First Brig., Banks' Army Corps.

No. 170.

Report of Lieut. Col. James L. Selfridge, Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FORTY-SIXTH REGT. PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Camp near Sandy Hook, Md., September 22, 1862.

Colonel Knipe having been assigned to the command of the brigade, it becomes my duty, as second in command, to report the part taken by the Forty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers in the action of the 17th instant near Sharpsburg, Md.

By order of Brigadier-General Mansfield, temporarily commanding the corps, the regiment was ordered to advance to the front about 5.30 o'clock a. m., and was marched into the woods, immediately fronting the position of the enemy, in column of companies, where they were deployed by order of Colonel Knipe into line of battle, and opened a lively fire of musketry upon the enemy. This position was maintained for upward of an hour, the enemy obstinately holding his ground in a corn-field fronting the woods, when Colonel Knipe ordered the regiment to advance. This order was obeyed with alacrity, the regiment advancing to the edge of the field occupied by the enemy, and pouring into their ranks at every step a fire so well directed that, if well supported, would have

compelled the enemy to give way. But this support was not given, and, in consequence, the regiment was compelled to retire some 200 or 300 yards, where they met re-enforcements hastening to the front. The One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, a new and untried regiment, was brought to our right in column of companies closed in mass. They had no sooner arrived in the field than their colonel fell, and their lieutenant-colonel was so severely wounded that he had to be carried to the rear. Colonel Knipe assisted Major Wanner, the remaining field officer, in deploying the regiment, and it, with other regiments, including the Forty-sixth, advanced and drove the enemy out of the corn-field over another, in clover, into woods beyond both.

After this was accomplished there was a pause of about a half hour in the battle, with the exception of the artillery firing. A brigade advanced about this time out of the woods to our left, and, passing us, pressed into those on our right, where they engaged the enemy, but were compelled to retire in about fifteen minutes in great confusion. They rushed past the regiments composing Crawford's brigade, and imparted, to a great degree, the alarm which they themselves felt to some of these regiments, which joined in their flight. The situation was most critical. A battery—a regular one, I think—was wheeled into position on the crest of the slope dividing the two skirts of woods, and opened a tremendous fire of grape and canister upon the pursuing foe. No infantry at the time supported this battery. Colonel Knipe with his colors and a small fragment of his regiment were all that showed any organization in the neighborhood. Some general (name unknown) entreated him to rally what he could of the retreating regiments around his standards and save the battery. This he succeeded in doing, the One hundred and seventh New York responding to his entreaties and forming on his colors. Other regiments, seeing the posture of affairs, regained their confidence and returned to the field. The battery was saved, the enemy retreating to the woods, and the battle, as far as infantry was concerned, on this part of the field, ended. By direction of General Williams, the regiment—what was left of it—retired to the rear to enjoy that rest of which they were so much in need.

Herewith is forwarded a list of the casualties of the day—the killed, wounded, and missing.* Among the former it grieves me to mention the name of Capt. George A. Brooks. A nobler man, a truer friend, a braver soldier, has not yet yielded up his life as a sacrifice to his country's glory.

I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JAS. L. SELFRIDGE,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

The COMMANDING OFFICER,
First Brigade, First Division, Banks' Army Corps.

No. 171.

Report of Maj. Isaac L. Haldeman, One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. 124TH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS,
Maryland Heights, September 25, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I would beg leave to report that on the morning of the 17th instant the One hundred and twenty-fourth Regiment Pennsylvania

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

Volunteers, commanded by Col. Joseph W. Hawley, was ordered to the front about 7 o'clock. On reaching the extreme edge of the wood on the east of the corn-field, our line was formed and stationed in a position behind the fence. We were then ordered to advance, a portion of our right extending across the road and beyond the grain-stacks. We were led in line into the corn-field about 20 paces, and ordered to halt, as we could not distinguish our own troops. It was here our colonel was wounded. We were then ordered to fall back to the edge of the corn-field and take position behind the fence, which was done in good order. We were again ordered to advance, when the right, advancing about 100 yards, received a raking fire from the enemy in the woods, which was responded to by repeated volleys from our men, but the fire from our left and the battery of the enemy on the right compelled us to again fall back to the stacks. A battery now planted on the hill between the wood and the corn-field and opposite the stacks, this portion of our right was ordered to its support. The balance of the regiment followed up the advance through the corn-field, making many successful charges upon the enemy, until they were also ordered back to the support of the battery.

The enemy's batteries being silenced at this point, our regiment was ordered to the rear by General Hancock, with instructions to hold ourselves in readiness to support the batteries on the right.

Receiving no further orders, we remained in our position with the One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers during the night.

I am, yours, very respectfully,

I. L. HALDEMAN,

Major One hundred and twenty-fourth Regt. Pa. Vols.

Col. J. F. KNIPE,

Commanding First Brigade, First Division, Banks' Corps.

No. 172.

Report of Col. Jacob Higgins, One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH PA. VOLS.,
Camp near Sandy Hook, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by my regiment in the action near Sharpsburg on the 17th of September, 1862.

I was ordered by General Crawford to advance in close column, at daylight, through some fields to a piece of woods where there was heavy firing at that time going on. I was then ordered into the woods and then back again by General Crawford, then to throw out skirmishers and again advance through the woods until I reached the other side of the timber, and then deploy in line of battle and advance through the fields and there halt. At this place my command was exposed to a most terrific fire of musketry, shot, and shell. I then fell back a few rods, by order of General Crawford, where I remained some minutes, and was again ordered forward to the crest of a hill, which I was to hold.

At this time some colonel, whose name I do not know, told me that his troops were falling back for want of ammunition, and asked me to advance to his support. I immediately reported this to General Crawford, who ordered me to advance at once. I gave the command, and

my men started forward with a yell, driving the enemy before them and gaining possession of the woods. Here I took some prisoners, whom I sent to the rear. Again I was ordered to advance and halt in line with a battery. Before reaching the battery, though, I took a number of prisoners, some of whom came running back with white handkerchiefs tied on their guns and gave themselves up. At the battery I gave the command for my men to lie down whilst awaiting further orders. About this time the fire of the enemy slackened somewhat, only some shots from their sharpshooters being fired, and these at mounted officers and the artillery horses. Previous to this General Mansfield fell, some of my men carrying him off the field on their muskets until a blanket was procured. General Hooker here came up to me and inquired if any troops were in the woods in front. I replied, "None but rebels," and that my command was in the front. While talking to me, his horse was shot by some of the enemy's sharpshooters. I remarked to him that his horse was shot. He replied, "I see," turned and went away.

In a short time I received an order to advance into the woods. I gave the order, "Forward," my regiment advancing in splendid style, and driving some South Carolina and Georgia troops back into the woods. I halted at the edge of the woods, and ordered Captain McKeage, of Company G, to deploy his company as skirmishers. This done, I again advanced a short distance in the woods, and halted again to examine the enemy's position. I found him in force in my front and on my right. On looking around I discovered myself without support either in my rear or right, and, being the only mounted officer present, I gave my horse to Lieutenant Higgins, and instructed him to ride back to the general, inform him of my situation, and ask him to send me support immediately, or I would be unable to hold my position, and that the enemy would certainly flank me and cut me off, my command being at this time in advance of the whole corps.

I now ordered Captain McKeage to advance cautiously with his skirmishers, and, at the same time, the regiment to advance to the crest of a small hill. My skirmishers soon became engaged with the enemy, who were advancing on my front in force. They continued to advance, when I ordered my skirmishers to rally, and gave the command to commence firing. A most destructive fire caused the enemy to halt. I held him here for some time, until I discovered two regiments of them moving around my right, while a brigade charged on my front. On looking around and finding no support in sight, I was compelled to retire. Had I remained in my position two minutes longer I would have lost my whole command. I fell back to the rear of the first batteries, when an artillery officer rode up to me, saying that his battery was on the left front and entirely unsupported, and asking me if I would support him. I replied in the affirmative, and marched my command to the battery and took my position.

General Franklin now rode up, and inquiring what regiment this was, I replied the One hundred and twenty-fifth Pennsylvania, when he said my position was right and he was glad I was there, and ordered me to remain there, which I did. I staid here until, the One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania coming up, under command of its major, General Franklin ordered me to form it in my rear and take command of both regiments.

My adjutant, R. M. Johnston, who acted as major in the absence of Major Lawrence, who has been in the Georgetown hospital for some time, fell, mortally wounded. His conduct on the field during the whole

action was most gallant. All my officers and men behaved in splendid style, particularly Captain McKeage and his company, who acted as skirmishers during the engagement.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JACOB HIGGINS,

Colonel, Comdg. One hundred and twenty-fifth Regt. Pa. Vols.

Col. J. F. KNIPE,

Forty-sixth Pa. Vols., Comdg. 1st Brig., 1st Div., Banks' A. C.

No. 173.

Report of Maj. Joel B. Wanner, One hundred and twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH PA. VOLS.,
Camp on Maryland Heights, Md., September 23, 1862.

Colonel Croasdale, in command of the One hundred and twenty-eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, having been killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hammersly so badly wounded as not to be able to attend to the duties, it becomes my duty as next in command to report to you the position and part taken by the regiment in the fight on the 17th instant.

Having been ordered under arms before daylight, we were formed in column of divisions and marched toward the scene of action about 6 o'clock, and when in the woods directly in front of the enemy General Mansfield commanded the colonel to deploy his regiment, but as the regiment was new and inexperienced (having been in existence but five weeks), and being within range of the enemy, who were concealed in a corn-field in front of us, about 60 or 70 yards distant, thus bringing us under fire immediately, there was much confusion in accomplishing the movement. Before they could be deployed, in fact very soon after giving the order, Colonel Croasdale was killed by a ball through the head, and about the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Hammersly was wounded in two places in the arm. I endeavored to finish the deployment, but it being the first time the regiment had ever been under fire, I found it impossible to do so in the excitement and confusion. At the suggestion of Colonel Knipe, of the Forty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, I ordered the regiment to charge into the corn-field and dislodge the enemy, while the regiment on our right was charging into the woods. They started off in gallant style, cheering as they moved, and penetrated the corn-field, but, in consequence of the overpowering numbers of the enemy concealed, were compelled to fall back, which they did in tolerable order.

The Forty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Knipe commanding, were on our left and held their position. I attempted, with the assistance of Colonel Knipe and Lieutenant-Colonel Selfridge, of the same regiment, to rally and form my men on their right. While thus employed we were ordered to fall back to the woods, by order of General Williams, and another brigade advanced to relieve us.

I desire here to bear testimony to the bravery and gallantry of Colonel Knipe and Lieutenant-Colonel Selfridge, of the Forty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, and at the same time thank them for the

valuable assistance rendered myself and the officers under me after the fall of Colonel Croasdale.

I have sent in a report of the casualties.*

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

JOEL B. WANNER,
Major, Commanding.

Col. J. F. KNIPE,
Commanding First Brigade.

No. 174.

Report of Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. 1ST DIV., GEN. WILLIAMS' (LATE BANKS') CORPS,
Maryland Heights, September 24, 1862.

SIR: In conformity with orders emanating from headquarters of the corps, I have the honor to report upon the part taken by my brigade, the Third of the First Division of your corps, in the recent battle of Antietam, near Sharpsburg, on the 17th instant:

The enemy, routed at passes of the South Mountain on the 14th, were rapidly pursued and brought to a stand near Sharpsburg, on the westerly side of Antietam Creek, on the 16th instant. Massed in rear of our forces, drawn up in line of battle under General McClellan, this corps, remaining inactive during the day, was moved on the night of the 16th and morning of the 17th to the right of our line to strengthen General Hooker, who had at noon of the 16th crossed the creek and engaged the enemy's advance.

Just after the break of day we were aroused from a brief slumber by sharp firing of musketry in front of General Hooker's position. The corps, then commanded by the lamented General Mansfield, was by that officer immediately put in motion. My brigade, formed in columns of battalions closed in mass, I directed toward a battery which I was ordered to support, but before reaching the same I received a countermanding order to move forward with all possible dispatch to the support of General Hooker, then severely pressed. I moved accordingly my ployed masses by the flank at double-quick, gradually gaining deployment distance, thus throwing forward in line of battle on the right the Second Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Andrews; in the center the Third Wisconsin, Colonel Ruger; on the left the Twenty-seventh Indiana, Colonel Colgrove. The One hundred and seventh New York Regiment, Colonel Van Valkenburgh, I held in reserve, throwing them into the edge of a piece of woods on the left, which I was informed by an aide of General Hooker, who met me advancing, was to be held at all hazards. The only remaining regiment of my brigade, the Thirteenth New Jersey, I had, by direction of General Mansfield, thrown into the edge of a piece of woods behind my first position as a reserve. This regiment remained as posted during the deployment of my line and the posting of the One hundred and seventh New York.

While moving forward the three regiments referred to, an aide of General Hooker's, galloping rapidly toward my command, begged me to hurry forward. It was apparent, from the steady approach of the sound

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

of musketry, that the enemy were advancing. Their shouts of exultation could be distinctly heard as the line of my deployed battalion, sustained on the right by Crawford's brigade and on the left by Greene's division, both of our own corps, advanced boldly to the front. Before the impetuous charge and the withering fire of our line, the enemy halted, wavered, fled in confusion, and sought shelter in the woods opposite from whence he had emerged. I immediately ordered the One hundred and seventh New York to support the movement of my advance line, at the same time sending my aide, Captain Wheaton, to bring up the Thirteenth New Jersey. We now held possession of the field, had driven the enemy into the concealment of the woods, and, by a partial change of front forward on our left, were advancing toward the center of the general line of battle.

General Mansfield had been mortally wounded at the commencement of the action while making a bold reconnaissance of the woods through which we had just dashed. The command of the corps here devolved upon you.

My brigade was now drawn up in two lines. In the first, the Second Massachusetts and the One hundred and seventh New York Regiments; in the rear, the Third Wisconsin and Twenty-seventh Indiana. These latter regiments had suffered considerably. In the others the casualties had been unusually light. We were at this time re-enforced by General Sumner's corps, who, coming with shouts to the field, pushed across into the woods containing the enemy, and engaged him with ardor.

By your direction, I formed my brigade in line of battle in the edge of the woods through which we had charged. General Sumner's corps soon became warmly engaged. It was apparent that the rebels had received very strong re-enforcements. The tide of battle again turned. Our forces were compelled to fall slowly back behind batteries posted in front of the woods the enemy had tried vainly to enter. More than driving our forces from the woods the enemy did not essay, or if he did, was foiled. The next movement of my brigade I am called on to report was ordered by General Sumner, through you. It was to move up toward the woods in front, to support the troops there. The order, most urgent and imperative, furnished the only information I possessed that our forces had again entered the woods in our front. I deemed it of the utmost importance that my command should move forward with the least possible delay. I therefore in person gave the order to the regiments nearest me, without the formation of my entire brigade, intending to bring up other regiments to support or continue the line, as circumstances might require.

The Second Massachusetts and the Thirteenth New Jersey Regiments were immediately put in motion. The Third Wisconsin and Twenty-seventh Indiana Regiments, which, as before stated, had suffered seriously in a previous encounter with the enemy, were lying about 200 yards in front, concealed from the view of the enemy by a slight ridge. The One hundred and seventh New York was posted some distance to the left. The Second Massachusetts and Thirteenth New Jersey pushed forward, with great alacrity, sufficiently far to find that the troops to be supported had retired, that a large force of the enemy lay concealed in the woods, while a not inconsiderable number showed themselves in the open fields beyond. These regiments were received with a galling fire, which they sustained and returned for a brief period, then fell back upon their supports. So strong was the enemy, that an addition of any force I could command would only have caused further sacrifice, without gain.

The loss in the Second Massachusetts was severe. Here fell, mortally wounded, Lieut. Col. Wilder Dwight, of this regiment, bravely fighting for his country. An official paper is not the place to express the sadness the death of this gallant officer brings to the regiment, in which his presence was so much felt, as well as to many friends serving in the army, to whom he was much endeared.

I halted my command to report to you, sir, the position of the enemy, and was ordered to form a supporting line behind batteries in position on the left. The rebel lines again advancing, I then forwarded a portion of my brigade to support those nearly in front, while the One hundred and seventh New York Regiment was directed to support Captain Cothran's battery on the left. This fine regiment, but just organized and brought into the field, in this battle for the first time under fire, moved with steadiness to its perilous position, and maintained its ground until recalled, though exposed to a front fire from the enemy and a fire over its head from batteries in its rear.

About this time, in the order of events as narrated, I received an urgent call from General Greene, commanding the Second Division of our corps, to send him any re-enforcements I might have and could spare. General Greene at this time was gallantly holding a portion of the woods to the left, the right of which was held by the enemy in force. I directed the Thirteenth New Jersey, Colonel Carman, to support him. This regiment, also for the first time this day under fire, moved boldly and in an orderly manner toward General Greene's position, and I am much gratified to report that the general has spoken to me of their conduct in terms of high commendation. The services of my brigade during a portion of the remainder of the day were confined to forming a supporting line to fresher troops in our front.

Again, however, late in the afternoon, was I called into action by a direct order, addressed in person by General McClellan to my brigade, to support General Franklin in his intended movement to the front upon the disputed woods. In conformity with this order, I formed my brigade in line of battle directly in rear of General Newton's brigade, of General Franklin's corps, and enacted orders from that officer, to whom I had sent a staff officer to report my position.

Captain Wheaton, my aide, immediately brought me an order to move my brigade to the support of a battery, on the contested field, somewhat to the left and about 300 yards to the front of the position I then occupied.

The absence of General Crawford from the field, by reason of a slight wound, placed me at this time in command of the First Division of the corps. Turning over the command of my brigade to Colonel Ruger, of the Third Wisconsin, I conducted him to his assigned position, which he held during the night of the 17th instant. The First Brigade (Crawford's) of my division, commanded by Colonel Knipe, of the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiment, was drawn up in line of battle, also supporting General Franklin's line, to the right of my original position.

Early in the morning the position of my division was again changed to the same direction, but somewhat in advance of the position of the evening before, supporting General Franklin. I held this line during the day and night of the 18th instant. The morning of the 19th revealed the fact that the enemy had fled under cover of the night.

Thus terminated a bloody and obstinate contest. From sunrise to sunset the waves of battle ebbed and flowed. Men wrestled with each other in lines of regiments, brigades, and divisions, while regiment, brigade, and division faded away under a terrible fire, leaving long lines

of dead to mark where stood the living. Fields of corn were trampled into shreds, forests were battered and scathed, huge limbs sent crashing to the earth, rent by shell or round shot. Grape and canister mingled their hissing scream in this hellish carnival, yet within all this and through it all the patriots of the North wrestled with hearts strong and nerve unshaken—wrestled with the rebel hordes that thronged and pressed upon them as to destruction; never yielding, though sometimes halting to gather up their strength; then with one mighty bound throwing themselves upon their foes, to drive them into their protecting forest beyond. We slept upon the bloody field of our victory.

I cannot too highly praise the conduct of my brigade of regiments, old and new. The Second Massachusetts, Colonel Andrews; the Third Wisconsin, Colonel Ruger; the Twenty-seventh Indiana, Colonel Colgrove, I had a right to expect much of. I was not disappointed. Veterans of Winchester and Cedar Mountain, they can add to their laurels the battle of Antietam Creek. In this battle, I believe unparalleled in this war in severity and duration, from sunrise to sunset ever under fire, at times very severely, never free from musketry or artillery, officers and men behaved with most praiseworthy intrepidity and coolness. The One hundred and seventh New York, Colonel Van Valkenburgh, and the Thirteenth New Jersey, Colonel Carman, being new troops, might well stand appalled at such exposure, but they did not flinch in the discharge of their duties. I have no words but those of praise for their conduct. They fought like veteran soldiers, and stood shoulder to shoulder with those who had borne the brunt of war on the Peninsula, in the Shenandoah Valley, and from Fort Royal to the Rapidan. They were led by those who inspired them with courage, and they followed with a determination to conquer or die. If I make special mention of the One hundred and seventh New York Volunteers, of my brigade, it is that I may speak of its colonel and lieutenant-colonel, Colonel Van Valkenburgh and Lieutenant-Colonel Diven, both of whom, members of the present Congress, have left their Congressional duties to organize and bring into the field this fine regiment for their country's service. The example of these gentlemen, leading their men into the fight, cheering them onward, themselves thoughtless of exposure, prominent in the advance, bearing extraordinary fatigues without a murmur, shows a willingness to sacrifice their comfort and their lives for their country. Let others of our prominent men do as they have done, are doing, and the rank and file of our country will throng to follow such earnest leaders.

I owe especial thanks to the Hon. Charles R. Train, who volunteered his services on my staff at a time when fatiguing labor and most arduous service had deprived me of all my aides save one officer. This gentleman also has shown his willingness to lay down his life in his country's cause. The invasion of the loyal North called him from his Congressional duties and his home at a moment's notice. No fatigues, though excessive, no danger, though most perilous, deterred him from moving forward whenever he could render assistance in beating back the invading foe.

To Capt. Charles Wheaton, jr., my aide, I am again indebted for valuable services, ever exposed and ever ready to move cheerfully into dangers, at a time when I was deprived of the valuable services of my adjutant-general, Capt. H. B. Scott, who was worn out by fatigue and exposure in the Army of the Potomac.

I cannot close this report without a recognition of the valor of the rank and file of my command. Every soldier, commissioned, non-commissioned, and private, deserves a nation's thanks. I carried into action,

in officers and enlisted men, about 2,210. My losses are as follows: 72 killed, 548 wounded, and 29 missing.*

I inclose, with my own, detailed reports from colonels of regiments showing the services by them and their commands performed on this eventful day, as well as a list of killed, wounded, and missing, by name.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. GORDON,

Brig. Gen., Comdg. First Div., Twelfth (late Banks') Corps.

General ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS,

Commanding Twelfth Corps.

No. 175.

Report of Col. Silas Colgrove, Twenty-seventh Indiana Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT INDIANA VOLS.,

September 22, 1862.

SIR: I beg leave to submit the following report of the part taken by my regiment (Twenty-seventh Indiana Volunteers) in the action of the 17th instant, near Sharpsburg, Md.:

About sunrise in the morning I received orders to get my regiment under arms. I immediately formed my regiment in column by battalions closed in mass, right in front. The brigade was promptly moved to the front, the Second Massachusetts occupying the right, the Third Wisconsin second, my regiment third, the One hundred and seventh New York fourth, and the Thirteenth New Jersey the left or rear. In this position the brigade was moved forward, I should judge, a distance of two-thirds of a mile. At this point, as by this time the action had become general and severe on our left, under your direction, the brigade was immediately moved to the left. The Second Massachusetts, Third Wisconsin, and Twenty-seventh Indiana Regiments moved to a point designated by you, and formed their line of battle on a swell of ground immediately in front of a corn-field, in which the battle had been raging for some time. Our troops in the corn-field, a part of General Hooker's division, had been badly cut up, and were slowly retreating. When we first gained our position, the corn-field, or nearly all of it, was occupied by the enemy. This field was on a low piece of ground, the corn very heavy and serving to some extent to screen the enemy from view, yet the colors and battle-flags of several regiments appearing above the corn clearly indicated the advance of the enemy in force. Immediately in front or beyond the corn-field, upon open ground at a distance of about 400 yards, were three regiments in line of battle, and farther to the right, on a high ridge of ground, was still another regiment in line diagonally to our line. When we first took our position it was impossible to immediately open fire upon the enemy without firing into our own troops, who were retreating out of the corn-field. As soon as these troops had filed past my left, I immediately ordered my regiment to fire, which was done in good order. The firing was very heavy on both sides, and must have continued for more than two hours without any change of position on either side. It was very evident from the firing that the enemy was greatly superior in numbers at this point. The only force during this time at this place engaged was the three old regiments of

* But see revised statement, p. 199.

your brigade. At one time during this part of the engagement the fire of the enemy was so terribly destructive it seemed that our little force would be entirely annihilated.

After the fight had raged for about two hours without any perceptible advantage to either side, some of our forces (I have never learned whose) came up on our left in a piece of woods on the left of the corn-field, and opened an enfilading fire upon the enemy. This fire and ours in their front soon proved too hard for them. They broke and fled, in utter confusion, into a piece of woods on the right. We were then ordered to fix bayonets and advance, which was promptly done. Advancing through the corn-field, we changed front to the right by throwing our left forward. We had advanced over the larger portion of the ground when we were ordered to halt. I soon discovered that General Sumner's corps had arrived and were fresh, not yet having been in the action, and the work of dislodging the enemy from the woods, designed for your shattered brigade, had been assigned to them.

At a later hour in the day my regiment and the Third Wisconsin were ordered to advance nearly over the same ground to the support of the Second Massachusetts, Thirteenth New Jersey, and One hundred and seventh New York, who had been posted in or near the woods held by the rebels, to the rear of the corn-field. We promptly advanced nearly to the woods, but before we could get there our forces had been cut up and had fallen back. The two regiments held their position until the enemy had been driven back by a well-directed shower of grape and canister from one of our batteries, after which we took up a position in rear and in support of the batteries. The Twenty-seventh Regiment, as well as the balance of your brigade, was under arms from before sunrise until after dark, and although the main part of the fighting they were engaged in occurred in the fore part of the day, yet during the whole day they were frequently exposed to heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. At night I was temporarily, by you, placed in command of the brigade, and the whole brigade marched to the front and nearest the enemy in support of our batteries in front. Although our men had gone into the fight without breakfast and had fought all day, they performed this arduous duty at night, not only without grumbling but with cheerfulness.

Subsequent events of the day have disclosed to us that the troops your brigade so bravely fought and conquered at the battle of Antietam were the same troops you fought at Winchester on the 25th of May last—Ewell's old division, eight regiments—Louisiana, Georgia, and South Carolina regiments. I am proud to be able to report to you that I believe every officer and man of my regiment who went into the fight with me did his whole duty. I saw no man or officer who took a backward step during the whole day unless ordered to do so.

I went into the fight with 443, rank and file. My loss in action was, in killed, 17, in wounded, 192. Most of the wounds are slight, many, however, severe and mortal. Quite a number of amputations have been necessary. Twelve deaths among the wounded have been reported to me. A list of killed and wounded is herewith submitted.*

Your obedient servant,

S. COLGROVE,

Colonel Twenty-seventh Regiment Indiana Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON,

Comdg. 3d Brig., 1st Div., Banks' Corps, Army of the Potomac.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

No. 176.

Report of Col. George L. Andrews, Second Massachusetts Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. SECOND REGIMENT MASSACHUSETTS VOLS.,
Camp near Sandy Hook, Md., September 23, 1862.

SIR: I compliance with orders from division headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Second Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers in the battle of September 17, 1862, near Sharpsburg, Md.:

The evening preceding, the regiment was ordered forward to a place near the battle-field, to be in readiness, with other forces, to support General Hooker. The men were here allowed a few hours' rest. At about 6 o'clock in the morning of the 17th the regiment moved with the rest of the Third Brigade, in column, to a point still nearer the scene of action, which had already commenced. From this point, after a short interval, a part of the brigade, including this regiment, which was on the right, was marched forward in column by battalion, with deploying intervals. Having reached the farther edge of a wood in front, the columns were deployed in line and ordered to advance against the enemy, who occupied a wood opposite the left of the brigade and a corn-field in front of the center and right. This regiment, with the rest of the brigade, advanced, passing through one of our batteries, by which its movements were necessarily much impeded, and was halted in an orchard, some 75 yards in advance of the position taken by the other regiments of the brigade. I formed the regiment in a broken line; the left perpendicular and the right parallel to the line of the other regiments. In front of the right, about 50 yards distant, were two regiments lying down. From my position a fire was opened, so directed as to cross that of the rest of the brigade, and which was delivered with perfect coolness, and evidently with great effect. I here witnessed the gallant manner in which the Third Wisconsin, under Colonel Ruger, sustained and replied to a destructive fire. The enemy was soon driven from his position, when our line was ordered to advance through the corn-field. The enemy fled from this part of the field, leaving it thickly strewn with his dead and wounded. The regiment was halted near one of our batteries, which was playing upon the enemy, receiving his fire in return. Up to this time the loss in this regiment had been very small.

Soon after this the corps of General Sumner passed us, advancing to attack the enemy in his near position, which was in a thick wood—his line being nearly at right angles with that of the Third Brigade when advancing to the attack. The front of the brigade was then changed so as to take a position in the woods from which the enemy had been driven, and which was directly opposite the wood above mentioned. At about 12 o'clock (m.) this regiment, with the rest of the brigade, was ordered forward to the support of General Sumner's corps. The regiment advanced in line, the Thirteenth New Jersey on its right, to a lane, fenced on both sides, which offered a partial cover, and which was about 100 yards from the wood held by the enemy. Here the regiment received a very heavy fire from a large body of the enemy posted in the woods. Our fire was opened in return; but the enemy having greatly the advantage, both in numbers and position, his fire became very destructive.

Being unsupported, it was impossible to advance and a useless sacrifice of life to keep my position. The regiment was accordingly marched back in perfect order to the position from which it had advanced. This

position, with some unimportant changes, was retained until evening, when the regiment, with the rest of the brigade, was ordered forward opposite the left of the wood held by the enemy, to support our batteries. Here it remained until the next morning.

Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men of the regiment for their bravery and steadiness under the fire of the enemy, and for their general good conduct throughout the day. I would include in this commendation the few remaining men of the company of Zouaves d'Afrique attached to this regiment; their only remaining officer was necessarily absent, sick. Assistant Surgeon Stone, with his hospital attendants and the detachment of recruits detailed to take care of the wounded, rendered most efficient service. Although there was little opportunity for individuals to distinguish themselves, yet several of the non-commissioned officers and privates were conspicuous for bravery, coolness, and good conduct in action. They will be properly noticed.

I have to lament the loss of Lieut. Col. Wilder Dwight, who fell, mortally wounded, at the lane above mentioned, while displaying his usual coolness and courage under the fire of the enemy. The loss of this gallant officer, so beloved by officers and men, is most severely felt; but he has added another bright name to the glorious list of brave and noble men who have freely given their lives in the cause of their country. Captain Francis and Lieutenants Crowninshield and Mills were wounded, the latter severely. Of non-commissioned officers and privates, 12 were killed, 51 wounded, and 2 are missing. Of the company of Zouaves d'Afrique, 3 were wounded, 1 of whom is missing.

I inclose the list of killed, wounded, and missing, called for by orders from division headquarters.*

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE L. ANDREWS,

Colonel Second Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON,

Commanding First Division, Banks' Army Corps.

No. 177.

Report of Col. Ezra A. Carman, Thirteenth New Jersey Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRTEENTH REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLS.,
Camp on Maryland Heights, September 24, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor of reporting the part performed by my command in the action at Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg, on Wednesday, September 17, 1862:

At daybreak on the morning of that day I was ordered to advance with the brigade to the support of General Hooker's corps, then hotly pressed by the enemy. Advancing in brigade line, I formed to the right of the One hundred and seventh New York, where we were exposed for a few minutes to a very heavy artillery fire. I was then ordered by General Gordon to advance through the corn-field on the right across the road and down into a thick wood to support General Sumner's corps. Advancing through the corn-field up to the road, I was fired into by the enemy, who had driven General Sumner's corps from

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

the wood. Seeing that my whole command would be annihilated if I advanced, and knowing that General Sumner's corps had been driven from the wood, I formed my line and prepared to dispute the advance of the foe. Their fire into my line was heavy, and after a stand of a few minutes I was obliged to retire. I report, with regret, the loss of a gallant officer at this place, Capt. H. C. Irish, of Company K, who fell at the head of his company while directing their fire.

After retiring about 200 yards to the rear and reforming my command, I was ordered to support General Greene's brigade, then in possession of the wood near the school-house, but heavily pressed by a superior force of the enemy. I advanced to this position, formed on the right of General Greene's brigade, and engaged the enemy for an hour. Being flanked on the right, the whole brigade was obliged to retire, which they did in very good order, followed by the enemy for a short distance. The farther pursuit of the enemy was checked by the rapid and effective fire of the battery attached to this brigade, under command of Captain Cothran. I again formed my command in line, waiting for an attack or an order to advance, but was not again called on.

I mention with pleasure the heroic conduct of James Kilroy, a private in Company G, of this regiment, who, when the color-bearer was disabled, volunteered to carry the honored emblem, and did so, always pressing forward until severely wounded. I append a list of my killed, wounded, and missing.*

I am, yours, truly,

E. A. CARMAN,

Colonel, Commanding Thirteenth New Jersey Volunteers.

Captain SMITH,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 178.

Report of Col. Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, One hundred and seventh New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH REGT. N. Y. VOLS.,
Near Maryland Heights, September 21, 1862.

GENERAL: On the morning of the 17th instant we were formed in line of battle, under your immediate supervision, in the corn-field, nearly opposite to the woods which were then in the possession of the rebels. After being thus formed we were moved by the left flank into the woods upon the left of the corn-field, and directly in front of the above-mentioned woods. These we were directed to hold at all hazards. Soon, however, the enemy gave way in front, and by your direction my command charged across the intervening plowed field at double-quick, passing entirely through the narrow belt of woods which had been the scene of conflict, and reached the lane and fence upon the opposite side. During the whole time we had been under constant fire, and as we crossed the belt of woods were under a perfect hail-storm of shell, round shot, and musketry. We were then ordered to shield ourselves from the enemy's fire by lying down near the fence. While here we lost a number of our men in killed and wounded.

In about an hour we received an order from you to retire into the

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

woods and again form line of battle, which I was in the act of obeying when General Gibbon, as I understand by your directions, ordered me to return and support Cothran's battery, which was doing good execution upon the right of the woods. I obeyed the order, formed my men in line of battle in front of the enemy, marched up to the battery, occupied the position assigned to us until past 3 o'clock, when the battery and my regiment were relieved by General Slocum's division. We were under severe fire from early in the morning until about 4 o'clock. The officers and men, so far as I know, of the One hundred and seventh Regiment behaved well, and obeyed every order with alacrity. During the time I was supporting Cothran's battery, General Greene directed me to send two companies as skirmishers into the woods immediately in front. I detailed Company I, Captain Colby, and Company E, Captain Morgan, to that duty. They did it in gallant style, but found the road and woods teeming with rebels.

Capt. E. Chalmers Clark, a brave officer, while in the active discharge of his duty on the field, fell, seriously wounded through the left breast by a musket-ball. Capt. W. F. Fox was injured by the concussion of a shell, and Lieutenant Gleason was wounded in the leg.

I desire to commend the coolness and bravery of Captain Cothran, who was in command of the battery. His decision and promptness, in my opinion, contributed in a great measure to the sustaining of that position.

Inclosed herewith I send a list of killed and wounded so far as I have been able to ascertain them.*

I am, general, yours, very respectfully,

R. B. VAN VALKENBURGH,

Col., Comdg. One hundred and seventh Regt. New York Vols.

General GEORGE H. GORDON.

No. 179.

Report of Col. Thomas H. Ruger, Third Wisconsin Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT WISCONSIN VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Sandy Hook, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following brief report of the part taken by the Third Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers in the battle fought near Sharpsburg, Md., on the 17th day of September, 1862:

The regiment arrived at the position assigned it, in company with other regiments of the brigade, between the hours of 6 and 7 a. m. The particular place occupied by the regiment was a knoll overlooking a corn-field, from which, as the brigade arrived, the enemy were driving our troops, belonging to some other brigade. The regiment suffered somewhat before the corn-field was sufficiently clear of our own troops to render it safe to fire. The fire of the enemy was returned with steadiness and spirit for a long time, until the ammunition in the boxes became nearly exhausted, and in some cases quite so. At one time the enemy had succeeded in advancing to within about 100 yards, at which point he became exposed to a cross-fire from the Second Massachusetts Volunteers, on my right. The combined fire of the regi-

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 198.

ments of the brigade particularly engaged at the point referred to—the Second Massachusetts, Twenty-seventh Indiana, and Third Wisconsin—drove the enemy rapidly out of the corn-field and into the woods. At this time an advance was ordered, and was being executed, with bayonets fixed, for the purpose of charging. Before any considerable distance was made, however, the corps of General Sumner came upon the field in two or three lines, which were perpendicular, or nearly so, to our line, which compelled a halt of our line. Very soon the troops, or some portion of them, that had passed and gone into the woods into which the enemy had been driven from the corn-field, came back in some disorder.

The regiment, with others of the brigade, was now placed by a change of front in position to support a battery, covering the retreat of the troops driven back from the woods. During the remainder of the day the regiment, with others of the brigade, continued in position as support to batteries, being exposed at times to the fire of the enemy's shells. The total number carried into action was, officers and men, about 340. The loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 198. I regret to report that most of the officers wounded were so severely wounded as to prevent return to duty for some time. Out of 12 officers with the regiment during the action, but 4 escaped untouched.

Accompanying is a list of killed, wounded, and missing.* It has been impossible in many cases to ascertain the character of the wounds.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. H. RUGER,

Colonel, Commanding Third Wisconsin Volunteers.

Capt. CHARLES WHEATON, JR.,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

No. 180.

Report of Brig. Gen. George S. Greene, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
September 29, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of this division in the battle of Antietam, on the 17th instant.

The division went into action with three brigades. First Brigade (Geary's), under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale: Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, Fifth and Seventh Ohio, and Sixty-sixth Ohio (the Twenty-ninth Ohio was on detached service). Second Brigade (Prince's), under command of Colonel Stainbrook, of the One hundred and ninth Pennsylvania: The One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania, Third Maryland, and One hundred and second New York (the One hundred and ninth Pennsylvania was on detached service). Third Brigade: Pur-nell Legion, Maryland Volunteers, Seventy-eighth New York, Sixtieth New York, and Third Delaware, under command of Colonel Goodrich. The First District of Columbia Volunteers had, with the exception of the colonel and adjutant, entirely disappeared from the command by sickness and desertion. The aggregate present on the day of the action was 2,504. The loss was in killed, 114; wounded, 507; missing, 30; total, 651.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 199.

The division was carried into action about 6.30 a. m., under the orders of Brigadier-General Mansfield. As we were going into action the Third Brigade was detached to the right, leaving under my command the First and Second Brigades, with an aggregate of 1,727. The division encountering the enemy in the first woods in our front drove them before it, and, entering the open ground partly covered with corn, moved to the left and took position on the right of the post and rail fence inclosing the field on the right of the burned house (Poffenberger's). There was a battery of brass guns at our left, which we protected. This battery getting out of ammunition for long range was replaced by another.

While in this position the enemy formed in strong force in the woods to the right of the white brick church and advanced on our line. The line was advanced to the axle-trees of the guns, and delivered their fire when the enemy were within 70 yards. They immediately fell back, having suffered immense loss. The division advanced, driving the enemy from the woods near the church and occupying the woods. The Purnell Legion joined us during the action. The Twenty-seventh Indiana was sent to our support, and, after doing good service, retired in consequence of their ammunition being exhausted. The Thirteenth New Jersey then joined the division, and assisted in holding the woods. The position of the division in the advanced woods was very critical. We were in advance of our line on the right and left of us. Sumner's corps, which had advanced on our left, had retired, as had also the troops on our right. Guns were sent for, and a section of Knap's battery arrived, and were ordered to take position on our left. The ground on our left and front was broken and wooded, and concealed the movements of the enemy. I placed the division in line, with the right thrown back, and sent forward skirmishers and sought re-enforcements from General Williams. None were at the time available, and the enemy advancing in large force, threatening to envelop the small command, they were forced to retire. They rallied in the second line of woods. They held the woods by the church nearly two hours, in advance of any other troops in their vicinity. They were in action from 6.30 a. m. to 1.30 p. m.

After rallying our men we were ordered to fall back, to allow the men to rest and get water and clean their guns. About 5.30 o'clock p. m. the division was ordered by General McClellan to take position in the rear of Franklin's corps, which was promptly done with the rest of your command, where we lay on our arms through the night.

Colonel Goodrich, of the Sixtieth New York, commanding Third Brigade, was killed early in the day while gallantly leading his command into action, the command of the brigade devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Austin, Seventy-eighth New York Volunteers, who remained in command during the remainder of the day.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was severely wounded at the close of the action, having discharged his duty through the day with great gallantry and zeal.

Where so many acted with distinguished gallantry it is impossible to designate all the individual officers entitled to notice. Colonel Stainrook, Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, One hundred and second New York, and Major Pardee deserve commendation for activity and gallantry through the day. I commend to your consideration Dr. A. Ball, acting medical director for the division, and the surgeons and assistants under his orders, for the great care and zeal with which they provided for the wounded on the day of battle. To my staff, Capt. C. P. Horton, assistant adjutant-general, and my aides, Lieutenant Shipman, and Lieut. C.

T. Greene, my thanks are due for efficient service rendered during the day. Lieutenant Greene, though young and fresh in the service, displayed great coolness under the most trying circumstances, and rendered most efficient service.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. S. GREENE,

Brig. Gen., U. S. V., Comdg. 2d Div., 12th (Banks') Army Corps.

Brig. Gen. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS,
Commanding Twelfth Army Corps.

No. 181.

Report of Maj. Orrin J. Crane, Seventh Ohio Infantry, commanding First Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., SECOND DIV., BANKS' ARMY CORPS,
Loudoun Heights, Va., September 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the First Brigade, Second Division, in the battle of Antietam, on the 17th September, 1862:

The brigade was composed of the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Maj. Ario Pardee commanding; Fifth Ohio Volunteers [Major John Collins commanding; Seventh Ohio Volunteers], Maj. O. J. Crane commanding, and the Sixty-sixth Ohio Volunteers, Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell commanding. The brigade, under command of Lieut. Col. H. Tyndale, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was formed at 5.30 a. m. in column of division, right in front. It was then marched in column about 1 mile to a point of woods, where the enemy were in force and had engaged our right, holding them in check.

At this point the order came to deploy column into line of battle, which was promptly executed. We then advanced a short distance into the woods, where the enemy were formed under cover of a fence. The action commenced. After exchanging a few shots the engagement became general, which continued for an hour and a half of severe fighting, with great slaughter to the enemy, when the enemy gave way in confusion and disorder before the furious onset of our troops. We pursued them rapidly, capturing many prisoners, and strewing the ground with their dead and wounded. After pressing them closely for a distance of one-half mile, we were obliged to slacken our fire, as our ammunition had given out, when, receiving a supply, we changed our line by the right flank, and marched to an elevation, where we awaited the advance of the enemy, who was advancing in column of regiments. We then received orders to fall back under cover of the hill, and awaited the advance of the enemy; when within a short range our troops were quickly thrown forward to the top of the hill, where we poured into their advancing columns volley after volley. So terrific was the fire of our men that the enemy fell like grass before the mower; so deadly was the fire that the enemy retired in great disorder, they not being able to rally their retreating forces. We charged them in a heavy piece of woods, driving them out of it, capturing a large number of prisoners (among them was a lieutenant-colonel and a lieutenant), and made terrible havoc in their ranks, covering the ground with the slain, many of them officers. We gained the woods, and held our position for two hours. We were then ordered to retire, and be relieved by other troops, under the command of General Smith.

It is impossible at this time to speak of individual bravery, but I can say, without flattery, that all, both officers and men of the different regiments of the brigade, nobly stood by their colors, and did their duty well on that eventful day. Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale, while nobly doing his duty, was severely wounded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ORRIN J. CRANE,
Commanding Brigade.

Brigadier-General GREENE,
Commanding Second Division.

No. 182.

Report of Maj. John Collins, Fifth Ohio Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Loudoun Heights, Va., September 24, 1862.

On the morning of the 17th, at 6 o'clock a. m., the Fifth Ohio Regiment, commanded by Maj. John Collins, was ordered to advance toward the enemy on the right. They proceeded in column by divisions until arriving within short distance of the enemy, when we deployed to the right of the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, of the same brigade, thus forming the right center, two Ohio regiments being deployed still farther to our right. Our regiment then moved forward to the woods occupied by the rebels, and, after a short but severe contest, succeeded in driving them before us. From the woods the enemy retired to a corn-field, followed by us, and while in the corn our regiment engaged a Georgia regiment in a hand-to-hand combat, using clubbed guns, a portion of the men having no bayonets. The enemy at this point was severely punished. After a short resistance, the enemy again gave way, and, being closely pursued, sustained great loss. We followed the retreating foe through the corn into an open field beyond, where, our men being out of ammunition, we halted behind the brow of a hill until the cartridge-boxes of the men were replenished. We then advanced about 50 yards farther, at which time the enemy were observed coming toward us. Our regiment laid down until they approached quite near, when they suddenly raised and discharged a volley into their lines which caused them to retreat in confusion. We followed them, driving them through the field into the woods in rear, and out of the woods into the corn still farther beyond. The regiment at this time was so reduced, from wounds and other causes, as to be unable to pursue farther.

About the center of the woods we took a position which we held until again out of ammunition, when, owing to the retreat of a regiment on our right, caused by the advance of a greatly superior force of rebels, we were compelled, at about 1 o'clock p. m., to retire from our position.

It is no flattery to say that officers and men did their duty bravely during the whole of the six hours' fire to which they were subjected.*

Very respectfully,

JOHN COLLINS,
Major, Commanding Fifth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Maj. O. J. CRANE.

* A medal of honor was awarded to Private John P. Murphy, of this regiment, for the capture of the flag of the Thirteenth Alabama Infantry.

No. 183.

Report of Capt. Fred. A. Seymour, Seventh Ohio Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HQRS. SEVENTH REGIMENT OHIO VOLS. (INFANTRY),
Loudoun Heights, Va., September 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Seventh Ohio Regiment in the late battle of the 17th day of September, 1862:

We formed in column of division, in compliance with orders from Brigadier-General Greene, commanding Second Division, Twelfth Army Corps. At 5.30 a m. we advanced in column of division to attack the enemy, who were under cover of a piece of woods and who were engaging our right and holding our men in check. We then deployed in line of battle to the right and advanced in line of battle into the woods, where the enemy were lying in force. The engagement then became general. After a half hour's hard fighting on both sides, we succeeded in driving the enemy from his position under cover of the fence to the corn-field, when they fell back in confusion and disorder. Our troops closely pursued them, capturing many prisoners and covering the ground with their dead and wounded. After pressing them for 1 mile, they again took shelter under cover of a heavy piece of woods, when, having exhausted our ammunition, our men rested on their arms and waited half an hour for the ammunition to come up. After replenishing the men with ammunition, we changed our line to the right to an elevated piece of ground, and awaited the advance of the enemy, who were charging on us from the woods *en masse*. Our men, with coolness, waited until within 50 yards and then poured in a scathing fire upon them, volley upon volley, until they were forced to give way. Our men then closely pursued them back through a thick piece of woods, which point we held until ordered to retire.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. A. SEYMOUR,

Captain, Commanding Seventh Ohio Volunteers.

Maj. O. J. CRANE,

Commanding First Brigade.

No. 184.

Report of Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell, Sixty-sixth Ohio Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HQRS. SIXTY-SIXTH REGIMENT OHIO VOLUNTEERS,
Camp near Harper's Ferry, Va., September 25, 1862.

SIR: In compliance to orders received from headquarters of First Brigade, Second Division, Second Corps, Army of Virginia, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Sixty-sixth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the late action near Sharpsburg, Md., on the 17th instant:

The regiment moved to the field of battle in column, in company with the Fifth and Seventh Ohio Volunteers (infantry), and Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, composing the First Brigade, under command of Lieut. Col. Hector Tyndale, of the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania. Moving in front of a piece of woods in which the enemy were in force,

and under whose fire we were placed, having 2 wounded while we were in column, I immediately deployed my regiment, and two high fences were a serious obstacle to my deploying to the left. I formed in line of battle, moving to the right. I observed that the Seventh Ohio had formed line in a similar manner, and I immediately attached my regiment on the left of the Seventh Ohio, and together we moved toward the right of the line that the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania were forming, which brought us immediately in front of a line of the enemy drawn up along a fence, in the edge of a corn-field. We immediately opened fire upon the enemy, who soon broke. We advanced, firing, in connection with the other regiments composing the First Brigade.

The retreat of this line of the enemy soon became a rout. My regiment took a number of prisoners, who were sent to the rear. The regiment moved rapidly forward and formed, with the rest of the brigade, under shelter of a small knoll, directly in front of the church on the Sharpsburg road. This regiment assisted in repulsing the several attacks made by the enemy to drive us from this position, and in their last attack I was wounded by a musket-shot along the cheek and neck, which disabled me from remaining on the field the rest of the day.

From the report of the acting adjutant of the regiment, we went into action 120 strong, and this small force acted as efficiently as it was possible for it to do. I had but two commissioned officers with me in the action, Lieutenants Smith and Yagel, both of whom escaped unhurt.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EUGENE POWELL,

Lieutenant-Colonel Sixty-sixth Ohio Vols., Comdg. Regiment.

Maj. O. J. CRANE,

Comdg. First Brig., Second Div., Second Corps, Army of Va.

No. 185.

*Report of Maj. William Raphael, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry,
of the battle of Antietam.*

HDQRS. TWENTY-EIGHTH REGIMENT PENNSYLVANIA VOLS.,
Bolivar Heights, Va., September 23, 1862.

MAJOR: On the morning of the 17th September, 1862, the regiment, under command of Maj. Ario Pardee, jr., in compliance with orders from Brigadier-General Greene, commanding Second Division, Second Corps, advanced in line of battle upon the enemy's center, at 6 o'clock. After severe fighting through a thick wood in which the enemy was concealed, we completely routed them, strewing the ground with their dead and wounded. The enemy gave way before us, and, upon our advancing rapidly, they abandoned three pieces of artillery—one, a 12-pounder iron gun, the other two, 12-pounder brass pieces. A most gallant charge was made by the regiment. As the enemy advanced upon us the second time we again drove them back, killing many. The regiment then advanced to within 50 yards of the enemy's lines, and held the position there until a regiment on the right gave way under a most galling fire, when the regiment was compelled to fall back, owing to the supply of ammunition being exhausted and the overwhelming force of the enemy, advancing in three columns on our right, left, and center, threatening annihilation to the small force in that position, numbering of the regiment about 300 men, and of the Federal forces not exceeding 600.

At 1.30 p. m. the order was given to fall back, when the regiment

retired about 200 yards to the rear, when it was relieved by forces under command of General Smith.

It is impossible at this time to speak of individual bravery.* Suffice it to say one and all, officers and men, could not possibly have fought with more determination.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM RAPHAEL,

Major Twenty-eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Vols., Commanding.

Maj. O. J. CRANE,

Seventh Ohio Volunteers, Commanding First Brigade.

No. 186.

Report of Lieut. Col. James C. Lane, One hundred and second New York Infantry, commanding Second Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the Second Brigade of this division entered the field of battle on September 17, 1862, under command of Col. H. J. Stainrook, at about 6.30 a. m., the regiments marching in column of divisions. The brigade consisted of the One hundred and second New York Regiment, One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania Regiment, and Third Maryland Regiment, the One hundred and ninth Pennsylvania Regiment being on detached service. Line of battle was formed in face of the enemy, and under fire, when the order was given to charge, and the enemy was driven back over half a mile, and batteries placed in position in front of the line gained. Soon after, the right and center of brigade rose from behind the battery and again drove the enemy some 500 yards through another piece of woods, with great slaughter, the regiment on the left being ordered by General Sumner to remain behind the battery as a support.

At about 12 m. the brigade fell back, from lack of support and want of ammunition, and at about 1 p. m. was drawn up in line about half a mile to rear of line of battle and allowed to rest. At night-fall the command was again ordered under arms, and took position behind General Franklin's corps as a reserve, and slept on their arms, no alarm occurring to bring them into action.

In the absence, from sickness, of Colonel Stainrook, and being senior officer reported present for duty, I have the honor to sign myself, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. C. LANE,

Lieut. Col. One hundred and second N. Y. Regt., Comdg. Brig.

Brigadier-General GREENE,

Commanding Second Division.

No. 187.

Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph M. Sudsbury, Third Maryland Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

NEAR SANDY HOOK, MD., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I hereby respectfully submit to you the following report con-

* A medal of honor was awarded to Corpl. Jacob G. Orth, Company D, of this regiment, for the capture of a flag supposed to belong to the Seventh South Carolina Infantry.

cerning the action of the Third Maryland Regiment in the battle near Sharpsburg on the 17th of this month:

We rested from 3 o'clock a. m. in a field about 1 mile from the bridge over the Antietam. At 6.30 o'clock in the morning General Greene, commanding the division, marched us from this field in column by companies, and, advancing in a southerly direction, we reached a point about 1 mile from our starting place. We here met the enemy, who was in possession of a piece of woods. Deploying in line of battle, we here met our first loss; 3 of our men fell. After a short but severe contest, we drove the enemy out of this wood and across a newly plowed field. This woods was filled with the wounded and dead of the enemy, who had taken refuge behind one of the batteries in front and toward our left. Arriving at the farther end of this field, we halted for some minutes, in order to form again in line. Our left rested on a burning farmhouse, said to have been the commissary store-house of the enemy, who had, before leaving, set fire to the same and thrown his salt in the well.

After again being formed, we advanced over a meadow toward the battery of the enemy, who had vigorously shelled us during our advance from the woods. Arriving behind the crest of a little elevation, we were ordered to lie down and wait the arrival of a battery which had been ordered to our support, and of which a section shortly came up and unlimbered. A full battery, said to have been Knap's, came up soon after and went directly into action. The enemy's infantry advanced from the right, apparently designing to take our battery. We were ordered up, fixed bayonets, and charged forward past the battery, which in the mean time had given the enemy the benefit of two rounds of canister. We drove the enemy, who flew before us across the fields and across the road leading from Bakersville to Sharpsburg. On the other side of the road is a church or school-house, surrounded by woods. Charging through this piece of woods, we drove the enemy out, and held possession nearly two hours. The enemy occupied a corn-field in front of us, and, judging from his fire, must have been in strong force. In this woods I lost most of my men. I took 148 men into action. Our casualties amount to 1 killed and 25 wounded, some of whom have since died. Four were missing.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SUDSBURG,

Commanding Third Regiment Maryland Volunteers.

Lieutenant-Colonel LANE,

Commanding Second Brigade.

No. 188.

Report of Lieut. Col. James C. Lane, One hundred and second New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND SECOND NEW YORK STATE VOLS.,
Camp in Field near Antietam Creek, September 18, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that in the action of yesterday the One hundred and second New York State Volunteers entered the field for duty, according to orders, at 6.30 a. m., in common with the rest of the brigade; that we marched to the woods held by the rebels, in close column by division, and that line of battle was formed by deployment of column. While the line was forming, under fire of the

sharpshooters of the enemy, Capt. M. Eugene Cornell, of Company D of this regiment, fell, dead, at the front of his command while bringing them into line, being shot through the head. After line was formed we advanced in order, driving the rebels before us, this regiment going, however, to the left of the brigade, and, after passing through the woods, taking the left of the burning building in the field beyond. From this building our men pursued the enemy to the corn-field in advance, where the One hundred and second halted and commenced firing at a battery which was playing on the right of the brigade, just beyond the corn-field. This battery retired immediately after our opening fire upon it.

At this time I marched the regiment by the right flank to rejoin the brigade, which was in position behind the battery of Parrott guns, to the right of the corn-field. Soon after the brigade moved forward past the battery, and drove the enemy through the woods beyond. The One hundred and second, however, remained supporting the battery, by order of General Sumner's aide. This battery retired after expending its ammunition, and was replaced by a battery of brass guns, which remained in position about twenty minutes, and returned, being threatened by a brigade of the enemy, the right of this brigade, being out of ammunition and unsupported, retiring at the same time. The One hundred and second also retired, joining in with the rest of the brigade, and were reformed into line by the general commanding division (General Greene), at the rear of the woods behind the burning building. The brigade was here rested, and, after some two hours, was again marched one-half mile to the rear, and, after forming line, arms were stacked and rations given out.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. C. LANE,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. One hundred and second New York Vols.

Colonel STAINROOK,

Commanding Second Brigade.

No. 189.

Report of Maj. Thomas M. Walker, One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH REGT. PA. VOLS.,

September 22, 1862.

I have the honor to report the part taken by the One hundred and eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers in the battle on Antietam Creek, Md., September 17, 1862.

We were moved during the night of the 16th from the center to the right. Arriving about midnight at the point for our bivouac, we rested until awakened at daylight by the fire of the pickets in our front. We were soon formed in column closed in mass, and marched about three-quarters of a mile to the front, and then halted to prepare breakfast. While so doing we were suddenly ordered to fall in. We advanced in column and deployed under fire of musketry, the enemy having driven our forces for some way and occupying the woods in front of us. We advanced and fired as we deployed, and by the time we reached the woods were in line, closing up on the left of the First Brigade. We swept the rebels from the woods, taking a large number of prisoners, among them a number of officers.

Arriving at the far edge of the woods, we halted and engaged the

enemy, who had rallied in the field beyond. Again advancing, we drove the enemy until we occupied the heights finally held by our forces. We laid under the brow of this hill to await the coming of a battery to our support. One was quickly sent, but was unfortunately out of the proper ammunition. Another soon came, well supplied, and began at once to fire upon the enemy. We had not been long in this position before the rebels had formed their line, with the intention of recovering their ground and taking this battery. They were allowed to approach within 30 feet (my men in the mean time having fixed bayonets), but at the proper time we rushed forward to the mouths of the cannon, handsomely repulsing their charge. We now faced to the right, and filed to the right to assist in repulsing an attack made on the troops covering our right. This was accomplished after some very heavy firing. When the enemy began to waver we advanced, driving them from the woods and from about the brick church. We held these woods, under fire, for over two hours, until a new regiment, formed at right angles to our right, receiving the fire of an advancing line, broke and ran through us, carrying us back over part of the ground we had fought so hard to gain. The rebels followed us to the top of the hill, upon which they tried to take our battery, but were stopped by a battery posted on our right. The line of our advancing forces, coming up, occupied the hill, thus leaving the field in our possession.

My regiment entered the fight with 13 officers and 230 men. Of this small command I have lost 1 officer and 26 men killed, 6 officers and 74 men wounded, and 7 men missing; a total of 114, or nearly half of my command.*

After seven hours' continuous fighting we were relieved, having expended nearly 120 rounds of ammunition to each man. The character of the fighting you well know. It will be shown by a glance at the colors we bore upon the field. (Together they are pierced with 25 shots.) Again was my color-bearer shot down. My adjutant, Lieutenant Kingsbury, was of great assistance. I shall also mention Lieut. Charles Woeltge, who, together with all my officers, behaved most bravely, and have received my hearty commendations for their conduct.

During the whole of the engagement the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment was on our right, and we continued side by side until the end, fighting almost as one man.

Respectfully, &c.,

THOS. M. WALKER,

Major, Commanding One hundred and eleventh Regt. Pa. Vols.

Lieutenant-Colonel LANE,

Commanding Second Brigade.

No. 190.

Report of Lieut. Col. Charles R. Brundage, Sixtieth New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of the battle of Antietam.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
Loudoun Heights, Va., September 25, 1862.

I have the honor to report that, on the morning of September 17, 1862, the late Col. William B. Goodrich, of the Sixtieth Regiment New York

* But see revised statement, p. 199.

State Volunteers, being in command of this brigade, was ordered to take the brigade, then composed of the Sixtieth and Seventy-eighth Regiments New York Volunteers, Third Delaware, and Purnell Legion, into the field on the right of the line of battle. Before getting into position, the Purnell Legion was ordered to some other portion of the field, which reduced the line of this brigade to the three first-named regiments. On getting into position, skirmishers were thrown out on the right and left, who cleared the woods of the enemy's sharpshooters. While thus engaged, and about an hour after the commencement, the colonel commanding was mortally wounded and borne from the field. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Austin, of the Seventy-eighth New York, who remained in command during the remainder of the day. In about an hour and a half from this time orders were received to withdraw the brigade from the field. This was done, and the line shortly after reformed about half a mile to the rear of its former position. The brigade remained in this line till near dark, when they received orders from yourself to rejoin the division.

This report is made from recollection only, no data being kept, as the command was not handed over to me till late in the evening. I deem it just, however, to make honorable mention of the coolness and bravery of the officers and men in action, especially of the true soldierly bravery of Colonel Goodrich, the daring and courage of Lieutenant-Colonel Austin, the valuable services of Captain Redington, of the Sixtieth New York, and of First Lieutenant McGregor, of the Seventy-eighth New York, the two latter having charge of the skirmishers.

Respectfully submitted.

CHAS. R. BRUNDAGE,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE S. GREENE,
Commanding Second Division, Twelfth Army Corps.

No. 191.

Report of Capt. Levin B. Day, Third Delaware Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT DELAWARE VOLUNTEERS,
September 27, 1862.

Pursuant to order, I report concerning the Third Regiment Delaware Volunteers in the battle of the 17th instant:

There were present but five line officers, and, by order of Maj. Arthur Maginnis, commanding, the regiment was divided into four companies of 30 men each, one company being afterward detached as skirmishers. Our regiment, the left of the brigade, occupied a woods about 250 yards from the rebel line of battle, Baker's California regiment on our left and partially in front. We lay in this position for about four hours, under a continuous shower of shell and musketry, firing as occasion offered by the advance or retreat of the rebels. The California with an Indiana regiment being partially outflanked, retreated directly through our ranks.

At this moment Major Maginnis was wounded, and we retreated in good order under command of Capt. William J. McKaig. We formed in a field to the rear of our former position, from which we again retreated

obliquely to the left and rear, coming into position by a 12-pounder battery, which immediately opened on the enemy. Out of range of the rebel guns, we reposed here until the engagement ceased. Both officers and men behaved with coolness and bravery, and it would be invidious to mention individual cases.

The report of killed and wounded has already been forwarded to brigade headquarters.*

Very respectfully,

L. B. DAY,

Captain, Commanding Regiment.

MANUEL EYRE, JR.,

Second Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant.

No. 192.

Report of Lieut. Col. Benjamin L. Simpson, Purnell Legion, Maryland Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

LOUDOUN HEIGHTS, VA.,

September 27, 1862.

Report of the proceedings of the Purnell Legion during the battle of Antietam:

We entered the field about 7 o'clock, and were immediately detached from our brigade, by order of General Williams, and sent to the support of the One hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Regiment, which position we held until ordered away. It entered the woods on the right of a white school-house, where it formed in line and went into action, where it remained until the enemy appeared in overwhelming numbers and compelled it to retire. It fell back to the woods on our right, where our artillery were stationed, when we again formed in line, and went into camp with the brigade.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

B. L. SIMPSON,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Purnell Legion.

No. 193.

Report of Lieut. Col. Charles R. Brundage, Sixtieth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQES. SIXTIETH NEW YORK STATE VOLUNTEERS,

Camp on Loudoun Heights, Va., September 27, 1862.

I have the honor to report that, on the morning of the 17th of September, 1862, the Sixtieth Regiment New York State Volunteers went into action with 217 enlisted men and 9 commissioned officers, and that being on the right of the brigade, Capt. J. C. O. Redington was sent out with his company (Company C) to skirmish, which he did with admirable skill and effect, clearing the woods to the right of the enemy's sharpshooters. After being in action between two and three hours, a brigade fell back on us, breaking our line and scattering our men, making a

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 199.

delay of an hour or more in our rejoining our brigade, then formed in line about half a mile to the rear of their position in action. The regiment remained with the brigade during the remainder of the day, and moved with it at dark to rejoin the division.

I take pleasure in reporting that the officers and men behaved well under fire, promptly obeying all orders. For an account of our losses I beg leave to refer you to official report of casualties.*

Very respectfully submitted.

CHAS. R. BRUNDAGE,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Sixtieth New York State Volunteers.

Col. W. O. REDDEN,

Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 194.

Report of Capt. Henry R. Stagg, Seventy-eighth New York Infantry, of the battle of Antietam.

HDQRS. SEVENTY-EIGHTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,

Loudoun Heights, September 27, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 17th instant:

We entered the action with 1 field officer (lieutenant-colonel), 1 adjutant, 1 sergeant-major, 2 captains, 3 first lieutenants, 5 second lieutenants, and 208 men. After the death of Colonel Goodrich, Lieutenant-Colonel Austin was left in command of the brigade until the action was over. Our loss in the action was 1 captain killed, 1 adjutant severely wounded, 8 men killed, and 18 wounded.

HENRY R. STAGG,

Captain, Commanding Seventy-eighth New York Volunteers.

Colonel REDDEN,

Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 195.

Report of Col. Arno Voss, Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, of skirmishes at Bunker Hill and Darkesville, W. Va.

CAMP WOOL,

Near Martinsburg, Va., September 9, 1862.

GENERAL: Pursuant to the orders of Col. D. S. Miles, commanding Railroad Brigade, at Harper's Ferry, I stationed an outpost, on the 3d instant, at a point about 3 miles south of Martinsburg, on the Winchester road, consisting of 95 men of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, under the command of Lieut. Col. H. Davis. On the morning of the 4th instant, Lieut. Charles Roden, of said command, having 10 men with him on a reconnoitering tour, suddenly came upon 12 mounted rebels at Bunker Hill, 6 miles south of said outpost, charged upon them, and drove them pell-mell before him about 3 miles beyond Bunker Hill. The enemy had 1 horse wounded and 1 man. In this affair Lieutenant

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 199.

Roden and his men behaved very gallantly. The next day, at about 10 o'clock a. m., Lieutenant-Colonel Davis met the enemy, about 40 mounted men, half a mile north of Bunker Hill, attacked them with about an equal number of his men, and drove them back into the town of Bunker Hill. Here the enemy dismounted, and, from the rear of some old buildings on a bluff beyond Middle Creek, opened deliberate fire upon our advancing party. Lieutenant-Colonel Davis rapidly crossed the creek, ordered the charge up the hill, when the enemy fled in the wildest confusion, each party exchanging fires. The chase continued for 6 miles, and resulted in the capture of 6 prisoners, all of the Twelfth Virginia (Ashby's) Cavalry, with their mount and arms. Two of the enemy were wounded. Our men all escaped unhurt.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, whose horse was shot under him, deserves great praise for the ability with which he led his men. In his report to me he speaks very highly of the conduct of Dr. McCarthy, the assistant surgeon of my regiment, acting as his adjutant, who received a ball through his sack and had his horse wounded; also of Captain Hayden, who led his company with great gallantry, and the officers and men of his company.

The enemy, after this, did not make their appearance at our outposts until the 7th day of September, when our vedettes were driven in about day-break. Lieutenant Logan, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, having been dispatched by Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, with 18 men, to ascertain their strength and position, was surrounded by the enemy, but succeeded in cutting his way through to near our outposts. Lieutenant Logan was severely, but not dangerously, wounded in the breast by a rifle-ball, and was carried from the field by his men. One of his men reached Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, and reported to him that a battalion of Ashby's cavalry, 400 strong, was drawn up on the Winchester pike. The lieutenant-colonel immediately dispatched a messenger to my camp, requesting me to send him re-enforcements. After having reported this fact to Brigadier-General White, commanding, and received his orders to send forward a sufficient force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, I immediately dispatched Company A, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, under Captain Grosvenor, on the Winchester pike, to Lieutenant-Colonel Davis' assistance. I then dispatched, over the so-called dirt road, running parallel with said pike, Companies B and E, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, under Captain Langholz and Lieutenant Vasseur, and four companies of the Sixty-fifth Illinois Infantry, under Major Wood, and, with another company of cavalry (Company C, Captain Bronson) and a section of Captain Phillips' battery, under his command, I marched over the pike to the scene of action. I learned from Lieutenant-Colonel Davis' report, that about 8.30 a. m., Captain Grosvenor arrived at the outpost with his company and reported to him. Adding this company to the force he had on hand, he immediately formed in column on the pike, headed by Company A and led by himself, and charged upon the enemy. They hastily retreated, firing, till they reached the town of Darkesville, about 7 miles south of Martinsburg, where they made a stand, occupying a very strong position on the other side of the creek and keeping up a brisk fire from their carbines and revolvers. Having exchanged shots for a while, Lieutenant-Colonel Davis ordered a charge, which was gallantly executed by his men, when the enemy turned and fled. They made no stand at Bunker Hill, but hurried through that town on to Winchester, not halting even there, saying that the Yankees would be there in half an hour. Captain Langholz and Lieutenant Vasseur, with their respective companies, were sent in

pursuit of the flying enemy, making several prisoners and capturing a number of horses and arms. They proceeded to near Winchester, whence they returned and joined me with the main force near Bunker Hill. I returned to camp. I caused Captain Bronson, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, in pursuance of an order to that effect from General White, to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Smithfield, from which town he drove a party of mounted rebels, taking 1 prisoner. He reported to me having met no force of the enemy in that direction. At 8 o'clock in the evening the forces under my command had all returned to camp.

The enemy's loss is 41 prisoners and 25 killed. We had none killed, and but 1 man taken prisoner. We have 13 wounded, most of them badly, among them Captain Grosvenor, who received a pistol-shot in his right breast in the charge at Darkesville. I am rejoiced to say that both he and Lieutenant Logan are doing well and will speedily recover. A list of the names of our wounded is appended hereto. Among the killed on the other side are Captain McDonnell and Lieut. Albert Carroll, of the Maryland Line Cavalry.

The officers and men of my command behaved admirably. The Twelfth Illinois Cavalry were the only troops engaged in this fight, and they fought bravely and gallantly, maintaining in a high degree the honor of the State from which they hail. The infantry, under Major Wood, did me good service in throwing out skirmishers on both flanks and marching in double-quick to the scene of action, eager to have a share in the fight. Captain Phillips brought his section of artillery promptly into position. Lieutenant-Colonel Davis is entitled to a special mark of distinction for his bravery and gallantry exhibited in these several encounters. Captain Grosvenor, Lieutenant Logan, and Assistant Surgeon McCarthy also deserve special mention.

The number of horses killed and wounded on our side is 15.

From the prisoners I learn that the force opposed to us on the 7th instant consisted of the Seventeenth Battalion Virginia Cavalry, a portion of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry (Ashby's), and the Maryland Line Cavalry, numbering in all 700.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[A. VOSS.]

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE,
Commanding Brigade.

No. 196.

Report of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, U. S. Army, commanding Middle Department, of the siege of Harper's Ferry.

HQRS. MIDDLE DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., September 27, 1862.

GENERAL: Herewith you will receive the following reports, &c., relating to the defense of Harper's Ferry and its disgraceful surrender by our troops, viz:

1. Report of Brig. Gen. Julius White, of the occupation and subsequent evacuation of Martinsburg, and retreat to Harper's Ferry, on the 12th of September, 1862.*

* See No. 197, report of September 20, p. 524.

2. Report of Brig. Gen. Julius White, of the defense of Harper's Ferry on the 13th and 14th of September, 1862, and the surrender on the 15th.*

3. Report of Lieut. H. M. Binney, acting aide-de-camp to Colonel Miles, of the same defense and surrender.†

4. Report of Col. Thomas H. Ford, of the Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Maryland Heights, of the defense and evacuation of Maryland Heights.‡

5. Report of Maj. H. B. McIlvaine, chief of artillery, of the part taken by the artillery during the siege of Harper's Ferry.

6. Terms of capitulation at the surrender of Harper's Ferry, September 15, 1862.§

7. List of killed, wounded, and missing on the Union side during the siege of Harper's Ferry, September 13, 14, and 15, 1862.

8. Abstract of report No. 2 (General White's).||

9. Abstract of report No. 3 (Lieutenant Binney's).||

10. Abstract of report No. 4 (Colonel Ford's).||

It would appear that there were concentrated at Harper's Ferry nearly, or quite, 13,000 men, all-sufficient for the defense of the post. Of these, 1,500 cavalry were ordered to leave before the surrender. They made their escape, and never stopped until they reached Greencastle, Pa. On the way they captured some 40 or 50 wagons, with ammunition and other supplies. Eleven thousand two hundred surrendered and were paroled. Captain Wood, of the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, left, without orders, before the surrender, with 13 of his men, 9 of whom returned and surrendered themselves to the rebels. Captain Wood and the remaining 4 men were arrested by General Franklin and sent to Baltimore.

I arrested the captain and handed him over to Brigadier-General Tyler, and have not since heard anything of him. He ought to be dismissed the service.

It may not be improper to remark that I had ordered Colonel Miles to erect a block-house on the highest part of the Maryland Heights, and sent a major to superintend the construction of it. This was not accomplished, because the colonel gave it no countenance. I also desired the colonel to abatis the heights of Harper's Ferry. This was also neglected. I also directed him to establish an intrenched camp on Bolivar Heights. Notwithstanding this gross neglect of duty, Harper's Ferry could have been easily defended by 10,000 men.

The only excuse offered was the want of shot for four long-range Parrott guns. Colonel Ward, of the Twelfth New York State Militia, informed me that he had, unexpended, over 80 rounds for the Parrott guns under his command, and I have been told that there were 120 rounds in all, unexpended. But even if it were true that all the shot for the Parrott guns had been expended, that would not have been a sufficient excuse for surrendering before an assault was made, which, I am sure, could have been repelled, if even, as asserted, there were 40,000 of the enemy.

The flanks of Harper's Ferry Heights are nearly perpendicular, and the ascent of the front is such that the enemy could not have accomplished it and taken the heights, if they were at all defended. The rear of this position was equally difficult of ascent. To say the least of it, it was a disgraceful surrender and not to be justified or excused.

* See No. 197, report of September 22.

† See No. 198.

‡ See No. 200.

§ See White's reports.

|| Omitted, the entire reports being printed.

The following telegrams, which I sent to General White and Colonel Miles, will show that they were instructed what to do, and that, at all hazards, they were to defend themselves to the last extremity:

[Dated Baltimore, September 6, 1862.]

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE, *Martinsburg*:

Defend yourself to the last extremity. No running before the enemy is coming. Reconnoiter.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

[Dated Baltimore, September 8, 1862.]

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE, *Martinsburg*:

The enemy is reported as approaching Hagerstown with a force of 5,000 from Frederick. Notify Lieutenant-Colonel Downey, at Kearneysville. You will order that regiment to Martinsburg or Harper's Ferry, if deemed necessary.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

[Dated Baltimore, September 8, 1862, in reply to his inquiry.]

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE, *Martinsburg*:

If 20,000 men should attack you, you will, of course, fall back. Harper's Ferry would be the best position I could recommend, but be sure that you have such a force against you, or any other that would overwhelm you. All surplus property will be ready for instant removal should you find it absolutely necessary to abandon Martinsburg. No property will be destroyed if by any means it can be saved.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

[Dated Baltimore, September 4, 1862—11.10 p. m.]

Col. DIXON S. MILES, *Harper's Ferry*:

You will send the major, with the remaining two companies of the Eighty-seventh Ohio Regiment, to Berlin, to report to Colonel Banning at Point of Rocks, to-morrow morning, the 5th. The Twelfth Regiment New York Militia ought not to think of leaving for home until we know what the enemy at Winchester intends to do, and in what direction he intends to move. To go before, the regiment will forever be branded as cowards.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

[Dated Baltimore, September 5, 1862.]

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry*:

* * * * *

The position on the heights ought to enable you to punish the enemy passing up the road in the direction of Harper's Ferry. Have your wits about you, and do all you can to annoy the rebels should they advance on you. Activity, energy, and decision must be used. You will not abandon Harper's Ferry without defending it to the last extremity.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

I did not fail to caution him in regard to supplies of ammunition and rations. His reply was that he had abundance.

To mine of the 5th instant, when I directed him to defend his position to the last extremity, he says, on the 7th instant:

The enemy is steadily pressing on my pickets, and is establishing batteries on the plateau opposite Point of Rocks, but I am ready for them.

This was the last dispatch I received from Colonel Miles. The telegraph wires were cut, and the road from Monocacy to Harper's Ferry was in the hands of the rebels. Every preparation was made for the defense, both in guns and materials.

On Maryland Heights [there were] seven guns, and on Camp Hill fourteen guns and howitzers, besides three light batteries, with horses. It was reported to me that fifty-eight guns were surrendered. How

many of these were on Bolivar Heights, under command of Brigadier-General White, I have not been informed. Thus matters stood in relation to Harper's Ferry when I received your orders, as follows:

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

WASHINGTON, *September 12, 1862.*

You will obey such orders as General McClellan may give you. You will endeavor to open communication with him and unite your forces to his at the earliest possible moment. His army is now near the line of the Monocacy.

To which I at once replied :

BALTIMORE, *September 12, 1862.*

You can put any of my troops under McClellan's command. They are all on the railroads in detachments and regiments. I have two regiments at the Relay House, one at Ellicott's Mill, one at Elysville, perhaps 7,000 or 8,000 at Harper's Ferry, and two regiments and a battery at Martinsburg. They may be in McClellan's neighborhood, and you can give him authority to use them as you or he may deem proper. I have no available troops, except those posted on various railroads.

I was afterward informed that General White had evacuated Martinsburg and joined his forces with those of Colonel Miles, increasing the force at Harper's Ferry to 13,000.

After the order of the 12th was received from you, I received no communications whatever from Harper's Ferry, presuming that General McClellan had taken it under his direction.

It is said that Harper's Ferry was lost in consequence of the enemy taking possession of Maryland Heights. It does not appear that any of the guns they mounted there reached Harper's Ferry. The guns of the troops under Ford were spiked and the large guns thrown down the precipice. The next day our troops went up and brought off the field guns, which had been previously spiked. There is no evidence that the guns of the enemy produced the slightest effect on the troops at Harper's Ferry. It is reported, and I think the number will probably be reduced, that Ford lost 160 killed and wounded, and the remainder at Harper's Ferry, about 40.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

[Addenda.]

BALTIMORE, *September 2, 1862.*

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

I have received your dispatch. Be on the lookout and keep up a vigilant reconnaissance. Let me know what is passing.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 4, 1862.*

Major-General WOOL :

General White abandoned Winchester night before last, and with his troops arrived at this post yesterday afternoon. No enemy that I can hear of in the Valley of the Shenandoah, nor do I know if Winchester is occupied by him.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

BALTIMORE, *September 4, 1862.*Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry :*

* * * * *

General White will either repair to this place or join the Army of the Potomac, but his troops and supplies will remain at Harper's Ferry, and you will dispose of them.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, *September 4, 1862.*

Col. DIXON S. MILES,
Commanding Harper's Ferry :

The order making disposition of Brigadier-General White is countermanded. He is ordered to repair to Martinsburg and take command of all the troops in and about that place, guarding the railroad and defending that place to the last extremity. Answer immediately.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, *September 4, 1862.*Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry :*

You will re-enforce Colonel Banning, if it can be done without danger to your position and if it be true that the enemy is advancing on him. The force you may send will depend on the force of the enemy. You will send ammunition of various kinds for the two 12-pounder guns, if it is not too late. They have but 30 rounds at the present moment for each piece.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, *September 4, 1862.*Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry :*

You will, if possible, learn the whereabouts of the enemy and the direction in which they are moving. It is possible that they will attack your position, perhaps Martinsburg, or some position this side of Harper's Ferry.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 5, 1862.—9 a. m.*

Major-General WOOL :

Your last dispatch received this morning. The enemy (A. P. Hill's division, represented to be 30,000 strong) that has crossed the Potomac at Noland's Ferry have cut the canal at Seven-mile level, and are running off the water. If Colonel Banning had more troops than are with him it would embarrass his retreat, which he must do before this force. He can retreat and obstruct their advance, and such are his orders. I cannot safely detach from here until I know the intentions of the enemy at Charlestown. Three brigades is the force, I am told, in the valley assigned to attack this place and Martinsburg.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

BALTIMORE, *September 5, 1862.*Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry :*

If you can get cars, send the Twelfth Regiment New York State Militia home on Saturday, unless you should be attacked. Colonel Cram, whom I sent up to look after the positions as far as Point of Rocks, says all is quiet there. If there should be any indications of an attack on Point of Rocks, you will re-enforce them. Be energetic and active, and defend all places to the last extremity.

There must be no abandoning of a post, and shoot the first man that thinks of it, whether officer or soldier.

JOHN E. WOOL.
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
Maryland Heights, Md., September 11, 1862.

Col. DIXON S. MILES:

Captain Russell, who is out on a scout, sent in two of his cavalymen, who say that the enemy are advancing on Williamsport.

Have you any news from McClellan to-day?

THOS. H. FORD,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

BALTIMORE, *September 11, 1862.*

Hon. F. H. PEIRPOINT,
Governor of Virginia, Wheeling, Va. :

I would not, under the present uncertain state of affairs, feel justified in removing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg any of the forces stationed there.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

No. 197.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Julius White, U. S. Army, commanding, of the evacuation of Martinsburg and the siege of Harper's Ferry.

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 16, 1862.*

I have the honor to state that this place has been defended for several days against an attack by the divisions of Jackson, A. P. Hill, Lawton, Walker, and McLaws, amounting in all to at least 40,000 men, with over fifty pieces of artillery.

After expending all our artillery ammunition, except that for short range, and defeating two attacks of the enemy's infantry, Colonel Miles, with the advice of his brigade commanders, reluctantly surrendered.

I regret to say that the gallant Colonel Miles is so severely wounded that his recovery is not probable. I march to-day, with the command, and will report to you in detail the events which have occurred since my last communication.

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

Major-General WOOL.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., *September 20, 1862.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on the 11th instant, being then at Martinsburg, Va., in command of the troops at that place, in accordance with the order of Major-General Wool, I sent the prisoners there detained to Camp Chase, Ohio, by rail, under guard of 1 lieutenant and 10 men. There were 29 prisoners, and, as the enemy were advancing, I sent an additional guard of a lieutenant and 30 men to go with them as far as Sir John's Run, and then to return, that being the dangerous portion of the road.

On the night of the same day, the enemy having crossed the Potomac into Virginia, the railroad communication west was cut off, but I have every reason to believe that the prisoners were safely transported. For the above reason neither of the guards were able to rejoin their commands.

On the 11th instant reports reached me, through scouts and others, that the enemy were crossing the Potomac into Virginia at or about Williamsport and Cherry Run in force; also, that they were passing to the west of Martinsburg, between it and North Mountain, thus cutting off our retreat in that direction.

It being ordered by Major-General Wool that the place should be held to the last extremity, at noon on the 11th instant I sent out one section of Captain Phillips' battery and four companies of the Sixty-fifth Illinois, together with half a company of cavalry and two teams, with axes, &c., the whole under command of Colonel Cameron, of the Sixty-fifth Illinois, with orders to proceed out upon the Williamsburg [Williamsport] road, as far as practicable, and to obstruct the roads, tear up the bridges, and, in every way possible, retard the advance of the enemy.

At night-fall, it having been well ascertained that the enemy were between us and North Mountain, and were in very large force near Falling Waters, on the Williamsport road, some 7 miles from Martinsburg, and were still crossing, it became evident that with the small force at my disposal the position could not longer be held.

Colonel Cameron's party was accordingly recalled, and every exertion made to convey the public property to Harper's Ferry, that being the only line of retreat left open.

The railroad agent had, the previous day, sent off some 11 empty cars, in defiance of my orders for them to be retained, but I had detained the train up from Harper's Ferry that day, consisting of but 6 cars, and I caused all the surplus arms, clothing, ammunition, and camp equipage to be conveyed to the railroad depot, to be sent thence by rail to Harper's Ferry, as but one of the regiments under my command was provided with transportation. This was done mostly by the men themselves, the transportation (being divided as equally as possible between the several regiments) being wholly insufficient for the purpose.

The railroad train was loaded to the extent of its capacity and sent to Harper's Ferry, where it arrived in safety. The transportation was then employed to haul the most valuable property remaining, and the troops and wagons took up their line of march at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 12th.

But little public property was abandoned, consisting mostly of tents and camp equipage, which could not be conveyed with the means at disposal.

Upon the march, the pickets of the enemy were encountered at Halltown, but they were driven back to Charlestown, the command arriving safely at Harper's Ferry on the afternoon of the 12th.

The enemy's advance entered Martinsburg but about three hours after its evacuation, their force being some 15,000 or 18,000 men.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

Col. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Chief of Staff and Asst. Adjt. Gen., Eighth Army Corps.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., *September 22, 1862.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on the 12th instant I arrived at Harper's Ferry, Va., from Martinsburg, with the troops under my command at that place.

At the time of my arrival, skirmishing had already commenced upon the Maryland Heights, between our forces and those of the enemy.

I at once addressed the following note to Col. D. S. Miles, commanding the post, viz:

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 13, 1862.*

Col. DIXON S. MILES,
Commanding Harper's Ferry:

COLONEL: I have the honor to state that I arrived at this post last evening with my command, consisting of the following named troops: Twelfth Illinois Cavalry; Sixty-fifth Illinois Infantry; One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Infantry; Phillips' battery (four guns), Second Illinois Artillery.

On an occasion prior to this, I was ordered by Maj. Gen. J. E. Wool, commanding, to repair to Martinsburg and take command at that post, thus leaving you in command here, which I consider an indication that the general desires you to retain this command.

Your familiarity with the topography of the vicinity, the fact that the troops and the guns have been placed under your direction, coupled with the additional important fact that the enemy is in heavy force in the immediate vicinity, and skirmishing with their advance already commenced, render it improper, at least for the present, to deprive you of the command for the sole reason of superior rank, believing that the interests of the service would not be subserved thereby.

Meanwhile I respectfully tender my services and those of the officers of my staff to render any aid in our power in the defense of the position.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

The propositions extended in this letter were accepted by Colonel Miles by his order of the same day, of which the following is a copy, viz:

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 42. }

HEADQUARTERS,
Harper's Ferry, September 13, 1862.

Brigadier-General White, with a magnanimity equal to his valor, proffers to the undersigned, commanding officer of the post, his services and those of the troops brought with him, for its defense in its present necessity. This act of high-toned chivalric generosity, of which there are but few precedents in our army, overwhelms me with the deepest gratitude.

I cheerfully accept the invaluable assistance of the gallant general, and will assign his troops to important positions.

It is hereby ordered that, wherever present during the siege of this post, the troops will obey implicitly and with alacrity all orders given by General White.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry, Commanding.

At this time the Maryland Heights were held by a brigade commanded by Col. Thomas H. Ford, of the Thirty-second Ohio, which consisted of the Thirty-second Ohio, three companies First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, the Seventh Squadron Rhode Island Cavalry, and two

companies of the First Maryland Cavalry, together with Captain McGrath's battery of two 9-inch columbiads and one 50-pounder rifled gun.

The other troops were placed upon Camp Hill, in the town of Harper's Ferry, and upon Bolivar Heights, their left resting upon the Charlestown turnpike, and protected by the woods and ravines between it and the Shenandoah.

The enemy, who had closely followed us from Martinsburg, had taken position along our front, on the north, west, and south, across the base of the peninsula between the Potomac and the Shenandoah.

No forces of ours whatever were placed upon Loudoun Heights. The enemy had a signal station there, and men were to be observed at work, apparently planting a battery. They were dislodged by our shells, thrown from Camp Hill.

At night Captain Russell, of the First Maryland Cavalry, with 6 men, was dispatched to make his way to our forces in Maryland, if possible, and inform them of our condition.

On the morning of the 13th fighting recommenced upon Maryland Heights, by the enemy advancing upon the northern and eastern slopes and attempting to dislodge our forces there stationed. It continued, with varying success, until 3.30 o'clock p. m., when the enemy advanced in overwhelming force, and the position was abandoned, first spiking the heavy guns and rolling them down the crags. The battery of four brass pieces was also spiked and abandoned. Being upon duty on the extreme left of our line, I was not cognizant of the abandonment at the time, and I attach hereto the report of Colonel Ford, giving full particulars of the occurrence.

It will be noticed that Colonel Ford claims to have been ordered by Colonel Miles to evacuate the heights. Colonel Miles, however, denied to me ever having given such an order, but said he gave orders that if it became necessary to abandon the heights, the guns were to be spiked and dismounted. Upon the abandonment of the Maryland Heights, the troops crossed the Potomac upon the pontoon bridge and took position upon Bolivar Heights, as assigned them. The enemy took possession of the summit above Maryland Heights, and now opened two batteries from the summit of Loudoun Heights, their fire being mostly directed upon Camp Hill. They were replied to by the guns upon Camp Hill and Captain Von Sehlen's battery, upon Bolivar Heights.

Two guns of Captain Rigby's battery were advanced upon the Charlestown turnpike, and shelled the woods, where the enemy was establishing himself. In the evening the entire cavalry force, consisting of the Twelfth Illinois, the Eighth New York, the Seventh Squadron Rhode Island, and two companies of the First Maryland, were ordered to cross the Potomac, upon the pontoon bridge, and, taking the road in the direction of Sharpsburg, to cut their way out if possible, there being no forage and they being useless in the defense of the place. Under an experienced guide, they succeeded in so doing, and captured a portion of General Longstreet's ammunition train and some prisoners on the way.

On the morning of the 14th our troops held the bridges across the Potomac, Camp Hill, and the line of Bolivar Heights, together with the ridge on the prolongation of the heights between the turnpike and the Shenandoah. The bridges were defended by eight companies of the First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, the Eighty-seventh Ohio, and one section of Captain Potts' battery, all under the command of Colonel Maulsby, of the first named regiment.

Camp Hill was occupied by Captain Graham's battery; four guns of Captain Potts' battery, two 24-pounder howitzers and two 20-pounder

Parrott guns, supported by the Twelfth Regiment New York State Militia, under command of Colonel Ward.

The right of Bolivar Heights was held by the brigade under command of Colonel D'Utassy, of the Thirty-ninth New York, consisting of the Thirty-ninth, One hundred and eleventh, and One hundred and fifteenth New York, the Sixty-fifth Illinois, and Captains Phillips and Von Sehlen's batteries. A slight earth-work was constructed upon the right, to protect the men of the batteries. The left of Bolivar Heights was held by the brigade commanded by Colonel Trimble, of the Sixtieth Ohio, consisting of the Sixtieth Ohio, Ninth Vermont, and One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, with Captain Rigby's battery. A slight earth-work was constructed upon the left, on the Charlestown turnpike, to protect that battery.

The ground to the southeast of the turnpike, and between it and the Shenandoah, was held by the Third Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Downey. The other troops were placed upon the plateau adjacent to Bolivar Heights, and under cover of ravines as much as possible.

Early in the morning the enemy opened from their batteries upon Loudoun Heights and from a battery planted during the night upon the summit of the Maryland Heights, directing their fire mostly upon Camp Hill. This fire was returned by the guns there, with spirit, and by Captain Von Sehlen's battery upon Bolivar Heights. This fire continued with brief intervals throughout the day, disabling for us one 20-pounder Parrott and three other guns and blowing up two caissons.

About noon, two companies of the Thirty-ninth New York and two of the Sixty-fifth Illinois, all under command of Major Wood, of the last-named regiment, recrossed the Potomac and ascended to our batteries upon the Maryland Heights and brought off the brass pieces abandoned there. They returned without any loss.

In the afternoon the enemy opened a battery from beyond the Charlestown turnpike, shelling our skirmishers thrown out to the front, in the woods. Late in the afternoon, a division of the enemy, under General A. P. Hill, made an assault upon the extreme left, advancing with great spirit.

Colonel Miles not being present, I took command for the time, and ordered the Ninth Vermont to support Colonel Downey, and subsequently re-enforced them with the Thirty-second Ohio and one section of Captain Rigby's battery. The attack continued until after dark, the firing being very sharp and the troops engaged behaving very handsomely, when the enemy was repulsed.

The fire now ceased, but during the night the enemy obtained a lodgment upon and beyond our extreme left. During the engagement I had placed the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York in the rear of the line as a reserve, with a section of Captain Potts' battery on the turnpike and another section on our left, as a support, if needed.

At daylight on the morning of the 15th the enemy opened from their batteries previously mentioned, and from the following, which he had planted during the night, viz: Two upon the plateau at the foot of Loudoun Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah; one of ten guns upon a knoll to the front of our extreme left, enfilading our works upon Bolivar Heights; one upon the Charlestown turnpike, in a belt of woods; one opposite the center of Bolivar Heights, and one upon our extreme right, near the Potomac; in all about fifty guns. Their fire was mostly concentrated upon Captain Rigby's battery, in the work on our left, and upon Captain Potts' battery, near by, which I had ordered up and placed in position to reply to the batteries in front. Both of these sustained

a heavy fire with the utmost gallantry, and replied rapidly and well. The preceding day a line of rifle-pits had been thrown up along the crest of Bolivar Heights, and the infantry were protected in them and the ravines to our left. The long-range ammunition had now almost entirely failed, and it became evident that, from the great preponderance of the enemy's artillery and his ability to keep up a fire at long range to which we were no longer able to reply, our ability to hold the position became a mere question of time, and that our defense could only be continued at a great sacrifice of life without any corresponding advantage.

Colonel Miles, at about 9 o'clock a. m., called a council of the officers commanding brigades, and conferred with them upon the propriety of surrendering without further resistance. It was the unanimous opinion of the officers present that it was useless to attempt to hold the position longer, and that, if reasonable terms could be obtained, it was best to surrender at once. By order of Colonel Miles, the white flag was accordingly displayed along our lines, and I was requested by him to arrange the terms of capitulation, which duty I accepted. I met Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, who was appointed by Major-General Jackson to arrange the terms of capitulation with me, and agreed with him upon the terms of surrender, the original of which agreement is herewith submitted.

In addition to the terms expressed in the articles of capitulation, two days' rations for the entire command were allowed us, which was very nearly all the subsistence on hand. The men were also allowed to retain their overcoats and blankets, and we were allowed the use of two teams to each regiment to convey the officers' baggage, &c., agreeing to return the same. The refugees from the Valley and Maryland, of whom there were several hundred in the place, it was stipulated should not be molested, but allowed to return to their homes, which was done.

The enemy did not cease firing at once upon the display of the white flag, probably not perceiving our signals, and some time after the flags were exhibited Colonel Miles was struck by a shell in the leg and mortally wounded. He was at once borne from the field. Many others were struck at about the same time and before the most distant batteries of the enemy had ceased. The entire command was paroled, and marched out on the 16th, arriving at Frederick, Md., the same day. By order of Major-General Wool, we then marched to this place, arriving on the 21st.

During the siege the conduct of the troops, most of whom were new levies who had never before been under fire, was good. Some disorder occurred among one or two new regiments when exposed to a galling fire from greatly superior numbers, but it was temporary. So far as the conduct of officers came under my observation, it was unexceptionable. Of all who deserve it, space will not allow me to speak. I cannot omit to mention, however, as distinguished for their gallantry, Col. F. G. D'Utassy, Colonel Trimble, Colonel Ford, and Colonel Ward, commanders of brigades; Colonel Maulsby and Lieut. Col. S. W. Downey, of the First and Third Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, who, with their brave men, are an honor to the State of Maryland; Colonel Willard, of the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York, a most gallant and accomplished officer; Colonel Stannard, Lieutenant-Colonel Andross, and Major Stowell, of the Ninth Vermont, a regiment, though but just enrolled, whose conduct was worthy of veterans; the gallant Colonel Sherrill, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, who was severely wounded while rallying his men; Colonel Cameron, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, and Major Wood, of the Sixty-fifth Illinois; Lieutenant-Colonel Hixon and Major Marley, of the Sixtieth Ohio; Major Hewitt, of the Thirty-second Ohio; Colonel Banning, of the Eighty-seventh Ohio.

The conduct of the officers and men of the several batteries was, with-

out exception, admirable. Captains Rigby, Potts, McGrath, Graham, Phillips, and Von Sehlen, under their accomplished and efficient chief of artillery, Major McIlvaine, acquitted themselves in the most honorable manner.

To Capt. Henry Curtis, jr., adjutant, and Capt. Randolph Botts, quartermaster, on my own staff, I was indebted for a prompt and fearless discharge of their duties at all times during the siege.

Of the staff of Colonel Miles, Lieutenant Reynolds, adjutant, and Lieutenants Binney and Willmon, aides, I can only say that each and all, so far as their duties brought them under my observation, were diligent and zealous, exhibiting a readiness to encounter whatever danger or toil their respective positions required.

I cannot close this report, general, without saying that the conduct as well as the words of the late Colonel Miles, who commanded during the siege, was that of a brave and loyal officer. The surrender was determined upon unanimously by a council of war when further resistance seemed useless, inasmuch as the commanding positions were held by the enemy in a force of not less than 40,000 of all arms in front, on both flanks, and in rear. I was prompted solely by a sense of duty in not assuming the command, and not from a desire to avoid responsibility. Of the obloquy, if any there be, which attaches to the surrender I expect to assume my share, and scorn to shelter myself behind the funeral pall of an officer who, whatever his military errors, died in defense of our country.

I have applied to the Adjutant-General for a court of inquiry to investigate the causes of the surrender and to determine whether it was justifiable or not, and trust the court will be ordered. The forces of the enemy were as follows: In front and on right flank the divisions of Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, and Lawton (Ewell's); on the left flank, Loudoun Heights, General Walker's division, and in rear, Maryland Heights, General McLaws—about 40,000 in all, under the chief command of General Jackson.

The topography of Harper's Ferry and its surroundings exhibits the fact that Maryland, Loudoun, and Bolivar Heights are separated from each other by more than 2 miles of distance, with a great natural barrier, either the Potomac or Shenandoah, separating each from the others. To properly defend it, requires a force sufficient to hold all these heights, and very much larger than we had. The separation of a command as small as ours, to hold all these heights, would insure its speedy destruction. It was necessary to choose one of the heights, and defend that; that was done. I append hereto a report of the killed and wounded, so far as any returns have been made.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

Col. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General.

HARPER'S FERRY, VA., September 15, 1862.

Terms of capitulation this day entered into between Brig. Gen. Julius White, of the United States Army, commissioner upon the part of the United States, and Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, of the Confederate States Army, commissioner upon the part of the Confederate States:

I. The garrison of Harper's Ferry, including all the troops at present under command of Col. D. S. Miles, with all munitions of war and

public property of every description belonging to the United States, will be surrendered to Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, commissioner appointed by Major-General Jackson, of the Confederate States Army. The officers and men to be paroled, not to serve against the Confederate States until regularly exchanged. The officers to be allowed to retain their side arms and personal property.

II. It is also agreed upon the part of the two commissioners that these terms of surrender do not include those soldiers of the Confederate States who, having been regularly enlisted in the service of the Confederate States, have deserted the same, and taken service in the United States Army.

A. P. HILL,
Major-General, C. S. Army.
JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.

Brigadier-General White proposed the following, which is not admitted, viz:

Provided that no person shall be considered a deserter whose prior service against the United States has been compulsory.

Brigadier-General White therefore protests in the name of the United States against any construction of the terms of this capitulation other than as proposed by him.

A. P. HILL,
Major-General.
JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.

[Indorsement.]

SEPTEMBER 20, 1862.

General White informs me that no one was delivered under the second article.

L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.

ANNAPOLIS, September 22; 1862.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS, Adjutant-General, U. S. Army:

GENERAL: I have the honor to state that, in my judgment, the public interests require an investigation into the causes of the recent surrender of Harper's Ferry, with the garrison stationed there, and do therefore respectfully request that a court of inquiry be ordered for the purpose.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1862.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS, Adjutant-General:

GENERAL: Having been permitted to amend the report of the events which occurred at Harper's Ferry, including the surrender of that post, I respectfully submit the inclosed, which I ask may be appended and made a part of the report.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.

AMENDATORY APPENDIX.

Immediately after my arrival at Harper's Ferry, in a conversation with Colonel Miles as to his plan of defensive operations, he stated that his orders were to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity. I suggested that Maryland Heights appeared to be the key to the position, and offered the only feasible line of retreat should that become necessary, as well as the most defensible position should it become necessary to concentrate the entire force at any one point, and that it should be defended at all hazard and with the entire force if necessary.

To this view he assented, and informed me he had erected defenses on the summit, the position of our naval battery being about half-way down the southwestern slope.

I was requested by him to assume the direction of affairs on the left of the line, at Bolivar Heights. So soon as I had heard of the evacuation of Maryland Heights, I sought Colonel Miles, as before stated, and proposed retaking the position. He informed me, however, that the heavy guns had been spiked and thrown down the mountain, and that the four brass field-pieces were spiked, the spokes cut from the wheels, and, therefore, they could not be removed and were utterly useless.

Without the heavy guns, which would have covered the crossing, the transfer of the forces across the Potomac was deemed by him impracticable.

The considerations which prompted me to concur in the judgment of the council of war, when the surrender was decided upon, were as follows:

1st. The loss of Maryland Heights and their occupancy by the enemy in a force greatly superior to our own entire force.

2d. The commanding officers of the batteries composed of our best guns reported their ammunition expended, except canister, &c., for short range.

3d. All hope of re-enforcement had departed, the firing during the engagements of Major-General McClellan's forces with the enemy having, day by day, receded northwesterly.

4th. The enemy in front, exclusive of his strength on Loudoun and Maryland Heights, was double our own, the preponderance of available artillery being still greater.

5th. There appeared no good object to be attained by the sacrifice of life without a reasonable hope of success.

6th. The council of war was unanimous in the opinion that further resistance was useless.

I was verbally informed by Major McIlvaine, Colonel Miles' chief of artillery, that the entire amount of artillery at the post was forty-six pieces, exclusive of seven small guns, known as Ellsworth guns.

On Sunday night, the evening before the surrender, I proposed to send to the front all the guns at Camp Hill (the interior work), and was informed there were neither horses nor harness to move them.

On Sunday afternoon I ordered the Twelfth New York Militia to the left front, to participate in the engagement. It was ordered back by Colonel Miles, as I am informed, on the ground that Camp Hill must be held by a part of our force. This position was protected on all sides by our outer lines.

Respectfully submitted.

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.

Report of Lieut. Henry M. Binney, Tenth Maine Infantry, aide-de-camp, of operations at Harper's Ferry September 1-15.

HARPER'S FERRY, September 18, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of occurrences and events at Harper's Ferry, Va., behavior of artillerists, officers and men connected with the different arms, under the command of Dixon S. Miles, colonel Second Infantry, U. S. Army, from the 1st day of September and ending with the fall of Colonel Miles, on Monday, September 15, 1862, from an abbreviated journal, kept each day by Lieut. H. M. Binney, aide-de-camp:

Monday, September 1, 1862.—Rumors reached Colonel Miles this p. m. of a demonstration of the enemy, to cross the Potomac into Maryland, near the mouth of the Monocacy River, at Noland's Ferry. Colonel Miles immediately communicates the rumor to headquarters at Baltimore and Washington, and sends to Point of Rocks the Eighty-seventh Ohio Volunteers (Colonel Banning), with two 12-pounder howitzers, with plenty of ammunition. The enemy's cavalry, 25 in number, under Lieutenant Baylor, dashed into Keys' Ferry this p. m., at 4 o'clock, and captured 6 pickets, in charge of a sergeant, and belonging to Capt. H. A. Cole, First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry. Colonel Miles was very busy all day and the previous night, doing all he could to prepare himself for the coming struggle, and placing himself to meet an attack at all points. Colonel Banning, Eighty-seventh Ohio, reports the enemy crossing at different points in the vicinity of the mouth of the Monocacy River.

Tuesday, September 2, 1862.—Colonel Banning advises us "The enemy have crossed a large force near Noland's Ford, below Point of Rocks." The One hundred and fifteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel Sammon, arrived and were sent to Charlestown, Summit Point, Opequon Bridge, and Halltown, to relieve the Eleventh New York State Militia (Colonel Maidhof), whose term of service had expired. Colonel Miles and staff rode to the front and examined the defensible points of Bolivar Heights. Received telegram 10 p. m. from General Halleck, notifying Colonel Miles that General White had been ordered to evacuate Winchester. Colonel Miles sent his aide, Mr. Binney, to Halltown, to instruct one company of the One hundred and fifteenth New York, stationed there, in regard to throwing out pickets and vedettes on different roads and passes. Vedettes were placed on Charlestown road, Shepherdstown road, and on the road leading to Keys' Ford, on Shenandoah River, 4½ miles distant from Halltown. Lieutenant Binney, with an orderly, went to Keys' Ford to ascertain the truth of the reported capture of Cole's cavalry pickets, and ascertained the facts to be as follows: A party of 25 Confederate cavalry dashed down the Kabletown or river road and captured the outer vedette a quarter of a mile from his comrades, and forced him to inform them of the position of the others, who were at that time in a corn-shed, dismounted. They dashed in and captured the party without resistance on the part of our pickets. This party of Confederate cavalry was led by a Lieutenant Baylor, son of the notorious Captain or Colonel Baylor who was killed at the battle of Winchester.

Wednesday, September 3, 1862.—Considerable excitement at this place on account of reports from Point of Rocks of the enemy having crossed, and driven in our pickets; their infantry are seen drawn up in line opposite Point of Rocks, on the Virginia side, up to 12 at night. Enemy

are said to have crossed a large army into Maryland at Noland's Ferry. Telegraph lines are being molested somewhere between this place and Baltimore. Enemy appear near Point of Rocks.

Thursday, September 4, 1862.—Colonel Banning, Eighty-seventh Ohio, at Point of Rocks, falls back toward Berlin. Colonel Miles, on being advised of it, immediately orders him back to his former position. Telegraph communications with Baltimore are considerably interrupted. Enemy have crossed in large numbers, under Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet; they cut the canal at Seven-mile level and run the water out, in order to cross their artillery. Brig. Gen. Julius White arrives with his brigade from Winchester—Thirty-ninth New York, Colonel D'Utassy; Thirty-second Ohio, Col. T. H. Ford; Sixtieth Ohio, Colonel Trimble; Ninth Vermont, Colonel Stannard, with Rigby's and Potts' batteries; First Maryland Cavalry, Captain Russell, and battalion Rhode Island Cavalry, Major Corliss.

Friday, September 5, 1862.—Colonel Miles assumes command. General White goes to Martinsburg and assumes command of forces at that place. General A. P. Hill intrenches himself at Lovettsville, opposite Berlin. Enemy crossed last night into Maryland with cavalry, infantry, and artillery (Jackson, Lee, and others), with others, Brad. Johnson, &c., with from 40,000 to 60,000, and march toward Frederick City; destroy Monocacy Bridge. Jackson locates himself at Frederick City.

Colonel Miles brigades his troops as follows:

First Brigade (right wing, line of battle Bolivar Heights, Va.), Col. F. G. D'Utassy (Thirty-ninth New York) commanding: Thirty-ninth New York (Garibaldi Guard) Infantry; One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers, Colonel Segoine; One hundred and fifteenth New York, Colonel Sammon; battery Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers, Capt. Von Sehlen.

Second Brigade (left wing, line of battle Bolivar Heights, Va.), Colonel Trimble (Sixtieth Ohio) commanding: Sixtieth Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Trimble; One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, Colonel Sherrill; Ninth Vermont Volunteers, Colonel Stannard; Potts' battery (substituted Rigby's subsequently).

Third Brigade, commanding on Maryland Heights (including the heavy siege guns thereon), Md., Col. Thomas H. Ford (Thirty-second Ohio) commanding: Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Ford; battalion First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, Maj. John A. Steiner; Captain McGrath, Company F, Fifth New York Heavy Artillery; Major Corliss' battalion Rhode Island cavalry; detachment First Maryland Cavalry, Captain Russell.

Fourth Brigade (commanding the intrenchments on Camp Hill, Va.), Col. W. G. Ward (Twelfth New York State Militia) commanding (three months): Twelfth New York State Militia, Colonel Ward; Captain Graham's company (A), Fifth New York Heavy Artillery; Captain Rigby's battery (Potts' substituted afterward); Eighty-seventh Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Banning (three months).

Independent commands: First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Regiment, Colonel Maulsby, Sandy Hook, Md.; Eighth New York Cavalry, Col. B. F. Davis, Harper's Ferry, Va.; detachments companies First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry, under Captain Cole, Sandy Hook.

Captain Faithful, provost-marshal and commanding at Frederick City, Md., reports sending off all his commissary and quartermaster stores he could, and destroys the balance. Dr. Weir, in charge of hospital, succeeds in sending his sick and wounded to Gettysburg, and saves his

most valuable medical stores and destroys the rest. Faithful retreats and forms a connection with his regiment (Colonel Maulsby's) at or near Sandy Hook, Md.

Saturday, September 6, 1862.—General Lee's army, in part, enter Frederick City. Colonel Banning, Eighty-seventh Ohio, with his two howitzers, falls back to Berlin and shells the rebels' advance guard, and on the opposite side of the Potomac. Colonel Banning again retreats before superior numbers to Knoxville; his guns are worked by a section of Captain Graham's company (A), Fifth New York Artillery. The sergeant refuses to leave his guns, and takes them from hill to railroad on a car pushed by hand to Sandy Hook, but leaves one limber and equipments. Scouts and refugees report the enemy in large force, and advancing toward Knoxville. They advance toward Banning's position, who shells their advance and retires back to Sandy Hook, and forms a junction with Colonel Maulsby's Maryland regiment. Colonel Miles visits his outposts, and makes every preparation to meet the enemy and check their advance in every or any direction. He sends an engine and platform car to Berlin, and recovers the limber to howitzer, equipments, and ammunition left by Banning at Berlin. Our telegraphic communications eastward cut off; obliged to forward via Wheeling, Pittsburgh, &c. The operator receives the following dispatch: "How are you, General Pope? General Jackson's army." Quiet from dark until midnight. An alarm from Sandy Hook. Colonel Miles and his staff, Lieutenant Binney, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Willmon, go down to outer vedettes, and remain until day-break. Return.

Sunday, September 7, 1862.—Colonel Miles and staff again visit Sandy Hook, and go out as far as Weverton Mill, on road to Berlin and Point of Rocks. He directs a reconnaissance of cavalry under Major Markell, Eighth New York Cavalry; sends also Lieutenant Green, with a small party of Cole's Maryland cavalry, with instructions not to return until he had felt the enemy and ascertained something definite. Markell, with squadron Eighth New York Cavalry, goes as far as Berlin; hears rumors and returns. Lieutenant Green goes on past, and pushes through Petersville and Middletown to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Frederick City, and "beards the lion in his den." He drives in the enemy's vedettes at five different points, and causes the enemy to beat the long roll along his whole line. Citizens of Middletown demonstrate their Union sentiments. Green returns, without loss, with several rebel prisoners. General White reports his cavalry pickets driven in. He sends out Colonel Voss, with the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, who meets the enemy, and, after a severe fight, routs them and takes 45 prisoners, horses, and equipments. The enemy lose 15 killed and large number wounded. Colonel Voss loses 2 killed and 12 wounded. Colonel Miles visits all the positions in and around Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, Sandy Hook, Bolivar Heights, and Camp Hill; sees all the commanding officers; tells them he expects they will do their duty in the coming struggle; encourages the men, and gives general instructions.

Monday, September 8, 1862.—Colonel Miles, with his aide, Lieutenant Binney, visits Maryland Heights; visits the different commanding officers and Colonel Ford, and gives his instructions in regard to their important position; encourages them, but gives them to understand that they must retain those heights at all hazards, as he considers them the key to his whole position, and represents that he could defy an army of 25,000 or 30,000 on his front or flank, by holding the Maryland Heights with the batteries thereon. He gives particular instructions to Colonel Ford, commanding, that *he can and he must*

hold them, representing if he could hold on for five days after the general attack, he felt sure the Government would send him assistance. The enemy appear to be crossing Blue Ridge Mountains at Snicker's Gap; the same observed yesterday. The smoke and dust indicate a large encampment. This p. m. the appearances indicate a division of columns, one moving toward Cumberland, the other making a retrograde movement back through Snicker's Gap. We have unreliable reports of the Union forces coming up from Washington, on both the Virginia and Maryland side of the Potomac, but we can obtain no reasonable foundation or reliable information to that effect. General White writes from Martinsburg that he will make a reconnaissance in force toward Winchester. Colonel Miles orders Eighth New York Cavalry to meet him at Smithfield and co-operate with him in his reconnaissance; Colonel Downey, at Kearneysville, to do the same. Our party went out, but did not meet General White's party. Eighth New York Cavalry go to Bunker Hill, Smithfield, and as far as Summit Point; capture a few pickets. Colonel Miles, finding himself short of forage and subsistence, seizes all the flour in stores and the mills in the vicinity; also sends out foraging parties toward Charlestown for hay, &c.; hauls in considerable forage from the Washington estate, near Halltown. Colonel Miles instructs Colonel Downey, at Kearneysville, to remain and protect the road and bridge at Opequon, unless severely pressed by the enemy; in which case he will retreat to Shepherdstown, cross the river, and fall back on eastern bank of the Potomac to Maryland Heights, and report to Colonel Ford for duty there. Major Rodgers sent to Washington with dispatches. Major Corliss, Rhode Island cavalry, makes a reconnaissance into Solomon's [Gap]; thence down through Jefferson, drives in the enemy's pickets; captures 25 prisoners, and pushes on to within 2 miles of Jackson's main army; returns without loss. Scouts report no enemy yet at Hagerstown. Our scouts also report only 400 cavalry (rebel) at Winchester, but report a large force marching through Snicker's Gap, destined for the valley of the Shenandoah.

Tuesday, September 9, 1862.—Colonel Miles, with his aide, visits Sandy Hook and Maryland Heights; returns, and goes out on left ridge of Bolivar Heights, toward the Shenandoah, and examines the points likely to be turned by the enemy on that flank. Telegraphs cut off westward near Sleepy Creek, west of Martinsburg; in working order again in afternoon. Colonel Miles and staff again visit Sandy Hook; visit Colonel Banning's outposts as far as Weverton. Jackson said not to be at Frederick, but General Lee's army, Longstreet, &c. General Anderson said to be at Lovettsville, with six guns and 3,000 men, with large army train. Cars arrive from Cumberland; met obstructions on railroad. Left at 7.30 p. m. for Martinsburg, taking empty cars, &c., for General White. Enemy reported at Boonsborough, Md., near Solomon's Gap.

Wednesday, September 10, 1862.—Captain Russell, First Maryland Cavalry, reports his dash on Frederick, what he did, and what he saw. One column of the enemy appears to be moving toward Baltimore, on Georgetown turnpike; the other moving toward Frederick City, from the Potomac. General White, at Martinsburg, writes: "The enemy will be whipped in Maryland, and we will be gobbled up in their retreat." Colonel Davis, Eighth New York Cavalry, made a reconnaissance toward Winchester to-day, but saw no enemy. Colonel Downey, Third Maryland, scouts with a squad of Captain Shamburg's cavalry into Maryland; meets the enemy near Boonsborough, Md., 1,500 strong. Downey has but 19 cavalry, and boldly dashes into the enemy, who are composed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. So suddenly does he come upon them

that they are thrown into utter confusion, but soon rally on ascertaining Downey's small party, and charge on him with their cavalry. Colonel Downey's horse killed, and himself wounded in head; thinks he killed 9 or 10 of the enemy, and he lost himself but 1 killed and 3 wounded. Colonel Miles' staff (Major McIlvaine, Lieutenant Binney, and Lieutenant Willmon) visit the lookout or observatory on Maryland Heights. We see no indications of the enemy in any direction.

Thursday, September 11, 1862.—Colonel Miles and staff visit Maryland Heights. The enemy make their appearance at Solomon's Gap; cavalry go out to feel them and their intentions; reported in large force. Colonel Miles orders a strong picket force in that direction. Solomon's Gap is the key to Antietam Ford, on Potomac; also to Maryland Heights. The enemy advance in large force into Pleasant Valley, eastern slope Maryland Heights. They shell our pickets from Solomon's Gap, and advance in such force as to drive back our pickets. Quiet during the night; a general attack expected along our whole eastern front in morning. General White writes he is entirely surrounded. Colonel Miles sends him empty cars for his baggage; his baggage arrives here at midnight.

Friday, September 12, 1862.—Enemy advance during the night and throw into the woods up the eastern slope of Maryland Heights three whole brigades of infantry; musketry firing most all day. Captain McGrath opens his big guns in the direction of Solomon's Gap. The enemy advancing at Solomon's Gap; they throw thirty-eight shells into our pickets there; we retire. The enemy, in force, attack us at the observatory, but we repulse them with severe loss. Colonel Miles re-enforces the heights by sending Downey's Third Maryland Regiment. Our men hold the lookout all night. Colonel Miles directs Colonel Ford to hold these heights at all hazards, and he will send him another regiment, if wanted. Colonel Miles and Lieutenant Binney visit the outposts. General White arrives from Martinsburg. General White generously gives up all claims to command to Colonel Miles. Colonel Miles accepts. General White tender his services to Colonel Miles. Colonel Miles issues a general order accepting the trust, and orders that the troops will obey implicitly all orders given by General White. A general attack expected at all points at day-break.

Saturday, September 13, 1862.—The ball opens early by Captain McGrath on Maryland Heights; throws his shells into the gap and along edge of mountain with effect. The enemy gain ground in the woods; Colonel Ford calls for re-enforcements. One hundred and twenty-sixth New York and Thirty-ninth New York are promptly sent to his assistance. Enemy press on; the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York break and fall back; Colonel Sherrill, while bravely rallying them, is wounded in the face, and they become panic-stricken. Colonel Miles and staff go upon the heights; his staff officers rally two or three companies of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York. The regiment partially rally under the exertions of a meritorious officer of the regiment, First Lieut. Samuel A. Barras, but again get the panic and retreat. Colonel Miles orders Colonel Ford, and if he can send him any more re-enforcements he will do so, provided he is not attacked on Bolivar in front. Enemy extend their lines to the Potomac. Colonel Ford fearful he cannot hold the heights, Colonel Miles tells him; "You can and you must." The panic became so great in the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York that Colonel Ford could do nothing with them. The Garibaldians were ordered by Colonel Miles' aide to bayonet the panic-stricken men if they attempted to break through the Garibaldians' lines. Much praise is due the gallant Garibaldians, who were under their major, for their

steadiness and discipline. Also the Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers deserve credit. Captain McGrath, commanding big guns, keeps up a constant cannonading. Captain Graham, with his 20-pounder Parrotts, on Camp Hill, also rapidly uses his effective guns on the rebels in the woods on Maryland Heights. The cannonading is tremendous since 2 p. m. Colonel Miles still hopes for assistance, but still determined to hold on until his last shell has been fired. Our subsistence short; our long-range ammunition exhausted almost, hardly enough for another day's defense. The enemy open about 11 o'clock a. m. on the Charlestown pike with two batteries; they are replied to by Rigby's and Von Sehlen's batteries. The cannonading is now terrific. Colonel Miles expressed a wish that he could be everywhere at the same time. General White was active, directing movements on the left. Enemy open still another battery upon Bolivar Heights. Colonel Miles, Lieutenant Binney, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Willmon, aide-de-camp, again visit Bolivar Heights; find General White active. He sends Captain Rigby, with two pieces of artillery, out on Charlestown road to play upon the enemy, putting a battery in position near Halltown. An officer overtakes Colonel Miles, from Colonel Ford, on Maryland Heights, who informs Colonel Miles that Ford says his regiments won't fight, and he cannot hold the heights. He sends back word that *he can and he must*. Colonel Miles afterward wrote the following letter, which was the last order given by him in regard to that position :

HEADQUARTERS HARPER'S FERRY, *September 13, 1862.*

Colonel FORD,

Commanding Maryland Heights :

Since I returned to this side, on close inspection I find your position more defensible than it appears when at your station. Covered as it is at all points by the cannon of Camp Hill, you will hold on, and can hold on, until the cows' tails drop off.

D. S. MILES,

Colonel Second Infantry, Commanding.

Major McIlvaine, chief of artillery, opens two 20-pounder Parrotts on Camp Hill upon the enemy on Maryland Heights. Colonel Miles and Lieutenant Binney, his aide, again visit Bolivar Heights, while Mr. Binney observes indications of a retreat at Maryland Heights, and calls Colonel Miles' attention. He looks and says, "My God, Colonel Ford is evacuating his position; we must stop it." Bolivar Heights are $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles from the Maryland Heights. Colonel Miles is very indignant. Colonel Miles and Lieutenant Binney start for the position, but on arriving at Camp Hill we saw that it was too late. The siege guns had been spiked, and the troops were leaving the heights by order of Col. Thomas H. Ford, Thirty-second Ohio, in charge. Colonel Ford's excuse was his men would not fight. In the opinion of all, the Thirtieth, D'Utassy's regiment, and the Thirty-second Ohio, with McGrath's battery, could have held the place at least that night. Colonel Ford's forces were as follows: Thirty-second Ohio, 700; Thirtieth New York (Garibaldi Guard), 600; One hundred and twenty-sixth New York (useless), 1,000; One hundred and fifteenth New York, 1,000; Rhode Island and Maryland cavalry, 400; McGrath's battery, 100; battalion Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, First Regiment, 300; battalion Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, Third Regiment, 500; total, 4,600 men. The enemy had no artillery on the heights at the time, and could not have had over 5,000 or 8,000 men. Our forces had four 20-pounder Parrotts on Camp Hill, which completely covered our position on Maryland Heights. Enemy now attack in strong force from Sandy Hook.

Toward evening Lieutenant Binney sent to inform General White of this attack, which requires his presence, and leaves Bolivar Heights to General White. Enemy open with shell and solid shot on railroad bridge from Sandy Hook; some of shell strike near headquarters. Colonel Miles places two pieces on railroad, and responds to the enemy's fire. The enemy get the worst of it and fall back. Quiet all night.

Sunday, September 14, 1862.—The enemy are planting batteries on the Loudoun Mountain. Captain Graham, on Camp Hill, opens with his 20-pounder Parrotts to dislodge them. His fire very effective; he dismounts two guns. The enemy do not respond. McGrath's and Von Sehlen's batteries play upon Maryland Heights, where the enemy have planted a battery of two guns. Colonel Miles directs artillerymen to save their ammunition, unless they see the enemy. The firing kept up constantly. Two o'clock p. m., the enemy open at five different points—two full batteries on Loudoun Mountain, a battery of two pieces on Maryland Heights, a battery of two pieces of long range on Shepherdstown road and on Charlestown turnpike. The cannonade is now terrific; the enemy's shell and shot fall in every direction; houses are demolished and detonation among the hills terrible. It is kept up until dark; our long-range ammunition is expended; only 36 rounds left, which are distributed by Major McIlvaine to Captain Graham. Our cavalry—Eighth New York Cavalry, Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, First Maryland Cavalry, Cole's cavalry, and battalion Rhode Island cavalry, all under Colonel Voss, hold a consultation at Colonel Miles' quarters, and Colonel Miles issues an order for them to cross the pontoon bridge, and take Sharpsburg road and cut their way out to our army. They start at 8.30 p. m. Their escape proves Colonel Miles' good judgment as to the route taken. Throughout the day our gallant artillerymen hold their own, and we have lost but 4 killed. Colonel Miles again expresses much anxiety, and fears if the enemy opens again in the morning he cannot hold out. No information can be obtained as to the whereabouts of army. Several attempts of Colonel Miles to open a communication had failed, and we hear of no effort being made to send us assistance. Several regimental officers advise him to surrender or evacuate. His reply was, "My last order from headquarters was to hold on at all hazards, and I shall hold on until my last shell is expended. O, where is McClellan and his army?" &c. Three full divisions are now in our front; we are entirely surrounded. Rebels in front are all under General Jackson and A. P. Hill. Everything quiet from dark until 9 p. m., when the enemy's infantry endeavor to flank us on left, near Shenandoah River. Lieutenant Binney, aide-de-camp, is sent out to post Colonel Banning, with a howitzer on Rifle Island, to repel any attempt in that direction. He throws out skirmishers, who connect with Colonel Downey's skirmishers from river to left ridge of Bolivar Heights. During the night the enemy in strong force, composed of General Pender's brigade of North Carolinians, attempt to turn our flank, which move Brigadier-General White shrewdly anticipates and repels with much slaughter. General White assists Colonel Downey's regiment, by sending him the Ninth Vermont and Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers. Here it was that Brigadier-General White was most active. His promptness of action, his personal bravery and firmness, saved this flank from being turned. General White repulsed them with severe loss to the enemy, and they retire and do not attempt the move again. Colonel Miles, aware that a desperate struggle must take place by day-break in the morning, advises with Major McIlvaine, chief artillery, and decides to

remove the heavy artillery to Bolivar Heights and fight it out there, and determined to hold out as long as possible, in hopes that assistance may arrive. The enemy during the night change the position of their batteries, and on Mouday a. m. by 5.30 o'clock open a terrific cannonade from seven different batteries, enfilading our position on Bolivar Heights.

Monday, September 15.—Colonel Miles and staff and General White and staff on Bolivar Heights; by day-break the enemy open on Camp Hill and Bolivar Heights from seven batteries, which renders Camp Hill almost untenable. Lieutenant Leek, Fifth New York Artillery, opens a cross-fire upon enemy's batteries on Loudoun Heights with much effect. This gallant officer is entitled to much credit for his brave conduct while surrounded with the enemy's missiles, working his guns in the most admirable manner. General White plants a battery of 20-pounder Parrotts on plateau near the Shenandoah, which does fearful and deadly execution to the enemy on Loudoun. We are surrounded by enemy's batteries; they open from Loudoun Mountain and Loudoun Farm, Maryland Heights, Charlestown road, Shepherdstown road. Nothing could stand before such a raking cannonade. Colonel Miles was everywhere, exposing himself to danger with the bravest, encouraging his artillerists, and met with many narrow escapes from the bursting shells of the enemy. At 8 o'clock a. m. our battery officers report their ammunition exhausted. General White meets Colonel Miles on the crest of heights and consults. General White proposes a consultation of officers. Lieutenant Binney sent to the left for Colonel Trimble, Second Brigade. Lieutenant Willmon sent for Colonel D'Utassy, First Brigade. The consultation is held in the midst of shell and round shot, and conclude to signalize a cessation of hostilities by waving white handkerchiefs, while General White offers to go out and ask the conditions of the enemy. The white flag is exhibited, the artillery stops firing for about fifteen minutes, when the enemy again open with a terrific cannonade. Colonel Miles, after having left General White, started with Lieutenant Binney to hunt for our horses and orderlies. Lieutenant Willmon went to hunt the orderlies, while Colonel Miles and Lieutenant Binney, aide-de-camp, started down the eastern slope of the heights, where every inch of ground was being torn up by the enemy's fire. Colonel Miles took Lieutenant Binney's hand, and remarked, "Well, Mr. Binney, we have done our duty, but where can McClellan be? The rebels have opened on us again; what do they mean?" Immediately after a shell passed us, striking and exploding immediately behind us, a piece of which tore the flesh entirely from his left calf, and a small piece cutting his right calf slightly. Lieutenant Binney immediately tied his handkerchief above the knee, and called for assistance; put him in a blanket, and, obtaining six men, dragged him to an ambulance, and sent word to General White.

Colonel Miles, upon his death-bed, mentioned the following names as deserving credit: Brigadier-General White was everywhere where the danger was thickest, coolly giving orders and superintending things generally on the left, which was the most exposed. Colonel Miles expressed himself several times as being highly pleased with the assistance rendered by this valuable and gallant officer. Maj. H. B. Mellvaine, chief of artillery, was also mentioned as deserving much credit for bravery, and for his cool and firm manner of placing batteries under the galling fire of the enemy on Camp Hill and other places, where the most danger existed, encouraging the artillerists. To Capt. Eugene McGrath,

Company F, Fifth New York Artillery, and Capt. J. H. Graham, Company A, Fifth New York Artillery, is due much praise for the masterly and gallant manner of handling their guns, and good conduct on several occasions; especially to Captain McGrath is due much praise, who commanded the siege guns on Maryland Heights on Saturday. To First Lient. Samuel A. Barras, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, is due much praise in his gallant effort to rally his regiment on the Maryland Heights, after the fall of Colonel Sherrill. The orderly sergeant of Von Schlen's battery and a sergeant of Captain Graham's battery were highly spoken of by Colonel Miles, and are deserving of promotion; the batteries of Rigby, Potts, and Phillips, for the courage displayed against tremendous odds of guns and position.

Colonel Miles remarked on his death-bed, "He had done his duty; he was an old soldier and willing to die." It was a fit end for an old soldier. He had nothing to lose, he said, but he only regretted he could not live to do justice to the gentlemen so closely connected with him, for their bravery in carrying his orders over the field, and to his artillery officers. He said he could not understand why the Government was so slow in sending him assistance. He had held the position against an army of 40,000 for five days and a half, two and a half of which were constantly engaged in a heavy artillery duel. He thought the army must know of his situation, and the tremendous cannonading must have been heard by McClellan. He lingered until 4.30 p. m. on Tuesday. His staff officers, at his request, staid by him. His death was easy, without a struggle. General Hill promised everything in the way of transportation for body, but he fulfilled nothing, and it was through the exertions of Major McIlvaine, Lieutenants Binney and Reynolds, that a team was procured, and his body was brought to Frederick, thence to Baltimore. On Friday, September 19, the remains were conveyed to Sweet Air and buried. Not being able himself to make a report, he requested me to make the above, and left to General White the duty of justice to his staff officers.

Respectfully submitted.

HENRY M. BINNEY,
Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE,
Commanding Troops at Harper's Ferry.

No. 199.

Report of Col. George L. Willard, One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Infantry, of the siege of Harper's Ferry, September 14-15.

HDQRS. 125TH REGIMENT NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
Annapolis, Md., September 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the One hundred and twenty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers during the 14th and 15th of September, 1862, at Harper's Ferry:

About 1 o'clock p. m., on the 14th September, the enemy, who had succeeded in establishing a battery of rifled guns on Loudoun Heights, opened with shot and shell upon my regiment, which, having just returned from picket duty, were engaged in preparing some food. The fire was rapid, and all the troops on the plateau made a speedy and somewhat disorderly retreat. My regiment, in spite of my efforts, and subjected for the first time to a hot fire, retreated in a good deal of disorder

toward the ravine running south from the battery on Bolivar Heights. At this point I succeeded in rallying them, and reformed the regiment on the east side, where it remained until ordered to cross to the west. Here two companies (Captains Cornell and Wood) were detached, by order of Brigadier-General White, to support two guns which had been ordered to advance. With the remaining eight companies I was directed, by the same officer, to occupy the ravine on the road leading to the Shenandoah. Four companies, under Lieut. Col. L. Crandell, occupied the extreme left of the line, protected by a slight skirt of woods, and four companies, under my own command, subsequently re-enforced by one of the companies which had been detached, were placed on the open ground. On my right was the Third Maryland and Ninth Vermont Regiments. During the night I called upon the commanding officer of the Third Maryland, Lieutenant-Colonel Downey, and with him on Colonel Stannard, of Ninth Vermont, and, upon consultation, a request was sent to Colonel Trimble, Sixtieth Ohio, commanding brigade, to grant us an interview, in the hope that some change might be made in the disposition of the troops, as we had become aware that the enemy had placed batteries on the opposite side of the Shenandoah, which it was believed would make our line of defense untenable. This interview was without result, as Colonel Trimble stated distinctly that the orders were to hold the line as then established. Some slight changes were then ordered in the position of the Ninth Vermont and Third Maryland, which were effected about 4 o'clock a. m. of the 15th September.

At daylight on the 15th September the enemy opened from the batteries which he had placed in position during the night, and was replied to by the two guns which had been placed in rear of the right wing of my regiment. The fire was very severe, and continued until about 8 o'clock a. m., when, to my astonishment, I saw a white flag raised from the battery on Bolivar Heights.

The firing from the enemy's batteries did not immediately stop, and I remained with my regiment in position until there was not to my knowledge any guns or troops on my right, all having retired and the firing ceased. Forty-five minutes after the raising of the white flag I ordered the regiment to retire, which was done in good order, although subjected to an artillery fire from Loudoun Heights, which opened on my regiment and killed 2 of my men. I ordered the regimental colors to be torn from the staff and destroyed, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. The casualties are as follows:*

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

G. L. WILLARD,

Colonel One hundred and twenty-fifth Regt. New York Vols.

Colonel TRIMBLE,

Sixtieth Ohio, Commanding Brigade.

No. 200.

Report of Col. Thomas H. Ford, Thirty-second Ohio Infantry, commanding brigade, of action on Maryland Heights.

SEPTEMBER —, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 5th instant I was ordered by Colonel Miles, commandant at Harper's Ferry, to the command of Maryland Heights, directly opposite Harper's Ferry.

* Embodied in No. 202, p. 549.

On the evening of the same day I assumed the command of the troops there stationed, consisting of the Thirty-second Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, under command of Maj. S. M. Hewitt; a squadron of Rhode Island cavalry, under command of Major Corliss; three companies of the First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, under command of Maj. John A. Steiner; two companies of the First Maryland Cavalry, under command of Captains Russell and Grafflin, and Capt. Eugene McGrath's battery of New York Heavy Artillery, numbering in all about 1,150 men.

Immediately upon my arrival at the heights, assisted by Major Steiner and Captain McGrath, I made strict examination of the situation of the defensive preparations, and found that no fortifications had been made so as to enable us to resist a superior force, the eastern and northern slope of the mountain being open and easy of access for any number of troops through Solomon's Gap. I found that at Solomon's Gap a battery of artillery might be placed in position so as to repel almost any force. I at once made application for a battery of artillery, in order to enable me to command that position, and, after continuous efforts for several days to obtain the battery, was overruled by Colonel Miles and gave up that mode of defense. Strict examination was then made of the top of the mountain, at a point familiarly known as the "Lookout," and my judgment was convinced that, if I could procure a section of artillery, I could make a stand at that point, and probably prevent the enemy from ascending the mountain, either on the eastern or northern slope through the gap; but, after making a second appeal for guns to man that position, I was told by Colonel Miles that if I and Captain McGrath had our way, we would have all the artillery at Harper's Ferry on Maryland Heights. Being foiled in my efforts, I abandoned this project as a means of defense.

On the 11th instant the enemy in large numbers encamped in Pleasant Valley, directly opposite Solomon's Gap, and drove in our pickets stationed there, shelling them out from the valley below. I immediately re-enforced the pickets at the lookout by one company of the Thirty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Captain Hibbets, and two companies of the Potomac Home Brigade, commanded by Captain Brown and Lieutenant Bridge.

Early on the following morning it was ascertained that the enemy's pickets were stationed at Solomon's Gap, and that our pickets were driven back about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, to a church on the Rohrsersville road. Having been re-enforced by a battalion of the Thirty-ninth New York, under the command of Major Hildebrandt, and one company of the One hundred and eleventh New York, and the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, under command of Colonel Sherrill, I immediately ordered Colonel Sherrill, with his regiment, and Major Hewitt, with five companies of the Thirty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, to the top of the mountain, to re-enforce Captains Hibbets and Brown, who were already there, whilst Captain Grunbecker, of Thirty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and two companies of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York were left to guard the eastern slope of the mountain, and Major Hildebrandt, with a portion of his battalion and two companies of Thirty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, were placed in position to defend Captain McGrath's heavy artillery, of two 9-inch columbiads and one 50-pounder rifled piece.

Brisk skirmishing commenced along the entire line about 3 o'clock p. m., and was continued until darkness closed the scene, with varied success, at times our forces driving them down the mountain slope, with

great slaughter, and then in turn being driven back. During the night both armies slept on their arms within speaking distance of each other, and certainly not more than 100 yards apart. It was apparent to all that on the morning of the 13th the decisive battle would be fought. I immediately made a pressing call for re-enforcements from the opposite side of the river, assuring Colonel Miles that at least three regiments must be sent to my relief during the night, or all must be lost in the morning, as the enemy were then on the mountain in ten times our number. So anxious was I to obtain re-enforcements, that, in addition to sending couriers twice to headquarters, I sent Major Hewitt, at 11 o'clock at night, for the purpose of impressing Colonel Miles with the importance of having re-enforcements at once.

Colonel Miles reiterated to Major Hewitt just what he said in his letter to me during the evening—"that re-enforcements should be on the heights by the break of day in the morning;" that he did not wish to remove troops at night, lest he might create a panic among the remaining troops at Bolivar Heights. Notwithstanding these assurances, I did not receive re-enforcements until 9 o'clock, at which time Colonel Downey's battalion of five companies arrived.

On the morning of the 13th, about 6.30 o'clock, the battle commenced, with great fury, on the top of the mountain, about a mile from the lookout, and 400 or 500 yards from a slight breastwork, thrown up two days before by Captain Whittier, of the Potomac Home Brigade. Our forces were driven back, after two hours' hard fighting, to the breastworks, where they made a most obstinate and determined resistance. At this point the gallant Colonel Sherrill, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York (in command of the forces at the time), fell, severely wounded, and was carried from the field. This produced a panic, particularly in his own regiment, many of them leaving the field in confusion and disorder. The residue of the troops, either hearing or imagining from the general backward movement that an order to retreat had been given, commenced a precipitate retreat down the mountain; the enemy in the mean time taking possession of our fortifications and the lookout (having driven us by this time, about 11 o'clock in the day, a distance of 2 miles) on the top of the mountain. At this critical juncture Colonel Miles and his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Willmon, arrived on the heights, and witnessed for themselves the consternation among the troops, when I was making an effort to reorganize and induce the troops to return to the field, in which Colonel Miles and his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Willmon, joined with great spirit and energy, but as fast as we forced them up one mountain path they returned by another, until all seemed to be lost. But after the efforts of Lieutenant Willmon, assisted by my aide-de-camp, Major Steiner, Adjutant Pearce, Lieutenants Bentley and Patterson, for one and a half hours, partial order was restored, and a portion of the troops returned to the field.

Colonel Miles acknowledged that he had been misled by his scouts and informers as to the number of the enemy in Pleasant Valley and at the entrance at Solomon's Gap, and told me repeatedly, both in private and in the hearing of his own aide-de-camp and others, that if my troops gave way again I must immediately withdraw my forces from Maryland Heights to Bolivar Heights, on the opposite side of the river. I have forgotten to mention that on the arrival of Colonel Downey with his battalion, he was immediately sent up the west side of the heights with his command, in addition to four companies under command of Captain Palmer, of the Thirty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Colonel Downey with his command made their way, through all

opposition, almost, if not entirely, to the lookout, on the top of the mountain; and although they arrived at the heights too late, yet during the after part of the conflict the gallant young colonel, with his entire command, aided with great forethought, courage, and coolness, saving to us many valuable lives, and harassing the enemy at every point where he attacked them.

At about 12 o'clock Colonel Sammon, with seven companies of his regiment (One hundred and fifteenth New York), arrived on the heights. Five companies, under the command of the colonel, were placed in position to support Captain McGrath's battery, and the remaining two companies were sent to the mountain top, under command of the lieutenant-colonel. This regiment behaved well, all its officers and men maintaining to the last the various positions assigned them. Severe skirmishing continued at all points on the mountain until 3.30 o'clock, when it was discovered that the enemy were advancing upon us in great force from the front and right, whilst at the same moment an entire brigade of the enemy were about to turn our left flank. In obedience to the positive orders of Colonel Miles, I ordered the guns to be spiked and dismounted and the forces withdrawn to the opposite side of the river, all of which was done in good order. I have been unable to ascertain accurately the number of killed and wounded in the engagements, but, from the best information that can be obtained, our loss in killed, wounded, and missing was about 160 men; whilst that of the enemy (from information obtained from themselves and from our own observations) must have been between 600 and 700 in killed and wounded. Captain McGrath, throughout the entire engagement, proved himself every inch a soldier, and it is unnecessary for me to say that as an artillerist he has few equals and no superiors. Under his well-directed fire, shot and shell spread dismay and death on every side of the enemy.

Of Colonel Sherrill I have only to say that he is a true soldier and a gallant man; also his adjutant, whom I do not know; and many other officers of his regiment behaved well, whose names I have never known.

The Thirty-second Ohio, under command of Major Hewitt; the Thirtieth New York, under command of Major Hildebrandt; a detachment of the Potomac Home Brigade, under command of Maj. John A. Steiner; a detachment of the First Maryland Cavalry, under command of Captain Russell, officers and men, all aided with great courage and coolness, and too much credit cannot be awarded them. Major Corliss, of the Rhode Island cavalry, was withdrawn from the heights early in the engagement by order of Colonel Miles.

Instances of individual courage were numerous, but space forbids that I should enumerate them in this report.

On the 7th instant, whilst the enemy were crossing in great force at Point of Rocks, Captain Russell, with 50 cavalry, attacked them, killing 3 and taking 17 prisoners; among the number was a captain and a lieutenant.

On the evening before the general engagement, Captain Banning, with four companies, all under command of my aide-de-camp, R. H. Bentley, attacked and captured the enemy's pickets within full view of the enemy's camp, and brought them to my headquarters as prisoners of war.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

THOS. H. FORD,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE.

[Inclosure.]

CAMP MILES, MARYLAND HEIGHTS, MD.,

September 9, 1862.

SIR: In accordance with orders received from your headquarters, I yesterday, with 50 men, proceeded to reconnoiter the country along the Potomac eastward and toward Frederick City.

At Petersville I met and captured one of the enemy's cavalry, and his horse. At the time he was dressed in citizen's clothes, and was evidently reconnoitering the road. At Jefferson I also captured a sergeant-major, of the Twelfth [?] Louisiana Regiment.

From Jefferson I struck across the country and came out on the Great Western turnpike, about 3 miles west of Frederick. I then came upon the enemy's pickets, and pursued them to within about 1½ miles of Frederick City. I captured there 13 of the enemy and 9 horses. One of the men captured was a Joshua Fluharty, a deserter from Captain Grafflin's company (H), First Maryland Cavalry. At the time of his desertion he held the position of first sergeant in Captain Grafflin's company. When captured he held the position of regimental bugler in one of the enemy's regiments. Another (Wheeler) was also a deserter from Captain Grafflin's company (H), First Maryland Cavalry. Among the captured were, I believe, one captain and one lieutenant.

I saw two columns marching, one from the Potomac on to Frederick, and the other marching from Frederick City out toward Baltimore or Washington.

The enemy evidently has no supply trains. I could see only a very few wagons, not more than enough to supply transportation for officers, sick, and wounded.

He has but few tents. Soldiers could be seen sleeping on the sidewalks and cellar-doors about the streets.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. RUSSELL,

Captain, Commanding Company I, First Maryland Cavalry.

Col. THOMAS H. FORD,

Commanding Forces at Maryland Heights.

[Addenda.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,

September 12, 1862.

COLONEL: Our forces, consisting of 400 infantry, under command of Major Hildebrandt, and 50 cavalry, under Captain Russell, are now fighting at Solomon's Gap. The rebels have thrown thirty shells and wounded several men. The rebels are attempting to pass through the gap, and our men are resisting.

THOS. H. FORD,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,

September 12, 1862.

COLONEL: Our forces from the lookout report that the enemy are advancing toward Sandy Hook with infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Our forces are still fighting at Solomon's Gap.

THOS. H. FORD,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
September 13, 1862.

Colonel MILES:

The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York has given way and straggling through the woods. All of our forces are falling back.

THOS. H. FORD,
Commanding Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
Maryland Heights, Md., September 13, 1862.

Col. DIXON S. MILES,
Commanding Division:

The enemy are extending their lines from the top of the mountain down to the river.

THOS. H. FORD,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

[SEPTEMBER 13, 1862.]

Colonel MILES,
Commanding Division:

I cannot hold my men. The One hundred and twenty-sixth all run, and the Thirty-second Ohio are out of ammunition. I must leave the hill unless you direct otherwise.

THOS. H. FORD,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 201.

Report of Maj. Henry B. McIlvaine, Fifth New York Heavy Artillery, of operations at Harper's Ferry August 27-September 15.

HARPER'S FERRY, VA.,
September 19, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the artillery in the late engagements at Harper's Ferry, while under the command of Col. Dixon S. Miles, Second U. S. Infantry:

August 27.—Reports reaching headquarters that the enemy threatened a crossing of the Potomac River into Maryland near Point of Rocks, by order of Colonel Miles, two 12-pounder guns, with detachments from Capt. John H. Graham's command, Fifth New York Artillery, and sufficiency of ammunition, were sent to that point supported by infantry, under Colonel Banning, Eighty-seventh Ohio.

September 7.—The enemy make a demonstration on Point of Rocks in force. Colonel Banning falls back to Berlin in good order, after shelling the advanced guard of the enemy.

September 8.—The enemy known to be in strong force on our front and rear. Active preparations are accordingly made for an obstinate defense.

September 12.—Enemy made the attack on Maryland Heights with infantry and artillery. Captain McGrath, Fifth New York Artillery, commanding naval battery of three guns, with the two 12-pounder light howitzers, supported by a strong infantry force, under Colonel Ford, Thirty-second Ohio, open a destructive fire of shell and musketry on the enemy, holding them in check. By order of Colonel Miles, two 12-pounder guns were added to that battery, making seven in all. Captain Graham assisted in shelling the enemy from the battery on Camp Hill.

September 13.—Enemy are discovered placing batteries on Loudoun Heights, on our left flank. Lieutenants Leek and Cundell, of Graham's battery, are directed to open fire on them from 24-pounder howitzers, which is effectively done, causing the enemy to withdraw. Expecting a simultaneous attack on all sides the following day, two 20-pounder Parrott guns were added to Captain Rigby's battery, on the extreme left of Bolivar Heights, which, with three 24-pounder howitzers already there, proved a most effective and destructive battery. Captain Graham was ordered to the front, on the extreme right of Bolivar Heights, with three heavy pieces of artillery, which also proved very effective; Captain Phillips' New York battery, of six rifled pieces, taking position next; Captain Von Sehlen, with a battery of six iron rifled 3-inch pieces, in position about the center; Lieutenants Leek and Cundell, of Fifth New York Artillery, remaining in position on Camp Hill. Captain Potts' Ohio battery is in position on right side of road on Camp Hill, gallantly assisting our now closely pressed troops on Maryland Heights by their rapid and close fire. The enemy make an advance from Sandy Hook, throwing shell, causing the four pieces of artillery under command of Colonel Maulsby to fall back to Harper's Ferry. One section takes position at pontoon bridge, the other on railroad bridge, Virginia side. The fire was promptly returned. The enemy opened a battery on our front, but is harmless. Captain Rigby is sent with a section of rifled pieces to engage the enemy on the road to Charlestown. Captains Graham, Von Sehlen, and Phillips open fire from their guns on the enemy's pickets, driving them back. Our troops on Maryland Heights are falling back from the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Colonel Miles sends an order to hold the heights at any cost. Captain McGrath, Fifth New York Artillery, keeps up a continuous and rapid fire from the battery, but it is of no avail. The order is given by the officer in command of the heights to spike the guns, and all the troops to retire to Harper's Ferry, which was done. At sunset all firing ceased. Lieutenant Thompson, ordnance officer, removed all ammunition from the arsenal to Camp Hill, securing it in different places most convenient to the batteries.

September 14.—The enemy open fire from Maryland Heights with one and from Loudoun Heights with two batteries; from Charlestown road a battery of two guns, and one heavy gun from Shepherdstown road. Their fire was brisk and range good, rendering it almost impossible to work the guns on Camp Hill. Our batteries replied with great vigor. Lost two guns, disabled by the enemy's fire. Both officers and privates deserve great credit for their indomitable courage under such a sharp fire. Recaptured the four field pieces left on Maryland Heights. All firing has ceased. Brigadier-General White proposes to mass all the artillery on Bolivar Heights and fight it out there, but the plan was frustrated by the enemy erecting a battery across the Potomac, on a bluff, commanding the extreme right of Bolivar, consequently enfilading our works; and it became necessary to leave the guns on Camp

Hill, that we in return might enfilade the enemy's works. Colonel Miles sent one gun down the railroad, on Shenandoah River, to our extreme left. A two-gun battery near Winchester Railroad was got ready for action, anticipating an advance of the enemy to turn our left flank. The attempt was made about midnight, but Brigadier-General White with great skill foiled the enemy. Finding but 36 rounds of ammunition left for the most effective guns, it was equally divided.

September 15.—Daylight discovered the enemy's batteries moved up to close range, and multiplied; seven batteries now opened fire, enfilading the works on Bolivar Heights. Our batteries replied immediately, and the firing was constant and rapid. Brigadier-General White and staff, with Colonel Miles and staff, exposing themselves to the terrific fire of the enemy, gave great confidence to the troops on Bolivar, who stood like veterans until the surrender. Captains Phillips and Von Sehlen's batteries rendered useless for want of ammunition. Captain Graham soon exhausted the ammunition for the 20-pounder Parrotts. Captains Potts and Rigby keep up a destructive fire on the enemy. General White orders these last-mentioned to move to a position nearer the enemy and Shenandoah River, from which they opened a sharp and effective fire. Reported to the commanding officers that the ammunition was nearly expended. After a consultation of officers, it was decided to surrender. The flag was struck about 9 a. m.; white flags were shown on the heights, but the enemy continued their fire twenty minutes. During this time, and some time after the white flags were shown, Colonel Miles fell mortally wounded. He remarked, "I have done my best, and what I thought to be my duty. This is a fit end for a soldier."

I believe that after the evacuation of Maryland Heights Harper's Ferry became untenable.

Number of guns used in the defense of Harper's Ferry, and turned over to the enemy.

24-pounder howitzers	6
20-pounder Parrotts	4
12-pounder guns	6
6-pounder smooth guns	6
12-pounder light howitzers	2
3-inch rifled pieces	10
3-inch rifled, James	6

These guns are spiked:

10-inch Dahlgrens	2
50-pounder Parrott	1
12-pounder light howitzers	2
12-pounder guns	2

47

Respectfully submitted.

H. B. McILVAINE,
Major and Chief of Artillery.

No. 202.

*Return of casualties in the Union forces at Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry.**

[Compiled from nominal list of casualties, returns, &c.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
General staff.....			1		6		7
12th Illinois Cavalry.....				2	4	153	159
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery M.....					3	97	100
65th Illinois Infantry.....			1	6	32	778	817
15th Indiana Battery.....					4	114	121
Rigby's (Wilder) Indiana Battery.....					4	109	113
1st Maryland Cavalry (detachment).....			1	2	1	19	23
Cole's Battalion Maryland Cavalry†.....							
1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry.....		6		6	32	747	791
3d Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry.....	1	2	1	8	24	510	546
8th New York Cavalry.....					5	87	92
5th New York Heavy Artillery, Batteries A and F.....		2			9	256	267
12th New York Infantry (militia).....					30	530	560
39th New York Infantry.....				15	10	520	545
111th New York Infantry.....		5		6	36	934	981
115th New York Infantry.....			1	10	28	950	989
125th New York Infantry.....		2		1	38	881	922
126th New York Infantry.....	1	12	4	38	30	946	1,031
Potts' Ohio battery (F, 32d Ohio Infantry).....					2	82	84
32d Ohio Infantry.....	1	9	3	55	81	643	742
60th Ohio Infantry.....		2	1	5	38	867	913
87th Ohio Infantry.....		1			38	976	1,015
7th Squadron Rhode Island Cavalry†.....							
9th Vermont Infantry.....				3	30	714	747
Unattached, in hospitals, &c.....						1,172	1,172
Total.....	3	41	13	160	435	12,085	12,737

OFFICERS KILLED.—Capt. Jacob Sarbaugh, Third Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry, Samuel R. Breese, Thirty-second Ohio Infantry, and Lieut. Alfred R. Clapp, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry.

DIED OF WOUNDS.—Col. Dixon S. Miles, Second U. S. Infantry, and Lieut. Daniel C. Hiteshew, First Maryland Cavalry.

No. 203.

Record of the Harper's Ferry Military Commission.

PROCEEDINGS OF A MILITARY COMMISSION HELD AT WASHINGTON, CITY, D. C., BY VIRTUE OF THE FOLLOWING ORDERS:

SPECIAL ORDERS, } WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJT. GEN.'S OFFICE,
No. 256. } Washington, September 23, 1862.

* * * * *

XXII. A special commission will assemble in this city at 11 o'clock a. m., on Thursday, the 25th instant, for the trial of such cases as may be brought before it.

* Includes actions at Maryland Heights September 12 and 13, and at Harper's Ferry and Bolivar Heights September 14 and 15.

† No loss reported.

‡ A number of the wounded fell into the enemy's hands, and are also counted with the captured.

Detail for the Commission : Maj. Gen. D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers ; Maj. Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. Volunteers ; Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. Volunteers ; Capt. Donn Piatt, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers ; Capt. F. Ball, jr., aide-de-camp ; Col. J. Holt, Judge-Advocate-General, U. S. Army, judge-advocate.

By order of the Secretary of War :

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,
September 25, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to the above orders.

Present, Maj. Gen. D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers ; Maj. Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. Volunteers ; Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. Volunteers ; Col. J. Holt, judge-advocate.

Absent, Capt. Donn Piatt, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers ; Capt. F. Ball, jr., aide-de-camp.

The judge-advocate read the order convening the Commission.

Two of its members being absent, the Commission adjourned to meet to-morrow, Friday, the 26th instant, at 10 a. m.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,
Friday, September 26, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

Present, Maj. Gen. D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers ; Maj. Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. Volunteers ; Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. Volunteers ; Col. J. Holt, judge-advocate.

Absent, Capt. Donn Piatt, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers ; Capt. F. Ball, jr., aide-de-camp.

The judge-advocate stated to the Commission that it was the wish of the Secretary of War that they should adjourn over to Monday, the 29th instant.

Thereupon the Commission adjourned to meet again at 10 a. m. Monday, the 29th of September, 1862.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,
Monday, September 29, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

Present, Maj. Gen. D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers ; Maj. Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. Volunteers ; Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. Volunteers ; Capt. Donn Piatt, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers ; Capt. F. Ball, jr., aide-de-camp ; Col. J. Holt, Judge-Advocate-General, U. S. Army, judge-advocate.

The judge-advocate not being prepared to proceed with the business of the Commission, at 12 o'clock it adjourned to meet again to-morrow at 11 a. m.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Tuesday, September 30, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

Present, Maj. Gen. D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers ; Maj. Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. Volunteers ; Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. Volunteers ; Capt. Donn Piatt, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers ; Capt. F. Ball, jr., aide-de-camp ; Col. J. Holt, Judge-Advocate-General, U. S. Army, judge-advocate.

The minutes of the last meeting having been read, the Commission

was duly sworn by the judge-advocate, and the judge-advocate was then sworn by the president of the Commission.*

The judge-advocate then stated that the matters which the Secretary of War desired to be submitted for the investigation of the Commission were the circumstances attending the late evacuation of Maryland Heights, under the command of Colonel Ford, and the subsequent surrender of Harper's Ferry by Colonel Miles, then in command, in reference to which the Secretary desired the Commission diligently to inquire and faithfully to report all the facts bearing, in their judgment, upon the conduct of said commanding officers, or their subordinates, in making said evacuation and surrender.

Whereupon the judge-advocate produced and read to the Commission the following papers, to wit:

The report of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, under date of September 27, 1862, addressed to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, U. S. Army, and the several papers therein referred to, from 1 to 10, inclusive, viz :†

1. Report of Brig. Gen. Julius White, of the occupation and subsequent evacuation of Martinsburg and retreat to Harper's Ferry, on the 12th September, 1862.‡

2. Report of Brig. Gen. Julius White, of the defense of Harper's Ferry on the 13th and 14th of September, 1862, and the surrender on the 15th.‡

3. Report of Lieut. H. M. Binney, acting aide-de-camp to Colonel Miles, of the same defense and surrender.§

4. Report of Col. Thomas H. Ford, of Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Maryland Heights, of the defense and evacuation of Maryland Heights.||

5. Report of Maj. H. B. McIlvaine, chief of artillery, of the part taken by the artillery during the siege of Harper's Ferry.¶

6. Terms of capitulation at the surrender of Harper's Ferry, September 15, 1862.**

7. List of killed, wounded, and missing on the Union side during the siege of Harper's Ferry, September 13, 14, and 15, 1862.††

8. Abstract of General White's report (No. 2).‡‡

9. Abstract of Lieutenant Binney's report (No. 3).‡‡

10. Abstract of Colonel Ford's report (No. 4).‡‡

He also read an appendix to the report of Brig. Gen. Julius White of the surrender of Harper's Ferry,§§ together with a report of Lieut. Charles Graham Bacon, acting assistant adjutant-general, relative to the conduct of Colonel D'Utassy at Harper's Ferry. (Appendix, No. 1.)

Questions propounded by Adjutant-General Thomas to different colonels in relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and their answers thereto, were also read by the judge-advocate. (Appendix, No. 2.)

Whereupon, at 2.45 o'clock, the Commission adjourned to meet again to-morrow, Wednesday, October 1, at 11 a. m.

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* So much of the daily journal as sets forth the meeting of the Commission, the names of the members and others present, and the reading and approval of the previous record, will henceforward be omitted, unless there are exceptional entries on these subjects.

† See Report No. 196.

‡ See Report No. 197.

§ See Report No. 198.

|| See Report No. 200.

¶ See Report No. 201.

** See p. 529.

†† See Report No. 202.

‡‡ Omitted in view of the publication of the entire report.

§§ See p. 531.

APPENDIX, No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS POST,
Annapolis, Md., September 23, 1862.

GENERAL: My impression is that Colonel D'Utassy is too good a soldier to have compromised himself at Harper's Ferry.

I inclose a communication from Lieut. Charles Graham Bacon, acting assistant adjutant-general, which I have no doubt is substantially correct.

If Colonel D'Utassy exonerates himself in this unfortunate affair at Harper's Ferry, I hope he will be released from arrest and ordered back to duty at the earliest practicable moment.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

DANIEL TYLER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS POST,
Annapolis, Md., September 23, 1862.

Upon the afternoon of Monday, the 15th ultimo [instant], I was directed to call upon Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch, of the rebel army, and ascertain from him what disposition was to be made of the surrendered forces at Harper's Ferry, contained in the First Brigade, Colonel D'Utassy. I immediately proceeded to his headquarters, and learned that duplicate muster-rolls would be required; that our regiments and batteries were to be drawn up as for muster, the roll to be called, men to answer, &c.; the form of parole then to be read to them, and the men, raising their right hands, to promise not to serve against the so-called Southern Confederacy until regularly exchanged; officers to sign individual paroles.

I returned to my colonel and reported. Rolls of the regiments and batteries were prepared, and in the case of my own (the Thirty-ninth Regiment) the names of no officers save those of company commanders were included.

At about 6 p. m. word was sent to General Branch that the muster-rolls of the brigade were ready, and we would feel obliged if he (General Branch) would come over and parole us, as he had said he would.

He came. The Thirty-ninth New York was formed in column of companies, non-commissioned staff in front, Colonel D'Utassy, Colonel Segoine, of the One hundred and eleventh, and Mr. Kent, correspondent of the New York Tribune, who was at the time acting in the capacity of private secretary to Colonel D'Utassy. I also accompanied them. When we reached the head of the column, General Branch was handed the muster-roll of the first company. Turning to Colonel D'Utassy, he remarked, "I suppose, colonel, you understand this parole as I do, viz, that you and your men understand you are not to go into a camp of instruction or drill until such time as you may be exchanged." Colonel D'Utassy immediately exclaimed, in an excited manner, "No, sir, I understand nothing of the kind. Such an understanding would not be correct. Suppose my Government desired to use this paroled force against the Indians of the Northwest, who are, like you, in a state of insurrection, would you, sir, consider that as a violation of our parole?" "Well, no," said Branch, "I do not think I would." "Then, sir," said D'Utassy, breaking in, "in the present state of our forces here surrendered, some of whom are green troops, it might be necessary to place them in a camp of instruction. I must, therefore, sir, decline ac-

cepting a parole for my men on the condition now imposed by you, which I am positive was not intended at the time the articles of capitulation were drawn up." Colonel Segoin and Mr. Kent also gave it as their opinion that such a construction could not be placed upon the simple words contained in the articles of capitulation, such as "will not serve until regularly exchanged." Upon this decision of Colonel D'Utassy, General Branch refused to parole any of the troops until he could ascertain the understanding of the disputed point as entertained by General A. P. Hill. He (General Branch) then wrote a note to General Hill, sent it, and, after awaiting an answer until after dark, said he would go to his quarters, and we might send about 9 o'clock for his answer. At that hour, in company with Mr. Kent, I called upon General Branch, and he then stated that General Hill concurred with him in his view of the parole. I reported this fact to Colonel D'Utassy, who said that he would rather go to Richmond than take such a parole. He then gave orders for our brigade to be ready to move at dawn next morning (the 16th). This was done, and by 6 next morning we were in motion for the pontoon bridge. I handed the muster-rolls to General Hill at his headquarters, and asked a pass for the brigade. He asked if the brigade was paroled. I replied, evasively, I thought so. He then sat down and wrote a pass, upon which we immediately crossed the river, thus giving them the slip.

Upon the announcement of the surrender, Colonel D'Utassy ordered the colors of all the regiments of our brigade to be conveyed to his headquarters. This was done, and two hours were spent in removing the various colors from their staffs and packing them in the colonel's private trunk.

The adjutant-general of General Gregg made several demands on me for the colors where I was engaged on the hill turning over the arms. I informed him that they had been sent to our brigade headquarters. He left, but shortly returned and stated that he could not find them. I said I regretted it, but could not aid him; that he must see my colonel. These flags are now in my colonel's private trunks in this city. These are the simple facts, which, on my honor as a gentleman, I certify to.

CHAS. GRAHAM BACON,

Lieutenant, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX, No. 2.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., September 23, 1862.

Adj. Gen. L. Thomas' memorandum of interrogations to colonels of regiments in regard to surrender of Harper's Ferry.

First officer, Colonel Cameron :

Question. Did you advise the surrender of Harper's Ferry, to Colonel Miles, or to any one else ?

Answer. I did not recommend a surrender to the commanding officer, nor to his brigade commanders, nor to any one else. There was not a formal consultation held, to my knowledge.

Second officer, Col. George L. Willard, One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Volunteers :

Question. Did you advise the surrender of Harper's Ferry, to Colonel Miles, or to any other officer, or were you consulted in reference to its surrender ; and, if so, what opinions did you give ?

Answer. I did not advise, nor was I ever consulted in regard to, the surrender of Harper's Ferry. I am not aware personally that there ever had been any consulta-

tion; but I have heard since the surrender, in common conversation, that there had been such a consultation by the brigade commanders.

Third officer, Colonel Sammon, One hundred and fifteenth New York Volunteers:

Question. Did you advise, &c.?

Answer. I was not consulted nor advised, nor did I consent to a surrender until ordered to do so. I know nothing personally of any consultation having been had; but I have heard the brigade commanders had such a consultation.

Fourth officer, Col. W. P. Maulsby, First Maryland Regiment Potomac Home Brigade:

Question. Same.

Answer. The national flag was lowered without any premonition to, or consultation with, myself, or any officer of my command. I know of no consultation in reference to the surrender having been held. I neither advised nor consented to surrender the place to the enemy.

Fifth officer, Col. Jesse Segoine, One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers:

Question. Same.

Answer. I never was consulted in any way, shape, or form; never advised a surrender to any one. I was told by Colonel D'Utassy that a council had been held, and that the determination was to surrender. This was about 8 o'clock in the morning.

Sixth officer, Col. George J. Stannard, Ninth Vermont:

Question. Same.

Answer. I was not consulted and I did not advise a surrender. I am not aware of any consultation between any parties in reference to the surrender.

Seventh officer, Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt, commanding Thirty-ninth New York Volunteers:

Question. Same.

Answer. No, sir; I was not consulted, nor did I give any advice to any one to surrender. I do not know, of my knowledge, of any consultation in regard to the surrender.

Eighth officer, Maj. William H. Baird, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers:

Question. Same.

Answer. I was not consulted in any way. I did not advise a surrender to any one. From my own knowledge, I do not know whether there was any consultation.

Ninth officer, Maj. S. M. Hewitt, Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers:

Question. Same.

Answer. I did not, sir. I was not consulted in reference to the surrender. I do not know, of my own knowledge, that there was a consultation. I have heard it rumored that Colonels Miles, Trimble, D'Utassy, and General White had consulted together. Colonel Ford was not with the regiment on Sunday; he was sick and not on duty at the time of the surrender, which was on Monday morning.

Tenth officer, Lieut. Col. S. W. Downey, Third [Maryland] Regiment Potomac Home Brigade Volunteers:

Question. Same.

Answer. I did not, sir. I was not consulted at all. I do not know that there was a consultation among any of the officers; I have since heard that such a consultation has been.

In presence of—

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Wednesday, October 1, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The judge-advocate stated that notifications to the several officers into whose conduct, in connection with the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, the Commission was instructed to inquire, were being issued, in order that they might have an opportunity of appearing before the Commission, cross-examining witnesses, and introducing such testimony as they might deem proper; and that, to afford time for the service of these notices, and for the parties to avail themselves of them, it would be necessary for the Commission to adjourn.

Whereupon the Commission adjourned to meet again to-morrow, Thursday, October 2, at 11 a. m.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Thursday, October 2, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The judge-advocate then stated that he had no evidence that the notifications referred to in the proceedings of yesterday had been served, and that in consequence he was not ready to proceed with the business of the Commission to-day.

Whereupon the Commission adjourned to meet again to-morrow, Friday, October 3, at 11 a. m.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Friday, October 3, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

General WHITE was duly sworn, and stated that he believed the testimony of the following-named witnesses, in addition to those summoned by the Government, important for him in the inquiry now in progress before the Commission, and he therefore asks that a summons be issued for them, which was accordingly ordered.

The names of said witnesses are as follows, viz: Colonel Stannard, Ninth Vermont, Chicago; Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, Williamsport; Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, Sixty-fifth Illinois Infantry, Chicago; Major Stowell, Ninth Vermont Infantry, Chicago; Capt. Randolph Botts, Capt. Henry Curtis, jr., Capt. W. Angelo Powell, staff officers, Chicago; Captain Rigby, Indiana battery, Captain Potts, Ohio battery, Captain Phillips, Illinois battery, Chicago; Lieut. Charles G. Bacon, Chicago; Lieut. H. M. Biune, 64 Kilby street, Boston; Lieutenant Willmon, Third [First] Maryland, Annapolis.

Colonel D'UTASSY, having been sworn, stated that the testimony of the following witnesses, in addition to those ordered to be summoned by the Government, and at the instance of General White, is important for him in the inquiry now in progress before this Commission. Wherefore it was ordered that a summons should issue for them.

The names of said witnesses are as follows: Captain Von Schlen, Fifteenth Indiana Battery; Lieutenant Parker, One hundred and fifteenth New York Volunteers; Colonel D'Utassy, Thirty-ninth New York Volunteers.

Colonel FORD, having been duly sworn, stated that the testimony of the following witnesses, in addition to those ordered to be summoned by the Government, and at the instance of General White, is important for him in the inquiry now in progress before this Commission. Wherefore it was ordered that a summons should issue for them.

The names of said witnesses are as follows: Maj. John A. Steiner, First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, Annapolis; Asst. Adjt. Gen. John B. Pearce, Thirty-second Ohio, Camp Douglas, Ill.; Capt. Abraham Crumbecker, Camp Douglas, Ill.; Capt. Eugene McGrath, Baltimore; Lieutenant Willmon, Camp Douglas, Ill., aide to Colonel Miles.

The judge-advocate then stated that the rooms to be hereafter used by the Commission would not be ready before to-morrow. Wherefore the Commission adjourned to meet again to-morrow, Saturday, October 4, at 11 a. m.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Saturday, October 4, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Colonel FORD stated that the following-named witnesses, in addition to those summoned yesterday, were important for him in the inquiry now in progress before this Commission. Wherefore it was ordered that a summons should issue for them.

The following are the names of the witnesses: Captain Brown, Company H, First Regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Annapolis; Mrs. Brown, his wife.

Col. WILLIAM P. MAULSBY was then duly sworn, who testified as follows to questions propounded by the judge-advocate:

Question. State what position you held in the military service at and immediately preceding the recent evacuation of Maryland Heights by the United States forces.

Answer. I was the colonel commanding First Maryland Regiment Potomac Home Brigade.

Question. State at what point your command was stationed during the period and events referred to, and what part you took therein.

Answer. For several days preceding the evacuation of Maryland Heights I was in command of the eastern approach to it, by way of railroad and canal, and Sandy Hook. I was ordered by Colonel Miles to hold the eastern approach to Maryland Heights. In his order he said, I think, "This position is not to be abandoned. I will, if necessary, re-enforce you with half my command." I am not sure that these words were all in the written order, as he was in the habit of adding verbally to his written orders.

My command at that point consisted of five companies of my regiment. Three more of the regiment were under command of Colonel Ford, on Maryland Heights, and two under Colonel Miles, at Harper's Ferry. I think eight companies of the Eighty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Banning, were ordered to report to me, and three pieces of artillery, Captain Potts. In the first instance I stationed my force at Sandy Hook, with one piece of artillery guarding at the point where the railroad, canal, and country roads leading down Pleasant Valley united. The remainder of my command I stationed on the outer heights, being the same ridge occupied by General Banks' army last summer. I threw out a line of skirmishers, covering the base of that height. I occupied that position the better part of two days and one night. I think the afternoon of the second day Colonel Miles rode up and remarked that that position was not tenable, and ordered me to fall back to the eastern slope of Maryland Heights. I did so, and while in the latter position another piece of artillery was furnished me. While thus situated, I discovered a large wagon-train of the enemy at a distance of about 3 miles, in Pleasant Valley, which, I suppose, was visible in its length from 1 to 2 miles, neither

of its extremities, however, being in view. I saw it first at about 11 o'clock and again at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy were observed planting a battery on the western slope of the eastern range of mountains. On the morning of September 12, 1862, I made the following written communication to Colonel Miles:

COL. DIXON S. MILES, *Commanding*:

CAMP AT SANDY HOOK, *September 12, 1862.*

COLONEL: The enemy is in sight with a large wagon train, apparently making its way toward Weyerton and Knoxville.

We, of course, are strong enough only to defend ourselves when attacked, according to your orders, and I make this communication in order that you may understand the condition of affairs, and take such action as you may deem proper. The train is apparently guarded by a heavy force of cavalry and infantry. The artillery, if any, is not yet in view.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. P. MAULSBY,
Colonel, Commanding.

The same evening, I think, I received from Colonel Miles the following communication:

Colonel MAULSBY, *Commanding Sandy Hook*:

SEPTEMBER 12, 1862.

A large force is represented marching on you; it may be our own army, but if it is the enemy your position is not a defensible one, and as soon as you know to a certainty it is the enemy you must fall back to the head of the bridge with your whole command, bringing the two guns along. Do it deliberately; obstruct the road against a charge of cavalry. Send Cole out to distinctly understand what is the character of the force marching on you. I will visit you so soon as I can. Our troops are driven out of Solomon's Gap, and a large infantry force is advancing on Maryland Heights. I shall now place guns to play on the road, from the bridge to Sandy Hook. Have the trees cut down by Captain Bamford's company to unmask the road on bank of canal. Have this done at once.

Your obedient servant,

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry, Commanding.

I received this on the top of the hill, and wrote a note to Colonel Miles in reply, in substance, that it was very clear the force in sight was the enemy, but as I did not understand his note to be a distinct order to retire, I wished him to give me such distinctly, if such was his wish.

A few hours afterward Colonel Miles rode up, and said, "If attacked, you will lose that gun, as you will not be able to get it down." He then ordered the guns to be brought down, and to fall back toward the head of the bridge, and there to make a stand, which we did, and fired several rounds. The enemy threw a shell which burst near us, when Captain Potts removed the guns to the point indicated by Colonel Miles, near the head of the bridge. That position we held until the next day. On Friday night my headquarters were removed to a point between the railroad and pontoon bridge. On Saturday morning I saw two regiments pass my position toward the Maryland Heights.

About 3 p. m. I saw the column retreating from the Maryland Heights. I received, about the same time, an order from Colonel Miles to cover the rear of the column and follow it across the bridge, which I did. I was still guarding the eastern approach. At the same time I was ordered by Colonel Miles (in person, I think, but am not positive) to destroy the pontoon bridge after the retreating column and my command had crossed. I detailed one of my lieutenants, having supplied him with axes, but directed him not to cut the rope of the pontoon boats until I should confer again with Colonel Miles. Calling on the colonel, I was told, through his aide, not to cut the ropes. A short time afterward I met Colonel Miles, and said to him, "Why, colonel, what does this mean? What is to be done?" To which he replied, in an agitated manner, "My God! I don't know; I am afraid Colonel Ford has abandoned the heights almost too soon. Do you hold these bridges." Which I did till Monday morning, the 15th, when I left my post for a few moments, and on my return I found the flag was lowered, and was told that a surrender had taken place.

The enemy advanced from the east. There were but two approaches from the east, one by Sandy Hook and the other through Solomon's Gap. Colonel Miles, four or five weeks before, had contemplated fortifying Solomon's Gap and holding it, which was never done.

Question. What is the distance from Maryland Heights to the gap?

Answer. About 4 miles.

Question. From the view which you had of the whole field, and of the operation of the enemy's forces, what necessity, if any, existed, in your judgment, for the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I am not prepared to speak of the necessity of the evacuation, when and as it occurred, but I am very clear that if the forces at Harper's Ferry had been moved

to the heights, they could have been maintained against any force, especially so if Solomon's Gap had been occupied.

By the COURT:

Question. From your being ordered to cover the retreat of Colonel Ford by Colonel Miles, would you or would you not infer that Colonel Miles had ordered Colonel Ford to retreat from Maryland Heights?

Answer. My impression immediately after the retreat was that the evacuation had been made by Colonel Miles' order, but this was merely an impression. His remark to me that he "feared Colonel Ford had abandoned the heights too soon," confirmed this impression.

Question. Did Colonel Miles, when he was in conversation with you, as the troops were retreating from Maryland Heights, express dissatisfaction at the abandonment of that position?

Answer. He did not, but simply, as stated, ordered me to cover the retreat. My recollection as to this point is not distinct, but it is strengthened by the fact, well remembered, that at the same time Colonel Miles directed me to destroy the pontoon bridge, and I asked how it should be done.

By General WHITE:

Question. When you say Maryland Heights might have been held by the force at Harper's Ferry, do you mean if they had been originally placed there, or that they might have reoccupied the heights after their evacuation in face of the enemy, successfully?

Answer. I mean if they had been originally placed there, or transferred there as the exigencies of the occasion required. Upon the question of reoccupation I give no opinion, but suppose, after the crest of the hill had been taken possession of by the enemy, its reoccupation would have been very difficult.

Question. Did you have an opportunity to observe the conduct of either the officers under arrest before this court, viz: Brig. Gen. Julius White, Col. F. G. D'Utassy, Col. Thomas H. Ford, and Col. W. H. Trimble, during the siege of Harper's Ferry; and, if so, what was its character?

Answer. I had no opportunity, from my position, of personally observing the conduct of any of the officers except that of General White, and that on a single occasion, when he visited my position, and manifested the most active interest in the defense of the bridges of which I had charge. I saw nothing in his conduct which did not give me satisfaction, and which did not excite my admiration.

The witness then said:

On Sunday night Colonel Miles gave me an order to take up about 100 feet of the pontoon bridge, and in a few moments afterward it was countermanded by him in person. Soon after this I saw his assistant adjutant-general, and asked him to see Colonel Miles, and ask him to state distinctly which of these conflicting orders was to be obeyed. I did this in my own defense, inasmuch as during my service under Colonel Miles I had frequently found his orders liable to be misunderstood, and I regarded the taking up the bridge as an important matter.

THOMAS NOAKES, introduced as a witness by General White, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. How have you been employed during the past six months, and under whose orders?

Answer. For the last six months I have been in the Government service as a guide; more recently under General White, formerly by General Banks.

Question. Did you guide the cavalry who escaped from Harper's Ferry; and, if so, was the same route feasible for infantry and artillery? If no, why not?

Answer. I did guide the cavalry to Greencastle, and do not think the route over which they passed was practicable for infantry or artillery. The road was very narrow and difficult; infantry could not have kept up with us. The road was too rough for artillery, passing, as it did, frequently over ravines, fields, and fences. If we had taken a different route, over which infantry and cavalry could have passed, we should have alarmed the enemy at Hagerstown, Funkstown, and Williamsport, and from either of these points they could have brought artillery and successfully resisted us.

Question. Did you communicate to General White the information of the evacuation of Maryland Heights; and, if so, where was he; what did he say and do?

Answer. On Saturday I thought the enemy were endeavoring to take possession of Loudoun Heights, and I remarked to General White that these heights ought to have been occupied by our men. He told me to go to Colonel Miles and tell him who I was, and for what purpose I had come, and advise with him. I did so. I got there about 11 o'clock. I suggested the propriety of trying to take possession of Loudoun Heights. "Poh, poh," said he, "I cannot hold Maryland Heights. I have just informed him to evacuate them if he should think he was overpowered." Before I left the door, a colonel rode up and spoke to some gentleman whom I did not know, and said, "I have given up the Maryland Heights, according to the order I have just got." The gentleman to whom he spoke said, "Did you get such orders?" He replied, "I did." He then asked for Colonel Miles. I then mounted my horse and went to Bolivar Heights. I found General White on the road near the heights, and said to him, "We are evacuating Maryland Heights." He remarked, "Damn it, is that so?" and turned to look, and said, "I see the men coming down from Maryland Heights now." But he then said, "That can't be so; they are only relieving the regiments that are there." He added, "I will go and see about it myself," and rode off.

Question. Did you, prior to the evacuation of Martinsburg by General White, go into Maryland to observe the enemy; and, if so, what did you see and report to General White?

Answer. I went into Maryland by way of Shepherdstown. I reported to General White that I saw the enemy in heavy force, not less than three divisions.

Question. Did you observe the crossing of the enemy to Falling Waters; and how many men do you think were marching on Martinsburg, then within 8 miles of that place, under Jackson?

Answer. I did, and am satisfied that the enemy's force amounted to not less than 25,000.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you recognize in me the person who rode up and said he had just evacuated Maryland Heights?

Answer. I am satisfied you are the gentleman.

Question (by same). Did Colonel Miles tell you in person that he had issued the order to abandon Maryland Heights?

Answer. Colonel Miles made no other statement on the subject than that which I have already mentioned.

The Commission here adjourned to meet again on Monday, October the 6th instant, at 11 o'clock a. m.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 6, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

William Blair Lord, of New York City, was appointed stenographer to the Commission, and duly sworn.

The minutes of the last meeting were then read and approved.

Col. GEORGE L. WILLARD, called by the Government, sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state to the Commission if you were present at

and immediately preceding the evacuation of Maryland Heights, and what command you held there in the service?

Answer. I am commanding the One hundred and twenty-fifth Regiment New York Volunteers. My regiment arrived at Harper's Ferry from Martinsburg on Friday, I think, the 12th of September, under command of General White. We went into camp on the plateau west from what is called Camp Hill. I suppose it is about three-quarters of a mile from Camp Hill. The next morning I went into Harper's Ferry to see General White and also Colonel Miles, who was the commanding officer. I saw them both there, and returned to my regiment. On the afternoon of that day I was ordered on picket with my whole regiment, and remained on picket until the next morning, when I was relieved by Colonel Downey, of the Third Maryland Regiment. I returned to camp again, and, while preparing some rations for my men, the battery on Loudoun Heights opened on us, and all the troops on the plateau left in considerable disorder, my own regiment among the number. I did not rally it until we reached a ravine running southwest from the battery on Bolivar Heights. We remained there until late in the afternoon, when the enemy made an attack on the Third Maryland Regiment, I believe. My regiment was then ordered across to the other side of the ravine; and still later in the evening, by direction of General White, two of the companies were ordered to support two guns which he had ordered down to the front. By direction, also, of General White, the other eight companies, under my immediate command, were ordered to take a new position. I do not know how I can explain it exactly. [A map of Harper's Ferry and vicinity was here shown to witness.*] We were ordered to take a new position here [indicating on the map] on a cross-road, extending from Bolivar Heights to the Shenandoah, as I supposed, to the railroad. It was, as I understand, the extreme left of our position.

By Brigadier-General WHITE:

Question. Do you recollect my directing you to connect with the regiment upon the road (Colonel Banning's)?

Answer. Yes, sir; the four left companies were directed to extend as far as possible, so as to reach the railroad, if it was possible to do so. One of the companies which were detached subsequently joined me, about 9.30 o'clock at night. My regiment remained in that position until the surrender.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Do you know nothing of the circumstances attending the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Nothing except from hearsay.

By the COURT:

Question. Will you state your loss in killed and wounded?

Answer. As near as I can arrive at it, my loss was 2 killed and 2 wounded. That was subsequent to the surrender.

Question. After the surrender of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir,

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Was your ammunition exhausted at all?

Answer. I had not had any occasion to use my ammunition.

Question. You had a battery there?

Answer. No, sir; I had not. There were two guns, by order of General White, detached to the right and rear of my right wing. I was not aware that those guns were immediately under my command. The commanding officer did not report to me, nor do I know the amount of ammunition he had or expended.

Question. Will you state your judgment as to the necessity that existed for the surrender of Harper's Ferry at the time it was made?

Answer. Any opinion I may have formed is based upon slight foundations. I was there but a short time, and during nearly the whole of that time I was with my regiment, either on picket or in my position awaiting an attack. On the night previous

* Not found.

to the surrender I felt that we were in very desperate circumstances, so much so that I sought out Lieutenant-Colonel Downey, commanding the Third Maryland, immediately on my right, and stated my apprehensions to him. I told him that I had discovered that the enemy were erecting batteries on the south side of the Shenandoah, the opposite side from us, which would enfilade our lines.

By the COURT:

Question. Was that on Loudoun Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; but extending up in this position [pointing out on the map], farther west than the battery on Loudoun Heights. Colonel Downey seemed to feel as I did, and, in company with myself, called upon Colonel Stannard, of the Ninth Vermont. Upon consultation with him a messenger was sent to the commander of the brigade, Colonel Trimble, who very soon made his appearance. After some conversation, I understood Colonel Trimble to say distinctly that it was Colonel Miles' order that the position then occupied should be held. Some slight changes were made in the Third Maryland and the Ninth Vermont Regiments, which took place about 4 o'clock in the morning. I told Colonel Trimble that I thought we were trying to defend a position which, unless there were some other means taken, it would take 50,000 men to defend. I thought our lines were entirely too extended. I knew of no reserves in rear of my line; but the circumstances attending my arrival there, the enemy being in force, and making an attack immediately the next morning, gave me no opportunity to look around. I did not even know the force that was there present at the Ferry. I did not know how many guns there were, nor the location of the batteries. At the time of the surrender I was not in a position to see to the westward or north-west of Bolivar Heights. I did not know what force might be there. And my opinion, if I give one, must be based upon these things.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What effect, in your judgment, did the evacuation of Maryland Heights have upon the strength and security of your position?

Answer. The evacuation of Maryland Heights seemed to me to be yielding the point of the position. I expressed my astonishment to Colonel Trimble. The first I heard of it, I think, was from Colonel Trimble, who remarked to me incidentally that Maryland Heights had been abandoned. I said "Maryland Heights abandoned!" He said "Yes."

By the COURT:

Question. Do you not think that Maryland Heights could have been easily defended against the whole force of the enemy near Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I do not think that Maryland Heights could have been "easily" defended. Leave out the word "easily" from the question and I can answer it.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You say, then, simply, that they could have been defended?

Answer. In my opinion they might have been defended. I am speaking now from the knowledge I have of the condition of the forces there.

By the COURT:

Question. Did the enemy occupy Maryland Heights in such a way as to annoy the forces in Harper's Ferry and on Bolivar Heights?

Answer. They did not occupy it so as to annoy the portion of the command with which I was connected. I was on the extreme left.

Question. Did they have any artillery there?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. You discovered none there?

Answer. I did not see any.

Question. You did not see any artillery fire from there after our troops abandoned the position?

Answer. I do not recollect seeing any.

Question. Did you see the enemy on Maryland Heights?

Answer. I did not. I mean by saying "I did not," that I did not see them there until after the surrender. When we marched across the river I saw their picket guards, &c., there; that was all.

Question. Have you any idea of the number of batteries that were firing upon the command at the time of the surrender?

Answer. It is very difficult to tell. I tried to discover at the time, but I could not tell the number of guns in the various batteries. They were firing from Loudoun Heights from at least one battery there.

Question. From any other point?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was firing upon us from the guns posted on the plateau on the south side of the Shenandoah. I should think one battery there, and I thought I discovered one or two detached guns.

Question. Point out on the map.

Answer. There was a battery here, and there appeared to be a battery here [pointing to the places on the map], and there seemed to be one or two guns detached. I do not know whether there was one or two guns. And there was another battery on the extension of this road [indicating on the map]. I did not see this battery, but I saw the effects of the shot and shell.

Question. You heard it?

Answer. Yes, sir. It seemed to be in a position to completely enfilade the whole line. There might have been more. As I remarked before, it was exceedingly difficult to tell the number of guns located in any of these positions. I know there was a very hot fire.

Question. Did it occur to you at any time that the troops could have been withdrawn from this place?

Answer. From the position I occupied?

Question. That the whole army could have been withdrawn from this position.

Answer. It did, sir; I mean that the effort might have been made.

Question. That was your impression?

Answer. That was the cause of my conference with the two colonels on the night previous to the surrender.

Question. That conference had reference to withdrawing the army?

Answer. It had reference to doing something.

Question. That was after the abandonment of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; I presume so. I was informed the day previous by Colonel Trimble that Maryland Heights had been abandoned.

Question. Will you please to state what occurred at that conference?

Answer. Nothing further than what I have already mentioned—that I myself felt that our position was exceedingly desperate; that the line was very extended; so far as I could judge, but a thin deployed line of men on our left. The battery on Bolivar Heights, the earthwork, was of a very simple character. There was nothing to defend us in front; the trees had not been felled; there were no rifle-pits, and other things and the knowledge that I had that the enemy were erecting these batteries that I mentioned on the south side of the Shenandoah, which enfiladed the line I was on, induced me, after some reflection, to see Colonel Downey. I mentioned these things to him. He felt the same anxiety I did. We went to see Colonel Stannard. Colonel Stannard seemed to feel as we did. We sent for the commander of the brigade, Colonel Trimble. When he arrived there I do not recollect exactly the language used, but it was that we felt that something should be done, if anything could be done, and his reply in effect was that Colonel Miles had ordered that position to be held—the line we then occupied.

Question. When did this conference take place?

Answer. I should think about 11 o'clock on the Sunday night previous to the surrender; on the night of the 14th of September.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. What was the character of the night? Moonlight or dark?

Answer. It was moonlight; slightly hazy.

Question. You think a retreat in the direction of Sandy Hook would have been practicable that night?

Answer. My idea was to withdraw the force entirely into Harper's Ferry, and retake Maryland Heights, if it was possible.

By the COURT :

Question. To withdraw the whole force into Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. After it was commanded by Maryland Heights?

Answer. To retake Maryland Heights, if it was possible. Harper's Ferry is down; in the town were many old walls, stone walls, bridges, and rocks which I thought could be made available. That might have been done at that hour, possibly, but I do not think that after daylight it could have been done.

By General WHITE :

Question. From your knowledge of the topography about Harper's Ferry, do you or not think it could have been defended successfully by the force there, without defenses had been erected on the heights, which command the position?

Answer. I do not think it could have been defended without the possession of those heights, or of Maryland Heights at least.

Question. Could that force have held possession of the different heights—those commanding Harper's Ferry—unless they had had artificial defenses erected, and have defended them against the force that came there, divided between Loudoun, Maryland, and Bolivar Heights?

Answer. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the country to answer that question.

Question. It is merely your opinion. You have been giving your opinion about other matters?

Answer. I could not give even an intelligent opinion, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the topography of the country there. I was there but a very short time, and all that time, as I mentioned before, in the immediate command of my regiment.

Question. After the arrival of General White's command, was there time to construct adequate defenses?

Answer. I think I could say very decidedly that, in my opinion, there was not. If I am not mistaken, the attack had already commenced, by skirmishers at all events. The next morning, when I rode down, very early, the attack had then commenced on Maryland Heights. Colonel Miles came in and remarked, "Ford is stampeded."

By the COURT :

Question. When was this?

Answer. On the morning of the 13th. I had had a conversation with General White immediately previous. General White was waiting for Colonel Miles. Colonel Miles arrived, and, in course of the conversation, said, "Ford is stampeded." Said he, "He wants re-enforcements; and I am afraid we will lose Maryland Heights."

By General WHITE :

Question. Could you see the valley so as to see the enemy's force and his batteries from where your regiment was?

Answer. I could not. I presume you mean the valley on the west of Bolivar Heights.

Question. The object of the question is to show that the portion of the enemy's artillery that you saw was to the eastward and southward.

Answer. That is the artillery I saw; that is all I saw. As I have said, I could not see the battery stationed on the prolongation of Bolivar Heights, which enfiladed our lines; but I could see the effects of their shot.

Question. At the time of the surrender, that is, after the evacuation of Maryland Heights, if the artillery ammunition was, as reported, expended, except canister and that class of short-range ammunition, and with so large a portion of the troops raw recruits that were there, do you think further fighting would have been useful?

Answer. I must confess I do. As I understood your question it is, "After the evacuation of Maryland Heights." Do you mean the morning of the surrender?

Question. I mean the morning of the surrender. The object of including the words "after the evacuation of Maryland Heights" is this: If the possession of Maryland Heights would have enabled the defense of Bolivar Heights and the retiring on that side, after the possession had been lost, and the report of the chief of artillery was that there was only ammunition of this kind, with these circumstances combined, was further fighting useful?

Answer. In the first place, I never heard until after the surrender that the ammunition had given out; never heard it so reported.

Question. The object of the question is to ascertain what your views would have been had you been called to a council, and it was so stated that that ammunition was expended, and the facts stated as they then stood, what you know of the enemy's force, &c., what would then have been your judgment?

Answer. I think that after daylight on the morning of the 15th it would have been almost impossible to have taken up any new position or line of defense other than the position the troops then held.

Question. Please state why you think so.

Answer. Well, sir, in the first place, many of the troops were raw troops; my own regiment was one. In the second place, the artillery on Loudoun Heights, on the south side of the Shenandoah, which had been established during the night, would have broken almost any infantry that we had there, and then there was the close vicinity of what I understood to be A. P. Hill's division, immediately in front of my regiment; so close, in fact, that it was reported, during the night, that we heard conversation and orders given. The moment any attempt to withdraw that line had been made there would have been an advance of that enemy, and they would have been at Harper's Ferry with us and have exposed our force, retreating, to the heavy artillery fire of the various batteries in position.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Do you think a retreat from your position during the preceding night would have been difficult?

Answer. I think it might have been done. It would have been under difficulties, because we were certainly in a position to task every officer's abilities.

Question. Both the bridges remained, did they not?

Answer. The bridges across the Potomac?

Question. The pontoon bridge.

Answer. I crossed the pontoon bridge after the surrender.

By General WHITE:

Question. Was there on Monday morning a reasonable hope of making a successful resistance?

Answer. I think I have answered that by saying that after daylight I thought it

would have been difficult or impossible to have withdrawn the lines then already occupied. My own ideas were that at that time it was not so much a successful resistance as a prolonged resistance, for twenty-four or forty-eight hours. I do not believe we could have withdrawn or made any changes of troops after daylight on the morning of the 15th of September.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. How long do you think you could have held the position that you occupied without a change ?

Answer. I think about three minutes.

By General WHITE :

Question. Did you have opportunity during the siege of Harper's Ferry to observe the officers, or either of them, who are under arrest, in connection with this investigation; if so, what was their conduct as officers ?

Answer. I saw General White and Colonel Trimble. I do not recollect of seeing the other gentlemen at all during that time; at least I had no official communication with them that I recollect. The only orders that I received were from General White and Colonel Trimble. Colonel Trimble went with me when my regiment was posted on picket, showed me the way out, gave me my orders, and altogether seemed to be anxious and interested in the affair; and on Sunday, when the attack commenced on our left on the Maryland regiment, General White came up and immediately ordered re-enforcements to be sent out, directed artillery to be sent forward and to be placed in position, gave me orders as to what dispositions to make of my regiment, and came down himself to see that they were carried out. Colonel Trimble also did the same thing. During the cannonade or bombardment, on the morning of the 15th, both of these gentlemen also came down to my regiment and gave some few directions.

The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. The object of the question, I suppose, is not so much the details, but the general estimate of the witness of their actions.

General WHITE. That is the object.

The WITNESS. I have no hesitation in saying that both of those gentlemen, so far as I observed them, were cool and collected. They were the only officers who gave me any orders whatever, or that I saw moving about the field.

By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. Did you see some troops ascend Maryland Heights after they had been abandoned, and save the guns and ammunition, and do you know what troops they were, and who gave them those orders ?

Answer. I know by hearsay; I know nothing of my own knowledge. I did not see any troops go up.

By General WHITE :

Question. Was there a skirmish by the enemy's cavalry prior to reaching Harper's Ferry by General White's command ?

Answer. Not that I am aware of.

Question. I mean the day we got in.

Answer. I recollect that the command was halted, and that there was such a report on the day we reached Harper's Ferry. I know nothing of it, of my own knowledge. The command was halted and formed, I may say, on the day we reached Harper's Ferry.

Question. How long have you been in service ?

Answer. I have been a commissioned officer since 1848.

Question. Did General White consult you the next morning after arriving at Harper's Ferry; and, if so, state the subject of the conversation ?

Answer. General White did consult me upon taking command of the forces at

Harper's Ferry. He said that on his return from Winchester he had been ordered to Martinsburg by General Wool, with a command less in number than that left with Colonel Miles, and that that would seem to indicate a disposition or intention on the part of General Wool to leave Colonel Miles as a permanent officer at Harper's Ferry. Under these circumstances he felt—I think he said he feared some difficulty, or that there might be some. At any rate, he wanted to know what my opinion was in regard to the matter.

Question. Do you recollect of my speaking of my ignorance of the place and the positions about it?

Answer. Yes, sir; General White said that he did not know the topography of the country, the number of troops, the batteries, the means of defense, &c. I told him that I should certainly deem it exceedingly hazardous to assume the command of Harper's Ferry. Said I, "General, the enemy are already attacking now; you can hear their guns as we sit here; you do not know the number of cannon; you do not know the troops; you do not know where they are located, and, if you should ask me, I should frankly say that if I were in your place I should offer my services and those of my whole command to Colonel Miles at once, and, when you have become acquainted with the place, you can assume the command if you find it necessary to do so."

Question. State what action I took immediately after that, if you remember.

Answer. Colonel Miles came in, and I believe General White wrote a letter, stating, substantially, as I understood it, these things, which letter he handed to Colonel Miles. Colonel Miles read it, expressed his gratification at being permitted to retain the command, and said General White's orders should be obeyed by all the officers and men at Harper's Ferry. I think he published an order on that subject, which I received afterward.

By the COURT:

Question. Were you consulted at all in reference to the surrender of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Not at all. I was not consulted nor advised with. The first I knew of it was the raising of the white flag. I remained in position three-quarters of an hour after that.

Maj. S. M. HEWITT, called by the Government, sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. State, if you please, your position in the military service of the United States.

Answer. I am major of the Thirty-second Ohio.

Question. Were you present at and immediately preceding the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State fully the circumstances that led to that evacuation.

Answer. I had better perhaps commence at the time I was ordered on the heights.

Question. Do so, and go rapidly over the events which bear on the surrender.

Answer. On Friday afternoon, about 4 o'clock, I received an order from Colonel Miles to proceed to the summit of Maryland Heights, with my regiment, and to support a company of the Thirty-second Ohio that was there on picket duty. At the same time this order directed me to take a bundle of combustibles and leave it upon the eastern slope, stating that the troops were withdrawn from Sandy Hook, leaving that point exposed; to take this bundle and place it upon the point of the eastern and southern portion of the mountain, and place a guard over it; and the orders were that, if we were pressed too hard, to fall back and ignite that combustible as a signal for the batteries on the Maryland and Bolivar Heights both to play upon the Maryland Heights, after the men were drawn out of the way under cover of these guns. [The witness indicated on the map the position of the batteries and the combustible.]

Question. Was that point commanded by Bolivar Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT :

Question. Which is the highest, Maryland Heights or Bolivar Heights?

Answer. Maryland Heights.

Question. You said that Bolivar Heights commanded Maryland Heights; you mean that they were in range?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was that a written order?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Have you a copy of it?

Answer. I have not.

Question. From whom was that order?

Answer. From Colonel Miles.

Question. Where is it now?

Answer. I could not tell you. When I received the order I read it in the presence of Captain McGrath, commanding the battery there, and Lieutenant Patterson, of our regiment. I do not know what has become of the order; I think that one of those gentlemen must have it.

Question. Was it addressed to you?

Answer. No, sir; it seemed to be a general order. It was brought to me and read to me, and then taken away. Lieutenant Patterson brought it to me, and Captain McGrath was near by and heard the order read.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. You will proceed with your narrative.

Answer. This was on Friday. About this time Friday afternoon the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiment reported to me. I was ordered also to station a line of pickets from the eastern slope of this mountain—a strong picket, extending up to the lookout, or up to our line where our picket was posted across the mountain.

By the COURT :

Question. Which was that, east or west?

Answer. The line would extend from the eastern brow of Maryland Heights in a northeast direction.

Question. Were you ordered to report to Colonel Ford when you went to Maryland Heights?

Answer. I was with him all the time, a part of his brigade. I established this line of pickets from that point up to the lookout. As I came up to the company stationed as pickets, I found them skirmishing briskly with the enemy. The balance of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York left after establishing that line of pickets I placed in position, and they went into work skirmishing until dark. After dark everything became quiet, and our men lay right down in line. I then went down to Colonel Ford's headquarters and reported to him the facts; all that I had observed.

Question. Where were his headquarters?

Answer. On the Maryland side of the river.

Question. On the heights?

Answer. Down on the side of the mountain, near this battery. I ascertained that there was a large force of the enemy there, immediately in front of this line that was formed across the mountain. We were near enough to hear them talk, and to hear their canteens rattle.

Question. On the northern slope of the hill?

Answer. Yes, sir; north of the lookout, in the direction of Solomon's Gap. A little before night I received an order from Colonel Miles to make an examination in regard to the enemy's cutting a road up the side of the mountain, and also to ascertain about the amount of force; that was the substance of the order. That, I think, was a verbal order, brought by some one of his men, I did not know who it was. I went on and ascertained all the facts that I could, and satisfied myself that there was a large force there, and that it was my duty to report the precise condition of things to my commander, and I went down for that purpose; that was after everything had become quiet, and after skirmishing had ceased. I reported these facts to Colonel Ford, and he ordered me to go over the river and lay the whole matter before Colonel Miles, and I did so.

Question. What occurred between you and Colonel Miles?

Answer. I informed him of the probable amount of force there, and that a general engagement might be expected in the morning at that point. "And," says I, "nothing short of a force sufficient to just shove them right off the mountain will save that place, and we want re-enforcements;" that was my language to him, as near as I can recollect. He had gone to bed when I called for him. He got up and came into his office, and I met him there. He asked some few questions in regard to the position of the enemy, the amount of the forces, and then assured me that there should be two regiments on the mountain by break of day, and two pieces of artillery, and also that he would send another regiment up on the west side of the mountain so as to come in on their right flank. He said that they should all be there by the break of day. I then returned to the mountain, and went on to the front of our lines. Colonel Sherrill, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, was there with the men while I was absent. They all lay down there in line during the night until morning.

In the morning about sunrise, perhaps, Captain Russell, of the Maryland cavalry, reported with a part of his command; I should think not over a company; they were cavalry; they left their horses, and came up with their carbines. I placed them in position. As soon as it was light enough to see, skirmishing commenced, and, soon after, a general engagement. There were no re-enforcements that came until 9.30 o'clock, except this company of Russell's. Our men held their ground there and fought well and did well. There were no re-enforcements until 9.30 o'clock, and then they came in scattering companies, or perhaps two or three companies together in two or three instances. The officers were all of them strangers to me. We held the position there with a little variation—sometimes we would be driven back a little, and then again we would drive the enemy back—until, I should judge, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, or between 3 and 4 o'clock, we received orders from Colonel Ford to fall back in good order. I notified the officers to draw their men off in good order.

Previous to that, however, there was one time when we were almost entirely overwhelmed by their forces. They were on both of our flanks, firing a cross-fire. I think Colonel Downey came up with some re-enforcements. I do not know what number of men he brought. I communicated to him the situation of things, and told him to go forward and hold the position as long as possible, and, if he was compelled to fall back, to fall back gradually and in order, and to fall back from the west side of the mountain; that is, with a portion of the men. There was only one path on the slope that they could come down. They could fall back that way with less confusion and with more safety, I judged. We remained in that situation, fighting all the time, until this order came to fall back to Harper's Ferry. I was about the last man that left the ground. I saw that all the men were formed in proper order, and marched off in an orderly manner.

Question. State the number of killed and wounded before you fell back.

Answer. In the regiment I commanded there were 35 killed and wounded.

Question. How many killed and how many wounded?

Answer. I could not give you that item exactly. There were 10 killed, and the greater portion of the balance were severely wounded; some were wounded slightly. Our regiment, I think, suffered more than any other that was engaged there, as they were in the front and center.

Question. Was this beacon lighted as was directed?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know the reason why it was not?

Answer. I do not. In the last order I received there was no order to ignite that ; there was a guard over it.

Question. Did the guard come in when you did ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; they came away.

Question. Without lighting the beacon ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Had the artillery been used at all on the heights ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; they had been throwing shell over in the direction of Solomon's Gap before we came down ; rather on the west side of the heights, in the direction of Solomon's Gap.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. There had been no failure of ammunition ?

Answer. On the mountain ?

Question. Yes, sir ; on the mountain.

Answer. No, sir ; there had not.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity of making that evacuation at the time it occurred ?

Answer. I am satisfied in my own mind that if we had remained there half an hour longer we would probably have been all taken prisoners. This, of course, is judging from the amount of force I saw in front, and the force approaching from the valley below ; that is, coming up the side of the mountain. They had passed clear around our left flank, and were on the west side of the mountain then in large numbers.

Question. Did not your position give you great advantages in the way of defense against the approach of the enemy in that way ?

Answer. No, sir ; it did not. There was nothing there to protect the men, except what this one company of our men got up while they were on picket the day before this occurred. It rained that day, and they worked nearly all day in the rain cutting down timber and putting up a little breastwork, which extended part way across the mountain. Aside from that, there was no protection nor preparation whatever.

By the COURT :

Question. What amount of re-enforcements altogether do you suppose arrived that morning ?

Answer. I do not think, take them altogether, that there was over one regiment came.

Question. What do you mean by one regiment, 800 men ?

Answer. A thousand men ; I do not think there was more than that.

Question. You spoke of giving orders to these men as they came up. Were you in immediate command of the troops there ?

Answer. I was not placed in command. I was placed in charge of my men. Colonel Sherrill came, and we consulted together in regard to the position.

Question. Who was the ranking officer present ?

Answer. Colonel Sherrill.

Question. Where was Colonel Ford during all this time ?

Answer. Down at the battery, near his headquarters.

Question. Were there any instances of bad behavior on the part of regiments—running away ?

Answer. There was.

Question. What regiment ?

Answer. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York.

Question. Any others?

Answer. Not that I am aware of. I think all the balance of the men who were there behaved gallantly; I know they did. I am sorry I cannot say the same about the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York.

Question. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York was a [new] regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir; they had just arrived there, perfectly new. They stood a little skirmishing at first; when the fire became brisk and hot they broke, with the exception of two companies. I do not know as I could give the letters of those companies; there were about two companies that did well—remained in their position—but the balance of the regiment broke. I stopped them, talked to them, encouraged them, and got them back; and for a while they did well as a general thing.

Question. How many regiments altogether were there engaged in this affair?

Answer. The Thirty-second Ohio, two companies of the Thirty-ninth New York on that part of the mountain, I think; they were not engaged in the fight; they were stationed on the western brow and formed that line of pickets. Then there were the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, and Colonel Downey, of the Third Maryland. I do not know how many men there were with him; I could not say.

Question. Those were the only regiments that were there?

Answer. All that I am aware of.

Question. Who took charge of the disposition of the troops there?

Answer. Colonel Sherrill and myself.

Question. Where was the balance of Colonel Ford's brigade?

Answer. I could not say. Major Steiner was in command of a few companies of the First Maryland. My impression is that they were up on the west side of the mountain, in the direction of Solomon's Gap; they were not on the summit. I did not see them that day at all.

Question. When the troops were falling back, did you see anything of Colonel Miles on the Maryland Heights?

Answer. I did not.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. You speak of a lookout, and of a slight fortification. How far north of that slight fortification was it that the fight first commenced on Friday?

Answer. Probably a quarter of a mile.

Question. A quarter of a mile from the fortification?

Answer. Yes, sir; perhaps not quite so far. It was immediately in sight of it.

Question. How far was the fortification north of the lookout?

Answer. Probably 300 yards.

Question. At what time were you driven back from your first position to this slight fortification?

Answer. I think it must have been about 9 o'clock in the morning.

Question. At what hour did you abandon the lookout?

Answer. That was probably 2 o'clock in the afternoon; 2 or later.

Question. At what time was Colonel Sherrill wounded?

Answer. I think about 10 o'clock.

Question. At what time did you yourself give the order for the troops to fall back, and what was your reason for giving that order?

Answer. That occurred after Colonel Sherrill was wounded. I think it must have

been after 2 o'clock. My reason for it was that it was in compliance with the order I received when I went on the mountain.

By the COURT:

Question. Received from whom?

Answer. From Colonel Miles.

Question. What order was that you received from Colonel Miles?

Answer. That order I have spoken of, the first one about our being too hard pressed.

Question. Was that order given to you directly?

Answer. It was brought and read to me by one of Colonel Miles' men; he was a stranger to me. It was read to me in the presence of Captain McGrath and other officers.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Whom did you leave in charge of the line on the southeastern slope of the mountain; what captain?

Answer. It was Captain Crumbecker.

Question. Did he notify you, before you gave that order to fall back, that the enemy were approaching on your left in overwhelming numbers?

Answer. Yes, sir. At this time Colonel Sherrill was wounded; after he was wounded his men mostly fell back in spite of all we could do. About this time Captain Crumbecker came to me, and gave me notice that the enemy were coming around on that part of the hill in large force.

Question. And you gave the order?

Answer. I sent forward a lieutenant, and instructed him to tell the men to fall back gradually and in order.

Question. After that order to fall back was given, describe the condition of the troops, especially of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York.

Answer. They were in the utmost confusion, officers and men, without, as I deemed, sufficient cause.

By the COURT:

Question. The whole command?

Answer. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York.

Question. Were these facts reported to the commanding officer, Colonel Ford, or whoever was in command?

Answer. They were; he was aware of it.

Question. What did he do upon having these facts communicated to him?

Answer. I did not leave the mountain.

Question. Did Colonel Ford go up there?

Answer. He did not come clear up.

Question. What was done?

Answer. I was informed that he had a company formed there to stop their descent from the mountain. I think it was with the bayonet; that was the impression I got. I used my utmost endeavors to stop them on the heights when they began to fall back.

Question. They were not ordered to fall back?

Answer. No, sir; they went without orders from the first to the last.

Question. In your narrative you have stated that they fought until a certain hour, when they were ordered to fall back by order of Colonel Ford?

Answer. That was the last order we received; probably between 3 and 4 o'clock; after 3, I think. These men all had left before the order came from Colonel Ford. I do not think there was a man of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York on the hill then. I had sent their adjutant down to try to get them back if possible, and that was the last I saw of him or of the men.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. From all that you know from every source, were you attacked by overwhelming numbers?

Answer. They were, I think, ten to one, to the best of my knowledge.

Question. Did I, on the night of the 12th, solicit you to inform Colonel Miles of the necessity of immediate re-enforcements?

Answer. You did.

Question. Did you inform him for me that the re-enforcements must be there that night?

Answer. I did; and impressed it upon him as earnestly as I was capable of doing. I felt the necessity of it.

Question. How many men of the Thirty-second Ohio do you think you had on the mountain?

Answer. At the time of the fight?

Question. Yes, sir; in the morning and during the day.

Answer. Three hundred and fifty would cover the whole number.

Question. Were you present so as to hear, or do you know from any conversation of mine the day I first went up on the mountain, that I urged the fortification and placing of artillery at Solomon's Gap?

Answer. I know that you did.

Question. Did you hear me express to all the officers in council my certain conviction that unless that was done Maryland Heights must be abandoned?

Answer. I did.

Question. Did you hear me urge the necessity of cutting down the timber, and placing artillery upon the lookout on Maryland Heights?

Answer. I did.

Question. In your opinion, could those heights have been maintained without artillery in those positions, and in addition a force greatly superior to that we had?

Answer. I am satisfied they could not.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you have opportunity, during the siege of Harper's Ferry, to observe the officers, or either of them, who are now under arrest, in connection with this investigation? If so, what was their conduct as officers?

Answer. I saw General White on the field on Monday morning; also Colonel Trimble. I was on the left of our line, nearly the extreme left, the left of Rigby's battery. Colonel Ford was not on the field during Sunday or Monday; that is, doing duty. He was sick in bed all the time, except about an hour and a half on Sunday, when he came out where the regiment was stationed, and then returned to his bed and remained there until Monday morning, until after the surrender. In regard to those men, I saw nothing in them but what indicated that they were doing their duty as far as was possible.

Question. Was there a heavy fire of artillery on Monday morning on the left?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many pieces of artillery do you think there were there? Had you any means of knowing, of ascertaining, or judging?

Answer. I know of three different batteries that were playing upon that point. There was a battery on Loudoun Heights, immediately on the summit, and another a little down the side of the mountain. As we passed farther to the right there were two other batteries, also, that fired upon us.

Question. On the east side of the Shenandoah?

Answer. Yes, sir; they were all playing upon our left.

Question. Were there any guns established by the enemy on Maryland Heights after the evacuation?

Answer. I think there was, perhaps, one gun there—one gun, perhaps, on the summit of Maryland Heights.

Question. Do you know how many batteries they had over in the valley to the westward of Bolivar Heights?

Answer. I do not; I was not on that line.

Question. You were there on Monday morning, were you not?

Answer. You ask how many batteries the enemy had?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. There must have been seven or eight batteries there.

Question. Did you have any conversation with any reliable person as to the force over in the valley—any officer of the rebel troops, or anybody else, from whom you could get information of the force there?

Answer. On all sides of Harper's Ferry?

Question. I mean immediately in front of our lines, on the west and southwest of Harper's Ferry, stretching from the Shenandoah around to the Potomac.

Answer. I was informed that there was immediately around the place 120,000 men.

Question. That includes all sides?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I refer now to the line in front of Bolivar Heights.

Answer. There were some 70,000 or 80,000 men in the valley, as I was informed.

Question. Do you recollect the source of your information?

Answer. It was one of the rebel officers, General Branch, gave me this information.

Question. How long have you been in the service?

Answer. I entered the service a year ago last June—the 5th of June.

Question. At the time of the surrender, what do you think would have been the prospect of a successful resistance, or of deferring the capture or destruction of our forces there for any time? You saw and knew the enemy's forces; what do you think were the prospects of a successful defense, and how long could it have been maintained?

Answer. I have no idea at all that we could have made any resistance but a short time longer; that is, successfully.

Question. You have been in other engagements?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many; several?

Answer. Several.

By the COURT:

Question. What day of the month did Colonel Ford take command of Maryland Heights with his brigade?

Answer. I could not answer that question now; I have a memorandum-book in my trunk that would give me the date.

Question. About how long were you on the hill before it was evacuated?

Answer. I think not over about a week.

Question. During that time what was done in the way of throwing up defenses; what efforts were made to defend the position by such means as Colonel Ford had?

Answer. He ordered a party to proceed around the mountain; examine the points around to Solomon's Gap; to make a thorough examination of it with a view to its defense. I was with the party.

Question. I had reference to his throwing any obstacles in the way, making rifle-pits, or using the facilities there for defending the position.

Answer. There was something done near the battery; some timber cut.

Question. How much?

Answer. Very little.

Question. Do you know what your supply of rations was—how many days' rations you had on hand?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know how many days' rations your own men had at the time you left?

Answer. I could not answer that question.

Question. How much ammunition had you?

Answer. When we went into the fight we had about forty rounds each.

Question. That was all you had?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Had the troops a plenty of spades and axes?

Answer. No, sir; and I had applied for some ammunition. I had gone down across the ferry for it, but was told that there was none there of the caliber we required.

Question. You say there were no spades or axes?

Answer. There were a few, I think, in the hands of the First Maryland there.

Question. Do you know whether Colonel Ford made efforts to get those to strengthen his position?

Answer. I know he got them, and they were used.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you know that I had a strong party detailed, who spent a couple of days in throwing obstructions across Solomon's Gap?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know about taking 100 men and rolling a big rock into Solomon's Gap?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. How far was Solomon's Gap from this point?

Answer. About $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

Question. I am speaking only of the means used to defend Maryland Heights themselves, in the way of cutting down trees, making rifle-pits, and things of that kind.

Answer. There had been near the battery, and some timber cut on the side of the mountain. They were, perhaps, one or two days cutting there; and on the summit of the mountain our men worked very hard—our pickets there—for perhaps one day. It was a rainy day.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you know that I had a party of men cutting up the side of the mountain from the battery, as far as I could have it cut down around the battery?

Answer. Yes, sir; and then this company that passed around the mountain observed all the places where the enemy could approach, and obstructed those approaches by cutting down timber, rolling stones, &c.

Question. Do you know about my making an effort on Quartermaster Patterson, of sending you over to Harper's Ferry—to try to get axes, and there were no axes to be had?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think about ten axes were the most we could find at any time to be used.

By the COURT:

Question. I understood you to say that Colonel Ford had made application for axes and had got them?

Answer. Those were the axes of this Maryland Home Brigade, which was located on the heights immediately about his quarters. I do not know how long they had been there.

Question. Do you know if Colonel Ford made any effort to get axes from the other side of the river?

Answer. I do.

Question. And he could not succeed?

Answer. No, sir.

By Colonel D'UTASSY:

Question. You said that only two companies of the Thirty-ninth Regiment were at Maryland Heights, and yet I sent over six companies of the Thirty-ninth Regiment, three companies of the One hundred and eleventh Regiment of New York, and the whole of the One hundred and fifteenth Regiment; in all, about 1,800 men.

Answer. Those men, with the exception of two companies, were not on the point I occupied; they were up by Solomon's Gap.

Question. Did you see some companies reascend the Maryland Heights the day after they had been abandoned, and save the guns and ammunition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know what companies they were, and by whose order they were sent?

Answer. I could not see what companies they were.

Question. Did you know who gave the orders for that to be done?

Answer. I did not.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. What was your profession before you entered the military service?

Answer. Medicine and surgery.

Question. Do you know the cause of my disability on Sunday evening and Monday while I was on the Harper's Ferry side? If so, state it.

Answer. I do. I know that you obtained leave of absence for sixty days, for the purpose of going home and having an operation performed for fistula; and that after you returned you had been almost utterly unable to ride horseback, and, in walking, the parts became so much inflamed that that caused a great deal of suffering and swelling. I know that Colonel Ford was confined to his bed in consequence of that swelling, on Sunday and Monday; I examined him myself. We had to bring him away from Harper's Ferry on a bed in a wagon. I tried to obtain an ambulance for him, but I could not succeed.

The Commission adjourned until to-morrow at 10 a. m.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 7, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Rev. SYLVESTER W. CLEMANS, called by the Government, was sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What position do you occupy in the military service?

Answer. I am chaplain of the One hundred and fifteenth New York State Volunteers.

Question. Were you occupying that position during the late events at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I was.

Question. Were you present at the time that Maryland Heights were evacuated?

Answer. I was on Bolivar Heights at that time.

Question. Did you have any conversation with Colonel Miles, or hear him have any conversation with others, as to the circumstances under which the evacuation of those heights took place?

Answer. I had no conversation with Colonel Miles, and I did not hear him have conversation with others; that is, with individuals. I heard some language he used on discovering the movement of the brigade on Maryland Heights.

Question. Will you state what it was?

Answer. I was standing on Bolivar Heights. Colonel Miles rode up there and halted his horse, perhaps 30 feet from me, and with his glass took a survey of the heights. In his apparent astonishment, as he saw the first movement of the retreat from Maryland Heights, I could give his own language if necessary.

Question. Give it.

Answer. He exclaimed "God Almighty; what does that mean? They are coming down! Hell and damnation!" He wheeled his horse and rode toward Camp Hill.

Question. That was all you heard him say in regard to it?

Answer. That is all.

Question. You have no personal knowledge in regard to the matter beyond that?

Answer. Nothing more.

Lieut. HENRY M. BINNEY, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What position do you occupy in the military service?

Answer. I am second lieutenant of the Tenth Maine. I have acted with Colonel Miles as an aide since February last.

Question. Were you acting as his aide during the recent events at Harper's Ferry which led to its surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state those events, so far as you have knowledge of them; first, those in immediate connection with the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I think the attack was made on Solomon's Gap, the extreme right of Maryland Heights, on Thursday, the 11th of the month, by infantry and artillery, the artillery shelling out the pickets which Colonel Ford had thrown down there. They then advanced up on the heights from that direction, and also from the eastern slope of Maryland Heights, from Pleasant Valley, during the latter part of the afternoon and during the night. On Friday, Colonel Ford's forces were engaged the principal part of the day. Early in the morning there was considerable infantry firing, the enemy working their way on the crest of the heights. In the afternoon of Friday, I think it was, Colonel Ford reported having had quite a sharp skirmish with the enemy near the lookout, on the crest of the heights, our forces driving the enemy back and retaining the lookout. During Friday night the enemy threw a large force on the heights, and on Saturday morning our forces were forced to fall back by degrees, Colonel Ford reporting as often as once an hour the state of affairs there. Colonel Miles visited the heights as often as twice a day on Thursday and Friday. On Saturday morning he was on the heights quite early, somewhere about 8 or 9 o'clock. On Saturday afternoon Colonel Miles and myself went on Bolivar Heights. While on Bolivar Heights, Colonel Miles was busily engaged looking for some demonstration of the enemy in front toward Charlestown. I observed that our troops were coming down Maryland Heights, toward the battery which was on the slope toward Harper's Ferry. I called Colonel Miles' attention to it. He immediately took his field-glass and looked over, and expressed himself indignant and highly incensed at the idea of leaving the heights. I asked him if I should go over there and give orders to stop it. He said he would go with me, and went down toward Camp Hill, and somebody reported to him that the guns were spiked and the troops were coming off the hill. The troops came down in good order across the pontoon bridge into Harper's Ferry.

Question. Do you know of any order given by Colonel Miles to Colonel Ford in reference to the contingency of the evacuation of the heights?

Answer. There never was any order given by Colonel Miles to that effect. At each visit of Colonel Miles to Colonel Ford, he set forth to him the importance of those heights, and Colonel Ford always represented that he could hold them against anything that was brought against him, on one occasion remarking that Colonel Miles would have to come over there for protection.

Question. You were present and heard those orders given by Colonel Miles to him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were they or not to the effect that he was to hold the heights to the last extremity?

Answer. To the last extremity and at all hazards.

Question. You heard nothing from Colonel Miles indicating that any change had been made in those orders, or that Colonel Ford should, under any circumstances, surrender those heights?

Answer. No, sir; I was with Colonel Miles day and night, constantly by his side from the first attack, whenever he was not in his bed. I was with him in every visit to every camp.

Question. Were you present when the first interview took place between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford after the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I was not; I do not know where it did take place.

Question. How long after the evacuation before you saw Colonel Ford?

Answer. I did not see Colonel Ford again until I met him at Annapolis; I did not see him after he left Maryland Heights. I had some occasion to visit his regiment with orders, but I did not see him. I understood he was quite indisposed. In fact, he was all the time he was on Maryland Heights.

Question. How long before the evacuation took place were you yourself last on the heights?

Answer. About four hours; we were there between 8 and 9 o'clock, and the evacuation took place a little after 1 o'clock.

Question. Did Colonel Ford then hold the same opinion in regard to his ability to maintain his position?

Answer. No, sir; he represented that if he could have one or two more regiments he could hold it, but, as it was, the enemy were forcing him back. He expressed some little doubt in regard to being able to hold it.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity for making the evacuation at the time it occurred?

Answer. In my opinion it was very precipitate. I was on Bolivar Heights at Camp Hill for three or four hours afterward, and there were no indications of the enemy until nearly sundown.

Question. The enemy did not occupy the position he abandoned for many hours afterward?

Answer. From that time until we left Harper's Ferry I did not see the enemy near the battery. The enemy threw some sharpshooters down on the extreme point of Maryland Heights, and fired at our headquarters in the Ferry. There was no enemy visible in and around the battery where the trees had been felled.

By the COURT:

Question. You say that at the last interview between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford, Colonel Ford expressed some doubt as to his ability to hold the place unless he was re-enforced?

Answer. He did.

Question. What reply did Colonel Miles make?

Answer. His reply was that he would send them another regiment if he could spare it from the front. He had been attacked in front, and expected an attack along the whole line. If he could spare a regiment without weakening his front too much, he said he would do so.

Question. Did he leave any discretion with Colonel Ford as to falling back if he was overpowered, or anything of the kind?

Answer. He remarked to Colonel Ford that he could hold the heights, and that he must. I did not hear him make any remark in regard to the evacuation in any shape. After Colonel Miles had left Maryland Heights on Saturday, he went upon Camp Hill to place some guns there, which were under Colonel Ward. He then came back to his headquarters, and wrote an order or a note to Colonel Ford, stating that since leaving his position there and coming to Camp Hill he could see that the position was much more defensible, covered as it was by the guns at Camp Hill, than it appeared when at his station on Maryland Heights, and again telling him that he could hold the position and must hold it.

Question. Do you know whether Colonel Ford ever received that order?

Answer. The order was sent by an orderly, and the receipt came back on the envelope.

Question. By whom was the receipt signed?

Answer. By Colonel Ford.

Question. What do you know about the order given by Colonel Miles to Colonel Ford, ending with the words, "You can hold the heights until the cows' tails drop off"?

Answer. That is the order to which I have just referred. He wrote the order in these words:

Since leaving your position on Maryland Heights and coming on this side, I can see that your position is much more defensible than it appears at your station, covered as it is by the guns at Camp Hill. You can hold on and must hold on until the cows' tails drop off.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Was that order given subsequent to his last visit to Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. After the re-enforcements had been asked for?

Answer. Yes, sir; that order was sent by an orderly, and that orderly brought back an envelope with Colonel Ford's receipt upon it; I do not know whether it was the envelope of that order or of a previous order, but he always had orders to bring back the receipt.

Question. Were you present when Major Hewitt called on Colonel Miles for re-enforcements? If so, state what passed.

Answer. I was not present when Major Hewitt called upon Colonel Miles.

By Colonel D' UTASSY:

Question. Do you remember that, when the heights were evacuated, I asked permission of Colonel Miles to retake them?

Answer. I was present when you proposed to Colonel Miles to take your regiment over there and bring off what stuff had been left there.

Question. That was on the subsequent day; but on the day of the evacuation, when Colonel Miles expressed his surprise at it, I right away turned myself to him and asked him if I could have permission to go and retake possession.

Answer. I do not recollect that exactly; I recollect your proposing to Colonel Miles to send your regiment over there; that you believed you could go over there and hold the heights with your regiment.

Question. I will recall to your mind some particulars. The colonel, when he saw the evacuation, made some exclamations in regard to it. There was present, besides yourself, another officer. I said, "Colonel, will you give me permission to go over with my regiment, or even with my whole brigade? I can hold the place." He said to that, "I can say nothing now until I know something more about it." The following day I again asked permission. That permission was not granted to me. I addressed myself to you personally, and said, "What is your opinion about it? Can I dare to risk it on my own account?" You said, "Decidedly, do it." I then sent over some volunteers, four companies, and brought down all the guns and ammunition there.

Answer. I remember so far as that you represented to Colonel Miles that you should take your regiment over there and hold the heights. And after Colonel Miles mounted and rode off, you represented to me that you should like to take two companies over there and take off what had been left, and you asked me if, in my opinion, it would be right. I said that I could not give you the order, but if you thought fit to go there, I would take the responsibility, if I were you. Your regiment was over there at the time of the evacuation. I recollect the conversation with Colonel Miles so far as that

you represented to him that you should go over there and hold the position. Colonel Miles represented that there was no necessity for going there; that Maryland Heights was of no use to us, as our big guns were destroyed; that the enemy would not occupy it, having silenced our guns. It was of no importance to us then, and, therefore, he saw no necessity of going over there.

Question. Did I go over the subsequent day, twenty-four hours after the evacuation, and bring down all the small guns there and the ammunition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did the same ammunition that I then brought down afterward help us to continue the fight for twenty-four hours?

Answer. I do not know what ammunition there was there, or what was brought off, unless it was some ammunition that Colonel Ford called for on Saturday morning. He sent over for some ammunition, stating that the Thirty-second Ohio was entirely out. Half an hour afterward he sent again, and half an hour after that he sent again. I was sent by Colonel Miles to the ordnance officer to get cartridges of .54 caliber. The ordnance officer said he had none of that caliber except for carbines. Colonel Miles said those would answer, and there were three wagon-loads sent over there some hour and a half before the evacuation. I do not know whether it ever reached him, or whether it was brought off by Colonel Ford or not; I cannot say; I do not know whether it was left there or brought down by you subsequently. I do not know what ammunition you did bring down. I know that you brought down the brass pieces that were left there. I do not know whether the ammunition you got there helped to defend the place afterward, for I do not know what was there. I know there was some belonging to the 6-pounders, the howitzers.

Question. Can you say anything in regard to the behavior of my regiment on Maryland Heights, particularly when the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiment ran?

Answer. On going on to the heights with Colonel Miles, we met nearly a full company of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York coming down the road on to the pontoon bridge. Colonel Miles asked them what the trouble was. They said they had no officers. He ordered them back, and left me to bring them back. I did so, and got them on the heights, where I found your major. I asked if there was any guard there to prevent their leaving the heights. They said there was not. I then saw the major, and represented the circumstances to him, and he said they did not come down his way, but through the woods the other way. I left orders for him to bayonet or shoot any who should attempt to leave, and I understood that he had some difficulty with them afterward. The Garibaldi Guards were represented by Colonel Ford, with his own regiment, to be the only two regiments he could depend upon. The Garibaldi Guards, so far as I know, and as Colonel Miles remarked, did their duty to the best of their ability, and on their return represented themselves as very indignant at being obliged to come back. When we were on the heights the regiment was in line of battle. It was the only regiment I saw. The rest were probably on the crest of the heights.

Question. So you are perfectly convinced that my regiment did, in every regard and in every respect, fully their duty?

Answer. They did, under your major; so much as to bring forth Colonel Miles' compliments to them. The only reason Colonel Miles gave for denying your proposition to go on the heights was that the heights would be of no use whatever to us after that.

By the COURT:

Question. That was the first conversation when he discovered the heights were evacuated?

Answer. It was after the troops came into Harper's Ferry.

Question. The next day?

Answer. No, sir; the same afternoon.

Question. Some hours subsequently?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was on Sunday that Colonel D'Utassy went back with four companies and brought back the guns, meeting with no resistance whatever.

Question. I understood that this application was made by the colonel when Colonel Miles expressed his astonishment at the evacuation?

Answer. He could not go then, for his regiment was already on the heights.

Question. But after he discovered the evacuation?

Answer. I think it was after they had got down from the hill. His regiment was already over there, at the time of the evacuation, under his major [after a slight pause.] Now, I come to recollect it, it was at the time we first discovered the evacuation that Colonel D'Utassy proposed to go over there himself, and take his regiment, and, if Colonel Ford saw fit to take the rest down, he could do so. Colonel Miles represented that he could not give the order until he saw Colonel Ford and understood the circumstances.

By Colonel D'UTASSY:

Question. I said, distinctly, in the hearing of both of you, and of other gentlemen, that, whatever Colonel Ford thinks, I was willing to take my brigade and hold the position there; in which case I would take my regiment over there and stay there, and Colonel Miles said, "I cannot give any orders until I hear from Colonel Ford."

Answer. That was the remark, and that, the big guns being destroyed and spiked, there was no necessity for Colonel Ford or any one staying over there.

By the COURT:

Question. Was that all in one conversation?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. At what hour in the day did you and Colonel Miles come up there?

Answer. It was between 8 and 10 o'clock. I think it was about 8.30 o'clock. Previous to that I had been down to Sandy Hook.

Question. Who were in company with you when you came over there?

Answer. I think I was alone with Colonel Miles.

Question. Alone with him?

Answer. I think so; I am not certain. Sometimes Major McIlvaine accompanied him, and sometimes Lieutenant Willmon. But I think that that morning I was alone with him.

Question. Do you recollect that you two came over there together alone?

Answer. I think so.

Question. What was the condition of the troops in the little valley, and below the battery, coming down the pathway?

Answer. The Garibaldi Guards were formed in line of battle to the left of the heavy guns, extending from the little breastworks where the howitzers were up the mountain.

Question. What did you see at the hospital, and the old house, and the road coming down?

Answer. I saw no troops there except the One hundred and fifteenth New York; that came up there that morning, and while we were there they were sent down, I think, under the direction of Major Steiner, thrown down into the woods into the path to the left of your headquarters.

Question. Did you notice the breaking of the troops from the mountain?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw no other troops except the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, who were scattered all over creation; I saw none of your regiment there.

Question. Do you recollect the efforts made by Colonel Miles and myself to get those troops to go back?

Answer. I do.

Question. Did you partake in those efforts?

Answer. I did; and actually used my sword and pistol.

Question. Do you recollect of seeing Colonel Miles and myself in the valley down below, making efforts to get those troops back?

Answer. I do.

Question. And on the slope?

Answer. Yes, sir. I recollect now that Lieutenant Willmon was with us that day, because I was left to bring back the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York down at the bottom of the hill, and when I got them up to the Garibaldi Guard, I directed them to go on the hill and join the rest of their regiment, and gave orders that they were not to be allowed to go through the lines of the Garibaldi Guard. Some one reported that the One hundred and twenty-sixth regiment, on top of the hill, were retreating, and Colonel Miles sent Lieutenant Willmon on the hill with orders, and he staid there something like an hour, Colonel Miles and myself remaining down below, picking up stragglers from the One hundred and twenty-sixth, and posting the One hundred and fifteenth.

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles make any remark about this regiment?

Answer. Nothing, except that he called them damned scoundrels whenever he met them.

Question. Did you hear him say anything about the effect of their leaving?

Answer. He said that one regiment skedaddling in that way would cause a panic through the whole, unless some stringent means were used to prevent it. So far as I saw, you were using every effort yourself, and so were your officers, to prevent it.

Question. Do you recollect my going into an old house there privately with Colonel Miles, and having a conversation with him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you recollect Colonel Miles requesting all to go out?

Answer. Yes, sir; and all went out but myself.

Question. You do not know what he said about the effect of these troops running, except what you have stated?

Answer. That is what I recollect, and that it would eventually cause the evacuation of the heights.

Question. Do you recollect Colonel Miles saying anything about spiking the guns?

Answer. He said if you were forced by overwhelming numbers to leave the position, not to do so without spiking the siege guns, and rolling them down the hill as far as you could; that the position was not to be abandoned without spiking the guns.

Question. Have you the envelope that receipt was written on, that you have referred to?

Answer. I have not; we did not keep them.

Question. Were not a great many papers sent up there that day?

Answer. I do not recollect that there was. We received some from you; one that you feared that you could not hold the heights, and one afterward asking for ammunition, and afterward you sent a verbal communication for ammunition.

Question. What time did you leave the heights?

Answer. About 10.30 o'clock. We had left the heights a little over two hours previous to the evacuation.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did the subordinate officers of this One hundred and twenty-sixth New York participate in this panic, or was it confined to the men?

Answer. It was the whole regiment, as I understood. They represented that it was under the orders of their major, Major Baird; I had orders from Colonel Miles, and he gave orders to several other officers, that if [we] came across Major Baird, to arrest him immediately. We did not come across him. The men represented that they had no officers, except Lieutenant Barras. While we were talking, Lieutenant Barras came down, and reported to Colonel Miles that the officers of the regiment had gone; that he was the only officer left; that he had been using his utmost endeavors to have the regiment retain its position on the heights, and to keep them together, but that he had utterly failed. Colonel Miles said that he must go back and make them stand. He merely said that his orders should be obeyed, and went off.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles order me to arrest this Major Baird?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At any time?

Answer. Yes, sir; at any time and place that you could find him. He gave orders to several officers to have him arrested immediately.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know whether he was arrested or not, subsequently?

Answer. I think not; I have not heard that he was; I inquired for him once afterward on Bolivar Heights.

Question. Where were the colonel and lieutenant-colonel of that regiment?

Answer. The colonel had been very severely wounded, according to the representations made. I was not present. They had had quite a severe skirmish on the top of the hill, near the lookout. The panic commenced there, and the colonel, dismounting, took his pistols from his holster and threatened to shoot the first man that ran. He was shot in the jaw, destroying nearly the entire jaw. That seemed to create a disturbance in the regiment, and nothing was done with them afterward. I never heard of the lieutenant-colonel; never saw him. I saw no officer of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York except Lieutenant Barras and Colonel Sherrill. The men represented that they had not a company officer even anywhere there. They had all gone, where, I do not know; they were probably scattered around in the woods.

Question. There was the usual proportion of company officers on duty with the regiment?

Answer. They had a full complement of company officers. It was a full regiment when it arrived at the Ferry; probably 950 went up on the heights.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state the circumstances which led to the surrender of Harper's Ferry; the events immediately connected with it?

Answer. I will commence with Sunday night. On Sunday night Colonel Davis, of the Eighth New York Cavalry, came down and represented that the cavalry was of no use there. There were nearly 2,500 cavalry, composed of a battalion of Rhode Island cavalry, a battalion of the Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry, the First Maryland Cavalry, and the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry. Colonel Davis represented that the cavalry was of no use there, and if we were obliged to surrender the place eventually they would be as great a prize as the enemy could get. Furthermore, that we had no forage for the horses, and they were perfectly useless there, and he desired the privilege of cutting his way out. Colonel Miles then issued an order, or sent his orderlies around to the different commanders of cavalry to meet at his office that evening.

They did meet there about 7 or 7.30 o'clock. He then told them that if they would consult together, and propose means of getting out, and a road to go by, he would issue the order giving them the privilege. There was considerable disputing as to the road they should take. Colonel Davis represented that he wanted to go up on the western side of the Potomac as far as Kearneysville, and then cross the river at Shepherdstown. Colonel Miles represented that there was extreme danger in their going that way. He and Colonel Davis had considerable talk about it, until, finally, Colonel Miles issued an order directing them to go across the pontoon bridge, then go up the Maryland side and take the Sharpsburg route, which they did. Colonel Miles said he did not wish the infantry to be aware of it until they were gone. They were to go without any led horses, with no bugle call, quietly and steadily. He was afraid if the infantry became aware of it, it would cause a stampede among them. I think Colonel Miles consulted with General White upon the subject.

By General WHITE :

Question. Do you remember the route I proposed for them ?

Answer. I do not. On Sunday night some of the infantry officers—I do not know who—some of the commanding officers of regiments, one or two of them, came down and said the cavalry were going out, and wanted to know why they could not go, too. They said they did not see the necessity of staying there and being butchered by artillery without the opportunity of using their men and musketry in any way. I do not recollect who they were; there were one or two of them. They spoke of either surrendering or cutting their way out. Colonel Miles then showed them an order which he had received by the last telegraph from General Halleck, stating that the General Government had perfect confidence in him, and that he must hold out at all hazards and to the last extremity. He said he had some ammunition left, and, after that was expended, he would then talk about an evacuation or surrender. During the night some officers came down from the extreme right of Bolivar Heights. I think Captain Von Sehlen, of the Fifteenth Indiana Battery, and Captain Graham, of the Fifth New York Artillery, came down to Colonel Miles' quarters about midnight, and represented that the enemy were planting a battery on the Sugar Loaf, so called. That is directly opposite the extreme heights of Bolivar, across the river. It is a very steep little round mountain, which would rake Bolivar Heights fore and aft, right straight across. Captain Rigby and Captain Potts were also there, whose batteries were to the extreme left of Bolivar Heights, under General White. They represented that the enemy were planting a battery on the plateau, under Loudoun Heights, on the extreme left, which would rake Bolivar Heights in the same way the other one would. The colonel represented that he expected they would enfilade the heights the next morning in every direction. About an hour before daybreak on Monday morning, Colonel Miles called for our horses, and we went on Bolivar Heights. Before we arrived there, the enemy had commenced shelling us. The enemy's battery on the plateau, under Loudoun Heights, to the extreme left of Bolivar Heights and across the Shenandoah River, was the heaviest battery we had playing on us that day, completely enfilading the left wing of Bolivar Heights. General White was there superintending the planting of a battery, removing it from one position down on the plateau near the Shenandoah. I think Captain Rigby's battery was planted there, or Captain Potts'; I do not remember which one it was. It seemed to draw the principal part of the enemy's fire from that position. Colonel Miles, Lieutenant Willmon, and myself went up Bolivar Heights, dismounted on the slope of the heights, and, leaving the horses with the ordnances, we went up on the crest of the heights, down on the extreme right, where there were some intrenchments thrown up and a battery planted, to see what indications there were of the enemy. We staid there some fifteen or twenty minutes, when we started to go down on the left again. We met Captain Von Sehlen, who reported that his command was entirely exhausted, and we met Captain Phillips, who stated that his ammunition was expended. About the center of Bolivar Heights Colonel Miles met General White, and remarked to him that the artilleryists had reported that they were out of ammunition, and he did not know what he should do; that he did not see that he could hold out any longer without the butchery and slaughter of his men, as the heights were being completely enfiladed. He asked General White's advice in the matter. General White did not seem inclined to recommend a surrender or anything of that sort. It was by Colonel Miles' proposition entirely, his first proposition, to raise a white handkerchief and ask for a cessation of hostilities.

Question. Before that was done, did I not advise Colonel Miles to call his brigade commanders together ?

Answer. I was going to say that you then advised Colonel Miles to call together his officers. What I meant to infer was that the raising of the white handkerchief was by Colonel Miles' proposition. He asked your advice and, after some time, you

proposed that the best thing we could do was to have a consultation of his officers. He then sent Lieutenant Willmon to the right for Colonel D'Utassy, and sent me to the left for Colonel Trimble. I could not find my horse, and I went down to the extreme left on foot. I found Colonel Trimble on horseback by his brigade, and reported to him the order. He started off, and I got back there in time to hear the latter part of the consultation. After some considerable conversation on the subject, Colonel Miles raised a white handkerchief, and ordered others to do the same, General White, I think, proposing to go out with a flag of truce.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. State what you heard of that consultation, and what was said.

Answer. I do not recollect any of the conversation, except that I heard Colonel D'Utassy remark that he did not see any reason for surrendering.

Question. Was there any conclusion arrived at in which all the officers concurred, or did they just separate, and Colonel Miles himself give the direction that a white flag should be hoisted?

Answer. I did not get there in time to hear the opinions expressed by the different commanding officers. When they separated, Colonel Miles raised his handkerchief, and directed me and others to do the same. Whether that was the agreement of the consultation or not, I do not know. I was not close enough to hear.

Question. You say that Colonel D'Utassy said that he saw no reason for surrendering?

Answer. He made some such remark as that. After the council of officers had broken up, Colonel Miles remarked to some infantry, who were manifesting some dissatisfaction at the hoisting of the white flag, that it was merely for a cessation of hostilities.

Question. You spoke of the exhaustion of the ammunition. Have you any personal knowledge of that?

Answer. I only know from the report of the officers of artillery; except this, that on Sunday night Major McIlvaine reported that there were but thirty-six rounds left for the Parrott guns.

Question. How long had they been throwing shell?

Answer. From Thursday afternoon.

Question. Constantly or only occasionally?

Answer. Occasionally on Thursday afternoon. On Friday the two guns under Colonel Ward were firing, at intervals, almost all day, and on Saturday morning the guns under Captain McGrath in Colonel Ford's intrenchments. On Sunday morning we commenced throwing shell early in the morning on to Loudoun Heights, where the enemy were throwing up batteries. We kept up a constant shelling pretty nearly through Sunday forenoon, until Colonel Miles ordered us to save the ammunition, unless we saw something to fire at.

Question. How long after the retreat of General Pope's army did you hear of the approach of the enemy toward Harper's Ferry?

Answer. It was about the 1st of September that our pickets were driven in. Our communications were cut off on the 3d of September, both railroad and telegraph.

Question. You mean those with Baltimore?

Answer. Yes, sir; for two or three days our communications by telegraph were open by Martinsburg to Cumberland and to Pittsburgh, and thence to Baltimore.

Question. The supply of ammunition on hand was not such as to prepare you for sustaining a siege?

Answer. Colonel Miles always represented that he could hold the place for five days. The supply of ammunition was not very extensive. There had been a requisition made for ammunition, which the railroad being cut off prevented us from getting. On the 1st of September there was a letter sent from Baltimore to the ordnance officer, representing that they had no ammunition there suitable for the guns we had, and

that we must make a requisition on Washington. Before that requisition could be made on Washington the railroad communication was cut off.

Question. Do you know what efforts Colonel Miles made to open communication with General McClellan?

Answer. We heard reports of troops coming up, but nothing definite. For instance, we heard that General Wool was coming up with 20,000 men, and that General McClellan was coming up on the Virginia side with a large force, but nothing definite. On Sunday, Captain Cole, of the Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry, and Captain Russell, of the First Maryland Cavalry, offered to open up communication with our army if there was any in Maryland. We had heard that Frederick had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Colonel Miles gave his consent, and they went; with what result I do not know. I have never heard anything of them since. We have been given to understand that they did get through to General McClellan, and represented the state we were in at Harper's Ferry. They never came back again.

Question. Did you hear that re-enforcements were on the way to Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Nothing officially. We heard that Frederick was taken by the enemy, and after that we never heard that Frederick had been retaken by General McClellan, or anything of the sort.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you hear firing?

Answer. We heard heavy firing on Sunday off in the direction of South Mountain, as we thought, though in the hills there we could hardly tell in what direction it was. We heard firing on Saturday afternoon, and on Sunday pretty much all day; also on Monday afternoon, after the surrender, and also on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Wednesday the cannonading was very heavy all day. I will state that on Sunday night there was an attempt made to turn our left flank by infantry, under General Pender, of the North Carolina Brigade. The whole brigade was thrown up on the extreme left, toward the Shenandoah River. I was sent down on the Shenandoah road, where Colonel Banning, of the Eighty-seventh Ohio was, throwing out skirmishers, to extend from the river to join Colonel Downey's skirmishers, on the extreme left of Bolivar Heights, and while doing so I heard heavy infantry firing up to the front, which I understood was Colonel Downey's regiment, and the Thirty-second Ohio. Toward the middle of the night there was quite heavy firing there, heavy skirmishing, which I understood was some regiments under General White and a brigade of the enemy undertaking to turn the left flank of Bolivar Heights, in which they were severely repulsed by the troops under General White. No further attempt was made in that line.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you know the disposition that was made of the troops to meet that attack?

Answer. Late on Sunday evening, before dark, I went round on the extreme left ridge with Colonel Miles, and found Colonel Downey's regiment lying down in the grass, with skirmishers thrown out in the front; Colonel Downey reported that there was a large force of the enemy there. There was a force of artillery thrown out on the Halltown road, near to that line of woods. Colonel Downey said that he thought the enemy were endeavoring to cut off that cavalry squad, as they had made no demonstration on him. Colonel Downey said that he wanted Captain Shamburg's cavalry with him. Colonel Miles said he did not know where he was, but if he could find him he would have him go up and report to him, though his cavalry force was only 19 men; and, as there was other cavalry there, he saw no necessity of more cavalry at that position. He said if he wanted another infantry regiment he could have it, and ordered me to send the Thirty-second Ohio there. I found Major Hewitt, and gave him orders to go there. Major Hewitt represented that he had just received an order from Colonel D'Utassy to report to him, on the right. I told him, on my own responsibility, that that order would be countermanded, and that the order of Colonel Miles was to report to Colonel Trimble, on the extreme left; that Colonel Downey was hard pressed and needed assistance. I reported to Colonel Miles, when I got down to headquarters, what I had done, and he approved it.

Question. Do you know the disposition made by myself of the troops to meet the attack of Hill's division?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Were you present there ?

Answer. Your disposition of troops, I think, was made after our visit. I know there was a heavy attack made there, and it was repulsed later in the evening than when we were there.

By the COURT :

Question. How long after General White went out with the flag to arrange terms was Colonel Miles struck ?

Answer. Not over twenty minutes.

Question. Before General White returned ?

Answer. We left General White on the crest of the hill. General White started about the same time we did. The officers dispersed after the consultation broke up. Colonel Miles started down to where we had left our horses. I told him that the orderlies had taken them away, but he thought I must be mistaken. We could not find the horses, and moved down the crest of the hill, and it was about twenty minutes after we left, fifteen or twenty, that a shell struck the ground behind him and exploded.

Question. Do you know whether the terms arranged by General White were submitted to Colonel Miles ?

Answer. I think not ; I think Colonel Miles did not see General White again until the next day. The report around the Ferry was that the terms were unconditional, until I asked General White afterward. I afterward understood that the terms were that the officers and men should be immediately paroled.

Question. No matter about that.

Answer. I do not know anything more than hearsay about the conditions of the surrender. The moment that Colonel Miles was struck, I met an orderly on horseback and sent him after General White. He wanted to know where he could find him. I told him I did not know, but thought he could find him upon the Charlestown road, and to report to General White that Colonel Miles was wounded. I do not know whether he ever reached him or not ; I think not.

By General WHITE :

Question. Do you mean to say that it was not agreed at the consultation, prior to my being sent out to negotiate the terms of the surrender—do you mean to say that a surrender was not agreed on ?

Answer. I do not know what was agreed upon anything more than that the moment they dispersed Colonel Miles raised a white handkerchief. The actual result of the consultation I do not know.

Question. You stated that Colonel Miles made the remark that sending out the flag was simply for a suspension of hostilities ?

Answer. I understood Colonel Miles to say to some infantry as we were going down that they were simply asking for a cessation of hostilities.

Question. What time was that ?

Answer. Soon after the consultation broke up. I do not know how long they had been in consultation when I got back.

Question. When you went down the lines with Colonel Miles, did you or he, or both of you, and others display the white flag all the way to the left ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; by Colonel Miles' order. Colonel Miles was the first to display the white handkerchief, and he ordered me to do the same, and he ordered me as I went down to tell others to do the same. Cannonading had ceased for some few moments, but opened again afterward.

Question. Do you know who were with me when I left the heights ?

Answer. I do not.

Question. And you do not know which way I went ?

Answer. I do not; I do not know what the agreement was between you and Colonel Miles; I stood apart from the conference somewhat; what I heard was simply to catch a few words here and there.

Question. Who officiated as chief of artillery?

Answer. Major McIlvane.

Question. Did he report on Sunday at any time, in the latter part of the day or at night, that the artillery ammunition was nearly expended?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did he report to Colonel Miles the next morning that it had all been distributed?

Answer. Yes, sir; that he found but thirty-six rounds, which had been equally divided between Captain McGrath and Captain Graham.

Question. Did Captain Rigby or Captain Potts, commanding batteries on the left, state, within your knowledge, to Colonel Miles, at any time on Sunday night or Monday morning, that their ammunition was expended?

Answer. They did not. Captain Graham, Captain McGrath, and Captain Von Sehlen reported that their ammunition was all exhausted. At that time the others on the left were pounding away incessantly, even after the council had broken up.

Question. Have you any knowledge of the number of batteries, or where they were located, of the enemy on the left of the line on Monday morning?

Answer. There were two intervals in the woods on the crest of Loudoun Heights.

Question. Commence with Maryland Heights.

Answer. On Maryland Heights I did not observe but two guns of the enemy on the crest of the heights above where our battery was. In my judgment, they were a 6-pounder and a 12-pounder howitzer. One gun seemed to throw a great deal farther than the other. On the crest of Loudoun Heights there were two positions which the enemy had on Sunday afternoon. There were originally two log-houses there, which Colonel Miles had destroyed in the first part of the summer. The enemy were busy there on Sunday afternoon, and we were shelling them while they were planting their batteries. At 2.30 Sunday afternoon they opened from both of these positions. I think they were a quarter of a mile apart. The woods were felled there and left a gap. They opened with three guns at one interval and four at the other. Afterward they brought two guns down below, between the two intervals, on the crest of a rock, and opened there. I cannot say whether they were extra guns or from those two intervals. Then, down on the extreme right, opposite the left ridge of Bolivar Heights, there was a plateau there near a house.

Question. East of the Shenandoah?

Answer. Across the Shenandoah from Harper's Ferry. If anything, it was a little higher elevation than Bolivar Heights itself, and enfiladed the heights. I do not know how many guns the enemy had there on Monday. It was on Monday morning that they opened there. They had planted them during the night. They opened just before daybreak on Monday morning. It was very misty, so that we could not see where these gaps were on the Loudoun Heights, on the plateau; the only way we could tell their position was by the flash of the guns. I could not see the battery or the men working the guns, on account of the mist and smoke. I suppose they must have had some half a dozen guns on the plateau, if not more. The fire from that position was very heavy, I know; principally directed to Potts' and Rigby's batteries. Then on the Charlestown road the enemy opened four guns in the woods there, and to the extreme right they opened two guns, on the Shepherdstown road, in a piece of woods.

Question. Have you not omitted the principal battery firing upon Rigby that morning, on the prolongation of the ridge of Bolivar Heights, below the road across the river?

Answer. To the left of the Charlestown road? On the Harper's Ferry side there was a battery there, down near the position where Colonel Downey had the fight the night before.

Question. Were there not two batteries there ?

Answer. I do not know ; I know there was cannonading there, but I did not go down far enough to observe. I counted seven different positions that opened upon us.

Question. Did you notice a battery between the Charlestown road and the one you speak of on the Shepherdstown road ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; there was a battery there ; then there was a battery on the extreme right, on the Shepherdstown road, and a battery at the opening of the Charlestown road, in the woods, opened upon us Sunday afternoon. Those guns were fired principally at the picket. On Monday the whole of them appeared to be directed upon Bolivar Heights. The principal batteries against us were the one on Loudoun plateau and the one down on our left, between the Shenandoah River and the Charlestown road.

Question. Did you, at the time the consultation in relation to the surrender broke up, hear Colonel Miles ask me to go and officiate as to the terms of the surrender ?

Answer. I did not hear him ask you, but he gave me to understand that you were to go. I asked him, immediately after he started away, who was going out, and he said General White. I do not know whether it was voluntary on your part or whether it was by his direction.

Question. Did you understand that the object was to negotiate terms of surrender ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; and from that I judged that a surrender was decided upon. Some infantry men there began to use some pretty harsh language, and Colonel Miles represented that it was simply for a cessation of hostilities until arrangements could be made.

Question. When he said "arrangements," what did you understand by that ?

Answer. I understood that it was simply a cessation of hostilities until you could go out and arrange terms of surrender.

Question. Did you understand that it was a cessation of hostilities that did not imply a surrender at all ? What did you understand ?

Answer. I understood that the terms of surrender had not been agreed upon. The surrender, as I looked at it, was decided upon, because you were to go out, as I understood, and ask on what terms the surrender would be accepted.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. But that was not the interpretation of the act that Colonel Miles conveyed to the troops ?

Answer. No, sir. As I understood, the interpretation he conveyed was that no surrender had been made.

By General WHITE :

Question. Let me ask you once more, as it is an important point, did you or not understand from his remark that the cessation of hostilities was for the purpose of determining if such terms of surrender could be obtained as would be satisfactory ; and, if so, that they were to be accepted ? I want you to state clearly what you understood Colonel Miles to mean.

Answer. I understood that the surrender was decided upon, and that you were to go out and make the arrangements for it.

By the COURT :

Question. If you could get reasonable terms ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I do not know whether it was left to General White to make the arrangements or not ; but I understood the terms of the surrender were to be negotiated by General White, if they could be made satisfactory.

Question. Unless some unreasonable demands were made?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Of course, a white flag under the circumstances can mean nothing else?

Answer. No, sir. I understood that General White was to go out and make as favorable terms as possible; that the surrender had been agreed upon, and if arrangements could be made satisfactory to General White, he was to go out and make them.

Question. Was it or not your understanding that the surrender was to be made, if, under ordinary circumstances, reasonable and usual terms could be obtained?

Answer. That was my understanding.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles say, in the consultation, that the ammunition was reported expended or nearly so—substantially so?

Answer. Yes, sir; I heard him make the remark that he did not see what he could do. Says he, "General, I do not see what I can do; the artillerists report that their ammunition is entirely expended."

By the COURT:

Question. What ammunition?

Answer. Artillery ammunition entirely. Major McIlvaine had not reported in person that the ammunition was entirely expended, but the officers commanding the batteries, Captain McGrath, Captain Graham, and Captain Von Sehlen, had reported so. Captain Rigby and Captain Potts had made no such report.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles say anything during the council of war about the quantity of subsistence on hand?

Answer. No, sir; not in the council.

Question. Did you hear him say anything in regard to it at any other time?

Answer. I heard him say on Friday that he should have to deliver half rations. I know he had seized the flour in the stores and mills in the vicinity, and I know we were short of rations, especially of hard bread.

Question. Do you know of any attempt to obtain subsistence and forage, and of the trains sent out for that purpose being driven back?

Answer. Yes, sir. Some teams started out for hay, and I know they came back without success.

Question. You say you were with Colonel Miles constantly during the siege?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How long was the cannonade kept up during that siege? I do not mean continually, but at intervals.

Answer. On Thursday afternoon the cannonade commenced with Captain McGrath's battery, on the right.

Question. I mean when did the enemy commence to cannonade from their positions; as fast as they occupied them?

Answer. The cannonade commenced by Colonel Banning.

Question. When did it first commence at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. On Thursday afternoon.

Question. Were our batteries, the most of them, at work during that time?

Answer. Constantly at work.

Question. Was there much ammunition expended?

Answer. Yes, sir; a tremendous quantity.

Question. Did we have any guns dismounted by the enemy's fire?

Answer. I do not know of but one.

Question. Any caissons blown up?

Answer. Yes, sir; I know of a caisson and a limber-box being exploded by one of the enemy's shells; I know of one gun entirely dismounted by the enemy's fire, and another was struck and very much injured. There were some gunsspiked on Maryland Heights on Saturday.

Question. Where were those guns situated that were dismounted?

Answer. On Bolivar Heights.

Question. Was not a Parrott gun destroyed on Camp Hill?

Answer. I do not personally know that. I understood that a Parrott gun had been dismounted; I did not see it.

Question. Can you tell about how many effective men were in Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I can name the different regiments and give about the number of men in each regiment.

Question. I do not care about the different regiments, but the number of effective men at the time of the surrender.

Answer. I do not know the number of effective men, but we had about 11,500 men.

Question. Exclusive of cavalry?

Answer. Exclusive of cavalry; we had nearly 15,000 men including the cavalry.

Question. After the evacuation of Maryland Heights, how many men were placed for the protection of the bridge in and about the town of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. The First Maryland and the Eighty-seventh Ohio.

Question. What was on Camp Hill?

Answer. Colonel Ward, of the Twelfth New York, and a detachment of Captain Graham's company of artillery.

Question. About how many men, then, do you think that would leave for the defense of Bolivar Heights?

Answer. Not over 7,500.

Question. How far was it from the extreme right of the line of Bolivar Heights to the Shenandoah River?

Answer. A full mile and a quarter.

Question. Were there troops enough there to form more than a single line of battle along there?

Answer. No, sir; and not that without large intervals.

Question. Did you see the enemy there in the valley?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What do you suppose was the prospect of holding that position, and how long could it have been held on Monday morning after the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I think if our infantry had been drawn up in line of battle to meet a demonstration of the enemy in the way of the assault that was prepared for us, they would have been utterly annihilated by the enemy's artillery previous to the enemy's infantry reaching us. One-half of the men would have been butchered. They would all have been taken prisoners before night.

Question. The persons who are under arrest in connection with this investigation are Colonel Trimble, Colonel Ford, Colonel D'Utassy, and myself. If you had any opportunity to know the conduct of any of these officers as officers during the siege, I would thank you to state it.

Answer. I had every opportunity.

Question. I do not mean the particulars of their conduct, but its general character.

Answer. I know of no commanding officer of a brigade that, in my opinion, did not do his duty to the utmost of his power. I had more opportunities of seeing yourself and Colonel Trimble, who were in the heaviest part of the fire on Monday morning, than I had of the others. Colonel Ford I did not see anything of after the evacuation of Maryland Heights. I understood that he was sick.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. You do not mean, then, by your remark in reference to the conduct of these officers to say that Colonel Ford did his duty in evacuating Maryland Heights?

Answer. No, sir; I mean to say that as long as he was on duty on Maryland Heights he appeared to do all he could. The evacuation of Maryland Heights, in my opinion, was somewhat precipitate. What the real circumstances in his front were I do not know; I know he was fighting there for two or three days.

Question. Could not the force from Harper's Ferry have been withdrawn on the night previous to the evacuation of Maryland Heights, and thrown on Maryland Heights, and then could not those heights have been held against the forces of the enemy, and would they not have commanded Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I think if all the troops in Harper's Ferry had been withdrawn on to Maryland Heights it could have been done, but you would have to throw them on the top of the heights, and the immense difficulty of getting up subsistence stores and ammunition to the troops after they were there would have required two or three days; and, after they were so placed, there was no means of supplying the men with water. From the representations of others and from my own observations, I know there is no kind of chance for men to live there for the want of water, without going a great distance for it.

By General WHITE :

Question. Do you think Maryland Heights could have been reoccupied by our troops after the enemy had occupied it?

Answer. I do not think our troops could have reoccupied Maryland Heights after the enemy had thrown their force on the crest of the hill. I know the enemy were there in large force, and I know, from observations that I made and from conversations I have had with Confederate officers, it was their determination to take Maryland Heights previous to any strong attempt to attack us in front, to silence those guns. That was their principal aim and determination.

By the COURT :

Question. Have you heard it stated that Colonel Miles, after he was wounded, said that he had always been in favor of the Southern Confederacy?

Answer. I know he never made any such statement; I never left his side, except for perhaps fifteen minutes at a time, after he fell until he died. I heard him remark several times previous to his being wounded, and after he was wounded, that he could not see where General McClellan was, or if any attempt was to be made to succor us why it had not been done. I would furthermore state that I remained at Harper's Ferry for three days after the surrender, and then rode 36 miles on horseback before

I met a Union picket. The first I met was a Union cavalryman of the Sixth Regulars. It did not look to me like the Union troops were within two hours of Harper's Ferry at the time of the surrender. I met no Union forces between Harper's Ferry and Frederick.

Question. When did you leave Harper's Ferry?

Answer. On Wednesday afternoon at 3 o'clock.

Question. That was the day of the Antietam fight?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. That battle was fought to the northward of Harper's Ferry, was it not?

Answer. The battle was fought a long distance up the Antietam Creek. The ford of Antietam is, I think, 12 or 15 miles from Harper's Ferry.

Question. If you had wanted to find Union troops would you have gone to Frederick to find them?

Answer. That was the nearest point; where the battle of Antietam was fought was farther from Harper's Ferry than Frederick.

Question. Which road did you take?

Answer. Across the pontoon bridge and down the Potomac road.

Question. Did you go up the river after crossing the canal?

Answer. We went down the river to Berlin, Sandy Hook, Jefferson, &c.

Question. That would carry you off from Sharpsburg?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was the nearest route to Frederick.

Question. But not to Hagerstown?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You say you were with Colonel Miles from the time he was wounded until he died?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did his mind wander any during that time?

Answer. It did at times; at other times it was very clear.

Question. You heard everything he said?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. He uttered no disloyal expressions at all?

Answer. No, sir; and directly the reverse.

By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. You have stated that on the night before the surrender several officers of the infantry came down and offered to cut their way out; do you remember their names or their faces?

Answer. I cannot recollect; I know there were three infantry officers there making these offers; I did not go into the room, but I heard them talking.

Question. Do you remember my sending down several times for artillery ammunition?

Answer. I do not recollect of but once; I might not have been present at other times; I was present several times when Colonel Ford asked for ammunition.

Question. Do you remember on Sunday afternoon, when Colonel Miles was riding along on Bolivar Heights, a report spread that General Sigel was advancing, and I ordered Captain Von Sehlen's battery

immediately to hitch on their horses, and Colonel Miles came along and said, "Who gave you orders to do this?"

Answer. I do not recollect.

Question. You recollect there was such a report?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was a report at one time that they were firing beyond Charlestown on the forces that were firing on us.

Question. Do you recollect my making a written application to provide cattle for the siege?

Answer. Yes, sir; you made a verbal application first, and then a written application.

Question. Do you know what battery fired the last shot when Colonel Miles had already raised the white flag?

Answer. One of the 6-pounder rifled guns under Captain Von Sehlen.

Question. Under whose command was that battery?

Answer. It was in your brigade.

Question. Who was the last man to raise the white flag?

Answer. I do not know.

By the COURT:

Question. You have stated that a conversation took place on Maryland Heights between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford, at which all were requested to withdraw but yourself.

Answer. I was not excepted, but I went in and he found no objection, and I staid there.

Question. Have you stated the whole of the conversation that took place between them on that occasion?

Answer. I do not recollect the exact conversation; but the substance of it I have stated. The substance of it was that Colonel Ford was to hold the heights at all hazards, and if Colonel Miles could send him any forces without weakening his front he would do so.

Question. Can you tell why he sent the order about the cows' tails dropping off?

Answer. Because Colonel Ford had sent down word that his regiment would not fight, and that he could not hold the heights.

Question. It was in that conversation that Colonel Miles told Colonel Ford to spike the guns if he was obliged to evacuate the heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You cannot recollect the conversation in detail?

Answer. No, sir; I know that Colonel Ford represented that he was pressed very hard there.

By General WHITE:

Question. Prior to my return from visiting the commissioners on the part of the enemy, Colonel Miles was wounded, and was not capable of attending to business?

Answer. Yes, sir; he was wounded and was not capable of attending to business, and did not.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you keep a copy of that order you sent over to Colonel Ford?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What has become of the papers and records belonging to Colonel Miles?

Answer. The order book, letter book, telegram book, and other important papers were put in a box and sent from Harper's Ferry to Adams' Express. When we went to Adams' Express office to distribute the goods, we directed this box to General White at Annapolis. That was the last I saw of it. I went to Annapolis immediately afterward, and found that General White had gone to Baltimore and thence to Washington.

Question. In your card to the public, in giving that order, you wrote from memory?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I will vouch for it being word for word.

Question. Did you write the letters also from memory?

Answer. Yes, sir. That was not intended exactly for the public. From some conversation I had with the editor of the Boston Journal in regard to the censures which I found everywhere cast upon Colonel Miles, knowing them to be unjust, I made this statement in the Boston Journal, at the request of the editor of the Journal. I had no idea it would be published everywhere.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. You say that I sent down for re-enforcements after Colonel Miles left the heights?

Answer. No, sir; I did not say that. You sent down for ammunition.

Question. I did not send down for any re-enforcements after you left?

Answer. Not to my knowledge. While he was there you wanted re-enforcements, and he said he would send them to you if he could spare them from the front.

Col. F. G. D'UTASSY, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state what position you hold in the military service?

Answer. I am the colonel of the Thirty-pinth New York Volunteers.

Question. What command did you have at Harper's Ferry during the events that led to its surrender?

Answer. From the 5th of September up to the 15th, the day of the surrender, I commanded the First Brigade.

Question. Will you state, as briefly as you can, your knowledge of the circumstances which led to the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I must be permitted to read here a letter which, at the request of Colonel Miles, I wrote to him. It was on the 9th of September that he requested me to go with Captain Von Sehlen on Maryland Heights, and make a report of the position. That evening I wrote the following:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, MILES' DIVISION,
Camp White, Bolivar Heights, near Harper's Ferry.

Col. DIXON S. MILES, *Commanding Forces:*

SIR: In obedience to your verbal orders to inspect the position of Maryland Heights and report to you accordingly, and to make such suggestions as I may deem beneficial to the interests of the service, I have the honor to lay before you the annexed topographical sketch, and to state as follows: I left at this 11 a. m., in company with Captain Von Sehlen. After having thoroughly inspected our position, at present under command of Colonel Ford, I find it, in my judgment, almost impregnable, and so stated to Colonel Ford, who replied, "I know it, and certainly never will leave it." The heavy guns are so happily posted as to control not only Loudoun Heights, but could very easily shell any enemy attempting to take position on Bolivar Heights, provided the trees, which are in the hollow to the right of Bolivar Heights, could be felled; for which I asked permission. I cannot but praise the general good arrangement of artillery. Would, however, suggest to have two of the four 20-pounder brass guns moved higher on the road leading to the so-called observatory, which Captain Von Sehlen tells me could be accomplished with facility. If this section would be properly supported by infantry, and a few additional abatis be made, I feel convinced that no force whatever could possess itself of this

position, which, as you so wisely suggested, is our main reliance. I deem the force at present under command of Colonel Ford amply sufficient; but am most willing to dispose of any of my regiments, should you so desire, and consider it needful. Feeling proud of the confidence you have shown in me, I can assure you you will find me at my post, as you found me at Bull Run, when first under your command.

The day after, I received this small scrap:

Colonel D'UTASSY:

Send a regiment to Maryland Heights immediately; ammunition, one or two days' rations, canteens, quick.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel, Second Division.

On the day the heights were evacuated I went down to Colonel Miles and asked him, "How is it possible that those heights were evacuated?" The evening before General White was down, and we were speaking of what our facilities would be if we had to withdraw, and General White, as well as myself, suggested the plan to draw our forces over the pontoon bridge and hold Maryland Heights. Colonel Miles said, "As a matter of course; it is the only chance we have." At that time we believed we were to be attacked in front. In consequence, I wrote this letter to General White, immediately after the evacuation of Maryland Heights:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
Harper's Ferry, September 13, 1862.

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE:

MY DEAR SIR: May I ask you, semi-officially, how and why it is that the position on Maryland Heights, which, in my opinion, as well as that of highly experienced officers, was almost impregnable, and which Colonel Miles himself told me was his main reliance, as it commands Bolivar and Loudoun Heights, and, as a matter of course, the whole valley, has been abandoned? I am informed by commanding officers of the different regiments lately across the river, that, after a successful shelling from the battery, the enemy in Maryland had entirely disappeared. The enemy is now distinctly visible on Loudoun Heights. I suppose, at least, that the force to be seen there is the enemy. From whom am I to expect orders, as no one is here, nor do I know where to find Colonel Miles? Am I authorized to act according to the dictates of my own judgment? A written reply will greatly oblige, your sincere friend,

F. G. D'UTASSY,
Commanding First Brigade.

This letter was returned to me with the following indorsement:

Deference to General Wool has alone prevented me from taking command here. Colonel D'Utassy will use his own discretion until he gets positive orders. This post will not be surrendered without a fight.

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

I wrote that letter in consequence of the enemy having made an attack on my right flank, where two companies of the Thirty-ninth Regiment were out as skirmishers. I there lost 4 killed and 15 wounded. The day after, General White sent for me, between 11 and 12 o'clock at night. It was at Colonel Trimble's. He said, "What is your opinion? What do you think we can do?" I said, "Nothing but fight." He then said, "Well, make your arrangements accordingly." And he told me to give the following orders: "We will probably be attacked to-morrow at daybreak. Have the canteens filled this very night; rations cooked for twenty-four hours, and the men to be ready to fall in." That order was issued and the men were ready and prepared. The following day General White came up and inspected our brigade. We then had already been attacked.

Question. What, in your judgment, was the necessity for the evacuation of Maryland Heights at the time it occurred?

Answer. I could not form any judgment or give you any opinion about it, as I was not there. I know one thing, that I was greatly surprised, and from the moment of the evacuation I looked upon it as a forlorn position, because it had been agreed that that was to be our line of retreat, and I made the offer to retake the position, as I considered it such an eminent position.

Question. What was the reply made to your offer to retake the heights?

Answer. Colonel Miles said, "Well, we must see; I will first see Colonel Ford, and hear why he abandoned it." The next day, when I again asked permission to do it, he said, "Damn it; they have spiked the guns; it is of no use." Then I went over on my own responsibility with four companies and brought down all the gunpowder for heavy artillery which was there, and four guns, of which two only were spiked; the other two only had a nail in, which was of no consequence.

Question. The enemy had not then taken possession ?

Answer. At that time I sent out one company of skirmishers, and they fired two shots in all. No enemy was visible there, and that was twenty-four hours after the evacuation.

By the COURT :

Question. What could have been the urgent necessity for abandoning Maryland Heights, when there was no enemy there for twenty-four hours afterward ?

Answer. At the time they were abandoned the report that came to me was that two hours previous to the abandonment we had lost considerably. Major Hildebrandt, who was in command of my regiment, reported to me 1 missing, 2 killed, and 16 wounded. I had sent over the One hundred and fifteenth Regiment, and I know they also lost some. I asked at what o'clock the fight took place, and they told me about three hours before the order came to leave the place.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Have you any question but that the heights could have been successfully reoccupied at the time you went up ?

Answer. I am positive they could.

Question. And held as before ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT :

Question. What guns did you propose to put up there ?

Answer. The four guns I brought down, and which I requested Colonel Miles' permission to bring up to my own position.

Question. Was there ammunition for them ?

Answer. For those guns there was plenty of ammunition. I had kept 50 men (all the tailors in my regiment) at work all day Saturday making bags for ammunition from the large kind, which I reduced to the small kind, which enabled me to keep firing on Sunday. On Saturday I received notice from the chief of ordnance that no ammunition for long range was there.

Question. What was the caliber of those guns ?

Answer. They were 20-pounders.

Question. Do you know their maximum range ?

Answer. I think that they were able to throw about 3,000 yards, because I spoke with Major Melvaine before I suggested the plan of cutting down the trees in the hollow of Bolivar Heights, and he said to me, "I can sweep clear over your heights with my guns," and that, I suppose, taking an eye measurement, is about 2 miles. We had, as you well know, some navy guns, some three pieces; I suppose he meant those guns would carry so far.

Question. What description of gun-carriages were those guns on ?

Answer. I do not know the English word for it; the French word is Lafayette.

Question. How could you have got them up on the hills ?

Answer. The heavy ones—the navy guns—were already on the hills.

Question. But they had already been disabled ?

Answer. Yes, sir; the four brass ones were on wheels.

Question. You would have had no difficulty in carrying them around ?

Answer. No, sir. When I was over there, Colonel Ford said to me, "What is your idea? What do you think of my position?" Jokingly, I said to him, "The devil could not get you out of here." He said, "I am certain of it." Said he, "Are those forces enough here?" I said, "Yes; but not defenses enough; you must have two guns higher up, and some force up there, or the enemy will come and take you in a trap." He said, "I have given orders to take some companies there." I asked if he

had any call for more artillery there. He said "Yes." I said, "I am going to make a report, and I will suggest strongly to Colonel Miles to take one section of your artillery higher up." That night I made the report to the colonel.

Question. What was done with the guns you brought down when Colonel Ford abandoned that position?

Answer. Colonel Miles placed them somewhere below, but where I do not know, but he positively refused me to have them taken up to strengthen my position on Bolivar Heights, although I urgently begged it. I must say that my impression was that he considered the case so forlorn from the moment of the evacuation of Maryland Heights that he did not urge things on as he did on former occasions, as long as we were still holding the heights.

Question. You went up the next day and brought these guns down. How were they left by Colonel Ford?

Answer. Two were perfectly spiked; the other two had a nail in, which was drawn out. They were not sufficiently spiked, and I begged to have them to take up to my position; but it was not allowed. They were brought into the town.

Question. Was it not your opinion that those guns could have been brought away by the troops when they came away?

Answer. My regiment asked permission to bring them down, and it was refused.

Question. Who refused it?

Answer. I am not prepared to say that, because one said this and the other said that, and I do not wish to leave an imputation upon anybody particularly.

Question. You only know from hearsay that it was refused. Did you receive any refusal from anybody?

Answer. No, sir, because I was not in command of my regiment there, but Major Hildebrandt was refused, and he reported that refusal.

Question. Is it your opinion that, with proper dispositions made on Maryland Heights, the place could have been held until you could have received re-enforcements?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know of any order to Colonel Ford to abandon the heights?

Answer. No, sir; except from hearsay.

Question. You know of none, of your own knowledge?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Will you state what took place in the council just previous to the surrender, the council in which it was determined to surrender; who voted for the surrender, and who voted against it?

Answer. I cannot say what took place previous to that, because I was attacked on my right flank, and I was down in the place directly below Bolivar Heights. Lieutenant Willmon came up to me on foot, and said, "Colonel Miles wants to see you." I went up with my adjutant, two aides, and three orderlies on horseback. On approaching Colonel Miles, he said, "Good gracious Heaven! get down from your horse; you will draw the enemy's fire on you." I smilingly replied, "Don't mind that; evil grass is never lost," meaning that there was no danger. He said, "Well, if you don't care, I don't want to be shot on your account; get down off your horse and send off your horses." General White and Colonel Trimble were present. I dismounted. Colonel Miles said, "Well, my boy, we meet again under unpleasant circumstances." I said, "Why?" He replied, "Well, we don't know what to do." I asked, "In what regard?" "Well," said he, "we must surrender." I looked at him a moment, and then said, "What! surrender?" Yes, sir," he said, "what do you want to do?" I told him, "Cut our way through." "Poh," he said, "bosh! nonsense! to-day it is too late." I said to him, "Colonel, I offered to do the same yesterday, and I suggested it to Colonel Davis, who, as you see, did it." "Well," said he, "yesterday is not to-day; what shall we do to-day?" I said, "Is it a council of war or is it a mere

private conversation?" He replied, "Well, I have half determined what to do, but General White said to call you all together." I said to him, "Then let the junior give his advice." Colonel Trimble was the junior, and he said, "Under actual existing circumstances, nothing else is to be done but to surrender." General White stood near us, but did not say one word. Colonel Miles went over to him, and said, "Well, you hear what he says." General White said, "Hear Colonel D'Utassy's opinion." I replied, "You know it; I will never surrender as long as I have a shot." Colonel Miles then began to curse, and said, "How many shots have you?" I sent for Captain Phillips and Captain Von Sehlen; the one had three shots, the other had one, long-range ammunition. When I heard that, I said, "I can do nothing else but surrender, particularly as you are averse to cutting our way out, but I will surrender only on honorable conditions." Colonel Miles then said to General White, "General, I will have to request of you to go out." I then turned to both of them and said, "Remember, I will surrender only on honorable conditions." General White said, "What do you mean by honorable conditions? Be sure I will do my best to save our honor." I replied, "The very least we must have is for the officers to have the honors of war and to retain their side-arms, and the men must be saved the disgrace of passing through the enemy's lines." He said, "That I expect to get, and better still." With that I turned off and went down to my position, and gave orders to the artillery to spike their guns, and ordered the men to unscrew the nipples of their guns, which I thought I had a right to do, as General White had not then gone out to agree on terms. I tore down the flags of my brigade, which I brought away with me. When the white flag was ordered to be raised in my camp, I drew my regiments up in line of battle, ordered them to stack their arms, and kept them there until about 11 o'clock, when General Jackson came.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you know anything about the number of the forces on Maryland Heights on Saturday, except by hearsay?

Answer. I know the official report which I received, which is as follows:

Colonel Ford, commanding the Thirty-second Ohio, will march his regiment as soon as possible, and take post on Maryland Heights, as its commander, for the protection of the battery at that post, and to maintain, at all hazards, that height.

Question. You misunderstand my question. I ask, do you know anything of the forces of the enemy on Maryland Heights on Saturday, except by hearsay?

Answer. Only by hearsay.

Question. You say that you think the heights ought not to have been given up. Do you mean that it should not have been given up to any force whatever? You say you do not know what force the enemy had there?

Answer. That is my private opinion; I never would have surrendered it.

Question. Do you say we ought not to have retreated or been driven down by any force whatever?

Answer. Driven down, yes; but not give it up.

Question. Do you know anything about the position that Major Hildebrandt occupied there?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You do not know whether he was in the fight on the eastern slope of the mountain, on the northern slope, up the valley, or where?

Answer. No, sir; I only know they were fighting, and losing considerably.

Question. How long have you been a military officer?

Answer. I got my first commission in 1843, in the Austrian service, and have been in service all that time, including the war in the Crimea.

Question. How long have you been under the command of Colonel Miles?

Answer. I was under his command for the first time at Bull Run. My regiment started on the 17th of May, and I came under his command on the 22d of May, and remained under his command until after the battle of Bull Run.

Question. How long were you under his command at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. From the 2d of September until the 15th.

Question. Were you in the habit of receiving orders from Colonel Miles?

Answer. Yes, sir; written and verbal.

Question. Was Colonel Miles in the habit of giving conflicting orders?

Answer. He was my immediate superior, and is now dead. I do not know as that question should be answered. If the court think I should answer it, I will.

The court decided that the question should be answered.

The witness then answered:

Yes, sir; he was. He sometimes gave written orders, and then almost instantaneously contradicted them verbally. I would state, as an example, he came up to my tent and said, "Well, my boy, we shall be starved out." I made a verbal application and then a written application for permission to go out and procure food. He replied, "We have plenty; enough; we do not need it." When he gave such orders, when reminded of them, he usually corrected them.

Question. Did this occur frequently with Colonel Miles?

Answer. It happened often; it happened several times with me.

Question. From your knowledge of Colonel Miles from the time you were first acquainted with him until the surrender of Harper's Ferry, do you believe he was morally, mentally, and physically competent to command such a force as was at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. There is an old Latin saying that "of the dead never anything but good." The opinion I have formed may conflict with the opinion of others, and, unless the court desire it, I do not think such an opinion should be given.

Colonel Ford insisted upon the question.

The court decided that, as a pretty wide range had been accorded to this investigation, the question should be answered.

The witness then answered:

I think that, during the latter part of the time, Colonel Miles was broken down, in consequence of previous abuse. I knew him at Harper's Ferry, where he was the strictest model of abstinence. I have studied medicine some little, and I thought that broke him down, as I knew him on former occasions as rather a good drinker. The sudden changing to new habits I think did him much harm. I spoke with him one day on the subject, and said to him, "I believe you will ruin yourself." He said, "I took an oath never to touch a drop, and I have not done it." I believe that sudden abstinence injured him greatly.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. You have not answered my question directly.

Answer. I did not consider him fit to command such a force.

By the COURT:

Question. You commenced a few minutes since to read an order from Colonel Miles in regard to Maryland Heights. We would like to hear that, if you please.

Answer. This is it:

Colonel Ford, commanding Thirty-second Ohio, will march his regiment as soon as possible, and take post on Maryland Heights, as its commander, for the protection of the battery at that post, and to maintain, at all hazards, that height.

Here is a letter of September 9, which relates to the instance I gave a few minutes since of conflicting orders from Colonel Miles:

The colonel commanding instructs me to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this a. m., and directs me to say it would give him great pleasure to accede to your request, but that he has already twenty days' provisions on hand in that line.

I had several times called for ammunition. On the 12th of September I received the following:

I have the honor to report your communication received. The reserve ammunition is on an island a short distance above here. Requisitions for ordnance have to be approved by Colonel Miles. Lieutenant Thompson is ordnance officer.

I sent down three times, but I did not get one bit of ammunition. I even had not ammunition for my own men. When the first order came for eighty rounds of ammunition, I had to borrow it from the One hundred and eleventh and One hundred and fifteenth regiments, whose caliber was equal to that of mine.

The Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 8, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Maj. HUGO HILDEBRANDT, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. I am major of the Thirty-ninth Regiment New York State Volunteers, and its commander at the affair of Harper's Ferry.

Question. Will you state, so far as they came to your knowledge, all the circumstances connected with the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. On the 11th day of September, late in the evening, I received orders from my colonel to proceed the next morning early to Maryland Heights to report myself to Colonel Ford, in command there. I had two companies from my regiment absent, and therefore I begged the colonel to relieve my companies, or send me two other companies. He gave me two other companies of the One hundred and fifteenth New York Regiment. I started with eight companies, and reported at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 12th to Colonel Ford. After a little rest, Colonel Ford gave me orders to proceed with six companies as far as Solomon's Gap to make a reconnaissance. It was reported to him that there were two companies of rebels in the gap, exhausted, and he ordered me to take them prisoners, if possible. I went with four companies of my own regiment, and two companies of the Maryland Home Brigade to conduct me, as I had no knowledge of the road. When I went out of the picket line, the cavalry pickets who were posted there told me that they were driven in from their position by a heavy force, and that they were shelled out from the gap. They were there on the lookout for observations. I paid not much attention to them, because, as my orders were, I thought I would go up with my force. I sent out skirmishers immediately; but the woods are so thick there that it is not possible to skirmish in the regular way. It was a very narrow road, and we had to go only on the road, and it is nearly impossible to ride on a horse. When we came up near to the heights, the two companies of skirmishers which I sent out were received by a very heavy fire. There I lost by the skirmish 2 men from the Maryland brigade, and from my regiment 4 or 5, and 1 missing. Then I drew up my column very easy by the flank; but we could not resist, as it was such a large force; and therefore I withdrew my forces and took up a better position, so that if they should come after us we could stay there and fight them. But they remained there, and we halted on our position near to the picket line. After a little rest, we heard some firing on the ridge of the mountain. It was the pickets that I had posted out from the Maryland regiment. I posted them so that I could cover my flank. They were attacked. Then we went up with the whole force, and after a few hours I returned to the camp with the force, and reported to Colonel Ford the facts. In the evening I received orders from Colonel Ford to go up on the heights. I was stationed by his headquarters. I was ordered to go up on the heights and report myself to Major Hewitt. I did so. Two companies of my regiment were ordered again, with other companies under the command of an officer from the Thirty-second Ohio whose name I do not recollect. I went up with only four companies to Major Hewitt. Major Hewitt ordered me back to the battery, and to stay the whole night under arms to protect the battery. The next morning I received orders again to go up with three companies on the heights to support Major Hewitt. My other three companies, which had returned in the night, I left at the battery in the command of a captain. I went up to Major Hewitt and reported. I was posted with the three companies on the extreme right of the line. After the first fire, which was, I think, at 7 o'clock, the skirmish began.

The line of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment was broken by the first fire, and Major Hewitt, with the Thirty-second Ohio, and I with my few companies had to go out in front so as to keep the enemy back. We held them with only a small force a very long time; after that we had to go behind a breastwork made of logs. After that I received orders from the adjutant of Colonel Ford to go down to the battery and give up two companies from my reserve to Captain Crumbecker, who was posted on a large rock, as a post of observation. I was to strengthen him with two companies of mine. Then two companies of the Thirty-second Regiment, on picket duty, were posted at the battery, and two companies of my regiment. I had then the command by the battery. I was not present at the second fire on the heights. I had taken a line at the batteries for their protection, as I was ordered. After the second fire I saw a very great confusion of these new regiments mostly; the One hundred and twenty-sixth ran down in a very great haste. They left their position and everything. Colonel Ford was at that time present by the battery. He was very mad, and gave me peremptory orders that I should not let them go out. They could not go through my lines, because I gave orders, when I saw the first retreat, to fix bayonets and shoot every one who should undertake to go through my line. I think the most of them went on the other side, on the left of our line. I sent out a few companies to hunt them up, and we had very great difficulty to get them again in order, so that the whole day I, and Colonel Downey, of the Third Maryland Regiment, had pretty nearly nothing else to do but to hunt after them to get them in order again; but it was impossible to restore the order. In the evening, after 4 o'clock, I saw most of the forces come down. I had no knowledge then why they all came down. They told me they had orders to withdraw themselves. My regiment was divided in many parts, and I had no orders to leave. Therefore I stood there until all came down; and after a short time I saw the Thirty-second Ohio Regiment come down too. I sent my adjutant to Colonel Ford, who was not present in his quarters at that time; but his adjutant gave me the order to concentrate my regiment and go over to Bolivar Heights. This is all I know about the Maryland Heights evacuation. I lost there about 14 wounded and 1 missing. About the Harper's Ferry affair, it was Saturday when the force was withdrawn from Maryland Heights. We had orders to be wide awake the whole night Saturday night.

Question. At what time of the day did the evacuation occur?

Answer. I cannot tell exactly the time; but I think it was between 4 and 5 in the afternoon. I had no opportunity to notice the time, but I think it was between 4 and 5 o'clock. I went to my colonel when I had withdrawn my regiment. Colonel D'Utassy at that time commanded the First Brigade. I reported myself to him. He asked me the reason why we left Maryland Heights. He was angry that I had left with my regiment. I told him I was one of the last, and that I did it by orders. The next morning the cannonade began from Loudoun Heights on our camp. That was Sunday. We were in readiness till the afternoon at 2 o'clock. In the morning, I think at 10 or 11 o'clock, I received an order from Colonel D'Utassy to send immediately down two companies to his headquarters, and report, under the command of Captain Hollingsby [Hollinde], to go and retake the four brass howitzers which were spiked the evening before and left on Maryland Heights, and an ensign left there. I sent down my two companies, and they went over with another company from the Sixty-fifth Illinois Regiment and brought those spiked brass guns down, and everything, baggage of officers, &c., that was left, and very little ammunition. In the afternoon, at 2 o'clock, I had orders to go with my regiment out on the right extreme and reconnoiter with four companies, to feel the enemy. After an hour, or perhaps less than that, we met the enemy's cavalry in force, and my skirmishers were shelled out from the woods and withdrawn. We again sent out a new force that relieved them; they stood there until dark in the woods, waiting for an attack.

Question. Was the flight of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiment universal?

Answer. It was almost universal.

Question. We have had the statement made here by one of the witnesses that, in the confusion, none of the officers of that regiment, except a single lieutenant, could be found. That was after the colonel was wounded.

Answer. I have seen officers, just like the men, skedaddle.

Question. Did you see any exception to this among the officers? Did you see any officers of that regiment endeavoring to rally their men?

Answer. I saw the adjutant of the regiment and a few lieutenants.

Question. Could you name them ?

Answer. I could not; I was not acquainted with them.

Question. Did you see any captains ?

Answer. I saw captains, too.

Question. What were they doing ? You say the officers skedaddled.

Answer. They went down to help me to rally their men; a very few officers; I noticed the adjutant.

Question. Did they run in the first instance with their men ?

Answer. I saw officers run with their men, but I did not notice particularly.

By the COURT:

Question. Were the enemy pressing and following them at the time, or were they running without cause ?

Answer. The enemy were pressing, and the Thirty-second and our men kept them back.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. At what distance were the enemy ?

Answer. Perhaps 100 or 120 yards from us.

Question. Was the fire at all a murderous one ?

Answer. It was a very heavy fire.

Question. What was the loss ?

Answer. I cannot tell you the loss; I can only tell of my regiment.

Question. What response did these troops make to your appeals ? What explanation, if any, did they offer of their conduct ?

Answer. Some of them said they had orders to retreat. The others said, "Our comrades went down and we followed them." I was asking in a very peremptory manner, for I was very angry with them, "What is the reason you run so ?" A few said, "We had orders to retreat;" and the others said, "We came after our comrades." After their colonel was wounded nobody could keep them back. We brought them back, but in a few moments they came down again; they skedaddled again. There were a few companies, as I recollect, who stood well.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you see their major run ?

Answer. I did not see him.

Question. You did not see him at all ?

Answer. At the first fire I saw him; he was on the left of his regiment. I and Major Hewitt were the only old field officers there, and we did not care for our men alone, but for all. I saw their major; he stood there in the line of his regiment.

Question. Did you see him trying to get his men back ?

Answer. No, sir; I did not meet him after that until in Chicago.

Question. Was he under fire when you saw him ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. He stood in his position ?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was at the first fire I saw him.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity of evacuating the heights at the time it occurred ?

Answer. My judgment is that we should not have evacuated the heights. We ought, perhaps, to have had more re-enforcements.

Question. How long do you think you could have held the heights with the force there ?

Answer. I do not know, because it was a very great confusion among these new regiments. But if we had had fresh troops there, to retake the line or make up our line again and advance with our two old regiments, the Thirty-second Ohio and my regiment, we could have retaken very easily the breastworks. The new regiments, after the second skedaddle, were very hard to manage.

By the COURT :

Question. If you had had another regiment as good as your own, you could have held the position ?

Answer. O, my God ! yes ; for it was a very good position. But the new troops were very raw troops ; I had no confidence in them.

Question. Was there any fighting going on at the time you left the heights ?

Answer. O, no.

Question. How long before had the last firing stopped ?

Answer. It was at least one hour or two hours after the fighting before we all fell back.

Question. There was no fighting when you left ?

Answer. Skirmish firing ; no pressure.

Question. How many men did you lose altogether in your regiment on Maryland Heights ?

Answer. We lost 15 or 16 killed and wounded. We fired our ammunition all out, and then I received from Colonel Ford ammunition for our regiment again. My men on the heights fired very near 50 rounds, every man ; that was very big firing. But only those two regiments did their duty. The Thirty-second regiment fought very bravely.

Question. How many men were in your eight companies ?

Answer. Very few.

Question. About how many ?

Answer. Perhaps 280 men ; I cannot tell exactly about that. I left the largest companies at home, because they were needed by the battery and to do picket duty.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Do you intend to say that, in your opinion, as matters stood, without any additional re-enforcements, you think that at the time the evacuation took place it ought not to have been made ?

Answer. It ought not. We could hold it for a time until we could get re-enforcements. The enemy came in a heavy force, but they were not pressing. Only their skirmishers had disturbed our force.

Question. They were not pressing in large force ?

Answer. Not at that time. They came up in a very large force, as you could see, but their main body was not there then.

Question. As our forces fell back, they did not press on and occupy the position you left ?

Answer. No, sir ; only their skirmishers occupied the position. We saw them, but very few of them in the position then. When I went up for my two companies and the two companies of the Thirty-second Ohio, under the command of Captain Crumbecker, we saw them there in heavy force, but only their advance was there.

By the COURT :

Question. How large a force do you think the enemy had there altogether ?

Answer. At the time when I saw it (we could not judge very well, because there were woods), there was at least three brigades. They were drawn up in three lines. In the afternoon most of the time I was down by the battery.

By Colonel FORD :

Question. At what time in the day were you placed at the battery in command of the battery ?

Answer. At 9 o'clock.

Question. After that time were you up on the hill at any time ?

Answer. I was twice up.

Question. At what time in the day were you last up ?

Answer. I think about 4 o'clock, when I concentrated my regiment, when I saw Captain Crumbecker, and he had orders to recall his men posted out.

Question. You speak of two companies being added to your Garibaldians. How many of the Garibaldi regiment had you ?

Answer. Six companies.

Question. How many men ?

Answer. About 280.

By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. Had you enough of ammunition, and who procured it for you ?

Answer. After my ammunition was gone, which I brought, Colonel Ford himself ordered his adjutant to send me up, immediately, ammunition, I think from his own regiment.

Question. I mean when you first started from the camp.

Answer. I had, in aggregate, from 40 to 50 rounds to a man.

Question. What was the conduct of the officers during the fighting that occurred ? I mean those now under arrest—General White, Colonel Trimble, Colonel Ford, and myself.

Answer. I had very little opportunity to see General White in Harper's Ferry, but I knew him in Winchester as a very calm, cool soldier, and he has my full confidence. Colonel Ford I saw on Maryland Heights; although sick, unwell, he was very often there by the battery, and always seemed to be the man to give orders out. I saw him present there several times with his adjutant. I have a good opinion of him. Colonel Trimble I did not know as a soldier. I have met him in private circles often. Colonel D'Utassy I have seen on many occasions, and he always behaved himself as an old soldier and a good soldier. I saw him at Harper's Ferry when my men were shelled out from the woods. He went himself and brought them back again into the woods, posted them himself, with my adjutant. In the night time, when there was any firing, he was there with the men, and was always present on every occasion. He has my full confidence also.

Question. Do you know anything about the surrender ? What were the orders I gave before the surrender took place, and who resisted the surrender ?

Answer. I know you told me, when I was down by you, that we would try, perhaps, to cut our way out. You said: "I will not surrender; we will fight until the last, and if everybody will surrender, I will always be against it." You told me that in presence of Captain Von Schlen and Colonel Cameron, and another officer whose name I do not recollect. I know when I was present, and you sent Lieutenant Parker, of the One hundred and fifteenth Regiment, with a message to Colonel Miles about cutting our way through, and I know you received orders from Colonel Miles that it was not possible to do so.

Question. At the time of the surrender, or rather before the surrender, did I give orders to unscrew the nipples of the rifles?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And what did I do about the flags?

Answer. You took my flag, and you put it somewhere, and I received it again in Annapolis; and also the whole brigade flags; and you gave orders that I should give orders to my men that they should unscrew their nipples and locks if possible, the nipples sure, from our rifles, and we did so.

Question. What reason did I give for this order?

Answer. So that in case we had to surrender the enemy should not find our rifles in proper condition to use them. I gave these orders, and it was done.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know why the guns were not brought off Maryland Heights at the time they were evacuated?

Answer. I asked Captain McGrath why did we not take the guns. He said he had orders to spike them and leave them there. That was his answer.

Question. That is all you know about it?

Answer. That is all I know about it. I received no orders except from Colonel Ford's adjutant, ever, to leave; I received no written orders.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. How long have you been a soldier, and when did you receive your first commission?

Answer. I am a soldier since my fourteenth year, since 1843. I received my first commission the 14th of May, 1849.

Question. And how long in this country?

Answer. Since the 17th of May, 1861.

Lieut. H. M. BINNEY, recalled by General White, and examined as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. Were you present at a conversation between Colonel Miles and General White concerning the line of defense. If so, state what was proposed by General White, if anything, and what Colonel Miles' reply was.

Answer. General White came down to Colonel Miles' headquarters, and I was present at one conversation. General White proposed to contract the lines, throwing back the left wing into a deep ravine, nearly a quarter of a mile from the left flank of the heights, to the left of the Shenandoah road, going from the Ferry to the heights. He represented that he thought our lines were too extended; that he thought by contracting the lines it would make the place more defensible in the case of an assault. Colonel Miles objected to it, stating that it would, he thought—I forget the exact words. He objected to it at any rate, stating that he desired to make a fight on the ridge of Bolivar Heights; that there was where he proposed to fight it out in case he was obliged to.

Question. Do you recollect his saying that the ravine would be enfiladed from Loudoun Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; he represented that if the enemy should plant a battery on the plateau at Loudoun Heights, it would enfilade the position.

Question. What was the direction of this line? How would it bear from the old line?

Answer. Obliquely to the left, throwing back the left, running obliquely from the slope of Bolivar Heights.

Question. Will you point out on this diagram about the location of that ravine?

Answer. [The witness explained on the map the location of the ravine.] General White replied to Colonel Miles that if he should await an assault on the heights it would then be impossible to withdraw the line to the ravine.

Question. Would the line proposed have been sufficiently contracted to have admitted of proper support by reserves, instead of being compelled to maintain a single line of battle, as was necessary on Bolivar Heights?

Answer. In my opinion, it would, and I think it would have been a much more advantageous position than to undertake to contend against an assault made by the enemy on the heights. It would have been nearer the supports from the intrenchments on Camp Hill, and if the enemy had shown themselves on Bolivar Heights to attack the position General White proposed, the guns at Camp Hill could have attacked them by firing right over our troops.

Maj. WILLIAM H. BAIRD, called by the Government, and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state what position you hold in the military service?

Answer. Major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York.

Question. Will you state briefly the circumstances which led to the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Will I commence from the time I went upon the heights?

Question. Begin when you went over there, when you had personal knowledge of what you state.

Answer. On the 12th of September last I was field officer of the day. I was out visiting the lines of pickets, when I received orders to rejoin my regiment at once, as we had marching orders. They sent an orderly for me. We started about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, I think, or 3.30. The regiment at that time was under the command of Colonel Sherrill. I believe his orders were to report to Colonel Ford at or near McGrath's battery. We halted there, and he went to report, which I suppose he did, to Colonel Ford. Major Hewitt, of the Thirty-second Ohio, then conducted us from the battery on to the heights. When we got on the heights we heard picket firing or slight skirmishing. We advanced up to the skirmishers and found a company of the Thirty-second Ohio, under the command of Captain Hibbets. It was then about the sun an hour, or perhaps three-quarters of an hour, high. We formed in line of battle across the mountain in rear of the skirmishers, expecting an attack. We could hear the enemy in pretty large force, by their talk, as I judged; we could hear numerous commands given as they were forming in line of battle, as I supposed by their commands. We could hear once in awhile a word that would indicate something of that kind. We remained there over night. The skirmishing ceased when it became dark. However, they kept up a pretty sharp skirmish from that time until dark. We laid on our arms all night. In the morning, Colonel Sherrill detailed Company B, of our regiment, and advanced it on the left of Captain Hibbets' company of the Thirty-second Ohio, to act with him on the same line of skirmishers. They were attacked by a large skirmishing force at first, and driven pretty well in to our lines. They rallied and drove the enemy back again. In the mean time our men, thinking they were gaining a victory or getting the advantage, all set up a shout, which discovered their strength to the enemy, I thought. About a half an hour from that time, or perhaps a little over (this was after sunrise; perhaps the sun was half an hour high or more—we could not tell on the mountain), they came out with a large force. They were pretty well scattered over the woods, and formed a longer line than we did. Our men, with a great deal of talking to and orders being [given] that they were not to fire until they received the command to fire, allowed the skirmishers to go to the rear, which they did in the center. The flanks being on the sides of the hill, they could not get around the flanks very well. There was a road leading near our center—passing through our center. We were formed across the brow of the mountain; they fired by file, and fired about three or four times, I should think.

By the COURT:

Question. What do you mean by firing three or four times by file?

Answer. I mean as near as I could get at it. I could not tell by volleys.

Question. You mean each man fired three or four times?

Answer. Yes, sir; they were green troops, and it is almost impossible to get green troops to fire by volleys; they almost generally fire by file. From the time we remained there, I should think, they fired three or four, or four or five, times a piece. They occupied that ground some fifteen minutes. They fell back. I heard no orders to fall back. The men were themselves pressed back by the force in front of them, and in some confusion, for the reason that there was underbrush, or some kind of a vine; especially on the left, where I was. The men had very hard work to get through it at all. There was crooked circling brush, something like grape-vines; there were breastworks thrown up roughly of logs, some 40 rods in our rear; and the only way they could get to the rear, to these breastworks, was by this single road; that is the only way they could get there any ways quickly. They fell back, firing in rear of these breastworks. As soon as all our forces got in rear of the breastworks they delivered their fire again, and succeeded in checking the enemy and driving them back. There was a slashing of timber, or abatis, that was cut down in front of this breastwork, I should think about 100 yards wide, running parallel with the works. We had been ordered by Major Hewitt, if pressed back, to get in rear of these works and hold them if possible. We succeeded in checking the enemy and driving them back. The firing ceased, and there was no firing for some half or three-quarters of an hour, I should think; I cannot exactly judge the time; but about that time. After about a half or three-quarters of an hour they then attacked us by firing heavy volleys. If I remember right, there was not a single skirmish shot fired. They came right out and delivered volley after volley. Our men returned the fire, and held the place some twenty minutes, I should judge, perhaps longer, not to exceed a half an hour, however. I was on the right at the time, or nearly in the center, when the firing commenced. The colonel was in the center. I ran to the right and took some 40 men. I took them along the brow of the mountain, or at the top of the height, to prevent being flanked on the right. There is a ridge of rocks higher than the other portion of the hill; a kind of a wall, you may say, of rocks that ran back at right angles with the work. About that time I saw a horseman come up the path that came about in rear of our center. Our colonel at that time had been wounded. What orders he gave I do not know, of my own knowledge. I saw the center and left begin to fall back. On the right, where I was, I could see large parties of men filing along, under cover of the woods, on the side of the hill below on our right; and my men who were standing on these rocks commenced firing at them, some of them. Before the second firing commenced, in the interval between the first skirmish with them and this second firing, Major Hewitt came up and told our colonel to hold these works as long as possible, and, if obliged to fall back, to go down by a path, which I did not know was there, to McGrath's battery, to fall down the northwestern slope of the mountain by a by-path that ran down in rear of McGrath's battery, and to make a stand at McGrath's battery and to hold it. When I saw the center, or rather when my men saw the left and center, give way, which was on the side we would have to fall back on, they fell back also without orders, running back along the brow on this ledge of rocks, jumping from one rock to another, toward the lookout. There were some blocks lying across one another. I supposed it was a place they had made signals from, or something of that kind. We crossed over near the block-house. The rebels by that time, some of them, had got to the breastworks where we had been, in the rear of them. They kept up a heavy fire all the time. We crossed over this path I speak of in the center of the mountain, going right along the brow of the mountain, and got on this path that led down the northwestern slope of the mountain to McGrath's battery. A portion of the regiment, or of all the regiments, had gone back on this path leading right straight over the mountain. I took the portion that was with me, and went down this path leading to McGrath's battery, and rejoined the other portion up above McGrath's battery. There was quite a nice road leading from McGrath's battery until you reached the highest portion of the mountain overlooking Harper's Ferry. I rejoined the remainder of the regiment that was there. In fact, the left and right had all mingled together. They were not in any particular line in rear of these works. They had come in such order, filing in, that they had not got their proper places in line. We were then ordered to go back on to the mountain; to go back by the path leading straight over the mountain again. I got my men together after some little trouble, and started back. I got about the length of my regiment on through the path, which was so narrow that the men had to go single file mostly, when I was ordered to halt by a lieutenant whom I did not know. I was a stranger to nearly all the officers there, my own as well as the rest.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. In whose name did he order you ?

Answer. He told me to halt and let my men rest, and said to me in a whisper, so that the men should not hear, that the order was to go off the mountain, to evacuate the mountain, but that he had not received it officially. I halted and gave the order to rest, and the men sat down on the rocks. In about twenty minutes he came back and said that we were to evacuate the mountain, and he wanted no confusion ; we must go quietly and in order. I do not know as he said it was by the order of Colonel Ford. I believe he expressed it in this manner : That Colonel Ford did not want any damned rout or noise about it ; that he wanted everything in order. I called my regiment to an *attention* ; gave the order to *about face* ; then filed down on this road by the left flank, and closed up. They were in one and two ranks on this path ; wherever they could double they did. I halted the left of the regiment when I thought we had gone a sufficient distance on this wide road to allow my regiment to close up. They closed up in four ranks, and we moved down to McGrath's battery. I was acquainted with Captain McGrath ; we were formerly captains in the same regiment. When I got there I halted the regiment in the works. I found Captain McGrath dismantling his guns. I rode up and spoke to him. There was nothing said, however, about the evacuation. Colonel Ford then came and rode at the head of my men with me down off the mountain. I think likely I was the first regiment. I did not see any other regiment ahead of me, that left the mountain as a regiment. When I got down on to the canal, or near the lock (I had eight companies on the hill ; two of my companies had been detailed as pickets the day before), I met these two companies coming over, or standing at an *order arms*. I ordered them to fall into their places in the line, and they marched over with me to our position that we occupied on Bolivar Heights, and had occupied for a week or so.

By the COURT :

Question. You had only eight companies with you on Maryland Heights ?

Answer. That was all.

Question. Can you name the officers, if any, who remained at the breastworks after the men retreated without orders ?

Answer. I had forgotten one thing. I think Lieutenant-Colonel Downey, if I remember right, came up while we were there during the last fight we had with the rebels. He came up with about 250 or 300 men ; it was pretty hard to judge how many. They came up under the fire in this path leading through the woods, and it was so narrow and so rough that the men could not come in any order at all. They were compelled to go along singly, as they could. He came up just as the firing commenced ; came up under the fire, and deployed his men along the works wherever they could get in to assist. I was not acquainted with my officers much ; they were all strangers to me mostly. I knew none of the Thirty-second Ohio, for I had never seen a man of them, except Captain Hibbets, and him I only saw the night before. I do not remember of any officer, unless it was the captain of Company B, of our regiment. He was on the right with me. His name is Aikins ; I cannot tell his first name.

Question. That does not have anything to do with the question, I think.

Answer. You wanted to know what officers remained. That is the officer I speak of. I was on the extreme right of the line nearly, on a ledge of rocks which run back at right angles to the line of battle. That was nearly our extreme right. The mountain then started from there and ran right down pretty steep.

Question. You do not recollect any officers that remained ?

Answer. They all nearly went together.

Question. All ran off with the men ?

Answer. They tried to stop the men ; but in the confusion it was hard to tell.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. It was hard to tell whether they were running with the men or trying to stop them ?

Answer. We could see some officers try to stop them. I had as much as I could do with my own men with me, trying to stop them.

By the COURT:

Question. How many had you killed in your regiment?

Answer. I think 43 killed and wounded.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Was the fire, when the men broke and ran, a very murderous one?

Answer. It was a very heavy fire.

Question. Did they remain at all after the fire commenced before they fled?

Answer. I have already said they fought some twenty minutes. I have been in some eight or ten fights, and I think it was as heavy a fire, for the time, as I ever saw.

By the COURT:

Question. What were the letters of your two companies on picket?

Answer. I could not tell.

Question. Do you recollect the names of the captains?

Answer. I do not. I went out and established the pickets myself; but the officers were all strangers to me. I cannot tell the names of half of them now.

Question. Did you rally your regiment again? Did your regiment ever come together again after that?

Answer. Yes, sir; I said I got them together above McGrath's battery, and marched them off.

Question. How far was that to the rear?

Answer. It was nearly a mile.

Question. What was the name of your adjutant?

Answer. The acting adjutant's name was Samuel A. Barras.

Question. Was he with you all the time?

Answer. No, sir; he was in the center.

Question. Do you know where he is now?

Answer. He was at Chicago when I left there.

Question. At the time your regiment fell back, how many men went with you when you went back?

Answer. I should think there were about 75. I was back in the rear pretty well, because I had the farthest to go to get to this side of the mountain, after we fell back.

Question. How were these men, in order or straggling along?

Answer. They were going in single file. They could not go in any other way. It was just a deer path.

Question. Did the other troops that were in the breastworks with your regiment fall back at the same time?

Answer. They did.

Question. Did your regiment break up or disperse more than any of the other regiments?

Answer. Not that I know of. My regiment had a number on their hats, about an inch and a half long, 126, so that a man could tell them as far as he could see them. In the other regiments I did not see any number on their hats.

Question. Did you see any efforts made on the part of officers of other regiments to rally your men?

Answer. I did not, any more than all the officers were there, and they were rallying all the men. Whether they were rallying mine or their own I do not know. They were encouraging their men, like all the officers I saw, to try to hold the works.

Question. Did you hear any complaints of your regiment, particularly, that day?

Answer. I did not that day. I heard afterward that they had a great deal of trouble in trying to stop my regiment. I took it for granted that they had seen a few of my men with other men, as they were straggling down the mountain, and took them all for the One hundred and twenty-sixth, because they saw this big number. I think I fetched off my regiment in as good order, when we did evacuate the heights, as any regiment, under the circumstances.

Question. We had reference to their coming from the breastworks. Did they come from the breastwork in as good order as any other regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was no order about it. They could not fall back in order. If they fell back at all they had to scatter. It was one of the worst places I ever saw. It was a complete ledge of sharp-edged rocks, and brush, and logs. In fact, I saw no place where the men could get back at any advantage only by this path.

Question. What was done with the killed and wounded there at the breastwork?

Answer. The wounded were taken to the rear by men helping them off.

Question. What became of the killed?

Answer. They were left there, all that I saw.

Question. Do you know how many were killed in your regiment?

Answer. I do not know exactly how many there. The killed did not amount to more than 5 or 6 or 7; something like that. We afterward had 13 killed on Bolivar Heights during the cannonading, and 7 wounded. I think 1 officer was killed.

Question. How long have you been in service?

Answer. I started a year ago last May.

Question. In what capacity, and in what fights have you been?

Answer. I started in the Thirty-eighth New York as a captain. The first battle I was in was at Bull Run, a year ago. I was promoted to major; my commission dates the 11th of January last. I was through the siege of Yorktown and in the battle at Williamsburg.

Question. In the same regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You were in the battle of Williamsburg?

Answer. Yes, sir; and at Fair Oaks, and through the change of base there from Fair Oaks, White Oak Swamp, and Malvern Hill.

Question. Compared with the regiments you have seen in any of the fights heretofore, how did your regiment behave at Maryland Heights?

Answer. I thought they behaved very well. I think a green regiment will behave much better in a place like that than they will in the open field. My regiment had not been drilled; they had not been taught their loadings and firings. They behaved as well as any green regiment I ever saw. There are always some in all regiments; I never saw one but what there were some skulks who will go to the rear if they can get there.

Question. Do you recollect any officer in the regiment that you considered behaved very badly that day?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you mean you saw no officer?

Answer. I saw no officer. I think Captain Hibbets is a very brave and gallant officer. He acted very coolly with his skirmishers, and held the enemy in check as long as he could.

Question. Does he belong to your regiment?

Answer. No, sir; he belongs to the Thirty-second Ohio. He was shot right through the ear.

Question. What was your opinion as to the necessity of evacuating Maryland Heights at the time they were evacuated?

Answer. Well, I do not think there was force enough there to hold them; and if I may be allowed to express what I think about it, there had been very bad arrangement in the first place in fortifying the place, to say nothing of the hill; the timber had not been cut down.

Question. I do not care about that. The question is, what do you think of the necessity of evacuating the heights at the time they were evacuated? Was there an absolute necessity for its being done at that time?

Answer. I think that there was, under the circumstances.

Question. How long before they were evacuated had the last fight taken place?

Answer. I do not know whether there had been any skirmishing with the enemy after we got through or not. That was about 10 o'clock—after 9 o'clock.

Question. Did you know what was going on above?

Answer. I did not.

Question. Did you hear firing going on?

Answer. I could hear once in a while a single shot; but the cannon were making such a racket that it was pretty hard to distinguish musketry firing. What with the big guns there and the guns on Camp Hill, there was a shell passing through the air nearly all the time; and, when shells are passing, it is pretty hard to hear musketry, unless it is very heavy.

Question. Where were they throwing shells from—Camp Hill?

Answer. I could not see the guns; I could hear the course of the shells. I judged they were throwing over McGrath's battery to the right, and Captain McGrath was throwing over the northwest slope of the mountain, where he supposed the enemy to be. That was what I supposed, as nearly as I could follow the course of the shell. It was all trees there. I supposed he was trying to throw his shells as near as he could in the rear of those breastworks that we had been fighting behind.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Were you in a position to see the eastern slope of the mountain, where the force under the command of Captain Crumbecker was?

Answer. I do not know Captain Crumbecker.

Question. You do not know where his force was placed?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Were you in a position to see the force under Major Hewitt over to the right, looking over to Pleasant Valley?

Answer. I saw some companies. I did not know who they were.

Question. Along down toward Solomon's Gap?

Answer. I did not see them.

Question. Were you in a position so as to discover the force of the

enemy approaching in front and by way of Sandy Hook, coming up on the left?

Answer. You mean in the valley?

Question. In the valley.

Answer. I could not. I never was by the lookout, only at the time we left the field.

Question. Were you in a position to see the enemy approaching down toward Unsell's, an old house across toward the spring, and down that side?

Answer. I saw none.

Question. Did you know that on the point of the hill I had a force stationed, under command of Captain Palmer, so as to prevent them from erecting a battery there and shelling us out?

Answer. I did not.

Question. You do not know the arrangement of the forces there?

Answer. I do not. I only got there when the sun was about an hour high. I only noticed where Captain McGrath was throwing his shells as I was passing the battery with my men.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know of a single one of the enemy being killed or wounded during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Do you mean on Sunday and Monday?

Question. At any time during the operations there; of your own knowledge.

Answer. I saw men fall. I do not know whether they were killed or not.

Question. How many?

Answer. I could not say how many; perhaps a half dozen.

Question. Where was that?

Answer. Around the breastworks on Maryland Heights. The enemy were covered with the brush; the bigger portion of the time you could not tell where they were, that is, only by their fire; you could not see them. There were trees in our front, that is, small trees felled. I should think something like chestnut trees, with yellow leaves on them. The trees had been cut down and the leaves had withered and faded. The enemy were in the edge of this brush.

Question. Did not your regiment break and run off, and disgrace itself on that occasion?

Answer. Not that I know of.

Question. You were there, were you not?

Answer. I was.

The Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 9, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Lieut. Col. S. W. DOWNEY, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What position do you hold in the military service?

Answer. I am lieutenant-colonel of the Third Regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers.

Question. Were you present at Harper's Ferry on the occasion of the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was on the Maryland Heights with my regiment.

Question. Will you state your judgment as to the necessity of that evacuation at the time it was made?

Answer. Do you desire my opinion?

Question. Yes, sir; your opinion as a military man.

Answer. I think that with the troops we had there at that time we would have been compelled, perhaps, during that night or the next morning to have evacuated the heights.

Question. Unless re-enforced?

Answer. Yes, sir; unless re-enforced. I will say, in connection with that opinion, that I re-enforced Colonel Ford with my regiment on the same day the heights were abandoned.

Question. Did you witness the engagement that took place in which the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers took part?

Answer. I will state that my order from Colonel Miles was, when I reached Maryland Heights to report to Colonel Ford. I have the written order in my pocket to that effect. I reported to Colonel Ford. Colonel Ford desired me to divide my command. In addition to four companies of my regiment, he gave me three companies of an Ohio regiment—the Thirty-second, if I am not mistaken. Four companies of my regiment were retained by Colonel Ford, who stated at the time, and it afterward proved true, that he sent those four companies around on the eastern road, going in the direction of the lookout. With the four companies and the three companies of Ohio troops, I was sent up the western slope with orders—as I understood at the time—to report to Major Hewitt. I had no written order to that effect. An order was placed in my hands which was directed to Major Steiner, which I have in my pocket. I marched, with seven companies, up a by-path, with an orderly to guide me, for I had never been on Maryland Heights before. Just as I reached the lookout, which is on the top of Maryland Heights—my men had not all come up; they were closing up—I heard a tremendous firing, and the bullets commenced rattling all around us, and I think perhaps two or three of my command were wounded at that time. I was talking with some officer at the time; I do not know his name. I saw our force within a short distance of me, behind some kind of breastwork made of logs, fallen trees, timbers, which lay right across the ridge. This officer, whoever he was—and I thought so myself at the time—said to me, “You better re-enforce Colonel Sherrill immediately.” I had never seen Colonel Sherrill—did not know who he was. It afterward turned out that he was the colonel of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York. I immediately headed my men and took the seven companies in behind this log-work. The firing was very brisk and very heavy. With the forces I brought we held the enemy. I had no straps on; I was dressed as I am now. I reported to Colonel Sherrill who I was, and said that I had command of the regiment that had just re-enforced him. He started over toward the left, and I kept my position to the right, perhaps toward the center it was, and kept walking backward and forward, rallying the men, getting them up to the breastworks, when an orderly rode up to the line—the fight had continued some time; I do not know how long, perhaps a half an hour, perhaps three-quarters—an orderly rode up to the line on a horse; said he, “The order is to retreat.” I turned to him and said, “Who gives that order?” I understood him to say that it was the order of Colonel Ford. Said I, “Sir, there can be no order to retreat.” I turned to the officers and men, and said, “There certainly cannot be an order to retreat from this position.” Although I had never been there before, I had looked around and seen the position of things. I said, “If we lose this position we lose everything; we can hold this position unless the enemy press heavier than they do now.” Some one else rode up to the line and said, “The order is to retreat.” The men commenced falling back. I turned to the men and said, “For God's sake, don't fall back; we must hold this position.” But they commenced retreating. I turned to the orderly and said, “Give me your horse, and I will see who gave this order to retreat.” I then took command myself, as I understood Colonel Sherrill was wounded, and I supposed I was the chief in command. I supposed the order was wrong. I jumped on the horse and rode down the mountain. I rode through the men first, and halted my own regiment,

with those that Major Grafflin had brought up, on a little ridge this side of the lookout; that is, from where the battery was posted, and I formed a line across there. Just as I got up there Major Grafflin, of my regiment, said that he was ordered to cover our retreat. I asked by whom. He said by Major Hewitt. I said, "Major, you hold your position here until I return, because I think the order is wrong, and that there is no order to retreat." I rode down then to see Colonel Ford, to see what was the order. I saw Colonel Ford at the battery, in company with Colonel Miles. Said I, "Colonel Ford, an order, said to come from you, has been given for the forces to fall back, to retreat." I do not know as those were the exact words; that is the sense of it, at any rate. Says Colonel Ford, "I gave no such order at all." I turned to Colonel Miles and said, "Colonel Miles, did you give the order?" Said he, "I did not." Said I, "An officer on the heights gave such an order, and said the order was given to him by the commanding officer." Then Colonel Ford and Colonel Miles ordered me to retake the position. I asked, "What troops will you give me to support me?" I think Colonel Ford said, "The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiment will support you;" perhaps some other troops. That was about 11 o'clock in the morning, I think. I then got on my horse and took an orderly and went up the western slope again, meeting some few men near Unsell's house, I think. After I struck the path up the mountain, I do not think I met a single man. I went in sight of the lookout. I was afraid to go there alone, for I knew the Confederates were in force behind those breastworks, the logs thrown up. I then struck along the ridge and went out to where I knew my regiment was posted. I found Major Grafflin there; he had the advance. I called him and Adjutant Ambrose, of my regiment, up to me, and a lieutenant of one of the regiments on the heights. I do not know what his name is; he had a red cap on. I called those three gentlemen up, and called Major Hewitt up. Said I, "Major, that position was evacuated or left, it was said, by your order. Here is the horse of the orderly that brought the order." Said I, "Did you give the order for the force to fall back from that position?" Said he, "I did give the order." I then took command of all the troops, by order of Colonel Ford, that were on the heights, and took the advance with my regiment. I think there were some other troops besides the One hundred and twenty-sixth with me. I do not know what regiments they were. I do not know that the Thirty-second Ohio were there then. Some of the troops were rallied, and my major took command of them. I visited Colonel Ford the second time to get re-enforcements. I can state, in this connection, what Major Grafflin, of my regiment, said of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment, I think it was. He was ordered to advance, and Captain Pratt's company, of my regiment, was put in the advance as skirmishers, and then my regiment followed, with the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, if I mistake not. They encountered the enemy within perhaps 400 yards of the lookout, and the skirmishers were driven in. At the first fire, the first volley, whatever troops they were, fled, so Major Grafflin stated. When I came up I found that he had taken a very good position, but he said he could not advance any farther unless he had re-enforcements. I then took command of the regiment myself, and sent my adjutant to Colonel Ford to say to him that I must have re-enforcements in order to hold that position where I was, and that I must have still more re-enforcements in order to execute his first order. My men were then skirmishing slightly, not very heavily. From all appearances, I concluded the enemy were in heavy force this side of the lookout; that is, between the battery along the ridge and the lookout. That is the narrative, as near as I can remember.

Question. The evacuation took place at what hour?

Answer. I reached the heights, I think, about 9 o'clock. At the time I reached the summit I suppose it must have been 10 o'clock. I had my watch with me, but did not look at it, as I was very busy at the time. When they commenced falling back from the lookout I think it was about 11 o'clock.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you witness any gross misconduct on the part of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiment?

Answer. I do not know. I know that there was a regiment in particular that I turned to and said, "Men, we must retake this position."

Question. You do not know that that was the One hundred and twenty-sixth?

Answer. I know that there were some of the One hundred and twenty-sixth with them; I do not know that they were all of the One hundred and twenty-sixth. I turned to the officers and men and made them a speech, and told them that we must retake that position; and some officers—who they were I do not know—turned to me

and said, "Sir, we have held a council of war, and we have concluded that these men will not fight." I turned to the men. Said I, "Men, if you have no officers to lead you, I will lead you myself, as your immediate commander. If there is a single man here who will follow me, I will lead him." And out of the whole number there—some 300, I should think—only five men stepped out. I put them on the left as skirmishers.

Question. To what regiment did those five men belong?

Answer. To the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment, I think. I never reached where those logs had been cut down until the heavy firing had commenced. I never had been there before, and knew nothing at all about the position. I was looking around to ascertain the ground.

Question. Have you the names of those five men?

Answer. No, sir. I wished afterward I had taken them. They came to me and said, "Sir, we are the representatives of the regiment." I am not positive that they belonged to the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment, but I think they did. I will say further, however, that behind those breastworks, as long as the men fought, the officers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth, those I knew, fought as well as any others there. I will say that for them. Colonel Sherrill was side by side with me, and he did his duty as nobly as any officer I ever saw. The major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth was on the left, I understood. I did not see him.

Question. Was this after or before the colonel was wounded?

Answer. He was wounded just after I first saw him.

Question. Then, at the time these five men volunteered the colonel was wounded?

Answer. Yes, sir; two or three hours before that.

Question. Did you see the officer in command of that regiment who succeeded the colonel?

Answer. I did not. I do not know who was in command of the regiment at the time.

Question. Did you recognize him among those officers who said they had held a council of war, and the men would not fight?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Can you name any of those officers?

Answer. No, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What was their position? Were they captains, lieutenants, or of other grades?

Answer. I think that Major Graffin, of my regiment, could give you more information on that point than I can.

Question. When you addressed the men at that time, what was their bearing? Were they standing in any order?

Answer. No order. It was impossible to form the men in any order on the heights; the trees were so thick, and the rocks, and everything.

Question. Did they dissent from the declaration of their officers that there had been a council of war, and the men would not fight?

Answer. No, sir; they said nothing at all. I posted a guard at one time, and told them to shoot any man who should attempt to go down to the battery. I took out my revolver to them at one time, and my surgeon did the same thing. There were some of all regiments; perhaps some men of my regiment. I do not know that there were in this number; but at the time of the retreat of the men from the breastworks there were men of all regiments scattered all through the woods. The officers got separated from the men, and they went on down toward the battery. I have this to say about my men—that they did very well on Maryland Heights; they followed me. That is all I have to say for them. Where there is a retreat ordered in that way, at

any place, take the best men in the world and there will always be some who will become scattered and demoralized. I have seen enough to know that.

Question. How were you doing when the order finally came to retreat?

Answer. The enemy were picking off my men. They were skirmishing some little. We had a line of battle thrown up across the ridge, and I believe that with proper re-enforcements I could have held the position, perhaps, against the force of the enemy there then. I had every reason to believe the enemy were bringing up re-enforcements. I therefore sent to Colonel Ford for re-enforcements, and said I must have re-enforcements to hold my position. I had, I suppose, only about 300 men, in addition to the two companies of the One hundred and fifteenth that were sent up and put on my left.

Question. Do you know of any individual of the enemy having been killed or wounded during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I have strong reasons to believe that there was a negro killed, who had wounded 2 or 3 of my men. I know that an officer took deliberate aim at him, and he fell over. He was one of the skirmishers of the enemy, and wounded 3 of my men. I know there must have been some of the enemy killed.

Question. How do you know the negro was killed?

Answer. The officer saw him fall.

Question. Did you see him fall?

Answer. I did not.

• **Question.** The object of the question is to ascertain whether you know, of your own knowledge, that any of the enemy were killed?

Answer. I saw none of them dead that I know of.

Question. Did you see any of them wounded?

Answer. No, sir. Because the enemy, of course, were advancing nearly all the time.

Question. They were covered by the woods?

Answer. Yes, sir. I should think it was about an equal fight.

By the COURT:

Question. At the time the order came for evacuating the heights, do you think they could have been held sufficiently long to have sent down and reported the case to Colonel Miles, and to have received re-enforcements?

Answer. I do, sir; I certainly think they could have been held sufficiently long for that. It certainly would not have taken more than an hour to have gone to Harper's Ferry and returned; that is, if Colonel Miles could have been found. I had great difficulty myself in finding him when I sent an orderly to him.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You stated that they could have been held probably until the next morning?

Answer. Yes, sir; I said so. I knew the enemy were massing their forces, and during the night would take the ridge. When they once got through Solomon's Gap they had an equal advantage with us, and when they once got this side of the lookout they had every advantage, for they had everything in their favor.

Question. What is your judgment, as a military man, about the failure to defend Solomon's Gap?

Answer. If I was ordered to hold Maryland Heights, I never should attempt it unless I was permitted to fortify Solomon's Gap—put a battery there with infantry; that certainly is the key to the place.

By the COURT:

Question. What is the distance from Maryland Heights to Solomon's Gap?

Answer. I do not know the distance. I know very little about the ground there.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Is it 3 or 4 miles?

Answer. I have never been at Solomon's Gap myself.

By the COURT:

Question. If you know nothing of the country there, have not visited it, how do you form your opinion as to its being the key of the position?

Answer. From information I have got from others.

Question. In what respect do you consider it the key? You say you do not know the distance from there.

Answer. I have understood the distance from where the battery was placed to be some $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. I have made very particular inquiries about Solomon's Gap, although I have never been there, for this reason: Some two or three weeks before I left Kearneysville, I had orders from Colonel Miles that, if I was attacked and forced to fall back, to fall back to Solomon's Gap, and take up a position there. I therefore had the whole road marked out.

Question. Do you mean you would have occupied Solomon's Gap with all your force, instead of occupying Maryland Heights?

Answer. No, sir; I would have placed a battery at Solomon's Gap, and perhaps two regiments of infantry to support it.

Question. Do you know whether the enemy were in force in what we call Pleasant Valley?

Answer. Yes, sir; they were in force.

Question. They occupied that, and could occupy it without going through Solomon's Gap?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think they could.

Question. With the enemy then in Pleasant Valley, Solomon's Gap would not be the key to the position; they could approach Maryland Heights from that direction?

Answer. Yes, sir; they could approach Maryland Heights in that direction. But then it is almost impossible to take possession of them if there were any force at all to oppose the enemy.

Question. Is there any communication between Pleasant Valley and Solomon's Gap?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. That is, could not the enemy push in between Solomon's Gap and Maryland Heights from Pleasant Valley?

Answer. I should think they could; but I do not know. I have here the written order from Colonel Miles directing me to take my regiment to Maryland Heights and report to Colonel Ford, and two written orders to fall back to Harper's Ferry.

Question. From whom are the orders to fall back?

Answer. From Colonel Ford.

Question. At what time did you receive them?

Answer. Perhaps it was 3 o'clock. I am not at all certain about that.

Question. Read the orders to fall back.

Answer. Witness read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
Maryland Heights, Md., September 13, 1862.

You are hereby ordered to fall back to Harper's Ferry in good order. *Be careful to do so in good order.*

By order of Thos. H. Ford, colonel, commanding Third Brigade.

I received another copy of the order the same as this.

Question. By whom is that order signed?

Answer. It is only as I have read it. It was brought by my adjutant, and he received it direct, and I considered, of course, that it needed no further evidence one way or the other. They are both the same order. I received the last one about fifteen minutes after receiving the first one.

Question. Did you receive them both by your adjutant?

Answer. No, sir; one was brought by an orderly; but my name was not there; it was not addressed to any one, and I have always been very careful about obeying orders. About fifteen minutes afterward, my adjutant brought the second order, which he said he received himself. He said, "Your name is not here, colonel; it is left blank; but I received the order direct myself." I had sent my adjutant to report to Colonel Ford that I must have re-enforcements in order to hold my position.

Question. Who was present at the time that Major Hewitt told you that he had given the order to retreat?

Answer. Major Grafflin, of my regiment, and my adjutant, both of them. I called them up as witnesses, to witness that he admitted that he gave the order. There was also a lieutenant of some other regiment; I did not know his name. I was determined to find out who did give the order, after seeing Colonel Ford and Colonel Miles.

Question. Do you know anything of any orders given by Colonel Miles to evacuate the heights?

Answer. No, sir; I know of no order that he gave. After the evacuation had taken place, I went to his headquarters for the purpose of seeing, but he was absent. On going down to the battery, I met Colonel Ford's adjutant, and asked him who gave the order, and he said Colonel Miles gave the order; that it was by his orders.

Question. Did you see Lieutenant Binney or any of Colonel Miles' staff at his quarters?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw Lieutenant Reynolds, and asked him who gave that order. He said to me, "I don't think that Colonel Miles gave the order." He then went on to remark that Colonel Miles very often wrote orders himself that were not put on record. I told him I was fully aware of that fact. Said he, "I did notice the colonel have a white envelope in his hand a short time before the evacuation took place; and now," said he, "I expect that was the order." That is what Lieutenant Reynolds, Colonel Miles' assistant adjutant-general, told me. I looked at it in this way; I knew I had received an order from one of Colonel Miles' aides to fall back through Solomon's Gap. Afterward I received an order directing me to report to General White, and fall back with him, and the aide was not aware that any such order had been issued; but it was in Colonel Miles' own hand. Indeed, I received a great many orders from Colonel Miles written by himself and signed by himself.

Question. At the time you saw Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford together, when you went down to find out about the order to retreat, was anything said by Colonel Miles, or Colonel Ford in his presence, about the condition of things over there?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know that Colonel Miles said anything. He was standing there by Colonel Ford, and had a glass looking in the woods. I reported to him the condition of things, and about the confusion on the heights. The order that I received, and reiterated by Colonel Ford or by Colonel Miles, was to retake that position, if possible; and I immediately left and went back to my regiment.

Question. What time in the day was this?

Answer. I think it was about 11 o'clock.

Question. The abandonment of the breastworks and the breaking of the troops had occurred before that?

Answer. Just before that. I came right down to report the fact to Colonel Ford.

Question. Between the time that Colonel Miles left and the order for the evacuation of the heights, had there been any serious fighting?

Answer. No, sir; not very serious fighting; constant skirmishing.

Question. Had anything occurred which would have induced an evacuation, or rendered an evacuation more necessary than at the time Colonel Miles was there himself?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think something had occurred to render it more necessary from this fact: When I left Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford, I went immediately up on the western slope, and went within a short distance of the lookout. The orderly who was with me crawled up to the edge of the bluff, and looked over to see if he could see any Confederates. He reported that he could not see any. Then I went along the ridge until I came to my regiment. I immediately put the regiment in motion, on the advance, and the skirmishers were immediately driven in by a volley from the enemy.

Question. Was that all you saw?

Answer. That was all.

Question. Was that reported to Colonel Ford?

Answer. I sent my adjutant to report to him; I do not know whether he did or not.

Question. How many did you lose, killed and wounded, in your regiment?

Answer. I had 11 men wounded and 3 killed, I think; 1 captain killed.

Question. Were those killed on Maryland Heights?

Answer. No, sir; 2 were killed on the heights, and, perhaps, 5 wounded; and then there were several of my men missing. Three Ohio companies were in my command. I do not know how many of them were killed and wounded.

Question. You say that when you saw that additional force of the enemy they fired a volley upon you. Did they drive your regiment back?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you report to Colonel Ford that you were driven back and could not hold your position?

Answer. My skirmishers were driven in, and Captain Pratt reported that the enemy were in strong force.

Question. Were you driven back?

Answer. No, sir; I held my position. Colonel Ford sent up two companies of the One hundred and fifteenth New York, and they were placed to the left of my men.

Question. Did you hold that position all the time?

Answer. Yes, sir; until I was ordered to fall back to Harper's Ferry. I will say this in justice to Colonel Ford, that while holding that position I sent my adjutant to report that I must have re-enforcements in order to hold it.

Question. From the appearance of things when you were ordered to fall back, how long do you think you could have held that position with the number of men you were losing in killed and wounded?

Answer. Indeed, I cannot tell; I might have held it an hour. I stated before that I do not think the position could have been held longer than till morning, for I took it for granted that the enemy would mass his troops during the night and attack at daylight.

Question. I understood that to apply to the heights generally. I am speaking now of your particular position. You say that two companies

had been sent to re-enforce you, and you held the position until ordered to fall back, and that you had 2 men killed and several wounded ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; they were shot just as they stood.

Question. How long could you have held that position as matters were going on at this time ?

Answer. I could have held it to all eternity, I suppose, if I had lived long enough, as it was going on at the time ; but Captain Pratt, in the advance, reported that the enemy was massing his troops for an attack. I sent that information to Colonel Ford, because I wanted to be prepared for them. They could easily flank us.

Question. How far was this position you speak of from Colonel Ford's headquarters ?

Answer. About a quarter of a mile, by the road.

Question. Did Colonel Ford come up there himself to see the state of things ?

Answer. No, sir ; not where my regiment was posted.

By Colonel FORD :

Question. Were you placed under arrest on the morning of the 13th of September by Colonel Miles ?

Answer. I was not.

Question. What was the number of men taken up by you on the mountain under your command ?

Answer. Of my own regiment, not over 400 men.

Question. Did you see the condition of the troops about the headquarters at the time you were down there—those retreating ?

Answer. I did.

Question. What was their condition when retreating down the path down the mountain ?

Answer. They were in the greatest confusion. There were men of all regiments moving about without any officers, and officers without any men.

Question. Did you see any force up the valley near where Colonel Sammon was stationed, approaching in that direction ?

Answer. I do not know where he was stationed.

Question. How far from the battery were the enemy when you saw them ?

Answer. I saw some men within half a mile of the battery ; I do not know how many—a few.

Question. How long have you been under the command of Colonel Miles ?

Answer. About one month and a half.

Question. Was he not in the habit of giving conflicting orders ? and, if so, state instances, if you recollect any.

Answer. He certainly countermanded his orders, sometimes very quickly ; and, in my judgment, his orders were conflicting.

Question. Did orders sometimes come to you signed by himself, and then again others signed by his adjutant-general ?

Answer. I have orders signed by Colonel Miles alone, and also by his adjutant-general and Lieutenant Binney and Lieutenant Willmon. As an example of conflicting orders, on the morning that I marched with my regiment on Maryland Heights Colonel Miles' verbal orders were, "I desire you to report to Colonel Hall, on Mary-

land Heights." He named over some three or four names. At last I said, "You mean Colonel Ford." "Yes, sir," said he; and from that conversation I came to the conclusion that Colonel Miles was not in a condition to command. That is my candid opinion.

Question. From what you know of Colonel Miles as a military man, do you think he was morally, mentally, and physically competent to command an army such as that at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I think he was not competent to command it.

Question. During the time you were on the mountain engaged in the contest, was the enemy advancing and you retreating, and was that the reason, in your opinion, why you cannot tell the number of their killed and wounded?

Answer. That is the reason; that the enemy possessed the battle-ground.

By General WHITE:

Question. Had you any information, by your observation or otherwise, of the force of the enemy investing Harper's Ferry? If so, state what that force was.

Answer. The information which I received as to the force of the enemy, was from Captain McDonald, of the Confederate Army. He told me that the force attacking Harper's Ferry was between 50,000 and 60,000 men. The day before the surrender, my regiment was placed on the extreme left of the line, between Bolivar Heights and Halltown. I saw, myself, at least two brigades of the enemy advancing against my regiment.

Question. At the time of the surrender of Harper's Ferry, on the 15th of September, what is your opinion as to the utility of further resistance?

Answer. My opinion is that it would have been impossible to have held out, in the condition of things.

Question. Had you opportunity during the siege to observe the officers who are under arrest in connection with this investigation, to wit: General White, Colonel D'Utassy, Colonel Trimble, and Colonel Ford? If so, state what their conduct was.

Answer. I saw General White, and Colonel Trimble, of the Sixtieth Ohio, I think, during the siege; and I certainly saw no lack of courage in either. They were both where the shells and balls were flying thick and fast.

Question. State who commanded on the left the evening before the surrender, in the engagement you were in.

Answer. I hardly know who had command. I will say this, that my orderly returned and stated that he had reported to you, and you would send me re-enforcements. I had sent some eight or ten before, to hunt up Colonel Miles.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You state that, in your judgment, Colonel Miles was not competent to command. Will you state upon what you base your opinion; whether it was from conversations with him or his conduct and bearing generally during the siege?

Answer. It was from close observation of Colonel Miles during the siege of Harper's Ferry, and also previous to that. I wrote Colonel Miles a letter after returning from Boonsborough, on or about the 10th of September, and stated that I had been in Boonsborough, and that Jackson's advance was there; that I had information from a citizen whom I knew to be loyal that they had a strong force, 70,000 men, and that they intended to attack Harper's Ferry. I also sent a copy of that letter to General White. Colonel Miles, in answer to that letter, after I had given him all this information, said that he did not think the enemy intended to attack Harper's Ferry. I have his letter to that effect. General White thanked me for the information and made use of it. Besides, in his manner he seemed confused.

Question. Was he so during the siege?

Answer. In my intercourse with him, I can say he was so.

By the COURT:

Question. How long did you serve under Colonel Miles?

Answer. About one month and a half.

Question. At that time?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you at Harper's Ferry for a month?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. How long were you with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I went in on Friday evening before the surrender on Monday.

Question. How often did you see Colonel Miles during that time?

Answer. Some three or four times; that is, had conversations with him some three or four times.

Question. Where was it that you saw him—at his quarters?

Answer. I saw him twice in the street, in front of his headquarters, and once he visited my regiment, when I had the extreme left of the line, between Bolivar Heights and Halltown.

Question. Were those three times the only times you saw him?

Answer. I think I saw him one other time. I do not know when it was.

Question. How long were those interviews that you had with him?

Answer. Perhaps ten minutes each.

Question. Do you mean to say that, judging from those three interviews of ten minutes each, his conduct during the siege was not good?

Answer. I mean to say this, that from those interviews, from the letters which I received from Colonel Miles, from what I had heard other officers say, in our conversations together, of Colonel Miles' conduct, from his general bearing, because I had watched him closely during the last month—I mean to say from all that he was not competent, in my humble judgment, to command the force at Harper's Ferry; and, as an explanation of what I have said, I would say that from what I had seen of him previous to the siege, I considered that, if he was not competent to command an army previous to that, I did not consider him any more competent to command during the siege.

Question. To the question asked you by General White as to the conduct of officers during the siege, you have answered in reference to General White and Colonel Trimble. What can you say as to the conduct of the others, Colonel D'Utassy and Colonel Ford?

Answer. I think that Colonel Ford performed his duty well on Maryland Heights. I saw nothing of him after we had retreated to Harper's Ferry. I understood that he was sick in his bed. Colonel D'Utassy I saw nothing of at all during the time the enemy were firing.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Was the judgment you have expressed of Colonel Miles' competency to command the one generally entertained by the officers there?

Answer. It was the general opinion. In this connection, if the court will permit me, I will say that I had a talk with Colonel Trimble, Colonel Stannard, and Colonel Willard, and I think that those officers expressed the same opinion.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know what opinion General White himself entertained of Colonel Miles' fitness to command?

Answer. I do not.

Question. You never heard General White say anything on the subject?

Answer. I do not remember that I have. [After a pause.] It seems to me that, after General White had written his letter to Colonel Miles, I had a conversation with him, in which the general gave me his reasons for not assuming command. I remember that he said that Colonel Miles was well acquainted with the ground; and that when he (General White) retreated from Winchester and fell back to Harper's Ferry, he was sent to Martinsburg to command a detached brigade while Colonel Miles was continued in command at Harper's Ferry, and he presumed from that that it was the desire of Major-General Wool to continue Colonel Miles in command at Harper's Ferry, no matter what might occur.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you advise me to assume the command or not?

Answer. I did not advise you to assume the command at the time.

Question. Did you advise me not to?

Answer. I think I said that, perhaps, it would be better for you not to assume the command; that I approved your course; I think I did say that at the time, in view, also, that I knew that General White would do all he could, no matter in what capacity he might be placed, and the troops under him.

By the COURT:

Question. You state that you did not consider Colonel Miles fit to command, and still you advised General White not to assume the command. What was your reason for that?

Answer. I do not know that I advised him in conversations that I had with him. On the night previous to the surrender, or early in the morning, I saw General White on the ground. At that time I was fully convinced that Colonel Miles was not the officer for the position, and I think I made that remark to Colonel Willard and Colonel Stannard, that it would have been better if General White had assumed the command.

Question. That does not answer the question. The question is, that, believing Colonel Miles to be incompetent for the command, why did you advise General White not to assume the command?

Answer. The conversation I had with the general was about the time we reached Harper's Ferry. It certainly was not on Sunday, because I do not know that I spoke to the general on Sunday, the day previous to the surrender. On Saturday I do not know that I saw General White.

Question. All that is not necessary. The question is, believing as you did that Colonel Miles was incompetent, unfit to command, why did you advise General White not to assume the command?

Answer. I have already stated, in answer to that question, that what I saw afterward, during the siege of Harper's Ferry, and previous to that, putting it all together, on the Sunday night previous to the surrender I made up my mind that Colonel Miles was not competent to command; before that I had had this conversation with General White. Knowing, as he said, that General Wool desired Colonel Miles to retain command at Harper's Ferry, and that he had stated in his letter to Colonel Miles, as I had understood, that he offered his services and those of his command to Colonel Miles in any capacity he might be placed, I thought it would be better for both of them to work together in that way than for him to assume command, as, perhaps, Colonel Miles might get angry with him, and, perhaps, might give conflicting orders. Those were the reasons why I thought as I did at the time I had this conversation with General White.

After hearing his testimony read over, the witness made the following explanation in regard to that portion of his testimony where he said that it would be almost impossible for the enemy, coming from the direction of Pleasant Valley, to take possession of Maryland Heights, if there was any force at all to oppose them.

What I meant by that was, the hill running along facing Sandy Hook is very difficult when held by an opposing force. I will also state that I took a view from the

lookout when I first went there, and I saw some 8,000 or 10,000 of the enemy away down in the valley beyond, toward Knoxville, off to the left, perhaps, of Knoxville. I could see them distinctly there, maneuvering.

Col. SIMEON SAMMON, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows :

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. What position do you occupy in the military service and did you occupy during the late events at Harper's Ferry ?

Answer. I was colonel commanding the One hundred and fifteenth New York Volunteers.

Question. Were you present before and at the evacuation of Maryland Heights ?

Answer. I was.

Question. Will you state, from your knowledge of all the circumstances which attended that evacuation, whether, in your judgment, it was necessary at the time it occurred ?

Answer. I would like to give a direct answer, but, owing to not having any knowledge of the force there was against us, I cannot answer directly. I should say that if the force of the enemy that I saw crossing the pontoon bridge, and arriving in Harper's Ferry after the surrender, was surrounding us at that time on Maryland Heights, it would be proper to evacuate them.

Question. Judging from the force you saw there at the time, what was your judgment as to the necessity of the evacuation when it occurred ?

Answer. I saw no force.

Question. Was there anything in the condition of our forces which called for the evacuation at the moment ?

Answer. It would be well, perhaps, for me to state the position that I occupied while on Maryland Heights. I came there near 12 o'clock on Saturday, the day of the evacuation, and was assigned a position in front of McGrath's battery. I saw none of the Federal forces, where they were stationed, and but few of the enemy, very few, indeed. Between 3 and 4 o'clock of the same afternoon I was ordered to retire in good order to Harper's Ferry, and did so.

Question. You were not in any engagement ?

Answer. Nothing but some slight skirmishes in front of us, where we were posted.

Question. Did you have an opportunity to see the conduct of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers ?

Answer. No, sir ; I did not.

By the COURT :

Question. Did you lose any men in killed and wounded in your regiment on Maryland Heights ?

Answer. We had some 5 wounded on Maryland Heights. One of my captains was seriously wounded.

Question. What number were there in your regiment that you took up there ?

Answer. We had about 900. They were not all immediately under my command.

Question. That number were taken on the heights ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Have you an idea how much ammunition was expended

while you were there by those batteries; can you form an idea of the number of times those guns were fired?

Answer. There was continuous firing.

Question. You say you saw no enemy. What were they firing at?

Answer. I presume at the enemy, somewhere.

Question. Shelling the woods?

Answer. The woods were very dense. It was impossible to see three rods in front, unless it was here and there a very small space. At the extreme right, at one time, there were six or seven "greybacks" presented themselves, and fired upon us, and we returned the fire. That was the last of them. There was a continual firing above us. I say "continual"; every now and then a few shots. There may or may not have been a very large force very near us, from all I could see.

Question. At the time the order was given for the evacuation, did you think it necessary to evacuate at that time?

Answer. I looked carefully at the order, and at the party bringing it. He seemed to be very much alarmed for our safety, and from that I drew the conclusion that it was necessary to go. Nothing from any force that I saw.

Question. Or from anything you saw yourself there?

Answer. Not from any force I saw against us.

Question. The order was from Colonel Ford, was it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was it in writing?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Brought by an orderly?

Answer. Brought by Major Steiner.

Question. Do you know anything of any order from Colonel Miles to evacuate?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Was Colonel Miles on the hill while you were there that morning?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At what hour?

Answer. I should think between 11 and 12 o'clock in the forenoon.

Question. Did you have any conversation with him, or hear any conversation of his with any one?

Answer. I did.

Question. What was the nature of it—anything in regard to the evacuation of the heights?

Answer. Not anything; only about our position. I marched my regiment to Colonel Ford's headquarters and met him there. Immediately after, Colonel Miles came out.

Question. From anything you heard Colonel Miles say that day, did you think he contemplated the possibility of the heights being evacuated?

Answer. Nothing was said that I could draw any such conclusion from. At least nothing was said in my presence relative to that.

Question. Did he say anything positively to the contrary?

Answer. He did not speak of the subject at all in my presence.

Question. Were you consulted at all in reference to the evacuation of the heights?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know if any of the other colonels were?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Have you the order you received from Colonel Ford; if so, will you read it?

Answer. Here is a copy of it:

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
Maryland Heights, Md., September 13, 1862.

You are hereby ordered to fall back to Harper's Ferry in good order. *Be careful to do it in good order.*

By order of Thomas H. Ford, colonel, commanding Third Brigade.

Question. Was it signed by anybody?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Why did you take it for an order, then?

Answer. I took it because I supposed he had signed it himself.

Question. He would not have said "by order" of himself; he would have simply signed it.

Answer. It was brought by Major Steiner.

Question. Did you see any instances of bad conduct on the part of any troops that day, breaking and running away on the heights?

Answer. I saw very many troops, soldiers standing about near Colonel Ford's headquarters. Not knowing where they came from, nor what they were doing there, I made the inquiry of Colonel Ford, in the presence of Colonel Miles. Colonel Miles stated that the One hundred and twenty-sixth had behaved very badly, and confirmed it with an oath. Colonel Ford remarked that he had to place a guard across the roadway, or a company, I forget which, to stop them; but they could not stop them. Immediately afterward I got my orders to go where I was to take my position, and that is all that I know about it.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Were you not stationed in the valley near the side of the mountain, immediately in front of the battery, in such a position that you could not see either our forces or the forces of the enemy?

Answer. That was our position. We could not possibly get a view of the enemy, or of any of our forces.

Question. By whose order were you placed in that position?

Answer. When I inquired where I was to go, Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford consulted about it, and, after consultation, Colonel Ford said I must leave two of my companies and take the remainder of my regiment, under the direction of Major Steiner, which I did.

Question. I sent Major Steiner with you as a guide?

Answer. Yes, sir; to direct me where to go. I was unacquainted with the locality, and he was sent to lead us to our position.

Question. Did you see Colonel Miles and myself together as we were retreating from the mountain; if so, when and where, and was our interview pleasant or otherwise?

Answer. I saw them just after passing over the pontoon bridge, and passing under the railroad bridge, on the rise in the armory yard, both together, on horseback. As my order was to return from Maryland Heights to Harper's Ferry, I then addressed Colonel Miles, and told him my regiment was there, and asked him where I must go. He then beckoned to Colonel Ford, and they consulted again. Colonel Ford turned around and said, "Colonel, take your regiment to the position you occupied on Bolivar Heights." That was all I heard or saw about them. The interview appeared to be pleasant, very much so, so far as I could judge from their countenances.

By the COURT:

Question. Was this their first interview after the colonel came down from Maryland Heights?

Answer. This was the first time I saw them together.

Question. It was as you came down, you say; how long was it after you got the order to fall back to Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Judging from the time in marching down, &c., it was perhaps an hour; about an hour, I should judge.

Question. Did Colonel Ford come down in advance of your command or behind?

Answer. He must have come down in advance, for I did not see him again after I left him to go up in the woods until I saw him at this point. I do not think he could have passed us, for the road was filled up.

Question. The point I want to get at is, do you know whether this was their first interview after the colonel came down from the heights?

Answer. That I do not know.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you recollect that I was standing there managing the crossing of the troops at the pontoon bridge, and their passing under the railroad, as you came up?

Answer. You were right at that point, and, when I first observed you, Colonel Miles was near by.

Question. And from that point beckoned me?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Colonel D'UTASSY:

Question. What do you know about the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and have you the general order I issued before the surrender?

Answer. I know very little, indeed, about the surrender. Here is an order I received on the 13th:

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 15. }

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
Camp White, Bolivar Heights, September 13, 1862.

Commanders of regiments and batteries will prepare cooked rations for their men, and fill all canteens with water to-night. We are entirely surrounded. The only hope we have is in conquering the enemy. Let our watchword and rallying cry then be "Victory or death!" Regiments will be ready to fall in promptly at 4 a. m. to-morrow, as we shall, in all probability, be attacked at daybreak.

F. G. D'UTASSY,
Colonel, Commanding First Brigade.

We received those orders and we fulfilled them as far as we could.

Question. What was the conduct of the officers who are now under arrest, General White, Colonel Ford, Colonel Trimble, and myself, during the siege, as far as it came to your knowledge?

Answer. As far as it came to my personal knowledge, Colonel D'Utassy discharged his duty promptly and efficiently. He was at all times about his brigade and urging them to do their duty. General White I did not see until after the surrender. I heard him spoken of, when spoken of at all, very favorably. We were in no council connected with the surrender. We did what was required of us, and, after the surrender, stacked our arms where ordered. That is about all I know about it.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You did not answer as to Colonel Ford. Do you make the same reply in regard to Colonel Ford on the heights, so far as he came under your notice?

Answer. Undoubtedly.

● By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. Who saved the flag of your regiment at the time of the surrender ?

Answer. Colonel D'Utassy.

By General WHITE :

Question. At the time of the surrender of Harper's Ferry, what was your opinion as to the utility of further resistance, in view of the position in which you were placed ?

Answer. My opinion is this, from all the knowledge I had, from the location of the place, and all the surroundings, if everything had been ordered up on Maryland Heights, I think we could have held out. But as that was evacuated, the surrender was inevitable; had to take place. I think if the forces had all been taken up on Maryland Heights on Friday, all the artillery, we could have held out.

By the COURT :

Question. Was there any difficulty about water on the heights for so large a force ?

Answer. There may have been. I am now speaking of the general features of the locality, of the place. Perhaps I had better add a word about the time that Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford ordered me in front of those batteries. They ordered me there to protect them, and not allow the enemy to outflank us. Colonel Ford said they were coming down in force.

Lieut. Col. HASBROUCK DAVIS called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. What position do you occupy in the military service ?

Answer. I am lieutenant-colonel, commanding the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry. I commanded them on the night of the evacuation of Harper's Ferry by the cavalry.

By General WHITE :

Question. Did you leave Harper's Ferry on Sunday evening, September 14; and, if so, was the route taken by the cavalry practicable for artillery and infantry ?

Answer. I did leave then. The route was not practicable for artillery and infantry at the rate we marched.

Question. Do you think it would have been practicable to have taken out the artillery and infantry by that route without attracting the attention of the enemy ?

Answer. We passed over the pontoon bridge and turned to the left in column of twos; we passed up between the canal and the bluff, and then turned to the right in the woods, and passed up several steep eminences. I should suppose that it was not a very good road at any time for artillery; I doubt whether it would have been practicable. But at the rate at which we marched that night, it would have been utterly impossible for the artillery and infantry to have accompanied us, even if the road had been good.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. At what rate did you march ?

Answer. We marched very swiftly, much of the time at a gallop; especially when we passed the pickets we went at a gallop; at other times at a trot. Until we reached Sharpsburg we marched at an exhausting rate; at too exhausting a rate, I thought. We passed the rear pickets of the enemy's force this side of the Antietam Works.

By General WHITE :

Question. What other route was proposed, and by whom, and why was it rejected ?

Answer. The original route proposed on Saturday was to cross the Shenandoah near Harper's Ferry, near the point there, and to pass down into Loudoun County; then, having passed the enemy's forces, to make our way to Washington down one bank or the other of the river.

By the COURT:

Question. To cross at Keys' Ferry?

Answer. No, sir; below, about half a mile from the point, near the village.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you recollect the reason why that was rejected?

Answer. It was pronounced impracticable. After our arrangements had been all completed, it was announced to us that the river was full of holes, and it was impossible to cross, and, therefore, Colonel Miles told me the plan must be given up.

Question. Did I talk of going with the cavalry; and, if so, what reason did I give, if any, for not doing so?

Answer. General White did talk of going with us. He proposed to go with the cavalry and lead it, as it had been put under his command; but he said it would not be proper for him to leave Harper's Ferry under the circumstances.

Question. Did you or not, after hearing my reasons therefor, advise me not to assume the command at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I do not recollect whether I said so to you or not. I recollect thinking it would be proper. It is quite possible I may have said so to you.

Question. Did you ever hear me caution Colonel Miles to save the artillery ammunition?

Answer. I did.

Question. Will you state the conversation?

Answer. I was present in Colonel Miles' room on Sunday, I think it was. General White came in there while I was sitting there talking with Colonel Miles about our going out. He came in, evidently very much exhausted, and said that he had been for two hours watching the practice of a battery on the heights, and he was satisfied that the shells from that battery did not reach the enemy; that the battery was doing no good—was wasting ammunition to no purpose. He said that he suggested—and I recollect that he called Colonel Miles' attention to the fact that it was but a suggestion and not a command—that the battery should be stopped. Colonel Miles sat down and wrote a command for the battery to cease firing, and sent it out by one of his orderlies. At the same time General White reminded Colonel Miles that the rations were rather short, and that it might be well to spare them, in anticipation of the continuance of the siege.

By the COURT:

Question. How long have you been in the military service?

Answer. I am a lawyer by profession. I enlisted, and have been in the service since the 28th day of February last. I joined my regiment, then at Camp Porter. I was engaged for some time previously in recruiting. I have been in active service since then.

Question. In your opinion, was it necessary that Maryland Heights should have been abandoned on Saturday?

Answer. I am incapable of forming an opinion on that point. I was not on the heights at all.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Have you been associated with Colonel Miles sufficiently long to form a judgment as to his capacity for such a command as that he held at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Perhaps my judgment might not be fair. I had an opinion, and a very decided one, upon that point. But my judgment, perhaps, might not be a fair one.

Question. You can express that opinion.

Answer. I did not think him competent for such a command. I thought his fault lay not in his military education, but in his character. I did not think he had enough decision of character to command such a place as that. I deemed him to be a very honest man.

Question. Did his conduct evidence self-possession, or was he disturbed, so far as you observed?

Answer. He did not seem to appreciate the responsibility he had upon his shoulders. I do not think he appreciated what he owed to his country. He had 12,000 men in his command, and I thought something ought to have been done to have saved them. There seemed to be a lack of any fixed policy on his part.

The Commission then adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 10, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Col. DANIEL CAMERON, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state to the commission what position you hold in the military service?

Answer. I am colonel of the Sixty-fifth Illinois Regiment.

Question. During the late events at Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights where were you stationed?

Answer. I was stationed on the extreme right of the line, on the north side of Bolivar Heights.

By the COURT:

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights at all?

Answer. I received orders to go to Maryland Heights, but they were countermanded.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Have you any knowledge of the events connected with the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I entered the Ferry on Friday night. On Saturday morning Colonel Miles desired me to get my regiment ready for marching, intimating that I was to go to Maryland Heights. I got them ready, but the order was countermanded, as Colonel Miles thought we would not be wanted there, and I was ordered to report to Colonel D'Utassy, First Brigade.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity of surrendering Harper's Ferry at the time the surrender was made by Colonel Miles?

Answer. When Colonel D'Utassy informed me that the place had been surrendered, I was somewhat excited, and expressed deep mortification at the announcement. I was ignorant, however, of the pressure that was upon the left, as I was stationed with my regiment upon the right, and had not been anywhere else. I do not know as I was qualified, from the position I held, to form a correct opinion as to the necessity that existed for the surrender.

Question. Do you, or not, believe that Harper's Ferry might have been held by throwing the entire force upon Maryland Heights, which commanded the defenses of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I have no doubt whatever that it might have been so held.

Question. Did you see Colonel Miles frequently during the siege?

Answer. I saw Colonel Miles first on Saturday, when I reported the arrival of my regiment, and I saw him at a subsequent hour, when he ordered me to report to Colonel D'Utassy. On Sunday I saw Colonel Miles, and called his attention to the appearance of the enemy on Loudoun Heights, and I asked him what it meant. He said he did not know. I said that I would tell him; that they were planting batteries there, and we would very soon hear from them. He said they had tried that before, and had succeeded in getting up a 6-pounder, which did not amount to anything. I asked him when he supposed the assault would be made upon us. He said he did not believe there was going to be any; that the enemy were not going to throw away their men, as they knew our condition; it was only a question of a day or so. I do not remember of again seeing the colonel.

Question. From all that you saw of his conduct and bearing, what judgment did you form as to his capacity for such a command as he held there?

Answer. It was my opinion that he was not qualified for the command. His intellect seemed to be dim. He was not excited, but he seemed to be stupid. His intellect was dull, all confusion.

Question. You say he was not excited, but simply confused, insensible?

Answer. Confused and stupid. It seemed as though everything was mixed up in his mind.

By the COURT:

Question. At what time was your order to go to Maryland Heights countermanded by Colonel Miles?

Answer. About 1 o'clock on Saturday.

Question. That was before the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. An hour and a half, perhaps two hours, before.

Question. Your regiment was in readiness to go?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I expressed a desire to Colonel Miles that the regiment should be sent there.

Question. Did Colonel Miles assign any reason for countermanding that order?

Answer. He said we would not be wanted over there.

Question. Did you ever serve under Colonel Miles before at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I was over three months in Colonel Miles' command, although I was not at Harper's Ferry.

Question. Is your opinion of him formed from what you saw of him at Harper's Ferry, or from your general intercourse with him?

Answer. Chiefly from what occurred at Harper's Ferry.

Question. How often did you see him there?

Answer. I was three times in his company.

Question. How long each time?

Answer. Ten or fifteen minutes, with a little general conversation.

Question. Do you know whether that was the estimate held of him by the officers there generally?

Answer. I had every reason to believe, from what I had seen, that he stood very high in the estimation of the general commanding the department, General Wool.

Question. I speak of the officers at Harper's Ferry.

Answer. I believe they formed a very low estimate of his ability, and the troops seemed to have no confidence in his loyalty.

Question. Did you ever see anything in his conduct that would lead you to question his loyalty?

Answer. I never have at any time. I have a small memorandum here which I thought it would be proper to exhibit to the Commission. It was handed to me by an officer on duty as a picket. It is in the handwriting of the late Colonel Miles:

HARPER'S FERRY, September 12, 1862.

The captain of the outer picket on the Shenandoah road will pass beyond his line 16 paroled Confederate prisoners, who are required to keep the road to Charleston, and on to Winchester, where they will be enabled to join the Confederate Army.

D. S. MILES,

Colonel Second Infantry, Commanding.

More prisoners, I am informed by the officer, left Harper's Ferry on the 13th, on Saturday, during the engagement on Maryland Heights. They went right to the headquarters of the enemy, doubtless, charged with all the information that anybody could have.

Question. Where had these prisoners been taken?

Answer. I did not learn the particulars.

Question. How came you in possession of that paper?

Answer. It was handed me by an officer of the One hundred and eleventh or One hundred and twenty-sixth. It was a paper taken up from the prisoners who passed out on that day. It was shown me, and I thought it was a paper of some importance.

Question. It was a pass?

Answer. It was the pass upon which they passed the lines.

Question. Do you know it to be in Colonel Miles' handwriting?

Answer. Yes, sir; I know it to be in his handwriting.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You say the troops questioned his loyalty. Do I understand you to embrace in that remark the officers generally?

Answer. I could only speak for my own regiment. The abandonment of Maryland Heights caused a very great sensation in my regiment among officers and men.

Question. This paper did not come into your hands until after the surrender?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. There were no transactions like that, known to the troops, that were the subject of conversation?

Answer. Not at all. It was shown to me by the officer as a sort of reminiscence, and I thought it was of sufficient importance to submit here.

Question. Did you know any of those prisoners personally, who they were, and their relations to the Confederates?

Answer. I did not.

Question. Do you know whether there were officers among them?

Answer. I do not.

Question. What was the character of the force at Winchester? They were directed to go to Winchester; "to keep the road to Charlestown and on to Winchester, where they will be enabled to rejoin the Confederate Army."

Answer. I do not know.

Question. At that time the siege of Harper's Ferry was being pressed?

Answer. The siege was being pressed and the engagement was going on on Maryland Heights.

By General WHITE :

Question. Did you ever exhibit that paper to me until after the surrender ?

Answer. I do not remember whether I ever exhibited it to you at all until here. I have just stated in evidence that I did not receive the paper until several days after the surrender.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Do you know at what hour of the day the prisoners passed out ?

Answer. I do not.

By the COURT :

Question. The fact that those prisoners had been released was known to the troops at the time it occurred, was it not ?

Answer. Not generally.

Question. There was some excitement over it, was there not ?

Answer. Not that I am aware of. I believe the matter was not known to any one, except the pickets who took up the passes.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Do you know whether they passed out of our lines by day or night ?

Answer. It was in the day-time that they passed out.

Question. They would certainly pass in view of a considerable number of our troops, would they not, taking the route indicated in that pass ?

Answer. They must have been seen by our forces.

By the COURT :

Question. You say the evacuation of Maryland Heights created great excitement in your regiment ?

Answer. It did.

Question. What was the impression as regards who gave the order for the evacuation ?

Answer. I heard no opinion expressed as to that.

Question. You spoke of it in connection with the men being dissatisfied with Colonel Miles.

Answer. They were disappointed in not going to Maryland Heights, according to the announcement made to me in the morning, and when, but an hour or so afterward, I heard that Maryland Heights had been evacuated, I supposed there was some connection with it.

Question. When Colonel Miles informed you that your obedience to the order to go to Maryland Heights was not necessary, what did you infer from it—that the order had been given to have the heights abandoned ?

Answer. Quite the opposite.

Question. What reason was given that it was not necessary for you to go ?

Answer. He assigned no reason ; simply said we would not be wanted there ; that it was not necessary I should go.

Question. That was an hour before the evacuation ?

Answer. It might be an hour and a half or even two hours. My impression is that the evacuation took place about 3 o'clock ; that is, the cannon ceased firing at that time.

In connection with the Maryland Heights matter, it might be proper for me to state that about half an hour after Colonel Miles called upon me, General White, in company with Colonel Trimble, also called. The general asked me if I had got any orders. I said that I had; that I was not going to the heights, but was under orders to report to Colonel D'Utassy, for service in the First Brigade. General White said that he was very much disappointed; that he thought the regiment could have been used to better purpose elsewhere, and he added that it was his intention to have gone with us. I told him that I was anxious to go, and asked him to countermand the order. He turned to Colonel Trimble, and said that he believed it would be best for him not to do it; that he did not wish to countermand the order. He said he was sorry; that it was not the service that he wished to see the regiment engaged in.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Any statement that you desire to make bearing upon that evacuation, or the necessity for it, or the absence of such necessity, will be pertinent to the inquiry.

Answer. On Sunday evening I called upon Colonel D'Utassy, who was in command of the First Brigade. I told him I was afraid the place was going to be taken. I spoke of the want of confidence in Colonel Miles; of the shortness, almost exhaustion, of the ammunition; of the general impression that seemed to reign through the place that Harper's Ferry would fall, and suggested to him that we ought to make an effort to leave. He said that he was as willing to do so as I was, but could not leave without orders. I desired him to apply for such orders. He subsequently informed me that he had done so, but that Colonel Miles would not, on any account, permit us to evacuate. In the night time, while I was with my regiment, I saw the enemy on Maryland Heights, enfilading us. They were actively engaged all Sunday night. I called on Colonel D'Utassy again, at 3 o'clock on Monday morning, and told him what Captain Phillips and Captain Von Sehlen had informed me—that their ammunition was almost gone; that the enemy had been actively employed through the night changing the position of their batteries and placing batteries in a position that would place us in a very perilous situation; and I again proposed to him that unless we could hold the place we ought then to make an effort to get away; that there was still time, as it was then about 3 o'clock in the morning. I told him that he might take his brigade without leave if not with it, and I would join the fortunes of my regiment to his and share with him the responsibility. Colonel D'Utassy desired me to see Colonel Miles and General White, and thought it was important the matter should be talked over further. I told him I would have to go back to my regiment; that I could not leave it. I understood that Captain Phillips and Captain Von Sehlen did call upon Colonel Miles or General White. I believe that is all that I have to state.

Question. Have you any doubt at all that the troops could have evacuated the Ferry and effected their escape?

Answer. I thought so, or I should not have made the proposition to leave.

Question. Did you regard the undertaking even as one of extreme peril?

Answer. No, sir; I did not. I thought the chances were very strongly in favor of our making our escape.

Question. Did you understand from any quarter upon what grounds Colonel Miles resisted this proposition which was urged upon him, to evacuate?

Answer. As I said before, he seemed to be thoroughly stupefied, and talked inconsistently. One time he led me to suppose, by his conversation, that the place could not be held; and at another time, as I was informed by Colonel D'Utassy, he gave as a reason for not permitting us to leave that the place must be held.

Question. You say you were three months with him previously?

Answer. Three months under him.

Question. Did you observe these peculiar characteristics during that time—this confusion of mind, insensibility, stupidity you speak of, or only during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I noticed it before, but supposed it was more the peculiarities of the man than anything else. It was chiefly by correspondence that I had any intercourse with him.

By the COURT:

Question. Were you well acquainted with the country in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Somewhat acquainted.

Question. What route did you propose to take?

Answer. I thought there were two routes; that we could cross the Shenandoah, take along the base of Loudoun Heights, and strike for Frederick, or break through above and make for McClellan's army.

Question. In the way of Shepherdstown, or in that direction?

Answer. In that direction. I do not know as we should have tried the Shepherdstown road. We heard the firing of McClellan's army Sunday afternoon very distinctly, and we were satisfied the army was not a very great way from us.

Question. Had you ever been over those roads which you proposed to take?

Answer. I had not, but I had some conversation with those who had. In the course of Sunday, when the matter first suggested itself to my mind, we had two men there who were thoroughly acquainted with the country in every direction. I had traveled with them before, and I had perfect confidence in them.

Question. What were the names of those men?

Answer. Noakes was one, and Captain McGuire, or some such name as that, the other.

Question. Did Mr. Noakes represent that the route proposed was practicable for artillery and infantry?

Answer. Not the route taken by the cavalry, but there were other routes that I was led to suppose were practicable. My conversation was chiefly with the captain. He said that he would make his escape, at all events, and thought we might all succeed in making our escape.

Question. Were you with Colonel Miles' brigade in the three months' service at Williamsport?

Answer. I was stationed at Martinsburg.

Question. Had you not previously been with him at Williamsport?

Answer. I retreated from the vicinity of Williamsport when I came to the Ferry. I had been sent out, by General White, to reconnoiter and see if Jackson was approaching, and, pushing on, I met the force of the enemy and fell back on the Ferry. I deem it proper to say, in reference to General White, that on Saturday morning he mentioned to me that he thought it would be his duty, under the circumstances, to waive the right to command. He stated to me his reasons, and asked me what I thought. I said that Colonel Miles being an officer of forty years' standing and possessing the confidence of General Wool so highly, as I had every reason to believe he did possess it, I thought he was justified in acting as he did; and, having remarked to the court the way in which the announcement of the surrender was received, I deem it but justice to Colonel D'Utassy to say that during the time I was in his brigade he acted uniformly the part of a brave, energetic, and good officer. I saw nothing like cowardice, or anything approximating to it, in anything he did. I believe he would have been pleased to have gone out with us.

Question. Do you know that any of the enemy were killed or wounded during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. On Sunday morning I saw Colonel D'Utassy, and proposed to him to give me permission to go to Maryland Heights and bring away the guns that had been abandoned there the day before. Colonel D'Utassy said he was willing if Colonel Miles would give his consent. I asked him to obtain the permission, as I would be pleased to go. Subsequently he gave me permission to detail two companies of my regiment, the Sixty-fifth Illinois, to act with two companies of his own regiment, all to be under the command of Major Wood, of my regiment. The force went over to Maryland Heights, had an exchange of shots with the pickets of the enemy, and I was informed by Lieutenant Floyd that 2 of the enemy were shot dead. They got the guns and brought them into Harper's Ferry. Captain Kennedy, of Company E,

of my regiment, had lost his tents, and asked me to permit a wagon to accompany them to bring over some of the tents of our own men that had been left there, and I gave permission. When he got there he did not load with tents, but loaded with ammunition. He informed me that he could have loaded a great many more wagons, if he had had them, with ammunition of all kinds.

Question. That does not answer the question exactly. Do you know, of your own knowledge, of any of the enemy being killed or wounded?

Answer. I do not.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you belong to the force that moved under General White from Martinsburg to Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I did.

Question. Had you any knowledge of Colonel Miles' capacity prior to your entry into Harper's Ferry under General White? If not, was your judgment thereupon formed from the events which transpired during the siege?

Answer. My judgment was formed alone from the events which transpired during the siege.

Question. You have stated that you believed Harper's Ferry could have been held if the entire force had been removed to Maryland Heights. Do you mean that the force should have been taken over before the evacuation of that position, or that it might have been reoccupied after the heavy battery had been destroyed and the enemy occupied the crest of the mountain?

Answer. I think it extremely doubtful whether we could have reoccupied the heights and held them after the destruction of the battery. The guns we brought over, the 12-pounder brass pieces, were all spiked.

Question. Did Colonel Miles tell you he was ordered to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, as the reason for not allowing the troops to leave there, or did you hear it from Colonel D'Utassy as coming from Colonel Miles?

Answer. I heard it from Colonel D'Utassy, assigned by Colonel Miles as the reason why we could not leave; that we must hold the Ferry.

Question. Had you any reason to doubt Colonel Miles' competency at the time of your arrival at Harper's Ferry with General White?

Answer. I had not.

Question. Had you an opportunity to observe the officers under arrest in connection with this investigation during the siege of Harper's Ferry; if so, what was their conduct?

Answer. What I stated of Colonel D'Utassy I can also say of General White.

Question. Have you any information of the force of the enemy investing Harper's Ferry? If so, state what that force was.

Answer. I had conversation with a great many of the rebel officers, and all of them told me that to have held out would have been madness; that their force was overwhelming.

Question. What is your opinion of the utility of further resistance at the time of the surrender; that is, on Monday morning, the 15th of September?

Answer. Informed as I was, subsequent to the surrender, that the ammunition was exhausted—that the enemy were massing their men on the left, and that a great many of our regiments now in the service were not to be relied upon in a close encounter—if I had been consulted, I should probably have acted in the same manner that the other officers did.

By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. Do you know what became of the gunpowder which you brought down from Maryland Heights ?

Answer. I do not.

By General WHITE :

Question. I believe you have stated that I consulted with you in regard to not assuming the command.

Answer. You did. I have so stated, and that I concurred in your opinion.

By the COURT :

Question. If you had been yourself ordered with your command to have kept the post of Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, knowing all the circumstances and the condition of things as they were at that time, would you have considered yourself justified in giving up the post at the time it was surrendered ?

Answer. I would rather not undertake to answer that question, for I do not think I can do so intelligently ; it is so exceedingly problematical that I would rather not answer it.

Question. You can answer the question. If you had orders to defend the post to the last extremity, and if you had known all the circumstances that existed at that time, that the ammunition was out, &c., would you have considered yourself justified in surrendering at that time—in other words, would you have considered that the “last extremity ?”

Answer. I do not think it was the last extremity. My impression is that we would have driven the enemy back in the first assault, with heavy loss, and they would probably have slaughtered us in the second.

By General WHITE :

Question. Would the further fight, which you think might have been made, have been productive of anything more than a temporary delay, if any ?

Answer. I do not believe it would have resulted in holding the place.

Question. I understand you, then, to say, that, although the last extremity literally had not been reached at the time of the surrender, practically, so far as any good results were concerned, it had been reached ?

Answer. I stated that any further engagement would not, in my opinion, have changed the result. The place would have fallen.

By the COURT :

Question. Was or was it not, then, your impression, at the time, that the surrender should have taken place, or you should have cut your way out through the enemy, one way or the other ?

Answer. It occurred to me, at 3 o'clock on Monday morning, when I made the last application at Colonel D'Utassy's quarters, that that was the last opportunity we had to leave the place. We would have got clear of the Ferry just about daybreak, but subsequently we could not have left. From what I saw myself, the force of the enemy was overwhelming. I might add that the force of General White, and I can say so generally of all the forces that came in, entered the Ferry with the impression that they had reached a fortress, but when they got there they found that no work had been done upon the place at all ; that there were no abatis ; no preparations for defense, and if there were any infantry intrenchments there I was not able to discover them.

Question. Were there no defenses at all on Bolivar Heights ?

Answer. Nothing to speak of ; twenty-four hours' labor would do all that was done there.

Capt. CHARLES GOODMAN, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state what position you occupy in the military service?

Answer. Assistant quartermaster.

Question. Where were you during the late events which resulted in the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrendering of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I was at Harper's Ferry.

Question. Did you witness the evacuation of the heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know, or have you any reason to believe, that the evacuation occurred without the orders of Colonel Miles?

Answer. I do not; I have no knowledge of that.

Question. You heard no declarations from him on the subject?

Answer. No, sir; I heard no declaration from him. I heard what others said in regard to it at the time.

Question. Were you acting as quartermaster at that time?

Answer. No, sir; I was not. I had been acting as quartermaster at Winchester, and, under the order to evacuate Winchester, I fell back to Harper's Ferry, and was there detained in my business operations until the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

Question. Do you know anything of officers and privates belonging to the rebel army having been paroled and sent out through our lines during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir; I know of one officer.

Question. Will you state his name, and at what time he was paroled?

Answer. I cannot give his name; he was an officer who was connected with the raid upon the train that left Harper's Ferry for Winchester the latter part of August. He was brought in a prisoner there and paroled.

Question. How long did he remain a prisoner?

Answer. He did not remain a prisoner more than two or three hours, I guess.

Question. Do you remember on what day he went out?

Answer. I cannot say precisely; but it was a few days before the battle of Harper's Ferry.

Question. Did you see him during the time he was in custody?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw him.

Question. Where was he?

Answer. He was in Colonel Miles' apartments. I saw him pass in and saw him pass out.

Question. Did he move around through the works?

Answer. No, sir; I understood that he was a little sick, and was ordered up to the hospital on the hill. In an hour or two afterward he disappeared. He was re-arrested the next day and brought in, and was then paroled.

Question. He escaped first, you say, without permission?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. He had not, at first, been paroled?

Answer. He was not paroled when he was first brought in; he was sent up to the hospital.

Question. He escaped from the hospital?

Answer. He disappeared from there; nobody knows how.

Question. Where was he arrested the second time?

Answer. He was arrested out on the road toward Charlestown; back in the country there.

Question. Do you know his grade?

Answer. I do not; he was one of their officers. It is very hard to distinguish what the rank of those Confederate officers is.

Question. Do you know anything of other officers, or of privates, having been paroled?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know, of your own knowledge, of this man having made his escape from the hospital?

Answer. I do not, from my own knowledge.

Question. Merely from what you heard?

Answer. It was the general report of all the officers I conversed with. I recollect there was at the time considerable indignation expressed about it.

Question. How long was he with Colonel Miles in his apartments?

Answer. He spent about an hour there, I should think.

Question. Was there anybody else present at the interview that you know of?

Answer. I do not know; I occupied the next building. I merely saw him pass in; saw the crowd, and saw him pass out.

Question. And he was paroled the next day?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was that previous to the commencement of the attack?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think some three or four days.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Did you hear anything said in camp about 16 prisoners having been paroled together during the siege?

Answer. No, sir.

By the COURT :

Question. Did this circumstance you speak of create much excitement there at the time? Was it generally known?

Answer. It created a great deal of excitement at the time, and Colonel Miles was denounced very much for the course he had pursued.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Was his loyalty questioned by the troops?

Answer. I cannot say that it was. His loyalty was questioned by the soldiers; I do not know whether by any of the officers or not.

By the COURT :

Question. It was questioned by the soldiers?

Answer. - Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know, of your own knowledge, that this officer was paroled?

Answer. I do not.

Question. All this you state is merely what you heard?

Answer. That is all.

Question. What do you know of the rebel force about Harper's Ferry during the siege?

Answer. It is a very difficult thing to ascertain the exact number. The staff officers who were in my room—General Hill's staff officers, two of them—stated that there were 80,000 men around us. We had a conversation in regard to the fight, and one of them said it was inevitable; that we were bound to give up; that they had force enough to crush us right out; that there were 80,000 men around us.

Question. You know only what he said?

Answer. I know this much, that on Monday night, the night after the surrender, an evacuation of Maryland Heights by the enemy took place through Harper's Ferry. My quarters were right on the main street. It was about 10 o'clock in the evening; a courier from General Jackson came rushing in my room, inquiring in an excited manner for General Hill. I remarked that he was in the next room. He went out, leaving my door open, and opened the door of the other room, and said, "General Jackson wishes to see you immediately." The remarks made, and the excited manner in which the man came in, of course convinced me that General McClellan, or some one else, was in the rear pressing them hard, and I so remarked to some of my friends who were in my room. General Hill started off immediately, and, about one hour from the time he left, the trains commenced passing through the town. They had been moving backward and forward all day; loading up and moving away, but very quietly. But in an hour from that time they passed by the hotel, generally at a trot. It excited my suspicion that something was up. I had been very unwell that day, and sat up nearly all the night. My bed was next the window, and I lay near the window. About 3 o'clock the trains had all got through. From that time I counted twenty-two regiments that passed over from Maryland Heights, crossed over the pontoon bridge, and passed right through. After they passed the bridge and came up to the hotel, the order was *double-quick*.

Question. They went off in what direction?

Answer. Toward Charlestown; up the valley.

Question. What was the strength of those regiments, generally?

Answer. There seemed to be about the average number in a regiment. I should think they would average about 800. I suppose there were some fifteen guns, also artillery, that passed at the same time. I did not see them all; I gave it up then. I suppose there must have been more than that.

Question. Had you any conversation with Colonel Miles in regard to his strength previous to the surrender?

Answer. No, sir; I had not. I had two or three business interviews with him while I was there; nothing else.

Question. What day was this that you saw those troops pass out?

Answer. It was Monday night, or rather Tuesday morning about 3 o'clock, it commenced.

Question. Did you see any other rebel troops there besides those that passed out?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many?

Answer. There were a great many troops that came in the morning of the surrender.

Question. How many?

Answer. I cannot say; the town was full of them.

Question. Were there 1,000, or 2,000, or 5,000?

Answer. I suppose there must have been several thousand; they were all over the village there.

Question. Those were the only ones you saw besides those that passed out?

Answer. Yes, sir; those were the only ones I saw.

Question. Do you mean that they were in town singly and in small groups, or in companies and regiments?

Answer. They came in and just scattered about. I did not go up on the hill after the surrender. I understood there were several regiments up there that came over from Loudoun Heights.

Question. Do you know whether this rebel officer that was paroled returned again with the rebel army to Harper's Ferry when the place surrendered?

Answer. I do not. I would add that the day of the surrender, during the day, quite a number of troops, cavalry, passed through the place; I should suppose there were 2,000 or 3,000.

Lieut. JOHN L. WILLMON, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. I was acting as aide-de-camp to Colonel Miles.

Question. Were you present with him during the late events which resulted in the surrender of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Part of them.

Question. Do you know of any rebel officers, who were captured, having been paroled and permitted to pass out through our lines?

Answer. One.

Question. Do you know his name?

Answer. His name was Rouse; his first name I do not know.

Question. What was his rank?

Answer. First lieutenant.

Question. Where was he captured?

Answer. That I do not recollect.

Question. How long did he remain within our lines?

Answer. Probably twenty-four hours.

Question. Was he confined in a room while there, or permitted to walk abroad?

Answer. He was in the guard-house, I think; but I will not be confident about that.

Question. He was discharged how long before the siege commenced?

Answer. I do not recollect the day. It was after the firing had commenced down the river by Berlin.

Question. Do you know upon what grounds or from what considerations Colonel Miles was induced at that moment to permit this officer to pass out through our lines?

Answer. I do not know. He had him brought up to his office, and had the door closed, and they were together there for a half an hour, I suppose.

Question. They were entirely alone ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; to the best of my knowledge.

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles say anything in regard to the reasons which induced him to send this officer through our lines ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was the matter spoken of in the army at the time ?

Answer. Not that I heard.

Question. Do you know whether this officer returned with the rebel troops after the surrender ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; he was under arms the day we surrendered. I saw him and spoke of it ; at least he was with the men who were under arms in the party.

Question. Did he have his sword on ?

Answer. I do not recollect that. He was with the cavalry as they entered the place. I recognized the same party, and called the attention of several to the fact that there was Rouse, the man that was paroled not long since.

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights on the Saturday they were evacuated ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you present at any interviews between Colonel Miles and the commanding officer of the heights ?

Answer. At what time ?

Question. Before the evacuation ; immediately before the evacuation.

Answer. I was not.

Question. At any time within a few hours ?

Answer. I was, upon one occasion, with the colonel when he and Colonel Ford had a consultation some distance from me. What that was I do not know.

By the COURT :

Question. Did you know of any order, written or verbal, having been sent to Colonel Ford in regard to the abandonment of the heights ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Have you any reason whatever, or have you ever had any reason, to doubt the loyalty of Colonel Miles ?

Answer. I have not, in the least. I supposed, from the way he managed things there, that he was doing all he could for his country.

Question. You do not know by what authority Maryland Heights was abandoned ?

Answer. I supposed by the authority of the commanding officer, commanding the forces there.

Question. Did Colonel Miles say they were abandoned contrary to his order ?

Answer. I heard him say that, in the course of the afternoon.

Question. Did he arrest Colonel Ford for this disobedience ?

Answer. Not to my knowledge ; he took it lightly.

Question. Did he express any dissatisfaction ?

Answer. At first he did ; but he did not make the demonstration that I thought an officer in command of the division should have done if an acting brigadier-general had violated an order, as he said Colonel Ford had done in evacuating the heights.

Question. Were you with Colonel Miles on Maryland Heights the day they were evacuated?

Answer. Yes, sir; but not when they were evacuated.

Question. What time in the day?

Answer. Colonel Miles, Lieutenant Binney, and myself arrived there, I suppose, immediately after the hour of 10.

Question. What time did the colonel leave there?

Answer. It was, I suppose, 12 o'clock; probably after.

Question. Did you ride down with him?

Answer. I rode down with him.

Question. Did he say anything on his way down about holding the heights?

Answer. He did not, to my recollection. Going down, we had to ride in single file, and he spoke but little, in riding out, at any time.

Question. Do you know of any orders he gave, after he got down, in reference to the heights?

Answer. I saw none. I heard that he issued an order.

Question. Were you with Colonel Miles when he was first informed that the heights were abandoned?

Answer. I was not. I was then in the office, getting out a special order.

Question. How long have you been with Colonel Miles?

Answer. Since the 1st of September last.

Question. What were the characteristics of the colonel in regard to doing business; did he seem to understand his business; was he systematic?

Answer. I always admired his way of doing business; he was very exact.

Question. Did he seem to have control of all his faculties?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was one thing I admired in him; no matter how much he was pressed, he did everything, as I thought, in admirable style.

Question. Was he in the habit of issuing orders and then contradicting them by verbal orders?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

Question. Was any complaint ever made to you that he did so?

Answer. No, sir; I think not.

Question. Did you ever see Colonel Miles, during this time, when you thought he had not the control of all his faculties, all his senses?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Were you present at the interview between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford immediately following the evacuation?

Answer. I was not.

Question. Did you witness any bad conduct on the part of any troops on Maryland Heights?

Answer. I did.

Question. Will you state the character of that bad conduct, and of what regiment?

Answer. On our way up we met, as near as I can recollect, about two companies of

the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York on the wayside, between Maryland [Heights] Battery and the canal. Colonel Miles then ordered Lieutenant Binney to fall back and bring them up. He first said, "Boys, what are you doing here?" Said they, "We have been ordered to fall back." Said he, "By whom?" "By some major," says one. Said Colonel Miles, "There has been no order to give orders to fall back. I have given no order to fall back, and no major could get one unless he got it from me." He then said, "Mr. Binney, bring those men up," and then he ordered them to the front. I then passed on with him. When we got up to the battery where Colonel Ford was, there were a great many stragglers around there. Colonel Miles looked around and said, "What are you men doing here?" Said they, "We have been ordered to fall back." Said he, "There has been no order to fall back?" He then turned to me and said, "Mr. Willmon, go up on the hill and reform the One hundred and twenty-sixth, and try to get it to the front; and tell every officer and man you see that there is no order given to fall back, but the order is to go to the front immediately and do his duty there to the last." I obeyed his order and went up the hill. There I found, I think, about 500 members of the One hundred and twenty-sixth, and a few of the First Maryland and some of the Garibaldi Guards, but I think they were on duty. Among the men I found, I think, four officers. I worked there for over an hour. I appealed to the corporals and sergeants to take the places of their officers, as there were no officers to command them; that they should form in companies in some shape or other and go to the front. After getting them into some kind of ship-shape, I met their adjutant and handed them to him, with instructions from the colonel that there was no order given to retreat, and that the men should be marched to the front immediately, and that he should take command and do so. I then came down and reported to the colonel. Says I, "Colonel, it is almost an impossible matter to get the men together. I have done all I could to form them in the best possible shape, and have handed them over to the adjutant, with instructions that they should be marched to the front and kept there." To which he replied, "Well, damn them, they will run; just what I thought they would do." Then we left and came down.

By Colonel FORD :

Question. Describe to these gentlemen the condition of the troops around the place I was using as a hospital.

Answer. There was an utter confusion. The men were being forced up one way, and by the time you would get them up hill one way, they would be running down another.

Question. When you got there, did you find me exerting myself to the utmost?

Answer. I did; Colonel Ford did his utmost there in his saddle, when I knew he was sick at the time.

Question. Did Colonel Miles join me immediately, and were we working there together when you got back?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT :

Question. To what regiment did these troops belong of whom you are now speaking?

Answer. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, and a few of the First Maryland, up near the summit of the hill.

Question. Did you see the major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth?

Answer. I did not.

Question. Did you see any of the officers?

Answer. As I said before, I saw what I thought to be four officers.

Question. Did they take any interest in rallying the men?

Answer. I would say in regard to the major, that I could not find him. He was ordered to be put under arrest. In going up there I asked the men, "Who commands you." "Our major commands," they said. "Where is your major," I asked. "He has got away from us; we don't know where he is." "Well, what has become of

your captains?" One of them replied, "I don't know what has become of them; they must have run away from us." I found four officers there, and out of the four there was but one captain; the balance were second lieutenants.

Question. What were they doing?

Answer. I appealed to them, and they shirked and twisted and screwed about, and said they thought they could not get the men up; that there were F's and G's there all together, and they could not get them into companies. I told them to put the K's and B's together, and get the men formed into companies somehow.

Question. The officers appeared as much stampeded as the men?

Answer. Quite as much so; the corporals and sergeants behaved better than the officers; when I appealed to them and told them to take the places of their officers and take the men to the front, they had some energy about them, and stepped out and said, "Fall in, boys; come on, boys."

Question. To what regiment do you belong?

Answer. To the First Maryland.

Question. You had orders at that time to arrest the major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth?

Answer. It was a general order; a verbal general order, rather, from the colonel. He said, "Any of you officers that find that major, put him under arrest." I thought it applied to any of the officers under him. I thought it applied to me and to others.

Question. Did you go to where the regiment had been originally formed to find the major?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. How far were you from where the regiment had been originally formed in line of battle?

Answer. That I do not know.

Question. How far from the breastwork where the other regiments were formed?

Answer. I would not be able to form any idea of the distance.

Question. Where were the other regiments during the time you speak of—the Thirty-second Ohio and the Garibaldi Guards?

Answer. They were out back of Unsell's, I think.

Question. You did not go to that line?

Answer. I did not.

Question. You do not know whether the major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth was there or not?

Answer. I do not. I did not find him.

Question. How many of the One hundred and twenty-sixth do you suppose you saw that day away from this line?

Answer. I saw what I judged to be two companies below the battery.

Question. Did you understand that they were ordered there, or had run away?

Answer. They acknowledged that they had skedaddled. Upon the hill I suppose there were about 400 or 500.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Have you any recollection of my requesting Colonel Miles to furnish artillery for Solomon's Gap and the heights there?

Answer. I think there was a communication received from you to that effect.

Question. Do you recollect Colonel Miles' reply at one time to that?

Answer. In writing or verbally?

Question. Well, verbally; something that he said about it to a man I sent down.

Answer. I heard him make the remark, I do not recollect to whom it was, or when it was, or whom before; I cannot recollect at this moment. The remark was made in headquarters that Colonel Ford would have all his artillery up there if he would allow it to go.

Question. Did he say, in connection with that, and all his men, too?

Answer. I do not think he did.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you know of my declining to assume the command of the forces when I arrived there, and offering to aid Colonel Miles in the defense of the place?

Answer. I do.

Question. State to the court, if you please, if you have any means of knowing whether, in your judgment, I was indolent or diligent in keeping my promise to Colonel Miles.

Answer. So far as I could see, you did all you could.

Question. Had you any means of judging?

Answer. Not more than what I could see with my own eyes. I saw that you were busy all the while on the field.

Question. Did you have an opinion in regard to the utility of any further fighting at the time of the surrender? If you had, what was that opinion?

Answer. From the knowledge of the facts, knowing that we were surrounded by the enemy in superior numbers, knowing as I did that the long-range ammunition was nearly, if not totally, expended, I thought it would just be sacrificing life to continue the contest longer than we did on Monday morning.

Question. Do you know that it was reported to Colonel Miles that that class of ammunition was expended?

Answer. Yes, sir; at least he sent Mr. Binney out for that purpose, and Mr. Binney came in and made the report.

Question. Have you any means of knowing the number or amount of the enemy's forces there?

Answer. I have a little memorandum here, a part of a report given by a deserter—not a deserter either. He was attempting to desert and was captured by our forces and brought in. It is as follows:

Prisoner taken to-night belonging to the Sixteenth North Carolina Regiment; taken on the left, toward Shenandoah River; reports three divisions of rebels attacking us, all under General Jackson. Prisoner in Pender's brigade, with General A. P. Hill's division. Jackson himself in our front; don't know who are on Loudoun Heights; thinks A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions.

Question. Did you understand that to be the force attacking us in front?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Without reference to the Maryland side or Loudoun Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you hear from any other source anything about the amount of their force on the other side?

Answer. I heard various rumors.

Question. I mean anything reliable?

Answer. No, sir; I did not.

By the COURT:

Question. Had you any evidence corroborating what that rebel soldier said?

Answer. Nothing more than their own admissions after the surrender, and what I saw with my own eyes. I saw any quantity of them.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Did you hear Adjutant Barras, when he returned, report to me that he could not hold the men of his regiment; that all of them had run again?

Answer. I do not recollect.

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles make this remark, "Arrest the major! Damn him! Shoot him the first moment you see him!"

Answer. I think I did.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know why Colonel Miles made no artificial defenses on Maryland Heights, or caused them to be made?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Did you ever hear him speak of it at all?

Answer. I did not. There was a traverse thrown up there, probably on Saturday morning, a short traverse.

Question. That was all the defenses there were then?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is the nature of the country on Maryland Heights; is it a wooded country?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Thickly wooded?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is, undergrowth.

Question. How far can a man see in any one direction there, as he is going along?

Answer. From the battery you can see in one direction toward Solomon's Gap.

Question. I mean close to the ground; not over the hill.

Answer. You could not see, on an average, over 100 yards.

Question. Those 500 men, stragglers, that you speak of, were they all in sight?

Answer. They were in the road. I do not think there were 500; it would not approach 500, I am sure. They were in the road commencing at the battery and going up to the summit. There were earthworks on Bolivar Heights; they were put up under the direction of Captain Boyle.

Dr. RICHARD E. SUTTON, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. I am the regimental surgeon of the One hundred and fifteenth New York.

Question. Were you present on Maryland Heights the day of the evacuation?

Answer. I was present on Saturday morning after the skirmish.

Question. While it was still held by our troops?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You did not witness the skirmish?

Answer. There had been a skirmish, and two companies of the One hundred and fifteenth were in it. The balance of the regiment were ordered up. There was a little scattering fire when I got up, but no general engagement.

Question. Was Colonel Miles there?

Answer. I saw Colonel Miles in conversation with Colonel Ford, at Colonel Ford's headquarters, when I got on the hill.

Question. Do you know anything as to any directions he gave in reference to the heights being held?

Answer. I do not; anything more than mere rumor.

Question. You are not a military man by profession?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you see anything of the conduct of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York that day?

Answer. I passed over in the rear of our regiment. I was detained a few moments to have a shoe set. When I got to Colonel Ford's headquarters, I crossed Major Baird of that regiment and a few men of the regiment, perhaps 20, who were looking for their regiment. My regiment had passed on in advance of them. I found their position and he accompanied me to the rear of that regiment and then passed to our right, to the rear of McGrath's battery. That was all I saw.

Question. They professed to be looking for their regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir; they told me they were looking for the regiment, as they had been ordered back to the heights. But the major thought it was impossible to hold possession of the heights; still, he was looking for his regiment.

By the COURT:

Question. This was after you got on the heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you see any of that regiment on your way up?

Answer. Only that portion of it.

Question. About 20 men, you say?

Answer. I think about 20 men; it did not exceed that.

Question. Did the major state how he became separated from the regiment?

Answer. I do not remember that he did. I rather inferred from the conversation that on their retreat they had got separated. I found that the two companies of the One hundred and fifteenth that had been up with them had also been separated from the regiment.

Capt. SILAS F. RIGBY, called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. What position do you occupy in the military service of the United States?

Answer. Commander of the First Independent Indiana Battery.

Question. Were you present during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I was.

Question. Commanded a battery there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At what portion of the line were you placed?

Answer. On the extreme left of Bolivar Heights.

Question. Was there an engagement there or in that vicinity on the Sunday afternoon prior to the surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Who was in general command there during that engagement?

Answer. On the extreme left—

Question. From whom did you receive your orders?

Answer. I received all my orders from Colonel Trimble.

Question. Did you send some guns to the front there during that engagement?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the result of the firing that was opened upon those guns—the infantry firing—as far as you observed it?

Answer. It was very severe for a time; the result was that the enemy was repulsed.

Question. Can you state how many, or about how many, guns, or, in other words, how many batteries, if you cannot state the number of guns, were opened on Monday morning by the enemy, and from how many directions?

Answer. There were between seven and nine batteries in all. There were seven opened on me on Monday morning—on the position I had.

Question. About how near to your battery was the one immediately in front of it?

Answer. I took it to be between 600 and 800 yards.

Question. Do you know how many guns were there?

Answer. As near as I could judge, some ten guns.

Question. Have you been in other engagements before that one?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many?

Answer. In six.

Question. How did the artillery fire that morning compare with other artillery fire that you have seen in the service?

Answer. It was the heaviest I have ever seen.

Question. How much ammunition had you left, except canister, at the time you ordered to cease firing?

Answer. I had not a round of anything but canister.

Question. Had you applied for other ammunition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. To whom?

Answer. To Major Melvaine, and also to Colonel Miles.

Question. What was the reply ?

Answer. The reply was that there was none there.

Question. It had all been distributed, do you mean ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; so I understood.

Question. It was impossible then for you to run your battery any longer, except with canister ?

Answer. I could not have done it any longer, only with canister, and I had but twenty-one rounds of that left.

Question. Was the fire of the enemy mostly converged on the left ?

Answer. On Monday morning it all seemed to be there, except one or two guns on the right.

Question. What is your opinion of the strength of the enemy in front of us on that day ?

Answer. I do not know as I could give a very definite opinion.

Question. Had you any information ?

Answer. I had no direct information farther than I got from Colonel Walker, chief of artillery in General Hill's division.

Question. What did he state ?

Answer. He stated their force to be some 70,000 men in all ; that is, on the converging points to the front, from the left of the Shenandoah around to the Charlestown road.

Question. What is your opinion as to the practicability of handling infantry that morning with a prospect of success in repulsing the attack of such a force of the enemy as you saw there ?

Answer. I do not think it could have been done successfully.

Question. Colonel D'Utassy, Colonel Ford, Colonel Trimble, and myself are under arrest in connection with this investigation ; if you had any means of observing the conduct of those officers, will you state what it was ?

Answer. I observed the conduct of none except yourself and Colonel Trimble. It was in all respects becoming a good soldier. The other officers were away at such points that I could see nothing of them.

Question. Did you see either of the officers mentioned during those two engagements, Sunday night and Monday morning ?

Answer. I saw you and Colonel Trimble in the heaviest fire to the front, rather between my battery and the enemy.

By the COURT :

Question. Do you know what loss the enemy suffered there ?

Answer. I do not. I made an effort to learn, but was unsuccessful.

Question. What loss did you sustain in killed and wounded ?

Answer. I had 3 men slightly wounded in my company ; that was all.

Question. How long have you been in service ?

Answer. I entered the service in this war on the 23d of April, a year ago.

Question. What did your artillery fire at mostly here ; at men or at batteries ?

Answer. I had two of my guns directly on the batteries, and four in use on their lines.

Question. Where were those batteries ?

Answer. They were to the front and right, the three that I worked on. The batteries to my left were a little out of my range. Captain Potts was between me and them, and he attended to them.

By General WHITE :

Question. Were their batteries, in your judgment, sufficient in number and their positions such as to enfilade our lines upon Bolivar Heights, and also to deliver a flanking fire on both our flanks ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; that is my view of it.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Do you know why it was that the supply of ammunition was so short at Harper's Ferry ?

Answer. I do not ; that is a question I could not answer.

By the COURT :

Question. Had requisitions ever been made by you previously for supplies of ammunition ?

Answer. No, sir. I came there with a full supply for my battery.

Question. How many rounds ?

Answer. I had 600 rounds. I came with a six-gun 24-pounder howitzer battery, and I came there with 100 rounds to the gun. When I came there I inquired for ammunition, and was told there was a plenty there. When it became short I made inquiries—I made a personal inspection, and was told there was none.

Question. Did you ever make an ammunition return to the ordnance officer ?

Answer. I made several ammunition returns there.

By General WHITE :

Question. You say you made a personal inspection for ammunition ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; at the wagons that were to supply us.

Question. Did you expend all those 600 rounds at that siege ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; with the exception of the canister.

By the COURT :

Question. Do you know that any of the enemy were killed or wounded during the siege of Harper's Ferry ?

Answer. I was told by some of their own men, whom I was in conversation with, that they were cut up tolerably badly on the front. We were not allowed to go out on the grounds to see anything.

Question. Did you ever ask any intelligent officer as to the effect of your own fire on the enemy ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I conversed with several in relation to it. They told me that my battery had to be taken if it cost a thousand lives ; that they had two brigades in line to charge it at the time of the surrender ; we could see their lines very distinctly.

By General WHITE :

Question. Was it two brigades or two divisions ?

Answer. Two brigades, I understood ; it might have been two divisions. I would say in relation to whom I received my orders from, that until Sunday afternoon and Monday morning I received them from Colonel Miles. I said also that I had a six-gun battery. I had two guns brought up ; after I had expended the ammunition for two of the guns, I had two Parrott guns brought up. I had six guns at work all the time.

Capt. BENJAMIN F. POTTS, called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. What position do you hold in the military service?

Answer. I have been commanding a battery of light artillery for the last three months—about three months.

Question. Were you present at Harper's Ferry during the siege?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Your guns were located a portion of the time on Camp Hill, were they not?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Operating against Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; Maryland and also Loudoun Heights.

Question. Were you subsequently removed to the front?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. By whose order?

Answer. By your order.

Question. What day was that?

Answer. On the evening of Sunday.

Question. Were you there the next morning during the engagement?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was there until after the surrender.

Question. Who was in command there that morning—in general command?

Answer. You were there, the only person I saw in command.

Question. Did you observe how much artillery the enemy appeared to have at work that morning—how many batteries?

Answer. Seven batteries was what I counted in front and on Loudoun Heights. There was another battery on Maryland Heights, making eight batteries in all; that is my recollection.

Question. Who located your battery that morning? Who gave you directions where it should be placed?

Answer. You gave me the directions on Sunday night about dark.

Question. Who directed you to open fire that morning?

Answer. You did.

Question. Did I tell you where to fire?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the result of the engagement on Sunday evening?

Answer. I did not do any firing on Sunday evening.

Question. What was the general result of the engagement?

Answer. The enemy was repulsed—our troops were repulsed, as I understood it. As far as I know, I believe it was an infantry engagement, although there was some artillery out there.

Question. What time did you get there?

Answer. About dark.

Question. About the close of the engagement?

Answer. Yes, sir, as they were coming back.

Question. On Monday morning, at the time you were ordered to cease firing, what amount of ammunition had you on hand, and what was its character and class?

Answer. I had not anything on hand, except about 12 rounds to the gun of canister.

Question. Had you applied for further ammunition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the reply you got?

Answer. That there was no ammunition of that caliber.

Question. Had you expended all your shell at the time you were ordered to cease firing?

Answer. Yes, sir, and had my guns charged with canister at the time.

Question. Have you been in other engagements?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was the character of the fire that morning compared with what you have seen in other engagements?

Answer. It was the heaviest engagement I have seen during my term of service.

Question. About how much ammunition had you expended during that siege?

Answer. I had drawn 1,000 rounds from the arsenal, and I expended it all during the siege, except the canister; I had left, about 12 rounds to the gun.

Question. Had you been an infantry officer before you took charge of that battery?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is your opinion of the practicability of handling infantry under the fire of the enemy's guns that morning, that is, the amount of infantry we had, against what the enemy had in front of us, with any reasonable prospect of repulsing an attack?

Answer. I do not think, with the force we had under the fire of the enemy's guns, that we could have repulsed them at all.

Question. Do you know where infantry could have been placed in line of battle that they would not have been very badly cut up by the enemy's artillery fire?

Answer. I know of no place on the left of where I was posted, to the left of the pike and on the ridge.

By the COURT:

Question. How far from the front were you?

Answer. I had two of my pieces planted right on the pike on the top of the height, and the others of my pieces were below.

Question. To the east and toward the river?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By General WHITE:

Question. With what force did you arrive at Harper's Ferry, and at what time?

Answer. With General White's force from Winchester on the evening of the 3d of September.

By the COURT:

Question. At what did you fire?

Answer. When ordered to do so, I fired on Maryland Heights and on Loudoun Heights, whenever there was any appearance of the enemy.

Question. At men or at batteries?

Answer. Part of the time we fired at men; we could see some of them occasionally.

Question. What was the character of your pieces?

Answer. Four of my pieces were 3-inch rifles; the other two were light 12-pounders, smooth-bore.

Question. What was the distance of your battery from Maryland Heights?

Answer. I can hardly state; merely guess. It must have been 2,500 yards, I should think, from where I was to the batteries.

Question. What was the difference of elevation between your position and Maryland Heights—the position you fired at?

Answer. My battery was planted on Camp Hill.

Question. How much higher were the Maryland Heights than your position? You have given the distance; now, what was the difference of elevation?

Answer. I could not tell exactly.

Question. Was it 100 feet or 200 feet; was it very material?

Answer. Yes, sir, it was material.

Question. About how much?

Answer. I should think 100 feet or more.

Question. Did your shot reach the top of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think they did.

Question. Could you see?

Answer. Yes, sir; their battery was planted to the left of Maryland Heights, down toward the river. It was not so far as it would be on to Maryland Heights, right in front, where I was.

Question. On the slope, not on the high ground?

Answer. On the slope, just below the high ground.

Question. That was what you were firing at, was it?

Answer. Yes, sir; and then I fired at men as we could see them at different places.

By General WHITE:

Question. You shelled the woods generally?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. How many did you lose in your battery, killed and wounded?

Answer. Three wounded, only slightly; none killed.

Question. Had you any means of ascertaining what the enemy's loss was?

Answer. I had none; only what I learned from different sources; some of the artillery officers of the Confederate army told me their loss was considerable; that is all I know about it. They did not give me any definite idea about it.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. To what regiment were you attached before?

Answer. To the Thirty-second Ohio.

Question. To my regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you, before this battle of Harper's Ferry, ever receive an order permanently detaching you from that regiment?

Answer. No, sir; I never have yet received that order. I was detached by General Piatt, but have not yet received the order permanently detaching me.

Question. When the order came to me, from Colonel Miles, to occupy Maryland Heights with my entire regiment, do you remember a conversation taking place between you and myself with regard to my duty in the premises as regarded ordering you there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State to the court what the conclusion was.

Answer. You stated to me that you had been ordered to take command of Maryland Heights, and wished me to take my battery and go along, inasmuch as you thought I still belonged to your regiment.

Question. Did I speak of the necessity of having the battery?

Answer. Yes, sir; you said you thought it absolutely necessary to have the battery go along.

Question. Did you go along?

Answer. Yes, sir; I went with the regiment across the river and across the canal and to the foot of the heights, when Colonel Miles ordered me back.

Question. Did he administer any reproof to you for going there?

Answer. No, sir; he had not then attached me to any brigade. He then assigned me to the Second Brigade, and afterward put me on the reserve.

Question. Were you afterward on Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you hear me at any time express my anxiety at not having you there?

Answer. Yes, sir; I never saw you there, but you expressed your earnest wish to have the battery there.

Question. Did you not hear me express my anxiety on the hill there?

Answer. Yes, sir. It was on Sunday that I was first over there. I was over there several times afterward.

Question. Upon talking to you, after looking around there, did I not say that I must, of necessity, be overwhelmed there unless Colonel Miles would order you there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was your opinion?

Answer. Upon examining all the points there, I thought it was necessary to have a battery there.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you recollect what elevation you gave your pieces in firing at this battery on Maryland Heights?

Answer. I do not recollect now.

Question. What elevation do you give your pieces usually in firing on a horizontal range at the distance of a mile, or from 1,500 to 2,500 yards?

Answer. About 4° is what we used.

Question. You do not recollect what elevation you gave them there?

Answer. No, sir. There were so many changes during the day that I do not recollect now what it was.

Question. Was the enemy's fire of artillery on you constantly?

Answer. Yes, sir; during Sunday.

Question. All day Sunday?

Answer. No, sir; not all day. I do not recollect now just at what time the enemy's fire opened on Sunday, but from the time they did open fire—which I think was about noon, probably a little earlier than that—it was a constant fire the whole afternoon until dark.

Question. Did this fire seem to be concentrated on your battery?

Answer. Yes, sir; Captain Graham's battery was on Camp Hill also. Our two batteries were close together.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you remember that, prior to the establishment of the enemy's battery on Maryland Heights, while you were on Camp Hill, I came there and directed you not to fire away ammunition unless you saw men or a battery to fire at?

Answer. Yes, sir; I recollect that distinctly; it was on Sunday morning—Sunday forenoon.

By the COURT:

Question. What other engagements have you been in?

Answer. I was in the engagement at McDowell, Va.; at Cross Keys; I was in the engagement at Greenbrier last fall, but I was in the infantry service then.

Lieut. MARTIN McMARTIN, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. Quartermaster of the One hundred and fifteenth New York Volunteers.

Question. At what point were you serving during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. On Saturday I was on Maryland Heights; on Sunday I was in camp and had charge of the provision and baggage train.

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights during the engagement that took place there?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was there I think about 11 o'clock.

Question. Did you observe the conduct of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York there?

Answer. I did not.

Question. Was Colonel Miles there?

Answer. I did not see him there.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you notice any instances of misconduct on the part of any troops there?

Answer. No, sir; none at all.

Question. No straggling on the part of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment?

Answer. None whatever; in fact, I did not see the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment while they were on the heights.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Have you any judgment at all as to the necessity that existed for evacuating those heights at that time?

Answer. Very little. I should suppose it would depend upon the number of the forces on the heights at the time.

Question. You were subsequently on the Harper's Ferry side of the river?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Have you any knowledge of prisoners being paroled during the siege, or immediately preceding it, and passing out through our lines?

Answer. None whatever.

Question. Have you any judgment as to the necessity of the surrender of Harper's Ferry when it occurred?

Answer. No, sir; I cannot say that I have. Yes, I have a judgment of my own.

Question. That is exactly what we meant.

Answer. I do not regard myself as competent to give an opinion on military matters; but at the time, in my opinion, it was unnecessary, and I so expressed myself.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you mean that it was unnecessary to surrender Harper's Ferry after the Maryland Heights had been given up?

Answer. O, no, sir. I think it was necessary then. I was speaking in reference to the abandonment of Maryland Heights. After that, I think it was very proper to surrender.

Question. Then the abandonment of Maryland Heights you think was uncalled for at the time?

Answer. I believed so at the time, because I saw no forces there, and I had no evidence that there was a large number of the enemy's troops on the hill.

Question. Have you any knowledge of anything connected with the official conduct of Colonel Miles, or of the four officers under arrest, General White, Colonel Ford, Colonel D'Utassy, and Colonel Trimble; do you know anything connected with their conduct on the occasion that struck you as in any respect deficient in military conduct in their duties in regard to the defense of that place?

Answer. Do you mean on the day of the surrender, or during either of the engagements there?

Question. During the siege, from the time the place was invested by the enemy, or a few days previous.

Answer. All I can say in relation to that is, that I supposed that Colonel Miles, on a requisition that I made to him for arms, the day before, I think, or two days before the surrender, should have seen that we had arms. I presented a requisition to him and told him that the nipples of many of the guns were broken. He refused to sign

the requisition, or rather he approved the requisition I presented to him, but discovered it was not in form. I had before understood him that I must get the colonel commanding the brigade, instead of himself, to approve it. But on taking it to the ordnance officer, I found that he would not issue them without Colonel Miles' signature. I went to Colonel Miles and asked him to approve the requisition. At first he did approve it, and then discovered Colonel D'Utassy's name on the requisition, and threw it back to me, and ordered Colonel D'Utassy to make an official report as to why one-half of the regiment had been disarmed. I had taken the old arms down on getting Colonel D'Utassy's approval, supposing that was right, and turned them in to the arsenal. I thought Colonel Miles should have seen that the men had their arms.

Question. You are speaking of the One hundred and fifteenth Regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What had you, as quartermaster, to do with that?

Answer. I signed the requisition for the arms.

Question. What had you to do with it? How did the requisition come to you? What had you to do with a requisition for arms in your regiment?

Answer. I made the requisition, approved by the colonel.

Question. By whose order?

Answer. By the order of the colonel of the regiment. I presented it to the colonel commanding the brigade, and he approved it. It was according to the order of Colonel Miles that it should be done in that way. He stated that he would sign no requisition whatever. He, however, probably intended to except a requisition for arms; there may be a misunderstanding about that, though. However, as he did at first approve the order before he threw it back to me, I went and got the arms.

Question. What day was that?

Answer. I think that it was the same day a portion of our regiment was sent up on Maryland Heights; two companies, I believe.

Question. Why did the colonel of your regiment postpone until that time the getting of the arms?

Answer. That I cannot say.

Question. Were they without arms, or was it to replace defective arms?

Answer. To replace defective arms.

Question. I understand you to say the old ones were turned in before you got any others?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And a portion of your regiment was then left without arms?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What number do you say were defective—about half of the regiment?

Answer. That is my recollection; that we got about 500.

Question. How long had they been that way?

Answer. I guess for two or three weeks; they were all the arms we ever had had.

Question. Did you make any requisition for arms before?

Answer. There had been one made by the colonel when we were at Charlestown, and I think he received some then.

Question. You got the arms?

Answer. Yes, sir; on this requisition, although I suppose Colonel Miles did not know I got them, as he threw back the requisition to me after approving it.

Question. That is the only matter you remember as connected with the service there?

Answer. At the time I went on Maryland Heights—it was about 11 o'clock, I think—I took two provision wagons; I was ordered to take provisions for two days. I got there, and not knowing exactly where the provision train should be placed, I called at Colonel Ford's headquarters and inquired there. There was some person in charge there (it was not Colonel Ford), who told me that there were some 30,000 of the enemy's troops on the heights.

Question. When was that?

Answer. During the engagement on Saturday.

Question. Who told you this?

Answer. Some one at the headquarters of Colonel Ford; I do not know who he was.

Question. Was he an officer?

Answer. I supposed he was. I understood him that the firing would be kept up for the purpose of enabling the train to get down the hill, and I think some half an hour after that either that person or some other in the headquarters there sent an order, inquiring of me the name of Colonel Sammon; sent an order to retire, as I supposed it was.

Question. So you returned with the stores?

Answer. I left them in charge of a sergeant and joined my regiment in the woods. I think about a half an hour after I joined them the order came to retire.

Question. At that time you saw no enemy, and saw no necessity for retiring?

Answer. No, sir; I saw no enemy.

Question. Was there any firing going on at that time?

Answer. Very little; there was firing of artillery.

Question. I mean infantry firing.

Answer. No, sir; very little; occasionally a shot. There had been, previous to that, before I got up on the hill.

Question. That is all you think material in answer to the question in reference to the officers named?

Answer. That is all.

Question. Do you know what amount of commissary stores were on hand at the time of the surrender?

Answer. No, sir; I do not. There was sugar, tea, coffee, some bacon—what amount I do not know.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Will you show the court here [making a diagram of the heights on paper] where you were stationed?

Answer. [The witness explained on the diagram.]

Question. Do you know what force the enemy had upon the mountain?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know what force they had in the valley?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Do you know what force we had on Maryland Heights?

Answer. I know some of them.

Question. Do you know their number and position ?

Answer. No, sir ; I think we had about 2,500 or 3,000.

Question. Do you know where the first fight was in the morning ?

Answer. I was not present.

Question. Do you know where the little fortification was ?

Answer. I was not there.

Question. Do you know where the lookout was ?

Answer. It was pointed out to me ; I did not go to it.

Question. Were you upon the mountain at all during that day ?

Answer. I was up where the forces were ; not on the crest of the hill.

Question. Not up to any other forces but yours ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You did not see at all during that time the troops breaking and running ?

Answer. I did not see anything of that.

Question. How long have you been in the service ?

Answer. A month, perhaps.

Question. After saying that you do not know the force of the enemy, or the position of the Federal forces, or anything about the troops running, do you undertake to say it was not necessary to abandon the heights ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What did you understand about it ?

Answer. I understood I was to give an opinion from the very limited means I had of forming one.

Question. Do you not think you had the means of forming one ?

Answer. I stated distinctly that I did not think I was competent to give an opinion.

Capt. JOHN H. GRAHAM, called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows :

By General WHITE :

Question. What is your position in the military service ?

Answer. Captain, Company A, Fifth Artillery, New York Volunteers.

Question. Did you command a battery during the siege of Harper's Ferry ?

Answer. I commanded a company of heavy artillery ; that is, I had the command of some light guns, not, strictly speaking, a battery.

Question. Was it not a field battery, or a portion of it ?

Answer. A portion of it, yes, sir.

Question. At the time of the surrender, on Monday, the 15th, what ammunition had you on hand for your guns, and of what class ?

Answer. For the whole it would be difficult for me to say. My company was divided in five different places. I had command of two guns, myself, on Bolivar Heights.

Question. Of what caliber ?

Answer. One 20-pounder Parrott gun and one light 12-pounder. For those guns I had some solid shot for the 20-pounder, and percussion shell. I had all kinds of

ammunition except long fuses. I was short for the 12-pounder gun, but I went down and got some and had it brought up.

Question. Do you say you had ammunition for all your guns, or for the two on the right?

Answer. For those two.

Question. You had sufficient ammunition to last how long; how many rounds altogether?

Answer. I cannot say that exactly; I had considerable.

Question. Solid shot and percussion shell?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. No fuses?

Answer. No long fuses. I had short fuses, plenty of them, but not such as I had been using.

Question. Had you anything on hand at that time but solid shot that could have been used at long range?

Answer. I had percussion shell. I had probably 100 rounds altogether of all kinds.

Question. For the two guns?

Answer. Yes, sir; for I had been down and brought up some from the Ferry.

Question. Were you in a position where you had an opportunity to observe the enemy's forces, their infantry, cavalry, &c., prior to the surrender?

Answer. I could see where they said they were, but I could not see them for the trees. I saw where they opened their batteries.

Question. How many batteries do you recollect that they had in position and operation on Monday morning?

Answer. There was one on Maryland Heights, and I think two on Loudoun Heights; one on the Shepherdstown road, and either one or two, I do not know which, over to my left, toward the Shenandoah River.

Question. Beyond the Shenandoah?

Answer. I do not know whether they were beyond or not.

Question. Do you know of a battery directly in front of Captain Rigby, on the prolongation of the heights?

Answer. That is the one I mean, right off in that direction.

Question. Do you know of one east of the Shenandoah, on the plateau at the foot of the heights?

Answer. I do not know whether that was on the other side of the river or on the Harper's Ferry side.

Question. Do you know that there was a battery there?

Answer. Yes, sir; but I was engaged with the battery over toward the Shepherdstown road.

Question. Do you know of one between the Shepherdstown road and the Charlestown road?

Answer. Only one battery.

Question. On the Charlestown road?

Answer. Yes, sir, just in the woods, close by, between Halltown and the Potomac.

Question. Did the fire from these batteries pretty generally enfilade and flank all our positions?

Answer. I do not think they did, the whole of them.

Question. Did you see that battery directly in front of Captain Rigby's?

Answer. He was away on the other end to the extreme left, and it was difficult for me to see.

Question. Was there a battery there that enfiladed our line?

Answer. Yes, sir. The battery that I say I do not know whether it was beyond the Shenandoah or not, that enfiladed the hill up, say, half-way.

Question. Taking from Maryland Heights around by the way of Loudoun Heights, and so on around to the Charlestown road, was not their fire delivered from nearly all points of the compass upon us?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. Please state your loss, if any, in killed and wounded, during the siege of Harper's Ferry.

Answer. None.

Question. Did the percussion shells you used explode or not?

Answer. I watched them very closely to see if they did, and I saw none explode.

Question. How many did you fire?

Answer. I fired some on Sunday and some on Saturday.

Question. How many in all?

Answer. Some twenty or thirty, I think; perhaps more than that. I did not keep any account. We were firing all the while. When we got out of long fuses we took those; and I tried some on Saturday before I got out of long fuses. If they had exploded I think I should have seen them.

Question. Whose make were those shells?

Answer. Schenkl's.

Question. What do you mean by long fuses—wooden fuses?

Answer. No, sir; paper fuses; twenty seconds.

Question. You mean long-time fuses?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By General WHITE:

Question. Those percussion shells were of very little use to you as shells?

Answer. Very little use as I could see. Colonel Ford said he fired some and they exploded; none of mine did.

By the COURT:

Question. How long had you those shells on hand?

Answer. I do not know how long they had them in the arsenal.

Question. You got them from the arsenal?

Answer. Yes, sir. I had them perhaps two weeks. My orderly sergeant fired some of them also, and he said they did not explode.

Capt. J. C. H. VON SEHLEN, called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. What position do you hold in the United States service?

Answer. I am captain of Battery No. 15, Indiana Volunteers.

Question. Were you at the siege of Harper's Ferry with that battery?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At the time of the surrender, on Monday, the 15th, how much ammunition had you on hand for all your guns, and of what class?

Answer. I cannot say the exact amount. I had been firing a great part of Saturday and on Sunday a part of my guns, and on Monday morning I kept up a very lively fire with all my guns. A part of my ammunition was blown up on Saturday; I could not say what amount.

Question. What was that you had left?

Answer. Mostly shrapnel.

By the COURT :

Question. How much ammunition did you lose by the explosion?

Answer. About 100 rounds.

Question. What was your loss in killed and wounded during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. One of my gunners and one private were wounded by the explosion of the limber, and one of the officers' servants was struck in the leg by a piece of shell. That was all the casualties I had.

By General WHITE :

Question. What part of the line were you on?

Answer. On the right-center of Bolivar Heights, except Monday morning, when I was down the Shepherdstown road.

By the COURT :

Question. What caused this limber to explode?

Answer. A shell of the enemy struck into it; a shell from Maryland Heights.

The Commission then adjourned to 11 a. m. on Monday next.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 13, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The minutes of the last meeting were then read and approved. The judge-advocate informed the Commission that the Secretary of War directs that the Commission also investigate and report upon the evacuation of Winchester by General White.*

Dr. Benjamin B. Miles appeared in attendance upon the sessions of the Commission as the representative of his father, the late Col. D. S. Miles, and was sworn to secrecy.

At the request of General White, Capt. Henry Curtis, jr., and Lieut. Henry M. Binney were admitted to the room, sworn to secrecy, and authorized to make a copy of the testimony taken in this case, for purposes of defense only.

Lieut. CHARLES G. BACON, called by Colonel D'Utassy, and sworn and examined as follows:

By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. What is your position in the United States service?

Answer. I am first lieutenant of your regiment. At the time you were commanding the First Brigade at Harper's Ferry, I was acting assistant adjutant-general.

* See Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, p. 767.

Question. What do you know about the offer I made to cut our way through before the surrender of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. On several occasions I heard you suggest that it could be done. In conversation, I think, with Colonel Cameron, Captain Phillips, and Captain Von Sehlen—my impression is that it was on Sunday night that you had a conversation with those three gentlemen—you suggested that the thing was possible. My impression is that some person—one of those three—was sent either to General White or to Colonel Miles, bearing a proposition of that character. Whether they saw them or not I do not know.

Question. After the evacuation of Maryland Heights, did I propose to retake the heights, and what happened after that? What orders did I give?

Answer. You said you thought the heights could be retaken, and, in order to prove that, you requested authority to send over to the heights, which you did. You received the authority, and sent over two companies from your own regiment and two from the Sixty-fifth Illinois.

Question. By whom were they commanded?

Answer. By Major Wood, of the Sixty-fifth Illinois.

Question. Did you go over yourself?

Answer. I did.

Question. What did you bring over from there?

Answer. We brought four brass field pieces—I do not know their weight—four caissons, and a tumbrel.

Question. Any ammunition and gunpowder?

Answer. Yes, sir; a wagon-load, as much as we could bring away. Had we had more wagons, we could have brought away a great deal more that was left.

Question. What enabled us to continue the fighting Sunday and Monday?

Answer. The ammunition brought over in that wagon. We got some 100 pairs of drawers from the One hundred and fifteenth Regiment, sent down by the quartermaster; you got tailors from various regiments of your brigade, and the powder in that wagon for the 11-inch Parrott guns on the heights was manufactured into cartridges for the 12-pounders, on our extreme right, commanded by Captain Graham, I believe.

Question. Do you know of orders that I gave during the latter part of the siege, before the surrender, as to what we would do?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State as briefly as you can their contents.

Answer. Immediately after the surrender you gave orders that everything should be done and conducted in an orderly manner; that the arms should be stacked, saying that, as we had to surrender, the best thing we could do was to behave in an honorable and gentlemanly manner.

Question. I mean before that General Orders, No. 15.

Answer. I do not recollect it.

Question. It was when we supposed we would be attacked at the night time.

Answer. You ordered the men to fight the best they could. You have the original of that order here, I think.

Question. Where had I been during the whole fight, and when the regiment broke up; when they broke on Sunday, what did I do with them?

Answer. You reformed it and marched it to the top of the hill, under the fire of both batteries.

Question. Do you remember who dislocated the two guns on Loudoun Heights which were planted there the first time?

Answer. Captain Von Sehlen.

Question. Under whose command was that battery of Captain Von Sehlen?

Answer. In yours, in the center of your brigade.

Question. Do you know about how many wounded and killed we had in my brigade?

Answer. No, sir; I cannot say exactly.

Question. Approximately?

Answer. My impression is, not more than 20.

Question. How many wounded?

Answer. I could not tell; I could not discriminate; when I say 20, I mean wounded and killed. I suppose that would cover the whole loss in your brigade; that is my impression.

Question. When General Branch offered to parole my command what conditions did he make, and what was my reply?

Answer. As we walked toward the head of your regiment, General Branch, yourself, Mr. Kent, Mr. Parker, and myself, General Branch said, "Colonel D'Utassy, I presume you place the same construction upon this parole that I do?" You said, "What is that?" He said, "I think that you are not to go into a camp of instruction; that you are not to drill." Said you, "No, sir; I understand nothing of the kind, and I will put an example. Suppose we are to be sent against the Indians in the Northwest." You turned to Colonel Segoine, of the One hundred and eleventh, and he put the same case that you did, and used the same remarks that you did, and you declined being paroled on that understanding or construction of the articles of capitulation. He then agreed to refer the matter to General A. P. Hill, and see if he put the same construction upon the articles of capitulation that he did. This was about dusk, and I was to call at 9 o'clock that night and receive his answer. I did so, and General Branch told me that General Hill entertained the same view of the subject that he did, and he must decline to parole you, except upon those conditions. I reported that to you, and you declined peremptorily receiving or entertaining any such proposition, and I believe ordered the troops to fall in the next morning at an early hour. General Branch said he would be there at 8 o'clock.

Question. Did I save the flags of the different regiments?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I believe they are all here now in your possession. You ordered the flags of the First Brigade to be all brought to your quarters immediately after the surrender. We spent some time taking them from the staffs, and they were put in your trunk, I believe.

Question. Do you know I opposed a surrender as long as I had a chance of fighting our way through?

Answer. I understood you did. I was not present at the council of war, but I always understood that you agreed to the surrender only upon the understanding that the ammunition was entirely out. Everybody in your brigade supposed that was the way you acted.

Question. Did you not make a statement to General Tyler, and what became of that statement?

Answer. I wrote a statement of that interview between General Branch and yourself, at General Tyler's suggestion, at Annapolis. He indorsed it and my impression is that he forwarded it to the Adjutant-General. Relative to that General Orders, No. 15, that you speak of, I have forgotten its number and purport, except I know it was intended to encourage the men and officers.

By General WHITE:

Question. You say you brought away a wagon-load of ammunition from Maryland Heights, and could have brought much more?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was there any long-range ammunition over there ?

Answer. I am not sufficiently versed in matters of artillery to be able to tell. There was a large quantity of various kinds of ammunition over there ; it seemed to me of four or five different kinds. There was ammunition for brass field pieces, for those large guns over there, the rifled guns, and for the shell guns. Shot was in those naval canisters, lead tanks or zinc tanks. We brought away four or five of those full, and a great many loose cartridges—large cartridges.

Question. And you think a large quantity in addition might have been brought away, if proper attention had been given to it ?

Answer. I know it could.

By the COURT :

Question. How many wagón-loads more ?

Answer. I think we could have filled two more wagons—two-horse wagons. There seemed to be one of those Sibley tents full of all kinds of ammunition.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Was anything said to anybody on the subject, that you know ?

Answer. I reported it to the colonel, but he said he had no authority to do anything. A very short time after we came back the firing was commenced from Maryland Heights. A gun was opened not more than 200 yards from where we had been.

By General WHITE :

Question. By whom ?

Answer. By the enemy, in a notch in the trees there, by the observatory.

Question. How much of this ammunition do you suppose was suited for the brass guns and how much for the naval battery—the ammunition left there ?

Answer. I could not say.

Question. Did you not bring away the most of the ammunition for the brass guns ?

Answer. I do not know as we made any distinction ; we loaded with great rapidity, and took what came to hand first.

Question. What was your object in bringing away the shell for those large guns ?

Answer. We brought away no shell.

Question. What ammunition did you bring away ?

Answer. Cartridges.

Question. Powder only ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you mean that the ammunition brought over, which was subsequently used in the defense of Harper's Ferry, was powder ?

Answer. Yes, sir. In relation to the ammunition for the brass guns, I would say that we brought away all that was in the limber. I opened one of them and they were partially filled. The brass guns themselves were spiked. Captain Hollinde, the senior captain of our two companies that went over, made the request that those guns might be delivered to him, that he might use them as a battery. He is an old Prussian artillery officer, and felt some little desire to use them in that way. He said he could unspike them and use them. I do not know as there was any action taken on that matter at all.

By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. Do you remember that on Sunday, when we heard firing on the other side, a report spread that relief was coming ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you remember my giving orders to the batteries to hitch their horses up, and they did so?

Answer. I believe so. They were not taken up on the hill, but retained in the valley, out of range.

Question. Do you know what I said to Colonel Miles as to what I wanted to do?

Answer. No, sir; I was not with you when you saw Colonel Miles that day. Lieutenant Parker was with you when you saw Colonel Miles that day.

By the COURT:

Question. You speak of two pieces of the enemy's battery on Loudoun Heights being dismounted by the battery. How do you know that?

Answer. They said so when they came over. Two officers came over to examine the battery; they said they wanted to see the battery that dismounted their pieces. They told some very exaggerated stories as to the number of men killed and wounded by that battery.

Question. Did you bring from Maryland Heights all the guns there?

Answer. No, sir; we brought over all that were mounted; the others were thrown down and their carriages all hacked to pieces.

Question. Was the ammunition you did not bring away destroyed or left there?

Answer. It was left there.

Question. Do you know, of your own knowledge, that there was a single individual of the enemy's army killed or wounded during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I did not see a single one. All I know is what was told me by their officers afterward.

Question. I want what you know of your own knowledge.

Answer. No, sir; for I did not go beyond what had been our own position, except to cross in the direction of Sandy Hook, at which there was no firing.

Question. How long after the evacuation of Maryland Heights did you go over there?

Answer. About twenty-four hours.

Question. Was there any evidence of the enemy being there then?

Answer. As I passed through Camp Hill, Major Wood suggested that I should go to several batteries on Camp Hill, and caution them not to fire, as they might fire on us. As I did so I saw some horsemen near where had been Colonel Ford's headquarters. Captain Potts planted a shell very near them and they went away. That was just before we went across.

Question. What was the distance from Camp Hill, where Captain Potts' battery was, to the top of Maryland Heights, where that battery was?

Answer. I could not say; it appeared to be in easy range. Captain Potts said, as I left him, that he would cover us.

Question. Did you see any enemy there?

Answer. As we crossed the pontoon bridge I saw some on the road that passes along the crest, and Major Wood left a half a company, or a platoon, at the road at the foot of the hill—the road which goes around to Sandy Hook—so as to cover our retreat.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you get any information in regard to the strength of the enemy that invested Harper's Ferry? If so, state what it was.

Answer. I got very little. I asked one of the rebel officers, who said he was a major—I did not know his designating marks; he said their force was 35,000 on the Virginia side, between the Shenandoah and the Potomac. That did not include Loudoun or Maryland Heights, as I understood.

Question. State what you were told in relation to the killed and wounded of the enemy.

Answer. A Colonel Walker, I think his name is—a large, tall man—came up there from Loudoun Heights, and said his battery had been there, and that his loss Sunday and Monday morning had been nearly 100 in killed and wounded from the batteries opposite to him. Von Sehlen's battery was immediately opposite to him. Phillips had fired at him, but Phillips' guns did not seem to reach as well as the rifled guns. He said his loss was nearly 100.

Question. That was on Loudoun Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; where they had had a signal station. Another officer said—not to me, but in my presence—that it kept them pretty well dodging up there—the signal officer on Friday, when Von Sehlen and Phillips were firing at them, and also Potts.

Question. Did you hear anything of the loss of the enemy in the valley in front during the fights of Sunday afternoon and Monday morning?

Answer. Do you mean on the Shepherdstown road?

Question. There and on the Charlestown road.

Answer. I heard that there was some loss on the Shepherdstown road; some of the men of my own regiment said they had shot men; that is all.

By the COURT:

Question. Did Colonel D'Utassy's men take a parole; were they paroled?

Answer. There was no reading of any parole to us; we signed no parole. I simply carried a muster-roll to General Hill and asked for a pass. He gave us a pass, which said that we were paroled men.

Question. It was a simple muster-roll, without a parole attached to it?

Answer. Nothing written upon it at all; just as they were prepared by the different regiments.

By Colonel D'UTASSY:

Question. Did they have the officers' names?

Answer. They embraced no officers' names, with the exception, I believe, of the company officers; not all of them. I know all the duplicates did not.

Question. Were they signed by me?

Answer. No, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. Were the other troops paroled differently?

Answer. I cannot say.

By Colonel D'UTASSY:

Question. What was the conduct of General White and myself in conducting the siege, so far as it came under your observation?

Answer. It struck me as being all that officers could do. I thought all that was done was done for the best.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Do you think there was an absolute necessity for the surrender of Harper's Ferry when it took place?

Answer. Under the circumstances I think there was.

Question. Do you think there was a necessity for the evacuation of Maryland Heights when it occurred?

Answer. That is a thing I would hardly like to give an opinion upon.

By the COURT:

Question. Have you an opinion?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think I have an opinion on the subject.

Question. It is proper you should give it, then.

Answer. I think there was no necessity for the abandonment of Maryland Heights.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Have you any doubt as to the practicability of effecting the escape of all the troops from Harper's Ferry on the night previous to the surrender?

Answer. No, sir. I have no doubt upon the subject at all.

Question. Do you not think that that opinion was generally entertained, and the desire generally felt that the troops should make an effort to escape?

Answer. I know very many of the officers entertained the opinion that it could be done, and they should like to try it.

Question. Did you hear any opinion expressed in favor of a surrender in preference to an attempt to escape?

Answer. No, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. You say you have no doubt about the practicability of an escape. You mean that you could escape?

Answer. Yes, sir. I think we could escape.

Question. Are you acquainted with the country about there?

Answer. No, sir. I had never been there except from September 4 till the day of the surrender.

Question. Which way did you think you could escape?

Answer. I think we should have followed the cavalry; gone over the road they did; and, judging from the resistance they met with (I had various conversations with persons in reference how it could be done—about the defense of Harper's Ferry, &c.), I thought there was no necessity for the surrender. But when the circumstances came out, as they did after the abandonment of Maryland Heights, I think there was no way of holding it.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. But, in your judgment, there still remained a chance to escape?

Answer. Yes, sir. I think Sunday night we could have gotten away.

By General WHITE:

Question. You do not doubt but what you could have got away Sunday night?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know where the enemy were at that time?

Answer. On the Maryland side I do not.

Question. You never had been over the road that the cavalry went, and did not know anything about it?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You did not know where the enemy were there?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. From what did you get your confidence that you could have escaped that way?

Answer. Simply from what I have since learned from the cavalry; that they met with no resistance, comparatively speaking; that they took across roads and corn-fields, and things of that kind.

Question. Do you know the rate at which they marched?

Answer. I do not.

Question. You are then, perhaps, not able to state that if the infantry could not have marched as rapidly as the cavalry did they could have got through?

Answer. I can only answer that question in this way: I think we might have gotten through by the way of Sandy Hook, even had the enemy been there. I think, with the force we had, we might have fought our way through. That was my impression.

Question. Did you see the force of the enemy that came over from Sandy Hook?

Answer. I did not. I heard that it was some 15,000.

Question. Did they have any artillery?

Answer. Some, I was told.

Question. The route was by way of Sandy Hook?

Answer. Passing around that knoll there, and two pieces of artillery there would make a pretty stout defense.

Question. And 30,000 men and a proper quantity of artillery would make a stronger defense?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. So you are sure you might have got away Sunday night?

Answer. I do not say I am sure. I will say that is my opinion.

Question. You express that opinion without any knowledge of the roads or of the enemy's forces?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. I understand you to say that you entertained that opinion then, and from the information you have since received, both in regard to the road and in regard to the enemy, that opinion is confirmed.

Answer. Yes, sir; that is about the idea.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. When were you first on Maryland Heights?

Answer. On that day.

Question. On what day?

Answer. On Sunday.

Question. Was that the next day after the evacuation?

Answer. I have some little confusion in my mind relative to that. My impression is that it was Sunday morning that we were on Maryland Heights.

Question. You never were there until after the evacuation?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know anything about the strength of the enemy on Maryland Heights on Friday and Saturday?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know anything about the position of our troops and their condition?

Answer. Nothing, except what I could see through my own glass.

Question. You have no knowledge of the strength of the enemy, or of the arrangement of our forces?

Answer. No, sir; none.

Lieut. S. A. BARRAS, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. I am acting adjutant of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York.

Question. You were present on Maryland Heights immediately before and at the time of their evacuation?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state what you observed of the conduct of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers, and what part they took in the defense of the heights?

Answer. It would be something of a lengthy statement.

Question. Begin at the time you were ordered over there.

Answer. The order was verbal at first; afterward there was a written order. I was present on Friday, when Colonel Miles requested a regiment to be sent down to the bridge to protect his quarters. Colonel Sherrill, the colonel of our regiment, was present at the time. Colonel Trimble, the brigade commander of our brigade at the time, left it to Colonel Sherrill to go if he saw fit; they were together. Colonel Sherrill made the remark that he knew nothing about military; that he made no pretensions to military; that he was just in the field and green, but if there was to be fighting he was ready to go. They decided that our regiment was to go. That afternoon we were ordered on the hill by way of the Winchester road and Harper's Ferry; we had been on Bolivar Heights. We went up the hill and reported to Major Hewitt, I think, the major of the Thirty-second Ohio, Colonel Ford's regiment. Company A, of the regiment, was left on the slope to guard that point. The balance of the regiment were marched, two or three companies, to the lookout, and some of them beyond. That night we had a little skirmish, of which I was not an eye-witness. There were none of the Thirty-second Ohio there that night. In the morning we formed a line of battle on the north slope of the mountain, and the skirmish commenced in the morning as soon as day-break. That night we had laid in hearing distance of the enemy, heard them talk, and I heard several remarks made as to what they were going to do in the morning. As soon as daylight we had a line of battle formed across the slope and skirmishers thrown out. Company B, of the regiment, was detailed as skirmishers, and there was a company of the Maryland cavalry up there on foot. I was introduced to the captain by a captain of the Thirty-second Ohio, the one who was shot through the ear. They were let through the line as skirmishers. We heard them beat the long roll and maneuver in battalion maneuver, and then they marched on us and drove in our pickets. There was a little breastwork, I cannot tell exactly the distance, but I should think about 80 rods—it may be farther—from the lookout. It was thrown up, I was informed, on Thursday. I did not see any of the work done. There was a little slashing in front. Some one gave the order to fall back after we were attacked. The center of the line was opened, and the skirmishers let through. Colonel Sherrill stood in the road with his revolver drawn. The men gave way and fell back to the breastwork, and, with the assistance of Colonel Sherrill and myself, we stopped them at the breastwork and held them. That was the first engagement. There was a lapse, I should think, of about an hour between the two engagements. I cannot tell exactly the time, as there was much excitement.

Question. Describe the second engagement.

Answer. Colonel Downey, a little fellow—I could not swear what regiment he belonged to—came up with some companies. I should judge that he had four or five companies, and wanted to know who was in command. He asked me the question. I told him that Major Hewitt was. I introduced him to Colonel Sherrill. Just at this time a volley was fired. There was no skirmish firing. A volley opened on the breastwork. I thought at the time it was a feint on the breastwork, and that they intended to flank us on the left, which was the case. I said to Colonel Downey that he had got there just in time, and to front his men, as the enemy would flank us on the left. Some one gave orders to fall back; it was repeated, by privates and every one else. I could not tell much about it. There was at no time, I should think, more than 1,500 on the hill.

Question. Of our troops?

Answer. I do not think there was of effective men.

Question. Did the regiment fall back in great confusion?

Answer. At the second engagement I think they did well under the circumstances. At the first engagement they could not fall back in order, because they had to cross the slashing, to fall back through that. That was in front of the breastworks.

Question. Were attempts made to rally them again after the second engagement?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did not those attempts fail?

Answer. There was a great deal of exertion made to rally the One hundred and twenty-sixth.

Question. What was the result?

Answer. I went back and reported to Colonel Miles, or left word there, that the regiment was out all Friday night; that they had had nothing to eat, and there was no water. They were a great deal discouraged. I cannot say that the regiment, the most of them, acted very bravely on the third rally. I came down to Colonel Ford's quarters and reported the fact to him.

By the COURT:

Question. Reported what fact?

Answer. I was attempting to rally the regiment.

Question. What was the fact you reported; that you could not do it?

Answer. The condition of the regiment.

Question. Were they in good condition or bad?

Answer. That they had been there all night Friday; had had nothing to eat with them; had no water; that Colonel Sherrill was wounded and the regiment was discouraged, and it was a new regiment.

Question. State whether they retreated in good order or in confusion.

Answer. I think they did well as long as Colonel Sherrill was there.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. He fell in the second engagement?

Answer. In the second engagement they stood well. It was our regiment that held the breastworks, mostly. There were some others there, but scattering.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity of the evacuation of the heights at the time it took place?

Answer. I do not consider myself competent to express an opinion

Question. You had a view of the enemy and the condition of our forces?

Answer. I had a private opinion.

Question. Give us that opinion.

Answer. Well, sir, I think at the time there was no particular necessity for it. I think we could have held Maryland Heights with the force we had at Harper's Ferry for some time. With the force we had on the hill I do not think we could. I do not know what force the enemy had. I cannot tell anything about that. I was on the lookout Friday night. I saw with my glass and with my naked eye, and counted their camp-fires as high as seventy.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you see any of the enemy killed?

Answer. I could see them fall.

Question. How many did you see fall?

Answer. Two or three.

Question. Did you think they fell from shots; was that your impression?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw one fall the first, and, I think, the second engagement I saw two fall. I could see them throw up their arms and fall back.

Question. What officers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth aided in rallying the troops when they broke?

Answer. Colonel Sherrill.

Question. After he was wounded, when they broke then?

Answer. I cannot tell; I was down rallying the troops myself. When the second engagement was about half over, I was in the path on the mountain. There is a road, and there are several paths that lead around.

Question. Did you see any other officers of your regiment engaged in rallying the troops?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw Captain Phillips, Company D.

Question. That was after Colonel Sherrill was wounded?

Answer. Before.

Question. Do you recollect any other officer besides Captain Phillips?

Answer. Yes, sir. There was Captain Scott, a very brave man, who stood through the whole thing until he was wounded.

Question. Who else?

Answer. Well, the officers stood generally with their commands. Company A was not there at all. They were up on the hill to the left of the skirmishers. Burrill was sick.

Question. Did not the officers in the first instance, as a general rule, all run off with the men?

Answer. They went with the men when they went back, I think.

Question. Did not Captain Phillips fall back with the men, also, at first?

Answer. I could not say. I do not know as I noticed him at the time they fell back finally.

Question. Is it not your opinion that the officers of your regiment behaved badly?

Answer. No, sir; not under the circumstances.

Question. What do you mean by "under the circumstances"?

Answer. There were a great many things connected with it.

Question. State what the circumstances were that you refer to.

Answer. I think if they had had a—well, sir, it is a hard thing to talk about.

Question. A hard thing to talk about?

Answer. Yes, sir; it is what I had hoped I would not be called upon for.

Question. You are here to tell the truth in regard to the conduct of your regiment, whether for them or against them.

Answer. Well, sir, as far as our belief is concerned, we think we did two-thirds of the fighting on Maryland Heights.

Question. That has nothing to do with the question.

Answer. It stood as well as any regiment I ever saw for a green regiment. They were a regiment that I drilled, some of the men by moonlight, in their loadings, when we expected an engagement there, especially Company A, to which I belonged. After I got through my other duties, I took them out by themselves on Thursday night, I think it was, and drilled them in loading.

Question. Were there two companies of your regiment left at Harper's Ferry on picket when you went over to Maryland Heights?

Answer. If my memory serves me right, there were 208 detailed from the regiment for picket. I tried to get the colonel to excuse us, because we expected to march the next morning somewhere, but they detailed 200, and said we must furnish the picket because we had the largest regiment, and we did so. The balance of the regiment, I should think, there, were a little over 600.

Question. Was this picket detailed from the companies generally?

Answer. So many from each company; no particular company detailed. The whole regiment was marched up except these men detailed from each company. I forget how many from a company. I made out the detail. I believe it is on file.

Question. You say the regiment behaved well under the circumstances; now, what circumstances do you refer to?

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What, in your judgment, excused the regiment for the confusion in which it fell back?

By the COURT:

Question. We know it was a new regiment, and wanting in discipline. Those are circumstances. What other circumstances?

Answer. I do not think there was force enough on the hill; that discouraged the troops; everything looked discouraging to them. The line of battle was opened, the center of the line, and those skirmishers were let through, and several of them were wounded; all bloody.

Question. How many of them were wounded?

Answer. At that time I should think there were three or four fetched right through there wounded.

Question. That was enough to make 800 or 900 men give way?

Answer. Well, then, I think if there had been a good commanding officer on the hill that had attended to his business, and enforced the thing, that, I think, would have been a little better.

Question. That is a proper reason to give. Now, is there any other circumstance of that character or of any other character that occurs to your mind?

Answer. A great many of the officers—most all the officers—were inexperienced. I do not think there was proper management, generally, on the hill; I cannot call it

military movement itself. What little I know about military, Colonel Downey and the men that were there were for doing their duty. Colonel Downey and Major Hewitt did all they could.

Question. Did the other troops fall back at the same time the One hundred and twenty-sixth did ?

Answer. There were some of the One hundred and twenty-sixth gave way at the time of the first engagement I am speaking of; some of them broke and ran. I think they were with those Maryland cavalrymen; and afterward Colonel Sherrill and myself made them go back; some of them we could not get more than in 3 or 4 rods of the line; three of them behind one tree, I recollect. They did not show themselves the men I expected they were. They did very well, though.

Question. The troops of your regiment ?

Answer. Yes, sir; some of our regiment.

Question. The question was, when your regiment fell back, did the other regiments fall back with them ?

Answer. All fell back together to the breastworks. The breastworks did not amount to much any way. After I went to Harper's Ferry there was nothing done there toward fortifying the place, of any consequence.

Question. How long were you there ?

Answer. A couple of weeks, I should think. I could tell to a day by looking to the record. But I did not know what I was ordered here for.

Question. What was the name of the major of your regiment ?

Answer. Major Baird.

Question. Did Major Baird exert himself as he should have done as the commanding officer of his regiment, or did he run off with the men ?

Answer. Well, I do not know as I could be a judge of how a man should perform up there.

Question. What did you think about it ? Did you think he did everything that should have been done by a commanding officer ? Did he set a proper example to his men, or did he run off with them and set them a bad example ?

Answer. Well, sir, I could not say, myself, that I think he did all he could; I think he could have done more.

Question. You think he should have done more than he did do ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did he as an officer behave in a disreputable manner or not ? That is the point. You are brought here against your will, and sworn to tell the truth and the whole truth. Why not answer the question at once. If you do not answer it here, you will be compelled to answer it before another tribunal.

Answer. I shall answer every question if I can answer it conscientiously.

Question. Say then what you think.

Answer. Well, sir, I do not think he acted as I should have done if I were placed as he was, or any other man holding Maryland Heights, holding command there as an officer. He is a particular friend of mine, and I respect him as a man and a citizen; but if a man dodges behind trees under such circumstances it looks bad to me, placed the way I was.

Question. Did he at any time become separated from his regiment ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. For how long a time ?

Answer. I do not know as he was over a proper distance, which I suppose is 12 paces distant. Well, he run ahead of his whole company when they broke.

Question. He did not behave as a commanding officer should behave, but set a bad example to his men?

Answer. I do not think he behaved the way a commanding officer ought to in the field.

Question. And set a bad example to his men?

Answer. I do not know whether they noticed it or not.

Question. It would have been a bad example if they had seen it?

Answer. Well, I think so; yes, sir.

Question. Did you notice this kind of conduct on the part of any other officers of your regiment?

Answer. I cannot say that I did; that I noticed anything out of character on the hill. They did not show that military—they did not have that influence over their men, of course, that I expected men would who had been in service a great while.

Question. Did not they set a bad example to their men?

Answer. No, sir; not on the hill; the officers stood pretty well, of the line.

Question. Subsequently did they behave badly?

Answer. Yes, sir; after they fell back beyond the lookout toward the Ferry. Well, under the circumstances, I do not know as they did. They held a council, the officers did. I went up and got together what I could with the regiment, and went up near the lookout. I met Captain Phillips and some of them up on the hill. They had been counseling together, and concluded they would fall back.

Question. Who ordered this council?

Answer. It was among themselves, the line officers.

Question. Made without any orders?

Answer. They said they had had orders to fall back.

Question. Had they any orders to meet in council?

Answer. Not that I know of. I do not think that was proper. I did not consider it so then, and it is not.

Question. Did you see anything of what you considered improper conduct on the part of any other officers of any other regiments on the hill?

Answer. No, sir; I did not. The officers of other commands who were there, I think, behaved themselves very well. Colonel Downey I know did. I can speak of him particularly as far as I saw.

Question. And Major Hewitt?

Answer. When Major Hewitt was there he was not very near the engagement. He was in command of the hill, as I understood it. I saw him through the lookout. I ran back from the lookout to the breastworks several times, backward and forward, to get the men who scattered back to the breastworks. I saw him there the most of the time, except the time that Colonel Downey came up with the re-enforcements.

Question. How did Major Hewitt behave on that occasion?

Answer. Well, he had nothing particularly to do with the maneuvering. He was not very close to the engagement.

Question. He was in command, you say?

Answer. Yes, sir; he behaved pretty well.

Question. What do you know of his giving an order to retreat from the breastwork?

Answer. The order he gave to Colonel Sherrill before the second fight was, that if he could not hold the breastwork on the hill, if he was obliged to fall back, to fall back by the road. There was a road you have to go down; after you get down a few rods it branches, and one branch led to McGrath's battery, and the other one branched

off to the right. He told us to fall back that road, but it was impossible to fall back there, if they attempted to flank us, for the distance was so short from this breastwork.

Question. How happened it that Major Hewitt, being a major, could give orders to Colonel Sherrill, who was a colonel?

Answer. I do not know anything about that.

Question. I understand you to say that Major Hewitt was in command until after your colonel was wounded?

Answer. Yes, sir; Major Hewitt led us up the hill when we were led up.

Question. Did he go as a guide, or did he go as in command?

Answer. I understood that he went in command.

Question. Were any of the other regiments there?

Answer. Some of the Thirty-second. I do not know as our order was to report to Major Hewitt. I do not know but what it was to report to Colonel Ford, and Major Hewitt led us up the hill.

Question. After the wounding of your colonel, Major Hewitt took command of the whole?

Answer. He was in command all the while. He staid up there with us most of the time. I supposed he was in command up there.

Question. Do you know of any command given by Major Hewitt to fall back from the breastwork after your colonel was wounded? You said the soldiers and everybody around there said there was an order to retreat.

Answer. I cannot tell who that order came from. When we fell back at the first engagement some one gave the order to fall back to the breastwork, and it was reported to me. I did not see it myself. That somebody came up there on a horse and said there was an order to fall back.

Question. Did you, or did you not, at the time believe that that alleged order arose from the men, or did you think it was an order in reality, given by some person in authority? Did you think at the time that it was an order in reality, or did you think it was merely by the clamor of the men as a pretext for running away?

Answer. I did not think there was any genuine order at all, up to the time we were ordered down the hill at the last. I could not myself believe it, because, if there had been such an order, it should have been in writing, or brought up by an aide-de-camp, or something of that sort. It looked to me as though the hill never ought to be given up.

Question. If you know of any officers in your regiment who did behave well on that occasion, you should give their names. You have mentioned Captain Phillips and Captain Scott. Do you know of any others?

Answer. Not that I saw myself. Captain Herendeen's Company was thrown down to the left. The captains of all of them behaved very well, and the officers of the line behaved very well in the fight, all that I saw. At least, I cannot recollect of any particular one who behaved disgracefully. I could not see them all.

Question. But all the captains who did not run away, you say, got together and held a council of war and concluded they would not fight?

Answer. That was after the second engagement. When we were ordered up the third time, some one fetched an order to get the men together. I went clear down to the colonel's quarters and picked up the stragglers—did the best I could. Major Baird came around there, and finally we were ordered to take the men up again, and took up some.

Question. Was not there an order on that occasion given to arrest Major Baird?

Answer. Not that I know of. I have heard such reports, that is all.

Question. Was any officer subsequently arrested for misconduct—any officer or soldier? Have any examples been made, or anything been done?

Answer. No, sir; not that I know of.

Question. No officer or soldier has been arrested for misconduct on that occasion?

Answer. Not that I know of.

Question. What was the loss of killed and wounded in your regiment there?

Answer. I think there were some 14 or 15 killed; killed and wounded, some 40 or 50.

Question. Do you know that to be the number?

Answer. I do not know it to be correct. It is either 14 or 15 killed. I would not state positive to a man about that.

Question. Do you mean killed and wounded on Maryland Heights, or during the whole siege?

Answer. The whole siege.

Question. I referred to Maryland Heights.

Answer. I do not know. There were very few killed there.

Question. Were there any killed that you know of?

Answer. I cannot say that there were any killed on the heights.

Question. How many were there wounded, if any?

Answer. There were a great many wounded on the heights. Colonel Sherrill and Captain Scott were wounded. O! yes, there was one reported to me killed. I know I got his watch and his tobacco box. I do not think there were more than one or two or two or three out of our regiment killed on the hill.

Question. How many of the enemy do you suppose you saw up there?

Answer. I did not see a great many. I could not give much of an opinion. It was in the woods. It was under excitement.

Question. Have you ever been in service before?

Answer. Not in any particular engagement. Not in any such engagement as we had on the hill. Not quite so close work. I have been in the service before, in the Thirty-third Regiment. I commenced the service about the time the war broke out. I think my resignation was dated in February last. I was out of the service then up to the time this regiment was formed. I assisted in raising Company A, of this regiment, and was the commandant of Camp Swift, at Geneva.

Question. Where is Colonel Sherrill now?

Answer. He left us at Annapolis and went home on sixty days' furlough.

Question. Where is his home?

Answer. At Geneva, Ontario County, New York.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you know me?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you remember seeing Colonel Miles and myself on the hill-slope on that day? Do you remember seeing us together?

Answer. Between your quarters and where we were, or down the road?

Question. On the slope of the mountain, down toward the hospital.

Answer. I recollect going down and reporting there. I could not say you were there. I recollect going and reporting to Colonel Miles down there.

Question. Were there a great many straggling troops on the hill-side at that time?

Answer. Of our regiment, there was.

Question. Were there of others?

Answer. Yes, sir; many others.

Question. A great many men in the valley and on the mountain slope?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you remember reporting to Colonel Miles the condition of things?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you state what you said?

Answer. I do not know as I could exactly.

Question. Did you say it was impossible to rally those troops?

Answer. Our regiment, I told him, it was almost impossible to rally. I think those were the very words I used.

Question. Did you not say you had been exerting yourself to the utmost to get them together, and that you could not do it?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I had.

Question. Do you remember a conversation about Major Baird?

Answer. There might have been a remark made about him.

Question. Do you remember saying he could not be found anywhere?

Answer. I recollect the question was asked where he was, and I said I did not know.

Question. Did you not say in addition that he could not be found?

Answer. I do not know about that.

Question. Did you not say the officers of your regiment were all gone off somewhere, and that you were left alone to rally the regiment?

Answer. I was alone as far as the field officers were concerned. I was the acting adjutant of the regiment, and those officers were not there. Colonel Sherrill had been wounded and carried down by the regiment, and Major Baird could not be found. I never saw a braver man than Colonel Sherrill in my life. It was rather rash than anything else in taking the position he did on the hill. I think he might have used more precaution, and that it would have been better.

Question. Were you present when Colonel Sherrill and I had a conversation, when he went on the hill?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think I was present. The colonel went to you for orders, I think.

Question. Did you see us together in that conversation?

Answer. I could not say I did. I was at the head of the regiment with Major Baird.

Question. How many of your regiment went forward after the second engagement?

Answer. How many went up the hill?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. There were some 300. All the balance of the regiment was scattered.

Question. That was the time you were trying to rally them?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What time in the day was this?

Answer. I could not tell. I presume I could not tell within two or three hours. I had been up there all night, and in the excitement I could not tell. But then I should think it was afternoon.

Question. Do you recollect any of the declarations of Colonel Miles about the troops running at that time?

Answer. I recollect Colonel Miles making a remark there ordering some one to the command of the regiment.

Question. Do you recollect his speaking of the troops running down the hill on all sides?

Answer. I recollect his attention was called to the fact that they were down there at that time. There was very little said there.

Question. Were you very much excited yourself about the troops running down the hill?

Answer. I did not like it very well.

Question. Were you not in a perfect rage about it?

Answer. No, sir; I was not very much excited. I do not very often get very much excited.

Question. Were you not very much exhausted, and did you not say so, in your efforts to keep the men from running down?

Answer. I think I did. I had got a horse then from somebody. I took a horse. I did not know who it belonged to.

Question. Do you know of any efforts made to re-enforce us on the mountain?

Answer. I did not know of any.

Question. Do you think if we had had all the force over from Harper's Ferry, we could have held the mountain against the enemy?

Answer. Why, yes, sir.

Question. Do you think we could in the condition of our troops there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. As they then were?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think we could have held it longer than we did.

Question. How much longer?

Answer. As long as we had anything to eat, if it had been properly attended to, if the hill had been properly fortified; but under the circumstances I cannot tell—I do not know.

Question. Was the hill fortified?

Answer. Nothing, only that little breastwork beyond the lookout.

Question. How long was that?

Answer. Only a few rods. It ought to have been, I should think, a little longer to the left.

Question. Aside from the forces there at the lookout and at the breastwork, do you know where our other forces there on the hill were located?

Answer. Most of them on Bolivar Heights.

Question. I mean the forces on Maryland Heights. Do you know, for instance, where Captain Crumbecker was with his force?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know of any particular force. There was not any force on the hill except some 1,400 or 1,500.

Question. You did not know of any except in the front?

Answer. They were scattered along on the mountain.

Question. Do you know where Colonel Sammon was located?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Or Captain Palmer?

Answer. Was he from your regiment?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. I knew the most of them by sight, but did not know their names.

Question. Did you find those mountain roads rugged and hard and stony—hard to get over?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was almost impossible to ride a horse up. I did ride mine up and back.

Question. You had only one way to go up and back?

Answer. Only one way.

Col. JESSE SEGOINE, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. Colonel of the One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers.

Question. Were you present during the late events at Harper's Ferry which resulted in its surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is your judgment upon the necessity of the surrender of Harper's Ferry at the time it occurred?

Answer. I think it could not have been avoided very well, if the information I received was correct.

Question. What is your judgment as to the practicability of the forces there escaping on the night previous to the surrender?

Answer. I am not able to say as to that, from the fact that, devoting myself exclusively to my own regiment, I seldom left my own camp unless ordered by the commandant of my brigade, Colonel D'Utassy. I gave my whole attention to my own regiment.

Question. Did your position give you any opportunity to form any judgment as to the necessity of evacuating Maryland Heights?

Answer. No, sir; it did not; because I was on Bolivar Heights. I had one company detailed the night prior to the evacuation for picket service over on the hill. They returned early in the morning. That is the most I know of that matter.

Question. Had Maryland Heights been retained, would there have been any absolute necessity for the surrender of Harper's Ferry at the time it was made?

Answer. Yes, sir; I should think there was some, from the fact that I understood from our artillery officers that our long-range ammunition was nearly exhausted. We could have held our position a few hours longer, and I supposed that we were going to make the attempt on Monday morning.

Question. Have you any doubt of the ability of our forces to reach Maryland Heights on the night previous to the surrender?

Answer. Not a shadow of it; I think they could.

Question. Have you any doubt of their ability to hold the heights had they occupied them in force?

Answer. Yes, sir; if the report of the force of the enemy coming against us was true.

Question. You think that with the entire force at Harper's Ferry the heights could not have been held against the enemy's forces?

Answer. No, sir; I think after Maryland Heights had been abandoned—

Question. I speak of prior to that.

Answer. I think we could have held Maryland Heights.

Question. And could have occupied them?

Answer. Yes, sir; I regarded the battery, however, in the wrong place, and that it might be attacked in rear in force, and captured.

By General WHITE:

Question. Was it your opinion that, after the evacuation of Maryland Heights, and the destruction of the heavy guns there, it would have been practicable to have taken that force across the river and reoccupied those heights in the face of the enemy then on the mountain, and with the enemy to attack us in the rear as we undertook to cross the river?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think it would have been a practicable thing at all, because it was alleged to us that there was a tremendous force there. It was stated to me by rebel officers that it amounted to 30,000 men, and we learned that there was a heavier force in our rear than there was in our front.

Question. Had you any opportunity to observe the conduct of the officers who are under arrest here in connection with this investigation?

Answer. Yes, sir; all except Colonel Ford; him I did not know. As I said before, I confined myself chiefly to my own regiment. I had some observation both of my own commander, Colonel D'Utassy, and also of General White, having seen him about. The other colonels were commanding brigades that I had very little knowledge of.

Question. Will you state the general result of your observations?

Answer. I believe that the conduct of those gentlemen whom I knew and was conversant with in no essential lacked bravery. I saw nothing to indicate to me anything but bravery among the officers as they came under my observation, and my immediate commander, Colonel D'Utassy, by his constant intercourse with men and officers, inspired them with confidence also; that and his general language to us, "Victory or death." And I supposed on the Monday morning that we were surrendered, while in line of battle at the foot of Bolivar Heights, a little in advance of the batteries—I supposed we were to have a tremendous fight there; I supposed that as a matter of course. But I knew—I was satisfied in my own mind—that we must ultimately surrender; but that we were going to make a stand there.

By Colonel D'UTASSY:

Question. Did you have a skirmish with the cavalry of the enemy, and how much was your loss during that whole time, and what did you hear was the loss of the enemy?

Answer. On Sunday night—the time I cannot tell, but I think it was about 9 o'clock in the evening; it was intensely dark—an order came to me from Colonel D'Utassy to make a left flank movement with my regiment and occupy a part of the position that an Ohio regiment on my left had occupied, they having been changed from that position to the left of the Second Brigade, I occupying before I commenced that movement the left of the First Brigade, to which I belonged. I had made the movement, and had thrown out the right and left flank companies as flankers, to connect with the left of the First Brigade and the right of the Second Brigade. The adjutant and the major were rectifying the alignment. I was dismounted myself at the time, as was also the adjutant, for there was so many loose stones there that it was almost impossible for a horse to keep his foot-hold, and it was extremely dark. I directed the adjutant and the major to rectify the alignment after the movement was

completed. They had got along up to the color company. I stood directly in rear of the color company, within 5 feet of the line, at the time. Suddenly we heard a clattering among the stones; you could see nothing; I supposed it was the major's horse floundering about the stones; but it turned out to be a body of the enemy's cavalry that made a dash at us and delivered a fire from carbines, as I supposed. I immediately ordered my regiment to return the fire; I repeated it about three times. I found they did not return it, and I ordered the One hundred and eleventh Regiment to cease firing. We held our position; I looked about as well as I could; we could see nothing; I found one dead man lying pretty near me; I could not tell who it was. I got some matches from one of the soldiers, and rubbed and tried to make out the man's face, but it was all covered with blood. I went on until I found 4 men killed and 1 very seriously wounded; I sent him to the hospital tent in our camp, but he died before morning. That made 5 killed. I do not know how many were wounded, 9 or 10, mostly slightly wounded. One man was wounded in the breast, and another had a little finger shot off—some little things of that kind.

By the COURT:

Question. Those were your own men?

Answer. Yes, sir. I could not tell how many of the rebels were killed, or whether any of them were, until the next day. When they came into our camp they told us we had killed 20 of them and wounded a number more. That is all I know about it. I did not see them. We remained there in line until daylight, as had been ordered.

Capt. JOHN C. PHILLIPS, called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. What position do you hold in the United States service?

Answer. Captain in the Second Regiment Illinois Light Artillery.

Question. Did you command a battery during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What guns had you there?

Answer. Four James rifled 6-pounders.

Question. Did you enter Harper's Ferry under my command from Martinsburg?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At the time of the surrender, on Monday morning, the 15th of September, what ammunition had you left for those guns?

Answer. I had about 40 rounds of canister; that was all, with the exception of some long-range shell that were unfit for use, too large for the bore; so that I could not use them.

Question. The canister was the only ammunition that was available?

Answer. Yes, sir; for over 300 to 500 yards.

Question. Had you made any requisition for supplies of ammunition?

Answer. Yes, sir; three times during that engagement.

Question. What were you told in reply?

Answer. The first time I got some 200 rounds. The second time, I think, I got 25 rounds. When I got the 25 rounds they said there was no more that would fit my guns.

Question. Did you expend all that ammunition?

Answer. Yes, sir; and afterward got some from Captain Rigby on Sunday night.

Question. And expended that also?

Answer. Yes, sir; on Monday morning; that was all I had.

Question.* Had you any of your guns or your limbers destroyed ?

Answer. The axle of one of the guns was broken, and we had to take an axle out of a battery wagon ; and the timbers of the guns were all broken by the recoil, so that there were two of the guns absolutely unfit for service at the time they were given up.

Question. Do you regard your guns as having been substantially unfit for service on that account ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I had the artificers in the act of making new axles for one of them. The forge wagon also broke down.

Question. Did you have any talk with any of the officers of your brigade on Sunday evening with regard to the expediency of attempting an escape ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I spoke with Colonel D'Utassy, who was commanding the brigade.

Question. Did you make application to Colonel Miles or myself in relation to that matter ?

Answer. I spoke to Colonel D'Utassy. He stated that it would be impossible to undertake anything of that kind without orders from his superior officer. I think what he said was to go down, as he was busy, and see Colonel Miles. I went down, but I could not see Colonel Miles. The cavalry was then drawn up, and there was a great deal of confusion. I told Colonel Davis if he would wait until such time as I could get back from Colonel D'Utassy, there might be some arrangements to go with them. I did not see the colonel.

Question. Did you see me ?

Answer. I did not.

Question. Have you any opinion about the feasibility of the infantry and artillery escaping from there at that time ?

Answer. Well, sir, the appearance of things at the time seemed to me rather blue there. I was under the impression that we would be captured, and I thought it was the only chance, that we might make a desperate attempt to get out. I supposed we would have to fight our way out. I afterward understood from Lieutenant-Colonel Davis that we would have had to cut our way out through a division of the enemy in order to get to General McClellan's army.

Question. At the time of the surrender what is your judgment as to its propriety ?

Answer. I had no ammunition. I could not do anything more myself. My guns were rendered useless, and, as far as I was concerned, I supposed it was necessary.

Question. Have you an opinion as to whether, with the character of force we had there and the fact that the ammunition for the artillery was expended, a successful resistance could have been made for any length of time ?

Answer. From what I had seen, from what information I could gather from some of the rebel officers that I was speaking to there, I considered that any longer defense, as I understood they were about to make an attack, would have been with a great sacrifice of life as the consequence, and we finally would have been overcome. One of their colonels told me there were 75,000 men on the plains surrounding us ; that, I supposed, had no reference to Maryland Heights.

Question. How long have you been in military service, and where ?

Answer. I have been in the English army. I served seven years in the same branch of the service. I am now in as lieutenant of artillery. I have been in this service since the 15th of June, 1861.

By Colonel D'UTASSY:

Question. When did you begin to observe the first signals of the enemy made on Loudoun Heights ?

Answer. I believe it was on Friday ; I think it was on Friday, the 12th.

Question. What orders did you receive, and what did you do?

Answer. I received orders from you to shell the woods of Loudoun Heights. I did shell Loudoun Heights and also Maryland Heights with my long ranges.

By the COURT :

Question. Did your ammunition fall short?

Answer. I understood from a captain of one of the rebel batteries that the first shell I threw, so he said, killed 16 of his men and wounded one of his lieutenants. I had a glass. The enemy's battery seemed to be on the summit of the hill. I could not see where my shell would light; so I supposed it must either go over or light right in the battery. Colonel Cameron and others at some distance could see better. The smoke would get so that I could not see. They said the elevation and range was very good. They supposed they lit about the battery; some fell short; that was owing to bad ammunition, I thought.

By Colonel D'UTASSY :

Question. What was the conduct of the officers now under arrest, so far as it came to your knowledge, during the siege?

Answer. I thought the conduct of General White and Colonel D'Utassy was brave, as far as I could see. They seemed to be present on all occasions that was necessary. I received orders at various times to sometimes fire and sometimes cease firing, according as it was necessary, I supposed.

Question. Did I give you orders to prepare your horses on Sunday, when the report was spread that we were about to be relieved?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I did harness my horses.

Question. Will you state what happened when Colonel Miles came up?

Answer. The latter part of it is rather confused in my mind. I could not state distinctly, safely, what did follow. I know I received counter orders. At all events, I did not hitch up and go out. In the confusion, I do not recollect exactly what the order was; I presume it was that I was not to go out.

By the COURT :

Question. How many did you lose in killed and wounded in your battery?

Answer. From the time I left Martinsburg I lost some 6 men.

Question. During the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Only one man. That was owing, I suppose, to the number of the shells of the enemy that did not burst. They fell all around us, though not one in ten bursted, owing, I suppose, to the shell striking the sandy substance there, choking the fuse. They seemed to use too long fuse in their shell; their range was very good.

Capt. HENRY CURTIS, Jr., called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows:

By General WHITE :

Question. What is your position in the United States service?

Answer. Assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, attached to General White's staff.

Question. Were you at Harper's Ferry during the siege?

Answer. I was.

Question. Were you present at a conversation between Colonel Miles and myself shortly after our arrival there, at which the plan of defensive operations was discussed?

Answer. I was present at several conversations between you. I do not recollect any one in particular.

Question. The principal point I want to get at, if you recollect it, is,

whether you remember my suggesting to him that Maryland Heights ought to be held at all hazards, and, if necessary, to take the entire command over there; that there should be a force there sufficiently strong—that these should be sufficiently re-enforced—to hold that position at all events; that, in my judgment, it afforded the only feasible means of saving the command if escape became necessary.

Answer. I recollect your saying that to him, very distinctly, more than once, if I recollect aright.

Question. Do you recollect his reply?

Answer. No, sir; I do not distinctly.

Question. Do you recollect his saying anything about what his orders were?

Answer. I do.

Question. What did he say about his orders?

Answer. He said his orders were to hold Harper's Ferry, the town, to the last extremity, and he appeared to doubt whether holding Maryland Heights would be holding Harper's Ferry.

Question. What is your observation as to the character of the troops there, as to their general efficiency? Were they troops that had seen much service, or were they mostly raw troops?

Answer. I should think the most of them were raw. At the time I was there I was not acquainted with a great many of the troops that were there. I never had seen them before. But that was my judgment, as far as I could form one.

Question. Were you with me the most of the time I was on the field?

Answer. I believe I was with you all the time, or very nearly all.

Question. Were we on the field when it was necessary and proper to be there?

Answer. I thought so; yes, sir.

Question. Were you present with me Sunday evening during the engagement on the extreme left?

Answer. I was.

Question. Do you recollect my ordering down two pieces of artillery from Captain Rigby's battery?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And their opening?

Answer. One of them opened; the other one was unable to unlimber.

Question. What was the general result of that engagement?

Answer. So far as was within my view, the enemy were repulsed on the left of their attack. I was informed that on the right of their attack they succeeded in effecting a lodgment near our lines.

Question. That was about night?

Answer. Yes, sir; they fired there until after dark, in fact.

Question. You directed the placing of the guns?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was the infantry engagement a pretty sharp one?

Answer. Yes, sir; quite so on the left.

Question. Have you any idea that the enemy suffered any loss?

Answer. Yes, sir; I am sure they did; they could not escape it under the circumstances.

Question. Did they retreat in any disorder after the artillery opened?

Answer. Yes, sir; they fell back; I could not see well for a little covering of bushes there, small trees, which was between me and them when they retreated. They fell back precipitately.

Question. Were you present with me the next morning during the cannonade on the left by the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you state how many batteries they had in position and working that morning?

Answer. My recollection of it is that there were nine.

Question. Was their fire mostly converged on our left?

Answer. It was all concentrated, so far as I observed, upon Rigby's and Potts' batteries, which were near the intersection of the turnpike with the ridge of Bolivar Heights, where they took position.

Question. What was the character of the artillery fire there compared with what you had seen heretofore? I mean as to its severity.

Answer. It was a very severe fire, I should judge.

Question. And its correctness of range?

Answer. I regarded it as very handsomely done, and also very severe, the severest fire of that description I was ever under.

Question. What was the conduct of our batteries during that engagement, as long as they had ammunition?

Answer. Excellent; it could not have been better.

Question. Were you present when I met Colonel Miles, up between the left and the extreme right—say somewhere near the center of the line?

Answer. Yes, sir; I recollect meeting him up there with you.

Question. Did you hear him speak to me in regard to the surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you recollect what he said to me?

Answer. I think I do.

Question. State what it was, if you can.

Answer. He remarked, in the first instance, that it would perhaps be necessary to surrender, and you suggested to him that it would be better to call together the commanders of brigades, and see what they thought on the subject.

Question. If you know anything further in relation to that interview, state what it was.

Answer. The commanders of brigades were sent for, according to your suggestion, and appeared, at least some of them; I recollect distinctly Colonel D'Utassy and Colonel Trimble being there; I do not recollect, personally, the others. There were others there, however; I was not personally acquainted with them.

Question. Do you know the decision of the council?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State it, if you please.

Answer. It was, that there was no beneficial result to be gained by fighting longer; that it was merely sacrificing the men; the position could be held but a very short time, perhaps but an hour or two longer, and that at a great sacrifice.

Question. Was that decision unanimous, or was it divided in opinion?

Answer. I understood it to be unanimous, as far as those I heard; I do not know that I heard all, but I think I did.

Question. Did you ever hear Colonel Miles say that our line of defense was to be on Bolivar Heights; that that line was to be where he was going to make his fight, or anything substantially like that?

Answer. I heard him make a remark to that effect more than once, I think.

Question. Do you know of my having to deploy Colonel Willard's regiment after they were in line for the purpose of completing the connection between our right and the extreme left, on the Shenandoah River?

Answer. Yes, sir; I know it was deployed.

Question. Were all the troops in that line able to form more than a single line of battle? Could there have been more than that there, with the troops we had, aside from those for the defense of the bridges?

Answer. All the troops that appeared, so far as my knowledge goes, had been employed, and they certainly did not handsomely cover the line.

Question. What was your opinion in regard to the propriety or impropriety of the surrender at the time it occurred?

Answer. At the time it occurred I regarded it as proper; that it could not have been avoided.

Question. Have you been in any other engagement besides that, and where?

Answer. The only other engagement of note I was in was the battle of Pea Ridge, in Arkansas. I have been in several skirmishes.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You have no knowledge of the condition of things on Maryland Heights, which led to their evacuation?

Answer. Nothing whatever, of my own knowledge.

By General WHITE:

Question. You may, or may not, know whether I was requested by Colonel Miles to look to the left of the line on Bolivar Heights, to attend to that particular portion, and what duty I discharged was to be done there?

Answer. I understood it so; but whether I heard Colonel Miles say so or not I am not confident.

Question. That is where we were during the entire siege, mostly?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was not up on Maryland Heights at all, myself.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you ever know of any order given by Colonel Miles in regard to the abandonment of Maryland Heights?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Nor anything that passed subsequently, showing either approval or disapproval on his part?

Answer. No, sir; I heard him make some remarks in the evening of the same day of the evacuation. I do not know as it bears upon that point especially. He said the troops he had there behaved very badly, and mentioned especially one regiment, the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York. He said it not only ran whenever a gun was fired, accidentally or otherwise, but also ran over what troops he had there, that would maintain their positions by themselves. He said it was impossible to maintain the position of those heights, and that he could do no better than to give them up.

The Commission then adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 14, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Capt. EUGENE MCGRATH, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows:

By Colonel FORD:

Question. What position do you hold in the military service?

Answer. Captain of Company B, Fifth Artillery, New York Volunteers.

Question. Where were you stationed?

Answer. On Maryland Heights.

Question. How long had you been stationed on Maryland Heights?

Answer. Since the last of May—the 29th of May, I think; perhaps the 1st of June.

Question. Under whose command were you on the heights?

Answer. Colonel Miles, until you came.

Question. At what time did I arrive on Maryland Heights, and assume command?

Answer. I really cannot tell what time it was. It was about five or six or eight days previous to the trouble there.

Question. I want you to describe the location of your battery on the heights. [Showing witness a map.]

Answer. I am under the impression it was about here [indicating on the map].

Question. Was it on the heights or on the slope of the mountain?

Answer. On the slope of the mountain, I should judge, about half way up, hardly half way.

Question. From the time I arrived on the mountain and assumed command, what activity and energy did I show, if any, in preparing for defense there?

Answer. I do not know, unless it was to throw your pickets out, and all that kind of thing.

Question. Was I anxious and determined there?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was my impression all through.

Question. What was the condition of the roads where the troops were located at different points? What was the condition of the mountain paths, by which we reached this road?

Answer. What do you mean; on the top of the mountain?

Question. Going up to the top of the mountain, and on the right and left, and to the points where Colonel Sammon was, and Captain Palmer was.

Answer. A road was cut through there; I had to blockade it, I know, before I sent your men through.

Question. I want you now, under a general question, to go on and describe the condition of those troops running from the mountain top down to your battery, &c.

Answer. I looked on it as a general stampede myself; I supposed it was general; men coming into my breastworks, and all around me, in my camp and all through it, running on all sides. I did not know what to make of it.

Question. Did they run on your left, too, as well as into the breastworks, over past the old cabin there, over toward Unsell's?

Answer. Unsell's was away from my camp.

Question. I mean coming over from that direction.

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw them coming from that direction as well as down the other way.

Question. In great numbers?

Answer. I did not have time to count them. I should think there were quite a lot of them.

Question. Did you make any exertion to return those troops?

Answer. Yes, sir; I got all the men of mine acting as infantry, what few there was, to drive them back, and I drew my pistol on them and called them a set of cowards, and then I requested you, I think, but I am not certain, to send a company to drive them back, and if they did not go back to shoot them down. I think I told you and some other gentleman there, I do not know who he was.

Question. How long did that exertion to replace those troops continue?

Answer. I really could not positively say. I do not recollect. I had a great deal to do; I had seven guns there, and my time there was taken up in paying proper attention to them.

Question. You were well acquainted with that mountain and all its roads and passes?

Answer. Tolerably; for my time there I went over it pretty well.

Question. Taking into account the enemy's forces, what you could learn from reports of aides coming back and the running of our troops, was there, in your opinion, a military necessity for abandoning the heights?

Answer. I do not take what I heard from aides or anything like that. I was on the mountain, on the lookout, on Thursday morning, Thursday noon, and Thursday afternoon. Major Steiner and myself were there, and Major Melvaine and myself were there, and I was up there again with somebody else, I have forgotten who it was. I was up there three times. I saw the enemy come over from the side of the other mountain, on the other side of Pleasant Valley, I think it was.

Question. Were you there on Saturday morning also?

Answer. I was not on the heights; I was at the battery.

Question. From all that you could see and learn, what was your opinion?

Answer. I think we could have held out there for a spell; we might have held out there a few hours, in my judgment. I did not want to leave it.

Question. You do not think we could have held out much longer?

Answer. It is my impression, from what I knew then and what I have learned since, that it was almost a matter of impossibility to keep it a great while. I did not know what would turn up. We could keep it a spell, and I did not know but what something might turn up to relieve us. That was my only hope in staying there; but if we had staid there, we should not have had any help in that time.

Question. What do you know, if anything, about an effort being made to get re-enforcements?

Answer. I know this: I met Colonel Miles and made a requisition for re-enforcements, and he sent a requisition to General Wool. I saw the document myself. Colonel Miles read it to me, to send a company of my old regiment up to me, so as to put a battery at Solomon's Gap. I think he told me there were plenty of guns here, lying around Washington, 32-pounders and such guns. He wanted four 32-pounders and two 24-pounders. He promised them to me every day. I calculated on having them every day, and expected them every day. He said that he had made a requisition, but he never got any. I made preparations and got everything in readiness so as to arrange them on Solomon's Gap; waited two weeks.

Question. Was it considered on all hands that it was necessary in order to hold that point to have artillery on the lookout and at Solomon's Gap?

Answer. Yes, sir. Colonel Miles detailed myself and Major Steiner in the first part of July, I think; I do not remember exactly the day. He told us to make a separate report. We went there together and examined Solomon's Gap and all that kind of thing, and examined both valleys, and made a report to him, which, I presume, is on file now among his papers.

Question. Did that report show the absolute necessity of these precautions?

Answer. Both Major Steiner and myself—I never saw his report or he mine, but my report I believe was about the same as the other, as near as I could learn from Colonel Miles—both of us recommended it in the strongest terms, and the very moment I made the report Colonel Miles then sat down and wrote a letter to General Wool for one company of the regiment I belonged to.

Question. Where was I immediately before the order was given to retreat from the mountain?

Answer. You were up to my tent, I think, or sitting on a bench outside of my tent.

Question. Do you recollect orderlies arriving from the other side of the river?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many arrived there?

Answer. I could not clearly say. I do not know how many; they were coming quite often. I do not recollect properly.

Question. How many do you think?

Answer. I do not think I could say anything about that, because I was not there myself. I do not think I was there in the tent more than twice or three times the whole day.

Question. You were there sometimes when they brought orders to me?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know the contents of any of them?

Answer. I do not know the contents of any of them. I recollect your coming down on horseback right to the intrenchment. I was working with the 12-pounder guns there. You called me and read me an order to vacate, and asked my opinion about it, and perhaps you recollect my reply.

Question. Were you up in the tent when any orders came?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you recollect the contents of any of them?

Answer. I do not think I do. No, sir; I do not.

Question. You say you made a reply to me. What was it?

Answer. I do not recollect exactly the words. You asked me what you should do. Says you, "Captain, what shall I do? These men are running away. Here is an order from Colonel Miles," and you went on to read it. It was to vacate and spike the guns, &c. You asked what to do. I told you I was not ready yet to leave there; I was going to fight them yet a spell. I believe that was my reply.

Question. And did we fight them yet a spell?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. For how long?

Answer. Quite a good while. Then I got the other order, the written order, long after that.

Question. Was there anything said before that day about spiking the guns?

Answer. By you?

Question. Did you hear anything from anybody that was in command?

Answer. No, sir; all I heard about it was this: Colonel Miles came up there, I think the day before, and called me aside. Said he, "Captain, they are about here in force." Said I, "Yes, I believe they are." He said, "Damn 'em, fight 'em." I said, "I will stay here, colonel, until you say go, and I hope you will not say that." Said he, "No, sir; I will not say 'go;'" and then he said, "Captain, if we are compelled to leave, if they come on in force, we will have to spike these guns; damn 'em, they sha'n't have 'em." That was about what he said. He did not intimate to leave, or anything of that kind, then, unless it was a hopeless case, as I understood him.

Question. Was there anything said by Colonel Miles on the day of the evacuation? You saw Colonel Miles and me together, did you not?

Answer. You were quite a ways off from us; I do not know what passed between you and him.

Question. Do you remember my questioning an orderly as to when he started with this order from Colonel Miles?

Answer. Yes, sir; I recollect that.

Question. Do you remember my putting him through a very severe examination?

Answer. I recollect you asked him what time he left there.

Question. And if he came direct?

Answer. I do not recollect that.

Question. Do you recollect his coming up there and my calling him to us, and putting him through a regular questioning, catechising him some time about that order?

Answer. I know you had some conversation; I do not know what it was. I simply heard you ask him what time he left. I recollect something in relation to that between you and the orderly—what time it was, or who he was; I do not know anything about it whatever.

By the COURT:

Question. You had no idea of what the substance of the order was?

Answer. The colonel read it to me. He was on horseback, and I had my hand on his thigh. The document went on to order Colonel Ford to spike the guns, if it was necessary, or something like that. I did not pay particular attention to it. The colonel asked me what I thought about it; if we better not, under the circumstances, abandon the place.

Question. Did it speak of abandoning the place and spiking the guns, or only of spiking the guns?

Answer. I think it referred to both, if I recollect properly. Colonel Ford read the order to me, but the purport of it I do not exactly remember.

Question. State whether you had any understanding of what it was, and what that understanding was?

Answer. The substance of it was to vacate and spike the guns.

Question. To vacate immediately and unconditionally?

Answer. I did not understand the particulars. He read it to me. Said he, "Captain, come here." He then read the paper to me. I did not understand the whole of it; I simply understood that we were to abandon the place. He asked my opinion about it.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you not recollect distinctly that I was directed to take the troops off in good order, and cautioned to see that they did not stampede down the hill?

Answer. No, sir; I do not recollect that.

Question. Nothing said about the troops being moved off in good order?

Answer. I have no doubt there was, but I do not recollect it; I could not swear to it. I recollect very well your bringing the order down and reading it. I think it was soon after that you called the orderly, some time after that, I think. My impression is that it was after that; the next time he came up from the quarters.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. At what hour of the day was this?

Answer. I should think it was along about 12 o'clock; somewhere in that neighborhood.

Question. How long before the evacuation took place was it?

Answer. I should judge it was a couple of hours, or two hours and a half; I hardly know. I should say it was about that time.

Question. You say that Colonel Ford asked your opinion of the order. From that did you think he asked your opinion as to what the order meant, or whether that condition of the order on which he was to evacuate had or had not occurred? Upon what point did he ask your opinion?

Answer. He read the order to me. As I told you, I had my hand on his thigh; he was on horseback. These men kept running down all the time. He said to me, "Captain, under these circumstances, I guess we had better leave here." Said he, "It is no use; these men are running in all directions;" and they were running in all directions, as I saw them. They retreated soon after they came there. They did not have much more than time to get to the top of the mountain, not more than a half hour, before they broke and came down on me.

Question. You cannot undertake to say whether it was an absolute order to evacuate or an order to evacuate on condition that certain things happened, as that he was overwhelmed, or that his men broke and run?

Answer. I could not say in relation to that.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. I want you to state to this court whether during all this time I was cool, and calm, and dispassionate.

Answer. Perfectly so.

Question. As much so as you ever saw me?

Answer. Yes, sir; I did not see any difference from what it is now, that I am aware of.

By the COURT:

Question. If the troops upon the heights had stood their ground, how long do you suppose you could have held that place, with the troops that were there?

Answer. If they had stood there, I think I should have been there yet.

Question. If those troops upon the heights had had an efficient commander do you not suppose they would have remained there? Do you not think the difficulty was that there was nobody up there to control them?

Answer. That was the general opinion.

Question. Is it not your opinion?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Do you know the officers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York that ran?

Answer. I knew one of them; he was in the same regiment with me last year.

Question. Could you give the names of any officers that particularly distinguished themselves in this retreat?

Answer. I was not up there at all; I was down at the battery; but I think the retreating part was done pretty well—enough of them in it.

By the COURT:

Question. Did not the officers retreat with the men?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw officers there. I heard—I do not know as I saw it—that some of them went clean down below my works, down the side of the hill toward the canal. They broke in every direction.

Question. Did you see any efforts on the part of the officers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth to stop the men at all, or did they lead the way?

Answer. All I saw in relation to that was that Colonel Ford got a company of the Garibaldi Guards and drove them up the hill. Not long after that Colonel Miles, with two or three staff officers, came along, and they drove up, I should think, 180 of them. I should judge so from the few moments I looked at them.

Question. Was Colonel Ford on the top of the mountain in the advance any time during the day?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think he was; not that I know of. He might have been there; I do not know.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you know the location of our forces there where Colonel Sammon's One hundred and fifteenth Regiment was?

Answer. They were right here [pointing to the map].

Question. Do you know where you requested me to place four companies to protect that point [indicating on the map]?

Answer. It was through Colonel Miles that I suggested that. That was a knob that run out of the mountain, perhaps a quarter of a mile, toward this Mr. Unsell's house. Colonel Miles said to me, "Captain, be careful of that; operate on that mountain, and be well flanked on that knob, for they will try to get a battery there." That was literally true for the old gentleman, for they did try to get a battery there. One of their men was taken prisoner who was trying to get a battery up there, and he told us so.

Question. And the other forces were all along here toward Solomon's Gap beyond the lookout?

Answer. I do not know about that.

Question. And we had forces over here [indicating on the map] under Captain Crumbecker?

Answer. I do not know how they were located.

Question. And then we had some over the Sandy Hook way. Will you describe the condition of these roads?

Answer. It is rather a difficult mountain to get about much; however, the rebels managed to get their batteries right along over the worst part of it, I know.

Question. When you went up any of these roads it was necessary to come back in order to get to another one?

Answer. I do not know what points you have reference to.

Question. The point where Captain Palmer was, and out there where Captain Crumbecker was.

Answer. I do not know where either of those parties were at all. I simply know this—that a portion of the First Maryland Regiment, as I heard—I was not there; I did not leave the battery from the time I commenced firing that day until we left—I heard that they were on the lookout, or by the lookout, with the Thirty-second Regiment. Away from that, I do not know where they were located; I simply know where you sent your pickets, and where you sent your men, at my request.

Question. Did those men send back to me for instructions from these different places?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you think it would have been prudent for me to have gone up these paths?

Answer. You were at your headquarters, where I suppose your place was, and they were looking for you all the time.

Question. How long would it have taken me to make the tour there?

Answer. I suppose it would have taken you, up to the lookout, an hour and a half.

Question. And to the other points a corresponding amount of time?

Answer. I do not know where the other points were.

Question. Was it not very difficult to find a man in this underbrush and among the stones and rocks?

Answer. Where was that; on the top of the mountain?

Question. Going through these by-paths.

Answer. If a man desired to hide away he could, but you could see a man in the paths.

Question. But you could not see him from headquarters, and tell where he was, at any of these points?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What is your opinion of the force attacking us there, from what you saw yourself and from all you learned?

Answer. If the force I saw in the valley was all coming to the mountain, it was a terrible force. I do not know where they went. I am satisfied there were a great many there.

Question. Are you satisfied there were a great many on the mountain?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In all, what force are you satisfied was there?

Answer. I could not say from myself how many there were. I heard from some of the colonels on the mountain that there were six brigades—twenty-four regiments. A colonel of the Seventh North Carolina Regiment—these are his boots I have got on now; we traded boots; mine hurt me; I made a pretty good trade—he told me there were just twenty-four regiments there.

Question. Attacking us there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. Would a battery and a force placed at Solomon's Gap be of any service in defending the heights against an enemy coming through Pleasant Valley?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Colonel FORD :

Question. Was not the way they approached through Solomon's Gap, into Pleasant Valley ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I do not know as they could get up there any other way to the valley.

Question. The first night they came there and shelled us out of Solomon's Gap, how many regiments did they bring there ?

Answer. I could not say anything about that.

Question. Do you know what a deserter reported about it ?

Answer. I recollect a deserter being down to your camp, but I have forgotten what he said.

By the COURT :

Question. Did you have command of all the artillery on Maryland Heights ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; all that was there at the time.

Question. How much artillery was there there ?

Answer. Seven pieces altogether. I got four brass pieces just before. I got two pieces two days before, on Wednesday, and Thursday afternoon I got two more ; I think that was the time I received them.

Question. What was the caliber of those pieces ?

Answer. They were 12-pounders, all the four brass pieces.

Question. And of the other pieces ?

Answer. I had two 9-inch guns and one 5-inch gun.

Question. Were those pieces near together in one battery ?

Answer. The big guns were about a rod apart.

Question. All the pieces were in the same breastwork, were they ?

Answer. The four brass pieces were in one breastwork. I got up a breastwork ; I think I had twelve hours' notice.

Question. Had you plenty of ammunition for those small 12-pounders ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; I had a pretty good supply. I sent over twice.

Question. Did you ever have occasion to use those 12-pounders ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. When ?

Answer. I covered the retreat of the whole body down the mountain ; I worked the guns until they were all down the hill, and some of them on the pontoon bridge, I think, when I spiked the guns, and I worked them pretty much all day the day before.

Question. Did you have occasion to use them coming down the mountain ?

Answer. I was on the side of the mountain, and these men who retreated from the top of the mountain came down right on my works, and so down the road. The road was right through my camp.

Question. Did you have occasion to use those pieces at all ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What did you fire at ?

Answer. I fired at the enemy, I presumed. I had the woods cut back of me about 100 yards, all clean down, back of me and all around.

Question. Did you ever see any enemy within that open space?

Answer. No, sir. Outside of it.

Question. How far outside?

Answer. I think one was up against a tree, on the margin of the open space; a man who waived a white handkerchief. Some of my company saw him before I did.

Question. That was after the infantry had retreated?

Answer. When they were coming down the hill; I could not say whether they were a half or two-thirds of the way down at the time. The man, if I recollect properly, had his arm around a tree and held out a white handkerchief. I knew we had no friends there, and so I blazed away.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. When you say if there had been any officer on the heights to control the men they would have stood, did you allude to me or to the officers in immediate command of the troops on the heights?

Answer. I had not the slightest idea of referring to you in that remark, for you were not there; you had no command up there.

Question. But you know that at these different points different officers had commands at these points and gaps and passes there?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know about that.

Question. Do you know that Captain Palmer had command at the point over there [pointing to the map]?

Answer. I do not really know; I heard that some of them had commands.

By the COURT:

Question. You speak of an officer of the One hundred and twenty-sixth that you knew as one of the men retreating?

Answer. I do not mean to say that of my own personal knowledge. I saw him go up on the mountain with this regiment, and what I heard since led me to suppose that he did not act like he ought to.

Question. What was his name?

Answer. Major Baird.

Question. What time of the day of the evacuation of the heights did you see Colonel Miles about your battery?

Answer. It was early in the morning; I could not exactly say what time.

Question. Was it 6 o'clock, or 9 o'clock, or 12 o'clock?

Answer. It would be all guess-work with me. I rather think it would be about 8 or 9 o'clock; I could not be positive.

Question. That was the time you saw him that day?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What time was it that Colonel Ford came to you with this order?

Answer. I think in the neighborhood of 12 o'clock.

Question. How long would it take Colonel Miles to go down from your battery to the Ferry?

Answer. Down to his quarters, three-quarters of an hour or an hour, I should judge.

Question. You did not see this order yourself?

Answer. Colonel Ford had it in his hand.

Question. You did not read it ?

Answer. No, sir ; I did not.

Question. Did you understand at the time that that order was an order for immediate evacuation, or was it left discretionary with Colonel Ford to do so if he thought the enemy's forces were too great for him ?

Answer. I really could not say in regard to that.

Question. Had you no impression at the time ?

Answer. Not the slightest. I had not made up my mind. I was fearful the thing might occur.

Question. The order made no impression on you ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; a very serious impression.

Question. What was it ?

Answer. It was that I had to abandon my works. I had done everything I could to make them effectual, and thought we would have to leave them before we had a proper fight.

Question. In other words, you had an impression of disappointment ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; that is the full term.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Have you particularly described the conduct of Major Baird ?

Answer. I did not know his conduct. I simply had hearsay in relation to that. I simply saw him going up with his regiment.

Question. You did not see his conduct upon the field or during the retreat ?

Answer. No, sir.

By the COURT :

Question. Did you have any conversation with Colonel Miles that morning at your battery ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; a few words ; not many.

Question. Did he say anything that would indicate that he thought it was necessary to abandon the heights ?

Answer. I do not think he did that morning. He did the day before. He was up there the day before.

Question. I speak of that morning.

Answer. I do not recollect that he said anything about it that morning.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Do you think the order you speak of as being read to you was more than the previous declaration that if you were overwhelmed you were to abandon the heights, or do you think it was an order to evacuate at once ?

Answer. I could not say, for my life ; I have not the remotest knowledge ; I recollect simply that Colonel Ford read it to me, and about that time things looked very dark, the people running away in all directions. That was so humiliating that I did not pay much attention to the order. A little while afterward Colonel Ford came to me and asked me if I had it ; he had dropped it or lost it in some way. I told him, "No, sir ; I did not have it in my hands at all." I think he came twice in relation to it.

By Dr. MILES :

Question. During the time you served under Colonel Miles, were you well acquainted with him ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. During the whole time that you served under him, did you ever see in writing or hear in any conversation of his any words that were treasonable to his Government ?

Answer. My God ! no, sir ; entirely to the contrary.

Question. When this order was read to you by Colonel Ford, was the signature read or did you see any signature to it at all ?

Answer. I did not see it at all.

Question. Was the signature read out ?

Answer. I could not give the slightest opinion about it.

Question. Did you see the handwriting ?

Answer. I might have seen the writing, but not a line. I know nothing except that there was excitement all the time, and I was so outrageously grieved to see the people running in on me that it aggravated the thing ten thousand times more. The men had not time hardly to get up the mountain—not more than a half or even a quarter of an hour up there. At the time, Colonel Ford read to me simply the words to evacuate and destroy the guns. The balance of it I have not the remotest recollection of ; I do not think I saw a line of it.

Question. Did you see Colonel Miles after he was wounded ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did he use any treasonable language then, either when in his senses or out ?

Answer. No, sir ; I went in the room, I should judge, about 4 o'clock. I rode down. The streets were then all full of the enemy's soldiers. I rode down amongst them, and after considerable exertion I got into the office, and finally into his room. The surgeon was there, and some others. He was lying, his back toward the door, on his side, and his leg was bandaged up. He heard my voice ; somebody spoke to me as I came into the room. He turned over, reached out his hand and took mine and pressed it ; said he, " Captain, I have done my duty to my country, and I am ready to die ; God bless you." Those were the last words I heard the colonel say. Every person in the room, seven or eight of them, I should think, heard the words as I did.

By the COURT :

Question. You say these infantry men were constantly running back into your works ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was done with them ?

Answer. Colonel Ford detailed a lot of Garibaldians to drive them up on top of the mountain, but my opinion is that they ran into the brush.

Question. Was any effort made to gather these men together and lead them into the fight by Colonel Ford ?

Answer. That was down in the valley where Colonel Ford's camp was. I saw Colonel Ford and the major of the Garibaldi Regiment and some men. I do not know how many the detachment consisted of ; I should think some 25 or 30. They came up the side of the hill within 5 or 10 feet of my breastwork, and soon after that or just before—I do not know which—Colonel Miles drove up some 180 or 190 of them—drove them right up from the canal. I do not know what disposition he made of them after they got out of sight of my camp.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you think a man could well have done more than I did to lead those troops back on the mountain?

Answer. I do not know whether you led them on the mountain in person or not.

Question. Starting them up under command of my aides?

Answer. I know you sent them up; I do not know whether they took them up or not.

Question. Was Colonel Miles and myself both working there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. For two or three hours?

Answer. I do not know how long; I do not think as long as that. You were both working to drive them up the hill.

Maj. JOHN A. STEINER, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows:

By Colonel FORD:

Question. What is your position in the military service of the United States?

Answer. Major.

Question. Of what?

Answer. Of the First Maryland Regiment Volunteers, Potomac Home Brigade.

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights at the time I arrived there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What means have you of knowing the amount of the enemy's forces attacking us there, through Solomon's Gap, and on the crest, and on the eastern slope of the mountain?

Answer. From the reports of the officers who observed them from the top of the mountain.

Question. In your opinion, how many men were attacking us there?

Answer. I thought there were some 12,000 or 15,000, perhaps more; I thought that at the time.

Question. When were our pickets shelled out of Solomon's Gap?

Answer. I think on Thursday, previous to the evacuation of the heights; I am not certain, however, about the time, but I think it was Thursday.

Question. How long had you been on the heights, in camp there?

Answer. I received the order from Colonel Miles on the 23d of June last. On the 24th I went to the heights and relieved the New York Eighth Cavalry, and was there then until the evacuation of Maryland Heights.

Question. Were you acquainted there with the roads, by-ways, paths, &c.?

Answer. Not all of them, but the principal roads.

Question. Were you acquainted with the roads, generally, leading to the places where our troops were stationed, under Colonel Sammon, Captain Palmer, Major Hewitt, Captain Crumbecker, &c.?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Describe to this court the condition of those roads, as to the practicability of traveling them.

Answer. The troops that were engaged principally in this action were upon the top of the mountain. They were reached by two or three roads. The road that I went more frequently to the position was to the left of the mountain, and that, I suppose, from our camp was at least 2 miles, if not $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. It took almost a northern direction for perhaps a half or three-quarters of a mile, then a northwestern direction up the rugged sides of the mountain until near its top, and then the road went directly east to the block-house, or the lookout, as it was called. The other road, the military road, led by Captain McGrath's camp, along the spur of the mountain, by the Potomac, until it got to the top of the mountain, and this road was almost directly north to the lookout or the breastworks. That road was regarded as $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the camp. It was so understood to be.

Question. Taking into consideration the condition of those roads, how long would it have taken me from my camp to have visited the several points where those troops were stationed and returned?

Answer. You could not have gone around, in my opinion, under three, perhaps four, hours; not under three hours, I am satisfied.

Question. During that day, were the persons commanding at those different points continually sending couriers to me, every five or ten minutes?

Answer. I believe so; the couriers came frequently.

Question. Was I continually active from early morning until we left those heights?

Answer. Most undoubtedly, more so than I expected you to be.

Question. I want you to go on and tell the court what you know about troops running down from the mountain, in confusion, into the valley.

Answer. On the morning of the 13th, Saturday morning, the hour I do not remember, there was a number of troops came down the hill in a great deal of confusion; ran by, or hurried by, Colonel Ford's quarters; I pursued them and forced them back, forced them back to his quarters, and there held them until they were brought into order, and sent up the mountain toward the battery. I believe they could not be got well beyond that; that is, I so understood.

Question. How long did this breaking of troops continue during the day there? If all day, state it.

Answer. It was pretty much from the morning, I think, about 8 o'clock, up until the order was received for evacuating; I think so.

Question. Did you notice my exertions in endeavoring to get those troops back into position?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And also the exertions of Colonel Miles?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you see us working together at it?

Answer. Yes, sir; Colonel Miles was present during the morning. I heard you threaten very emphatically some troops that were near your quarters. You used very strong language, and told them that if they did not return you would shoot them. You were then in your saddle.

Question. Was Colonel Miles and I engaged in the same effort to get these troops back there?

Answer. I think so.

Question. What time in the morning did Colonel Miles come up on the side of the hill there?

Answer. My impression is that it was about 9 or 10 o'clock; that is my impression; I may be wrong.

Question. How long did he remain there?

Answer. That I do not know. Colonel Miles, you remember, ordered me to place in position the One hundred and fifteenth New York, Colonel Sammon's regiment, and it took me, I suppose, an hour, nearly, to get them in position, on the western side of the mountain.

Question. What do you know, if anything, about an effort being made to get axes, shovels, or anything like that, to do work on the mountain, to cut down trees, make breastworks, &c.?

Answer. I understood it to be said at your quarters that axes had been called for, but they were not in the quartermaster's department at Harper's Ferry; I understood it to be said at your quarters; who said it I do not remember.

Question. Taking into view the condition of these running troops, and the amount of the enemy in force about us there, was there a military necessity for evacuating Maryland Heights?

Answer. I believed so then; I believe so still.

Question. In your opinion, could we have held out much longer?

Answer. No, sir; we could not have done so.

Question. Do you remember of seeing Colonel Miles and myself in my quarters after your return from placing Colonel Sammon's regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir; or it was either just afterward or just before; I think it was just afterward.

Question. Relate to the court any conversation you may have heard between us.

Answer. I just came in at the moment when you were complaining of the breaking of certain troops that were on the mountain. Colonel Miles was about leaving. Says he, "Colonel Ford, then do the best you can; spike your guns and throw them down the mountain."

Question. Do you remember my sending men out time and again to try to stop up Solomon's Gap with trees?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you remember an effort made by me to throw a big rock in there?

Answer. There were some heavy rocks thrown into that road on the western side, Sharpsburg side, of the mountain, and large timber cut down; at least that was reported by one of my officers who was sent out for the purpose, Lieutenant Beard.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. At what hour in the day did this interview take place between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford?

Answer. I could scarcely say what hour it was; I do not remember what hour Colonel Miles came over to the heights; I think it was about 9 or 10 o'clock; it may have been nearer 11. I do not remember distinctly.

Question. Did you understand the words which he used at parting from Colonel Ford to be an absolute order to evacuate, or only upon condition that he was overwhelmed?

Answer. I regarded it as an order for leaving the heights. I was a little surprised at it, but I so understood it. When I heard that remark I would say that my heart sank, but I thought we were to leave the heights. I so understood it.

Question. You did not feel then that there was any necessity for such an abandonment at that time?

Answer. I thought there was a necessity from the fact that Colonel Miles, in whom I had entire confidence, made use of that language, but previous to that I did not.

Question. Did the evacuation begin immediately after this interview?

Answer. No, sir; not immediately afterward. I think the evacuation commenced about 2 o'clock. I am not certain, however, about that. I was constantly engaged, and very seldom consulted my time-piece.

By the COURT:

Question. Who else was present at this interview?

Answer. I do not remember of any person being present. There may have been one or two of Colonel Ford's officers there; I do not remember of any others.

Question. You say it was about 10 o'clock, you think, when Colonel Miles was there?

Answer. I fixed it from 9 to 11.

Question. Had any fighting occurred after he left, before the evacuation commenced?

Answer. I think so.

Question. Where?

Answer. I think up on the heights; I am not sure about that.

Question. Then, what there occurred between the time Colonel Miles left, when you thought there was no necessity for evacuating, and 2 o'clock, when the evacuation took place, to render it necessary? You say that at 11 o'clock you did not consider it necessary to evacuate. At 2 o'clock you say there was a military necessity for it. What had there occurred in the mean time to make it necessary?

Answer. I said that previous to Colonel Miles making the remark I had thought there was not. After his making the remark, as I said before, having the confidence I had in him, I believed it then to be necessary.

Question. Then, when you state it to be a military necessity to evacuate at 2 o'clock, it was nothing from what you knew yourself, but simply from what you heard Colonel Miles say?

Answer. Principally; yes, sir.

Question. How many men had you at this point where Colonel Ford was stationed?

Answer. Collected together, do you mean?

Question. Yes, sir. How many men were there on duty—how many troops?

Answer. There were not many there.

Question. How many?

Answer. The principal part of them were about the battery, Captain McGrath's battery.

Question. How far was that away?

Answer. I suppose, perhaps 200 or 300 yards; 200 yards, I suppose. Colonel Ford was principally, however, at the battery; that was his position.

Question. Had these men in this position been themselves attacked at all?

Answer. No, sir; the enemy's force had not got down to this position then. They were only within a few hundred yards. The firing was quite near.

Question. You say you were absent at one time during that morning, placing the One hundred and fifteenth Regiment. What time was that; after Colonel Miles' arrival, or before?

Answer. Colonel Miles sent me with that regiment. I think that was at 9 o'clock, or it may be a little after.

Question. Did that regiment arrive on the field with Colonel Miles, or about the time?

Answer. I do not know. I had just returned from the execution of an order, when Colonel Miles saw me and sent me with this regiment.

Question. You do not know when this regiment arrived?

Answer. No, sir; I can only tell about the time I placed them in position. I think it was between 9 and 10 o'clock.

Question. Do you know of any re-enforcements having arrived at the heights that morning?

Answer. The One hundred and fifteenth Regiment, Colonel Sammon's, came up, and Colonel Downey's.

Question. They came up on the heights that morning?

Answer. Yes, sir; they came up that morning.

Question. Do you know about what time?

Answer. Colonel Downey's came previous to the One hundred and fifteenth New York. I think Colonel Downey got up there about 8, or between 8 and 9 o'clock.

Question. The One hundred and fifteenth arrived after that?

Answer. After that; yes, sir; or if they got there previously I did not see them before that time. There was a company with two howitzers came up that morning. I do not remember what company it was. They came before Colonel Downey's got up. I do not remember what regiment it was attached to.

Question. You say you understood Colonel Miles to give an order to abandon the heights?

Answer. I repeated the language he used in reference to that battery.

Question. I understood you to say that the impression upon you was that it was an order to abandon the heights.

Answer. I so understood it; yes, sir; that was my conclusion from his language to Colonel Ford.

Question. That was what you understood?

Answer. I so understood it.

Question. Did it not occur to you to be singular that he should give an order to abandon a post that he had just re-enforced with two regiments and a section of artillery?

Answer. I cannot say that it did, because things developed themselves, I presumed, as the action went on or as the engagement progressed. I presumed that Colonel Miles' apprehension of things developed themselves.

Question. After he came up on the heights?

Answer. I presume so; yes, sir.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Did you see Colonel Miles and myself together as we were retreating from Maryland Heights?

Answer. After we got to the Ferry I rode up to Colonel Miles to report, or rather to ask him the question whether I should report to Colonel Maulsby or not. When I rode up to him, Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford were engaged in conversation, pleasantly apparently, and very friendly. When I asked the question of Colonel Miles whether I should report to Colonel Maulsby, he first answered me, "Yes, sir." I then rode to my detachment, which was in front of Colonel Miles' headquarters, and one of his aides came after me. Says he, "Colonel Miles desires to see you, major." I reported at once to him, and he then placed me in position at the railroad bridge, the iron bridge, which position I held with my detachment until the surrender.

Question. We were still in conversation there and talking when you came back?

Answer.-I think so.

By Dr. MILES:

Question. What connection did that conversation you overheard in relation to the evacuation of the Maryland Heights have to the previous conversation; or did you hear the conversation?

Answer. Do you refer to the remark about spiking the guns?

Question. Yes, sir; and the abandonment of Maryland Heights.

Answer. I did not hear the entire conversation. I remarked that I got in just previous to the remark when Colonel Ford was complaining about the breaking of the troops on the mountain, not being able to hold them in position. Then I heard Colonel Miles give the response I repeated.

Question. Did you see any written order for the evacuation of Maryland Heights?

Answer. No, sir; I did not.

The Commission then adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 15, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Lieut. JOHN B. PEARCE, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows:

By Colonel FORD:

Question. What is your position in the military service of the United States?

Answer. Lieutenant and adjutant of the Thirty-second Ohio Regiment.

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights with the regiment?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What time did you go there?

Answer. I think I first went there on the 5th of September. I believe it was the 5th. I am not certain, however.

Question. Please state to the court what you know about efforts being made to fortify and secure artillery for the heights, &c.

Answer. When I first went there we had a battery of artillery that came part of the way with us to where we commenced making the ascent of the heights. The battery was there ordered back by Colonel Miles, and never came with us. That battery was intended to fortify Solomon's Gap, the key of the position, as we thought. The next day you made another effort to get a battery, but still we got none. You made several other efforts. I moved down, at the solicitation of Colonel Ford, on several occasions—ten or twelve times. But we got no battery and were promised none. We were promised one on the heights proper, but not back at Solomon's Gap.

Question. What do you know, if anything, about efforts being made to procure axes, &c., to fell the timber?

Answer. We made efforts three or four days before the fight commenced to obtain axes, but we obtained no axes. We had but ten axes on the mountain. I counted them myself. I got them and gave them into the hands of the men.

Question. State what you know about our efforts to obstruct Solomon's Gap and the passes in the mountain there.

Answer. We made efforts by sending out as many men as could handle the axes. I

believe 50 men were sent out with the ten axes to obstruct all the roads they could possibly obstruct—the principal roads, and they did obstruct some of them.

Question. State when our pickets were first shelled out of Solomon's Gap.

Answer. Thursday evening, just after supper time.

Question. What time after that did the fighting commence on the crest of the mountain?

Answer. The next afternoon, I believe, skirmishing commenced there. In the evening our pickets and theirs were just 100 yards apart. While I was there in the evening we could hear them talk distinctly. That was on Friday night, I believe.

Question. Will you describe to the court the condition of the troops up on the mountain during all day on Saturday?

Answer. They were running in every direction on Saturday. I was carrying orders to the top of the heights, and I met them running, and saw them in the bushes and behind trees and rocks and every place else. They appeared to be coming from every direction, mostly. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York were the troops I saw running. I was ordered by Colonel Ford to take some men, and I did take 20 men, and rout them out of the bushes and send them back to their places. I should think there were 200 or 300 of them about headquarters, or within the neighborhood, within 600 or 700 yards around in the ravines coming off the mountain. They were in wild confusion and dismay.

Question. Did that state of things continue up to the time of the evacuation?

Answer. It continued all the time until we left the heights. We tried to rally them. I took a squad of them up to the top of the heights, but we could never get them up to the top of the heights. They scattered in every direction. There were so many paths and by-roads there that there was every opportunity to escape. Nobody could possibly hold them.

Question. State what you know about my making efforts to get re-enforcements on the mountain.

Answer. You made every effort you could. I went twice, by your orders, to get re-enforcements. I went down the morning we evacuated the heights. The evening before, Colonel Miles said we should have re-enforcements at daylight; but they never came. I went down at 8 o'clock in the morning. There was no sign of re-enforcement yet. But he immediately [ordered] Colonel Downey's Maryland regiment, I believe, and said if he did not get out in five minutes he would put Colonel Downey under arrest. Colonel Downey said afterward he never ordered him. We did not get re-enforcements until 9 o'clock.

Question. What was said the evening before by Colonel Miles about our being attacked there?

Answer. That was the morning of the fight I went down. He said there was nobody on Maryland Heights but skirmishers, but that we should expect an attack on the plateau on the Rohrersville road. I told him there was nobody there, but that there were two brigades on the mountain. He said there was not. I told him he would soon find there was. He ordered me back, and told me to tell Colonel Ford to watch the Rohrersville road. We had been scouting that road, but had never found any force out there. I was out there myself 4 miles, and forced in their pickets.

Question. What do you know about the force of the enemy on the mountain?

Answer. We were attacked in front by eight regiments, as I afterward understood. It looked like that by the demonstration they made. I was told by rebel officers that they had there that morning Barksdale's division—two brigades, and there was one brigade in Pleasant Valley, back of us.

Question. What do you know about the enemy trying to flank us on the right or left?

Answer. Captain Crumbecker sent word about 2 o'clock, I think it was, that we were being flanked by a brigade on the eastern slope of the mountain. That is the information he sent to headquarters.

Question. From all you know, from all you saw there, the troops running away, and all these things taken into account, in your opinion was there a military necessity for evacuating the heights?

Answer. I think so; when they were all running; I did not see anybody standing their ground, as I thought, doing proper. I could hardly get through with an order as I was sent up the heights. It was almost impossible to get through the troops running down the steep mountain road. I went up eight times, I believe, during the day.

Question. Is there anything else you think of? If so, state it.

Answer. I do not remember. There were a great many things that transpired there.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did you know any of the officers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth?

Answer. By sight, only.

Question. Not by name?

Answer. No, sir; I did not know them by name. The first I saw of them was that morning.

Question. Did they seem to be as conspicuous in the flight as their men, or did they attempt to rally their men?

Answer. I saw a great many of the line officers on the slope of the mountain. I did not see any down where we got the majority of the runaways. I was told, however, they were there.

Question. What were those officers doing?

Answer. Standing around the hospitals and ambulances and ammunition wagons.

Question. You saw none of them attempting to rally their men?

Answer. I did not; not one of them.

By the COURT:

Question. You did not know Major Baird, of that regiment?

Answer. I knew him when I saw him. I had just seen him that morning. I had not seen him before.

Question. What was he doing?

Answer. I did not see him at all. I only know by hearsay.

Question. Did you see any other troops running except that regiment?

Answer. I did not.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did they throw away their arms, or did they carry their arms with them?

Answer. Some of them had arms, others had not; the majority had arms. Those that came off the western slope, through the bushes, had lost their arms, some of them. They were all "sick" when I saw them.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know how many regiments were on the hill besides this One hundred and twenty-sixth?

Answer. There were only our regiment and a dismounted cavalry company up on the top of the hill.

Question. Were those the only forces under Colonel Ford?

Answer. No, sir. We had some off on the western slope.

Question. I spoke of all the troops there for the defense of Maryland Heights.

Answer. There were, I believe, five or six companies off to the left, at Unsell's, and the spring there; they were performing picket duty.

Question. How far was that away?

Answer. Not over a half a mile, I should think.

Question. Had they been driven in?

Answer. No, sir; except at the time we left. They were driven in then. There was a man shot right there at Unsell's, about a half a mile from headquarters. We had, however, two companies of the One hundred and fifteenth New York Regiment, I think it was, and one of ours out 3 miles, at a place called "the school-house." But they were driven in.

Question. At what time?

Answer. When the fight was raging on the mountain. They had to be driven because they had to come in around that way. Then there was a force went out in the morning to Solomon's Gap, some six companies, under the command of Major Hildebrandt; they came back and claimed that they were driven in, but I did not believe they were.

Question. Were you with Colonel Ford at the time he determined to abandon the heights?

Answer. No, sir; I was out, carrying orders.

Question. Were you with him when he gave the order?

Answer. Yes, sir; I carried the order.

Question. Then you were with him when he determined to abandon the heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; he told me he had the order ready.

Question. Do you know what reason he gave for abandoning the heights?

Answer. The reason that we all had; that the troops would not stand, and we could not get any re-enforcements.

Question. What was the reason assigned by Colonel Ford?

Answer. The reason was that they refused him re-enforcements, and what troops he had did not stand their ground.

Question. I understood you to say that only one regiment ran; that all the others stood their ground.

Answer. We had only six companies of our regiments there.

Question. That was the reason assigned by Colonel Ford?

Answer. Yes, sir; one of the reasons, I believe.

Question. You know of no instructions that he had from any higher authority to abandon the heights, do you?

Answer. No, sir. I was constantly on the move that morning, and was not in headquarters only to receive orders and carry them.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Did you not hear me say, after speaking of the condition of the troops, that I had been ordered or authorized by Colonel Miles to evacuate?

Answer. You had moved up to Captain McGrath's quarters?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. Up near the field?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. I do not remember. But that was the understanding we all had there. When you authorized me to carry the orders I carried them, and that was the understanding on the heights, that we had orders from Colonel Miles; we understood it so.

By Dr. MILES :

Question. From what did you form your idea that this battery was to go to Solomon's Gap—the battery you speak of as being intended to go to Solomon's Gap, that you did not receive ?

Answer. It was the place of defense that Colonel Miles had spoken about before we went over there.

Question. Who ordered it to go there ? -

Answer. It was not ordered any place ; that was the intention to have it go there. It was ordered up the heights and stopped.

Question. Was the battery under Colonel Ford's command ?

Answer. Yes, sir; it belonged to our regiment.

Question. Was it not attached to Colonel Trimble's brigade ?

Answer. No, sir; they brigaded a lot of troops over there; I do not know how it was fixed; I believe it was in Colonel Trimble's brigade. But it was still in our regiment, and never had been transferred.

Capt. JOHN T. WHITTIER, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows :

By Colonel FORD :

Question. What is your position in the military service of the United States ?

Answer. Captain Company F, First Regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers.

Question. How long were you stationed on Maryland Heights ?

Answer. I could not tell exactly. Somewhere between three and four months; I do not know the exact date.

Question. Were you there when I first arrived there ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I want you to state to the court, as briefly as possible, the efforts made by me to get defenses up there on the heights.

Answer. I suppose you want to know from beginning to end ?

Question. Make it as short as possible. Did I make exertions when I arrived there, as much as I possibly could ?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think I was brigade officer of the day the third day you arrived there. That day Colonel Ford gave me especial orders to go into Solomon's Gap and examine every picket post he had there, and if I saw any position where another post was needed to post it there. I went out. Around the picket posts was between 11 and 15 miles, the highest way we could come to it. I went into Solomon's Gap in the morning. I discovered that it was necessary to have another picket post there. Colonel Ford said to me that he did not want any men that could run away; cavalry could run away; infantry could not run away. I then stationed, I think, 22 infantry.

Question. This may be all well enough, but it only lumbers up the record. Did I make efforts to obtain axes ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State what you know about that.

Answer. I happened to be in Colonel Ford's headquarters; I think it was on

Sunday evening. I asked Colonel Ford about some axes. He asked where could he get them. I told him he could make a requisition on the quartermaster at Harper's Ferry and get axes, which he immediately ordered his quartermaster to do.

Question. What was the result of that effort?

Answer. He went over and came back, and said he could not get them that day. Colonel Ford ordered him, in my presence, to go the next day. He went over and said there were no axes there to be had.

Question. Did I direct you to erect that fortification up there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know of my trying to get axes for you there?

Answer. Yes, sir. I had a letter in my trunk from you, but it was taken from me. It said if axes could possibly be got they would be there the next morning.

Question. Did we fail to extend that fortification because we could not get axes?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did I direct the timber to be cut down?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did we fail to do that simply because we could not get axes?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Describe to the court, as briefly as possible, the troops running, and the efforts made by you and others to stop them.

Answer. The time I came down from the heights I was taken with cramp colic very seriously, and had to remain at my quarters. The next day I crawled out, determined to do all I could. I discovered the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment New York Volunteers, very visible, in the woods coming down. I heard Colonel Ford order them back and order a guard to be stationed there to send them back. I saw them sent back, and saw them crawl in the woods. I afterward notified a sergeant-major who was there that they were all lying in the woods; that the woods were all full of them; that they did not go up. He went up and tried to get them out, but could not get them.

Question. Did you yourself make any effort?

Answer. I did.

Question. Go on and state what you did.

Answer. I tried all I could to get the men back. I told them they must go back; that as we had but few men there, what men we had there must go back. They would not pay any attention to any one. Nobody had any command over them. They were worthless; not worth anything.

By the COURT:

Question. What were their own officers doing?

Answer. I did not see many of their own officers; I do not know as I saw any of them. I cannot say I saw any of their own officers there. I saw an officer, a first lieutenant, I think, taking some 50 or 60 of them up, trying to get them up, about an hour before we left the heights. He collected them away down by the canal.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Do you remember seeing the forces away down the valley that day—clear down the valley?

Answer. What forces?

Question. The One hundred and twenty-sixth and other troops running away?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How many ?

Answer. I should think there were at least 400 troops there.

Question. Did you make an effort to get them to return ?

Answer. I told the officers they should take them back. That was the first lieutenant I spoke of. He tried to take back some 50 of the men.

Question. Did this continue until we left the heights ?

Answer. It did. Before we left the heights there were some 300 or 400 men marched across the pontoon bridge from Harper's Ferry. They had been over there and gathered them up. I was down there and saw that.

Question. From all that you know of the position of our forces there, the running away of the troops, and the position of things about Maryland Heights, in your opinion, was there a military necessity to leave ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I heard a conversation which took place between you and Colonel Miles.

Question. Go on and state it.

Answer. Colonel Miles was swearing around there. I do not recollect the words he used. He used a great many profane oaths about those men ; that they were not worth anything ; that they could not be stopped. You wished him to give you one good regiment. Says he, "You can't have another damned man." Those were the very words he used. "If you can't hold it, leave it." Those were the very words that Colonel Miles spoke to you in my presence, right in your door-way.

Question. Were Colonel Miles and myself together trying to rally these troops during the day ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT :

Question. Was that after or before he made this remark to Colonel Ford, that he could not have another man ?

Answer. Both after and before.

Question. That he was trying to rally these men ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Did you know any of the officers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment ?

Answer. I did not.

Question. You saw none of them making any efforts to rally their men ?

Answer. I only saw this first lieutenant I speak of.

Question. How long after this interview between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford did the evacuation begin ?

Answer. I certainly could not tell that. I should think, as high as I can recollect, it was about noon-time, or in the neighborhood of 1 or 2 o'clock, that this interview took place. I would not say certain ; I think it was.

By Dr. MILES :

Question. Were you not informed at the time the requisition was made for axes that they were employed by the chief engineer on Bolivar Heights ?

Answer. I was not.

Question. No such word sent ?

Answer. I do not know anything about the order. I did not receive any order.

Question. I thought you were with Colonel Ford when he received the report.

Answer. I told him where he could get them. He made a requisition for the axes but did not get them.

Question. At this time, when you say you were present at the conversation when Colonel Miles said they should not receive another man, did he not say he could not spare a single man from the front?

Answer. I think he said he expected an attack from the front.

Question. How many regiments did you receive?

Answer. Two full regiments and two parts of regiments, I think, as far as my recollection serves me; I could not tell exactly. I was busily engaged all the time myself, at work night and day.

Capt. C. J. BROWN, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows:

By Colonel FORD:

Question. What is your position in the military service of the United States?

Answer. I hold a captain's commission in the First Maryland Regiment Potomac Home Brigade.

Question. How long were you stationed on Maryland Heights?

Answer. About two months, I think.

Question. Were you there on Saturday, the day of the evacuation?

Answer. I was.

Question. Were you there engaged in those fights on the mountain?

Answer. I was.

Question. Both in the morning and later?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I want you to describe to the court the condition of the troops stampeding and running there.

Answer. You ordered me up to the mountain the night before, on Friday night, to the lookout.

Question. Confine yourself to the question, and make it as short as possible.

Answer. I went up there the night before and reported to Major Hewitt. The next morning, about daylight, the fight commenced. A short time afterward he ordered me to deploy my company and Company B on the right, from the lookout to the breastwork. I did so, and staid there until the fight was over, until we were ordered to fall back that they might shell the heights there.

Question. You have not answered my question. Describe the condition of the troops breaking and running from the heights, what you saw of it.

Answer. My company and Company B, the Thirty-second Ohio, and what Garibaldi Guards were there stood first rate, as I thought. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York broke, and, were not reformed again as a regiment during the fight, as I could see, and I was in the whole of it.

Question. From the forces of the enemy that you saw there, and the flanking upon your right, what was your opinion? Was there a military necessity for evacuating the heights?

Answer. I think so. When we were ordered to fall back they had partially turned the left flank of the breastwork. We were catching a cross-fire.

Question. You were then receiving a cross-fire?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT :

Question. Did you notice the conduct of the major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment at all?

Answer. I saw him there; I did not know who he was at the time; I have since learned he was the major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth. I saw him doing all he could, I thought, to rally his regiment, and also the colonel of the One hundred and twenty-sixth. He acted very bravely, I thought; recklessly, as I thought.

Question. The major, then, was rallying the regiment at the time the colonel was doing so; that was previous to the colonel being wounded?

Answer. Yes, sir; they were both of them rallying their men.

Question. Did you see the major trying to rally that regiment after the colonel was wounded?

Answer. I did not notice him after the colonel was wounded. I saw the colonel when he was wounded; I was right close by him.

Question. You did not see the major after that?

Answer. No, sir; I did not see him, afterward, at all.

Capt. HENRY CURTIS JR., recalled by Colonel Ford, and examined as follows:

By Colonel FORD :

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles say anything about spiking the guns and throwing them down the heights? If so, when was it, and what did he say?

Answer. I did hear him make some remark in regard to it; I think it was Friday evening or Saturday morning after I arrived there. The remark was that he ordered you, in case of the evacuation of the heights, to spike the guns and dismount the large guns and throw them down the heights; down the crags.

By General WHITE :

Question. I would like you to state where I was at the time of the evacuation of Maryland Heights, and whether I was cognizant of the evacuation until after it had transpired.

Answer. At the time of the evacuation you were on the extreme left of the position on Bolivar Heights, placing some regiments there. You sent me out, perhaps half a mile in front, to choose a position for a battery, and when I returned I heard rumors that the heights had been evacuated some two hours previously, and that upon receiving the news you had immediately ridden down to the town. You were not there, but I found you in town.

General JULIUS WHITE, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows:

By Colonel FORD :

Question. I just want you to state your inference from a conversation you had with Colonel Miles about the evacuation of Maryland Heights.

Answer. Perhaps I had better state the conversation.

Question. Yes, sir; state the conversation.

Answer. As soon as I learned that the heights had been evacuated, I rode down and met Colonel Miles on the hill, not far from the fortification known as Camp Hill. I inquired of him if he had given the order for the evacuation of Maryland Heights. He said "No." I expressed surprise, and told him it was hardly possible that Colonel Ford should have evacuated Maryland Heights without an order; that I was aston-

ished at it. He repeated that he had given no order. Said I, "Have you had any conversation with him in relation to it; was there any discretionary power?" He said that all he had said to Colonel Ford in relation to the matter was, that if he found it was necessary to evacuate the heights he must be sure and spike the guns and pitch the heavy guns down the mountain. I remarked to him that that would seem to me to imply some discretionary power on the part of Colonel Ford, or at least to contemplate the contingency when the place would have to be evacuated. He said, "Of course." That was the substance of the conversation; the exact words I am not able to repeat.

Question. Was I placed under arrest at any time, by order of Colonel Miles, to your knowledge?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

Question. Would you not have had knowledge of it if I had been?

Answer. You might have been arrested without my knowledge. I was for the most part on duty on the left, where I was assigned.

Question. Did you ever hear that I had been placed under arrest by Colonel Miles?

Answer. No, sir.

By Dr. MILES:

Question. During the time from your arrival at Harper's Ferry had you frequent conversations with Colonel Miles?

Answer. Several times; not very frequent.

Question. During the time you were there did you ever hear him utter any treasonable language or see any writing of his to that effect?

Answer. No, sir; I heard nothing of the kind, and saw nothing that led me to suppose that he was disloyal.

Question. From your knowledge as a military man, did you see anything in his conduct during the siege of Harper's Ferry in any way cowardly?

Answer. No, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. Had you any means of judging or making any estimate of Colonel Miles' capacity as a commander before you went to Harper's Ferry?

Answer. No, sir; I never had any acquaintance with him. I met him once, only, prior to that. Yes, sir, I met him twice, but I had no conversation with him; no means whatever of judging of his capacity. My stay in Harper's Ferry, from the time I reached there from Winchester, was very brief. I was ordered away again the next day.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did you know anything of those paroled prisoners having been sent through our lines while the siege was pending?

Answer. I did not hear of it until I reached here.

Question. You did not know of it at the time?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Nor anything about the paroled rebel officer Rouse?

Answer. That transpired some days before I reached Harper's Ferry, as I am informed—some days before the siege commenced. I did not know of it at the time.

By the COURT:

Question. Had you any conversation with Colonel Miles in reference

to the importance of Maryland Heights, its being the key of the position, and the necessity of defending it?

Answer. Yes, sir. I had such a conversation with him before I determined what course I should take in relation to the command.

Question. State to the court, if you please, what he said.

Answer. The conversation grew out of a question I asked him as to his proposed plan of defense of the position. I asked him what his plans were. He did not give me any very definite plan of operations. I think he said he had not any specific plan beyond the defense of Bolivar Heights and the bridges; that these positions being defended, Harper's Ferry was secure, and that his orders were to hold Harper's Ferry. By holding that line and the bridges, as I inferred from what he said, the place was secure. I then suggested to him whether, in case we were attacked by a greatly superior force, he did not think it would be better to hold Maryland Heights at all hazards, even if we had to withdraw the entire force there; whether the bridges could not be defended from that position as well as from the other side. He said that he did not think they could be as well; that Camp Hill best commanded the bridges and the approach from that side. He also said that there was no water on Maryland Heights; that the objection to taking the entire force over there was that and the difficulty of getting up subsistence and artillery, and when they got there the difficulty of remaining there for want of water.

Question. Did you suggest to him, then or at any time, the fact that Bolivar Heights or Camp Hill would not be tenable if he lost Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is, if the battery was gone from Maryland Heights. Without that battery, I thought it would not be tenable; with that battery, I thought it would be.

Question. Did you suggest that if Maryland Heights were abandoned that position would not be tenable?

Answer. I do not know as I said that to him in express terms; I know that was my opinion. That was the drift of the conversation, the tendency of the conversation. I do not remember to have said it in so many words, however.

Question. State, if you please, whether, in your opinion, Maryland Heights does not command Loudoun Heights.

Answer. Not where that battery was placed.

Question. I do not speak of where the battery was placed; but whether the heights did not, and whether an enemy occupying it would not have commanded with their guns, as soon as they could have got guns in position, Loudoun Heights.

Answer. Yes, sir; and every other position about Harper's Ferry.

Question. That is what I am coming to. Then Loudoun Heights command any position on Bolivar Heights that Maryland Heights do not reach, do they not?

Answer. Yes, sir; the extreme left of our line, for instance, on Bolivar Heights, was commanded by Loudoun Heights, while the guns from Maryland Heights, at least such as they had there, did not reach there.

Question. Did you, or did you not, think that Maryland Heights was, by reason of these circumstances, the commanding position of the whole place?

Answer. Unquestionably, if the guns had been on the crest of the mountain.

Question. We will always suppose that the enemy could put guns there?

Answer. I thought you were speaking of our battery.

Question. Not at all. I am speaking of the defense of Harper's Ferry; that an order is given to defend Harper's Ferry; that it could not be

defended, except by holding Maryland Heights, and the best way to defend it was by holding Maryland Heights, and the abandonment of Maryland Heights, therefore, rendered it impossible to hold Harper's Ferry?

Answer. That is my judgment, and, in connection with that, I would like, if the court have no objection, for my own satisfaction to have put upon the record one other remark. I regard Harper's Ferry, although my opinion may be worthless, as a very weak position, instead of a strong one. The popular idea that it is a strong one is a fallacy. The three commanding positions about it, Maryland Heights, Loudoun Heights, and Bolivar Heights, either of them being above it, either of them being possessed by the enemy, Harper's Ferry is commanded by them, and each command on these positions necessary for the defense of Harper's Ferry is necessarily detached from the others, not within supporting distance of the others, on account of the great natural barriers offered by the Potomac and the Shenandoah; and during an engagement it is not practicable to support one position by the forces at another. Therefore, each is a separate command, and, therefore, each should have been fortified to make it properly defensible by such a force as we had there.

Question. And each should have been defended, should it not, by a suitable protecting force?

Answer. That is my judgment.

Question. Just state, if you please, if you had to [act] again in the matter, and you were in command there, whether you would not have held Maryland Heights to the last, and whenever you abandoned them you would have considered it an abandonment of the whole position against a large force attacking?

Answer. Substantially. I should have fortified the approach to Maryland Heights; that is, Solomon's Gap, and had another fortification on the summit of the mountain. That is what I should have done, and then, as a last resort, I would have taken the entire command over there.

Question. Did you not look upon the want of water as a serious difficulty, in regard to occurrences that took place at the time the surrender occurred?

Answer. Unquestionably. No preparation had been made to provide it. Preparation might have been made on Maryland Heights to have provided water, if time had been taken in advance to do so. I understand that in fortifying the place, necessarily, preparations for water must be made, among other things.

Question. You say you understood from conversation with Colonel Miles that he appreciated the importance of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I so understood it.

Question. And that he gave a discretionary power to Colonel Ford abandon those heights?

Answer. I gave the conversation that took place.

Question. What was the impression made upon your mind at that time?

Answer. My inference was that there was some discretionary power, from the fact that he told me he had ordered him, if he had to evacuate that position, that the guns must be spiked and pitched down the mountain.

Question. Had you any further conversation with Colonel Miles at the time, expressing any dissatisfaction at the abandonment of those heights, or the consequences that would follow?

Answer. I spoke, perhaps, somewhat warmly, when I spoke to him as to whether he had issued an order for the evacuation. When I learned that he had given the order to spike the guns and pitch them down the mountain, if necessary, I assumed that there must have been a necessity for the act. I had not been there; my duty led me in another part of the field entirely; I was not cognizant of what had transpired nor how large a force the enemy had there, until subsequently, and, therefore, I was

incapable of judging whether the evacuation was proper or improper, although I felt at the time that it was the loss of the entire position and the command.

Question. Did Colonel Miles make any remark at this time in regard to the conduct of Colonel Ford in abandoning the position when he did?

Answer. No, sir; he found no fault with Colonel Ford; made no remark upon that subject, whatever.

Question. How long was this conversation after the heights had been evacuated?

Answer. I should suppose this conversation occurred somewhere about 5 o'clock in the evening; I do not know how long before that the heights had been evacuated.

Question. Have you any reason to believe, from what occurred, that Colonel Miles was in any way dissatisfied with Colonel Ford for having abandoned the heights?

Answer. He did not so express himself to me. He merely stated, without commentary, that he had not issued the order for the evacuation, and when I suggested that there must have been something in the way of an order, as I have already related, or Colonel Ford would not surely have taken the responsibility of such a movement without some authority, he stated this conversation that he had had with Colonel Ford: that if he found it necessary to abandon the heights he must be sure and spike the guns; and he said, "That was all the order I have given." I inferred that it contemplated such a contingency by his expressing himself in that way.

I will, if the court will permit me, make one further statement. Several witnesses have given evidence in relation to the feasibility of taking the command away from Harper's Ferry after the evacuation of Maryland Heights, and two have spoken of going by crossing the Shenandoah. I simply desire to state to the court that after the surrender the occupation of the bridge was had by the enemy in crossing their forces. I was anxious to get my command away, on account of the short amount of subsistence I had. Upon remonstrating with them in regard to it, General Hill suggested that we might cross the Shenandoah and take down the south side of the Potomac to Washington. I went out with him to examine the ford, taking along with us a person who was familiar with it. A mounted man was sent in, and he rode some 30 or 40 yards into the water. It was found to be so deep that it would be impossible for a man to stand in the water. The water was so deep and the current so swift that it was almost impossible to stand there, and, upon going a few yards farther, the horse fell into a hole in the river and almost drowned the man.

Question. Why not have tried Keys' Ford, above?

Answer. I do not know. Possibly we might have got across there, but then that would have led over the heights instead of around this way by the Potomac. My object is simply to show that the crossing of troops over the Shenandoah in the night would have been utterly impracticable, and, I think, utterly impracticable in the day-time. At least, we gave it up that morning as such. My object is to show that while the enemy were investing the place there could have been no opportunity of crossing our forces there.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. What means have you of knowing the number of the enemy's forces that were on and around Maryland Heights?

Answer. I had a conversation, after the surrender, with General McLaws, who commanded a portion of the troops there. I understood from him that there were two divisions there—he did not give me the numbers—his own and one commanded by General Anderson, I think. Anyway, there were two divisions.

Question. Did you see the troops passing over from there after the surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw them when I was not asleep. - They were passing my quarters all night.

Question. And the next morning?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What number do you suppose passed over?

Answer. I have no idea. I should think 20,000, perhaps 30,000, and a large amount of artillery. They crossed all night, until 10 o'clock the next day, without any intermission whatever, marching by the flank past by where I was quartered.

Mrs. ELIZABETH BROWN, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows:

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Are you the wife of Captain Brown, First Regiment Potomac Home Brigade?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights on the day of its evacuation?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Are you acquainted with Colonel Miles?

Answer. No particular acquaintance; only just when I saw him passing.

Question. You were in the habit of seeing him up there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you hear a conversation between Colonel Miles and myself on the day of the evacuation?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where, and what was it?

Answer. On Saturday, near 12 o'clock, I think it was.

Question. Go on and relate the conversation.

Answer. I went upstairs and took off my shoes, to listen. You were ordering the men to leave the room while you were talking. I heard Colonel Miles tell you that your men would have to fall back to the Ferry; they could not hold the heights; the thing was impossible; the rebel force was too strong. You rose to your feet and swore you would be damned if you could not hold it, provided he would send re-enforcements. He said he had sent all he could spare. You were swearing, and said that it was a shame that the men should have to give up.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Was this on the heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; up in Mrs. Buckle's room, where Colonel Ford staid. I was listening down the stove-hole. There was nothing but a board floor, and a tin over the hole, which I lifted up. The reason I listened was that I was anxious to hear what was going on. My husband was on the battle-field, and I wanted to know what was going to be done. That was all I heard. I slipped my gaiters on again and went down stairs after that, and picked up what I could carry away with me, when I found I had to leave.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you hear all the conversation?

Answer. That was all I heard.

Question. Were they conversing before you were there?

Answer. I do not know; I expect they were; I just heard that much, no more.

Question. Was there any one else in the room besides Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford?

Answer. No one but their two selves.

By Dr. MILES:

Question. Could you see from this stove-hole all over the room, whether there was anybody else in there or not?

Answer. There was no one up with me.

Question. I mean below.

Answer. I was certain there was no one else. I could see right down into the room.

Question. Could you see all over the room?

Answer. Yes, sir; I could look them right in the face, but they did not see me; they were so busily engaged. When I left they were both standing on their feet together. When I got down stairs Colonel Miles was at the door.

The Commission then adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 16, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

Maj. CHARLES H. RUSSELL, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. I was captain at Harper's Ferry; I am now major.

Question. In what regiment?

Answer. First Maryland Cavalry.

Question. It has been stated here that you and Captain Cole left before the surrender of Harper's Ferry with the view of opening some communication with General McClellan. Did you or not do so?

Answer. On Saturday evening, after Maryland Heights had been evacuated, Colonel Miles sent for me. He first asked me if I thought I could lead out what cavalry force there was there, from Harper's Ferry. I told him I was willing to try. He afterward asked me if I could not go with two or three men, and pass the enemy's lines, and try to reach somebody that had ever heard of the United States Army, or any general of the United States Army, or anybody that knew anything about the United States Army, and report the condition of Harper's Ferry. I told Colonel Miles that I was willing to make the trial, and he told me that if I could get to any general of the United States Army, or to any telegraph station, or, if possible, get to General McClellan, whom he supposed was at Frederick—he thought he must be at Frederick—to report, that he thought he could hold out forty-eight hours; that he had subsistence for forty-eight hours, but if he was not relieved in that time he would have to surrender the place.

Question. That was Saturday night?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Go on and tell us what occurred then.

Answer. I went from Colonel Miles' quarters down to my own quarters and selected 9 men. I went through our line of pickets on the Virginia side. I kept upon that side of the river, passed the enemy's line of pickets, and moved down near the river through the fields until I came near Shepherdstown. I crossed the Potomac near the mouth of the Antietam. I met the enemy's pickets there again. We put spurs to our horses and dashed by that picket, and passed on through by-roads until we came to South Mountain. There we met a picket of 71 infantry of the enemy. We got around them by taking a road through the woods, and then we went directly over the center of South Mountain until I reached Middletown. I reported there to General Reno. He gave me a fresh horse, and directed me to report to General McClellan. I reported to General McClellan, who was in camp then near Frederick City.

By the COURT:

Question. What time was it that you reported to General McClellan?

Answer. I should think it was 9 o'clock in the morning.

Question. Sunday morning?

Answer. Yes, sir; perhaps not quite so late as 9 o'clock.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You reported in person?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you give him the details of the situation at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state what he said to you?

Answer. I reported to him the information that Colonel Miles directed me to give about his situation; that he could hold out forty-eight hours; that he had subsistence for forty-eight hours; and then told him that Maryland Heights had been evacuated. He asked me if Colonel Miles held Loudoun Heights. I told him there was no force there we knew of, of either army. He replied that General Franklin was then on his way to relieve that garrison; and he immediately sent off a messenger to General Franklin to urge him forward. He then asked me if I thought I could get back to Colonel Miles. I told him I did not think I could. He afterward sent me with a note to General Franklin, as I told him I was acquainted with the country there, and knew the position of the enemy, and perhaps could be of assistance to him. I got upon my horse and went to General Franklin.

Question. At what time did you leave General McClellan?

Answer. Perhaps it was 10 o'clock on Sunday morning.

By the COURT:

Question. You were there only an hour?

Answer. Not more than an hour.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. At what time did you reach General Franklin?

Answer. It must have been 3 o'clock, I should think.

Question. On the same day?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you find him marching or in camp?

Answer. He was then fighting the battle of the gap when I reached him.

Question. Which gap?

Answer. The gap just back of Brownsville; I do not know any particular name for it.

Question. Did you immediately communicate with him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What did he say to you?

Answer. He requested me to remain there. I stopped about there until the enemy was driven from the gap; then General Franklin's corps rested for the night, and was there the next morning, Monday morning. General Franklin moved his force up through the gap, and formed a line of battle there about 9 o'clock, I should think, on Monday morning. The enemy was thrown in line of battle $1\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 miles beyond us, and while we were there in line of battle the firing at Harper's Ferry ceased. There was very heavy cannonading in the morning. It ceased, and General Franklin said he had no doubt Harper's Ferry had been surrendered. He sent a message to General McClellan, asking whether he should proceed or remain where he was. I asked General Franklin if I could be of any further use to him. He said if I wished to go any where else, he had no objection. I then left and went down to Williamsport, where a part of my command was.

Question. Who bore the message back to General McClellan? You did not bear it?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. And you do not know whether it reached him, or what was his reply?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What distance was Franklin's command from Harper's Ferry?

Answer. About 7 miles.

Question. Did General Franklin speak to you as being then under orders to relieve that place?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was he moving in that direction at all?

Answer. He was moving in that direction.

Question. Was the enemy formed in line of battle between him and Harper's Ferry at the time you speak of?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did General McClellan express any surprise at the condition of affairs at Harper's Ferry, as related by yourself?

Answer. He was very much surprised. I do not recollect how he manifested that surprise. Some expression he made use of indicated that he was surprised that Maryland Heights had been given up.

By General WHITE:

Question. Had you any means of judging of the force of the enemy in front of General Franklin at that time? If so, what do you think it was?

Answer. The enemy had his force drawn up in two lines. I could not tell about the gap what the enemy's force was. But the next morning, after we had moved through the gap, there were two lines of battle, and there seemed to be about two brigades in each.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Have you any doubt about the ability of General Franklin to have relieved Harper's Ferry on Monday if it had held out?

Answer. None whatever.

Question. The assurance you bore to General McClellan was that the command could hold out forty-eight hours from Saturday evening?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. Will you state exactly what you told General McClellan?

Answer. I told him I had been sent by Colonel Miles from Harper's Ferry to report his condition there, and then I reported the condition; that Colonel Miles told me that he had subsistence for forty-eight hours, and he thought he would be able to hold out that time, and if he was not relieved by that time he would have to surrender. I told him that Maryland Heights had been evacuated, and that all our forces were upon the Virginia side of the river.

Question. Was anything said by you, any message sent by you to General McClellan, in regard to a deficiency of ammunition?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did not Colonel Miles tell you to say so ?

Answer. No, sir ; he merely spoke of subsistence.

Question. Was any officer present besides Colonel Miles at the time he gave you those instructions ?

Answer. Colonel Ford was present, and Colonel Davis of the cavalry regiment ; I forget the number of his regiment now ; and I think General White was present, but I am not certain about that.

Question. Did they concur in the opinion expressed by Colonel Miles, that they could hold out for forty-eight hours ?

Answer. No, sir ; I did not hear any of them make any remark to that effect.

Question. Did they hear the conversation ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By General WHITE :

Question. Did you have more than one conversation with Colonel Miles about going away from Harper's Ferry on this expedition ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was it at the first or at the last, the final, conversation at which you think I was present ?

Answer. I could not tell. My impression is that you were there, and Colonel Miles was speaking to me, and I recollect your smiling at something that was said. That is the only thing I remember about your being there. I had a conversation with him before I went down to select my men. He ordered me to report after I was ready to start, and I went back and did so.

By the COURT :

Question. Your notification to General McClellan was on Sunday morning at 9 o'clock ?

Answer. I judge it to be about 9 o'clock. They had just got through breakfast—General McClellan had—when I got there.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Did you see the orders which you bore to General Franklin from General McClellan ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You do not know their precise character ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Whether they were imperative and urgent ?

Answer. When I arrived General McClellan immediately sent off a message by one messenger, a fresh man upon a fresh horse, and I stopped in General McClellan's quarters. He ordered me a breakfast. After breakfast he wrote another dispatch, and I bore that myself.

By the COURT :

Question. Have you any idea what were the contents of that first communication ?

Answer. None at all.

Question. Do you know the contents of the second ?

Answer. No, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Could the cannonade of this engagement on Sunday even-

ing, of which you speak, at the gap, have been distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir; unless the cannonading there was very great.

Question. The engagement with the enemy was not resumed on Monday morning?

Answer. No, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you hear distinctly, all the while, after you reported to General McClellan, the cannonading at Harper's Ferry until it ceased on Monday morning?

Answer. While I was near Frederick I heard cannonading; but I could not swear that it was at Harper's Ferry; I believed it to be in that direction.

Question. The reverberations through those mountains would render it uncertain whether it was the action of General Franklin or at Harper's Ferry; it was near enough in that direction to prevent your telling which it was?

Answer. Yes, sir. Monday morning we could hear the cannonading from Harper's Ferry very distinctly and very terrific.

Question. After you got in position with General Franklin?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did you understand it to be the purpose of General Franklin to press on, until after the cessation of the cannonading that morning?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. There was no obstacle in his way? You spoke of the enemy being formed there that morning.

Answer. Yes, sir; the enemy was formed directly in front of him.

Question. That front was in the direction of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Would he have had to have fought a battle to have reached Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir; and then a report came in that the enemy were moving down upon his right flank, moving from Sharpsburg. I believe that is the reason why General Franklin did not [move] forward and engage the enemy immediately.

By the COURT:

Question. What was on General Franklin's right, of our troops?

Answer. None of our troops.

Question. Was there no troops between General Franklin's and General McClellan's position? If so, they must have been on General Franklin's right.

Answer. After we passed through the gap, General Franklin's line was thrown across the valley, his right resting upon the mountain.

Question. I mean the general line of the troops, not the immediate position that he occupied at the moment, but the general position of our army on Franklin's right; or you may call it between his position and General McClellan's headquarters, the direction that you passed over. In other words, did you see other troops before you joined Franklin?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you know of any that were near you, but out of sight?

Answer. No, sir; I think his army corps was sent alone.

Question. Where was the rest of our army?

Answer. Down about Boonsborough.

Question. They were then on his right and in advance, were they not?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In other words, General McClellan could have sent word to the commanding officer of that force to have looked out for any force coming from Sharpsburg to flank Franklin?

Answer. Sharpsburg was nearer to General Franklin than General McClellan was.

Question. Still, there were other troops that could have co-operated with Franklin, could they not, in the event of his undertaking to push his way through to Harper's Ferry, should the troops of the enemy threaten his flank?

Answer. [No answer.]

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Do you know the amount of force that General Franklin had under him at that time?

Answer. I do not.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know anything of any rebel officers or men being paroled by Colonel Miles and sent out through our lines during the siege of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. While I was at Harper's Ferry I captured an officer between Harper's Ferry and Frederick; I sent him back to Colonel Ford, and Colonel Ford sent him over to Colonel Miles, and I heard that he was paroled and set at liberty.

Question. Was that when you were on your way to carry the message to General McClellan?

Answer. No, sir; I think it was before.

Question. What was that officer's name, do you know?

Answer. No, sir; I do not remember it.

Question. Was it Rouse?

Answer. I do not remember distinctly enough to swear to it.

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles say anything about it, subsequently?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you have any conversation with this rebel officer that you captured?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did he say anything about having known Colonel Miles or being acquainted with him?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did he state that he was from Winchester, or from near Winchester, or where he had been serving?

Answer. He stated that his home was near Maryland Heights, in Maryland.

By General WHITE :

Question. You say the engagement between General Franklin's corps and the enemy occurred on Sunday ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. About what time of day did that battle cease ?

Answer. Near sundown.

Question. From that time up to the time when the cannonade at Harper's Ferry ceased, was there any movement of that force under General Franklin, in any direction ?

Answer. Yes, sir; General Franklin advanced, perhaps, a mile.

Question. And found the enemy in line of battle ?

Answer. Yes, sir; and threw his own force in line of battle.

Question. You say, also, that it was understood that a force of the enemy was moving down upon his right flank ?

Answer. It was so reported.

Question. You also say that in his movement toward Harper's Ferry he would have been compelled to have fought a battle ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was the force of the enemy so trifling that you think he would have had no difficulty whatever in relieving Harper's Ferry during the day ?

Answer. If the enemy had not been re-enforced, I think he would have had it in a few hours.

Question. You expressed yourself as being without any doubt that he might have reached Harper's Ferry during that day. Are not battles of somewhat doubtful issue at times ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I only want to call to your attention that you expressed yourself unqualifiedly of opinion that General Franklin might have reached Harper's Ferry during the day, and still you say a battle would have to have been fought. If you are still of that judgment that is all right.

Answer. I think he could have whipped the enemy and reached Harper's Ferry both, before night.

By the COURT :

Question. Do you [know] how numerous the enemy were at that point ?

Answer. I judge there were about four brigades.

Question. What means had you of knowing ?

Answer. Only by what I could see of the enemy. The enemy was in an open field; one line thrown behind a stone wall, and the other line behind a rail fence.

Question. Did you see their artillery ?

Answer. I saw part of it. I do not know that I saw all of it.

Question. Did you see their cavalry ?

Answer. Yes, sir. Their cavalry was very light.

By General WHITE :

Question. You do not know whether the divisions of General McLaws and General Anderson were both there or not ?

Answer. No, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights while the enemy were advancing upon them?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In what capacity?

Answer. I had command of two companies of cavalry there.

Question. Were you present when the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers gave way?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state their conduct?

Answer. The night before the fight on Maryland Heights I was in Colonel Ford's quarters. He said to me, "Well, captain, these fellows are pressing closer upon us, driving in our pickets." Says he, "To-morrow one of two things has got to be done; we have either got to drive them from that hill or they are going to drive us from it." And then he added, "Colonel Miles has sent over here, offering to re-enforce me with some raw troops; but I have made no answer at all to Colonel Miles, because I don't want any raw troops. I would rather do what fighting I have got to do here with the little handful of men which I have confidence in, for I believe they would do me more harm than good." I told the colonel that the cavalry was of no sort of use there, and, if he wished, I would dismount my men and take them up. He said he wished I would do so, and bring them up there about daylight. About daylight I had my command on foot and took them and reported to Colonel Ford. He ordered me to go and report to the major of the Thirty-second Ohio, who was in command on the hill. I went up there, and the major said he would like to have me act independently, and throw my men out as sharpshooters, and shift my command about to any point of the battle where they were most needed. I told him that was just what I would like. I then took my command immediately and marched to the front, where the skirmishers were deployed. I had not thrown my men out. They had just reached there, and were standing in line, when the sergeant who was at the head of my column was shot in the thigh. He fell, and the skirmishers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York broke and ran. I threw my own men behind trees and rocks that there were about there. I went back to where the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York had retreated, and begged the officers to bring their men forward again. The officers succeeded in bringing their men forward. They were thrown out again as skirmishers. We skirmished there awhile, until the enemy had formed its line of battle, and we heard the commander of the enemy's forces give the command to "forward." We could hear them tramp through the alders and undergrowth. Then the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York broke again and fled through the line of battle that had been formed. That line was composed in part, I think, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth, with part of the Thirty-second Ohio Regiment that was up there, and, I believe, two companies of Garibaldi Guards. They ran right through them, and some of them passed entirely back over the breastworks. Some were rallied again behind that line of battle. We fought there again. We made a stand there after we got behind that line of battle, and fought there awhile. The enemy came up, and were in line. They came pretty close to us, but one of my lieutenants was shot, and then the One hundred and twenty-sixth broke again and fell behind the breastworks, and a goodly number of them fled out of sight. I do not know where they stopped.

By the COURT:

Question. Did their officers go with them?

Answer. I do not know, sir. I did not see many of their officers. After the skirmishers broke, I saw but very few of the officers. I saw the colonel; he was there cheering on his men until he himself was shot in the mouth.

Question. Did you see Major Baird?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw him when we were behind the breastwork. I did not notice him until we were there. Whether he was in front or not, I do not know.

Question. When you did see him, what was he doing?

Answer. He was standing a good piece back from the breastwork. I do not know that he was doing anything.

Question. In rear of his men?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. The second flight of which you speak commenced when the retreat of the enemy was heard?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Before there was any volley discharged upon you?

Answer. There had been some miscellaneous firing; some skirmishing; that is all.

Question. But at the moment this flight took place there was no firing?

Answer. No, sir; the skirmishing was growing a little rapid. There was no volley from a regiment or from a company even.

Question. You did not see Major Baird making any efforts, or did you, to rally his men?

Answer. No, sir; he might have done it. I did not see him.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity of evacuating Maryland Heights at the time it was done?

Answer. Well, we might have held it a little longer, but it was very evident that we were being flanked. We had merely a handful of men at the breastwork. A good part of the One hundred and twenty-sixth had already gone away from the breastwork. The Thirty-second Ohio Regiment was small. I do not think there were more than 300 of them. I do not think we had more than 450 or 500 men there behind the breastworks; I do not think we had that many. They had already turned our left flank, and had begun to pour in a fire upon us from the left. The men were holding their ground well then; they were not going at all. The enemy had tried to come up in front three times, and we had driven them back. Then, while they were turning our left, our men standing their ground well, there was a cavalier riding down from the lookout upon his horse, waving his hat and motioning us back. I went to him and asked him what he wanted. He said the order was for us to fall back. I communicated the order to the captains there. The colonel of the One hundred and twenty-sixth had been wounded. The major I did not see—the major of the Thirty-second Ohio. I do not know where he was then. I communicated that order, and the men fell back. The order was to fall back to the heights, farther back on the hill. As soon as the men had fallen back beyond the range of the enemy's fire, I went right down to Colonel Ford, and told him that I understood he had given an order to fall back from the breastworks. He said he had given no such order; that that order must have come from Major Hewitt. He asked if the men could not be rallied and taken back on the heights again. I told him I thought they could. He asked who would do it. Some other officer was there, and I think he rallied the Thirty-second Ohio, and Colonel Ford asked me if I could not take charge of the rest there, and try to rally them and get them back on the hill. I told him I thought I could. We undertook it. The Thirty-second was rallied and marched back, I think, as far as the block-house, and a part of the One hundred and twenty-sixth and a part of one of the Maryland Home Brigade regiments was moving up the hill, when some officer told me there were orders to evacuate Maryland Heights, and that we need not go on any farther. I stepped up to the adjutant who was close by, and asked him if that was the order. He said it was; that he had the order in his pocket. I have no doubt we might have held it awhile longer, but without re-enforcements it would have been impossible for us to have held it long.

By the COURT:

Question. When the troops fell back this time, in obedience to this order, did the enemy follow?

Answer. They followed us to the breastwork.

Question. Did the troops go back and retake the breastworks when they went back on the hill?

Answer. No, sir. After our troops had fallen back from the breastwork, the enemy formed a line upon the left. They did not seem to try to occupy the breastwork, but

formed a line, or a column rather, upon what had been our left. And we could hear the men give three cheers down there on the slope of the hill. The line the enemy formed there would take him directly on toward the siege guns.

Question. You say that Colonel Ford had but a handful of men up to the breastwork. Do you know how he had the rest of his forces disposed on the heights?

Answer. No, sir; I do not. His own regiment was quite small. Colonel Miles had placed a force of two companies, I think, down by the siege guns. They remained there.

Question. As I understand you, the only place being pressed or threatened at that time was this point at the breastwork?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And, in your opinion, the force there was too light to hold it?

Answer. Yes, sir. When we retreated we had to retreat through the enemy's fire. When we retreated from the breastwork we had to retreat through the enemy's fire upon our left flank; they could rake the breastwork from the position they had already attained.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. Were you sent out by me on Friday evening to feel the enemy's position on the heights, and to examine their situation?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How did you find it there on the heights out toward Solomon's Gap?

Answer. The enemy was pressing us close there, on Friday night.

Question. And in great numbers?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you report that fact to me when you came back?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you come back off the heights and report to me that with my force it was impossible for me to hold those heights; that they were driving us as they pleased there? During the day, 12 o'clock or 1, when you were wounded and came down, you spoke of the condition of the troops, their running, and our small force. Did you speak of the necessity of new re-enforcements?

Answer. Yes, sir. I think I asked you the question why Colonel Miles did not send us re-enforcements; that it was impossible for us to hold the heights with the men we had there.

Question. You spoke of seeing me at Harper's Ferry, in Colonel Miles' headquarters; do you recollect what time of night that was?

Answer. I think that was about 9 o'clock.

Question. Were we not in there alone when you came in?

Answer. I think you were. I could not swear to it; but I think you were.

Question. And this colonel came in and stood off at an open space. Colonel Miles was sitting at the table, and I was talking to him. Was that the condition of things?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were we conversing pleasantly and agreeably about the whole affair?

Answer. Yes, sir; there seemed to be nothing but good feeling there.

Question. You spoke of some laughing that took place at a remark Colonel Miles made. Did not Colonel Miles say, in reply to some one—I was speaking about your condition, and that they would be likely to be very harsh with you, and I wanted you to get away—did not Colonel Miles say, “Go; and if you see any man that has ever heard of the United States Government or the United States Army, say that I cannot hold out here much longer”?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Col. WILLIAM G. WARD, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. I am colonel of the Twelfth Regiment National Guards, State of New York.

Question. Where were you during the late events at Harper’s Ferry, which resulted in its surrender?

Answer. I was stationed, in command of the Fourth Brigade, at a place they called Camp Hill.

Question. You have no knowledge of the events which occurred on Maryland Heights?

Answer. Nothing further than what I could see.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity of the surrender of Harper’s Ferry at the time it took place?

Answer. I think, from all that I have been able to learn, that at the time we could have held out but a few hours longer, if so long.

Question. Had the cannonade commenced in the morning before the surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir; the cannonade commenced at early daylight.

Question. The surrender occurred at what hour?

Answer. I think the white flag was shown about 7.30 o’clock. The firing continued more than an hour afterward.

Question. Do you think you could have held out until evening?

Answer. I think it is possible that an assault might have been resisted; although, not being in front, it is impossible for me to say. I certainly could have supported the force on Bolivar Heights considerably with artillery from my left.

Question. Do you think the force could have retreated from Harper’s Ferry the night previous?

Answer. I think they might have tried it.

Question. Do you think the chances were in favor of success?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think so, decidedly.

By the COURT:

Question. Which direction did you think offered the best chances of success in evacuating the Ferry?

Answer. To go to the north and west; to go across the Potomac and go to the north and west, presuming that the enemy’s force was still chiefly to the south and east of us. I thought our best chance was to go to the left.

Question. Do you know anything about Colonel Miles having paroled some prisoners during the siege?

Answer. Not to testify to.

Question. Not of your own knowledge?

Answer. I believe not, what I could testify to. I only know from hearsay, and having had an officer pointed out to me as having been paroled by Colonel Miles.

Question. When was he pointed out to you?

Answer. On the morning of the surrender an officer came in with some cavalry, and he was pointed out to me as a man who had been paroled at Harper's Ferry a day or two before.

Question. Did you hear his name?

Answer. I did not.

Question. You saw the officer?

Answer. Yes, sir; but I had not seen him in the prison.

Question. Was his parole a matter of comment before the surrender?

Answer. No, sir; I heard nothing of it.

Question. It was subsequently that you knew of it?

Answer. Yes, sir; all that I know.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Do you know anything of privates having been paroled during the siege?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know anything officially about it.

Question. Did you hear the matter spoken of?

Answer. Yes, sir; I heard it spoken of by one or two of my officers, who said that there had been Confederate prisoners paroled by Colonel Miles.

Question. During the siege?

Answer. It was after communication was cut off with Baltimore and the east; whether it was during the siege proper or not I do not remember.

By the COURT:

Question. This paroled officer, who was pointed out to you, did he seem to be in command?

Answer. He had his sword drawn.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What seemed to be his rank?

Answer. I think he was a lieutenant. I do not know their marks very well, but from the number of men he had with him I should judge he was a lieutenant.

By Dr. MILES:

Question. How long have you known Colonel Miles?

Answer. Only since I was at Harper's Ferry, about the middle of June last.

Question. Were you intimate with him during the time you were there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you hear any treasonable language from him, either in writing or verbally?

Answer. I never knew of anything in any way that would lead me to form any opinion of him from which I should judge him to be a traitor in word or deed.

Question. During any part of the siege was any cowardice shown by him?

Answer. None that I saw or heard of.

By General WHITE :

Question. How long have you been in the service ?

Answer. Altogether ?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. Three months and a little over, last year, and the same period this year, or rather a little over four months.

Question. You have stated that you were in command of the Fourth Brigade on Monday morning, at the time of the surrender ; I will thank you to state how your brigade was disposed of—where the troops were during the action on Monday morning.

Answer. The Twelfth Regiment were chiefly placed in the ditch of the intrenchment.

Question. On Camp Hill ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; the Eighty-seventh Ohio were in their camp, the greater portion of them ; Captain McGrath's command, of the Fifth New York Artillery, had charge of the guns. That was all the force that I had on Monday morning.

Question. The others were disposed of elsewhere ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was your regiment during that siege, during either of the engagements on Maryland Heights, or in front toward the valley, engaged as infantry ?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Were they engaged at all ?

Answer. My regiment did not fire a single shot.

Question. About how far was it from Camp Hill to the intersection of the Charlestown road and Bolivar Heights, where the engagement took place on Sunday ?

Answer. I should judge it was about a mile, in a straight line.

Question. And how far from Camp Hill to where the engagement occurred on Maryland Heights ?

Answer. We used 5-second fuse for spherical case, and 7-second fuse for time-shell. I do not know the exact distance.

Question. It was across the river ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You have expressed the opinion that an assault might have been resisted from the front. Being at Camp Hill that morning, at the distance of a mile, were you able fully to judge of the position of the enemy's batteries and the effect of their fire ?

Answer. No, sir ; I merely gave my opinion from my stand-point.

Question. You had no means of knowing what force they would have assaulted us with ?

Answer. No, sir ; my opinion is founded merely upon my own observations.

Question. When ; at that time ?

Answer. At the time.

Question. And at the distance of a mile ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Have you ever passed over the road which you think the command might have been taken out by?

Answer. Not to any great distance.

Question. You are not able to state, perhaps, whether it is practicable for artillery?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Are you able to state whether the infantry might have been marched out, as infantry are usually marched, or with sufficient rapidity to turn the enemy's flank and escape?

Answer. My opinion was that it ought to have been tried.

Question. The question is whether you think it was practicable, or whether you had sufficient knowledge to enable you to form an opinion as to its practicability?

Answer. The only way I know of finding out whether it was practicable or not was to try it.

Question. Had you any information at that time of the position of the enemy's forces on the other side of the river—the north side?

Answer. No information. I inferred, from the sound of the cannonading that had been heard for several days, the general direction in which I supposed the enemy was, and also from the direction in which I knew Frederick was, where the enemy had last been heard from.

Question. The fire from the enemy's batteries on Loudoun Heights, what was its accuracy? Was it good during the fire upon your position on Sunday?

Answer. They first fired over us; afterward they got the range, and a great number of shells were thrown in our camp, and through the whole line of intrenchments.

Question. That position was fully commanded, in the case, for instance, of the troops having been formed there as you suggested, by way of support in case of awaiting an assault?

Answer. I stated that I could support the position on Bolivar Heights, with artillery on my left.

Question. I want to know whether, in your judgment, the position you held was tenable by an infantry force under the fire from the Loudoun Heights battery, with a view to efficiency; that and the Maryland Heights battery also.

Answer. We were exposed to a fire in reverse in half enfilade, and of course it would have caused great destruction among troops drawn up in line in the works.

Maj. S. M. HEWITT, recalled by the court, and examined as follows:

By the COURT:

Question. An order is said to have been given to fall back from the breastwork upon Maryland Heights. Do you know anything about that order, where it came from? That is, after the first repulse, when the troops fell back to the breastwork. From that they fell back in great confusion down the hill upon an order said to have come from you, ordering them to retreat.

Answer. There was no positive order in reference to it. It was simply instructions in obedience to the orders that I received from Colonel Miles on Friday. I sent forward a lieutenant. This was at the time the One hundred and twenty-sixth fell back, after Colonel Sherrill was wounded. I was back trying to rally those men, and I sent forward a Lieutenant Carnes, of our regiment, to tell them to hold out as long

as possible; but if they were compelled to fall back, if they were overpowered, to fall back in good order. That was by way of instruction; that was the instruction I gave him.

Question. Was that the only order you gave?

Answer. That was all the order I gave.

Question. When Colonel Downey asked you subsequently, in presence of other officers, if you had given such an order and you said you had, what order did you refer to?

Answer. I referred to those instructions I sent forward in obedience to the orders from Colonel Miles.

Question. How came it that you were in command on the heights? You were not the ranking officer. Who placed you in command on the heights?

Answer. I was sent up simply with my own regiment to sustain the picket that was placed there. I never was placed in command of any other force, to my knowledge.

Question. Was any one officer in command up there?

Answer. No, sir; not that I know of; these instructions that I sent forward were more particularly to my own regiment that I felt I was in command of.

Question. And you gave your regiment no order to fall back that morning?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You say you sent this order to your regiment—if they were forced back, to fall back in good order. Where was the regiment then?

Answer. They were up to the breastworks.

Question. Where were you?

Answer. A short distance back, endeavoring to rally these men, and get them back to their places.

Question. To whom did you send this order?

Answer. I sent it to the officers in command of the different companies. There was Captain Hibbets, of our regiment, there, and Captain Brown, of the Third [First] Maryland; he was there with two companies. I did not send the order to any particular officer; I sent this lieutenant forward with instructions for them to hold out as long as possible, and then, if they were overpowered, to fall back in good order.

Question. Did you receive that order direct from Colonel Miles?

Answer. It was read to me the day previous, at the time I went up on the mountain.

Question. By whom?

Answer. I could not say who it was brought to me by; but it was some one of Colonel Miles' aides, I judge.

Question. And you do not know who it was brought that order?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was it in writing?

Answer. It was in writing.

Question. Did you know the handwriting?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You do not know whether it was an order or not?

Answer. It was a general order, and seemed to be directed to me. It was read in presence of some other officers.

Question. You did not see the writing, and do not know by whom it was signed?

Answer. I saw the handwriting, and read the order, and others read it at the same time.

Question. How did you know that it was an order?

Answer. By the heading.

Question. Yes, sir; but not knowing from whom it came, or by whom it was signed, how could you tell that it was an order?

Answer. It was headed an order; General Orders, No. —, I could not tell what, and then went on in the usual style and form of an order.

Question. How did you understand it to be genuine? If it was not a genuine order it was no order at all. You say you did not know the handwriting. Did you know Colonel Miles' handwriting?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. How did you know that it came from him, or anybody?

Answer. I could not swear to that, but I had no reason to think anything else.

Question. Was it a staff officer who brought it?

Answer. I was not acquainted with his staff. I did not know the person who brought it.

Question. How was it signed?

Answer. I could not say now as to that. Lieutenant Patterson, of our regiment, also saw the order, and read it. It was rather a difficult hand to read. It was a very good handwrite, but a little hard to read.

Question. It was merely a paper purporting to be an order, brought to you by a stranger?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you remember the substance of the order, what it stated, its language?

Answer. Yes, sir; I gave that in my evidence the other day.

Question. Is that the order you referred to in your former evidence, where you were to fall back and fire some combustibles?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is the order.

Question. Then it was not an order applicable to this particular engagement?

Answer. I think it was.

Question. How can an order be given the day before in reference to an engagement that you do not know will come off at all?

Answer. That was the only instructions that I had, or that I knew of any one having.

Question. Then you took the responsibility of deciding that the time had come to which that order applied?

Answer. I did not take any responsibility.

Question. You say you sent word to the captains to hold on as long as they could?

Answer. Yes, sir; the most critical moment seemed to be at that time, when the colonel of the One hundred and twenty-sixth was wounded, and his men fell back *en masse*; and it left but very few men there at the breastwork; and I sent these instructions forward, to have them hold on as long as possible, and, if compelled to fall back, why to do it in good order. At the same time I was endeavoring to stop these men, and prevent them from leaving.

Question. Do you know of any rebel officer or men being paroled by Colonel Miles during the siege and sent outside the lines?

Answer. I do not.

Question. No prisoners paroled by him?

Answer. I do not.

By Colonel FORD:

Question. After you received that order from Colonel Miles, of which you speak, did you have a conversation with me before you went on the mountain?

Answer. I think not.

Question. Did you go up to where Captain Hibbets was, on the point there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was Captain Hibbets in command when you went up there?

Answer. He was.

Question. Did you not assume command when you reached him up there?

Answer. I did.

Question. Inquiring of him the condition of things up there, the location of the enemy, &c.?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Now, when Colonel Sherrill came up there, did he not say to you that I had directed him to go where you were, sending a guide with him, and to consult with you about the condition of the force, he assuming command there?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You were simply to consult with him and advise him as to the position of the enemy?

Answer. That was all.

Question. Was Colonel Sherrill an entire stranger there?

Answer. I never saw him before. He was an entire stranger on the mountain, I think.

Question. He said he was to inquire of you as to the position and location of the enemy, &c.?

Answer. Those were the facts.

Question. Then, originally, when you were sent up there, you were placed in command?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And after Colonel Sherrill went up, and until he was wounded, you consulted with him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And after he was wounded and carried off the field, were you not the ranking officer at that particular point?

Answer. I was at that time, I think.

By Dr. MILES:

Question. Was it not customary for you to receive orders through your brigade commander?

Answer. It was.

Question. To have orders sent to Colonel Ford, and have him send them to you?

Answer. Yes, sir. There was a great deal of irregularity in reference to orders. Sometimes they would come verbally, and sometimes in the form of a written order, and sometimes one person would bring them and sometimes another.

Question. Was it not customary upon receiving a verbal order, if it was one of any importance, to receive a written order soon afterward?

Answer. I never received any such after a verbal order.

Maj. CHARLES H. RUSSELL recalled by General White, and examined as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. Will you state, if you please, what difficulties there were, if any, on Sunday evening in the way of General Franklin's corps moving forward in the direction of Harper's Ferry, any more than there would have been the next day? Were there any difficulties at that time that would not have been met the next day?

Answer. There was no difficulty except that it was nearly sundown when the enemy was driven from the gap.

Question. This was about 7 miles from Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did any other difficulty except darkness intervene?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Knowing what you do of the character of the troops at Harper's Ferry, that is, that a large proportion of them were raw troops, which, in your opinion, would have been most practicable—for the troops at Harper's Ferry to have cut their way out through the enemy, or for General Franklin's corps to have fought their way in?

Answer. It would have been far more practicable for General Franklin's corps to have moved up to Harper's Ferry.

Question. Were the troops at Harper's Ferry, judging from what you saw of their conduct on Maryland Heights, such troops as you would like to attempt to cut your way with through a much heavier force of the enemy?

Answer. No, sir. There was a very small body of reliable troops there. The percentage of reliable troops was quite small.

Lieut. HENRY M. BINNEY recalled by the court, and examined as follows:

By the COURT:

Question. I wish you to state to the court, if you please, with regard to the parole of that officer, Lieutenant Rouse.

Answer. This Lieutenant Rouse belonged to the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry. He was in command of the party that made the dash down and destroyed the Winchester train. He was captured by Colonel Davis, of the Eighth New York Cavalry, out near Summit Point. He had been wounded and was going home, as he represented. His father lives near Summit Point; I think near Smithville. At the time he was brought in he was brought in in his team. Colonel Miles and the rest of us were on Bolivar Heights.

I did not hear of it until I got down to headquarters. It seems that Colonel Davis brought him to headquarters to deliver him to Colonel Miles, and waited there at the quarters for some time for our return. But the officer complained of his wound, and Colonel Davis sent him up to the hospital with a surgeon. He met a surgeon there, and told him to take him up to the hospital and have his wounds dressed. The surgeon, it seems, rode up to the hospital in front, and the team followed on behind. The surgeon says that he did not understand that he was a prisoner. When he arrived there the team was not behind him and could not be seen. As soon as we heard of it we sent out scouts after him, but did not overtake him till morning. We do not know how he got out of the lines. The only information we got was, when we asked him how he got out, he said he had flanked us with his team. He was recaptured the next morning and brought up to Colonel Miles' room, and was in the room something like an hour. I heard part of the conversation between this Lieutenant Rouse and Colonel Miles. Colonel Miles did everything he could to worm out of him the position of the enemy and what their plans were, but he could get no information of any importance at all from him. There was considerable talk with regard to his parole. The young man begged for his parole, and gave his word as an officer and as a gentleman that he would not undertake to take up arms again until he was properly exchanged. He had some conversation in regard to Colonel Davis, on account of some insulting language that Colonel Davis had used toward him. He put on considerable airs about his honor, and being a gentleman, &c. He was finally paroled, Colonel Miles keeping a copy of the parole. I escorted him outside of the lines. The next day there was considerable excitement around Harper's Ferry in regard to Colonel Miles having paroled this man, and there were some remarks made in regard to it. There seemed to be quite a feeling of censure against Colonel Miles for it. I reported to Colonel Miles what I heard in that line. He represented that it was not worth while to pay attention to it; that at that time there had been nearly 300 Union prisoners who had been taken at Manassas and paroled, who had passed through Harper's Ferry and sent on to Baltimore, and he said that if our men were entitled to parole theirs were. This officer, I think, was paroled nearly five or six days previous to our being attacked at Harper's Ferry. At the time of the surrender of Harper's Ferry, the first cavalry I saw was under command of this Lieutenant Rouse, who had his sword drawn, in command of the company. I spoke to General Hill about it, and called his attention to it; but he said he did not know anything about it. I then suggested to General Hill that there was a good chance for him to swap me off for him, but he did not pay any attention to it. This lieutenant had represented that he was severely wounded in the thigh. I do not know whether he was or not. I know he was on duty that day. I do not think that Colonel Miles—I never heard anything said about it—was any way acquainted with this man or had ever seen him before. There was another officer captured, the one Major Russell speaks of, named Bougher. He was a Marylander, and his family resided somewhere down near Berlin. I think he was a former acquaintance of Colonel Miles. He was not paroled, so far as I know. I know he was in jail for some time, and his wife came and interceded with Colonel Miles to parole him; but I do not know that he paroled him. I think he was in jail there when we surrendered.

Question. Were you present during the whole interview between Colonel Miles and Lieutenant Rouse?

Answer. No, sir. I went in there with a letter Colonel Miles had directed me to write, as we always carried the letters to him to read over before we sent them away. As I went in he told me he was busy then, but would attend to me in a moment. I sat down and heard part of the conversation. I know Colonel Miles hesitated some time before he gave him a parole.

Question. On what day was this prisoner taken?

Answer. I do not recollect. It was before the siege commenced; before we were attacked at Solomon's Gap. I think it was about a week before we were attacked at all that he was paroled.

Question. Are you certain of that?

Answer. It was about the time our pickets were being driven in down by Point of Rocks, about the time the report was brought in of the enemy's crossing the Potomac, before we had any attack at Harper's Ferry. I think it was after the railroad had been destroyed, and the communication cut off with Baltimore.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You say that when you brought the matter to General Hill's notice he declined paying any attention to it?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. He did not seem to regard the breach of parole as any impropriety?

Answer. No, sir. I did not hear the young man say anything myself, but I understood that when some one remarked to him about his being there on duty, he laughed at the idea of his parole. I am satisfied, from observations that I have had, that all who have been paroled, as soon as they get where their army is, go right into service again without paying any attention to their parole.

Question. You think that is the general rule, as far as you have observed?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you ever know of any other case than this?

Answer. Yes, sir. I knew of the case of an officer taken at the time General Saxton was in command there; at the time of the former raid of Jackson down the valley.

Question. Do you know anything of several privates having been paroled and sent out by Colonel Miles?

Answer. Yes, sir; there were two privates taken by General White's command on Sunday night. I think they belonged to the South Carolina troops. They were paroled. I never saw anything of them afterward; they were paroled and sent out of the lines.

Question. On Sunday night during the siege?

Answer. I think it was the time they turned the left flank. They were brought in on Sunday evening. They were paroled, at any rate. I do not recollect exactly. I think he turned them over to the provost-marshal.

By General WHITE:

Question. Who turned them over?

Answer. I think Colonel Miles turned them over to the provost-marshal, and then afterward I think they were paroled. At any rate there was one brought in from Maryland Heights, a Louisianian, whom Colonel Miles paroled. And there were two, dressed in citizens' clothes, who represented that they were conscripts. They were paroled and escorted out of the lines.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. At what time was that?

Answer. That was, I think, on Friday afternoon.

Question. Were there any paroled later than that?

Answer. Not that I recollect of, except the two privates taken, I think, on Sunday night. I may be mistaken.

Question. The siege was then being pressed?

Answer. Yes, sir; the two privates were blindfolded when they were passed out of our lines.

By General WHITE:

Question. What privates?

Answer. Those taken on Sunday night.

Question. When were they sent out of the lines?

Answer. I think Sunday; it may have been Saturday night.

Question. By whom?

Answer. I escorted them out myself. Colonel Miles escorted the two citizens who represented that they were conscripts. One of them Colonel Miles appeared to have been acquainted with before. They were escorted out as far as where the road goes over Bolivar Heights, by Colonel Miles, Mr. Willmon, and myself. Then he directed me to escort them out to where our pickets were, in the piece of woods. I went down there, but the pickets refused to let them pass them there, and I had to go back and get the officer of the day.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You say they were blindfolded as they passed through our lines?

Answer. The two privates were.

Question. Were they blindfolded as they came in?

Answer. I do not know. I know they were as they passed out. Our guard-house was full of citizen prisoners, and we had no place to put them, and our provost guard were on duty guarding the bridge.

By the COURT:

Question. You say that Colonel Miles was acquainted with one of these men?

Answer. One of the citizens who represented themselves to be conscripts. Yes, sir.

Question. Where had he known them; do you know?

Answer. I do not know. I had seen them before, myself; either at the Ferry or somewhere else.

By Dr. MILES:

Question. Do you know anything of the private conversation that took place between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford, about which the female witness yesterday testified that there was no one in the room?

Answer. I know I was present in the room at that time.

Question. Did you hear the conversation?

Answer. Yes, sir; I repeated the conversation in my former evidence.

Question. Were not the troops at Harper's Ferry regularly brigaded?

Answer. They were regularly brigaded previously to occupying Maryland Heights. However, the heights had been occupied for some months past by a battalion of the Maryland Home Brigade and McGrath's battery. After the troops were brought down by General White from Winchester, and he had left for Martinsburg, the troops were regularly brigaded in four brigades.

Question. Was it not customary to send orders to brigade commanders and have them issue copies?

Answer. Yes, sir. After the troops were brigaded, I never knew Colonel Miles to write a letter or issue an order respecting any independent battalion, regiment, or battery. I never knew him to send it directly to any regiment, but to the brigade commander, and let him issue it. I never knew him to issue any orders to any one except to brigade commanders.

Question. When verbal orders were given, if of any importance, did he not send a written order immediately afterward?

Answer. He did not often give verbal orders. If on the field he gave any verbal orders, if it was of any importance he sent a written order after he got to his headquarters.

Question. Did Colonel Miles allow his aides or any of his staff to issue orders?

Answer. No, sir; he never allowed us to issue an order. He always wrote out himself and brought it to us to copy, and also all letters of any importance he always wrote himself. Some of little or no importance at all—as, for instance, he would come in and tell us perhaps, "Answer this letter so and so." But it was always submitted to him for him to read before it went away.

Question. Were all orders and letters copied?

Answer. Yes, sir. All orders, and letters and telegrams, whether of great importance or not, were always copied in the letter-book.

By the COURT :

Question. Did you keep any register of prisoners who were paroled ?

Answer. Yes, sir. I think that in the letter-book are the names of all the prisoners, whether political or prisoners of war. Every once in a while we would clean out the guard-house and send them off to Baltimore; and with them were sent officers with a list of their names, where they belonged, and the charges against them.

Question. Is that letter-book with the papers we have sent for ?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think it is with the papers, and there is a file of the paroles. Citizens he generally paroled with the understanding that they should report to him every ten days or six days.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. You heard that statement which that lady gave yesterday in regard to the conversation between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford ?

Answer. Yes, sir; and I thought the stove-hole must be small, or I was, one of the two, for I certainly was in the room.

Question. Is your recollection of the conversation substantially different from her statement ?

Answer. No, sir. My evidence is the same as hers exactly; the wording may be a little different, but it is the same in substance.

The Commission then adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 20, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

After some time spent upon the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Winchester by General White, the Commission resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and proceeded to the examination of witnesses.

Col. WILLIAM H. TRIMBLE, called by General White, and sworn and examined as follows :

By General WHITE :

Question. What is your position in the military service ?

Answer. Colonel of the Sixtieth Regiment Ohio Volunteers (infantry).

Question. Were you on duty at Harper's Ferry at the time of the surrender of that place, and for some days prior ?

Answer. I was.

Question. In what capacity ?

Answer. I had been placed by Colonel Miles in command of a brigade the second day after I arrived at Harper's Ferry from Winchester.

Question. At the time the siege of Harper's Ferry commenced, in what position was your brigade placed ?

Answer. Directed by Colonel Miles, the day he gave me orders appointing me as commander of a brigade, to take the left flank, stationing two regiments on Bolivar Heights, resting on the Charlestown road, and the Ninth Vermont, Colonel Stannard, to be in position to occupy the ground on the left of the battery, on the point on Bolivar Heights.

Question. Do you know whether I was on duty in that vicinity during the siege ?

Answer. Do you mean from the time you returned from Martinsburg ?

Question. I mean during the siege at Harper's Ferry.

Answer. The two days, you mean—Sunday and Monday?

Question. Saturday, Sunday, and Monday.

Answer. Yes, sir; on Saturday there was no conflict there. You were out on the ground, in consultation with other officers, making observations, I presumed. I think the most of the day you were at Harper's Ferry, as a conflict took place on Maryland Heights on Saturday.

Question. Was there an engagement on Sunday afternoon with the enemy's infantry in that vicinity; and, if so, will you state what officer was in general command on our side, and what the result of the action was?

Answer. An engagement commenced, about 3 o'clock, on the left; the enemy had been gradually advancing.

Question. You need not give the details. Just simply state the facts.

Answer. I do not know but, to answer a part of your question, it will be necessary for me to state that Colonel Miles had been there at Rigby's battery with me at 2.30, and some conversation passed between us. He left for Harper's Ferry, and in a half an hour from that time the engagement commenced on the left. Colonel Downey, who had been placed in position on the left, asked for re-enforcements. My force was very weak. Colonel Willard, of the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York, was very much afraid to lead his regiment into the conflict, as they had been panic-struck by the shelling from Loudoun Heights. I wrote a note and sent an orderly hastily to Colonel Miles for re-enforcements, and told him to see General White, if he could not see Colonel Miles. He returned and reported to me that he could not find Colonel Miles, and that General White was sick. I sent him back immediately with a note, I think to General White, saying that I had no authority over any other troops than those under my own command, and they needed re-enforcements on the left. General White, himself, came out immediately, and from that time until after dark was very active and patient in directing me what to do and in controlling the action of our forces.

Question. You received your orders from me on that day?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you the next morning also?

Answer. Yes, sir, and that night I received some instructions from you. I sent Major Marley, at 11 o'clock, to see you.

Question. Are you able, from your position there, to state the number of guns, or rather the number of batteries? I do not suppose you can state the number of guns that the enemy had in operation the next morning.

Answer. Yes, sir; I can state the position of their batteries, and with regard to some of their batteries, the number of their guns, from information given me afterward by rebel officers.

Question. State generally.

Answer. They had two batteries of heavy guns on Loudoun Heights, which threw their shell entirely over Bolivar Heights, over Rigby's battery, the most extreme distant point from them. They had three batteries, which they planted on Sunday night, on the table-lands immediately under Loudoun Heights, opposite my command on Bolivar Heights. These batteries, I understood, had five guns each. Then they had a battery on the ridge in line with Rigby's battery, on the left flank of the two regiments under my command resting on Rigby's battery, with six of their best guns, so I was told by General Hill's assistant adjutant-general. They had a battery to the left of the Charlestown pike, on the wooded ridge beyond, which was a very powerful battery, for it sent its shot and shell entirely to the town of Bolivar. They had another battery which opened upon us to the right of the Charlestown pike; and then they had batteries from that point in a circle to the Potomac, that did not open, except one on the extreme left of the enemy or on our extreme right. At the same time the batteries on Maryland Heights were playing upon us.

Question. Was the fire from those batteries that morning a severe one?

Answer. It was perfectly terrific.

Question. Have you been in other engagements besides that?

Answer. Yes, sir; and under artillery fire in three different engagements.

Question. How did that compare with what you had seen in other engagements?

Answer. The others were so perfectly insignificant in comparison with this that there was just no comparison at all.

Question. Did the fire from these different batteries of the enemy command that entire line of ours from every possible conceivable direction or not?

Answer. It commanded every foot of it around the batteries on the left and along the lines, enfilading that part of the ground, and producing a terrible cross-fire. Our position was under their command, every foot of ground; there was not a place where you could lay the palm of your hand and say it was safe. I rode through it all that morning and saw it.

Question. Was there any place in that vicinity, on Bolivar Heights, that infantry could have been formed with any kind of regard to success, or any kind of prospect of bringing them into action, even, without their being slaughtered by this artillery fire?

Answer. No, sir; the regiments between the Charlestown [pike] and the Shenandoah would have rested with their flanks toward the batteries under Loudoun Heights, and they would, at the same time, have been in position to have been shelled from behind, from Loudoun Heights, and, at the same time, they would have received the fire from the batteries on the ridge in front; and the regiments on Bolivar Heights, to the right of Rigby's batteries, were under range of three batteries on their flank, one on the ridge and two on either side of the Charlestown pike and also the shells from Loudoun Heights and the batteries under Loudoun Heights. The batteries under Loudoun Heights threw to that point, as I know from having rode over that ground several times and having met a cross-fire there.

Question. Did Colonel Miles ever say to you that the line on the summit of Bolivar Heights, stretching from the Potomac to the Shenandoah, was to be the line which he proposed to defend—the line we occupied?

Answer. Yes, sir; he told me from the first that was to be the line.

Question. Do you know of its having been suggested to him that that line should be contracted, in order that proper support to the front might be had? If so, what was his remark in regard to it?

Answer. Suggested by any other person than myself?

Question. In any way.

Answer. I did hear of others making that suggestion, and I suggested to him, myself, that it was so long a line for the small number of troops we had, that I did not see how we could defend it, unless there was some effort made to give us the advantage by throwing up breastworks and making rifle-pits from the Charlestown pike to the Shenandoah and Bolivar Heights. Colonel Stannard and myself had taken every pains, the first day I was appointed to command the brigade, to examine the country and see what was necessary for the defense of the left flank, as we thought it a weak point, and it was generally so regarded. We suggested to Colonel Miles the cutting down a belt of forest only about a half a mile from our front, in which the enemy could conceal themselves, and the cutting down also the corn-fields between that forest and our front line. He objected to both.

Question. This was before the siege commenced?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you present at the consultation of officers called together by Colonel Miles in relation to the surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. At that consultation was there any difference of opinion as to the necessity which existed?

Answer. No, sir; there was no difference of opinion. A point made, and which all acquiesced in, was to make honorable terms. It seemed to be generally conceded that there was nothing left for us but to surrender or see our men slaughtered without being able to do any public good.

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles request me to act as the commissioner to negotiate the terms of the surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir; and he requested me to give notice to the enemy's batteries from Rigby's batteries and from a point along the pike.

Question. Is it your opinion, knowing what you do of the character of the troops there at Harper's Ferry being mostly inexperienced troops, that any good result whatever would have attended a further contest?

Answer. No, sir; I believe that whenever the troops rose from their cover—those under my command I had taken great pains to put under cover as much as possible, to prevent the destruction of my men, as they were not able to aid in the destruction of the enemy—the very moment they rose from their position I think there would have been such a destruction of human life without the accomplishment of any public good that we would have been held morally responsible by the country for having permitted it. That is my view of the matter. If I had thought there had been a possibility of holding out against the enemy until we were re-enforced, or of defeating the enemy, I would not have consented to surrender if all the men in the universe had asked me to do it. I do not think any officer there would. There was as great anxiety to maintain our position there as I ever saw among any set of officers, and a deep sense of mortification because they could not do it.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. How long do you think you could have held out at the time of the surrender?

Answer. I do not think we could have held out an hour. The enemy were then almost within rifle range.

Question. You think you would have been destroyed without an assault, simply by long-range cannon?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think they could have destroyed us in an hour, or a half a day, or even a day by their artillery alone, because we could have kept the men under cover, but the very moment they advanced with their infantry in such superior numbers and our men rose to engage them, we would have been swept from the very face of the earth by their artillery, being in such close range, in full view, and taking the regiments on the flank, as would have been the case. It would have annihilated our force on the left, and the new troops could not have been held, I do not believe, by any mortal man, under such a fire. There were some regiments there that would have stood until they were cut to pieces, but some of those new regiments, not three weeks from home, could not have been expected to stand.

By the COURT:

Question. Where would they have gone?

Answer. Like wild asses or colts, they would have run into danger rather than out of it, there.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you rally them and drive them into line?

Answer. I told them to obey their officers, to obey me; that I was encountering more danger than they were; that they were running into danger rather than out of it by coming out into open ground into full view. The day before, when two or three shells burst in their tents—they were engaged, perhaps, in getting their breakfasts—they were so perfectly confused and panic-struck that they ran and scattered like

sheep, and it took two hours to get them together again in the ravines, where they were perfectly under cover.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did you succeed finally in tranquilizing them?

Answer. I succeeded in getting them together in the ravines under cover. But a few moments afterward, during the engagement, when I asked Colonel Willard to send his regiment to support Colonel Downey, he said it was no use to march that regiment to meet the enemy; they were so panic-struck he could not hold them together to face the enemy, and I was compelled to send Colonel Stannard with only four companies of his regiment to support Colonel Downey. There were portions of other regiments, I have ascertained since, that had already become panic-struck and left. I saw that when General White asked me to go back and bring the men together; after the surrender.

Question. What is your judgment as to the possibility of that force escaping across the river the night before the surrender?

Answer. We had no knowledge at all of the position of the enemy. It would have been venturing upon blind chance. But if Colonel Miles had consented to it or listened to the proposition, and held a military consultation, I believe that nine-tenths of the officers would have voted for venturing the attempt to cut our way out; that was the feeling. I know it was my own feeling. I asked Colonel Miles at 9.30 on Sunday whether we had not better attempt to fight our way out in some direction. He said, "No; he could not listen to any such proposition; he was ordered to hold Harper's Ferry at all hazards."

Question. Did you not regard that a means of holding Harper's Ferry, to occupy the heights?

Answer. Yes, sir. If we had still held Maryland Heights, or had marched over there Sunday night. I would have been willing to have gone over there by moonlight on Sunday night and attempted to retake Maryland Heights.

Question. Were they then occupied by the enemy?

Answer. I was so much engaged in my position that I had no opportunity of knowing of anything outside of it. I cannot answer positively in regard to that matter.

Question. The whole objection of Colonel Miles was upon the ground that he had been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry at all hazards?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was the point he made, and had made more than once.

Question. Was there any remonstrance on the part of the officers to the effect that they would succeed in holding Harper's Ferry by occupying the heights?

Answer. I do not know what other officers may have said to him. I was kept so much engaged on the left that I did not get to Harper's Ferry, or to any other part of the command, and I had very little opportunity to know what other officers said to Colonel Miles. I know what I said to him myself.

Question. Did you yourself urge that?

Answer. I thought we had better try to save the command, even if we lost our transportation. To save our small-arms and troops to the Government would have been a great deal better than to run any risk of losing them. And if he would have consented, I have no doubt the majority of the officers would have much preferred attempting to cut our way out in some direction. The reply was that he could not consent to anything of the kind; he had been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry at all hazards. At that moment the shells commenced coming rather rapidly from Loudoun Heights, and interfered with our conversation, and he rode off, and there was nothing more said upon the subject.

Question. A council of war was not called until the next morning?

Answer. He never held any consultation, that I am aware of, with his brigade commanders from the time they were appointed until the Monday morning, about the surrender. I know that as a body they were not called together for consultation at any time.

Question. Had you been associated with Colonel Miles long in command?

Answer. Only from the time I came from Winchester. The second day after I came from Winchester I rode down to Harper's Ferry, by the advice of General White, to take a room to be sick in, as I was extremely unwell. Colonel Miles gave me his orders, and I returned to camp and went to work. I saw a great deal of Colonel Miles; that is, he came out and called at my quarters several times.

Question. Do you think you saw enough of him and his conduct there to enable you to form an estimate of his capacity for such a command as he held there at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I took some pains to avoid forming an incorrect opinion of Colonel Miles, because I felt it was better to doubt my own judgment than to doubt the capability of my superior; and, moreover, I felt that having been appointed by an officer of large experience and observation—General Wool—that was of itself sufficient, in my estimation, to give me confidence in Colonel Miles as my superior in command. But before the conclusion of this matter I confess that all my faith and confidence in him were broken down utterly. I felt that he was totally unfit for such a command. I had not felt so up to the time that General White returned, for all that had happened up to that time had been his declining to do what I have spoken of, cutting down the forest and corn-fields, and building some defensive works. I supposed that he would show on the battle-field that he was a military commander.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you recollect my consulting you as to the propriety of my assuming or not assuming the command when I reached Harper's Ferry from Martinsburg?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state what advice or opinion you gave to me?

Answer. I asked you the evening you reached there from Martinsburg, as we were riding along together, whether you would assume the command. You said you could not tell until you saw Colonel Miles. The next morning you called at my quarters and told me that Colonel Miles had not offered to give you the command, and that General Wool having so clearly indicated by his manifestations of preference for Colonel Miles that he desired him to be in command, you did not feel at liberty to assume it yourself. As you seemed to desire my opinion as to your conduct in that matter, I said to you that, as much as I might desire you should take the command, I should not under the circumstances ask you to do so. The judge-advocate has asked me if I had had such opportunities as would enable me to form an opinion of Colonel Miles. I do not know as I have sufficient military judgment to form a correct opinion and estimate of a military commander, but I took great pains to try not to form a bad opinion of my superior. But, in the end, I was compelled to feel that Colonel Miles was not competent for such a command.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. In what points of character and conduct was that incapacity most manifest?

Answer. He seemed to want decision of character and firmness. He seemed to me to want energy and determination of character, and he seemed to me when the fighting came on— [After a pause.] It is with extreme reluctance that I speak of a superior officer who is now dead, and I would be very glad to avoid doing so. Colonel Miles treated me with a great deal of respect and courtesy and kindness, and I felt very anxious to think well of him as my superior officer.

Question. You were about to make some remark about his conduct when the fighting came on.

Answer. He was not there. He had left me without any plan of defense, without any instructions, without any authority to call for re-enforcements, when the enemy were advancing upon our line, leaving me, a young officer, in a very embarrassing position. That, moreover, at a time when there was great confusion among our teams and cavalry, and when in the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Regiment a perfect stampede had taken place.

Question. Do you know where he was?

Answer. I understood that he went to Harper's Ferry. But I sent my orderly with a note to him, and he said he could not find him. Afterward, however, the Thirty-second Ohio came out and reported to me, and I presumed they were ordered up by Colonel Miles.

Question. You do not know where he was found?

Answer. I do not. My orderly said he could not find him, and his aide, up to that time, could not find him.

Question. Was the cannonade heavy at that time?

Answer. They were firing upon us at that time from the Loudoun Heights battery and from the batteries in front, and the enemy's infantry were evidently advancing upon us when he left me.

Question. Do you know anything of certain prisoners having been paroled and sent out of our lines during the siege?

Answer. I do; because my pickets came to me to know whether they should let them go. I told him not to let them go, but to bring them back and put them in the guard-house until the engagement was over.

Question. There has been a paper produced here as one given to certain prisoners, signed by Colonel Miles, directing the pickets to allow them to pass and proceed on to their headquarters. There were 16 prisoners. Do you know anything about that paper?

Answer. They did not bring the paper to me. Some one came to me, when I was on my horse very actively engaged, and called my attention to the matter, and said there were 15 or 16 of them with a pass through the lines. The lieutenant in command of the picket came and said these men were there, and had been ordered to be permitted to pass. He asked me what he should do. I told him to hold them until evening, and then bring them in and put them into the guard-house until I could see Colonel Miles about it. I thought it was unwise to let them go.

Question. What course was taken with them?

Answer. They were brought in that evening; but I was engaged until after night in attending to the fighting that was going on; and after night I was going around among the regiments, placing them in position, and did not get to see the lieutenant; and the artillery fire commenced the next morning so early that I never got to know what did happen.

Question. You do not know whether they finally went out or not?

Answer. I do not know.

By the COURT:

Question. What night was that?

Answer. It was Sunday night, I think.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. They were then going out while the siege was being hotly pressed?

Answer. Yes, sir; pressed by the enemy.

Question. Was that fact generally known in camp?

Answer. I do not know that it was. All I know about it is just as I have stated.

Question. Do you know what impression it made among the officers and troops? Did you hear the matter spoken of?

Answer. Some officers, who were near me at the time this lieutenant sent word to know what to do, were very indignant, and spoke their indignation. I do not recollect what officers they were; they were some officers of the regiments under my command. I paid but little attention to it after I had given my orders, but dashed off to attend to other duties pressing upon me. I recollect very well that the matter was spoken of at the moment indignantly.

Question. Do you know anything of an officer named Rouse having been paroled?

Answer. A lieutenant?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. Yes, sir; I heard that matter spoken of, and saw the officer the night he was brought back by our cavalry. I understood that he had been paroled and had violated his parole, and our cavalry had gone out in pursuit of him and had caught him at Berryville and brought him back. The night he was brought back I was out with Colonel Sherrill and Major Baird, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, examining our picket lines, and we came in contact with the cavalry party and this lieutenant as they were passing into camp. I understood the next day that he was paroled again.

Question. He had, then, violated his parole before being taken a prisoner the second time?

Answer. Yes, sir; so I understood, I never got thoroughly to understand the form in which he had violated it; but there was something about going to the hospital, and, instead of doing that, he had slipped through our picket line and made his escape.

Question. How long was that before the surrender?

Answer. That was, I think, the first night I was appointed to the command of the brigade. I do not recollect what the dates were.

Question. How many days before the surrender?

Answer. I have lost the reckoning of time so completely that I can hardly tell. It was the night of the 5th or 6th of September, I think, that this lieutenant was returned and brought back by our cavalry. Colonel Miles had given me, apparently with the view of getting rid of the responsibility, the controlling of the ingress and egress from our camp; had thrown upon me the responsibility of controlling the matter; that is one excuse for my taking upon myself to stop these 15 men that night. I had been regulating that matter for several days, freeing Colonel Miles from all trouble and vexation about it.

By the COURT.

Question. Did you hear at the time of the surrender, or after, any dissatisfaction in regard to it expressed on the part of the men or the regimental officers?

Answer. No, sir; I never heard a soldier or an officer express dissatisfaction about the matter until, at Annapolis, in the presence of some officers with whom I was not acquainted, Colonel Willard, very much to my astonishment, made a remark to which I replied at the moment.

Question. You heard nothing of it, at the time, at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What was your losses in your regiment in killed and wounded?

Answer. That report was made by me to General White, at Annapolis, and, the officers being out of camp and having no conveniences for writing, I was so late in getting it in that I did not get an opportunity of looking over the list of killed and wounded, and then I was crippled at Annapolis, and never had an opportunity since of learning it.

Question. Did you not know at the time how many you lost?

Answer. I understood—I do not recollect at what time; some time, during the day after the surrender probably, that I met the officers of the regiment—

Question. I am speaking of your own regiment, the Sixtieth.

Answer. I understood from the officers of the Sixtieth that they lost 8 or 10 men, but I cannot say positively as to the number; that regiment was immediately on the right of Rigby's batteries and in the rifle-pits, and the enemy had not succeeded in getting the range perfectly until about the time of the surrender, when a shell burst

in the rifle-pits and killed several men, and, as I rode down to Rigby's battery to raise the white flag there, the shells flew all around on every side of them, covering the men with dirt from the embankment in front, and tearing the ground up in the rear.

By General WHITE :

Question. That was an enfilading fire on that line ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; and a very dangerous one. The men had kept their positions very bravely, and were fully resolved to fight to the death when the attack should be made. That regiment would probably have stood very firmly at that point.

By the COURT :

Question. You spoke of Major Baird, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York. Had you any opportunities of judging of his conduct as a soldier and an officer ?

Answer. I had not. During the time of that artillery fire Monday morning, I rode, on two occasions, along Bolivar Heights where the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York and the Sixtieth Ohio were, but I was riding very rapidly, and merely rode along to see that the regiments were there, ready, in case the enemy advanced on that part of the line ; and then I rode along to the battery, in obeying the order of Colonel Miles to raise the white flag. It was rather too dangerous a place for a man on horseback to stop to make particular investigations into anybody's conduct, for the whole air seemed to be filled with cannon balls and shells passing swiftly over, and I preferred riding on to standing still. I did not know anything, however, against Major Baird's conduct there on Sunday or Monday, and heard nothing against his conduct on either day. What his conduct was on Maryland Heights, where he was in command of his regiment after Colonel Sherrill fell, I cannot speak of, as a matter of course, for it was not under my observation.

Question. Do you know anything about Colonel Miles' commands in reference to Maryland Heights ?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Had you any conversation with him about it ?

Answer. No, sir ; I never had any, either with him or Colonel Ford.

Maj. HENRY B. McILVAINE, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows :

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. What position do you hold in the military service ?

Answer. Major in the Fifth New York Artillery.

Question. Were you present at Harper's Ferry during the late events which resulted in its surrender ?

Answer. I was.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity which existed for the surrender at the time it was made ?

Answer. I think it was necessary for the saving of life.

Question. Will you state to the Commission the reasons which induced you to think so ?

Answer. I supposed the position was weak to stand against an assault from the enemy, from the fact that they could take a position out of range of what ammunition we had, and open their batteries effectually upon us, and it would have just made a slaughter-house of our position.

Question. How long do you think the position could have been held at the time of the surrender ?

Answer. I think it might have been held that day, no longer ; but I do not think it would have been policy in any commanding officer to have sacrificed his command. It could only have been held by the retiring of the forces in a condensed position as it were, and dreadfully exposed ; but the result, in my opinion, is the same.

Question. What was the condition of your supply of ammunition at the time of the surrender?

Answer. The condition was a sad one. It was a fact that we had no ammunition of sufficient range to make a successful fire on the enemy.

Question. The long-range ammunition was exhausted?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was so reported to me by captains of the batteries.

Question. Do you know of any efforts having been made to obtain a further supply?

Answer. The ordnance officer, Mr. Thompson, I think, mentioned to me, when I was examining his arsenal and stores—he said that requisitions had been made, but he had heard nothing from them. Requisitions had also been made for heavy ordnance.

Question. Did he state when those requisitions had been made?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you remember whether the cannonade in the direction of General McClellan's command was heard at Harper's Ferry before the surrender, on Sunday and on Monday morning?

Answer. I heard cannonading in a northeasterly direction, or in the direction of Frederick, I think on Sunday.

Question. What distance off did it seem to be?

Answer. I hardly noticed at the time even the direction of the wind, which governs those things a great deal. It could not have been less than 10 miles distant.

Question. What is your judgment as to the practicability of the troops escaping over the river the night previous to the surrender?

Answer. I considered that impossible.

Question. Will you state why you so considered it?

Answer. I am simply giving my opinion. I do not pretend to know a great deal about these matters. We had but one way of crossing the river, and that was over the pontoon bridge, and in driving a great deal over such a bridge it would rack it a great deal. The crossing must necessarily be very slow, and the blocking up of such a bridge by even one loaded wagon, for instance, would delay us a great while. It could not have been done short of a night, at the lowest calculation, and then, after crossing, the whole command would have been likely to have been destroyed. The position of the road along that mountain is such that they could have been flanked by a small force of the enemy and destroyed entirely. There is but one way to go, I suppose, and that is the route the cavalry took, which, I think, is very impracticable for infantry or a train of any kind. Along the bank of the canal, in case of an attack, such a confusion would have resulted that it would have been a disaster and a surrender, only on one side of the river instead of the other.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you know of Colonel Miles repeatedly rejecting the proposition to take the command out, refusing to entertain such a proposition, on the ground that he was ordered to remain at Harper's Ferry, and hold it to the last extreme?

Answer. Yes, sir; he showed me his orders, and expressed his intention to hold it.

Question. Do you recollect the proposition by myself, on Sunday, after the engagement on the left, to mass the artillery in front, taking up all that could be spared, all except what was necessary for the defense of the bridges? If you do remember it, will you state any reason why it was said it was not proper to do it?

Answer. I distinctly remember the conversation in my room between yourself and myself, and one great reason for not doing so was the want of proper means of moving the artillery to the front, and, after getting it there, the want of material to move it back again in case of necessity.

Question. That is, there were no horses nor harness there to move it to the front or move it after getting there, when it became necessary?

Answer. No, sir; there was only one means of moving it, and that was by teams of the quartermaster's department, and all officers know the trouble of securing even one team from that to do anything with.

Question. Was there infantry there, reliable troops, that could have supported and held a battery that was without horses to move it?

Answer. No, sir; I know that.

Question. I will ask you if you know, or had any opportunity of observing, the conduct or efficiency of the officers under arrest in connection with this investigation—myself, Colonel D'Utassy, Colonel Trimble, and Colonel Ford. If you do, state what you know about it; not the particulars, but the general result of your observation.

Answer. I cannot particularize at all. I have heard many officers express their admiration of the conduct of General White and Colonel Trimble in exposing themselves in the performance of their duty. Of course, Colonel Ford I do not know personally, and I never met him before to-day, and not having been on Maryland Heights at any time, I am not able to say anything in regard to the colonel's conduct in the fight there at all.

By the COURT:

Question. Had you any opportunity of judging of Colonel D'Utassy?

Answer. I did not see him on Monday morning at all.

By General WHITE:

Question. State, if you can, the amount of artillery the enemy had on Monday morning in operation; the number of batteries, if you cannot state the number of guns and where they were located.

Answer. I mentioned them in a report I made, which is as near correct as I could make it. I considered there were about seven batteries opened upon us. Do you wish me to state the position of these batteries?

Question. As you have made a report, it does not matter. Were there any on Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; one gun on Maryland Heights. It seemed to be a heavy piece; a rifled piece.

By the COURT:

Question. How long did you serve with Colonel Miles?

Answer. I reported to him on the 2d of August, and was appointed on his staff on the same day, and served with him up to the day of his death.

Question. Served on his staff as chief of artillery?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you in the habit of seeing him every day?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you familiar with all his plans and his manner of carrying them out?

Answer. That is a pretty tough question. I do not know how to answer that. He talked over his plans with me occasionally.

Question. How did you regard him—as an efficient commanding officer?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you ever see anything in the conduct of Colonel Miles that would lead you to question his loyalty?

Answer. No, sir; never for an instant at any time I was with him.

Question. Did he give his personal attention to carrying out his orders?

Answer. He did, and visited his positions every afternoon.

Capt. S. C. MEANS, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. Captain of cavalry.

Question. In what regiment?

Answer. An independent company. We are not attached to any regiment at all.

Question. Were you at Harper's Ferry during the late events there which resulted in its surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir; up to Sunday night. I was not there when the surrender was made.

Question. Did you leave on Sunday night?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Under what circumstances?

Answer. Well, when Maryland Heights were surrendered, I just thought we might just as well surrender the Ferry. And I knew I would be hanged if I was caught.

Question. You are a Virginian?

Answer. Yes, sir. I thought if I could get out I would, and I invited all who wished to follow me to follow me; and there were a great many that did.

Question. Did you escape with the large body of cavalry, or in the advance?

Answer. I was in advance of the whole body.

Question. You encountered no difficulty in effecting your escape?

Answer. We had some little skirmishing along the route; nothing serious.

Question. Are you well acquainted with the geography and topography of that region?

Answer. On the Virginia side I am. On the Maryland side I cannot say that I am, very well. I am well acquainted, but not very well. There are a great many passes there I do not understand.

Question. Will you give the Commission your judgment as to whether the infantry could have effected their escape the night the cavalry cut their way through?

Answer. I do not think there would have been any difficulty in the world.

Question. You think they could have passed over the road you passed over?

Answer. Yes, sir; the infantry could have done it; the artillery could not. The infantry could have done it well and easy. It was through the mountain; a rough road. It would have been bad for artillery to have gotten over, it is very true, but infantry could have done it.

By the COURT:

Question. Why could not the artillery have passed over the road?

Answer. The artillery could not have taken that road on account of the noise they would have made. I have no doubt they could have got over it. The only obstruction we met with was when we met with this ammunition train of Longstreet's,

We heard a considerable noise, and drew up in line of battle in a field, tore down the fences, and got back into a field. But we had no skirmishing; they surrendered at once. When we ordered the train to halt, they halted and gave themselves up at once.

By General WHITE:

Question. You have stated that you thought there would have been no difficulty in the infantry going out at the time you did. How long, in your opinion, would it have taken the infantry to have crossed the Potomac?

Answer. I think there were, perhaps, 10,000 men there, and it would, perhaps, have taken them three hours, I think.

Question. After crossing, how long, suppose there had been no interruption whatever—how long would it have taken them to have marched where they would have been perfectly clear of danger of attack and being surrounded by the enemy?

Answer. Well, sir, three hours more would have taken them out.

Question. When you say "out," do you mean clear around the enemy's left flank?

Answer. Yes, sir; I mean entirely out of their lines.

Question. And how far would that have been?

Answer. Twelve miles.

Question. Is not that more than three hours' march?

Answer. A forced march could have done it. "Stonewall" Jackson could have done it, I know.

Question. You say you had some little skirmishing with the enemy?

Answer. Very little; we expected to have a skirmish with the guard that was with the ammunition train, but they showed no fight; they surrendered.

Question. You had some with the pickets?

Answer. Occasionally a shot; not a skirmish, but a shot now and then.

Question. With infantry, marching as a column of infantry would, what is your opinion as to their being attacked by the enemy?

Answer. I think if we had left a rear guard of cavalry, we could have protected them and carried them out of all that. I think that by all means every man that could get a horse should have gone out. There were 2,000 horses left there.

Question. Who had them?

Answer. They were artillery horses and captured horses. I had captured a great many myself and left them there.

Question. You are mistaken about the number, I think.

Answer. I guess you will not find any officer there who will not say what I do. I do not think there was less than 2,000. Of course, I guess at the number.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. The horses were of no use whatever in the defense of the place?

Answer. No, sir.

By General WHITE:

Question. How much force do you suppose the enemy had on the north side of the Potomac at that time?

Answer. From the best information I could get, they had about 7,000 men.

Question. I mean their entire force?

Answer. Do you mean over in Maryland?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. About 135,000, I reckon.

Question. And you, in passing out with the cavalry, turned the entire left flank of that force?

Answer. We did not turn the flank at all. We were on one side of the mountain and their force was on the other. At that time there were none of them beyond Pleasant Valley, and we passed up on the southern side of the Blue Ridge, as we call it in Virginia, until we passed them. They were in Maryland, though, but, by going on as far as Chambersburg, we got entirely around them. Stuart took pretty much the same route, only he crossed the Potomac higher up, and came around a week ago and a little over.

Question. Suppose the infantry had been started out at the time the cavalry started from Harper's Ferry, when they were passing up that road what would have prevented the force under Jackson in the valley from attacking our column?

Answer. Jackson at that time was in Pleasant Valley.

Question. You are mistaken in that; he was in front of us at Bolivar Heights.

Answer. He had not crossed over the mountain.

Question. On Sunday night?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. We fought his troops on Sunday afternoon before you left.

Answer. I do not know where in the world he could have been.

Question. In passing up that road with the entire command, if the lines of the enemy were stretched around to the Potomac at Shepherds-town, would it not have been probable that they would have known of our departure and attacked us there?

Answer. There is a probability of it; but at night, that way, I do not think we would have had anything more than their pickets to have attended to.

Question. You think they would have allowed our entire command to have gone out without an attack?

Answer. I think they would.

Question. Why?

Answer. We had seen no indication of anything else when we went, nothing like showing fight in any force.

Question. That was because your passage up the river was pretty rapid?

Answer. That was so; we were going along moderately fast.

Question. Did you go about 10 miles an hour?

Answer. I think we went at least that. I do not want it understood that I looked upon Colonel Miles as a traitor. I never did. I served under him too long. I think he was a loyal man.

By the COURT:

Question. What is your opinion in regard to the capacity of Colonel Miles for that command?

Answer. I think he was entirely capable ten days before the surrender of Harper's Ferry. I will have to commence at the beginning to get the story right. The day after we had the skirmish in Leesburg—not a skirmish either, but a pretty hard fight—Colonel Miles sent me back to Leesburg to learn the truth of the forces coming

there. I could not go to Leesburg, but I got on a mountain near by, within a mile of it, and I had a good spy-glass and saw everything distinctly. I saw forty regiments coming into Leesburg and sixty-odd pieces of artillery. I went back and reported it to Colonel Miles. He turned around to me and said, "It is a damned no such thing," just in that way. That was the first time Colonel Miles treated me so abruptly in his life. I saw the reason of it at once. I told him then he could send some one who could see better than I could. He says, "Here is a man that is right from there, and he says everything is quiet." Says I, "Colonel, that man lives 13 miles from Leesburg, and there is a large mountain between him and Leesburg, and he must see clear through that mountain to see better than I did with my glass." I turned to the man, and said, "Mr. Hough"—his name was Hough—"when were you in Leesburg?" He says, "I have not been there at all, but," says he, "I have not heard anything." He had not been there at all, but lives in Hillsborough, 13 miles off, while I had been there, or in sight of there, and had a spy-glass. When the old colonel found I had him a little in that respect, he knuckled down to me and treated me very kindly. He told me to go to Point of Rocks and stay there till further orders. I went there, and was introduced to Colonel Banning, who had command there at that time, and talked with him, I suppose, one hour. I then went off to get my supper—I had had no dinner, in fact—and the colonel came after me, and told me his pickets had been caught off the tow-path some 3 miles below there, and he wanted me to go and see about it. I went and got a squad of men and went down, and, sure enough, they were caught off there. I reported that to Colonel Banning, and he immediately telegraphed it to Colonel Miles. That was about 5 o'clock on the evening of Thursday, when they commenced crossing the river—the main body. Colonel Banning got no reply until 12 o'clock at night, and then he got a dispatch that he would be re-enforced at daylight the next morning. But there were no re-enforcements. I stood there on picket all night, and I suppose 10,000 crossed over that night, and the first good place they came to, they just laid right down. The next morning at sunrise I came up and reported to Colonel Banning; but no re-enforcements yet. I then told him I would go up and see Colonel Miles; in fact, he told me to go up. I went on to Knoxville, and met Colonel Maulsby, of the Home Brigade, and ate my breakfast with him. He sat down and wrote to Colonel Miles, by me. I went up and saw Colonel Miles, but he would not believe anything I said, or that there were any soldiers over the river, or any danger.

Question. You made the remark a few minutes ago that in that conversation you discovered what was the matter. What was the matter with Colonel Miles?

Answer. That is a thing I did not care about telling; but as you have asked me I suppose I must. I think he had taken too much to drink. I never had seen it the case before, but that was my impression at the time. I had been serving under him before for three or four months, and I never saw that the case with him until that time; therefore I paid no attention to what he said.

Question. Did he continue in that state during the remaining portion of your stay?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was the Thursday week before the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. That was the first I ever discovered in him anything of the kind.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. How did his condition manifest itself; was it in confusion of ideas?

Answer. Not at all.

Question. In excitement?

Answer. No, sir; he seemed to be stubborn, nothing else. In the fix he was in then, he would not believe anything you would tell him.

By General WHITE :

Question. Do you mean to be understood that during the siege of Harper's Ferry Colonel Miles was not intoxicated all the time, but he seemed to have enough to make him stubborn? Do you think he was drinking?

Answer. I think he was. I had been reporting to him once or twice a week for at least two or three months, and I had never found him anything else but perfectly straightforward in every respect until about that time.

Col. WILLIAM H. TRIMBLE, recalled at his own request, and examined as follows:

By the COURT:

Question. You wish to explain something in your former testimony, do you?

Answer. Yes, sir. It occurred to me after I left the room that I had not given a proper or special answer to one of the questions of the judge-advocate, in regard to the reasons for my opinion in reference to the military capacity of Colonel Miles. I have already stated that Colonel Miles declined to make some defensive works, and to clear out the forest in front of our position that interfered with the range of our artillery and furnished a cover for the enemy. In addition to that, he had said to me that the enemy could not plant artillery on Loudoun Heights; that they could not plant batteries on the table-lands under Loudoun Heights, and that the ground in the ravines, on the left flanks running from the turnpike to the Shenandoah, was impassable. But these things, when the engagement came on, proved the incorrectness of Colonel Miles' military judgment; and then his not being on the battle-field to support the command by his presence, and to direct it by his military ability; his leaving me without instructions or any plan of defense, or any authority to call for re-enforcements; all these things combined compelled me to give up my faith in him as a commander. I wish the court to understand that it was that combination of circumstances that compelled me to come to a conclusion adverse to Colonel Miles.

Question. Did you notice during the siege that Colonel Miles was intoxicated?

Answer. I did not; and although I heard suggestions among officers about there doubting his being true to his trust, I replied promptly and decisively always to any such suggestion, that I would not permit myself to think such a thing of any superior officer, and that all the things that had been stated to me as evidences of his being untrue were only evidences to my mind of his being a weak man, wanting in decision and firmness and in good judgment.

By General WHITE:

Question. Did you see General "Stonewall" Jackson at Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir; I did, and had a conversation with him. I made a point to see him, in order to make an issue with him that had not been made in the conditions of surrender, as I understood. I understood and I am satisfied that General Jackson was in chief command there.

Maj. Gen. N. P. BANKS, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state to the Commission whether you have, at any time, with your command, occupied the Maryland Heights; and, if so, when and with about what force?

Answer. In the month of July, 1861, I occupied Maryland Heights with a small force, a large part of my troops being at the base of the mountain, in the valley. My command consisted of about 5,000 men.

Question. How many were up on the heights?

Answer. We had two regiments there the most of the time, and one in the town of Harper's Ferry.

Question. What is your opinion as to the natural capabilities of defense which the heights furnish?

Answer. With provisions and water, Maryland Heights would be a very strong position; a small force could hold them against a large number of men, for a time.

Question. Is there difficulty there in regard to a proper supply of water?

Answer. At some seasons of the year there might be.

Question. In the summer months?

Answer. Yes, sir; in the dry months; but there are several small springs on the mountain which could be made available for troops, but in the spring of the year there is plenty of water.

Question. They could be made available in the summer months for what force, do you suppose?

Answer. I could not say how many men could remain there for any length of time through the summer months.

Question. For a few days or weeks? You remained there long enough to become quite familiar with the mountain.

Answer. Yes, sir; but I am not able to answer that question explicitly. We supposed when I was there, that subject being much canvassed, that springs could be found that would supply a considerable force with water; but there being no exigency for our putting a large number of men on the heights, and they being better accommodated below in that respect, we never explored the heights so far as to enable me to state what length of time troops could remain there. An old man who lives at the base of the mountain, near Sharpsburg, said that there were several springs upon the heights which would furnish water if attended to, cleared out.

The Commission then adjourned to 11 a. m. to morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 17, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

The investigation was then resumed in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

The judge-advocate submitted in evidence copies of the following papers, furnished by the War Department, which were read:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 5, 1862.

Major-General WOOL, *Baltimore, Md.:*

I find it impossible to get this army into the field again in large force for a day or two. In the mean time Harper's Ferry may be attacked and overwhelmed. I leave the dispositions there to your experience and local knowledge.

I beg leave, however, to suggest the propriety of withdrawing all our forces in that vicinity to Maryland Heights. I have no personal knowledge of the ground, and merely make the suggestion to you.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *September 7, 1862.*

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry:*

Our army is in motion. It is important that Harper's Ferry be held to the latest moment. The Government has the utmost confidence in you, and is ready to give you full credit for the defense it expects you to make.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 8, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Thanks for confidence. Will do my best. Enemy advancing from Winchester.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 9, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

Information that Loring is marching 15,000 to 20,000 of all arms, via Snicker's Ferry, from Leesburg. If he visits me I am ready; but believe his intention to march on Cumberland, via Romney.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 10, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Enemy reported advancing from Boonsborough. He may intend to pass on the Maryland Heights or the Potomac, at Antietam Creek. Troops in position and ready.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 11, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

No sign of the enemy this morning. Yesterday Colonel Downey made a dash on force of 15,000 at Boonsborough with 19 cavalry; threw their line into confusion, killed 6, and safely retreated. Downey slightly wounded.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

ROCKVILLE, *September 11, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, I understand, with 9,000 troops. He can do nothing where he is, and could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered at once to join me by the most practicable route.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 11, 1862.

General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, *Rockville*:

There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present. His only chance is to defend his works till you can open communication with him. When you do so he will be subject to your orders.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 12, 1862.

Major-General MCCLELLAN, *Middleburg*:

Is it not possible to open communication with Harper's Ferry, so that Colonel Miles can co-operate with you?

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 12, 1862.

Col. DIXON S. MILES, *Harper's Ferry*:

You will obey such orders as General McClellan may give you. You will endeavor to open communication with him and unite your forces to his at the earliest possible moment. His army is now near the line of the Monocacy.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

FREDERICK, *September 14, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

A courier from Colonel Miles, who left in the night, has just arrived, and says Colonel Miles is surrounded by a large force of the enemy, but thinks he can hold out two days. General White has joined him with his command from Martinsburg. Miles is in possession of Harper's Ferry and Loudoun Heights. If he holds out to-day I can probably save him. The whole army is moving as rapidly as possible. The enemy is in possession of Maryland Heights.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

BALTIMORE, *September 15, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

The following dispatch has been received from Col. A. Voss, Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, dated Greencastle, Pa., September 15:

Harper's Ferry is from all sides invested by a force estimated at 30,000. By order of Colonel Miles, I left it last evening at 8 o'clock with the cavalry, about 1,500 strong, to cut my way through the

enemy's lines. I succeeded in reaching this place about 9 this morning, having passed the enemy's line about 3 miles northward of Williamsport, and capturing a wagon train of over 60 wagons, loaded with ammunition, and 675 prisoners. Colonel Miles intends to hold the Ferry, but is anxiously looking for re-enforcements.

No cannonading heard to-day. If cavalry are fit for service, I will order them to General McClellan. Colonel Davis says his regiment is used up, and, as he has lost everything, asks where he shall go to refit. As soon as I learn their condition I will give them orders accordingly.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 15, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

In addition to the force sent yesterday to Edwards Ferry, a division will move to-day to occupy Barnesville or Poolesville.

The Harper's Ferry cavalry has cut its way through to Greencastle, and reports Colonel Miles very hard pressed, and, unless relieved, will have to surrender to-day. Enemy planting guns on heights. Telegram from Greencastle, dated 9 a. m. to-day.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

BALTIMORE, *September 16, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

The following dispatch, dated Harper's Ferry, 16th, via Frederick, has just been received:

I have to state that this place has been defended for several days against an attack by the divisions of Jackson, A. P. Hill, Lawton, Walker, and McLaws, amounting in all to 40,000 men, with over fifty pieces of artillery. After expending all our artillery ammunition, except that for short range, and defeating two attacks of the enemy's infantry, Colonel Miles, with the advice of his brigade commanders, reluctantly surrendered. I regret to say that the gallant Colonel Miles is so severely wounded that his recovery is not probable. I march to-day, with the command, and will report to you in detail.

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General, Commanding.

SHARPSBURG, *September 16, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

I learn that Colonel Miles surrendered at 8 a. m. yesterday, unconditionally. I fear his resistance was not so stubborn as it might have been. Had he held Maryland Heights he would inevitably have been saved.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

After discussion by the Commission, the further investigation of this case was postponed for the present.

The Commission subsequently adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 21, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

The Commission resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

The judge-advocate read in evidence the following papers from the War Department:

ORDNANCE OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 20, 1862.

Hon. P. H. WATSON,
Assistant Secretary of War:

SIR: In answer to your letter of this morning, I have to state that there were but three requisitions for arms, ordnance, and ordnance stores made by Colonel Miles or

any other officer for the supply of the forces at Harper's Ferry for a month previous to the 15th day of September, 1862, all of which requisitions were promptly complied with, by orders on and issues from the Washington Arsenal. These requisitions were:

1st. From Lieut. Warren Thompson, on 20th August, for 300 cartridges for 5-inch Dahlgren guns, for 200 cartridges for 6-pounder James guns; filled by order for supplies No. 3361.

2d. From Col. B. F. Davis, on the 3d September, for 80,000 caps for pistol cartridges; filled by order for supplies No. 3572.

3d. From Lieut. Warren Thompson, on 3d September, for 8 haversacks, 8 tube-pouches, 300 12-pounder cartridges, 10 priming wires, 12 thumb-stalls, 200 20-pounder cartridges, 10 lanyards, 10 tow hooks, 12 rammers and sponges, 10 gunners' gimlets, 6 pounds of iron tacks, 8 fuse wrenches, 10 vent punches, 1,000 copper tacks, and 6 handspikes; filled by order for supplies No. 3586.

I inclose a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, showing that these general orders were promptly complied with.

There was also a requisition received here on the 3d September, approved by Colonel Miles, for the Eighth New York Cavalry, stationed at Summit Point, for 600 Sharps carbines, with accouterments and ammunition for the same, to be sent to Summit Point, via Harper's Ferry. These articles were not sent because not on hand. This regiment left Harper's Ferry before the surrender.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. W. RIPLEY,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Ordnance.

WASHINGTON ARSENAL, D. C.,
October 20, 1862.

General J. W. RIPLEY,
Chief of Ordnance:

SIR: I have the honor to state that the only orders received here, as appears by the books of my office, having reference to stores issued to Harper's Ferry for a "month previous to the 15th September, 1862," are orders Nos. 3361, 3572, and 3586. These orders were promptly complied with.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

GEO. D. RAMSAY,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

The judge-advocate also read in evidence the following papers, found among those left by the late Col. D. S. Miles:

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
September 13, 1862.

Colonel MILES:

The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York has given way, and are straggling through the woods. All our forces are falling back.

THOS. H. FORD,
Colonel, Commanding.

A paper without date, but indorsed as received on the 13th September:

Colonel MILES:

I cannot hold my men. The One hundred and twenty-sixth all run, and the Thirty-second are out of ammunition. I must leave the hill unless you direct otherwise.

THOS. H. FORD,
Colonel, Commanding.

Lieut. HENRY M. BINNEY, recalled by the Government, and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Look at this paper, and see if you can tell at what hour of the day it was received by Colonel Miles [handing witness note, without date, to Colonel Miles from Col. T. H. Ford, read above].

Answer. I have no recollection of ever having seen this before.

By the COURT:

Question. Whose indorsement is that on the back?

Answer. It is the writing of the clerk in the office,

Question. Where is he?

Answer. He is with the First Maryland Regiment, I suppose. He belongs to Captain Cook's company.

Question. Do you recollect this paper [handing witness note to Colonel Miles from Col. Thomas H. Ford, dated September 13, 1862]?

Answer. No, sir; I do not recollect of ever seeing it before. I think it was written early in the forenoon of Saturday, before Colonel Miles went on the heights. There was some such note came, but I did not see it. Colonel Miles said there was some trouble up there with some of the regiments, and we got our horses and went over there, and met some 180 men, which he left me to drive back. That was after some such note as this was received. I do not know as this was the one.

Question. State whether you ever noticed Colonel Miles in a state of intoxication at any time during the siege of Harper's Ferry; and, if so, at what time.

Answer. No, sir. Since I have been with him, in February last, I have never known him to use intoxicating drink in any shape, kind, or form. I have visited with him the different camps of the different regiments, and we have always been invited to dismount and go in. When we have done so, Colonel Miles has always refused to drink. Even at a private party on the 4th of July he refused to drink champagne with the ladies there.

Question. You never suspected that he drank privately?

Answer. No, sir; I never saw him under the influence of liquor, and never saw any liquors about his quarters, and I knew all his rooms. I know that General Rosecrans came there at one time and asked for something to drink, and Colonel Miles said he kept none about him.

Question. Did you ever see his nerves affected by want of liquor?

Answer. No, sir; I never saw him except when he was calm and cool, under all circumstances, and seemed to be equal to all emergencies that might arise, except on Monday morning, the morning of the surrender. I think that then, surrounded as he was, and attacked on all sides, he seemed to be a little flustered, and hardly to know how to act. At all other times he seemed to be perfectly cool and calm. That was the only time I ever saw him when he seemed to be excited. As far as liquor is concerned, I am willing to make oath that he never used it while he was at Harper's Ferry. I have often heard him make the remark to some of the colonels, when asked to take something to drink, that he begged to be excused; that he had had enough said about his drinking at Bull Run, and since that time he had never allowed liquor to pass his lips. I know he has had presents of liquors, wines, &c., but they were put in his closets and cupboards, and were there after his death. I never saw empty bottles, even, about his quarters, unless it was in the rooms of some of his staff.

Maj. HENRY B. McILVAINE, recalled by General White, and examined as follows:

By General WHITE:

Question. You stated in your evidence yesterday that you thought that at the time of the surrender of Harper's Ferry, it might have been held during the day. That answer might perhaps be differently interpreted. What I desire to know is whether by the word "might" you meant a possibility or a probability. What meaning did you intend to convey by that expression?

Answer. Well, sir, I meant this, that it could only have been held that day by desperately disputing the ground by an almost hand-to-hand conflict, disputing the ground inch by inch, and hardly that. My mind has always been made up that the place was untenable.

Question. Do you think such a contest as would have been necessary to hold the place that day, if it could have been held at all, would have been made with troops of the character we had—new troops?

Answer. No, sir; I had no confidence in the troops myself, being mostly raw troops. It was hardly possible to hope for a gallant resistance of that kind from them.

Question. Do you think the line we had would have withstood the first assault of the enemy, even for ten minutes?

Answer. I must confess I do not. I do not like to speak so disparagingly of our gallant troops.

By the COURT:

Question. What reason have you for believing that the troops would not stand?

Answer. From the fact that three of the regiments had only had their arms for a very few days previous to the attack on Harper's Ferry, and from my own observation in seeing a great many of the troops.

Question. Had any of them broken or behaved badly before?

Answer. Yes, sir; on Sunday night I had seen the troops leaving their positions behind their intrenchments on Camp Hill and falling back to the Potomac.

Question. What regiments?

Answer. The Twelfth New York State Militia.

Question. Any others?

Answer. I saw a great many, not in bodies, but stragglers from the other regiments, with the numbers 111 and 126 on their caps.

Question. Did you ever see Colonel Miles, during the siege, under the influence of liquor?

Answer. Never.

The further investigation of this case was suspended for the present.

The Commission then resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Winchester by General White.

Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. on Thursday next.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 23, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The Commission resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Winchester by General White, and spent some time thereon.

The Commission then resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

Mr. JOHN JOLIFFE and Mr. S. W. JOHNSTON appeared as the representatives of Colonel Ford, to conduct the investigation in his behalf, and were sworn to secrecy.

THOMAS NOAKES, recalled by Colonel Ford, and examined as follows:

By Mr. JOHNSTON:

Question. In your former testimony you stated that you were directed by General White to go to Colonel Miles in regard to Maryland Heights, and that in the conversation Colonel Miles scouted the idea, and said, "I cannot hold Maryland Heights. I have just informed him to evacuate there if he should think he was overpowered."

Answer. Yes, sir; that is right.

Question. Did he say, "I have just informed him," or did he name anybody?

Answer. I think he said the commanding officer.

Question. The commanding officer of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir; or I am satisfied he could not have meant anybody else. I took for granted he meant the commanding officer of the heights.

Question. Farther along you say in your testimony, "While I was standing there, an officer, a colonel, rode up, and spoke to a gentleman standing there, saying, 'I have given up Maryland Heights, according to the order I have just got.'"

Answer. Yes, sir; that is right.

Question. When you speak of "a gentleman," was he an officer?

Answer. Yes, sir; I am satisfied he was an officer.

Question. Where was this officer standing?

Answer. Right in front of Colonel Miles' quarters.

Question. How long had you been there at headquarters, either with Colonel Miles or about there?

Answer. From the time I left General White until I left Harper's Ferry to go back, I suppose it was some two hours and a half, or may be three hours. I cannot recollect just the time, because I had right smart to attend to. I was bothered about a great many things then.

Question. Can you state near the time?

Answer. I suppose about three hours. I am positive about that.

Question. Leaving there about what time do you suppose?

Answer. About 11 o'clock, I think.

Question. It is all memory on your part, I suppose?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Capt. W. ANGELO POWELL, called by Colonel Ford and sworn, and examined as follows:

By Mr. JOLIFFE:

Question. Were you at Harper's Ferry at the time of the evacuation, or about that time; and, if so, in what capacity?

Answer. I was; acting as engineer.

Question. In what force?

Answer. In the Engineer Corps.

Question. Did you hear Colonel Miles say anything about whether or not Maryland Heights could be retained; and, if so, what did he say upon that subject?

Answer. After the evacuation of Maryland Heights, in the afternoon, Colonel Miles said in his office that it was well Colonel Ford had left as soon as he did, otherwise his men would have been driven back and his guns captured and turned upon us.

Question. Do you know whether or not Colonel Ford sent at any time to Colonel Miles for re-enforcements?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What occurred?

Answer. I do not know how many were sent to him; but he sent for re-enforcements.

Question. What remarks were made by Colonel Miles, or any other officer, to the person by whom Colonel Ford sent for re-enforcements?

Answer. I think it was on Friday evening that he said that Colonel Ford had

made the remark to him that he could hold that place against all hell. Then he continued his remark by saying, "Then what in hell does he want of more men?"

Question. Did he say anything about jeopardizing his force in front?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was it?

Answer. He said, "What in hell does he want of more men? I cannot jeopardize any force in front." At that time I do not think there was an attack.

Question. Where; in front?

Answer. Yes, sir; on Bolivar Heights.

By General WHITE:

Question. On our arrival at Harper's Ferry, at the time of the evacuation at Winchester, was there any conversation, that you remember, between myself and Colonel Miles relative to the fortification of Loudoun Heights and of Bolivar Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state what it was, if you please?

Answer. It was proposed by yourself, and I think I also spoke of it, to fortify Loudoun Heights, because, in case the enemy should approach from that side, which there was a probability of their doing, they would then have command of Bolivar Heights and also Camp Hill. Colonel Miles made the remark, as near as I can remember, that the enemy would not attack that way, but would attack like they did in the spring, that is, from the front. It was also advised to cut down the timber on Bolivar Heights, and also on Maryland Heights.

Question. Clear it entirely?

Answer. Yes, sir; the timber around the siege guns could not possibly have been over 100 yards, 300 feet, from the siege guns. The consequence was that infantry approaching there could get right up on the gunners and pick them off—their sharpshooters would.

Question. This conversation occurred before I was ordered to Martinsburg?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were any of these things done which were then recommended?

Answer. No, sir; I spoke of it several times to Colonel Miles, but he said there was no necessity for doing so. I even wanted to have the woods cleared off Bolivar Heights, but he said it was unnecessary; that we wanted to keep the woods there to mask what we were doing. I had got my orders from him, and proceeded immediately to putting up the works there. The object of retaining the trees there was to prevent the enemy from seeing what we were doing; whereas instead of that it was a shelter for an attack on their part. The woods that were cut down on the left of Bolivar Heights was done by the consent of Colonel Miles, after a great deal of persuasion from me and others. If it had not been for that woods being cut down, I think they would have taken that battery when they made their attack on the left flank. General Hill and Colonel Walker, or General Walker, I think, said he never found anything more difficult to march men through than that abatis there.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you know anything in regard to orders having been sent to Colonel Ford in regard to the abandonment of Maryland Heights?

Answer. I only know that Colonel Miles made the remark in his office, as he was in the habit of doing every evening to me when I returned from Bolivar Heights, that he had given orders to Colonel Ford that if he was too hard pressed he should fall back on the Virginia side—that is, to Harper's Ferry—and disable the guns. Whether those orders were written ones or verbal I cannot say. It was during this conversation that it was spoken about the woods being cut down. I advised him to cut down

the woods. I thought they were too near entirely; we could not see what the enemy were doing on the heights, and, of course, that was all to our disadvantage.

Question. When did this conversation take place between you and Colonel Miles?

Answer. In the evening, about 8 o'clock; on Friday, I think.

Question. The day before the abandonment of Maryland Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir. At that time I did not know whether it was on Friday or Saturday; but I know now from the dates I have of it.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your judgment as to the practicability of escape the night previous to the surrender of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Well, sir, in my view—it may not be of much account; still, I give it—I think it would have been almost impossible to have got the infantry force and artillery out of Harper's Ferry; that is, clear of the enemy; it would have been an utter impossibility; but it might have been practicable to have got that force over on the Maryland side, but they would then have been under a very severe attack of the enemy. There would have been a great many men slaughtered, and I think they would have been, perhaps, compelled to have surrendered there. There was no preparation made on the Maryland side, or on the Loudoun side, to resist an attack. The enemy had all the advantage; they had the woods there for their cover, which should not have been. Colonel Miles had three months to fortify that place, and clear the timber off, but he did not do it.

Question. Made no preparation at all for defense?

Answer. The only preparation made for defense was done, I think, by order of General Saxton, and the work was under the superintendence of some other captain there; I do not recollect his name. It consisted of a face and two bastions, and then a line of earthworks, which did not amount to much, in fact to nothing at all, for they were never used except on the enemy on Loudoun.

By General WHITE:

Question. Where were those masks?

Answer. On Camp Hill. They were of no account. The enemy had complete command of that place; they could fire right down there. In fact, while the engagement was going on by the artillery between Camp Hill battery, which was under command of Captain Graham, and the Loudoun side, and also from the Maryland side, Captain Graham had to move his guns very often. They had complete command of the place. The rebel officers there said we killed a number of their men upon the Loudoun side with our 24-pounder howitzers and some of our 20-pounder Parrott guns. Whether it was so or not, of course I am not able to say. That was their acknowledgment, any how. After opening fire from Loudoun Heights on that battery of Captain Graham, they turned their guns, and fired down into the cavalry one shell that scattered.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you confine yourself to the question?

Answer. That is for you to say.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What number of horses do you suppose remained after the cavalry escaped from Harper's Ferry?

Answer. There were 13 horses of mounted men—1 man was wounded, I think—returned over the pontoon bridge, and a sergeant, or perhaps one of the corporals, came up while I was in the room with Colonel Miles, and stated that 13 men had returned, and there was 1 wounded and 1 killed.

Question. Was there not a large number of spare horses and artillery horses there?

Answer. There were those 13 horses, and there were some 26 besides, perhaps, that remained on the ground.

Question. The opinion has been expressed here by one witness that there were 2,000 horses left there.

Answer. Artillery horses?

Question. Horses of all kinds.

Answer. I doubt very much that there were 2,000.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you believe that there were 1,000?

Answer. No, sir; I know the enemy were very much surprised when they got in there and found so very few horses to take.

Question. Aside from the battery horses there, and the horses belonging to officers, do you believe there were 200 left there; public property, I mean?

Answer. There must have been very near that number.

By the COURT:

Question. Had you any means of knowing?

Answer. I only judge by the number of teams I saw.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. How many battery horses do you suppose there were?

Answer. There may have been in the neighborhood of a hundred.

By the COURT:

Question. Were those extra horses, besides those regularly used for the batteries?

Answer. They were horses that belonged to some orderlies that remained there, and some that belonged to some of the men that were sick in the hospital, and some that belonged to the teams.

Question. Do you know of any captured horses there in the hands of the quartermaster or other persons?

Answer. No, sir; I do not. I may have been aware of it; but if I was I have forgotten it.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you know Captain Means, who commanded an independent company of cavalry somewhere about Leesburg?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you know whether there was any such person there at the time our cavalry left?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Did you hear of him at the time?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you know who led the cavalry out from there?

Answer. Colonel Davis; that is to say, they were under his command, but they were guided out by a citizen, and several men who belonged to the Maryland cavalry.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did Colonel Miles ever discuss with you the question as to withdrawing the forces from Harper's Ferry to Maryland Heights with a view to holding them?

Answer. It was spoken of, I think, on Saturday evening.

Question. By him?

Answer. Yes, sir; I came into the room just as the conversation was being ended, and then remained with him a few moments, as he requested me to do. After saying that the men would be sacrificed by going over there, he said, "I am ordered by General Wool to hold this place; and," continued he, "God damn my soul to hell if I don't hold it against the enemy."

Question. He did not consider Maryland Heights as a part of the place?

Answer. No, sir; he considered that it would be disobeying his orders to go over on the Maryland side. That is what I understood from his conversation.

Question. As a military man, what is your judgment upon that question? Would not an order to hold Harper's Ferry imply an order to hold the heights which commanded it?

Answer. Of course. If he found it was impracticable to hold Harper's Ferry by remaining on the Virginia side, it was his duty, as the commanding officer, to have gone over on the Maryland side, as the result, if it had been in our favor, would have been to hold Harper's Ferry.

Question. Maryland Heights does unquestionably command Harper's Ferry?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Have you expressed an opinion as to the necessity for the surrender of Harper's Ferry when it occurred?

Answer. I am not aware that I have.

Question. Will you do so?

Answer. After losing Maryland Heights, and permitting the enemy to plant their batteries on the left flank of Bolivar Heights, I then considered that the place was surrendered. Of course they were firing in the fog at us; but when the fog did rise above the ridge, they had complete command of the place.

Question. You were present during the whole of the operations?

Answer. Not on Monday morning, I was not.

Question. But previously?

Answer. Yes, sir; and on Monday morning I was near enough to see where their batteries were. I went up there and found that the enemy had a battery on our left flank, enfilading us, and another one back of Harper's Ferry.

By General WHITE:

Question. Across the Shenandoah, under Loudoun Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your judgment, as a military man, of the defense throughout, made at Harper's Ferry? Was it skillfully and properly made?

Answer. The first part was not—the engagement during Saturday, and a portion of Friday, I think, when our troops fell back from Knoxville or in that vicinity; but the management of the troops on Saturday afternoon, I think, could not have been bettered.

By General WHITE:

Question. Where do you refer?

Answer. On the left flank.

Question. You mean Sunday, do you not?

Answer. On Sunday, yes, sir; I mean on the left flank, where the fighting was.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you mean Saturday and Sunday or Friday and Saturday?

Answer. I mean on Sunday afternoon and evening, when the enemy made an attack on our left flank, on Bolivar Heights.

By General WHITE:

Question. Who commanded our forces there at that time?

Answer. Colonel Trimble, I think, was there, and yourself as in command. Those were all that I remember had any command there.

Question. Were the enemy repulsed and driven off in some disorder from that attack?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Those batteries you speak of having been planted on the left were placed under the fire of their guns on Loudoun Heights?

Answer. Yes, sir. You gave me an order to put some guns in position, and, while I was doing so, I heard the enemy moving over there in that timber.

Question. Were you present at that point on Monday morning, at the intersection of the Charlestown road and Bolivar Heights?

Answer. I came up near that, just where our headquarters were pitched one time when we came there, but I went back. I did not think there was any necessity for my staying there any longer, as I had nothing to do, and I was under fire all the time from the enemy's shells.

Question. Do you know whether I was present that morning or not?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw you go up there.

By Mr. JOHNSTON:

Question. If you are familiar with Maryland Heights, taking the lookout as a stand-point, state what preparation was necessary, in your judgment, in the construction of works and the location of batteries, of course, including the size and number of the guns, for the successful defense of Maryland Heights against the force that is understood to have come up in front there, and what time would have been required to have constructed them?

Answer. You have a survey here from General Cullum [map handed witness] for the defense of Maryland Heights from the east side. I would have recommended, of course, that all the timber be cut down along the slope of the heights, in the form of abatis, and that toward Solomon's Gap there should be thrown up an earthwork of sufficient strength to mount at least three guns; and also, on the Maryland Heights near the Ferry, almost above where Captain McGrath's battery was, there should have been placed a battery, that being the highest point and commanding Loudoun Heights, in fact, almost enfilading the position the enemy would have to occupy. I should have placed there at least four or five guns, and I would have had them 30-pounder Parrots. On the east slope of the south end of Maryland Heights I would have placed a masked battery for the purpose of preventing the enemy from making an attack from Sandy Hook. That need not have had more than two guns, and they might have had them one rifled and the other smooth-bore.

By the COURT:

Question. That would have served the same purpose as the work on Camp Hill?

Answer. Camp Hill, to have commanded the bridge and the ground east of it, along the river and railroad, should have had works down under the brow of the hill, to protect it from the enemy's works on Loudoun Heights. That, from the shape of the ground, could have been very easily done. Then, the timber all along on this plateau and along the west side of Maryland Heights should have been cleared off. The enemy attempted to put a battery over here [indicating on the map], and Captain McGrath's battery fired at them three or four times with excellent practice, and they

did not put it there. The work placed on Camp Hill, according to the directions of General Saxton, was all very well in case the enemy made an attack along this plateau between Bolivar Heights and Bolivar itself, but when the enemy had a battery on Loudoun Heights, that place was under their fire, was commanded by it, and became of no use.

Question. What number of men would be requisite on Maryland Heights, with these works you speak of?

Answer. I should think at least 3,000 men, making allowances for all contingencies. That is an excellent place for water—a spring to get water from.

Question. Where?

Answer. Just beyond this camp [pointing out on the map]; a plenty of it on this plateau.

Question. If the enemy occupied that position would there have been a supply of water on the heights?

Answer. Then make cisterns there for water.

Question. Or force it up by a steam-engine from the river?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is the capacity of that spring, if you can tell?

Answer. I think it was sufficient to supply in the neighborhood of from 2,000 to 3,000 men; that is, with care by damming it up, and saving the water. Perhaps the supply might have been larger by sinking it deeper. That I never tried, and, of course, I am not able to say.

Question. Have you been educated as a military engineer?

Answer. As a civil engineer. I had practice with Crawford Neilson as a military engineer, and with several engineers whose names I do not recollect now. I was with General Rosecrans on his staff as assistant engineer, and with General Cox in the Kanawha Valley, after General Frémont took command of Western Virginia.

By General WHITE:

Question. And you constructed the works at Winchester?

Answer. Yes, sir; I have studied military engineering a great deal, and am very anxious to put it in practice. For the defense of Loudoun Heights, I think it would have been necessary to have put up a work there of considerable strength; a regular work for at least 3,000 men, for that is liable to be attacked not only from the east side but from the south side, along the ridge. There I think I should have had some six or eight guns, and some of them long-range guns. The water for that position would have to be secured by means of cisterns. For Bolivar Heights, I think two or three small detached works would have been sufficient; but it is necessary, to fortify that place, to clear the timber off at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the positions of the artillery, to make it of any strength. That is all I have to say relative to fortifying that place.

Question. A portion of the question related to the time it would have taken to have constructed these works.

Answer. It would have taken, at an average of 1,000 men, two months and a half, easy work.

Question. How long would it have taken to have fortified Maryland Heights alone, as you have described it?

Answer. About three weeks.

Question. Did you contemplate the erection of block-houses?

Answer. No, sir; they are not of much importance in a position of that kind, except against infantry. Where the enemy is able to bring artillery upon them, they are but a trap.

Question. Do you not think that position would have been attacked by infantry, if attacked at all by a large force?

Answer. Certainly; infantry and artillery together.

Question. In the event of an attack by infantry, would not block-houses be very important in the defense of that position?

Answer. Yes, sir; but there are so many good positions there for artillery, that I think an enemy in attacking that place would not neglect the advantage which they give.

By Mr. JOLIFFE:

Question. Could Maryland Heights have been successfully defended without artillery to command the entrance of Solomon's Gap?

Answer. Not with the force we had.

Capt. WILLIAM H. GRAFFLIN, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. What is your position in the military service?

Answer. Captain of cavalry.

Question. Were you at Harper's Ferry during the siege which resulted in its surrender?

Answer. I was on Maryland Heights until we left that point and went to Harper's Ferry.

Question. What is your judgment as to the necessity of the evacuation of Maryland Heights at the time they were abandoned?

Answer. I think that with the force we had there, after the engagement we had there, we held it just as long as we well could. I was present at the first two engagements, and the men were pretty well used up. They were up there without anything to eat or drink.

Question. Do you know how it happened that you were there without anything to eat or drink?

Answer. I volunteered to Colonel Ford to go up, and I took my company up there before daylight. We had no canteens, and the boys carried very few crackers with them. They went up in a great deal of excitement, for it was something new to them to be dismounted, and at daylight we opened the fight.

Question. Were you with the cavalry that escaped from Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I was. I was in command of the rear guard, Companies II and I. Captain Russell went out on Saturday evening with 6 men and broke through the enemy's lines.

Question. Do you or not believe that the force at Harper's Ferry could have escaped over the route you took?

Answer. I think they might. To be sure, they could not have escaped without an engagement. It is very likely we might have had considerable of a fight before we got out; but I think the best portion of them might have got out; that is, if they had been stripped of everything but their ammunition and arms. They could not have carried anything with them. There was not any doubt in the world, from what I saw in going out, that we were completely surrounded. They attacked us at several points, and I think it was owing to the surprise we made on them that we got through so well.

By General WHITE:

Question. Do you think infantry could have been marched with sufficient rapidity to have gone through as you did?

Answer. I think the best portion of them could; some, no doubt, would have given out.

Question. At what rate did you march ?

Answer. At first, in crossing the pontoon bridge, we had to cross by file, which threw the column just double its length, and for some distance we had to ride in a lope, and in a fast run some time before we came up. After we got into column, as is always the case with cavalry, the rear guard would be running one moment and at a halt the next moment, owing to the irregularity of the right of the column ; but I do not think the right of that column, judging from what I saw, was out of walk much of the time. Sometimes I would have to stop for some time, and then at other times again I would be in a run.

Question. What do you think about taking artillery along ?

Answer. Well, sir, with an addition of horses we might have taken artillery.

Question. How long that night would it have taken to have got over the bridge all the troops there, cavalry, artillery, and infantry ?

Answer. It would have taken some time, if they did not move before we did.

Question. Would it have taken all night ?

Answer. If they had commenced at dark, they might have got their artillery and infantry over before I got over. It was about 10.30 o'clock before I moved out of the street.

Question. You think we might have moved 10,000 or 12,000 men in that time with the artillery we had ?

Answer. I think so.

Question. Your men, 2,000 of them mounted, took until 10 o'clock to go over ?

Answer. They commenced to cross a little after 9 o'clock, I think ; but there was a great deal of unnecessary delay in crossing that cavalry.

By the COURT :

Question. Could not a portion of them have crossed the ford ?

Answer. They could all have crossed the ford, all the cavalry.

Question. Would it not have expedited the movement very much if some of them had crossed the ford ?

Answer. I do not think it would ; but I know one thing, that it took that cavalry longer to cross than it would have taken four times that amount of infantry.

Question. Could or not both cavalry and infantry have been crossing at the bridge and at the ford at the same time ?

Answer. Yes, sir ; the river was very shoal then.

Lieut. ADAM CARNES, called by Colonel Ford, and sworn and examined as follows :

By Mr. JOHNSTON :

Question. What is your position in the service ?

Answer. I have been a lieutenant since the 1st day of September ; before that time I was a scout.

Question. In what regiment are you a lieutenant ?

Answer. I am second lieutenant in the Thirty-second Ohio.

Question. Were you on Maryland Heights for a few days immediately prior to its evacuation ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you present during the fight on the heights ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you have an interview with Colonel Sherrill and Major Hewitt shortly before the evacuation of the heights?

Answer. I went after Colonel Sherrill between 9 and 10 o'clock, I should judge, at night. I had difficulty in finding him, for it was very dark, and I dare not speak. The enemy and our folks were lying within 100 yards of each other. I found him, and fetched him back to Major Hewitt at the lookout, a high point of the mountain, where there was a pen built up, probably 15 feet high, where we could go up on it, and see into both valleys. I was consulted by them, and they came to the conclusion—

By Mr. JOLIFFE:

Question. State the words which passed; what one said, and what the other said.

Answer. I will do that as near as I can. Major Hewitt thought about two regiments, and Colonel Sherrill thought about one regiment would do. Says Major Hewitt, "There are men to spare down in the valley, and we haven't got three regiments." He was putting it down on a paper, to send it by an orderly down to Colonel Ford. They came to the conclusion that they would send for three regiments and two mountain howitzers, to start as soon as the moon rose, and to be there by daylight in the morning, so that we could operate them. We concluded that if we could not operate by that time, the enemy had been there time enough to be prepared, and they would have that advantage of us. He quit writing, and concluded he would go down and see Colonel Ford himself.

By Mr. JOHNSTON:

Question. Who would go down?

Answer. Major Hewitt. The colonel of the One hundred and twenty-sixth sent him down. He returned between 12 and 1 o'clock in the morning, I should judge; probably 1 o'clock.

Question. What did he say upon his return?

Answer. He said Colonel Miles told him he would send a force there as soon after sun-up as convenient. At 9.30 o'clock in the morning we got three companies.

By Mr. JOLIFFE:

Question. Not three regiments?

Answer. No, sir; three companies. I think that probably was Colonel Downey.

Question. Had you with these three companies a sufficient force to hold Maryland Heights?

Answer. Let me go back a little and state the case. They commenced firing on us early in the morning on Saturday. We had skirmishing on Friday, but it didn't amount to a great deal. The general attack was not made until Saturday morning, and then not generally until about 9 o'clock. It commenced firing and skirmishing. They then formed a solid column across the mountain. I supposed they had a flank out at the time, but I didn't know it; but before the firing was over I went on the lookout, probably not to exceed every twenty minutes, and could see every movement made in each valley toward a flank. I reported that to Major Hewitt, and Major Hewitt to the colonel of the One hundred and twenty-sixth. That is the way we arranged the matter there. We had the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment, three companies, I think, of the Third Maryland Regiment, and I don't remember how many companies of our regiment; probably two or three. There were other companies of our regiment guarding other places on the mountain; easy places to ascend the mountain. After the first fire we hadn't, I don't think, at any time more than 350 or 400 fighting men on the mountain, because they ran, and it was an impossibility to get them back. A man couldn't do it, and we hadn't any other power.

By the COURT:

Question. To what regiment did the men belong who ran?

Answer. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York. There was one company of the One hundred and twenty-sixth that did very well; as well as could be expected of new troops.

Question. Who was the captain of that company?

Answer. I can't tell; but it was Company F.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Did you observe particularly Major Baird's bearing on the field?

Answer. The major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. I did.

Question. What was it?

Answer. It was not very good.

Question. Was it very bad?

Answer. Well, it was about as bad as a man of his standing could be.

Question. Did he fly?

Answer. Every chance he could get. His own colonel and our major and all persuaded him to get him back. His excuse was that he was after his men to get them back. My opinion was that he was trying to get away himself.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you see him attempting to rally his men?

Answer. No, sir; I saw him attempting to get away himself on several occasions, and saw him ordered back.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You think that, with the exception of that single company, the conduct of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment was bad?

Answer. Yes, sir; a few men of each company besides, perhaps, remained there. The colonel was a good man; right at his place as long as he was there. There was no better man. He was wounded.

By Mr. JOLIFFE:

Question. After the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment ran, could Maryland Heights have been held with the force that was left?

Answer. No, sir; it couldn't have been held if they had staid, with the force that was coming against us. We had thrown up, unbeknown to them, in the night, or in the evening rather, a fortification; that is all that checked them. We held that place probably a half an hour, probably an hour, by getting back of it; I don't think they knew it was there; they might have known it, but I don't think they knew it until they came on it. The top of the mountain there where we threw that up was narrow. If it hadn't been for that, I don't suppose any of the One hundred and twenty-sixth, only Company F, would have staid. That captain was the only rallying officer the One hundred and twenty-sixth had that staid on the ground.

By the COURT:

Question. Did you see Lieutenant Barras on the mountain at any time, the adjutant of the One hundred and twenty-sixth?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. How did he behave?

Answer. I saw him frequently. He went down off the mountain once, but he returned. Well, I have seen men do worse, and I have seen men do better; I couldn't give you his acts just as they were. If he had had a good major, he would probably have been a good adjutant.

By Mr. JOHNSTON:

Question. Where were you driven by the force of the enemy there?

Answer. When you get back to the lookout—that is the highest point there is—after you leave it about 50 yards, you come to an offset—slight. You go on probably 300 or 400 yards tolerably level until you come to another point. We held that point.

Question. About what time did you get there?

Answer. I should judge that by that time it was near the middle of the day, or probably after.

Question. What would have been the result if you had remained there two hours?

Answer. The result would have been that we would have been just as we are now, paroled prisoners; probably not so many, I suppose.

Question. You would have been flanked?

Answer. Yes, sir; we were flanked, right and left both; on each side of the mountain.

Testimony in this case closed.

General WHITE submitted a written statement in relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, which he read, and asked to have placed upon the record hereto appended.

Mr. JOLIFFE, on the part of Colonel Ford, asked for time in which to examine the evidence and prepare a brief on behalf of Colonel Ford.

After some discussion, the Commission proceeded to deliberate with closed doors.

Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. on Saturday next.

APPENDIX.

WASHINGTON, *October 22, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following propositions for the consideration of the special military commission appointed to investigate the circumstances attending the surrender of Harper's Ferry, in September last, and respectfully request that they be made a part of the record in the case. The evidence adduced establishes, I believe, the following points, viz:

That, on being threatened by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and in accordance with instructions, I marched my command from Martinsburg into Harper's Ferry, on the 12th day of September, in good order.

That, at the time of my arrival, the post of Harper's Ferry was partially, and on the next day wholly, invested by the enemy, in a force variously stated at 40,000 to 70,000 of all arms, the truth being probably a medium between the extreme figures, with at least the full complement of artillery ordinarily connected with such a force.

That Col. D. S. Miles, U. S. Army, had been specially designated by the General-in-Chief, if not in express terms at least by implication, as the commandant at Harper's Ferry (see dispatch of Major-General Halleck to Colonel Miles, dated September 7); that this designation had been further confirmed by the order of Major-General Wool, issued on September 4, directing me, being then at Harper's Ferry, to repair to Martinsburg and take command at that post, thus leaving Colonel Miles in command at Harper's Ferry; and that, under such clearly expressed evidences that the authorities, confiding in the patriotism and ability of Colonel Miles, intended that he should retain the command, I could not have legally superseded him.

That if I could legally have displaced Colonel Miles, it would have been not only in contravention of the intentions of the proper authority, but unjust to him, and, to all appearances, subversive of the public

interests, inasmuch as his mature years, his military education, long experience as an officer of the army, his familiarity with the topography of Harper's Ferry and its vicinity, knowledge of the forces present and of the subsistence and ordnance stores on hand, and having placed the troops and guns according to the plan of defense which his judgment had dictated as the best, warranted the confidence reposed in him by the General-in-Chief, entitled him to the credit of whatever there might occur, in the defense of the place, of a meritorious character, and made him responsible for the proper execution of the trust confided to his hands. Had I exercised the prerogative which superior rank conferred, disregarding these important considerations, I should justly have been held responsible for whatever disaster subsequently befell the garrison and post of Harper's Ferry.

That, notwithstanding I declined to assume the command, I did not seek to avoid my proper duty in the field, but was diligent in my efforts to defend the position, consulted with and advised Colonel Miles according to the best of my judgment, recommending economy of ammunition and subsistence stores, advised sending the cavalry away, made other suggestions, some of which were adopted and others rejected, was personally present and in the discharge of my duty, during the engagements in the front on the 14th and 15th of September, and, generally, during the siege manifested an interest in the public service such as the commission I hold requires. (See the evidence of all the witnesses examined on this point, especially that of the brigade and regimental commanders, officers of batteries, the officers of Colonel Miles' staff, and that of Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, who led the cavalry out.)

That, prior to notifying Colonel Miles that I should not assume the command, I consulted with him as to his plan of defense, and suggested that Maryland Heights, from its commanding elevation and the heavy battery established there, was the key to the whole position; that it afforded the only feasible route for the escape of the command should evacuation become necessary, and ought to be held at all hazards, even if the entire force at his disposal should be required for its defense; that Colonel Miles concurred in these views, and gave me to understand they would be executed by him. (See evidence of Captain Curtis on this point.)

That the subsequent evacuation of Maryland Heights was wholly without my knowledge until some hours after its occurrence, being then on duty at the extreme left of the line on Bolivar Heights, and in no way connected with or responsible for that event, whether the same was justifiable or not. (See evidence of Captain Curtis and Thomas Noakes and Captain Mallory.)

That the evacuation of Maryland Heights was virtually the surrender of Harper's Ferry; but that thereafter there were two severe engagements with the enemy, the latter terminating only when the artillery ammunition had been expended, except canister shot, the enemy at that time commanding the entire field, from nine batteries, to whose fire no response whatever could be made.

That the exceeding weakness of our line of defense, viz, seven regiments deployed upon a line over a mile in length, with no reserves, most of the troops raw recruits, and no possibility existing of forming a better line at that time, the surrender was justifiable—indeed, a necessity—the comparatively small number of killed and wounded having no bearing upon the question, inasmuch as many lives had been saved by keeping the troops under cover.

That further resistance would have been attended with great loss of life

without a reasonable hope of resisting even for a half hour the assault which the enemy were then advancing to make. (See evidence of all witnesses examined on this point.)

That the surrender was proposed by Colonel Miles; that, on my recommendation, his brigade commanders were called together prior to deciding a question of such grave importance; that the opinion of the council of war was unanimous that further resistance was not only useless, but would be a criminal waste of life, and that surrender was a duty.

That the post and garrison were not surrendered until after a bombardment of two days, nor until the ammunition with which to respond to the enemy's fire was entirely expended, and therefore was not ignominious in its character, but a military misfortune, wholly unavoidable after the evacuation of Maryland Heights. (See evidence of Colonels Trimble and D'Utassy, Willard, Sammon, Segoine, battery captains, &c., Captain Curtis, Major McIlvaine, and others.)

That the escape of the command from Harper's Ferry was impracticable, certainly after the evacuation of Maryland Heights. Some witnesses have thought it feasible, but with one exception these witnesses were wholly ignorant of the road and country over which, if at all, the escape could have been made; while the officer who headed the cavalry which escaped, the guide who conducted it, as well as many prominent officers of the garrison express a contrary opinion. It would have consumed the entire night to have crossed the Potomac, so that when daylight appeared we should have been in full view of the enemy; the troops were inexperienced, and, under such circumstances, a retreat would doubtless have become a rout. One witness (Major Russell), who escaped with a few of his command on Saturday night, who is perfectly familiar with the country and with the position of the enemy, stated that it would have been much easier for General Franklin's corps to have fought their way into Harper's Ferry in time for the relief of the post than for the garrison to have cut their way out; but if escape had been possible, it has been shown that Colonel Miles refused always to entertain such a proposition, clinging to the hope of relief from General McClellan's forces, and referring invariably to his orders commanding him to hold the post to the last extremity, which he considered imperative and refused to violate by a retreat. (See evidence of Colonel D'Utassy, Colonel Cameron, Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, Major McIlvaine, Thomas Noakes.)

The evidence further shows that whatever errors I committed, if any, were not the result of pusillanimity, but of respect for the authorities who placed Colonel Miles in command and issued the orders under which he was acting.

In conclusion, I further state that none of my friends have been asked to write newspaper paragraphs exculpatory of my conduct, or to bespeak official intervention in my behalf. I have come before this tribunal, I trust, as a soldier should, relying upon the facts for my justification, with an abiding faith in the intelligence and justice of its members.

The commission I have the honor to hold in the military service of my country was given me for services rendered on the field. I hope it will be found unsoiled by improper conduct and in trustworthy hands.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JULIUS WHITE,

Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers.

Maj. Gen. D. HUNTER,

President of the Commission.

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 27, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.*

* * * * *

The Commission resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

Mr. Joliffe, as the representative of Colonel Ford, submitted a written statement in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights, which was read and ordered to be made part of the record (hereto appended).

The Commission then proceeded to deliberate in secret session.

Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

APPENDIX.

I. To Maj. Gen. D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers; Maj. Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. Volunteers; Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. Volunteers; Capt. Donn Piatt, assistant adjutant-general Volunteers; Capt. F. Ball, jr., aide-de-camp, commissioners "*for the investigation of circumstances attending the late evacuation of Maryland Heights, under the command of Colonel Ford, and the subsequent surrender of Harper's Ferry by Colonel Miles, then in command.*"

In submitting to the Commission the views which we now have the honor to present to you, we will confine ourselves to the first part of this investigation, namely, that "of the circumstances attending the late evacuation of Maryland Heights under the command of Colonel Ford."

II. Colonel Ford was not consulted on the subject of the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and we believe that no effort has been made or will be made to connect him with that surrender, except so far as his conduct as commander of Maryland Heights may be supposed to have tended to produce that result.

III. As dates are material in this investigation, we ask your attention to them at the outset.

1. Colonel Ford arrived at Harper's Ferry, with his command, in the evening of the 3d day of September, 1862, and on the 5th day he was ordered by Colonel Miles, his superior officer, to the command of the defenses of Maryland Heights, and, promptly, with his forces, went up to the place assigned him.

2. Early in the morning of Saturday, the 6th day of September, Colonel Ford began to examine his position; and on that day, after a full examination of it, he reported in person to Colonel Miles, and told him what he needed to make that place defensible.

3. On the Saturday next thereafter, viz, of September 13, 1862, Colonel Ford evacuated Maryland Heights, having been upon them but one week.

IV. As the exact condition of the defenses of Maryland Heights at the time when Colonel Ford took the command of them is not only material, but absolutely essential to a full and clear knowledge of his conduct, we will endeavor to state that condition with as much accuracy and precision as possible; but in doing so we will not encumber this brief with a topographical description of the place, as that has already been done and a map of it is before you.

Captain Powell states that, for the successful defense of Maryland

* It met and adjourned on the 25th without the transaction of other business.

Heights, there should have been three guns at Solomon's Gap and four other guns on the heights, and 3,000 men would have been absolutely necessary in order to defend them. That fortifications were necessary at ———, and that it would have taken two weeks, with a force of 1,000 men, to prepare the necessary defenses. This testimony is not contradicted or disputed by any witness, and Captain Powell is the only engineer who has been examined in this case. But the actual condition of these heights was very different indeed from that, as is clear from the evidence:

1st. There was, on the southeastern slope of the hill and about half-way up the hill, a battery of two siege and three 12-pounder guns, which were placed in that position for the defense of Harper's Ferry and not for the defense of Maryland Heights, except only against attacks that might be made by an enemy approaching those heights either from Harper's Ferry or from the southwestern side of those heights. The battery was of no value whatever to defend Maryland Heights against an advance by the enemy approaching from the north or northeast or northwest, or from all of those points, because but one of its guns could be brought to bear upon the enemy coming from those directions, as the whole hill was between the battery and the enemy approaching from those quarters. There were, with the exception of this battery, no artificial defenses upon the hill. It was covered with timber, and in all other respects in its natural condition. By the judgment of military gentlemen who have been examined upon the subject, Solomon's Gap was the key to Maryland Heights in an attack from the north, northeast, or northwest; and there was not at that place or near it, at the time Colonel Ford took the command, a single piece of artillery or a breastwork, or any other artificial defense.

On the 10th or 11th of September, two Parrott guns were sent to him, which were placed by order of Colonel Miles at the battery. Colonel Ford took with him, upon Maryland Heights, a battery of six guns, under the immediate command of Captain Potts, which battery had always been with and belonged to his regiment (Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers); but on the 5th day of September, the same evening that it was taken up, Colonel Miles ordered that battery over to Harper's Ferry, and it was, in obedience to that order, sent over to Harper's Ferry on the same day that the order was received, September 5, 1862, and never was brought back again.

Colonel Ford took up with him, on the 5th of September, the Thirty-second Ohio Regiment, about 400 or 500 men (infantry). There were on the heights, when he went up, three companies of the Potomac Home Brigade, numbering about 200 men (infantry), and the artillery of McGrath's battery, the same guns already mentioned (and which were afterward re-enforced by the two Parrott guns), and about 100 men with these guns and battery; two companies of cavalry, numbering about 75 men, under the command of Major Russell, and some cavalry, about 150 or 200, which were ordered down on Friday morning, September 12, by Colonel Miles, and went, pursuant to Colonel Miles' order, to Harper's Ferry, leaving him about 675 men.

On Friday morning, about daylight, he was re-enforced by 260 Garibaldi Guards, in six companies, under the command of Major Hildebrandt, and on Friday evening, September 12, he was further re-enforced by eight companies of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiment, Volunteer Militia, commanded by Colonel Sherrill, numbering probably 600 or 700 men. On Saturday, at 12 o'clock, Colonel Miles brought up, in person, five or six companies of Colonel Sammon's regiment, One

hundred and fifteenth New York, and placed them, himself, in a position to guard McGrath's battery. These companies were not on the top of the hill at any time. Colonel Ford made every effort in his power to obtain re-enforcements and other means of defense; he sent written requests to Colonel Miles for axes, spades, and other intrenching implements, and for artillery; he sent verbal requests for the same by his officers, and went in person to Colonel Miles, and importuned Colonel Miles whenever he met with him, which he often did, for these things, so greatly as to excite expressions from him that implied his displeasure. Still, Colonel Ford persevered in these requests from the time he took the command of these heights down almost to the hour when he gave the order to evacuate them. He got ten axes, two Parrott guns at the battery, and no more intrenching tools or artillery. He received the re-enforcements already mentioned, and no more. Whether Colonel Miles did right or wrong in not complying with these requests, it is no part of our duty here to inquire into. It is enough for us to show that Colonel Ford did all that he could do to obtain such aids, and could not, and did not, obtain them; and to show further that without these means of defense furnished in due time he could not hold his position against the forces of the enemy.

V. As a general statement, the orders he received were to hold Maryland Heights as long as he could do so, and, if he should be overpowered by superior force, to spike the guns and throw them down the hill, so that they could not be used by the enemy against Harper's Ferry, and to retreat in good order. One alleged order is disputed; one witness, Lieutenant Binney, states that an order was sent by Colonel Miles, directed to Colonel Ford, to hold Maryland Heights "till the cows' tails dropped off," and that it was receipted for on the envelope in which it was sent. Colonel Ford denies that he ever received any such order. No person is named by whom that order is alleged to have been sent; no person has testified that he delivered any such order to Colonel Ford. The envelope, on which it is alleged a receipt was written, is not produced or accounted for. But the order-book is in evidence, and there is there that which purports to be a full copy of that order. Now, if it was copied from the original, and it purports to be so as much as all the other orders in the book, then the copy must have been made by some person who had that original order lying before him; and, after that, it must have been sent away, because no one claims to have seen it after it was sent, as is alleged, to Colonel Ford. The order is dated September 13, and the book itself upon its face shows indisputably that that one order of September 13 and three general orders of September 14(?) were copied before the disputed order was placed in the book. This is a matter that certainly requires explanation, and there is no explanation attempted; no one witness states the name of the person who made this copy, or in whose handwriting it is; it is at the top of the right page of the book, so that the person who did so, if he placed it there before the copies of orders of the 14th. were made, could not but have seen that he was leaving a page in blank. It is not like the accidental turning of two leaves. This shows, and in our judgment conclusively, that this paper never came from Colonel Miles, and that no such order was issued by him on the 13th day of September, 1862, because, if it had been issued and copied into the order-book on that day, it would necessarily have preceded the orders that were issued and copied on the 14th day of September. It must have been placed upon the order-book by some person who had access to that book; who had the opportunity to put it there. The handwriting resembles that

in which other copies are entered. It is either the same handwriting, or the handwriting of a person who has endeavored to imitate as closely as possible the handwriting of the preceding entries. If it is the same, then Lieutenant Binney knows whose it is. If it is not the same, then it is a forgery; and no man would forge such an order if there were in fact a genuine order the same in substance. Lieutenant Binney swears positively that he does not know who put this matter upon the order-book. It was his duty to state the name to you if he knew it; and to state, further, his opinion of the handwriting. But it must have been placed there by some person of the military family of Colonel Miles; no others had access to the books; and Lieutenant Binney knows all those persons, and is acquainted with the handwriting of all who acted as clerks to Colonel Miles while he and they were with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry.

But, further, Lieutenant Binney published what he informed the public was an order from Colonel Miles. He did not state to the public in his card that he published the alleged order from memory merely. The public were caused to believe by him that he copied that order. But now and here he testifies that he did not copy it, but wrote it only from memory. The alleged order published is, according to our recollection of it, exactly the same as that upon this book. This identifies the person. Lieutenant Binney wrote both. He denies, upon his oath, all knowledge of how this matter came upon this order-book. It is, then, a mere forgery. But, further, the alleged copy has upon its face evidence that it never came from Colonel Miles. The words "till the cows' tails drop off," are not such as would have been employed by an old man, as Colonel Miles was. They are such as only a young man, and quite a young man, would have used. They are the offspring of youthful levity. The taste is not that of Colonel Miles. That he was a man of correct taste the previous orders in the book show; not one of them, so far as we have seen them, shows any mark of bad taste or vulgarity; all are written as a gentleman would write them. But there is still further and more conclusive evidence that this alleged order did not come from Colonel Miles. He knew the position of Colonel Ford, and knew also that the cannon at Camp Hill did not and could not defend the position of Colonel Ford at "all points." The position of Colonel Ford was the whole defense of Maryland Heights, and the guns at Camp Hill defended only so much of it as was within their range. The whole place where the attack was made upon Colonel Ford's position was behind the hill from the side on which these guns were; they could not have been brought to bear upon the enemy until after the forces of Colonel Ford had retreated and were below the battery commanded by McGrath, and then they would have been nearly useless. But, further, we assert that not only was no such order given, but, on the contrary thereof, that Colonel Miles did order Colonel Ford to vacate the heights. Now let us see where is the weight of the evidence—on which side is the proof.

1. Mr. Noakes states that Colonel Ford rode up to an officer in his presence and said to that officer, "I have vacated Maryland Heights, according to the order I have just received." This was while Colonel Miles was within half a mile of Colonel Ford, alive and in good health. The same witness testifies that when he suggested (at General White's request) to Colonel Miles the propriety of trying to take possession of Loudoun Heights, he replied, "Poh! Poh! I cannot hold Maryland Heights. I have just informed him to evacuate them."

2. Colonel Maulsby states that Colonel Miles ordered him to destroy the pontoon bridge after the retreating column should have crossed

upon it, and said to him, "I am afraid Colonel Ford has abandoned Maryland Heights most too soon," words which, briefly, are orders from him to Colonel Ford to abandon them, but that it was done sooner than he expected.

3. Lieutenant Binney himself testifies Colonel Miles said the running of the troops would eventually cause the evacuation of the heights. He said to Ford, if forced by overwhelming numbers to leave the position, not to do so without spiking the heavy guns.

The circumstances stated by Colonel Cameron are not consistent with the giving of any such order at the time it is alleged to have been given. He was ordered to have his regiment in readiness to go over to support Colonel Ford. He obeyed the order, and about 1 o'clock Colonel Miles countermanded it, and said the troops would not be needed over there. Why would they not be needed? The enemy was still there. The only reasonable solution is that he had given an order to Colonel Ford to spike the guns and retreat; because in any other contingency they were greatly needed by Colonel Ford.

4. Captain McGrath heard Colonel Ford read an order from Colonel Miles to vacate. Miles told McGrath if compelled to leave, to spike the guns; states that Colonel Ford regularly examined the orderly who brought the order, respecting the time he was bringing it. Colonel Ford was on horseback and McGrath standing by him with his hand on his thigh while he read the order to him, and consulted with him about it.

5. Mrs. Elizabeth Brown heard a conversation between Miles and Ford near 12 o'clock on Saturday; the men were ordered to leave the room. She heard Colonel Miles tell Colonel Ford that his men would have to fall back to the Ferry; they could not hold the heights; the thing was impossible; the rebel force was too strong. When she got down stairs Colonel Miles was at the door.

Lieutenant Binney swears that his statements do not, in substance, differ from those of Mrs. Brown.

The conduct of Colonels Miles and Ford are altogether inconsistent with any such order. Colonel Miles met Colonel Ford at the pontoon bridge. Did he charge him with disobeying his orders? No. Did he put him promptly under arrest? No; he never gave any such order. Did he reason or expostulate with him, or ask any explanation of his conduct? No. The witnesses all state, who saw them, that they walked along in cheerful, pleasant conversation. It was not until Monday that Harper's Ferry was surrendered; and during all that time, from Saturday till Monday, not one witness states that Colonel Miles made any harsh remark about Colonel Ford or his conduct. The testimony of the chaplain, who gives you the words of Colonel Miles, but not one word at the very moment, when, if he had given no such order to evacuate, that implied that he had not done so [*sic*]. It all is proved in the fact that this order had to be obeyed sooner than he expected it to be. It was the duty of Colonel Miles to have immediately ordered Colonel Ford under arrest, if he believed that he evacuated Maryland Heights contrary to his orders. He was in good health, in the full exercise of all his faculties, and well knew what his duty was. That no such order was even talked of to any man by Colonel Miles is abundant proof that he knew Colonel Ford had not subjected himself to arrest. His conduct can be explained upon no other theory.

Let us now turn to the conduct of Colonel Ford. He told Captain McGrath that he had an order from Colonel Miles to evacuate; read the order to him; knew Colonel Miles' handwriting. Now, it was either

true or false. If he had no such order, then the paper that he was reading to McGrath was a forgery of the order of his superior officer, who was alive and well, and within 2 or 3 miles of him. He rode up to an officer and told him he had left Maryland Heights in obedience to an order he had received. He had or had not received such order. If he received no such order, he was guilty of willful falsehood. After that, he was inquiring for Colonel Miles, and soon afterward found Colonel Miles, and then they went on together in pleasant conversation.

Take, now, all this testimony, not singly, but all together; the position of the entry on the order-book; the testimony of Noakes, Maulsby, McGrath, and Brown; the conduct of Colonel Miles and of Colonel Ford, and you must discredit a volume of evidence before you can reach the conclusion that the order referred to was ever received by Colonel Ford. Indeed, it would seem to be doubtful whether such order was ever issued by Colonel Miles; but that is a matter in which we have no interest, as, unless received by Colonel Ford, he is not responsible for disobedience to it. This relieves Colonel Ford. He evacuated Maryland Heights under the order of his commanding officer. This obedience to that order was an act of official duty on his part. He was bound to obey it. He did obey it, and that ends the inquiry as to him. But if any member of the Commission shall entertain a different opinion, then I respectfully submit that Colonel Ford should have evacuated Maryland Heights at the time he did so; that he did right in ordering the guns to be spiked and the men to go over to Harper's Ferry. In other words, that there was a military necessity for the evacuation, and if he had had no superior officer to command him he should have evacuated the heights as soon as he did so. To determine the matter, we must see, as exactly as possible, the condition of his command and of his position at the time he did give the order to spike the guns and to fall back upon Harper's Ferry. What was that condition?

The enemy had already marched through the defile of Solomon's Gap, and were in three columns, one in front, one on each wing, with artillery and infantry. The [strength] of the enemy is variously estimated from 25,000 down to 12,000. Colonel Ford's cavalry had been shelled out of Solomon's Gap on Thursday night. Colonel Ford had no mortar, not a single piece of artillery, to oppose them, and they were pressing on with both infantry and artillery. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiment had fled; were rallied as well as they could be, and Colonel Sherrill was wounded; they fled again, leaving to Colonel Ford only about 300 or 400 men, infantry and dismounted cavalry, armed with carbines. The enemy was approaching on both flanks and from the center, from 25,000 down to 12,000 men, with fifteen pieces of artillery at least. Could these 300, or 400, or 600, or, if you please, 1,000 men withstand the enemy even upon the lowest estimate of their numbers, 12,000 men, armed as they were with artillery, and the means of shelling our troops? Could Colonel Ford have any reason whatever to hope for success in such a conflict? His troops had already been driven back to the breastwork of logs, and from that point back to a depression in the hill, and from that point back still farther to another depression, below which were the guns. He was strictly ordered to spike the guns and throw them down the hill, so that the enemy could not use them against Harper's Ferry. Another backward [movement], another repulse, only was wanted, and the guns were lost. What was to be done? The enemy were his superiors, greatly so, both in arms and in numbers. He had no special advantage of position; he was on a hill, so, too, were they, and they were coming up on both sides. A day's delay and the guns were

lost; an hour's delay and they were in increased danger. Why fight and sacrifice the lives of his men when he could have no hope of success? Was it his duty? Is it the duty of any officer to continue a conflict when he knows that the only result of his doing so will be to add to the number of the slain? It was his duty to save the lives of his men. Honor, conscience, patriotism, reason, religion, every obligation that can bind man to man, and man to his God, required it at his hands.

Every officer who was on the hill and who is here as a witness has stated that there was a military necessity for the evacuation at the time Colonel Ford gave the order to do so. There are witnesses called by the Government—Major Hewitt, Major Steiner, Major Baird, Major Russell, Colonel Downey, Captain Brown, Captain Whittier, Captain Grafflin, Lieutenant Carnes, Adjutant Pearce, and many others, all unite with one voice in this declaration.

Colonel D'Utassy states that he was surprised when Colonel Ford left Maryland Heights, and believes they could have been held longer; but he is careful to add, "If re-enforcements had been sent to Colonel Ford;" that is, if he had been re-enforced in due time, for the arrival of fresh troops, no matter how great their numbers and how complete their equipments, after the time when they were too late to be of service, would not have been re-enforcements in any proper sense of the word. I take this only as a specimen of all the rest. Every one is careful to add that Colonel Ford must have been re-enforced in order to enable him to hold the heights, and implies that he could not have held them without such re-enforcements, so that the difference in opinion is only apparent, and not real. Colonel Ford himself always said he could hold the heights if he was properly re-enforced. But with all his efforts, after having strained every nerve to obtain such re-enforcements, he could not do so. The result was inevitable, and he knew it. All the officers knew it. The heights were abandoned. In addition to this, but one of these officers who states that the heights could have been held longer was on the hill or knew with any reasonable certainty the force that Colonel Ford had to contend with. There was, then, a military necessity for the evacuation of Maryland Heights at the time Colonel Ford ordered it to be made.

The opinion of a commanding officer, formed upon the field, with all the facts fully before him, pressing upon his attention, calling for the prompt exercise of his judgment and skill, should in all cases be respected, and will by this tribunal, and will there be treated with great deference and not lightly overruled. You cannot by all the evidence you can obtain, have so full and so clear a view of all the circumstances that surrounded Colonel Ford at the time he gave the order as he had at that time. That Mrs. Brown was there no one denies or doubts. It was her house for the time being; her husband was in the battle, and she was necessarily anxious, not to say curious, to know what was to be the result. That there was a hole for the stove-pipe to pass through no one doubts, and but a plank floor. She could then hear every word that passed between Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford. Colonel Ford was angry, paced up and down the room and swore that it was a shame. He received the order, but did so with great dissatisfaction. Just as Colonel Miles was leaving the house, Major Steiner met him at the door.

Lieutenant Binney is asked whether he contradicts the lady, and swears he does not, but swears that he agrees with her substantially in her statement.

Captain Powell heard Colonel Miles state just after the evacuation, "It was well; the next charge the enemy made they would have driven our forces from the mountain and got possession of the siege guns, and turned them upon us at Harper's Ferry."

The conduct of both Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford when they were together shows that Colonel Miles had ordered Colonel Ford to evacuate Maryland Heights. They met and were in friendly conversation just as Colonel Ford came down and by the pontoon bridge. Colonel Sammon, Major Steiner, and Captain McGrath saw Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford together shortly after the evacuation, and their relations were evidently pleasant and friendly. Major Russell saw Colonel Ford at Colonel Miles' headquarters that evening, as late as 9 o'clock, in friendly conversation. Mrs. Brown: "I heard Colonel Miles tell you (Colonel Ford) that your men would have to fall back to the Ferry; they could not hold the heights; the thing was impossible; the rebel force was too strong. You rose to your feet and swore you would be damned if you could not hold it, provided he would send re-enforcements. He said he had sent all he could spare." This must have been a few minutes before the remarks of Colonel Miles testified to by Major Steiner. It was at the same place, and as Colonel Miles was leaving. The most truthful testimony of a hundred witnesses, including Colonel Ford himself, and all his officers, could not present it fully and clearly. After all had been told that they could tell you, still, the half would have been left untold. He acted, as all commanders must act, in view of the facts as they were then presented to him. He did the best he could; angels can do no more.

Not one witness casts a shade of doubt or imputation upon the courage and coolness and capacity, the patriotism or the honor, of Colonel Ford. Not one man states that he did not make the best use he could of the means he had at his command, and the very best disposition that could be made of his forces. Not one witness testifies that he was ever absent for a moment from his post of duty, or negligent or backward in the discharge of his duty. He was always, at all times and in every place, eager and anxious to discharge his whole duty to his country in his command. Not one witness doubts the clearness of his intellect and his general ability as a commander of his regiment. Not one witness doubts, in the least, but that he was and is an honest, truthful, honorable, and faithful officer. Where, then, is there room left for censure, or for anything else than praise? He fought bravely and wisely and well, but was overpowered by superior numbers with superior advantages, and, under the order of his commanding officer from whom it should have been given, he left a position that might have been made nearly impregnable if properly fortified and manned, but which was nearly defenseless. He regrets that he was compelled to do so; regrets the sad results of his withdrawing from the heights and the discomfiture of his forces, but knows that he has done his whole duty. He obeyed every order of his commanding officer promptly and fully. What duty did he omit or neglect to discharge? At what moment was he absent from his post? At what time was he ever found remiss, or careless, or negligent, or off his guard, or taken by surprise? Never. He, therefore, claims it as his right that this tribunal certify the Government that the evacuation of Maryland Heights was not caused or produced by any misconduct or omission of duty on his part; that in the service assigned to him he did faithfully and wisely and carefully and well his duty, and his whole duty, and is now, as he always has been, a meritorious officer. Defense! He needs no defense.

Our duties to our friend are now closed. It has not been the office of advocates, but more nearly resembles that of a book-keeper, who arranges the scattered items into one account and shows the balance. We have had first to arrange the evidence, and, that done, the justification of our friend is full and complete. And this high tribunal, the highest that perhaps has ever met in the United States, and charged with one of the most important inquiries that ever was committed to any tribunal, will, we are sure, take great pleasure in certifying the Government that Colonel Ford merits nothing but praise for his conduct as commander of Maryland Heights. The Government, we are sure, when the facts shall be fully known to it, will cheerfully concur in that opinion.

We have the honor to be, with great respect,

JOHN JOLIFFE.

SANDERS W. JOHNSTON.

OCTOBER 27, 1862.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 28, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

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The Commission resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

The judge-advocate read-in evidence the following telegram from General McClellan to General Halleck:

FREDERICK CITY, *September 13—11 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

An order of General R. E. Lee, addressed to General D. H. Hill, which has accidentally come into my hands this evening, the authenticity of which is unquestionable, discloses some of the plans of the enemy, and shows most conclusively that the main rebel army is now before us, including Longstreet, Jackson, the two Hills, McLaws, Walker, and R. H. Anderson's and Hood's commands. That army was ordered to march on the 10th, and to attack and capture our forces at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg yesterday, by surrounding them with such a heavy force that they conceived it impossible they could escape. They were also ordered to take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; afterward to concentrate at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. That this was the plan of campaign on the 9th is confirmed by the fact that heavy firing has been heard in the direction of Harper's Ferry this afternoon, and the columns took the roads specified in the order. It may, therefore, in my judgment, be regarded as certain that this rebel army, which I have good reasons for believing amounts to 120,000 men or more, and know to be commanded by Lee in person, intended to attempt penetrating Pennsylvania. The officers told their friends here that they were going to Harrisburg and Philadelphia.

My advance has pushed forward to-day and overtaken the enemy on the Middletown and Harper's Ferry roads, and several slight engagements have taken place, in which our troops have driven the enemy from their position. A train of wagons, about three-fourths of a mile long, was destroyed to-day by the rebels in their flight. We took over 50 prisoners.

This army marches forward early to-morrow morning, and will make forced marches to endeavor to relieve Colonel Miles; but I fear, unless he makes a stout resistance, we may be too late.

A report came in this moment that Miles was attacked to-day, and repulsed the enemy; but I do not know what credit to attach to the statement. I shall do everything in my power to save Miles if he still holds out. Portions of Burnside's and Franklin's corps moved forward this evening. I have received your dispatch at 10 a. m. You will perceive, from what I have stated, that there is but little probability of the enemy being in much force south of the Potomac. I do not by any means wish to be understood as underrating the importance of holding Washington; it is of great consequence; but upon the success of this army the fate of the nation depends. It was for this reason that I said everything else should be made subordinate to placing this army in proper condition to meet the large rebel force in our front. Unless General

Lee has changed his plans, I expect a severe general engagement to-morrow. I feel confident that there is now no rebel force immediately threatening Washington or Baltimore, but that I have the mass of their troops to contend with, and they outnumber me, when united.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Will you state to the court at what time General McClellan was ordered to advance and repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland; at what time he did actually advance; the average number of miles marched by him per day in pursuit of the invading enemy, and if, in your opinion, General McClellan should not have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I could not answer that question without referring to the record. I could not trust my memory as to the date General McClellan left here or the dates at which he arrived at different points; I can do so by referring to the record.

Question. Will you do so, and transmit your answer in writing to this Commission?

Answer. I will; or I will appear here to-morrow and give it verbally.

The Commission then proceeded to deliberate with closed doors. Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 29, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

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The Commission resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, recalled by the Government, and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. [Propounded yesterday in writing.] Will you state to the Commission at what time General McClellan was ordered to advance and repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland; at what time he did actually advance; the average number of miles marched by him per day in pursuit of the invading enemy, and if, in your opinion, General McClellan should not have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry?

Answer. [In writing.] I think General McClellan left Washington and established his headquarters at Rockville on the 7th of September. He left here some time in the afternoon or the night of the 7th; whether he got to Rockville before midnight or not, I cannot say. He had been directed some days before by the President to take the field against the enemy in Maryland. Most of his forces had preceded him, and on the 8th were encamped near Rockville, at Poolesville, Offutt's Cross-Roads, and on the road from Leesborough to Brookville. Burnside's forces moved along the latter road on the morning of the 8th, and entered Frederick City, I think, on the afternoon or night of the 12th. General McClellan established his headquarters there on the morning of the 13th. The battle of South Mountain was fought on the 14th, and that of Antietam on the 17th. A part of the army crossed the Monocacy below Frederick City, and was reported on the 13th to be near Jefferson and Centreville, about 12 miles from Harper's Ferry. The corps of Sumner and Franklin were within about 20 miles of Harper's Ferry on the 12th. The battle of South Mountain was fought on the 14th, about 10 or 12 miles distant, and that of Antietam on the 17th, about 12

miles distant from Harper's Ferry. The above distances are taken from the maps, and the dates from telegrams and reports of scouts; they may not be absolutely correct. The distance marched between the 8th and 14th, including the 8th, was different for different corps, averaging about 6 miles per day. It is not easy to answer the latter part of the question of the Commission without a full knowledge of the position and forces of the enemy. General McClellan has not made any report of his operations in Maryland, nor have I seen any report of his subordinate officers. But, judging from all the information I could obtain from scouts, spies, deserters, and prisoners of war on all these matters, I am of opinion that it was possible for General McClellan to have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and that he should have done so.

By the COURT:

Question. Will you please state to the court who placed Colonel Miles in command at Harper's Ferry, and if it was the intention of the Government that he should be the permanent commander there?

Answer. He was in command there when I arrived here. I do not know who placed him in command. He was under the general command of General Wool when I came here. I suppose he was the commanding officer of the post, appointed as such. As to that I do not know.

Question. Here is a telegram to Colonel Miles before General White came to Harper's Ferry:

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 7, 1862.

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry*:

Our army is in motion. It is important that Harper's Ferry be held to the latest moment. The Government has the utmost confidence in you, and is ready to give you full credit for the defense it expects you to make.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Was it intended by that that he should continue in command there?

Answer. So far as the telegram is concerned, there was no intention about it. It was a communication to the commanding officer of the post, and applied equally to his successor, should he have one. In respect to the numbers of the enemy, I would say that there has been an examination of prisoners of war from every corps and regiment, prisoners captured up above here and also out at Manassas, at the different battles, and the statements made by those prisoners as to the numbers of the corps, or even regiments, to which they belonged have all been put down. A very full examination has been made, sifting the testimony of a very large number of witnesses to that fact, under the direction of General Banks, and the general average of the forces, taken from these different sources—and they differ very little—is 97,000, total force under Lee's command. They were not all in these battles; that is, the whole force.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. What was the force of General McClellan at that time?

Answer. Over 90,000 in the field.

The Commission then proceeded to deliberate with closed doors. Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 30, 1862.

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The Commission resumed the investigation in relation to the evacuation of Maryland Heights, and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

Maj. Gen. JOHN E. WOOL, called by the Government, and sworn and examined as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. Will you state what command you held during the late events which resulted in the surrender of Harper's Ferry?

Answer. I had no immediate command of Harper's Ferry at the time of its surrender. Previous to that my command extended from the eastern shore of Maryland and Virginia to Wheeling.

Question. At what time did Harper's Ferry cease to be a part of your command?

Answer. About the 12th of September.

Question. Three days before the surrender?

Answer. Yes, sir; I immediately answered that order, and wrote to General Halleck that he or General McClellan could take all the troops from the Relay House up to Martinsburg, or even beyond that—to Martinsburg, at all events. I stated the number of troops at that time. When I wrote that letter I did not know that General White had fallen back or retreated, and joined Colonel Miles' command; which I had previously directed him to do in case he should be attacked by an overwhelming force.

Question. Will you state to the Commission what measures, if any, were taken under your directions, or were suggested by you, looking to the preparation of Harper's Ferry for defense against the enemy?

Answer. I have orders here and telegrams from Colonel Miles and my answers to them. They are as follows:

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 7. }

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., June 15, 1862.

II. Col. Dixon S. Miles, Second U. S. Infantry, will, without delay, make a return to department headquarters at Baltimore of all the troops under his command, giving their station and all the information necessary to a full understanding of the duties performed by them, together with any suggestions as to the changes, &c., that, in his opinion, he may deem advisable.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 7. }

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., June 17, 1862.

III. Colonel Miles will take measures to complete, without delay, the intrenchments commenced by him at Camp Hill, near Harper's Ferry. If the work cannot be performed by the soldiers under his command, he will employ contrabands for that purpose. He will immediately mount two additional guns in the intrenchments above named.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 9. }

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE DEPARTMENT,
Baltimore, Md., June 17, 1862.

I. Col. S. Graham, Fifth New York Artillery, will, without unnecessary delay, detail one of his best companies to proceed to Harper's Ferry and report to Col. D. S. Miles, Second U. S. Infantry, commanding at that place, for duty with the heavy batteries. Maj. James Belger, quartermaster, U. S. Army, will furnish the necessary transportation.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 10. }

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., June 18, 1862.

I. The Twenty-third Regiment Illinois Volunteers, with battery attached, under Colonel Mulligan, en route for Annapolis, Md., will halt at Harper's Ferry until further orders. Colonel Mulligan will report to Colonel Miles for duty.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 10. }

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., June 18, 1862.

II. The Twenty-second Regiment New York State Militia will march for Harper's Ferry at 10 o'clock a. m. to-morrow. Any baggage which cannot be taken, for want of time, can be forwarded after the regiment. Upon arriving at Harper's Ferry, the commanding officer of the regiment will report to Col. D. S. Miles, commanding at that place, for duty. Maj. James Belger, quartermaster, U. S. Army, will furnish the necessary transportation.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 12. }

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., June 20, 1862.

I. The Twelfth Regiment New York State Militia (exclusive of Company A) will march to-day for Harper's Ferry. Upon the arrival of the regiment at that place, the colonel will report to Col. D. S. Miles, commanding, for duty. All unnecessary baggage will be left behind. Maj. James Belger, quartermaster, U. S. Army, will provide the necessary transportation.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 57. }

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., August 8, 1862.

VIII. The troops at Hagerstown, Williamsport, and Frederick, Md., are placed under command of Col. Dixon S. Miles, commanding at Harper's Ferry, Va. Captain Perkins, First Vermont Cavalry, is relieved from duty at Hagerstown, and will proceed to join his regiment without delay.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., August 22, 1862.

Col. DIXON S. MILES,

Commanding Railroad Brigade, Harper's Ferry, Va.:

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that you will ascertain, without delay, the quantity of ammunition in the hands of the troops, and if not supplied with at least 100 rounds per man, to cause immediate requisition to be made for sufficient to furnish them with that quantity. The utmost vigilance and activity in the protection of the railroad is expected from all the troops stationed along it for its defense.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

BALTIMORE, August 24, 1862.

Colonel MILES, Harper's Ferry:

You will relieve no regiment without an order from these headquarters.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, August 24, 1862.

Col. DIXON S. MILES, Harper's Ferry:

COLONEL: You will inform me by return mail to what regiment the cavalry captured by the enemy belonged. It appears to me that these men are wholly unworthy of trust, as they were taken while at dinner. I hope you will be careful in your selection of men sent out on picket. In all such cases you ought to select an officer in whom you have full confidence, and with instructions to guard against surprise. I will send, in a day or two, a regiment of cavalry in which you can confide.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

HARPER'S FERRY, August 25, 1862.

Lieutenant-Colonel WHIPPLE,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

The enemy's cavalry are increasing on Winchester road. Trains have to be guarded by infantry escort. To run the road with safety much longer will require a cavalry regiment, and I hope one will be sent me immediately.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 77. }

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., August 28, 1862.

VII. Maj. R. S. Rodgers, Second Regiment Eastern Shore of Maryland Volunteers, will repair to Harper's Ferry, Va., and report to Col. Dixon S. Miles, Second U. S. Infantry, for duty in the construction of a block-house on Maryland Heights, above the battery, in order to protect it from a flank movement of the enemy, and prevent him from taking possession of the heights.

By command of Major-General Wool:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

BALTIMORE, September 2, 1862.

Colonel MILES, Harper's Ferry:

I have received your dispatch. Be on the lookout and keep up a vigilant reconnaissance. Let me know what is passing.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, September 4, 1862.

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

You will re-enforce Colonel Banning, if it can be done without danger to your position and if it is true that the enemy is advancing on him. The force you may send will depend on the force of the enemy. You will send ammunition of various kinds for the two 12-pounder guns, if it is not too late. They have but 30 rounds, at the present moment, for each piece.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, September 4, 1862.

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

You will send the major, with the remaining two companies of the Eighty-seventh Ohio Regiment, to Berlin, to report to Colonel Banning at Point of Rocks to-morrow morning, the 5th. The Twelfth Regiment New York Militia ought not to think of leaving for home until we know what the enemy at Winchester intends to do, and in what direction they intend to move. To go before, the regiment will forever be branded as cowards.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

HARPER'S FERRY, September 4, 1862.

Major-General WOOL :

General White abandoned Winchester night before last, and, with his troops, arrived at this post yesterday afternoon. No enemy that I can hear of in the valley of the Shenandoah, nor do I know if Winchester is occupied by him.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

BALTIMORE, September 4, 1862.

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

General White will either repair to this place or join the Army of the Potomac, but his troops and supplies will remain at Harper's Ferry, and you will dispose of them.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, September 4, 1862.

Col. DIXON S. MILES,
Commanding, Harper's Ferry :

The order making disposition of Brigadier-General White is countermanded. He is ordered to repair to Martinsburg, and take command of all the troops in and about that place, guarding the railroad and defending that place to the last extremity. Answer immediately.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, September 4, 1862.

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

You will, if possible, learn the whereabouts of the enemy, and the direction in which they are moving. It is possible they will attack your position, perhaps Martinsburg, or some position this side of Harper's Ferry.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

HARPER'S FERRY, September 5, 1862—9 a. m.

Major-General WOOL :

Your last dispatch received this morning. The enemy (A. P. Hill's division, represented to be 30,000 strong) that have crossed the Potomac at Noland's Ferry have cut the canal at Seven-mile level, and running off the water. If Colonel Banning had more troops than are with him it would embarrass his retreat, which he must do before this force. He can retard and obstruct their advance, and such are his orders. I cannot safely detach from here until I know the intentions of the enemy at Charlestown. Three brigades is the force, I am told, in the valley, assigned to attack this place and Martinsburg.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

BALTIMORE, September 5, 1862.

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

If you can get cars, send the Twelfth Regiment New York State Militia home on Saturday, unless you should be attacked. Colonel Cram, whom I sent up to look after the positions as far as Point of Rocks, says all is quiet there. If there should be any indications of an attack on Point of Rocks, you will re-enforce them. Be energetic and active, and defend all places to the last extremity. There must be no abandoning of a post, and shoot the first man that thinks of it, whether officer or soldier.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

BALTIMORE, September 5, 1862.

Colonel MILES, *Harper's Ferry* :

The position on the heights ought to enable you to punish the enemy passing up the road in the direction of Harper's Ferry. Have your wits about you, and do all you can to annoy the rebels should they advance on you. Activity, energy, and decision should be used. You will not abandon Harper's Ferry without defending it to the last extremity.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE, *Martinsburg* :

BALTIMORE, *September 6, 1862.*

Defend yourself to the last extremity. No running before the enemy is coming. Reconnoiter.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

Brig. Gen. JULIUS WHITE, *Martinsburg* :

BALTIMORE, *September 7, 1862.*

If 20,000 men should attack you, you will, of course, fall back. Harper's Ferry would be the best position I could recommend; but be sure that you have met such a force, or any other that would overwhelm you. All surplus property will be ready for instant removal, should you find it absolutely necessary to abandon Martinsburg. No property will be destroyed if by any means it can be saved.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

Major-General WOOL:

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 7, 1862—2.30 a. m.*

The enemy is steadily pressing on my pickets from Point of Rocks; has driven them in to Sandy Hook, and is putting batteries in position on a plateau opposite. I am ready for them.

D. S. MILES,
Colonel Second Infantry.

Hon. F. H. PEIRPOINT, *Governor of Virginia, Wheeling, Va. :*

BALTIMORE, *September 11, 1862.*

I would not, under the present uncertain state of affairs, feel justified in removing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg any of the forces stationed there.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

Major-General WOOL:

HARPER'S FERRY, *September 16, 1862.*

I have the honor to state that this place has been defended for several days against an attack by the divisions of Jackson, A. P. Hill, Lawton, Walker, and McLaws, amounting in all to at least 40,000 men, with over fifty pieces of artillery. After expending all our artillery ammunition, except that for short range, and defeating two attacks of the enemy's infantry, Colonel Miles, with the advice of his brigade commanders, reluctantly surrendered. I regret to say that the gallant Colonel Miles is so severely wounded that his recovery is not probable. I march to-day with the command, and will report to you, in detail, the events which have occurred since my last communication.

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

When I was at Harper's Ferry in August, I gave verbal orders to Colonel Miles in regard to the intrenchments there. He had not completed the intrenchments, and I directed him how it should be done. He had not made embrasures, and I told him to do it immediately, in order that his men might be able to ascertain how to direct their guns. I directed him also to build an intrenchment on Bolivar Heights. Afterward, by a written order which I do not see here, finding that he had not done so, I directed him peremptorily to intrench Bolivar Heights, and to abatis Camp Hill, which he, however, neglected doing. He also neglected to build a block-house on Maryland Heights, which I had directed him to build. When I gave him the order to punish the enemy coming in the direction of Harper's Ferry, I supposed he then had the block-house finished. Soon after, however, Major Rodgers came down and informed me that Colonel Miles gave no countenance to it.

Question. He had ample time and ample means for complying with both these orders?

Answer. Yes, sir; it was in August that I first gave orders in regard to Bolivar Heights and abatising Camp Hill. I also directed him to place a battery of six pieces in the road in front of Harper's Ferry bridge. After they had exhausted their firing, it was to be presumed that they might occupy the heights, and when they should commence the assault they would probably have to come down that road to attack Camp Hill. I ordered him to place a battery of six pieces there, and pointed out the place to him, and he promised to do it. He seemed to be very zealous at the time, and determined to do everything; but I am inclined to think he was overwhelmed with his duties, and perhaps had not the capacity to embrace so important a command as that. But he was the best officer I had. It was my determination to have gone up there myself, if there should be merely an attack on Harper's Ferry; but having the command of the two places, I thought Baltimore the most important. And I had anticipated that a force would be sent from Washington sooner than it was. If Colonel Miles had held out there for a few hours longer, I have no doubt General McClellan would have re-enforced him. At any rate, my opinion was that 10,000 men could have defended that place against 40,000, and I do not think the enemy had half that number; not over 30,000, at all events. I have not been able to determine from any accounts I have had that the enemy had the number reported. Colonel Miles had 13,000 there at first, but he sent away 1,500 cavalry.

Question. Had he made any representations to you about his supply of ammunition being short ?

Answer. No sir ; he said he had abundance.

Question. He made no requisitions for ammunition ?

Answer. No, sir ; when I was up there in August he had a large quantity of ammunition ; probably some of it had been issued. I wrote to him afterward about it, but he said he had abundance of everything. I recollect he had sixty days' rations when I was up there in August. I found afterward that he had neglected to call for rations. I imagine that at the time of the surrender, or previously, he was rather short. But I was apprehensive that he was rather short of rations, and I sent up rations to him as soon as I found that to be the case.

By the COURT :

Question. Did these rations reach him ?

Answer. I think they did, but not so soon as I wished. I believe there was no great deficiency of rations there, and of ammunition I supposed there was abundance, and they did not exhaust it, so it was reported to me. It seems that they became alarmed in consequence of being short of ammunition for the long-range Parrott guns. But Colonel Ward informed me that he had 80 rounds unexpended in his possession at the time of the surrender, and I understood there were 40 rounds more.

The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. I do not think he made any such statement to us. The testimony thus far goes to show that the long-range ammunition was upon the point of exhaustion.

The WITNESS. He reported to me that he had 80 rounds in his possession at the time. But I do not think that should have made any difference as to the defense of the place, because they could have waited until the assault was made. Colonel Miles had abundance of guns there to defend the position in case of an assault. I stated in my report the number of guns they had on Camp Hill. I did not know how many there were on Bolivar Heights. I could not report as to that.

By the COURT :

Question. Did Colonel Miles ever make any requisitions for ammunition, or supplies of any kind, that were not filled ?

Answer. No, sir ; I was very careful about that myself, and, when I was up there last, I requested him not to neglect it. All requisitions were very promptly filled.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. You were personally acquainted with Colonel Miles ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What is your judgment as to his capacity for such a command as that ?

Answer. I did not think he had the capacity to embrace so large a command as he had there ; but he appeared to be very zealous, and he was one of the best officers I had. Indeed, he was the only one I could place there, the only regular officer. I do not know that I had one that would have answered his purpose, unless it was General Morris, who commanded at Fort McHenry. I have always considered the surrender a disgraceful one—one that ought not to have been made without awaiting an assault. The report was that he lost only 40 men.

By the COURT :

Question. Did you consider him a better officer for such a command as that than General White ?

Answer. That would be a very difficult question to answer under the circumstances.

Question. You are acquainted with the locality of Harper's Ferry ; I understand that you have been at Harper's Ferry ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Does the Commission understand you to say that, after the loss of Maryland Heights, they should have held Bolivar Heights and Harper's Ferry until an assault was made?

Answer. Yes, sir; for this reason—the enemy had no guns on Maryland Heights that could reach our troops.

Question. Do you recollect whether requisitions were made on you for axes and other means to carry out those fortifications which you recommended there?

Answer. No, sir; I believe he did make a requisition on the quartermaster at Washington; that had been the practice; he had authority to do so.

Question. Such a requisition would not be made on you, but would be made direct to Washington?

Answer. It might have been either; he had authority to do either.

Question. Do you know why Colonel Miles did not have the block-house built on Maryland Heights, as you directed?

Answer. No, sir; I supposed it had been built until Major Rodgers returned and informed me that Colonel Miles would not countenance it.

Question. There was a telegram before the Commission from General Halleck to yourself, in which he suggested that Colonel Miles take his whole force to Maryland Heights. Was any suggestion of that kind ever made to Colonel Miles by you?

Answer. No, sir; I did not suppose, myself, that there could be any doubt about defending the place.

Question. This is the telegram to which I refer [handing it to witness].

The telegram is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 5, 1862.

Major-General WOOL, *Baltimore, Md.:*

I find it impossible to get this army into the field again in large force for a day or two. In the mean time Harper's Ferry may be attacked and overwhelmed. I leave all dispositions there to your experience and local knowledge. I beg leave, however, to suggest the propriety of withdrawing all our forces in that vicinity to Maryland Heights. I have no personal knowledge of the ground, and merely make the suggestion to you.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Answer. I do not recollect that dispatch. I will examine, however, and see if I have it. Even if I had received it, I would not have approved of it, because I thought they could defend themselves where they were, and particularly after I had ordered the block-house to be built on Maryland Heights. There were plenty of materials on the heights to build a block-house; it could have been done in a very short time; no trouble about that. When I was up there in August and saw Colonel Miles, and told him to complete his intrenchments, I think he had not formed his embrasures. I told him to do it immediately, and to abatis Camp Hill. I did not suppose there was any want of tools. He made no requisitions on me for them; I was always very particular about that. When I was up there I told him that anything wanted would be furnished. He had abundance of ammunition; I examined myself; I supposed ample for any attack that might be made; but I should think from what I have learned here that they must have wasted their ammunition. Colonel Miles appeared to be extremely zealous and extremely anxious, and I thought he would make a good defense. I had no idea, after my instructions to him that he should defend Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, that he would give up without resistance; in fact, when no assault had been made. His men could have got out of the way of the enemy's long-range cannon, if they were enfilading his works. Indeed, I think that musketry would have kept them back if nothing else. Camp Hill is very steep, and the flanks are nearly perpendicular. Colonel Miles, himself, never seemed to doubt his ability to defend the place. His last dispatch to me was that he was ready for the enemy.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE :

Question. What became of Captain Wood, who escaped with 13 men, 9 of whom returned to Harper's Ferry and surrendered themselves?

Answer. He went off with General Tyler, I suppose. I had him arrested upon the report that was made to me, and told him to go to General Tyler. I never saw him afterward.

Question. Disregarded his arrest?

Answer. Yes, sir; at least, I suppose so. I never heard any more of him.

The Commission then proceeded to deliberate with closed doors. Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 31, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The Commission resumed the consideration of the circumstances attending the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and proceeded to deliberate thereon with closed doors. Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 1, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The Commission, with closed doors, resumed the consideration of the circumstances attending the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

Subsequently the Commission adjourned to 11 a. m. Monday, November 3.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 3, 1862.*

The Commission met pursuant to adjournment.

* * * * *

The Commission adopted a report, which accompanies this record, marked A, of the circumstances attending the evacuation of Winchester by General Julius White, which was signed by the president, Major-General Hunter, and attested by the judge-advocate.*

The Commission then adopted a report in relation to the circumstances attending the evacuation of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, which was signed by the president and judge-advocate of the Commission, and accompanies this record.

Thereupon the Commission adjourned to meet again at 11 a. m. to-morrow.

D. HUNTER,
Major-General, President.

REPORT.

The Commission, consisting of Maj. Gen. D. Hunter, U. S. Volunteers, president; Maj. Gen. G. Cadwalader, U. S. Volunteers; Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, U. S. Volunteers; Capt. Donn Piatt, assistant adjutant-general of Volunteers; Capt. F. Ball, jr., aide-de-camp, U. S. Army; Col. J. Holt, Judge-Advocate-General, called by the Government to in-

* See Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, p. 803.

investigate the conduct of certain officers connected with, and the circumstances attending, the abandonment of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, have the honor to report as follows:

On the 3d day of September, General White entered Harper's Ferry, with his command, from Winchester. The next day he was ordered to Martinsburg, to take command of the forces at that place. On the 12th of September he again returned to Harper's Ferry, where he remained until its surrender, without assuming command.

On the 7th of September, General McClellan (the larger portion of his command having preceded him) left Washington, under orders, issued some days previously, to drive the enemy from Maryland. He established that night his headquarters at Rockville, and from which place, on the 11th of September, he telegraphed to General Halleck to have Colonel Miles ordered to join him at once.

On the 5th of September, Col. Thomas H. Ford, of the Thirty-second Ohio, took command of the forces on Maryland Heights.

Forces were placed at Solomon's Gap and Sandy Hook. Those at Sandy Hook, being under Colonel Maulsby, retired, by order of Colonel Miles, to the eastern slope of Maryland Heights two or three days previous to their evacuation by Colonel Ford.

On the 11th of September the force at Solomon's Gap was driven in by the enemy. Colonel Ford called upon Colonel Miles for re-enforcements, and on Friday, the 12th of September, the Thirty-ninth and One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Regiments were sent him, and on the morning of the 13th he was further re-enforced by the One hundred and fifteenth New York and a portion of a Maryland regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Downey.

Colonel Ford made requisition for axes and spades to enable him to construct defenses on the heights, but obtained none, and on the 12th, with twelve axes belonging to some Maryland regiment, being all he could obtain, a slight breastwork of trees was constructed near the crest of the heights, and in front of which for a short distance a slashing of timber was made.

The forces under Colonel Ford were stationed at various points on Maryland Heights, the principal force being on the crest of the hill near the breastwork and lookout. Skirmishing commenced on Friday, the 12th, on the crest of the hill.

Early in the morning of the 13th the enemy made an attack on the crest of the hill, and, after a short engagement, the troops retired in some confusion to the breastwork, where they were rallied. About 9 o'clock a second attack was made, which the troops behind the breastwork resisted for a short time, and until Colonel Sherrill, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, was wounded and carried off the field, when the entire One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment, as some witnesses testify, with the exception of two companies, as Major Hewitt states, broke and fled in utter confusion. Both men and most of the officers fled together, no effort being made to rally the regiment except by Colonel Ford and Lieutenant Barras, acting adjutant, and some officers of other regiments, directed by Colonel Miles, who was then on the heights.

Soon after, the remaining forces at the breastwork fell back under a supposed order from Major Hewitt, who himself says that he gave no such order, but merely sent instructions to the captains of his own regiment that, if they were compelled to retire, to do so in good order. Orders were given by Colonel Ford for the troops to return to their position, and they advanced some distance up the heights, but did not regain the breastwork.

That morning Colonel Miles was on Maryland Heights for some hours,

consulting with Colonel Ford. He left between 11 and 12 o'clock without directly ordering Colonel Ford to evacuate the heights, but instructing him, in case he was compelled to do so, to spike his guns and throw the heavy siege guns down the mountain. About 2 o'clock, perhaps a little later, by order of Colonel Ford, the heights were abandoned, the guns being spiked according to instructions.

On Sunday, Colonel D'Utassy sent over to the Maryland Heights four companies, under Major Wood, who brought off without opposition four brass 12-pounders, two of which were imperfectly spiked, and also a wagon-load of ammunition.

General White, on his return to Harper's Ferry on the 12th of September, suggested to Colonel Miles the propriety of contracting his lines on Bolivar Heights so as to make a better defense; but Colonel Miles adhered to his original line of defense, stating that he was determined to make his stand on Bolivar Heights. General White also urged the importance of holding Maryland Heights, even should it require the taking of the entire force over there from Harper's Ferry. Colonel Miles, under his orders to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, while admitting the importance of Maryland Heights, seemed to regard them as applying to the town of Harper's Ferry, and held that to leave Harper's Ferry even to go on Maryland Heights would be disobeying his instructions.

General McClellan established his headquarters at Frederick City on the morning of the 13th of September.

On the night of the 13th, after the evacuation of Maryland Heights, Colonel Miles directed Captain (now Major) Russell, of the Maryland cavalry, to take with him a few men and endeavor to get through the enemy's lines and reach some of our forces, General McClellan if possible, and to report the condition of Harper's Ferry; that it could not hold out more than forty-eight hours unless re-enforced, and to urge the sending of re-enforcements. Captain Russell reached General McClellan's headquarters at Frederick at 9 a. m. on Sunday, the 14th of September, and reported as directed by Colonel Miles. Immediately upon his arrival, General McClellan sent off a messenger, as Captain Russell understood, to General Franklin. At 10 a. m. Captain Russell left for General Franklin's command, with a communication to General Franklin from General McClellan. He reached General Franklin about 3 o'clock that afternoon, and found him engaged with the enemy at Crampton's Gap. The enemy was driven from the gap, and the next morning, the 15th, General Franklin passed through the gap, advancing about a mile, and, finding the enemy drawn up in line of battle in his front, drew his own forces up in line of battle. While there stationed, the cannonading in the direction of Harper's Ferry, which had been heard very distinctly all the morning, Harper's Ferry being about 7 miles distant, suddenly ceased; whereupon General Franklin sent word to General McClellan of the probable surrender of Harper's Ferry by Colonel Miles, and did not deem it necessary to proceed farther in that direction.

The battle of South Mountain was fought on Sunday, the 14th, and on the same day, during the afternoon, the enemy at Harper's Ferry attacked the extreme left of the line on Bolivar Heights, but, after some time, were repulsed by the troops under the command of General White. On Sunday night the cavalry at Harper's Ferry made their escape, under Colonel Davis, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry,* by permission of Colonel Miles, and reached Greencastle, Pa., the next morning, capturing on their way

* Col. B. F. Davis, Eighth New York Cavalry, was the officer meant, and he was brevetted for this service. (See pp. 583, 629, 758, 775, and Part II, pp. 305, 306.)

an ammunition train belonging to General Longstreet, consisting of some 50 or 60 wagons.

The Commission regard this escape of cavalry as being worthy of great commendation to the officers conducting the same.

Several of the infantry officers desired permission to cut their way out at the same time the cavalry made their escape, but Colonel Miles refused, upon the ground that he had been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity.

On the morning of the 15th the enemy opened their batteries from several points, seven to nine, as estimated by different witnesses, directing their attack principally upon our batteries on the left of Bolivar Heights.

The attack commenced at daybreak; about 7 o'clock Colonel Miles represented to General White that it would be necessary to surrender. General White suggested that the brigade commanders be called together, which was done. Colonel Miles stated that the ammunition for the batteries was exhausted, and he had about made up his mind to surrender. That was finally agreed to by all present, and General White was sent to arrange articles of capitulation. The white flag was raised by order of Colonel Miles, but the enemy did not cease firing for some half or three-quarters of an hour after. Colonel Miles was mortally wounded after the white flag was raised. The surrender was agreed upon about 8 a. m. on Monday, the 15th of September.

The following was the testimony of officers commanding batteries:

At the time of the surrender, Captain Von Sehlen had some ammunition; could not tell what amount, but mostly shrapnel; had lost about 100 rounds on Saturday, the 13th, by the explosion of a limber, caused by one of the enemy's shells.

Captain Rigby had expended, during the siege of Harper's Ferry, about 600 rounds, being all that he had with the exception of canister.

Captain Potts had expended about 1,000 rounds, being all that he had with the exception of canister.

Captain Graham had but two guns of his battery under his immediate command on the morning of the surrender; had probably 100 rounds of all kinds, but no long-time fuses.

Captain Phillips had expended all his ammunition except some 40 rounds of canister and some long-range shells, too large for his guns.

Captain McGrath's battery had been spiked and left on Maryland Heights on Saturday.

It appears that during the siege, and shortly previous, Colonel Miles paroled several Confederate prisoners and permitted them to pass through our lines. During the week previous to the evacuation of Maryland Heights, a Lieutenant Rouse, of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, who had been engaged in a raid upon a train from Harper's Ferry to Winchester a short time before, was captured and brought into Harper's Ferry. He escaped while on the way to the hospital, he pretending to be sick, but was retaken. He was paroled, but returned in command of some rebel cavalry on the morning of the surrender. The attention of General A. P. Hill was called to the fact that Lieutenant Rouse was a paroled prisoner, but no attention was paid to it. Lieutenant Rouse himself, on being spoken to about it, laughed at the idea of observing his parole.

On Saturday, the day of the attack upon and evacuation of Maryland Heights, Colonel Miles directed that 16 Confederate prisoners be permitted to pass through our lines to rejoin the rebel army at Winchester. Other cases are testified to, but the above-named are of the most importance.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WHITE AND COLONELS D'UTASSY AND TRIMBLE.

Of the subordinate officers referred to in this case, with the exception of Col. Thomas H. Ford, the Commission finds nothing in their conduct that calls for censure. On the contrary, General Julius White merits its approbation. He appears from the evidence to have acted with decided capability and courage.

In this connection the Commission calls attention to the disgraceful behavior of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry, and recommend that Major Baird, for his bad conduct, as shown by the evidence, should be dismissed the service. Some of the officers of this regiment, Lieutenant Barras, acting adjutant, and others, not known by name to the Commission, behaved gallantly, and should be commended.

COL. THOMAS H. FORD.

In the case of Colonel Ford, charged with improper conduct in abandoning Maryland Heights, the Commission, after a careful hearing of the evidence produced by the Government, and that relied on by the defense, and a due consideration of the arguments offered by counsel, finds:

That on the 5th of September Colonel Ford was placed in command of Maryland Heights by Colonel Miles; that Colonel Ford, finding the position unprepared by fortifications, earnestly urged Colonel Miles to furnish him means by which the heights could be made tenable for the small force under his command should a heavy one be brought against him. These reasonable demands were, from some cause unknown to the Commission, not responded to by the officer in command of Harper's Ferry; that subsequently, when the enemy appeared in heavy force, Colonel Ford frequently and earnestly called upon Colonel Miles for more troops, representing that he could not hold the heights unless re-enforced; that these demands were feebly, or not at all, complied with; that, as late as the morning of the 13th of September, Colonel Ford sent two written demands to Colonel Miles for re-enforcements, and saying that, with the troops then under his command, he could not hold the heights, and, unless relieved or otherwise ordered, he would have to abandon them; that, as late as 11 o'clock a. m. of the 13th, a few hours previous to the abandonment of this position, Colonel Miles said to Colonel Ford that he (Colonel Ford) could not have another man, and must do the best he could; and, if unable to defend the place, he must spike the guns, throw them down the hill, and withdraw to Harper's Ferry in good order.

The Commission is, then, satisfied that Colonel Ford was given a discretionary power to abandon the heights or not, as his better judgment might dictate, with the men and means then under his command; and it is believed from the evidence, circumstantial and direct, that the result did not, to any great extent, surprise, nor in any way displease, the officer in command at Harper's Ferry.

But this conclusion, so much relied upon by the defense, forces the Commission to consider the fact: Did Colonel Ford, under the discretionary power thus vested in him, make a proper defense of the heights, and hold them, as he should have done, until driven off by the enemy?

The evidence shows conclusively that the force upon the heights was not well managed; that the point most pressed was weakly defended as to numbers, and, after the wounding of the gallant colonel of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry, it was left without a com-

petent officer in command, Colonel Ford, himself, not appearing nor designating any one who might have restored order and encouraged the men. That the abandonment of the heights was premature is clearly proven. Our forces were not driven from the field, as full time was given to spike the guns and throw the heavier ones down the precipice, and retreat in good order to Harper's Ferry. The loss in killed and wounded does not indicate a desperate conflict, and the opinion of officers sustaining that abandonment is weakened by the fact that the next day a force returning to the heights found them unoccupied, and brought away, unmolested, four abandoned guns and a quantity of ammunition.

In so grave a case as this, with such disgraceful consequences, the Commission cannot permit an officer to shield himself behind the fact that he did as well as he could, if in so doing he exhibits a lack of military capacity. It is clear to the Commission that Colonel Ford should not have been placed in command on Maryland Heights; that he conducted the defense without ability, and abandoned his position without sufficient cause, and has shown throughout such a lack of military capacity as to disqualify him, in the estimation of this Commission, for a command in the service.

COL. D. S. MILES.

The Commission has approached a consideration of this officer's conduct, in connection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, with extreme reluctance. An officer who cannot appear before any earthly tribunal to answer or explain charges gravely affecting his character, who has met his death at the hands of the enemy, even upon the spot he disgracefully surrendered, is entitled to the tenderest care and most careful investigation. These this Commission has accorded Colonel Miles, and, in giving an opinion, only repeats what runs through our nine hundred pages of evidence, strangely unanimous upon the fact that Colonel Miles' incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility, led to the shameful surrender of this important post.

Early as the 15th of August he disobeys orders of Major-General Wool to fortify Maryland Heights. When it is attacked by the enemy, its naturally strong positions are unimproved, and, from his criminal neglect, to use the mildest term, the large force of the enemy is almost upon an equality with the few men he throws out for their protection.

He seemed to have understood and admitted to his officers that Maryland Heights was the key to the position, and yet he placed Colonel Ford in command with a feeble force; made no effort to strengthen him by fortifications, although, between the 5th and the 13th of September, there was ample time to do so; and to Colonel Ford's repeated demands for means to intrench and re-enforcements to strengthen the position, he made either inadequate return or no response at all. He gave Colonel Ford discretionary power as to when he should abandon the heights, the fact of the abandonment having, it seems, been determined on in his own mind, for, when the unhappy event really occurred, his only exclamations were to the effect that he feared Colonel Ford had given them up too soon. This, too, when he must have known that the abandonment of Maryland Heights was the surrender of Harper's Ferry. This leaving the key of the position to the keeping of Colonel Ford, with discretionary power, after the arrival of the capable and courageous officer who had waived his rank to serve wherever ordered, is one of the more striking facts illustrating the utter incapacity of Colonel Miles.

Immediately previous to and pending the siege of Harper's Ferry he paroled rebel prisoners, and permits, indeed, sends them to the enemy's headquarters. This, too, when he should have known that the lack of ammunition, the bad conduct of some of our troops, the entire absence of fortifications, and the abandonment of Maryland Heights were important facts they could, and undoubtedly did, communicate to the enemy. Sixteen of these prisoners were paroled on the 12th, and a pass given them in the handwriting of Colonel Miles, and some of them left as late as the 14th; while a rebel officer, by the name of Rouse, after an escape, is retaken, and subsequently has a private interview with Colonel Miles, is paroled, and after the surrender appears at the head of his men, among the first to enter Harper's Ferry.

It is not necessary to accumulate instances from the mass of evidence that throughout scarcely affords one fact in contradiction to what each one establishes, that Colonel Miles was unfit to conduct so important a defense as that of Harper's Ferry.

This Commission would not have dwelt upon this painful subject were it not for the fact that the officer who placed this incapable in command should share in the responsibility, and in the opinion of the Commission Major-General Wool is guilty to this extent of a grave disaster, and should be censured for his conduct.

The Commission has remarked freely on the conduct of Colonel Miles, an old officer, killed in one of the battles of our country, and it cannot, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command when it thinks such censure deserved. The General-in-Chief has testified that General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only 6 miles per day on an average when pursuing the invading enemy. The General-in-Chief also testifies that, in his opinion, General McClellan could, and should, have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the Commission fully concur.

The evidence thus introduced confirms the Commission in the opinion that Harper's Ferry, as well as Maryland Heights, was prematurely surrendered. The garrison should have been satisfied that relief, however long delayed, would come at last, and that 1,000 men killed in Harper's Ferry would have made a small loss had the post been secured, and probably save 2,000 at Antietam. How important was this defense we can now appreciate. Of the 97,000, composing at that time the whole of Lee's army, more than one-third were attacking Harper's Ferry, and of this the main body was in Virginia. By reference to the evidence, it will be seen that at the moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland Heights his little army was in reality relieved by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, within 7 miles of his position, and that after the surrender of Harper's Ferry no time was given to parole prisoners even, before 20,000 troops were hurried from Virginia, and the entire force went off on the double-quick to relieve Lee, who was being attacked at Antietam. Had the garrison been slower to surrender or the Army of the Potomac swifter to march, the enemy would have been forced to raise the siege or have been taken in detail, with the Potomac dividing his forces.

D. HUNTER,
Major-General, President.

J. HOLT,
Judge-Advocate-General.

[Addenda.]

ANNAPOLIS, MD., September 22, 1862.

Col. J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General :

SIR: I have just received the following from Brigadier-General White, and notified him that I refer this strange arrangement to headquarters. Shall the wagons be returned, and how ?

GENERAL: I have the honor to state that, after capitulating at Harper's Ferry, I was allowed by General A. P. Hill, commanding, at that post, the forces of the enemy, some 24 wagons for the transportation of officers' baggage, after my pledge to return them to the enemy's lines. I respectfully request, therefore, that the quartermaster be directed to forward them back.

Very respectfully,

JULIUS WHITE,
Brigadier-General.

DANIEL TYLER,
Brigadier-General.

—
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 22, 1862.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Annapolis, Md. :

You will arrest Brig. Gen. Julius White and the other commanders of brigades at Harper's Ferry at the time of the surrender, and direct them to report in person in Washington at the Adjutant-General's Office. Col. Thomas Ford will be arrested, and also any other officers who you may be advised took part in recommending the surrender of Harper's Ferry.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

—
ANNAPOLIS, MD., September 22, 1862.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General, U. S. Army :

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that at the surrender of Harper's Ferry, Va., on the 15th instant, all the papers relating to the brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. Julius White at Winchester, Va., as also to the brigade under his command at Martinsburg, Va., were scattered and destroyed by the Confederate soldiers, who broke open the box in which they were placed.

I cannot, therefore, return to the Department the books and papers of those commands.

Very respectfully,

HENRY CURTIS, JR.,
Capt. and Asst. Adj. Gen., Brigadier-General White's Staff.

—
ANNAPOLIS, MD., September 23, 1862.

Col. J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General :

SIR: The Harper's Ferry troops arrived Sunday night, tired out. To-day we forward 2,300 to Chicago, and to-morrow shall forward 3,300,

and next day, and thereafter, as many daily as the railroad can transport. The arrest of several officers embarrasses us, but we shall move along.

DANIEL TYLER,
Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS,
Annapolis, September 23, 1862.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General, Washington:

GENERAL: From what I can learn, Colonel Ford will be able to convince the Secretary of War that he is not responsible for the capitulation at Harper's Ferry; if so, as his services are very necessary to his regiment, I hope the Secretary will give the case an early decision, and, if thought compatible with the good of the service to release Colonel Ford, that he will be ordered at once to join his regiment.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

DANIEL TYLER,
Brigadier-General, Camp Parole, Md.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 23, 1862—8.30 p. m. (Received 9.10 p. m.)

Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

The conspicuous conduct of Capt. B. F. Davis, First Cavalry, in the management of the withdrawal of the cavalry from Harper's Ferry at the surrender of that place, merits the special notice of the Government. I recommend him for the brevet of major.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

ANNAPOLIS, MD., *September 23, 1862.*

GENERAL-IN-CHIEF:

General Julius White is in Baltimore. I have requested General Wool to arrest him and send him to Washington. The brigade commanders are Colonels D'Utassy, Trimble, Ford, and Ward. The first three named will be arrested. The last is the colonel of the Twelfth New York, and is in that city. The commanders of regiments are Colonels Segoine, Sammon, Cameron, Stannard, Sherrill, Maulsby, Willard, and Banning; Lieutenant-Colonels Hixon, Andross, Downey, and Satterlee, and Major Hildebrandt. Satterlee went to New York with his regiment (the Twelfth). From what I have learned, the regimental commanders were not consulted in regard to the surrender of Harper's Ferry. I will see each one of them. Colonel Cameron says there was not a formal consultation held, to his knowledge.

L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 183. }

WAR DEPT., ADJT. GEN.'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 8, 1862.

I. The military commission, of which Maj. Gen. David Hunter, U. S. Volunteers, is president, appointed to meet in the city of Washington,

on the 25th of September, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 255, of September 23, 1862, to investigate the circumstances of the abandonment of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, having reported that Col. Thomas H. Ford, Thirty-second Ohio Volunteers, conducted the defense of Maryland Heights "without ability, abandoned his position without sufficient cause, and has shown throughout such a lack of military capacity as to disqualify him, in the estimation of the Commission, for a command in the service," the said Col. Thomas H. Ford is, by direction of the President, dismissed from the service of the United States.

II. The Commission having reported that the behavior of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry was disgraceful, and that Maj. William H. Baird, for his bad conduct, ought to be dismissed, the said Major Baird, of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers, is, by direction of the President, dismissed from the service of the United States.*

* * * * *

IV. The military commission, of which Major-General Hunter is president, is dissolved.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 204.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, commanding, during the Maryland Campaign.†

LONGSTREET'S CORPS.—Maj. Gen. JAMES LONGSTREET.

McLAW'S DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. LAFAYETTE McLAWS.

Kershaw's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. B. KERSHAW.

2d South Carolina, Col. John D. Kennedy.
3d South Carolina, Col. James D. Nance.
7th South Carolina, Col. D. Wyatt Aiken
and Capt. John S. Hard.
8th South Carolina, Lieut. Col. A. J. Hoole.

Cobb's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. HOWELL COBB.
Lieut. Col. C. C. SANDERS.
Lieut. Col. WILLIAM MACRAE.

Semmes' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. PAUL J. SEMMES.

10th Georgia, Capt. P. H. Loud.
53d Georgia, Lieut. Col. Thomas Sloan
and Capt. S. W. Marshborne.
15th Virginia, Capts. E. M. Morrison and
E. J. Willis.
32d Virginia, Col. E. B. Montague.

Barksdale's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM BARKSDALE.

16th Georgia.
24th Georgia.
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion.
15th North Carolina.

13th Mississippi, Lieut. Col. Kennon McElroy.
17th Mississippi, Lieut. Col. John C. Fiser.
18th Mississippi, Maj. J. C. Campbell and
Lieut. Col. William H. Luse.
21st Mississippi, Capt. John Sims and
Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys.

* See Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, p. 804.

† Compiled from the reports.

Artillery.

Maj. S. P. HAMILTON.
Col. H. C. CABELL.

Manly's (North Carolina) battery, Capt. B. C. Manly.
Pulaski (Georgia) Artillery, Capt. J. P. W. Read.
Richmond (Fayette) Artillery, Capt. M. C. Macon.
Richmond Howitzers, (1st company), Capt. E. S. McCarthy.
Troup (Georgia) Artillery, Capt. H. H. Carlton.

ANDERSON'S DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. RICHARD H. ANDERSON.

Wilcox's Brigade.

Col. ALFRED CUMMING.

8th Alabama.
9th Alabama.
10th Alabama.
11th Alabama.

Mahone's Brigade.

Col. WILLIAM A. PARHAM.

6th Virginia.
12th Virginia.
16th Virginia.
41st Virginia.
61st Virginia.

Featherston's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WINFIELD S. FEATHERSTON.
Col. CARNOT POSEY.

12th Mississippi.
16th Mississippi, Capt. A. M. Feltus.
19th Mississippi.
2d Mississippi Battalion.

Armistead's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. LEWIS A. ARMISTEAD.
Col. J. G. HODGES.

9th Virginia.
14th Virginia.
38th Virginia.
53d Virginia.
57th Virginia.

Pryor's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. ROGER A. PRYOR.

14th Alabama.
2d Florida.
8th Florida.
3d Virginia.

Wright's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. A. R. WRIGHT.

44th Alabama.
3d Georgia.
22d Georgia.
48th Georgia.

Artillery.

Maj. JOHN S. SAUNDERS.

Donaldsonville (Louisiana) Artillery (Maurin's battery).
Huger's (Virginia) battery.
Moorman's (Virginia) battery.
Thompson's (Grimes') (Virginia) battery.

JONES' DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. DAVID R. JONES.

Toombs' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. ROBERT TOOMBS.
Col. HENRY L. BENNING.

2d Georgia, Lieut. Col. William R. Holmes and Maj. Skidmore Harris.
15th Georgia, Col. W. T. Millican.
17th Georgia, Capt. J. A. McGregor.
20th Georgia, Col. J. B. Cumming.

Drayton's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. THOMAS F. DRAYTON.

50th Georgia, Lieut. Col. F. Kearse.
51st Georgia.
15th South Carolina, Col. W. D. De Saussure,

Pickett's Brigade.

Col. EPPA HUNTON.
 Brig. Gen. R. B. GARNETT.

8th Virginia, Col. Eppa Hunton.
 18th Virginia, Maj. George C. Cabell.
 19th Virginia, Col. J. B. Strange, Lieut.
 W. N. Wood, and Capt. J. L. Cochran.
 28th Virginia, Captain Wingfield.
 56th Virginia, Col. William D. Stuart and
 Captain McPhail.

Kemper's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. L. KEMPER.

1st Virginia.
 7th Virginia.
 11th Virginia.
 17th Virginia.
 24th Virginia.

Jenkins' Brigade.

Col. JOSEPH WALKER.

1st South Carolina (Volunteers), Lieut.
 Col. D. Livingston.
 2d South Carolina Rifles.
 5th South Carolina, Capt. T. C. Beckham.
 6th South Carolina, Lieut. Col. J. M.
 Steedman and Capt. E. B. Cantey.
 4th South Carolina Battalion.
 Palmetto (South Carolina) Sharpshooters.

Anderson's Brigade.

Col. GEORGE T. ANDERSON.

1st Georgia (Regulars), Col. W. J. Magill.
 7th Georgia.
 8th Georgia.
 9th Georgia.
 11th Georgia, Maj. F. H. Little.

Artillery.

Fauquier (Virginia) Artillery (Stribling's battery).
 Loudoun (Virginia) Artillery (Rogers' battery).
 Turner (Virginia) Artillery (Leake's battery).
 Wise (Virginia) Artillery (J. S. Brown's battery).

WALKER'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. JOHN G. WALKER.

Walker's Brigade.

Col. VAN H. MANNING.
 Col. E. D. HALL.

3d Arkansas, Capt. John W. Reedy.
 27th North Carolina, Col. J. R. Cooke.
 46th North Carolina, Col. E. D. Hall.
 48th North Carolina, Col. R. C. Hill.
 30th Virginia.
 French's (Virginia) battery, Capt. Thomas
 B. French.

Ransom's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. ROBERT RANSOM, Jr.

24th North Carolina, Lieut. Col. John L.
 Harris.
 25th North Carolina, Col. H. M. Rutledge.
 35th North Carolina, Col. M. W. Ransom.
 49th North Carolina, Lieut. Col. Lee M.
 McAfee.
 Branch's Field Artillery (Virginia), Cap-
 tain Branch.

HOOD'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. JOHN B. HOOD.

Hood's Brigade.

Col. W. T. WOFFORD.

18th Georgia, Lieut. Col. S. Z. Ruff.
 Hampton (South Carolina) Legion, Lieut.
 Col. M. W. Gary.
 1st Texas, Lieut. Col. P. A. Work.
 4th Texas, Lieut. Col. B. F. Carter.
 5th Texas, Capt. I. N. M. Turner.

Law's Brigade.

Col. E. M. LAW.

4th Alabama, Lieut. Col. O. K. McLemore.
 2d Mississippi, Col. J. M. Stone.
 11th Mississippi, Col. P. F. Liddell.
 6th North Carolina, Maj. Robert F. Webb.

Artillery.

Maj. B. W. FROBEL.

German Artillery (South Carolina), Capt. W. K. Bachman.
 Palmetto Artillery (South Carolina), Capt. H. R. Garden.
 Rowan Artillery (North Carolina), Capt. James Reilly.

* Left at Leesburg.

EVANS' BRIGADE.

Brig. Gen. NATHAN G. EVANS.
Col. P. F. STEVENS.*

17th South Carolina, Col. F. W. McMaster.
18th South Carolina, Col. W. H. Wallace.
22d South Carolina, Lieut. Col. T. C. Watkins and Maj. M. Hilton.
23d South Carolina, Capt. S. A. Durham and Lieut. E. R. White.
Holcombe (South Carolina) Legion, Col. P. F. Stevens.
Macbeth (South Carolina) Artillery, Capt. R. Boyce.

ARTILLERY.

Washington (Louisiana) Artillery.

Col. J. B. WALTON.

1st Company, Capt. C. W. Squires.
2d Company, Capt. J. B. Richardson.
3d Company, Capt. M. B. Miller.
4th Company, Capt. B. F. Eshleman.

Lee's Battalion.

Col. S. D. LEE.

Ashland (Virginia) Artillery, Capt. P. Woolfolk, jr.
Bedford (Virginia) Artillery, Capt. T. C. Jordan.
Brooks (South Carolina) Artillery, Lieut. William Elliott.
Eubank's (Virginia) battery, Capt. J. L. Eubank.
Madison (Louisiana) Light Artillery, Capt. G. V. Moody.
Parker's (Virginia) battery, Capt. W. W. Parker.

JACKSON'S CORPS.—Maj. Gen. THOMAS J. JACKSON.

EWELL'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. A. R. LAWTON.
Brig. Gen. JUBAL A. EARLY.

Lawton's Brigade.

Col. M. DOUGLASS.
Maj. J. H. LOWE.
Col. JOHN H. LAMAR.

13th Georgia.
26th Georgia.
31st Georgia, Lieut. Col. J. T. Crowder.
38th Georgia.
60th Georgia.
61st Georgia.

Early's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JUBAL A. EARLY.
Col. WILLIAM SMITH.

13th Virginia, Capt. F. V. Winston.
25th Virginia.
31st Virginia.
44th Virginia.
49th Virginia, Col. William Smith.
52d Virginia, Col. M. G. Harman.
58th Virginia.

Trimble's Brigade.

Col. JAMES A. WALKER.

15th Alabama, Capt. I. B. Feagin.
12th Georgia, Captain Rodgers.
21st Georgia, Maj. Thomas C. Glover.
21st North Carolina, Captain Miller.
1st North Carolina Battalion.†

Hays' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. HARRY T. HAYS.

5th Louisiana.
6th Louisiana, Col. H. B. Strong.
7th Louisiana.
8th Louisiana.
14th Louisiana.

* Commanding brigade while General Evans commanded provisional division.
† Attached to Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment.

*Artillery.**

Maj. A. R. COURTNEY.

Charlottesville (Virginia) Artillery (Carrington's battery).
 Chesapeake (Maryland) Artillery (Brown's battery).
 Courtney (Virginia) Artillery (Latimer's battery).
 Johnson's (Virginia) battery.
 Louisiana Guard Artillery (D'Aquin's battery).
 First Maryland Battery (Dement's battery).
 Staunton (Virginia) Artillery (Balthis' battery).

HILL'S LIGHT DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. AMBROSE P. HILL.

Branch's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. L. O'B. BRANCH.
 Col. JAMES H. LANE.

7th North Carolina.
 18th North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel
 Purdie.
 28th North Carolina.
 33d North Carolina.
 37th North Carolina.

Gregg's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. MAXCY GREGG.

1st South Carolina (Provisional Army),
 Maj. E. McCrady jr., Col. D. H.
 Hamilton.
 1st South Carolina Rifles, Lieut. Col.
 James M. Perrin.
 12th South Carolina, Col. Dixon Barnes,
 Lieut. Col. C. Jones, and Maj. W. H.
 McCorkle.
 13th South Carolina, Col. O. E. Edwards.
 14th South Carolina, Lieut. Col. W. D.
 Simpson.

Field's Brigade.

Colonel BROCKENBROUGH.

40th Virginia.
 47th Virginia.
 55th Virginia.
 22d Virginia Battalion.

Archer's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. J. ARCHER.
 Col. PETER TURNEY.

5th Alabama Battalion, Captain Hooper.
 19th Georgia, Maj. J. H. Neal and Capt. F.
 M. Johnston.
 1st Tennessee (Provisional Army), Col.
 Peter Turney.
 7th Tennessee, Maj. S. G. Shepard and
 Lieut. G. A. Howard.
 14th Tennessee, Lieut. Col. J. W. Lockert.

Pender's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. PENDER.
 Col. R. H. BREWER.

16th North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel
 Stowe.
 22d North Carolina, Maj. C. C. Cole.
 34th North Carolina.
 38th North Carolina.

Thomas' Brigade.

Col. EDWARD L. THOMAS.

14th Georgia, Col. R. W. Folsom.
 35th Georgia.
 45th Georgia, Maj. W. L. Grice.
 49th Georgia, Lieut. Col. S. M. Manning.

Artillery.†

Maj. R. L. WALKER.

Branch (North Carolina) Artillery (A. C. Latham's battery).
 Crenshaw's (Virginia) battery.
 Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery (Braxton's battery).
 Letcher (Virginia) Artillery (Davidson's battery).
 Middlesex (Virginia) Artillery (Fleet's battery).
 Pee Dee (South Carolina) Artillery (McIntosh's battery).
 Purcell (Virginia) Artillery (Pegram's battery).

* The Charlottesville Artillery, left at Richmond in August, did not rejoin the Army till after the battle of Sharpsburg. John R. Johnson's and D'Aquin's batteries were the only ones present with this division at Sharpsburg, the others having been left at Harper's Ferry and Shepherdstown.

† Braxton's, Crenshaw's, McIntosh's, and Pegram's batteries engaged at Sharpsburg. Davidson's battery had been left at Harper's Ferry, and Fleet's and Latham's batteries at Leesburg.

JACKSON'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. JOHN R. JONES.

Brig. Gen. W. E. STARKE.

Col. A. J. GRIGSBY.

Winder's Brigade.

Col. A. J. GRIGSBY.

Lieut. Col. R. D. GARDNER (Fourth Virginia).

Maj. H. J. WILLIAMS.

2d Virginia, Capt. R. T. Colston.

4th Virginia, Lieut. Col. R. D. Gardner.

5th Virginia, Maj. H. J. Williams.

27th Virginia, Capt. F. C. Wilson.

33d Virginia, Captain Golladay and Lieutenant Walton.

Taliaferro's Brigade.

Col. E. T. H. WARREN.

Col. J. W. JACKSON.

Col. J. L. SHEFFIELD.

47th Alabama.

48th Alabama.

10th Virginia.

23d Virginia.

37th Virginia.

Jones' Brigade.

Col. B. T. JOHNSON.

Brig. Gen. J. R. JONES.

Capt. J. E. PENN.

Capt. A. C. PAGE.

Capt. R. W. WITHERS.

21st Virginia, Capt. A. C. Page.

42d Virginia, Capt. R. W. Withers.

48th Virginia, Captain Candler.

1st Virginia Battalion, Lieut. C. A. Davidson.

Starke's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM E. STARKE.

Col. L. A. STAFFORD.

Col. E. PENDLETON.

1st Louisiana, Lieut. Col. M. Nolan.

2d Louisiana, Col. J. M. Williams.

9th Louisiana.

10th Louisiana, Capt. H. D. Monier.

15th Louisiana.

Coppens' (Louisiana) battalion.

Artillery.

Maj. L. M. SHUMAKER.

Alleghany (Virginia) Artillery (Carpenter's battery).

Brockenbrough's (Maryland) battery.

Danville (Virginia) Artillery (Wooding's battery).

Hampden (Virginia) Artillery (Caskie's battery).

Lee (Virginia) Battery (Raine's battery).

Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery (Poague's battery).

HILL'S DIVISION.*

Maj. Gen. DANIEL H. HILL.

Ripley's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. ROSWELL S. RIPLEY.

Col. GEORGE DOLES.

4th Georgia, Col. George Doles.

44th Georgia, Captain Key.

1st North Carolina, Lieut. Col. H. A. Brown.

3d North Carolina, Col. William L. De Rosset.

Rodes' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. R. E. RODES.

3d Alabama, Col. C. A. Battle.

5th Alabama, Maj. E. L. Hobson.

6th Alabama, Col. J. B. Gordon.

12th Alabama, Col. B. B. Gayle and Lieut. Col. S. B. Pickens.

26th Alabama, Col. E. A. O'Neal.

Garland's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. SAMUEL GARLAND, jr.

Col. D. K. McRAE.

5th North Carolina, Col. D. K. McRae and Capt. T. M. Garrett.

12th North Carolina, Capt. S. Snow.

13th North Carolina, Lieut. Col. Thomas Ruffin, jr.

20th North Carolina, Col. Alfred Iverson.

23d North Carolina, Col. D. H. Christie.

Anderson's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE B. ANDERSON.

Col. R. T. BENNETT.

2d North Carolina, Col. C. C. Tew and Capt. G. M. Roberts.

4th North Carolina, Col. Bryan Grimes and Capts. W. T. Marsh and D. P. Latham.

14th North Carolina, Col. R. T. Bennett.

30th North Carolina, Col. F. M. Parker and Maj. W. W. Sillers.

* On "field return," Army of Northern Virginia, for September 22, this division appears as of Jackson's Corps.

Colquitt's Brigade.

Col. A. H. COLQUITT.

13th Alabama, Col. B. D. Fry.
 6th Georgia, Lieut. Col. J. M. Newton.
 23d Georgia, Col. W. P. Barclay.
 27th Georgia, Col. L. B. Smith.
 28th Georgia, Maj. T. Graybill and Capt. N. J. Garrison.

*Artillery.**

Major PIERSON.

Hardaway's (Alabama) battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway.
 Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery, Capt. J. W. Bondurant.
 Jones' (Virginia) battery, Capt. William B. Jones.
 King William (Virginia) Artillery, Capt. T. H. Carter.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.†

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM N. PENDLETON.

Brown's Battalion.‡

Col. J. THOMPSON BROWN.

Powhatan Artillery (Dance's battery).
 Richmond Howitzers, 2d company (Watson's battery).
 Richmond Howitzers, 3d company (Smith's battery).
 Salem Artillery (Hupp's battery).
 Williamsburg Artillery (Coke's battery).

Cutts' Battalion.§

Lieut. Col. A. S. CUTTS.

Blackshears' (Georgia) battery.
 Irwin (Georgia) Artillery (Lane's battery).
 Lloyd's (North Carolina) battery.
 Patterson's (Georgia) battery.
 Ross' (Georgia) battery.

Jones' Battalion.§

Maj. H. P. JONES.

Morris (Virginia) Artillery (R. C. M. Page's battery).
 Orange (Virginia) Artillery (Peyton's battery).
 Turner's (Virginia) battery.
 Wimbish's (Virginia) battery.

Nelson's Battalion.

Maj. WILLIAM NELSON.

Amherst (Virginia) Artillery (Kirkpatrick's battery).
 Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery (Ansell's battery).
 Huckstep's (Virginia) battery.
 Johnson's (Virginia) battery.¶
 Milledge (Georgia) Artillery (Milledge's battery).

Miscellaneous.

Cutshaw's (Virginia) battery.
 Dixie (Virginia) Artillery (Chapman's battery).
 Magruder (Virginia) Artillery (T. J. Page, jr.'s battery).
 Rice's (Virginia) battery, Capt. W. H. Rice.¶
 Thomas (Virginia) Artillery (E. J. Anderson's battery).**

* Cutts' and Jones' battalions also under D. H. Hill's command at Sharpsburg.

† Including all batteries mentioned in the reports, or in the reorganization of October 4, and not elsewhere accounted for. Brooke's, Dearing's, and Nelson's Virginia batteries joined after the campaign had terminated.

‡ First Virginia Artillery.

§ With D. H. Hill's division at Sharpsburg.

¶ Marmaduke Johnson's battery.

¶ Not mentioned between September 1-22, but probably with the army, in reserve.

** Left at Leesburg.

CAVALRY.

Maj. Gen. JAMES E. B. STUART.

Hampton's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WADE HAMPTON.

1st North Carolina, Col. L. S. Baker.
 2d South Carolina, Col. M. C. Butler.
 10th Virginia.
 Cobb's (Georgia) Legion, Lieut. Col. P. M. B. Young.
 Jeff. Davis Legion, Lieut. Col. W. T. Martin.

Lee's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. FITZ. LEE.

1st Virginia, Lieut. Col. L. Tiernan Brien.
 3d Virginia, Lieut. Col. John T. Thornton.
 4th Virginia, Col. Williams C. Wickham.
 5th Virginia, Col. T. L. Rosser.
 9th Virginia.

Robertson's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON.
 Col. THOMAS T. MUNFORD.

2d Virginia, Col. T. T. Munford and Lieutenant-Colonel Burks.
 6th Virginia.
 7th Virginia, Capt. S. B. Myers.
 12th Virginia, Col. A. W. Harman.
 17th Virginia Battalion.

HORSE ARTILLERY.

Capt. JOHN PELHAM.

Chew's (Virginia) battery.
 Hart's (South Carolina) battery.
 Pelham's (Virginia) battery.

No. 205.

Report of Surg. Lafayette Guild, C. S. Army, Medical Director Army of Northern Virginia, of killed and wounded at Boonsborough (South Mountain or Turner's Pass), Crampton's Gap, Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg (Antietam), and Shepherdstown (Blackford's or Boteler's) Ford.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
PICKETT'S DIVISION.			
<i>Kemper's brigade.</i>			
1st Virginia.....		8	8
7th Virginia.....	2	10	12
11th Virginia.....	3	38	41
17th Virginia.....	6	30	36
24th Virginia.....		2	2
<i>Pickett's (old) brigade.</i>			
8th Virginia.....	4	9	13
18th Virginia.....	5	38	43
19th Virginia.....	7	37	44
28th Virginia.....	8	54	62
56th Virginia.....	1	19	20

Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia—Continued.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
WALKER'S DIVISION.			
<i>Ransom's brigade.</i>			
24th North Carolina	20	44	64
25th North Carolina	2	13	15
35th North Carolina	3	23	26
49th North Carolina	16	61	77
Branch's battery	2	3	5
<i>Walker's brigade.</i>			
30th Virginia	39	121	160
27th North Carolina	31	168	199
46th North Carolina	5	60	65
48th North Carolina	31	186	217
3d Arkansas	27	155	182
French's battery	1	1	2
HOOD'S DIVISION.			
<i>Anderson's brigade.*</i>			
7th Georgia	3	9	12
8th Georgia	2	17	19
9th Georgia	2	14	16
11th Georgia		10	10
1st Georgia (Regulars)	1	29	30
<i>Law's brigade.</i>			
4th Alabama	7	37	44
6th North Carolina	8	117	125
2d Mississippi	27	127	154
11th Mississippi	8	96	104
<i>Wofford's brigade.†</i>			
18th Georgia	13	72	85
1st Texas	45	141	186
4th Texas	10	97	107
5th Texas	5	77	82
Hampton's Legion	6	47	53
Reilly's battery (Division Artillery)	2	8	10
Garden's battery (Division Artillery)		9	9
Bachman's battery (Division Artillery)	2	2	4
<i>Toombs' brigade.*</i>			
2d Georgia	6	37	43
15th Georgia	6	30	36
17th Georgia		12	12
20th Georgia	4	44	48
<i>Jenkins' brigade.*</i>			
1st South Carolina	2	37	39
2d South Carolina	2	14	16
5th South Carolina	5	26	31
6th South Carolina	7	51	58
Palmetto Sharpshooters	9	55	64
<i>Evans' brigade.‡</i>			
Holcombe Legion		18	18
17th South Carolina	18	49	67
18th South Carolina	3	39	42
22d South Carolina	8	64	72
23d South Carolina	14	66	80
Washington Artillery (Corps Artillery)	4	26	30
M'LAWS' DIVISION.			
<i>Drayton's brigade.*</i>			
15th South Carolina	26	84	110
50th Georgia	29	97	126
51st Georgia	1	7	8

* Belonged to Jones' division. † Hood's brigade. ‡ Did not belong to any division.

Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia—Continued.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
<i>Barksdale's brigade.</i>			
13th Mississippi.....	8	55	63
17th Mississippi.....	11	82	93
18th Mississippi.....	10	73	83
21st Mississippi.....	6	56	62
<i>Kershaw's brigade.</i>			
2d South Carolina.....	17	77	94
3d South Carolina.....	7	73	80
7th South Carolina.....	23	117	140
8th South Carolina.....	2	17	19
Read's battery.....	4	10	14
<i>Semmes' brigade.</i>			
10th Georgia.....	15	69	84
53d Georgia.....	11	63	74
15th Virginia.....	11	63	74
32d Virginia.....	15	57	72
<i>Oobb's brigade.</i>			
Georgia Legion.....	18	68	86
16th Georgia.....	23	83	106
24th Georgia.....	13	145	158
15th North Carolina.....	16	143	159
ANDERSON'S DIVISION.			
<i>Wright's brigade.</i>			
44th Alabama.....	4	65	69
3d Georgia.....	9	57	66
22d Georgia.....	2	19	21
48th Georgia.....	1	46	47
<i>Armistead's brigade.</i>			
14th Virginia.....	—	7	7
38th Virginia.....	2	14	16
53d Virginia.....	3	8	11
57th Virginia.....	—	1	1
<i>Wilcox's brigade.</i>			
8th Alabama.....	12	63	75
9th Alabama.....	12	42	54
10th Alabama.....	10	53	63
11th Alabama.....	3	26	29
<i>Pryor's brigade.</i>			
14th Alabama.....	2	43	45
2d Florida.....	6	43	49
8th Florida.....	13	56	69
3d Virginia.....	3	16	19
<i>Featherston's brigade.</i>			
2d Mississippi Battalion.....	5	55	60
12th Mississippi.....	6	53	59
16th Mississippi.....	27	100	127
19th Mississippi.....	6	52	58
<i>Mahone's brigade.</i>			
6th Virginia.....	4	19	23
12th Virginia.....	3	36	39
16th Virginia.....	—	5	5
41st Virginia.....	1	8	9
JACKSON'S DIVISION.			
<i>Winder's brigade.</i>			
4th Virginia.....	3	21	24
5th Virginia.....	2	26	28
27th Virginia.....	3	5	8
33d Virginia.....	3	16	19
Batteries (division).....	—	9	9

Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia—Continued.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
<i>Taliaferro's brigade.</i>			
23d Virginia.....	8	35	43
37th Virginia.....	9	45	54
47th Virginia (Alabama).....	6	30	36
48th Virginia (Alabama).....	5	33	38
Danville Artillery.....	2	3	5
<i>Starke's brigade.</i>			
1st Louisiana.....	14	49	63
2d Louisiana.....	10	49	59
9th Louisiana.....	25	57	82
10th Louisiana.....	17	34	51
15th Louisiana.....	4	15	19
Batteries.....		8	8
EWELL'S DIVISION.			
<i>Larson's brigade.</i>			
13th Georgia.....	48	169	217
31st Georgia.....	11	39	50
60th Georgia.....	11	48	59
61st Georgia.....	16	91	107
<i>Early's brigade.</i>			
13th Virginia.....		5	5
25th Virginia.....	2	21	23
31st Virginia.....	2	10	12
44th Virginia.....		22	22
49th Virginia.....	5	73	78
52d Virginia.....	3	36	39
<i>Hays' brigade.</i>			
5th Louisiana.....	10	40	50
6th Louisiana.....	18	29	47
7th Louisiana.....	6	63	69
8th Louisiana.....	7	84	91
<i>Trimble's brigade.</i>			
12th Georgia.....	13	49	62
15th Alabama.....	9	75	84
D. H. HILL'S DIVISION.			
<i>[Garland's] brigade.</i>			
1st North Carolina.....	18	142	160
2d North Carolina.....	11	61	72
3d North Carolina.....	46	207	253
20th North Carolina.....	11	30	41
<i>[Anderson's, G. B.] brigade.</i>			
4th North Carolina.....	6	52	58
13th North Carolina.....	41	149	190
23d North Carolina.....	18	35	53
30th North Carolina.....	10	63	73
<i>[Ripley's] brigade.</i>			
4th Georgia.....	22	119	141
6th Georgia.....	10	13	23
21st Georgia.....	4	72	76
44th Georgia.....	17	65	82
Jones' battery.....	1	25	26
<i>[Colquitt's] brigade.</i>			
19th Georgia.....	13	76	89
23d Georgia.....	14	64	78
27th Georgia.....	15	89	104
28th Georgia.....	11	62	73
Rodes' brigade.....	70	409	479
Hill's (A. P.) division.....	113	818	931
General Anderson and aide-de-camp.....		2	2
General Garland.....	1		1
General Starke.....	1		1
Grand total.....	1,567	8,724	10,291

No. 206.

*Report of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding cavalry,
of operations September 2-20.*

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,
February 13, 1864.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the cavalry division, from the battle of Groveton Heights, August 30, 1862, to the recrossing of the Potomac, September 18, 1862:*

* * * * *

On the night of the 2d [of September] the command bivouacked near Fairfax Court-House, except Robertson's brigade, which, by a misapprehension of the order, returned to the vicinity of Chantilly before the engagement.

While these events were occurring near Fairfax Court-House, the Second Virginia Cavalry (Col. T. T. Munford) had proceeded, by my order, to Leesburg, to capture the party of marauders, under Means, which had so long infested that country and harassed the inhabitants. Colonel Munford reached the vicinity of Leesburg on the forenoon of the 2d, and, learning that Means with his command was in the town, supported by three companies of the Maryland cavalry on the Point of Rocks road, he made a circuit toward Edwards Ferry, attacked from that direction, and succeeded, after a heavy skirmish, in routing and driving the enemy as far as Waterford, with a loss on their part of 11 killed, 9 severely wounded, and 47 prisoners, including 2 captains and 3 lieutenants. Our own loss was Lieutenant Davis killed and several officers and privates wounded. In this engagement, Edmund, a slave belonging to one of the men, charged with the regiment and shot Everhart, one of the most notorious ruffians of Means' party. The enemy's papers acknowledged that their entire force of 150 men of the First Maryland and Means' company were, all but 40, killed or captured, stating that our force was 2,000. Colonel Munford's entire force was 163 men, of whom but 123 were in the charge.

On the morning of the 3d, General Fitz. Lee, pursuant to instructions, made a demonstration with his brigade and some horse artillery toward Alexandria, Hampton's brigade moving by way of Hunter's Mill to the Leesburg turnpike, below Dranesville, encamping near that place. Robertson's brigade, having also crossed over from the Little River turnpike, encamped near the same place on the same night. Meantime the main army was moving by a flank toward Leesburg. Demonstrations were also kept up toward Georgetown and the Chain Bridge, Robertson's brigade moving in the direction of Falls Church. Between Vienna and Lewinsville he encountered the enemy's pickets, and, after a brief skirmish, drove them in. Having posted a portion of his cavalry with one piece of artillery near Lewinsville to prevent surprise, he then drew up the remainder of the cavalry in a conspicuous position near the church, and opened with his two remaining pieces. The enemy replied with two guns, and the firing continued until nearly sundown, when, perceiving several regiments advancing to assail his position, General Robertson, in accordance with his instructions, retired.

The cavalry followed the rear of the army to Leesburg, and, crossing the Potomac on the afternoon of the 5th, Lee's brigade in advance, moved to Poolesville. He encountered at that point a body of the

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, p. 743.

enemy's cavalry, which he attacked, capturing the greater portion. The reception of our troops in Maryland was attended with the greatest demonstrations of joy, and the hope of enabling the inhabitants to throw off the tyrant's yoke stirred every Southern heart with renewed vigor and enthusiasm.

The main army moving to Frederick the next day, the cavalry resumed their march on the flank, halting at Urbana, Hampton's brigade in advance. The advance guard had the good fortune to rescue from a member of the enemy's signal corps a bearer of dispatches from President Davis to General Lee. The dispatches, fortunately, by the discreteness of the bearer, had not fallen into the hands of the enemy, and were eventually safely delivered. At Urbana the main body was joined by Robertson's brigade, at this time under command of Col. T. T. Munford.

Near this place I remained with the command until September 12, covering the front of the army, then near Frederick City, in the direction of Washington. My left, consisting of Lee's brigade, rested at New Market, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; my center, Hampton's brigade, near Hyattstown, and my right, Robertson's brigade (Colonel Munford commanding), in the direction of Poolesville, with one regiment (the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry) at that point. The enemy having advanced upon my front, Hampton's brigade became engaged in several skirmishes near Hyattstown, driving the enemy back on every occasion; and, on September 8, ascertaining that the enemy were about to occupy Poolesville, I ordered Colonel Munford to proceed to that point and drive them from the place. Munford's advance guard had just reached the town, when the enemy appeared with three regiments of cavalry and four pieces of artillery. Munford selected a position and opened fire with a howitzer and Blakely, when the enemy also brought up two pieces and returned the fire. Their guns had scarcely opened when their cavalry suddenly advanced and charged the howitzer. They were, however, received with two rounds of canister, which drove them back, and the Seventh Virginia Cavalry (Captain Myers commanding) charged them. They also charged the Blakely, but Colonel [A. W.] Harman, with about 75 men of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, met and repulsed them. Lieutenant-Colonel Burks, in temporary command of the Second Virginia Cavalry, held the cross-roads commanding the approach to Sugar Loaf Mountain, and kept the enemy in check with his sharpshooters.

The loss on this occasion was 15, killed, wounded, and missing.

The cross-roads were successfully held for three days, during which regular skirmishing and artillery firing took place, when, on the 11th, the enemy advanced in force with infantry. Having maintained the present front even longer than was contemplated by the instructions covering the investment of Harper's Ferry (found in the orders appended to this report), the cavalry was withdrawn to within 3 miles of Frederick.

Lee's brigade having fallen back from New Market and crossed the Monocacy near Liberty, Robertson's brigade was ordered to retire in the direction of Jefferson, and Hampton's brigade was directed to occupy Frederick City, in the rear of the army then moving toward Middletown. Hampton's pickets were thrown out on the various roads leading in the direction of the enemy's approach, and about midday on the 12th he was notified that a heavy force was advancing on the National road. As two squadrons had been left on picket at the bridge over the Monocacy between Frederick City and Urbana, it was of great importance to hold the approaches by the National road until the squadrons were withdrawn; and, with this end in view, a rifle piece was added to the two guns already in position on the turnpike, and a squadron from the Second

South Carolina Cavalry, under Lieutenant Meighan, sent to support the batteries. The enemy soon appeared and opened fire on the cavalry, when, the squadrons at the bridge having rejoined him, General Hampton slowly retired to the city, sending his artillery on before to occupy a position commanding the ground between the city and the mountain. The enemy now pressed forward, and, planting a gun in the suburbs of the city, supported by a body of cavalry and a regiment and a half of infantry, opened fire upon the crowded thoroughfares of the place. To secure a safe retreat for the brigade, it was necessary to charge this force, which was gallantly done by the Second South Carolina Cavalry, Colonel Butler; Lieutenant Meighan leading his squadron in advance. The enemy were scattered in every direction, many of them killed and wounded, 10 prisoners taken, among them Colonel Moor, Twenty-eighth Ohio, and the gun captured. Unfortunately, five of the horses attached to the piece were killed, so that it could not be removed. The enemy's account, subsequently published, admits the repulse of their force and the capture of the gun. After this repulse the enemy made no further efforts to annoy our rear. The brigade retired slowly, bringing off the prisoners captured, and bivouacked that night at Middletown, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin having been left, with his command and two pieces of artillery, to hold the Catoctin Mountain.

Munford was, in the mean while, ordered to occupy the gap in this range, near the town of Jefferson. The force under his command consisted at this time of only the Second and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, the Sixth Virginia having been left at Centreville to collect arms, &c.; the Seventeenth Battalion detached before crossing the Potomac on an expedition into Berkeley, and the Seventh Virginia Cavalry having been ordered, a day or two before, to report to General Jackson for operations against Harper's Ferry.

Every means was taken to ascertain what the nature of the enemy's movement was; whether a reconnaissance feeling for our whereabouts, or an aggressive movement of the army. The enemy studiously avoided displaying any force, except a part of Burnside's corps, and built no camp-fires in their halt at Frederick that night. The information was conveyed promptly to the commanding general through General D. H. Hill, now at Boonsborough, and it was suggested that the gap which I held this night was a very strong position for infantry and artillery. Friday, the day on which, by the calculation of the commanding general, Harper's Ferry would fall, had passed, and, as the garrison was not believed to be very strong at that point, I supposed the object already accomplished. I, nevertheless, felt it important to check the enemy as much as possible in order to develop his force. With a view to ascertain what the nature of this movement was, I had, before leaving Frederick, sent instructions to Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee to gain the enemy's rear from his position on the left.

On the morning of the 13th, I moved forward all of Hampton's command to the support of Colonel Martin. Foiled in their attack on the preceding evening, the enemy appeared in front of Colonel Martin, at daylight on the 13th, and endeavored to force their way through the mountain. Their advance guard was driven back, when they posted artillery on the turnpike and opened fire on Colonel Martin, who held the mountain crest. This was responded to by a section of rifle guns under Captain Hart, whose fire was so effective that the enemy's battery was forced several times to change its position. The skirmishers on both sides had meanwhile become actively engaged, and the enemy was held in check until he had marched up to the attack two brigades

of infantry, which was the only force we were yet able to discover, so well did he keep his troops concealed. About 2 p. m. we were obliged to abandon the crest, and withdrew to a position near Middletown. All this was duly reported, in writing, by me, through General D. H. Hill, to the commanding general.

In the engagements at the gap in the Catoctin and near Middletown the Jeff. Davis Legion and First North Carolina Cavalry, respectively under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Martin and Colonel [L. S.] Baker, conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry, and sustained a hot fire of artillery and musketry without flinching or confusion in the ranks. Captain [T. P.] Siler, a gallant officer of the First North Carolina Cavalry, had his leg broken during the engagement.

The enemy soon appeared in force crossing the mountain, and a spirited engagement took place, both of artillery and sharpshooters, the First North Carolina, Colonel Baker, holding the rear and acting with conspicuous gallantry. This lasted for some time, when, having held the enemy in check sufficiently long to accomplish my object, I withdrew slowly toward the gap in the South Mountain, having given General D. H. Hill ample time to occupy that gap with his troops, and still believing that the capture of Harper's Ferry had been effected. On reaching the vicinity of the gap near Boonsborough, finding General Hill's troops occupying the gap, I turned off General Hampton, with all his cavalry except the Jeff. Davis Legion, to re-enforce Munford, at Crampton's Gap, which was now the weakest point of the line. I remained myself at the gap near Boonsborough until night, but the enemy did not attack the position. This was obviously no place for cavalry operations, a single horseman passing from point to point on the mountain with difficulty. Leaving the Jeff. Davis Legion here, therefore, and directing Colonel Rosser, with a detachment of cavalry and the Stuart Horse Artillery, to occupy Braddock's Gap, I started on my way to join the main portion of my command at Crampton's Gap, stopping for the night near Boonsborough. I had not, up to this time, seen General D. H. Hill, but about midnight he sent General Ripley to me to get information concerning roads and gaps in a locality where General Hill had been lying for two days with his command. All the information I had was cheerfully given, and the situation of the gaps explained by map. I confidently hoped by this time to have received the information which was expected from Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee. All the information I possessed or had the means of possessing had been laid before General D. H. Hill and the commanding general. His troops were duly notified of the advance of the enemy, and I saw them in line of battle awaiting his approach, and, myself, gave some general directions concerning the location of his lines during the afternoon, in his absence.

Early next morning I repaired to Crampton's Gap, which I had reason to believe was as much threatened as any other. Brigadier-General Hampton proceeded, as directed, toward Burkittsville. As General Jackson was then in front of Harper's Ferry, and General McLaws, with his division, occupied Maryland Heights, to prevent the escape of the Federal garrison, it was believed that the enemy's efforts would be against McLaws, probably by the route of Crampton's Gap. On his way to the gap, Brigadier-General Hampton encountered a regiment of the enemy's cavalry on a road parallel to the one which he was pursuing, and, taking the Cobb Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel [P. M. B.] Young, at once charged them, dispersing them, killing or wounding 30 and taking 5 prisoners. Our loss was 4 killed and 9 wounded, among the former Lieutenant [J. F.] Marshall and Sergeant Barksdale, and among

the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Young and Captain [G. J.] Wright, all of whom acted with remarkable gallantry.

General Hampton then drew near the gap, when Colonel Munford, mistaking his command for a portion of the enemy's cavalry, ordered his artillery to open upon him. This order was on the point of being executed, when Hampton, becoming aware of his danger, exhibited a white flag and thus averted this serious misfortune. Hampton's brigade remained at the gap for the night.

Next morning, upon my arrival, finding that the enemy had made no demonstration toward Crampton's Gap up to that time, and apprehending that he might move directly from Frederick to Harper's Ferry, I deemed it prudent to leave Munford to hold this point until he could be re-enforced with infantry, and moved Hampton nearer the Potomac. General McLaws was advised of the situation of affairs, and sent Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb with his command to hold Crampton Gap. General Hampton's command was halted at the south end of South Mountain, and pickets sent out on the roads toward Point of Rocks and Frederick. I proceeded, myself, to the headquarters of General McLaws, to acquaint him with the situation of affairs, and also to acquaint myself with what was going on. I went with him to the Maryland Heights, overlooking Harper's Ferry, which had not yet fallen. I explained to him the location of the roads in that vicinity, familiar to myself from my connection with the John Brown raid, and repeatedly urged the importance of his holding with an infantry picket the road leading from the Ferry by the Kennedy farm toward Sharpsburg; failing to do which, the entire cavalry force of the enemy at the Ferry, amounting to about 500, escaped during the night by that very road, and inflicted serious damage on General Longstreet's train in the course of their flight.

I had ordered Colonel Munford to take command (as the senior officer) at Crampton's Gap, and hold it against the enemy at all hazards. Colonel Munford gave similar instructions to the officers commanding the two fragments of infantry regiments from Mahone's brigade, then present, and posted the infantry behind a stone wall at the eastern base of the mountain. [R. P.] Chew's battery and a section of navy howitzers, belonging to the Portsmouth Battery, were placed on the slope of the mountain, and the whole force of cavalry at his command dismounted and disposed on the flanks as sharpshooters. The enemy soon advanced with overpowering numbers to assail the position, his force in sight amounting to a division (Slocum's) of infantry. They were received with a rapid and steady fire from our batteries, but continued to advance, preceded by their sharpshooters, and an engagement ensued between these and our infantry and dismounted cavalry. Colonel Parham, commanding Mahone's brigade, soon after arrived with the Sixth and Twelfth Virginia Infantry, scarcely numbering in all 300 men, and this small force for at least three hours maintained their position and held the enemy in check without assistance of any description from General Semmes, who (Colonel Munford reports) held the next gap below and witnessed all that took place. General Cobb finally came with two regiments to the support of the force holding the gap. At his request Colonel Munford posted the new regiment, when the infantry which had been engaged, having exhausted their ammunition, fell back from their position. The enemy took advantage of this circumstance and suddenly advanced, and the fresh regiments broke before they were well in position. General Cobb made great efforts to rally them, but without the least effect, and it was evident that the gap could no longer be held. Under these circumstances Colonel Munford (whose artillery had ex-

hausted every round of ammunition and retired) formed his command and moved down the mountain on the Boonsborough road to the point where the horses of the dismounted sharpshooters were stationed. The enemy were at the forks of the Harper's Ferry and Boonsborough roads before many of the cavalry reached it, the infantry having retired in great disorder, and the cavalry were the last to give up their position.

In this hot engagement the Second and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry behaved with commendable coolness and gallantry, inflicting great injury with their long-range guns upon the enemy, and their exertions were ably seconded by the troops under Colonel Parham, who held his position, most gallantly, until overpowered.

Hearing of the attack at Crampton's Gap, I rode at full speed to reach that point, and met General Cobb's command just after dark, retreating in disorder down Pleasant Valley. He represented the enemy as only 200 yards behind, and in overwhelming force. I immediately halted his command, and disposed men upon each side of the road to meet the enemy, and a battery, which I had accidentally met with, was placed in position commanding the road. The enemy not advancing, I sent out parties to reconnoiter, who found no enemy within a mile. Pickets were thrown out, and the command was left in partial repose for the night.

The next morning, more infantry and a portion of the cavalry having been brought up to this point, preparations were made to repulse any attack, Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson being now in immediate command at this point. The battle of Boonsborough, or South Mountain, having taken place the evening previous, resulted unfavorably to us, and the troops occupying that line were on the march to Sharpsburg. The garrison at Harper's Ferry surrendered during the forenoon. Late on the afternoon previous, Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee arrived at Boonsborough and reported to the commanding general, having been unable to accomplish the object of his mission, which his report will more fully explain. His command was assigned to the important and difficult duty of occupying the line of battle of the infantry, to enable it to withdraw during the night; and early next morning his command was charged with bringing up the rear of that column to Sharpsburg, while Hampton accomplished the same for McLaws' command, moving out of Pleasant Valley to Harper's Ferry.

I reported, in person, to General Jackson at Harper's Ferry, and thence rode, at his request, to the commanding general, at Sharpsburg, to communicate to him General Jackson's news and information. Our army being in line of battle on the heights overlooking the Antietam, I was assigned to the left, where Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee's brigade took position after his severe engagement near Boonsborough between the enemy and his rear guard, Munford's small command being on the right.

On the afternoon of the 16th the enemy was discovered moving a column across the Antietam to the pike, with the view of turning our left beyond the Dunkard church. This was duly reported and the movement watched. A little skirmishing took place before night. I moved the cavalry still farther to the left, making way for our infantry, and crowned a commanding hill with artillery, ready for the attack in the morning. General Jackson had arrived in time from Harper's Ferry, with a part of his command, on the night before, to take position on this line, and the attack began very early next morning. The cavalry was held as a support for the artillery, which was very advantageously posted so as to bring an enfilading fire upon the enemy's right.

About this time Lieut. Col. John T. Thornton, of the Third Virginia

Cavalry, was mortally wounded at the head of his regiment. To the service he was a brave and devoted member. In him one of the brightest ornaments of the State has fallen.

This fire was kept up with terrible effect upon the enemy, and the position of the artillery being somewhat endangered, Early's brigade was sent to me by General Jackson as additional support. The enemy had advanced too far into the woods near the Dunkard church for the fire to be continued without danger of harming our own men. I accordingly withdrew the batteries to a position farther to the rear, where our own line could be seen, and ordered General Early to rejoin his division, with the exception of the Thirteenth Virginia Infantry, commanded by Captain [F. V.] Winston, which was retained as a support for the artillery. The artillery opened from its new position, at close range, upon the enemy with still more terrible effect than before. The Thirteenth Virginia Infantry, being within musket range, did telling execution. Early's division now pouring a deadly fire into their front, while the artillery and its support were bearing so heavily upon their flank, the enemy soon broke in confusion, and were pursued for half a mile along the Williamsport turnpike. I recognized in this pursuit part of Barksdale's and part of Semmes' brigades; and I also got hold of one regiment of Ransom's brigade, which I posted in an advantageous position on the extreme left flank after the pursuit had been checked by the enemy's reserve artillery coming into action. Having informed General Jackson of what had transpired, I was directed by him to hold this advance position, and that he would send all the infantry he could get in order to follow up the success. I executed this order, keeping the cavalry well out to the left, and awaiting the arrival of re-enforcements. These re-enforcements were, however, diverted to another part of the field, and no further engagement took place on this part of the field beyond a desultory artillery fire.

On the next day it was determined, the enemy not again attacking, to turn the enemy's right. In this movement I was honored with the advance. In endeavoring to pass along up the river bank, however, I found that the river made such an abrupt bend that the enemy's batteries were within 800 yards of the brink of the stream, which would have made it impossible to have succeeded in the movement proposed, and it was accordingly abandoned.

The commanding general having decided to recross the Potomac, the delicate and difficult duty of covering this movement was assigned to Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee, while I was directed to ford the river that afternoon with Hampton's brigade at an obscure ford, and, proceeding to Williamsport, cross the river again at that point, so as to create a diversion in favor of the movement of the army. Hampton's brigade did not reach the ford until dark, and, as the ford was very obscure and rough, many got over their depth and had to swim the river. The duty assigned to Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee was accomplished with entire success, and he withdrew his command safely to the south side of the Potomac on the morning of the 19th.

Hampton's brigade crossed the Potomac a short distance above Williamsport, while a part of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry dashed across the river immediately at Williamsport, chasing a few of the enemy's pickets from the place. I was also aided in this demonstration by a battalion of infantry under Captain [W. W.] Randolph, of the Second Virginia; also by a detachment of the Eleventh Georgia, and, it may be, by small detachments of other regiments, and a section of the Salem Artillery and one of the Second Company Howitzers. The bridge over the canal was destroyed, but a very good road was constructed without

much labor under the aqueduct over the Conacocheague. Having moved out the command, including Hampton's brigade, upon the ridges overlooking Williamsport, active demonstrations were made toward the enemy.

On the 20th the enemy were drawn toward my position in heavy force, Couch's division in advance. Showing a bold front, we maintained our position and kept the enemy at bay until dark, when, having skirmished all day, we withdrew to the south bank of the Potomac without loss.

During the Maryland campaign my command did not suffer on any one day as much as their comrades of other arms, but theirs was the sleepless watch and the harassing daily *petite guerre*, in which the aggregate of casualties for the month sums up heavily. There was not a single day, from the time my command crossed the Potomac until it recrossed, that it was not engaged with the enemy, and at Sharpsburg was several times subjected to severe shelling. Their services were indispensable to every success attained, and the officers and men of the cavalry division recur with pride to the Maryland campaign of 1862.

I regret exceedingly that I have not the means of speaking more in detail of the brave men of other commands, whose meritorious conduct was witnessed both at Sharpsburg and Williamsport, but whose names, owing to the lapse of time, cannot be now recalled, and I have no reports to assist me. Brigadier-General Early, at the former place, behaved with great coolness and good judgment, particularly after he came in command of his division, and Col. (since General) William Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia Infantry, was conspicuously brave and self-possessed. One of the regiments of Ransom's brigade, also becoming detached from the brigade, behaved with great gallantry, and for a long time held an important detached position on the extreme left, unaided.

The gallant Pelham displayed all those noble qualities which have made him immortal. He had under his command batteries from every portion of General Jackson's command. The batteries of Poague, Pegram, and Carrington (the only ones which now recur to me) did splendid service, as also did the Stuart Horse Artillery, all under Pelham. The hill, held on the extreme left so long and so gallantly by artillery alone, was essential to the maintenance of our position.

Maj. Héros von Bocke displayed his usual skill, courage, and energy. His example was highly valuable to the troops.

Cadet W. Q. Hulihen, C. S. Army, was particularly distinguished on the field of Sharpsburg for his coolness and his valuable services as acting aide-de-camp. I deem it proper to mention here, also, a young lad named Randolph, of Fauquier, who, apparently about twelve years of age, brought me several messages from General Jackson under circumstances of great personal peril, and delivered his dispatches with a clearness and intelligence highly creditable to him.

Private R. T. Clingan, Company G, Cobb's Georgia Legion, one of my couriers, was killed while behaving with the most conspicuous bravery, having borrowed a horse to ride to the field. He had been sent to post a battery of artillery from his native State.

Captain [R. E.] Frayser, Signal Corps, rendered important services to the commanding general from a mountain overlooking the enemy on the Antietam.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,

Major-General.

Col. R. H. CHILTON,

Chief of Staff, Army of Northern Virginia.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, C. S. Army, commanding cavalry brigade, of operations September 2-20.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE,
October 25, 1862.

MAJOR: In accordance with the orders of Major-General Stuart that I should give a report of the operations of my brigade since it joined the division in September, I beg to forward the accompanying reports:

I shall confine myself in these papers to such matters as I deem of sufficient importance to deserve mention.

On the morning of— I reported to General Stuart, and was at once taken by him to Flint Hill, near Fairfax Court-House, which was found to be in the possession of the enemy. After some firing of artillery and sharpshooters the enemy retired, and were followed by my brigade with two pieces belonging to Stuart's Horse Artillery. The enemy were soon overtaken, when the rifle piece of Captain Pelham opened on them with effect, scattering them in every direction. As soon as the cavalry could be brought forward, I pursued them, taking a few prisoners; but, owing to the darkness, my pursuit had to be very slow and cautious. The enemy placed some guns and infantry so as to command the road, and opened fire from the woods as I advanced. Having no artillery then with me, I withdrew the brigade, having lost one man so severely wounded that he died the next day.

Early the next morning we moved on toward Dranesville, taking a few prisoners along the road. From this point we were ordered to Leesburg, where, after halting a few hours, we proceeded to the Potomac, which we crossed on the afternoon of September 5, and marched to Poolesville, where we halted for the night.

The next day we moved to Urbana, in which neighborhood the brigade remained for several days, having various little skirmishes with the enemy near Hyattstown, driving them back on every occasion. Leaving Urbana, the brigade followed the main army to Fredericktown, which place I was directed to hold after our army passed through. My pickets were thrown out on the various roads leading to the city, and I was notified about midday on September 12 that the enemy in heavy force was advancing on the National road. Having two squadrons on picket at the bridge over the Monocacy (on the road from Urbana) and near that point, it was of the utmost consequence that I should hold the approaches to the city by the National road until these squadrons could be withdrawn. With this object in view, I took one rifled gun to the assistance of the two guns which were on the pike, and placed a squadron of the Second South Carolina Regiment to support the battery. This squadron was under command of Lieutenant Meighan, who had been skirmishing with the enemy since he had crossed the Monocacy. The enemy opened fire on this squadron, killing 2 of the men. Finding that my other squadrons were coming in, I withdrew slowly to the city, sending my guns to occupy a position which would command the road from the city to the foot of the mountain.

In the mean time the enemy had planted a gun in the suburbs of the city, and, with unparalleled atrocity, fired into the city along its crowded streets. This gun was supported by a regiment and a half of infantry and a part of a regiment of cavalry. To secure a safe retreat for my brigade, it was necessary to dislodge this force. I therefore ordered Lieutenant Meighan to charge with his squadron, while I brought the brigade to his support. This order was most gallantly carried out, the

squadron, accompanied by the provost-marshal guard of 40 men from the different regiments, under Captain [J. F.] Waring, Jeff. Davis Legion, all under the immediate direction of Colonel Butler, and led by Lieutenant Meighan, charged the enemy, scattered them in every direction, killing and wounding many, taking 10 prisoners, among them Colonel Moor, Twenty-eighth Ohio Regiment, and capturing the gun. Unfortunately, five of the horses attached to this gun were killed, so that it could not be removed. In the published accounts of the enemy they admit the loss of this gun and the repulse of their force.

I beg to commend most favorably the conduct of the Second South Carolina Regiment on this occasion. They were ably and gallantly led by Colonel Butler. Especial praise is due to the squadron of Lieutenant Meighan, which had never been under fire before, and yet no troops could have behaved better. Captain Waring, with the provost guard, participated in this brilliant charge. So successful was the charge and so complete the repulse of the enemy that no further attempt to molest me was made, and I withdrew the brigade, at a walk, from the city, bringing off my prisoners. Leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Martin with his command and two guns to picket at the gap of the mountain that night, I took the brigade to Middletown, where we bivouacked that night.

The operations of the brigade on the next and the ensuing days I reserve for another report.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WADE HAMPTON,
Brigadier-General.

Major [N. R.] FITZHUGH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MARTINSBURG, W. VA., *October 31, 1862.*

MAJOR: I beg to present the following report of the operations of my brigade on the morning of September 13, and the few days subsequent:

As already reported to you, the brigade encamped on the night of September 12 near Middletown, leaving the Jeff. Davis Legion, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, to picket the National road on the gap of the mountain between Frederick City and Middletown.

At daylight on the morning of September 13 the enemy made his appearance and attempted to force his way across the mountain. His advance guard being driven back, he planted a battery on the pike and opened fire on [Lieutenant-]Colonel Martin. Captain [J. F.] Hart, with a section of rifled guns, had been sent to [Lieutenant-]Colonel Martin, and he returned the fire of the enemy with good effect, forcing him to change his position more than once. In the mean time skirmishers on both sides had become actively engaged, and the fight was kept up until 2 p. m., when the enemy gained a position which commanded Hart's guns, as well as the road. I ordered the guns withdrawn and placed in position near Middletown. The brigade then took position in rear of them, waiting the approach of the enemy, who soon appeared in force crossing the mountain. A brisk artillery fire took place on both sides, and the sharpshooters of the two forces also became engaged. Having held the enemy in check sufficiently long to accomplish the objects desired by General Stuart, I was directed by him to withdraw my command in the direction of Burkittsville, sending my guns and [Lieutenant-]Colonel Martin's command on to Boonsborough.

The First North Carolina Regiment, under command of Colonel Baker, was the rear guard of the brigade during the fight at Middletown, and

both officers and men conducted themselves to my perfect satisfaction. They were exposed to a severe fire of artillery and musketry, which they bore without flinching, nor was there the slightest confusion in the ranks. They lost 8 men wounded and 3 missing. Captain Siler, a gallant officer, was among the wounded, having his leg broken. He was brought off, but, as his wound became painful, he was left at Boonsborough.

Before leaving this part of my report, I beg to commend the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Martin and his command while he held the gap of the mountain. The men of [Lieutenant-]Colonel Martin fought with their accustomed gallantry, and they were ably supported by a portion of the North Carolina Regiment, who had been detailed as sharpshooters. [Lieutenant-]Colonel Martin on this occasion, as on all others, conducted himself as a gallant and able officer.

After withdrawing the brigade from Middletown, I proceeded toward Burkittsville, where I expected to form a junction with Colonel Munford. On the road to this place I discovered, on a road parallel to the one on which we were, a regiment of Yankee cavalry. Taking the Cobb Legion with me, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Young to charge this regiment. This order was carried out in gallant style, the legion crossing sabers with the Yankees and chasing them some distance. Five prisoners were taken, while a published account of the Yankees now before me admits a loss of 30 killed and wounded. The prisoners taken belonged to the Third Indiana and the Eighth Illinois. [Lieutenant-]Colonel Young, who led the charge, received a painful wound in the leg, and Captain [G. J.] Wright, whose company was in the advance, was wounded in the arm. Our loss was 4 killed and 9 wounded. Among the former I regret to have to mention Lieutenant Marshall and Sergeant Barksdale. I take pleasure in calling attention to the behavior of this command. Colonel Young led with great gallantry, and, after his fall, Major Delony. After driving in this cavalry, I moved on to Burkittsville, where we remained during the night of September 13.

On the morning of the 14th I was ordered by General Stuart to proceed in the direction of Knoxville, to cover the front of General McLaws.

We remained here until the morning of the 16th, covering the crossing of the division of General McLaws into Harper's Ferry. Passing through this place, we recrossed the Potomac on the morning of the 17th, and reported to General Stuart near Sharpsburg during the battle of that day.

On the night of the 18th we crossed into Virginia; marched all night. The next day crossed the Potomac at Mason's Ford into Maryland. On the afternoon of the 19th joined General Stuart at Williamsport.

On the 20th, in attempting to advance, I was met by a large force of cavalry, which was afterward re-enforced by a division of infantry. As the enemy were advancing in heavy force on the roads leading to the town, General Stuart ordered me to withdraw across the river at night. This was successfully accomplished, and the brigade took position near the Sulphur Spring. Since that time no movement of interest has occurred except the expedition into Pennsylvania, of which a report has already been made.

I have thus given a summary of the operations of my command, as directed to do by General Stuart.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WADE HAMPTON,

Brigadier-General.

Major FITZHUGH,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No 208.

Reports of Col. Thomas T. Munford, Second Virginia Cavalry, commanding brigade, of operations September 4-20.

[OCTOBER 16 ?], 1862.

* * * * *

On the 4th [of September*] I was ordered to take command of the brigade [Robertson's], then *en route* for Maryland. I joined General Stuart at Urbana, and, on the morning of September 8, I was ordered to Poolesville, with instructions to drive the enemy from that place. My advance guard had just entered the place when the enemy appeared in force, with three regiments of cavalry and four pieces of artillery. I selected an elevated position to the left of the town, and, as soon as they came within range, opened on them. In a few moments they replied with two heavy pieces, and at the same time advanced and drove in my pickets to the left and rear of my advance gun. Not knowing the country, and having had but a few moments' notice, I had some difficulty in extricating my guns, one a howitzer, the other a Blakely. The enemy charged up near the howitzer, but two rounds of canister sent them hurriedly back. Captain Myers, commanding the Seventh, charged them handsomely. They also charged the rifle piece supported by the Twelfth, when Colonel Harman repulsed them with some loss. A portion of his regiment behaved very badly. His loss was 8 men, killed, wounded, and missing. His regiment had been reduced by detail and other causes to about 75 men. Colonel Harman himself displayed great gallantry, and, had his command supported him, the result would have been different. Lieutenant-Colonel Burks, temporarily commanding the Second (all the field officers being away wounded), held the cross-roads and checked the enemy with his sharpshooters. In this skirmish Private P. H. Bird, of Company D, was killed, and Sergt. James W. Biggs, of Company C, badly wounded. For three days I held this cross-roads, skirmishing every day, guarding the Sugar Loaf Mountain.

On Thursday, the 11th, General Slocum advanced with his division, and we fell back to a point 3 miles from Frederick City on the Buckeys-town road. I may here state that the Sixth Virginia Cavalry, belonging to the brigade, having been left at Centreville to collect arms, &c., was not in Maryland with the brigade. The Seventeenth Battalion was on detached service, and on the 10th the Seventh Regiment was ordered to report to General Jackson. They did not again join the brigade until we recrossed into Virginia.

On the 12th we removed to Jefferson. At this point we remained until the next day, constantly skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry. The enemy's infantry pressing us on three roads, we fell back to Burkittsville. The enemy advanced on Jefferson by the Point of Rocks road, on the main road from Poolesville, and by a road over a gap which intersects the road leading to Middletown about 1½ miles from Jefferson. We were pursued nearly the whole way to Burkittsville by their cavalry. We had the brigade train to protect. I kept them back with the sharpshooters of the Second Regiment, under Captain Holland, and hurried Colonel Harman's command on to Burkittsville to protect the road leading directly from Jefferson to that point. Captain [T. B.] H[olland], finding himself heavily pressed and with a mere handful of men, made a dash at a regiment of the enemy's cavalry, driving them back with loss.

* Portion of report omitted above relates to operations August 26-September 3, 1862, and is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 747-749.

In this skirmish Lieutenant [T. A.] Tibbs was wounded and Private James P. Abbitt, of Company B, killed.

Getting the train safely over Crampton's Gap, I placed three pieces of artillery in position and awaited their approach, which was momentarily expected. After they were repulsed by Captain Holland, General Hampton, coming in on their rear, drove them off. Not knowing that General H[ampton] was to come up on that road, and seeing a supposed enemy, I waited until they were in easy range before ordering the artillery to fire. General H[ampton] perceiving my intention, when the lanyard had been applied and nothing was required but the word "fire" to be given, a white flag appeared, and I found they were our friends.

We remained on the mountain that night, and the next morning received orders from General Stuart to hold the gap at all hazards. A report of what occurred at that place has already been forwarded.

I am, major, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS T. MUNFORD,
Colonel Second Virginia Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS ROBERTSON'S BRIGADE,
October 3, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that on September 14 the enemy drove in my pickets at Burkittsville, and, in accordance with the orders received from Major-General Stuart, I assumed command at Crampton's Gap (as I was the senior officer), and instructed the officers commanding the two fragments of regiments (infantry) of Mahone's brigade to hold the post at all hazards. I posted the infantry behind a stone wall, at the base of the mountain, and running parallel with it; the artillery—Chew's battery and a section of the Portsmouth Battery (boat howitzers)—about half-way up the mountain, in the most eligible position I could find. I dismounted all the cavalry, and posted them on the right and left flanks. Finding that the artillery could not reach the enemy from the position selected, with effect, I retired the two rifle pieces to the crest of the mountain, and from that elevation poured an effective fire into their advancing columns. The enemy first advanced his skirmishers and made a demonstration as if he intended attacking the gap held by General Semmes, but, as both his and my artillery played upon him with effect, he retired and moved his whole force upon me. As soon as his skirmishers were deployed, he advanced one regiment of infantry in line of battle, which was immediately followed by four others. In half an hour five other regiments appeared on their left and advanced in the same way, and in a very short time another brigade appeared in rear of those who had preceded them. Soon after the skirmishing commenced, Colonel Parham, commanding Mahone's brigade, came up with two very small regiments (Sixth and Twelfth Virginia), scarcely 300 men, which he soon got in position. General Semmes certainly knew the condition of things, as his artillery had been used, and he could see what was going on from his gap. I also sent dispatches to General Cobb, informing him of what was in front of us. For at least three hours this little force maintained their position against Slocum's division. (See General McClellan's dispatch of 16th.) After much delay, and some four couriers had been sent, General Cobb, with two regiments of his brigade, came up to my support. When the general himself came up, I explained the position of the troops, and of course turned over to him the command. At his request I posted the two regiments. The first troops,

having exhausted all their ammunition, began to fall back as soon as their support came up, Colonel Parham having already partially supplied them with ammunition. When the other two regiments of General Cobb's brigade came up, he again requested me to put them in position, but they behaved badly and did not get in position before the wildest confusion commenced, the wounded coming to the rear in numbers and more well men coming with them. General Cobb attempted to rally the men, but without the least effect, and it would have been as useless to attempt to rally a flock of frightened sheep. Had General Cobb's brigade given the support to the first troops engaged which they deserved, the gap would have been held. The cavalry horses were on the road leading to Boonsborough, and, having previously retired the artillery on the Harper's Ferry road (every round of ammunition having been fired for some time before), I formed my command, and moved down the mountain, the infantry still running in great disorder on the Harper's Ferry road, followed a short distance by the enemy, who were then between them and the cavalry, who had to go for their horses. The enemy was at the forks of these roads before many of the cavalry, who were the last to give up their position.

The Second Virginia Cavalry lost 1 man killed (Peter Bird, Company D) and 2 men wounded.

Had General Cobb come up in time, the result might have been otherwise. There were two stone walls at the base of the mountain parallel to each other, and one commanding the other, which could have been held against great odds had the troops been in position.

It affords me great pleasure to commend Colonel Parham as a gallant and efficient officer; he did everything in his power to hold his position, and his little command fought splendidly.

Captain Chew used his guns with great coolness and effect, and his battery only retired when he had exhausted every round of ammunition. The guns of the Portsmouth Battery were of too short range to be effective.

The cavalry (Second and Twelfth) behaved splendidly under the fire they were placed, and did good service with their rifles.

Colonel Parham's loss must have been heavy, as they were a long time engaged, and the firing was as heavy as I ever heard.

I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS T. MUNFORD,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. J. T. W. HAIRSTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MARCH 4, 1863.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I was ordered off on a scout on Monday, and did not get back until Thursday, and the papers I sent for did not arrive until to-night. I can give a synopsis of our operations only, as I was first under General Ewell, then General G. H. Stuart, then General Ashby, then for a short time had the brigade myself, then under General Robertson, and frequently on detached service. I have omitted all from the time we started to Richmond until we returned and started from Waterloo Bridge.

The fight we had at Crampton's Gap was the heaviest I ever engaged in, and the cavalry fought here with pistols against rifles. I have sent my report to General Stuart, but cannot furnish it now until I hear from

him, and do not know that it would amount to anything except to show you that your cavalry were not idle.

In Maryland we lived on green corn, principally, for both men and horses, and our valley campaign was one of constant toil.

I have failed to mention any of the officers who have won a good name by their gallant services. Captain [R. P.] Chew, as true as steel, and ever ready, deserves to be mentioned. Col. O. R. Funsten is a noble man, and General Jones' brigade is second to none I have ever yet seen, in point of mettle.

Please accept my apology for the delay. I had sent in my reports to Major-General Stuart, by his order, and would have sent them to you had I not been ordered to send them to him. I have lost my notes, as I did not think they would ever be called for again.

With my best wishes, I am, as ever, your friend and obedient servant,
THOMAS T. MUNFORD

Lieut. Gen. THOMAS J. JACKSON.

P. S.—General Stuart has my report of the Crampton's Gap fight, and, if you have not completed your Maryland campaign, I should like for you to see it, as several of my regiment sealed with their lives the love of country on that rugged mountain side.

[T. T. M.]

No. 209.

Report of Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, C. S. Army, commanding cavalry, of operations September 4.

IN CAMP NEAR GARYSBURG, N. C.,
October 12, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with instructions received on the morning of September 4, with the Seventh and Twelfth Regiments Virginia Cavalry and three pieces of Chew's battery I proceeded in the direction of Falls Church, to make a demonstration against the enemy and hold him in check while our army was crossing the Potomac above. The enemy's pickets were encountered between Vienna and Lewinsville, and driven in after a brisk skirmish, in which the enemy lost 3 killed. After posting a portion of my command and one piece of artillery near Lewinsville to prevent surprise, I opened fire with the other two pieces from the hill overlooking the church, to the right of the main road, where, in a conspicuous position, I had placed my cavalry. The enemy replied with two guns, and the firing was kept up until nearly sundown. About that time several of the enemy's regiments were seen advancing toward the church from Taylor's Hill, at which point they seemed to be collecting from various directions.

The object of the reconnoissance having been fully accomplished, in accordance with my verbal instructions I withdrew the command at dark.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

B. H. ROBERTSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Hdqrs. Cavalry Division, Army of Northern Virginia.

No. 210.

*Report of Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery,
of operations August 20-September 24.*

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS,
September 24, 1862.

GENERAL : I have the honor to report the part performed by my command and by myself in the recent operations of our army, and especially as to service rendered in defending the Potomac Ford at Shepherdstown, in connection with General Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry and the battle of Sharpsburg :

In obedience to orders from the War Department on August 19, my immediate command moved from Richmond on the 20th to co-operate with the forces on the North Anna River, and, in compliance with your own direction, it marched forward with that entire force toward your front lines on the 26th.

By request of the President, my personal progress to join you was more rapid than that of the column. After bestowing a day upon requisite arrangements, I committed the General Reserve Artillery to Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts, under the senior general, D. H. Hill, and hastened on to your headquarters. Some uncertainty as to the route, amid the changing scenes of the occasion, and an enfeebling disease, in part retarded my progress, though, with medical aid, I ceaselessly pressed on ; so that not until after midday Saturday, August 30, could I reach you, on the memorable battle-field of that day, near Manassas (second Manassas). Having reported and delivered messages from the President, I was kindly urged by you to seek some convenient place in the rear, where rest and medical treatment might relieve the disorder then prostrating me. This, after witnessing the battle for perhaps two hours with intense interest, I found myself compelled to do ; and under the hospitable roof of Mr. Foote, robbed though he had been of almost everything by the unscrupulous enemy, received for a few days the kindest attention.

On Wednesday, September 3, my command had arrived at Sudley, and, though still unwell, I joined it and marched with the troops to Leesburg. There, besides other work, I had, preparatory to crossing into Maryland, to arrange for sifting out the reduced and strengthening the more efficient batteries in all the artillery battalions with this part of our army. Physical exhaustion rendered this task scarce less than severe.

Major Richardson was left in charge of the batteries, sections, feeble horses, &c., detained, with orders to take them to the neighborhood of Winchester, and there establish a depot for the recruiting of horses, &c., while the battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts and Major Nelson were prepared for advancing.

Sunday, September 7, with the portions of these two battalions not detailed on special duty, I proceeded to the neighborhood of Frederick, Md., and there reported on the morning of the 8th.

On Wednesday, 10th, the command, excluding Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts' battalion, which had been assigned to duty with General D. H. Hill's division, and including the battalions of Col. J. T. Brown, of Maj. William Nelson, and of Col. S. D. Lee, who had then reported to me, marched with the army toward Hagerstown.

Sunday morning, 14th, we were summoned to return toward Boonsborough, the enemy having advanced upon General D. H. Hill. When

I arrived and reported to you a short distance from the battle-field, you directed me to place in position on the heights of Beaver Creek the several batteries of my command. This was accordingly done, just before nightfall. At midnight I was again summoned to your headquarters, and directed to send Col. S. D. Lee, with his battalion, on the road to Centreville [Keedysville], and to take the residue of my command by the shortest route to Williamsport and across the Potomac, and then to enter upon the duty of guarding the fords of that river.

By sunrise, Monday, 15th, we had reached the intersection of the Hagerstown, Sharpsburg, Boonsborough, and Williamsport roads, and there received reliable intelligence of a large cavalry force of the enemy not far ahead of us. I immediately posted guns to the front and on the flank, sent messengers to General Toombs, understood to be at Sharpsburg, for a regiment or two of infantry, set to work collecting a band of armed stragglers, and sent scouts to the front. These latter soon returned and reported the road clear for some 2 miles. I therefore determined to advance cautiously, without waiting for infantry, in order to protect the large wagon train proceeding by the Hagerstown road through Williamsport. The cavalry, which consisted of three regiments, escaped from Harper's Ferry, crossed our road perhaps less than an hour ahead of us. We thus narrowly missed a rather strange encounter. My purpose was, of course, if we met, to attempt the destruction of those retreating invaders.

Having crossed the Williamsport Ford, I assigned to Colonel Brown its defense and that of another a mile or more lower down, and proceeded with the remaining battalion (Major Nelson's) to the neighborhood of Shepherdstown.

By 10 o'clock of the 16th the guns were here in position on the heights overlooking the ford, a mile below the town, and the passage was thenceforward assiduously guarded.

Here other and arduous duties devolved upon the command and upon myself. By night or by day much labor was needed on the road; the passage of troops had to be facilitated, and important dispatches forwarded in different directions, all rendered the more essential toward General Jackson hastening to Sharpsburg after capturing Harper's Ferry. This continued through the 17th, while the battle (Sharpsburg) was raging, and during the night; especially in my having to meet a requisition for all the long-range guns that could be obtained and possibly spared from the fords. Instructions also reached me to have apprehended and sent forward all stragglers.

On the 18th arrangements had to be made for meeting a demonstration of the enemy reported at Shepherd's Ford, 4 miles above. Some cavalry and a small infantry force of collected stragglers, duly organized for the occasion, were sent thither with a battery. While engaged in these duties I was again summoned to aid in repairing roads and facilitating the passage of troops. The difficult achievement of recrossing our army, with its extensive train, over that single ford, during the night, and the enemy close at hand, having been resolved upon, every available man and officer of my immediate command, and such others as could be gathered, were at once set to work removing obstructions, preventing collisions, having lights at hand as needed, and promoting the orderly movement of vehicles on the several routes.

After a night thus spent, Major Nelson and myself were, by dawn Friday, 19th, in saddle, for the purpose of securing guns from some of the artillery that had crossed, and placing them in position to aid in

repelling the enemy when he should appear. Forty-four guns were thus secured; of these the character, position, &c., were as follows: A 10-pounder Parrott and two other rifles, under Captain Maurin, on the right hand height, 200 or 300 yards from the river; next him, on the left, a 10-pounder Parrott, under Lieutenant Maddox. On his left, Captain Milledge had four 3-inch rifles and a 12-pounder howitzer. Next to Captain Milledge, Captain [W. H.] Chapman was placed, with one rifle and one Napoleon. On the left of these, and on the brow of the cliff overlooking the ford, and to rake it and its approaches, Capt. M. Johnson was placed with two 6-pounders and two howitzers. These dispositions were all below the road leading directly from the ford, along a ravine, to the interior. Above that road Captain Kirkpatrick, with two 6-pounders and two 12-pounder howitzers, occupied the brow of the cliff, to cross fire with Captain Johnson upon the ford and its approaches.

On Captain Kirkpatrick's left, and for a like purpose, was placed Captain Huckstep's battery of four 6-pounders. On an eminence to his left were planted two 10-pounder Parrotts, of Captain Braxton's battery. Still farther to the left, and on an elevation more commanding, though farther from the river, were located an effective 12-pounder Whitworth, under Captain Barnwell, my ordnance officer, and two 10-pounder Parrotts, under Captain Hardaway. Nearer to the river, and still to the left, positions were, by Colonel Long, assigned to a battery of four 6-pounders, to sweep the road on the opposite shore; and, to their left, two 10-pounder Parrotts, of a Louisiana battery (the names of their officers are not remembered). There being no favorable positions for other guns, the eleven remaining of the forty-four mentioned were removed beyond range, to be called up if required.

These arrangements had not been all completed, when, about 8 a. m. of the 19th, the enemy appeared on the distant heights opposite, and found our army entirely and safely across the ford, and on the Virginia side of the Potomac. They soon brought up and opened artillery much exceeding ours in weight. Still, our rifles did excellent service in keeping at bay for hours the entire hostile host, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, which, in various positions, appeared; care being taken not to waste ammunition in mere long-range exchanges of shot. Our troops that had been briefly resting in the valleys were now ordered farther inland, to be out of reach of the shells, &c., so numerously hurled by the enemy, yet near enough to turn readily upon and perhaps destroy the adverse army should it force the passage of the river and take position between it and our forces.

From yourself, I received instructions to hold the position all that day and the night succeeding, unless the pressure should become too great, in which event I was, at my discretion, to withdraw after dark, it being most unlikely that a discreet commander would then risk the destruction of his entire army by getting it across in the night, and being assailed when in disorder next morning, with such a river behind him. Should I find it best at nightfall to withdraw, I was to follow the track of our army. I was informed also that two brigades of infantry would remain as a support to the ford, defending artillery (those of Generals Armistead and Lawton); these commanded, the former by Colonel Hodges and the latter by Colonel Lamar. They were to picket the ford, and, screening themselves as well as possible, to act as sharpshooters on the bank. I was, by General Longstreet, requested to take charge of these brigades. I did so, and instructed the colonels commanding to keep their force at the ford strong, vigilant, and as well sheltered as occasion

allowed, and to have the residue well in hand, back of adjacent hills, for protection, till needed. My directions were also given them not to fire merely in reply to shots from the other side, but only to repel any attempt at crossing, and to guard the ford. My own position was chosen at a point central, moderately protected by conformation of ground, at the same time commanding the general view and accessible from every direction, with as little exposure of messengers as any one place in such a scene could be. And here, except when some personal inspection or order had to be given requiring temporary absence, I remained for best service throughout the day.

During most of the forenoon the enemy's fire was furious, and, under cover of it, in spite of persistent vigor on the part of our batteries, a heavy body of sharpshooters gained the canal bank on the northern and hostile side of the river. This proved to us an evil not slightly trying, since it exposed our nearer cannoneers to be picked off, when serving their guns, by the enemy's effective infantry rifles.

From the advanced batteries on the left I was, therefore, applied to for some infantry to counteract in part this evil, by availing themselves of any cover at hand to serve as sharpshooters on that part of our side. I accordingly ordered to the duty 200 of the infantry in reserve.

After some time, the cavalry officer commanding at the ford, 2 miles below, notified me that the enemy was before him in force; had planted a powerful battery, and could not be prevented crossing unless I sent him some infantry. Considering the importance of thus securing our flank, I judged it proper to send him also an infantry force of between 100 and 200 men. Of the extent of loss at Sharpsburg from the two brigades left with me, and of their consequent very small numbers all told, I had not been informed when their assignment to my direction was made. In providing, therefore, for protecting right and left, as described, I was not aware of infantry weakness for the ford itself. This was, however, as the evening progressed, made to me only too certain. The enemy's fire, which had for a season relaxed, became fiercer than before, and so directed as to rake most of the hollows, as well as the hills, we occupied. At the same time their infantry at the canal breastwork was much increased, and the crack of their sharpshooters became a continuous roll of musketry. Colonels Lamar and Hodges both reported to me that the pressure on their small force, the whole of which remaining I had ordered to the river, and the sum total when all were there was, they informed me, scarcely 300, was becoming too great to be borne. I directed them to hold on an hour longer; sunset was at hand, and I had communicated with Colonel Munford, who promised at dark to be with us; that by that time I would have the batteries withdrawn; they should, after due notice, retire next the batteries, and the cavalry should fall in between them and the enemy, so that all would get rightly out. This plan, I judged it, under the circumstances, best on the whole to adopt, in the discretion left with me, as the reason of the case already indicated seemed not to justify the sacrifice incident to utmost resistance against any crossing. While these directions were passing, the commanders of battery after battery notified me that their ammunition was exhausted, and that they were thus exposed to small purpose. Their request for permission to retire, under such circumstances, it was not deemed wise to grant wherever the movement could be seen by the enemy; in case where they could get back unseen, it was sanctioned. Instructions were sent to each battery, besides, to retire in specified order, as dusk deepened to conceal them in so doing. It

was, of course, a critical and anxious hour, inasmuch as a dashing force might, on the necessary reduction of our fire, get across and capture some of our longest-served and latest-removed guns.

Deep dusk had now arrived; certain batteries, as allowed, were on their way inland, while others, as directed, were well using ammunition still on hand. My own position was taken near the point of chief importance, directly back from the ford, so that I might the better know of and control each requisite operation. The members of my staff vigorously seconded my endeavors, under furious fire, in carrying orders and supervising their fulfillment, and everything appeared likely, under favoring Providence, to result in effecting the withdrawal planned.

This prospect was, however, suddenly changed. A number of infantrymen rushed rapidly by the point I occupied. Arresting them, I learned that they were of the sharpshooters who held guard at the ford; that their body had all given way, and that some of the enemy were already on our side of the river. Worn as were these men, their state of disorder, akin to panic, was not, justly, to be met with harshness. They were, however, encouraged to be steady and useful in checking disorder, and affording such tokens as they might, in the settling dark, of force, to make the enemy cautious. No other means had I of keeping back an advance. All my staff were, at the moment, absent but two, one of whom was instantly sent to find, as carefully as possible, the state of facts toward the ford; the other, to secure the orderly retirement of the last batteries and of everything attached to my own headquarters, evidences being unmistakable that the reported crossing was in part a fact. My personal situation was all the while necessarily much exposed, and now to easy capture, accessible as it was to cavalry in a few moments, should such have crossed and be coming forward.

The arrival of our own cavalry being now unlikely, I had to determine, at once, what duty required of myself. The enemy would doubtless adopt one of two courses; either, shrinking from hidden danger, cautiously proceed only 100 or 200 yards, or, more adventurous, push on a force along the chief road as he could find it. In the former case, our guns, &c., would, as considerably instructed, get fairly out of reach, and this was, in the main, my expectation; still, the other course, a pushing hostile force, had to be provided for. I therefore proceeded to a point in the road probably not then reached by any party of the enemy, on foot and leading my horse, and accompanied by my adjutant and ordnance sergeant, who had rejoined me, along a path still thundered over by the enemy's shells and crossing the road inland from the river. Those shells were obviously indicative of no intended advance of any considerable body of the enemy; firing on their own troops thus would scarcely be risked. Along the road I found the rear of our artillery column properly moving. Mounting here, I rode with the column and employed the two young officers in moving our hospital camp and enforcing order along the entire column.

While thus proceeding, I learned that General Pryor was resting not far ahead with the division under his command. Finding him perhaps within 2 miles of the river, I made known to him the state of facts, and asked of him a detail to go back with me that I might at least, were any guns captured, recover them, or, endangered, secure them. The general thought the responsibility too serious for him to assume, and requested me to refer the matter to General Hood, supposed near. General Hood's staff was found on the march, but himself, unwell, I was told, I did not see. No one could inform me where General Longstreet

was. To find yourself, then, was clearly my next duty. This, in the extreme darkness and amid the intricacies of unknown routes, proved a task of no little difficulty and delay. At length, succeeding, and making known to you the main facts, I was instructed to do no more till morning, when measures would be taken suited to circumstances, and meantime to secure a few hours of necessary rest. Early the next morning I had the privilege of accompanying a force, under General Jackson, sent to punish the enemy; of attending that honored officer and friend in the exposure incident to his command, and of witnessing the destructive chastisement inflicted upon the several thousands that had crossed and remained on the south side of the river. Under the immediate orders of General A. P. Hill, his division made upon that doomed body of the enemy a resistless charge, to their actual extermination. The furious fire of the enemy from beyond the Potomac, though necessarily harmful at first, proved far less damaging than it must otherwise have been, because such direction had to be given their pieces as to spare their own troops receiving the charge.

This severe work having been accomplished, I found that but four of our pieces had been lost. These, their horses being killed and the men being too weary to drag them away, had been spiked and left. They were, next morning, found by the enemy and thrown over the cliffs, before General Jackson's arrival to destroy them.

About noon of this day, Saturday, September 20, returning from Shepherdstown along the Winchester road, about 4 miles on the way, I joined our batteries, commanded by Major Nelson. With others, similarly instructed by myself, he had been diligently engaged the previous evening in causing batteries to be withdrawn in order, as directed, and the anticipated caution of the enemy had allowed them all to get back with no further damage than the leaving of one gun apiece by each of four batteries, as already mentioned.

Captain Maurin, an officer of tried merit, was, as said, compelled to spike and leave a 10-pounder Parrott; Captain Milledge, a 12-pounder brass howitzer; Capt. M. Johnson, also a 12-pounder brass howitzer, and Captain Huckstep, an iron 6-pounder.

The brass howitzer 12-pounder left by Captain Milledge proves, I regret to report, to have been a gun marked with the coat of arms of our own commonwealth, and belonging to the Virginia Military Institute, and to have been, on these accounts, especially valued. The Confederate States Government will, I hope and earnestly recommend, have of it a *fac simile* made and returned to the Virginia Military Institute.

Besides these losses, we had, in the batteries, 3 men killed and 4 wounded, and of horses, 26 killed and disabled. What casualties occurred in the infantry under Colonels Lamar and Hodges I have not been informed. Those officers have reported, I take for granted, through their division commanders.

That the immense force of the enemy was so effectually kept back and our army quietly relieved from disturbance by the persistent vigor and endurance of our comparatively small repelling strength, and with no greater loss, is assuredly cause for thankfulness to the Giver of good, and occasion for just appreciation of fidelity on the part of officers and men who performed the service.

Major Nelson's cool courage and persistent vigor throughout the day, and in the trying hour at its close, deserve especial mention. His services were of great value. Captains Hardaway, Kirkpatrick, Braxton, Maurin—indeed, every artillery officer from time to time under my eye,

and as otherwise known of by me—performed stern duty, I am satisfied, with commendable resolution and skill, as did the men. Captain Barnwell, of my staff, distinguished himself by the efficiency with which, under ceaseless exposure to shells hurled at his position, he managed our accurate Whitworth gun. My aide, Lieut. Charles Hatcher, and Sergt. Maj. Robert Jones also deserve honorable mention for the alacrity with which they bore my messages in every direction under hottest fire. Other members of my staff were, for the most part, absent on duty previously assigned. To Colonels Lamar and Hodges and the troops they commanded credit is justly due for the persevering determination with which they bore during all the day a fire, doubly galling, of case shot from the enemy's cannon and of musketry from the vastly outnumbering infantry force sheltered by the canal bank across the river. Not until overworn did the handful of our sharpshooters at all give way, and that would probably have been prevented could a double number, partly sheltered by trees, &c., have allowed relief in action.

Thankful that so much was done with such partial loss, I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. N. PENDLETON,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery.

General R. E. LEE,

Commanding Army of Northern Virginia.

For convenience, a sketch is annexed of our entire artillery organization for and after the campaign.*

With the First Corps, or right wing, of the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet, consisting of nineteen brigades, adjusted into five divisions, served an artillery force of 112 guns, viz: Forty-five rifles, 13 Napoleons, and 54 common smooth-bores, arranged into six battalions of several batteries each, of which battalions one attended each division and one constituted the corps reserve artillery. With the Second Corps, or left wing, commanded by Lieut. Gen. T. J. Jackson, and consisting of a brigade or two less than the other, adjusted into four divisions, served an artillery force of 123 guns, viz: Fifty-two rifles, 18 Napoleons, and 53 short range, arranged into battalions, attached and commanded as in the First Corps.

The cavalry corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, had also attached to it an effective mounted battery, known as Pelham's Horse Artillery, armed with two rifles and two 12-pounder howitzers.

Besides the general charge of all this artillery, its equipment, organization, and constant efficiency for and in action, the general chief of artillery held, under personal orders as the Commander-in-Chief might direct, a general reserve artillery, consisting of three battalions with several batteries each, having in all 15 rifles, 1 Napoleon, and 20 short-range guns, so that in our artillery service with the Army of Northern Virginia there were, adjusted as described, 275 guns.

Respectfully,

W. N. P.

* This report is printed from a copy found among General Pendleton's military papers. The original seems to have been received in Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Richmond, Va., September 30, 1862, but it is not found in the Confederate archives. The postscript must have been added later than November 7, 1862, and is supposed to refer to the tabular statement following, also found among General Pendleton's papers.

*Artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia in the summer of 1862, at Sharpsburg, &c.**

RIGHT WING.

Division.	Brigade.	Battery.	20-pounder Par-rotts.	10-pounder Par-rotts.	3-inch rifles.	24-pounder how-itzers.	12-pounder how-itzers.	Napoleons.	6-pounders.
Anderson's (11 rifles and 9 short range).	Wilcox's	Lewis's	2	2	2				2
	Wright's	Grandy's					2		3
	Perry's	Maurin's	2	1	1				2
	Mahone's	Huger's	1	1					2
McLaws' (7 rifles and 11 short range).	Featherston's								
	Semmes's	Manly's		1					3
	Cobb's	Carleton's	2				1		2
	Barksdale's	McCarthy's							1
Pickett's (3 rifles, 4 Napoleons, and 9 short range).	Kershaw's	Read's	1	1					2
	Armistead's	Dearing's	1				1		2
	Kemper's	Macon's	2						4
	Jenkins's	Stribling's					2	4	
Hood's (4 rifles, 5 Napoleons, and 5 short range).	Corse's								
	Toombs's	Bachman's						4	
	Anderson's	Garden's					1	1	2
	Robertson's	Reilly's	2	2	2				
Ransom's (6 rifles and 6 short range).	Law's								
	Cooke's	Branch's	1	2			3		
Artillery Reserve	Ransom's	French's	3	2			3		
	Washington Artillery	Squires's		1	2				
Alexander's battalion.		Miller's						2	
		Richardson's					2	2	
		Esheleman's					2		2
		Jordan's			2		1		1
		Rhett's	2	1					
		Moody's		2	2		2		
		Parker's					2		
		Eubank's			1		1		1
Total			2	24	19	6	21	13	27

LEFT WING.

Division.	Battery.	20-pounder Par-rotts.	10-pounder Par-rotts.	3-inch rifles.	Blakely rifles.	Hotchkiss rifles.	Whitworths.	12-pounder how-itzers.	Napoleons.	6-pounders.
D. H. Hill's (9 rifles and 14 short range).	Bondurant's			2				2		
	R. C. M. Page's			2				1		3
	Fry's			1				1		3
	Hardaway's			2			1			
A. P. Hill's (9 rifles, 8 Napoleons, and 13 short range).	Carter's	1						2		2
	Braxton's			2						4
	Latham's								2	2
	McIntosh's	1	1					1	1	
	Davidson's		1						2	1
	Crenshaw's							1	1	2
	M. Johnson's		2					2		
J. R. Jones' (12 rifles, 3 Napoleons, and 5 short range).	Pegram's	2							2	
	Brockenbrough's		1	2				1		
	Raine's		3					1		
	Caskie's	1								3
	Lusk's	1								2
	Carpenter's		2						2	
	Wooding's	2	1						1	

* This statement does not account for the batteries of Anderson, Blackshear, J. S. Brown, Chapman, Coke, Fleet, John R. Johnson, Leake, Lloyd, Nelson, T. J. Page, jr., Rogers, Thompson, and Wimbish, disbanded under General Lee's order of October 4, 1862, the men, guns, &c., being distributed to other batteries; nor for Cutshaw's and Rice's batteries, consolidated September 26 with Carpenter's and Wooding's batteries, nor for Boyce's, Hart's, Moorman's, Pelham's, and Woolfolk's batteries. The battery reported above as Fry's was Peyton's during the campaign, and that given as Massie's was the organization of October 4, 1862, from Ancell's and Huckstep's batteries; and "Alexander's battalion" was S. D. Lee's battalion during the campaign and till November 7, 1862.

Artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia in the summer of 1862, &c.—Continued.

LEFT WING—Continued.

Division.	Battery.	20-pounder Par-rotts.	10-pounder Par-rotts.	3-inch rifles.	Blakely rifles.	Hotchkiss rifles.	Whitworths.	12-pounder how-itizers.	Napoleons.	6-pounders.
Early's (10 rifles, 6 Napoleons, and 6 short range).	Brown's		2	1						2
	Balthis'									
	Dement's								4	2
	Carrington's							2		
	Latimer's								2	
Reserve Artillery, Col. J. T. Brown (10 rifles, 1 Napoleon, and 13 short range.)	D'Aquin's		1							
	Poague's	2	3							
	Smith's		2							
	Dance's			1						1
	Watson's		2			1		1		
	Hupp's							1		2
	Brooke's							1	1	2
	Total	2	17	29	2	1	1	22	18	31

GENERAL RESERVE.

Battalion.	Battery.	20-pounder Par-rotts.	10-pounder Par-rotts.	3-inch rifles.	Hotchkiss rifles.	James rifles.	Whitworths.	12-pounder how-itizers.	Napoleons.	6-pounders.
Cutts'	Lane's	2	3				1			
	Ross'		3					2	1	
Nelson's	Blackshear's							2		3
	Kirkpatrick's							3		4
	Massie's									6
	Milledge's		1	3	1	1				
Total		2	7	3	1	1	1	7	1	13

In all—with right wing, 112 pieces, viz, 45 rifles, 13 Napoleons, and 54 short range; with left wing, 123 pieces, viz, 52 rifles, 18 Napoleons, and 53 short range; in general reserve, 15 rifles, 1 Napoleon, and 20 short range.

No. 211.

Report of Capt. John G. Barnwell, Reserve Artillery, of operations September 14-19.

HEADQUARTERS RESERVE ARTILLERY,
October 22, 1862.

COLONEL: Having been sent to Richmond on duty by Brigadier-General Pendleton, I have been prevented from making my report as to this command sooner.

On September 14, the Reserve Artillery consisted of the battalions of Colonels [J. T.] Brown and Lee and that commanded by Major [William] Nelson, and, on the evening of that day, were placed in position by General Pendleton on the heights of Beaver Creek, but were not engaged.

Colonel Lee the next morning was sent with his command to a place called Centreville [Keedysville], and General Pendleton was ordered to cross the Potomac at Williamsport to guard the fords. Colonel Lee has not since been with the command. Colonel Brown was ordered to guard the fords at Williamsport and the ford 2 miles lower, name not known. He has not since been under the command of General Pendleton. One of his batteries (Captain [D.] Watson's) was sent, on the 17th, to Sharpsburg, but was not engaged. The remaining battalion, commanded by Major Nelson, and composed of the batteries [of] Captains [T. J.] Kirkpatrick, [John] Milledge, Ancell, M. Johnson, and Huckstep, reached Shepherdstown on the 16th, and were assigned their position on the heights commanding the ford a mile below the town. They remained there during the engagement of the 17th.

On the 18th, Captain Ancell was ordered to a position at Shepherd's Ford, 4 miles above the town, and on that night I reported to General Pendleton with a Whitworth gun and a detachment of men from the Purcell Battery, which I had been ordered to bring from Winchester.

The batteries of Captains [R. A.] Hardaway, Maurin, and [William H.] Chapman having been also reported to General Pendleton, and two other batteries having been placed on our left by Colonel [A. L.] Long, but whose names I have been unable to learn, the reserve on the morning of the 19th consisted of forty-four guns, which were placed as follows: On the right of the ford one 10-pounder Parrott and two 3-inch rifles, under Captain Maurin; one 10-pounder Parrott, under Lieutenant [T. A.] Maddox, of Cutts' battalion; four 3-inch rifles and one 12-pounder howitzer, under Captain Milledge; one 3-inch rifle and one Napoleon gun, under Captain Chapman; two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder howitzers, under Capt. M. Johnson. On the left of the ford two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder howitzers, under Captain Kirkpatrick; four 6-pounders, under Captain Huckstep; two 10-pounder Parrotts, under Captain [C. M.] Braxton; one Whitworth gun, under Captain Barnwell; two 10-pounder Parrotts, under Captain Hardaway; four 6-pounders and two 10-pounder Parrotts (captains not known), placed by Colonel Long, of General Lee's staff. The remainder of the guns, all short range, were not placed in position, and all of those mentioned were engaged during the day.

The casualties were as follows: In Captain Maurin's command, one 10-pounder Parrott, with limber, spiked and without ammunition, and one 6-pounder caisson, broken by the enemy's fire, abandoned; 1 man killed, 2 wounded, and 10 horses disabled, &c. Captain Milledge lost one 12-pounder brass howitzer and caisson (ammunition fully expended) and 3 horses. Capt. M. Johnson lost one 12-pounder brass howitzer with limber, 1 man wounded, and 6 horses disabled. Captain Huckstep lost one iron 6-pounder and limber, 1 man killed, and 4 horses disabled. There were casualties in other batteries, but no pieces or ordnance stores lost.

The battalion of Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts was not with General Pendleton in Maryland or on the banks of the river, but has since reported. His report* is inclosed for your inspection, hoping that it is sufficiently accurate.

I remain, your most obedient servant,

J. G. BARNWELL,
Captain, Artillery.

Lieut. Col. E. P. ALEXANDER,
Chief of Ordnance, Army of Northern Virginia.

* Not found.

No. 212.

Report of Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps, of operations September 2-18.

HEADQUARTERS,

Near Winchester, Va., October 10, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the late campaign:*

* * * * *

On September 2 the command marched, via Dranesville, Leesburg, and across the Potomac at White's Ford, to Frederick City, Md., arriving there on the 7th.

I moved from Frederick for Hagerstown on the 10th, and reached there with part of my command on the 11th, sending six brigades under Major-General Anderson to co-operate with Major-General McLaws in the assault upon Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. During the operations against this garrison the approach of a large army from Washington City for its relief was reported. We were obliged to make a forced march, in order to reach Boonsborough Pass, to assist Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division in holding this army in check, so as to give time for the reduction of Harper's Ferry.

I reached Boonsborough about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and, upon ascending the mountain, found General Hill heavily engaged. My troops were hurried to his assistance as rapidly as their exhausted condition would admit of. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Evans, Pickett (under Garnett), Kemper, and Jenkins (under Colonel Walker) were extended along the mountain to our left; Brigadier-General Hood, with his own, and Whiting's brigade (under Colonel Law), Drayton's and D. R. Jones' (under Col. G. T. Anderson), were extended to the right. Major-General Hill had already placed such batteries in position as he could find ground for, except one position on the extreme left. It was my intention to have placed a battery in this position, but I was so much occupied in front that I could find no time to do so before nightfall. We succeeded in repulsing the repeated and powerful attacks of the enemy and in holding our position until night put an end to the battle. It was short, but very fierce. Some of our most gallant officers and men fell in this struggle; among them the brave Col. J. B. Strange, of the Nineteenth Virginia Regiment. Had the command reached the mountain pass in time to have gotten into position before the attack was made, I believe that the direct assaults of the enemy could have been repulsed with comparative ease. Hurried into action, however, we arrived at our positions more exhausted than the enemy. It became manifest that our forces were not sufficient to resist the renewed attacks of the entire army of General McClellan. He would require but little time to turn either flank, and our command must then be at his mercy. In view of this, the commanding general ordered the withdrawal of our troops to the village of Sharpsburg. This position was regarded as a strong, defensive one, besides being one from which we could threaten the enemy's flank or rear in case he should attempt to relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry.

Crossing the Antietam on the morning of the 15th, Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division and my own command were placed in line of battle between the stream and the village of Sharpsburg. Soon after getting

* Portion of report here omitted appears in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 563-566.

into position, we heard of the surrender of Harper's Ferry. This left the portions of the army engaged in the reduction of that garrison free to join us. After much shelling at one point and another of our line, which extended more than a mile on each side of Sharpsburg, the enemy finally attacked General Hood, on my extreme left, late Tuesday evening, September 16. Hood drove him back, but not without severe loss, including that of Colonel Liddell, of the Eleventh Mississippi, an officer of great merit, modesty, and promise.

During the night the enemy threw his forces across the Antietam in front of Hood's position, and renewed his attack at daylight the next morning. Hood was not strong enough to resist the masses thrown against him. Several of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's brigades re-enforced the position; but even with these our forces seemed but a handful when compared with the hosts thrown against us. The commands engaged the enemy, however, with great courage and determination, and, retiring very slowly, delayed him until the forces of Generals Jackson and Walker came to our relief. D. R. Jones' brigade, under Col. G. T. Anderson, came up about the same moment; soon after this the divisions of Major-Generals McLaws and R. H. Anderson. Col. S. D. Lee's reserve artillery was with General Hood, and took a distinguished part in the attack on the evening of the 16th, and in delaying that of the 17th. General Jackson soon moved off to our left for the purpose of turning the enemy's right flank, and the other divisions, except Walker's, were distributed at other points of the line. As these movements were made, the enemy again threw forward his masses against my left. This attack was met by Walker's division, two pieces of Captain Miller's battery, of the Washington Artillery, and two pieces of Captain Boyce's battery, and was driven back in some confusion. An effort was made to pursue, but our line was too weak. Colonel Cooke, of the Twenty-seventh North Carolina, very gallantly charged with his own regiment, but, his supply of ammunition being exhausted and he being unsupported, he was obliged to return to his original position in the line.

From this moment our center was extremely weak, being defended by but part of Walker's division and four pieces of artillery; Cooke's regiment, of that division, being without a cartridge. In this condition, again the enemy's masses moved forward against us. Cooke stood with his empty guns, and waved his colors to show that his troops were in position. The artillery played upon their ranks, with canister. Their lines began to hesitate, soon halted, and after an hour and a half retired. Another attack was quickly made a little to the right of the last. Captain Miller, turning his pieces upon these lines and playing upon them with round shot over the heads of R. H. Anderson's men, checked the advance, and Anderson's division, with the artillery, held the enemy in check until night.

This attack was followed by the final assault, about 4 p. m., when the enemy crossed the bridge in front of Sharpsburg and made his desperate attack upon my right. Brigadier-General Toombs held the bridge and defended it most gallantly, driving back repeated attacks, and only yielded it after the forces brought against him became overwhelming and threatened his flank and rear. The enemy was then met by Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones with six brigades. He drove back our right several times, and was himself made to retire several times badly crippled, but his strong re-enforcements finally enabled him to drive in my right and occupy this part of my ground. Thus advanced, the enemy's line was placed in such a position as to enable General Toombs to move his brigade directly against his flank. General Jones seized the opportunity

and threw Toombs down against the enemy's flank, drove him back, and recovered our lost ground. Two of the brigades of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's division advanced against the enemy's front as General Toombs made his flank attack. The display of this force was of great value, and it assisted us in holding our position. The enemy took shelter behind a stone wall, and another line was advanced to the crest of a hill in support of his first line. Captains Richardson's, Brown's, and Moody's batteries were placed in position to play upon the second line, and both lines were eventually driven back by these batteries. Before it was entirely dark the 100,000 men that had been threatening our destruction for twelve hours had melted away into a few stragglers. The battle over, orders were sent around for ammunition-chests and cartridge-boxes to be refilled.

Early on the morning of the 18th a few sharpshooters began to exchange shots. I observed that the enemy had massed his artillery on the opposite side of the Antietam, with a view, apparently, to meet an attack from us. Our ranks were too much thinned to warrant a renewal of the conflict, with the chances of being drawn under the fire of this artillery. The effort to make a flank movement by our left the day previous developed the fact that the enemy had extended his right so as to rest it upon the Potomac, and thus envelop our left flank. From our position it was impossible to make any move except a direct assault upon some portion of the enemy's line. I therefore took the liberty to address a note to the commanding general, about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, suggesting a withdrawal to the south side of the Potomac. Before my note reached him, however, he rode to my bivouac and expressed the same views. Arrangements to move across the Potomac were completed by dark. My command, moving first, crossed about 2 o'clock in the morning, and part of it was placed in position in case it should be needed at the ford. The entire army crossed, however, without molestation, and, as directed by the commanding general, I proceeded to form his line. As this was completed, it became evident that the enemy was not pursuing, except with some of his batteries and some small force. The various commands were then marched off to their points of bivouac.

The name of every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private who has shared in the toils and privations of this campaign should be mentioned. In one month these troops had marched over 200 miles, upon little more than half rations, and fought nine battles and skirmishes; killed, wounded, and captured nearly as many men as we had in our ranks, besides taking arms and other munitions of war in large quantities. I would that I could do justice to all of these gallant officers and men in this report. As that is impossible, I shall only mention those most prominently distinguished. These were Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson, on the plains of Manassas, at Harper's Ferry, and at Sharpsburg, where he was wounded severely. Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones, at Thoroughfare Gap, Manassas Plains, Boonsborough, and Sharpsburg. Brig. Gen. R. Toombs, at Manassas Plains, in his gallant defense of the bridge at Antietam, and in his vigorous charge against the enemy's flank; he was severely wounded at the close of the engagement. Brigadier-General Wilcox, at Manassas Plains on August 29 and 30; afterward absent, sick. Brigadier-General Garnett, at Boonsborough and Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Evans, on the plains of Manassas, both on August 29 and 30, and at Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Kemper, at Manassas Plains, Boonsborough, and Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Hood and Colonels Law and Wofford, at Manassas Plains on August 29 and 30, Boonsborough, and at Sharpsburg on the 16th and 17th. Col. G. T.

Anderson, commanding D. R. Jones' brigade, at Thoroughfare Gap, Manassas Plains, Boonsborough, and Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Mahone, at Manassas Plains, where he received a severe wound. Brig. Gen. R. A. Pryor, at Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Jenkins, at Manassas Plains on August 29 and 30; on the last day severely wounded. Colonels Hunton, Corse, Stuart, Stevens, Hateley (severely wounded), and Walker (commanding Jenkins' brigade after the latter was wounded), at Manassas Plains, Boonsborough, and Sharpsburg. Colonel Posey, at Manassas Plains and Sharpsburg, where he commanded Featherston's brigade. Colonel Benning, at Manassas Plains and Sharpsburg. At Sharpsburg, Captain Miller, of the Washington Artillery, was particularly distinguished. Colonel Walton, of the Washington Artillery, at Rappahannock Station, Manassas Plains (August 29), and Sharpsburg; and Major Garnett, at Rappahannock Station. Lieutenant-Colonels Skinner and Marye, at Manassas Plains, where they were both severely wounded; and Major Walker, at Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas Plains. In the latter engagement this gallant officer was mortally wounded.

It is with no common feeling that I recount the loss at Manassas Plains of Colonels Gadberry, Eighteenth South Carolina; Means, Seventeenth South Carolina; Moore, Second South Carolina Rifles; Glover, First South Carolina Volunteers; Wilson, Seventh Georgia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, Fifth Texas. At Boonsborough, Col. J. B. Strange, Nineteenth Virginia Volunteers, and Lieutenant-Colonel McLemore, Fourth Alabama; and at Sharpsburg, Colonel Liddell, Eleventh Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonel Coppens and Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes, Second Georgia Volunteers. These valuable and gallant officers fell in the unflinching performance of their duty, bravely and successfully heading their commands in the thickest of the fight.

To my staff officers—Maj. G. M. Sorrel, assistant adjutant-general, who was wounded at Sharpsburg; Lieut. Col. P. T. Manning, chief of ordnance; Maj. J. W. Fairfax; Maj. Thomas Walton, who was also wounded at Sharpsburg; Capt. Thomas J. Goree and Lieut. R. W. Blackwell—I am under renewed and lasting obligations. These officers, full of courage, intelligence, patience, and experience, were able to give directions to commands such as they thought proper, which were at once approved and commanded my admiration.

Lieutenant-Colonel Blount volunteered his services to me at Boonsborough, and was, both there and at Sharpsburg, of material service to me.

The medical department, in charge of Surgeon Cullen, were active and unremitting in the care of the wounded, and have my thanks for their humane efforts.

My party of couriers were zealous, active, and brave. They are justly entitled to praise for the manly fortitude and courageous conduct shown by them in the trying scenes of the campaign.

The cavalry escort, commanded by Captain Doby, have my thanks for meritorious conduct and valuable aid. Captain Doby, Lieutenants Bonney and Matheson, Sergeants Lee and Haile, and Corporals Whitaker and Salmond, were distinguished in the active and fearless performances of their arduous duties.

I am indebted to Col. R. H. Chilton, Colonel Long, Majors Taylor, Marshall, Venable, and Talcott, and Captains Mason and Johnston, of the staff of the commanding general, for great courtesy and kindness in assisting me on the different battle-fields.

I respectfully ask the attention of the commanding general to the

reports of division, brigade, and other commanders, and approve their high encomiums of their officers and men.

Reports of killed, wounded, and missing have already been forwarded.

I remain, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Statement of losses in the corps commanded by Maj. Gen. J. Longstreet in the engagements at Crampton's Gap, Maryland Heights, Sharpsburg, and South Mountain.

Command.	Casualties from September 14 to 17, inclusive.						
	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Toombs' brigade.....	3	13	14	108	1	21	160
Drayton's brigade.....	11	71	16	264	3	176	541
Anderson's brigade.....	8	7	72	1	5	93	
Kenner's brigade.....	1	14	18	84	27	144	
Jenkins' brigade.....	27	28	168	1	11	235	
Garnett's brigade*.....	2	23	14	185	32	261	
Wright's brigade.....	32	25	167	3	31	258	
Mahone's brigade.....	8	12	80	5	122	227	
Armistead's brigade.....	1	4	8	26	1	35	
Pryor's brigade.....	8	40	17	268	49	382	
Featherston's brigade.....	3	42	31	207	36	319	
Hood's brigade.....	10	59	35	382	1	61	548
Whiting's brigade.....	6	47	46	344	25	468	
Evans' brigade.....	3	37	14	171	4	61	290
Walker's brigade.....	13	127	38	646	93	917	
Ransom's brigade.....	5	36	10	131	4	186	
Kershaw's brigade.....	11	79	42	413	6	551	
Semmes' brigade.....	5	51	22	252	43	373	
Barksdale's brigade.....	5	30	28	244	4	311	
Cobb's brigade.....	12	64	29	289	26	426	846
Lee's artillery.....	2	8	2	73	85		
Washington Artillery.....	4	3	25	2	34		
Wilcox's brigade.....	1	33	24	157	3	26	244
Total.....	102	862	478	4,756	48	1,262	7,508

No. 213.

Report of Lieut. Col. P. T. Manning, Chief of Ordnance, of the number of guns and caissons lost, &c., in the Maryland Campaign.

HDQRS. ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, RIGHT WING,
October 14, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to transmit the report containing the number of guns and caissons lost or abandoned in Maryland belonging to this command, in accordance to your order of the — instant; all of which is respectfully submitted.

Battalion Washington Artillery.—One 12-pounder caisson, left on field, was burned the night we fell back, by Colonel Anderson's brigade.

*Pickett's brigade.

†Wofford's brigade.

McLaws' Division.—Captain Read's battery, one 3-inch rifle gun. Captain [H. H.] Carlton's battery, one 12-pounder howitzer (brass) in battle of Crampton's Gap. Captain Lloyd's battery (Ransom's brigade), one 6-pounder gun (brass) and two caissons.

Lee's Battalion Artillery.—Captain [T. C.] Jordan's battery, one 12-pounder howitzer caisson. Captain [A. B.] Rhett's battery, one 12-pounder howitzer limber. Captain [W. W.] Parker's battery, rear chests 12-pounder howitzer caisson. Captain [G. V.] Moody's battery, one forge in Potomac. Captain [Pichegru] Woolfolk's [jr.] battery, one 12-pounder howitzer and limber. Captain Moorman's battery, two 10-pounder Parrott guns and rear carriage of caisson. Captain Maurin's battery (Pryor's brigade), one 10-pounder rifle (Parrott) and caisson. One caisson was destroyed by the enemy's shell during the fight.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. T. MANNING,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Ordnance, Right Wing.

Lieut. Col. E. P. ALEXANDER,

Chief of Ordnance, Department of Northern Virginia.

No. 214.

Report of Col. Stephen D. Lee, U. S. Army, commanding artillery battalion, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION RESERVE ARTILLERY,
Camp near Winchester, Va., October 11, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to render the following report of the part taken by the battalion of artillery under my orders in the battle of Sharpsburg:

The battalion crossed the Antietam about 8 a. m. September 15, and, in obedience to orders from General Longstreet, with the exception of Eubank's battery, took position on the bluffs to the left of the pike, facing the Antietam. Eubank's battery, in compliance with a written order of General Longstreet, held by the adjutant-general of Toombs' brigade, was sent to report to General Toombs, at the lower bridge, and remained with his brigade until the army recrossed the Potomac. Nothing of interest occurred during the morning.

About 1 p. m. the infantry of the enemy made its appearance across the creek, and was fired on by my long-range guns, causing them to move back. The enemy soon brought up several long-range batteries, with which they opened on our guns whenever they fired on their infantry. Nothing resulted from this firing except to make their infantry change position. The guns engaged were two rifled pieces of Parker's battery, two of Rhett's battery,* under Lieutenant [William] Elliott, and one of Jordan's battery,† under Lieutenant [C. A.] Bower. They were exposed to a hot fire; several men slightly wounded and several horses disabled. During the night the battalion, excepting Moody's battery,‡ shifted farther to the left of our line, taking a sheltered position on the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike, in front of a church. Remained during the day, the enemy making no offensive demonstration until near sundown. Since early in the morning they appeared engaged in massing

* The Brooks Artillery.

† The Bedford Artillery.

‡ The Madison Light Artillery.

their troops opposite our left, and toward evening endeavored to get into position to turn our left, bringing on quite a severe skirmish. Two howitzers of Rhett's battery took part in the skirmish, but it soon became too dark to continue the firing. It was now evident that the enemy would attack us in force on our left at daylight, compelling us to change our line and give him an opportunity to use his long-range batteries across the Antietam, enfilading our new position.

The action commenced about 3 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, between the skirmishers. Woolfolk's,* Parker's, and Rhett's batteries were placed in position in front of the church, on the right of the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike, and opened on the enemy at daylight. These batteries were compelled to fire over our infantry, but fired with effect. A continuous fire was kept up until about 8.15 a. m., when the enemy gave way and our firing ceased as our infantry followed in pursuit. The batteries above mentioned while engaged were exposed to an enfilade fire of about twenty rifle guns from across the Antietam, two batteries in their front, and the fire of the infantry of the enemy, most of the time about 500 yards distant. They suffered very heavily and had exhausted most of their ammunition.

I should have mentioned that two guns of Jordan's battery, under Lieutenant Bower, were sent to an advance position under Capt. John S. Taylor, but had to retire, owing to their exposed position and the fire of several batteries against them. About this time I ordered Rhett's battery to the rear for ammunition, and Parker's and Woolfolk's batteries to move slightly to the rear to refit, many horses and men being killed. They could only move the pieces by leaving portions of the caissons, so many of the horses had been disabled.

About this time, 9 a. m., Moody's battery, which had been engaged near the center of our line, arrived and reported, and I placed it in position on the ground previously occupied by Parker's battery. General Hood's division, which followed the enemy when he gave way, not being supported, was compelled to fall back before their overwhelming numbers. The enemy having gained his rear, and occupying a position almost between his retiring troops and Moody's battery, his troops fell back so sullenly, and were so near to the enemy, that it was impossible to use the battery. This being the case, I advanced two guns of Moody's battery some 300 yards into a plowed field, where I could use them. They remained in this position and did good service for about fifteen minutes, under Captain Moody and Lieutenant [John B.] Gorey. This section was exposed to a most galling infantry fire, and retained its position until the infantry on its right and left retired, when I ordered it to the rear. The gallant Lieutenant Gorey was killed, being shot in the head by a Minie-ball as he was sighting his piece for its last discharge. The section with which he was serving was not his own, but, seeing it was going to an exposed position, he asked permission to accompany it. A more gallant officer was not in our service.

Our troops having to fall back rapidly, my guns were, by direction of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, retired to the ridge of hills across the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, and between the church and Sharpsburg, and fired for a short time. General McLaws' division arriving at this time, and, going into action, I moved the battalion about a mile from the field, to refit. It was now about 10 a. m.

About 3 p. m., the batteries having refitted and replenished with ammunition, I again moved to the front with twelve guns, all that could

* The Ashland Artillery.

be manned, and received orders from one of General Longstreet's aides to take position in front of the village of Sharpsburg, to the right and left of the turnpike, relieving Colonel Walton, of the Washington Artillery, of New Orleans. Four of Moody's guns were placed on the right of the village; two of Parker's and two of Jordan's were placed at the left; Rhett's two pieces were placed on a ridge to the left of the village, on the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike. These guns, in their respective positions, did good service. Those in front of the village were exposed to a heavy fire of artillery and infantry, the sharpshooters of the enemy being within 200 yards of them during the entire evening. The guns of Moody's battery, in connection with Squires' battery, of the Washington Artillery, of New Orleans, repelled some six or eight attempts of the infantry of the enemy to take our position. At one time their infantry was within 150 yards of our batteries, when, by a charge of our supporting infantry, they were driven back. Two guns of Moody's battery, with Garnett's brigade, drove the enemy from the ridge to the left of the village after they had taken the ridge from our troops. The guns retained their position in front of the village till our troops were driven into the village on the right, when, by direction of General Garnett, they withdrew. The enemy were afterward repulsed from the village, and the hill for a short time was re-occupied by Capt. Thomas [H.] Carter's battery. It was now near dark, and the hill was held but by a few infantry.

Captain Eubank's battery not being with me, I am not prepared to speak from personal observation of his action, but General Toombs informed me that he and his company did good and gallant service.

The officers and men of my battalion behaved with the utmost gallantry. During the entire time engaged they were exposed to a heavy fire from the enemy, as is shown by the list of casualties inclosed; but of about 300 men who went into action, 86 casualties occurred and 60 horses were disabled.

In the morning, the battalion was engaged during the severe fight before our re-enforcements came up on the left, and was the only artillery engaged with General Hood's division. In the evening, it was engaged in front of the village and on the right, where the fight was heaviest. I regret to state that Captain Woolfolk's battery lost a gun on the field. It was on the left in the morning, when our lines gave way before the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. The 4 horses, 2 drivers, and 4 cannoneers at the piece were disabled, and it was with difficulty that the battery could be moved. I do not attach any blame to the captain. The piece could not be recovered, owing to the proximity of the enemy, though several attempts were made.

Capt. John S. Taylor, Confederate States Artillery, temporarily attached to my staff, was killed in the morning while gallantly discharging his duties. He was entirely fearless, and always sought the post of danger, and his example did much toward inspiring his daring in all around him.

Though, generally, all behaved well, I will particularly mention the following as having attracted my attention by distinguished gallantry: Capts. George V. Moody, Parker, and [Pichegru] Woolfolk, jr.; Lieutenant Elliott, commanding Rhett's battery; Lieutenants Gilbert and Fickling, Rhett's battery; Lieutenant Parkinson, Parker's battery (severely wounded in the leg); Lieutenant [J.] Sillers, Moody's battery; Sergeants Conroy, Price, and Corporals Gaulin and Donoho, Moody's battery. I would also mention Lieutenant Maddox, of Colonel [A. S.] Cutts' battalion of artillery, who had two guns under my command, and

behaved with great gallantry. My adjutant, Lieut. W. H. Kemper, Alexandria Artillery, was of great assistance to me, and exhibited gallantry and coolness in an eminent degree.

Inclosed is a list* of casualties.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEPHEN D. LEE,

Colonel Artillery, C. S. Army, Commanding Battalion.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Right Wing.

No. 215.

Report of Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman, commanding artillery battalion, of the loss of artillery at Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CAMP,
October 19, [1862].

COLONEL: In response to your inquiry of this morning, "as to the time and place of, and the circumstances attending, the loss of two 10-pounder Parrott guns and the rear part of caisson in the recent engagements," I am happy to state that you have been misinformed as to my losing two guns and rear [carriage of] caisson. During the engagement of September 17 at Sharpsburg (I presume between the hours of 3 and 4 o'clock) I had a 10-pounder Parrott disabled, axle being lost. The gun was then hauled off some 800 yards, and limber sent off for another carriage, which was soon procured, and forthwith returned for the gun, but, during the interim, some one, supposing the gun abandoned, appropriated it. These are the particulars as I get them from Lieut. C. R. Phelps, then in command.

Respectfully,

M. N. MOORMAN,

Captain, Comdg. Artillery Battalion, Anderson's Division.

Lieut. Col. E. P. ALEXANDER,

Chief of Artillery, &c.

No. 216.

Report of Capt. Victor Maurin, commanding company of Donaldsonville Artillery, of the loss of artillery, &c., at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford.

CAMP NEAR WARNER MCKARNE'S FARM,
Frederick County, Va., October 20, 1862.

SIR: In answer to your inquiries of this day, I herein send you that part of my report referring to the loss of the Parrott gun and caisson, made to Col. J. B. Walton, chief of artillery, on the 20th ultimo, and to General Pryor on the 9th instant:

In the retreat of the 19th near Shepherdstown one Parrott gun and caisson was lost. This happened in the following manner: The smooth-bore guns, on account of their short range, and the 3-inch rifle gun, for

want of long-range fuses, being of no service, were sent to the rear about 4 p. m. The two Parrott guns remained in position until dark, and, when ordered to move back, could no longer pass through the road, it being commanded by the enemy's artillery. I was, therefore, obliged to cut across fields and fences and a country entirely unknown to me, without a guide, and, in the darkness of the night, the rear piece, with worn-out horses, lagged behind. Lieutenant [R. P.] Landry returned to bring it up, but lost his way, and having come before a thick wood which could not be crossed, it was there abandoned and spiked, the enemy shouting in the rear, and, as he believed, gaining upon him. I sent for the piece and caisson the next day, but only the caisson was recovered, the piece having been taken away. One caisson for 6-pounder gun was destroyed by a shell during the evening of the same day. We lost 20 horses in the engagement, and, besides, having suffered much for food, being harassed during three days and nights, contributed greatly to the loss of the gun.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
V. MAURIN,

Captain, Commanding Company, Donaldsonville Artillery.

Lieut. Col. E. P. ALEXANDER,
Chief of Ordnance.

No. 217.

Report of Col. J. B. Walton, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

DECEMBER 4, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the several batteries composing the battalion Washington Artillery under my command in the engagements before Sharpsburg, Md., on September 16 and 17 last:

On September 15 the battalion, attached to the right wing of the Army of Northern Virginia, reached Sharpsburg, Md. Here a line of battle was formed, with the Antietam in our front, and here the forces under Generals Lee and Longstreet awaited the approach of McClellan's army. The four companies of this battalion were posted on the line as follows: The first company, Capt. C. W. Squires, Lieuts. E. Owen, Galbraith, and Brown, with two 3-inch rifles and two 10-pounder Parrott guns, on the right of the turnpike running through the center of and to the front of the town; the third company, Capt. M. B. Miller, Lieutenants McElroy and Hero, with four 12-pounder Napoleons, to the right of Captain Squires; to the right of Captain Miller, across a ravine and in an orchard in front of General D. R. Jones' position, were placed the second company, Capt. J. B. Richardson, Lieutenants Hawes, Britton, and De Russy, with two Napoleons and two 12-pounder howitzers, and the fourth company, Capt. B. F. Eshleman, Lieutenants Noreom, Battles, and Apps, with two 6-pounder bronze guns and two 12-pounder howitzers. During the afternoon the enemy made his appearance across the Antietam, and opened upon our lines with his long-range batteries. We did not reply, our guns not being able to reach his position.

The next morning (16th), the enemy having planted some batteries nearer our position and becoming annoying, I ordered the batteries to open all along our line, and engaged him in an artillery duel. This commenced at 11 a. m. and ended at 11.40, a period of forty minutes. Some

of his batteries were silenced, others we could not reach, and, having no ammunition to spare, we ceased firing, by order of General Longstreet, and drew the guns under cover of the hill. Captain Squires' battery of rifles was the only one of the battalion engaged in this conflict. Shortly after this firing ceased, Captain Richardson, having been placed in a position to watch the bridge over the Antietam in front of General Toombs' brigade, with his two Napoleons, opened fire with one gun upon a column of the enemy to the left of the bridge. After firing five rounds they retired out of his range.

On the morning of September 17 (our batteries still remaining in the positions of the day before), the enemy crossed large bodies of infantry in front of Captain Squires' position; they also opened their batteries upon him. Paying little attention to the artillery practice of the enemy, he quietly awaited the advance of his infantry, and concentrated his fire upon them, and succeeded in driving them from view. He then withdrew his guns and allowed the batteries of the enemy to expend much ammunition.

Shortly afterward, the enemy advanced one regiment of infantry. Captain Squires then turned all his guns and those of Garden's battery upon him, which drove him back. He rallied a second time, but again he was driven behind his hill. Here he was re-enforced and advanced again. He was again broken, but rallied within 400 yards of the batteries, from which position he deployed skirmishers and annoyed our men with the bullets of his sharpshooters. He again sounded the charge, and advanced within canister range. We opened a heavy fire upon him; he broke, and our supports, under General Garnett, charged him. Being nearly out of ammunition, Captain Squires withdrew his battery to refill his chests. One 10-pounder Parrott gun, under Lieutenant Galbraith, afterward engaged the enemy on our right until dark; the other 10-pounder Parrott was disabled during the action and sent from the field.

During the action, Captain Squires was deprived of the valuable services of Lieut. E. Owen, who was wounded in the thigh by a piece of shell, while acting with his usual gallantry with his guns.

Captain Squires, in his report, compliments highly his lieutenants, Owen, Galbraith, and Brown, who were in the hottest of the action, and proved themselves brave and efficient officers—worthy leaders of brave men.

Sergt. Maj. C. L. C. Dupuy went into action with his battery and did good service.

At 9.15 a. m. Captain Miller's battery, of four Napoleons, was ordered from its original position to a point to the left of the main road and near our center. Here Captain Miller was so fortunate as to meet with General Longstreet, who assigned him a position. He immediately opened upon the enemy's infantry, who were advancing upon our left and front. Here he suffered considerably from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, losing two of his gunners and several of his cannoneers, wounded, when, ascertaining that the enemy was beyond effective range, he was ordered by General Longstreet to cease firing and go under cover. Here he remained twenty minutes, when, the enemy again advancing, he ordered his battery again into position. Lieutenant Hero having been wounded and Lieutenant McElroy having been left to watch the movements of the enemy on the right, Captain Miller found himself the only officer with his company, and, having barely men enough left to work a section effectively, he opened upon the enemy with two pieces with splendid effect. After an action of half an hour, he removed his section

to a more advantageous position 100 yards to the front and right, placing the remaining section under Sergeant Ellis, directing him to take it completely under cover. He then continued the action until the ammunition was nearly exhausted, when Sergeant Ellis brought up one of the remaining caissons. The enemy had made two determined attempts to force our line, and had been twice signally repulsed. They were now advancing the third time, and were within canister range, when Sergeant Ellis, who had succeeded in rallying some infantry to his assistance, brought one of the guns of his section into action on Miller's left, and gave them canister, with terrible effect. The three guns succeeded in checking the enemy's advance, and remained in action until the ammunition was exhausted, when they were retired to be refilled. After procuring the required ammunition, Captain Miller was returning to his former position, when he was directed by General Lee to an elevated and commanding position on the right and rear of the town, where General A. P. Hill had but just begun his attack. Here I placed him in charge of the guns that had been ordered to this position, leaving Lieutenant McElroy to command his section, and he continued the fight until its close at nightfall.

Too much praise cannot be bestowed on Captain Miller for his stubborn defense of the center for several hours; to Lieutenants Hero and McElroy, and Sergeants Ellis, Bier (chief artificer), and Dempsey (artificer), for their gallantry.

This part of the action was under the immediate eye of General Longstreet, commanding, and his staff, who, when Captain Miller's cannoners were exhausted, dismounted and assisted the working of the guns.

Captain Miller was compelled, owing to his loss of horses, to leave one caisson on the field. He endeavored to bring it off the next day, but it was deemed unadvisable, it being in range of the enemy's sharpshooters, and it was abandoned and subsequently destroyed.

Captain Richardson engaged the enemy in his front with the two Napoleons of the second company until 1 p. m., when one of his guns was disabled by a shot from one of the three batteries that had been playing upon him, and he withdrew through the town of Sharpsburg and joined his section of howitzers on the right and rear. Procuring ammunition and repairing his disabled gun, he reported with his full battery to General Toombs, and took position on the right and began firing at the enemy's infantry, who at this time had crossed the bridge and was advancing in large force up the hill to his left, and finally getting out of his range, when he retired to a new position.

I afterward ordered Captain Richardson forward with his section of Napoleons and the 10-pounder Parrott gun of the first company, under Lieutenant Galbraith, to the position on the right, near the guns under Miller, when he opened fire and continued in action until the close of the engagement at nightfall. The section of 12-pounder howitzers, under Lieutenants Hawes and De Russy, were brought forward at the same time and assigned a position by General Toombs near his brigade. Here they opened on the enemy at a distance of 500 yards, and continued firing until the enemy was driven out of range.

Lieut. J. D. Britton was wounded in the arm late in the evening, after making himself conspicuous during the action for his coolness and soldierly bearing.

Captain Richardson, in his report, expresses himself entirely satisfied with the conduct of his officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. They behaved in such a manner as to reflect credit upon the second and of the corps of which they are a part.

The fourth, under Eshleman, was not idle during this eventful day,

when the battalion was so actively and effectually employed. About noon on the 17th he was directed by General Jones, in front of whose position he was placed, to remove his battery to a position to guard the ford below the bridge held by General Toombs. The battery was placed in position between the Blackford House and the ford, and opened fire upon the enemy, who were crossing in force. A long-range battery of the enemy on the opposite bank of the stream opened upon and enfiladed his guns, and he was compelled to retire, not, however, before he had driven the enemy back from the ford. He then received orders from General D. R. Jones to hold the enemy in check, if possible, until the arrival of General A. P. Hill, whose division was near at hand. The enemy soon made another attempt to cross with infantry and cavalry. Captain Eshleman took a position nearer the ford, and, under cover of a hill which protected him from the enemy's battery, opened fire upon him with case and shell. At this juncture General Pender arrived with a portion of General Hill's command and came to Eshleman's support. After driving the enemy back a second time, he kept up a moderate shelling of the woods near the ford until night, when he was ordered to retire and bivouac.

Captain Eshleman pays his lieutenants (Norcom, Battles, and Apps) a just compliment for their gallant conduct throughout the day, and especially during the steady and unflinching defense of the ford. His non-commissioned officers and men vied with their comrades of the first, second, and third companies, and added fresh laurels to the high standing of the corps.

Captain Squires, in the latter part of the day, succeeded in refilling the chests of the remaining section of his battery, and reported to General Toombs with his two 3-inch rifles and a section each of the Maryland Light Artillery and Reilly's battery, but his services were not then required; the enemy had been driven back at all points.

The casualties in this engagement were 4 killed, 28 wounded, and 2 missing.

This closes the imperfect record of the action of the several companies of the battalion Washington Artillery in the eventful battle before Sharpsburg, Md. It is to be hoped the general commanding, under whose immediate eye we fought on both days, will find in it enough to satisfy him that, without the incentive of revenge for wrongs, the soldiers of Louisiana are ever among the foremost in the performance of patriotic duty to their country.

Always ready and ever watchful and zealous, Adjt. W. M. Owen has again placed me under obligation for services on the field. Frequently, in my capacity of chief of artillery, during the two days, had I occasion to send him to distant parts of the field under the heaviest fire. Gallantly and unhesitatingly he executed every order.

Color-Sergeant Montgomery, as at the battle of Manassas, served me as aide, and was generally under fire during the engagement of the two days. He is a deserving and brave gentleman.

Ordnance-Sergeant [B. L.] Brazelman deserves special mention for his assiduity and unflagging devotion in supplying ammunition and in the performance of all his duties. He, on this occasion, added to his well-established reputation of an intelligent, brave, and meritorious soldier.

I am, major, very respectfully,

J. B. WALTON,
Colonel, Commanding.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORRELL,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Right Wing, Army of Northern Virginia.

No. 218.

Reports of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations September 10-17.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, *October 21, 1862.*

Col. R. H. CHILTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

I inclose herewith a report of the operations of my command in Pleasant Valley, Md. There are particular reasons why I should make a special report of the engagement at Crampton's Gap; to do which, however, it is necessary to obtain reports from Colonel Munford, who was first in command, and from Colonel Parham (Mahone's brigade), who came next after, and made the dispositions previous to the arrival of General Cobb.

Very respectfully,

L. McLAWS,
Major-General.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, *October 18, 1862.*

SIR: On the 10th ultimo, in compliance with Special Orders, No. 191, of September 9, 1862, from your headquarters, I proceeded with my own and General Anderson's division, via Burkittsville, to Pleasant Valley, to take possession of Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. I reached the valley on the 11th. Pleasant Valley runs north and south, and is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge, on the west by Elk Ridge, the southern portion of which ridge being more specially designated as Maryland Heights, the distance across in an air-line between the summits of the two ridges being about $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 miles. The valley itself is rolling and irregular, having one main road along or near the foot of the Blue Ridge, and there is another along the base of Elk Ridge, but it is very much out of repair and not much used. The Potomac River runs along the south ends of both ridges, Harper's Ferry town being on the opposite side of the river but entirely commanded by Maryland Heights, from which a plunging fire, from musketry even, can be made into the place. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the turnpike to Frederick, Md., through Middletown, and the canal to Washington City pass along the south end of Blue Ridge, there being just enough space for them between the mountains and the river. They also pass under the south end of Maryland Heights, where a crowded space for them has been made by blasting the rocks for a very considerable distance. The railroad bridge crosses the river just under the precipice of Maryland Heights, and about 50 yards above it the Yankees had a pontoon bridge for wagons, &c. The railroad bridge was defended by cannon placed on the farther end; the narrow causeway along the river under Elk Ridge, by cannon placed under the precipice and on the road. The river there is near 400 yards wide. On the west slope of Elk Ridge the enemy had three heavy guns, placed so as to command the approaches along the road and the town on the opposite side, and, I believe, the road coming from the west, and they also swept Bolivar Heights, which defended the approaches to the town from the side between the Shenandoah and the Potomac, west and south. So long as Maryland Heights was occupied by the enemy, Harper's Ferry could never be occupied by us. If we gained possession of the heights, the town was no longer tenable to them. Pleasant Valley was ap-

proached from the east—first, by the railroad, turnpike, and canal, at the south end of Blue Ridge; second, by a road over the ridge passing Burkittsville, a small town about a mile or less from the foot of the Blue Ridge, over Brownsville Gap, and by another through a gap to the north of the last-named road, known as Crampton's Gap. The two last were about 1 mile apart. The second road was distant from the one along the south end of the ridge 4 miles. Thus Crampton's Gap was 5 miles from the first road along the Potomac. Passing from the valley going west were two roads—one along the south end of Maryland Heights, already mentioned, and another through Solomon's Gap, a slight depression in Elk Ridge, about 5 miles north of the first. At the south end of Blue Ridge, and just at the commencement of the pass, coming from the east, is the small town of Weverton. About half-way between that place and Harper's Ferry, along the turnpike, is another small place called Sandy Hook. The road from Sandy Hook ran about the middle of the valley, and joined the main road along the foot of the Blue Ridge 2 miles from the Potomac. Understanding that there was a road running from the top of Solomon's Gap along the ridge to the heights commanding Harper's Ferry, I directed General Kershaw, with his brigade and that of General Barksdale, to proceed along that road and carry the heights, using infantry alone, as the character of the country forbade the use of any other arm.

On the 12th he proceeded to carry out the order. I then directed a brigade of General Anderson's division (General Wright's) to ascend the Blue Ridge with two pieces of artillery, and, proceeding down it to the point overlooking Weverton, to command the approaches to the pass there, along the turnpike, railroad, and canal. General Semmes was left opposite the gap the troops had passed over into the valley (the one next south of Crampton's Gap), with his own and General Mahone's brigade, commanded by Colonel Parham, with orders to send a brigade to the top of Solomon's Gap, to protect the rear of General Kershaw and also to take precautions to guard the passes over the Blue Ridge. General Cobb's brigade was directed to cross the valley, and, marching along its base, to keep in communication with General Kershaw above and up to his advance, so as to give support, if possible, if it was needed, and to serve as a rallying force should any disaster render such necessary. I then moved down the valley toward the river with the rest of the command, the inhabitants generally impressing it upon me that Maryland Heights was lined with cannon for a mile and a half. The main force was kept with the advance of General Kershaw, of which I was constantly informed by signal parties stationed on the heights moving with General Kershaw. General Kershaw soon encountered the skirmishers of the enemy, and drove them before him until darkness put an end to the conflict. General Wright gained his position without opposition, and at sundown General Anderson pushed forward a brigade (General Pryor's), as I directed, and took possession of Weverton, and disposed the troops to effectually defend the pass. The brigades of Generals Armistead and Cobb were moved up, forming a line across the valley from the right, commanding the road from Sandy Hook.

On the 13th, General Kershaw—after a very sharp and spirited engagement through the dense woods and over a very broken surface, there being no road from the point he had ceased operations the night previous, and across two abatis, the last quite a formidable work, the east and west sides being precipices of 30 or 40 feet, and across the ridge were breastworks of heavy logs and large rocks—succeeded in carrying the main ridge, where the enemy had a telegraph station, and by

4.30 p. m. we had possession of the entire heights, the enemy going down a road which they had constructed on the side opposite the Ferry, invisible to our troops from the valley, and were fired on by our skirmishers as they crossed the pontoon bridge to Harper's Ferry town. The report concerning cannon along the heights proved to be false, as the enemy used but one battery on the heights, and that was placed on the road toward Harper's Ferry, and was withdrawn so soon as the main ridge was carried. The battery of heavy guns placed on the west slope of the mountains, which during the day fired frequently on the storming party and dropped shells into Pleasant Valley, was spiked and abandoned at the same time. The troops in the valley were then advanced, and General Cobb's brigade occupied Sandy Hook with but little resistance, the enemy having abandoned the place with their main force of 1,500 on the night previous, leaving several hundred new muskets and other stores. The road, then, from Harper's Ferry, which presented egress from the place, coming east, was now completely commanded. Up to this time I had received no notice of the advance of either General Jackson or General Walker, except that a courier from General Jackson brought a dispatch from him to the effect that he hoped his leading division would be near Harper's Ferry about 2 o'clock on this day, and some firing in that direction led to the belief that he was advancing. During the day heavy cannonading was heard to the east and northeast, and the cavalry scouts were constantly reporting the advance of the enemy from various directions, but the truth of these reports was questionable, as the lookouts from the mountains saw nothing to confirm them.

On the 14th, the morning was employed in cutting a road to the top of Maryland Heights practicable for artillery. Major McLaws, of my staff, had examined the ground, and, reporting a road practicable, was directed to make one, and by 2 p. m. Captain Read and Captain Carlton, under the direction of Major Hamilton, chief of artillery, had two pieces from each of their batteries in position overlooking Bolivar Heights and the town. Fire was opened at once, driving the enemy from their works on the right of Bolivar Heights and throwing shells into the town. In the meanwhile General Walker, who had informed me of his arrival after dark on the 13th instant, had opened fire from Loudoun Heights, and General Jackson's batteries were playing from several points. Hearing of an advance of the enemy toward the gap over which the command had passed into Pleasant Valley, I had, about 12 o'clock, ordered General Cobb to return with his brigade to the camp near the point where the road came into the valley, and directed General Semmes to withdraw the brigade from Solomon's Gap, leaving a mere guard, and to tell General Cobb, on his arrival in the vicinity, to take command of Crampton's Gap. This gap was over 5 miles from the positions of my main force. I was on Maryland Heights, directing and observing the fire of our guns, when I heard cannonading in the direction of Crampton's Gap, but I felt no particular concern about it, as there were three brigades of infantry in the vicinity, besides the cavalry of Colonel Munford, and General Stuart, who was with me on the heights and had just come in from above, told me he did not believe there was more than a brigade of the enemy. I, however, sent my adjutant-general to General Cobb, as also Major Goggin, of my staff, with directions to hold the gap if he lost his last man in doing it, and shortly afterward went down the mountain and started toward the gap. On my way, with General Stuart, I met my adjutant-general returning, who informed me that the enemy had forced the gap and that re-enforcements were needed by General Cobb. I at once ordered up Wilcox's brigade, commanded by Col. Alfred

Cumming, of the Tenth Georgia Regiment, who had been detached from General Semmes' brigade for that purpose, and rode toward the gap.

Fortunately, night came on and allowed a new arrangement of the troops to be made to meet the changed aspect of affairs. The brigades of Generals Kershaw and Barksdale, excepting one regiment of the latter and two pieces of artillery, were withdrawn from the heights, leaving the regiment and two rifle pieces on the main height overlooking the town, and formed line of battle across the valley about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Crampton's Gap, with the remnants of the brigades of Generals Cobb, Semmes, and Mahone, and those of Wilcox, Kershaw, and Barksdale, which were placed specially under command of General Anderson. Generals Wright and Pryor were kept in position guarding the Weverton Pass, and Generals Armistead and Featherston that from Harper's Ferry. That place was not yet taken, and I had but to wait and watch the movements of the enemy. It was necessary to guard three positions: First, to present a front against the enemy advancing down the valley; second, to prevent them from escaping from Harper's Ferry and acting in conjunction with their troops in front; third, to prevent an entrance at Weverton Pass. The force of the enemy engaged and in reserve at Crampton's Gap was estimated to be from 15,000 to 25,000 and upward.

The loss in those brigades engaged was, in killed, wounded, and missing, very large, and the remnant collected to make front across the valley was very small. I had dispatched Lieutenant Tucker, my aide-de-camp, with a courier and guide, to report to General Lee the condition of affairs, but, on getting beyond our forces, he rode suddenly on a strong picket of the enemy, was halted, and fired on by them as he turned and dashed back. The courier was killed, but Lieutenant Tucker and the guide escaped. General Stuart had, however, started couriers before that, and sent others from time to time during the night, and I, therefore, was satisfied that General Lee would be informed before morning.

On the 15th the enemy did not advance, nor did they offer any opposition to the troops taking position across the valley. The line to oppose them from that direction was, therefore, formed, and the artillery posted to the best advantage, our artillery on Maryland Heights firing on the enemy below so soon as light permitted.

About 10 a. m. it was telegraphed to me from Maryland Heights that the enemy at Harper's Ferry had hoisted a white flag and had ceased firing. I at once ordered the troops which were defending the pass from Harper's Ferry to advance their skirmishers along the road to the bridge, or until they were fired on, and directed all the trains to be sent toward the Ferry, still keeping the line of battle opposed to that of the enemy above. They, in the meantime, were planting batteries on the Blue Ridge to operate against the artillery on the left of the valley looking north, which had been advantageously placed in position by my chief of artillery, Major Hamilton, along the line formed across the valley. My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Tucker, had been sent to communicate with General Jackson, in Harper's Ferry, and he returned and reported that General Jackson wished to see me. The enemy showing no disposition to advance, I left the command to General Anderson, with directions to push the train across the river as fast as possible and follow with the infantry when the trains were well over. I then rode over and received orders to proceed to Sharpsburg with all possible dispatch. I returned to Pleasant Valley, and, as the troops had been gradually withdrawn, I formed a new line across at the foot of the valley, still holding Maryland Heights and Weverton Pass, and waited until near 2 o'clock, when, the trains having passed over the river, the troops were withdrawn to the

right bank, and, marching through Harper's Ferry, encamped near Halltown, 4 miles distant, about 8 o'clock on the 16th instant.

The troops that were engaged in the attack and capture of Maryland Heights are entitled to especial commendation, as they were laboriously employed for two days and one night along the summit of the Elk Ridge, constantly working their way, under fire, during the day, and at night resting in position, all this time without water, as none could be obtained but from the valley beneath, over a mile down the mountain, and at the close of the contest there was not a straggler from the two brigades. General Kershaw, who had special command of this force, acted in this instance (as he has in all others when under my command) with great skill, coolness, and daring, and is deserving of special praise. I refer you to his report for other particulars of the engagement and for the operations of the brigade of General Barksdale, which accompanied him and materially assisted in the capture of the place.

Seeing that the canal was full of water about Weverton, I directed General Pryor (if tools could be obtained) to cut the canal just above a culvert near the place, which he did, and thinks the canal was materially damaged. He also broke the canal lock.

The enemy having forced Crampton's Gap, thereby completely cutting off my route up the valley to join the forces with General Lee, as Solomon's Gap, the only road over Elk Ridge, was just in front of the one over the Blue Ridge occupied by the enemy, I had nothing to do but to defend my position. I could not retire under the bluffs along the river, with the enemy pressing my rear and the forces at Harper's Ferry operating in conjunction, unless under a combination of circumstances I could not rely on to happen at the exact time needed; could not pass over the mountain except in a scattered and disorganized condition, nor could have gone through the Weverton Pass into the open country beyond to cross a doubtful ford when the enemy was in force on the other side of the Blue Ridge and coming down in my rear. There was no outlet in any direction for anything but the troops, and that very doubtful. In no contingency could I have saved the trains and artillery. I therefore determined to defend myself in the valley, holding the two heights and the two lower passes in order to force a direct advance down the valley, to prevent co-operation from Harper's Ferry, and at the same time to carry out my orders in relation to the capture of that place. I received several communications from your headquarters in relation to my position, which were obeyed so far as circumstances permitted, and I acted, in departing from them, as I believed the commanding general would have ordered had he known the circumstances. The force in Harper's Ferry was nearly, if not quite, equal to my own, and that above was far superior. No attempt was made to co-operate from Harper's Ferry with the force above, and the force above did not press down upon me, because, I believe, General Lee offered battle at Sharpsburg. The early surrender of Harper's Ferry relieved me from the situation, and my command joined the main army at Sharpsburg on the morning of the 17th.

My special thanks are due to General Anderson, whose division was under my command, for his advice and assistance, and the cordial co-operation of all in generally performing their whole duties. The operations at Crampton's Gap I give in a separate paper.

To the members of my staff—Major McIntosh, assistant adjutant-general; Majors Goggin, McLaws, and Edwards, acting commissaries of subsistence; chief surgeon of division, Surgeon Gilmore; Captain King, who accompanied General Kershaw during the whole of his operations

on the heights; Captain Costin and Lieutenant Tucker, aides-de-camp; Captain Taliaferro and Lieutenant Edwards, ordnance officers—I am indebted for their aid and active assistance. Captain Manning, who had charge of the signal corps, being unable to attend to his duties from a sudden attack of erysipelas in the head, Captain Costin took charge of the party, and it rendered very great service during the three days it was required. Lieutenant Campbell, of the Engineers, also distinguished himself for his activity in reconnoitering the positions of the enemy.

Very respectfully,

L. McLAWS,
Major-General.

Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, *October 20, 1862.*

SIR: On the morning of September 16, ultimo, my command, consisting of my own division and that of General Anderson, marched through Harper's Ferry from Pleasant Valley, and halted near Halltown and a short distance from the road which turned to the right toward Shepherdstown, which was on the way to Sharpsburg, to which place I had been directed to march by orders direct from General Lee and afterward from General Jackson. The entire command was very much fatigued. The brigades of Generals Kershaw and Barksdale had been engaged on Maryland Heights on the 12th, 13th, and 14th, and on the 15th had been marched from the heights to the line of battle up the valley, formed to oppose that of the enemy below Crampton's Gap. Those of Generals Cobb, Semmes, and Mahone (Colonel Parham) had been engaged and badly crippled at Crampton's Gap, and all the others had been guarding important points under very trying circumstances. A large number had no provisions, and a great portion had not had time or opportunity to cook what they had. All the troops had been without sleep during the night previous, except while waiting in line for the wagon trains to pass over the pontoon bridge at Harper's Ferry. I had ridden on to Charlestown to look after the sick and wounded from Pleasant Valley, when notice was sent me to hasten the troops to Sharpsburg. I returned to camp and started the command at 3 p. m. Halted after dark (and the night was very dark) within 2 miles of Shepherdstown, when, receiving orders to hasten forward, again commenced the march at 12 o'clock that night, many of the regiments still without provisions. I may here state that the crossing at Harper's Ferry was very much impeded by the paroled prisoners passing over the bridge whenever there was an opportunity offered by any accident to the bridge causing temporary halt in the trains or batteries, which was of frequent occurrence, and the streets of Harper's Ferry town were crowded with prisoners and wagons, all of which prevented me from halting, even for a moment, in the town, to obtain provisions there.

On the morning of the 17th, about sunrise, the head of my column reached the vicinity of General Lee's headquarters near Sharpsburg. I rode on to the town, looking for General Lee, and on my return, not finding him, met General Longstreet, who directed me to send General Anderson's division direct down the road to the hill beyond Sharpsburg, where he would receive orders. I learned from him where General Lee's camp was, and reported to General Lee for orders. He directed me to

halt my division near to his headquarters, which was done, and I then rode back to hasten up General Anderson, whose division was in the rear. About an hour after this my division was ordered to the front by an aide-de-camp of General Lee, Major Taylor. In about 1 mile we came in rear of the position, which was pointed out by Major Ratchford, of General D. H. Hill's staff, as the one the division was to occupy. I was, of course, entirely ignorant of the ground and of the location of the troops. General Hood, however, who was present, pointed out the direction for the advance, and my line of battle was rapidly formed, General Cobb's brigade on the right, next General Kershaw's, Generals Barksdale and Semmes on the left. Just in front of the line was a large body of woods, from which parties of our troops, of whose command I do not know, were seen retiring, and the enemy, I could see, were advancing rapidly, occupying the place. My advance was ordered before the entire line of General Kershaw could be formed. As the enemy were filling the woods so rapidly, I wished my troops to cross the open space between us and the woods before they were entirely occupied. It was made steadily and in perfect order, and the troops were immediately engaged, driving the enemy before them in magnificent style at all points, sweeping the woods with perfect ease and inflicting great loss on the enemy. They were driven not only through the woods, but over a field in front of the woods, and over two high fences beyond and into another body of woods over half a mile distant. From the commencement of the fight, the men were scattered, by the engagement, through the woods where the enemy made their only stand, and, there being no immediate support, the several brigades fell back into the woods, and the line, to maintain the position, was formed by the brigades of Generals Ransom (Walker's division) and Armistead (General Anderson's division), which had been sent to my support; of General Early, which was already in position, and the brigades of Generals Barksdale and Kershaw. Captain Read's battery had been placed in position on the right of the woods, which we had entered, and did most excellent service, but it was exposed to such a severe fire, General Kershaw ordered it back after losing 14 officers and men and 16 horses. Another battery, Captain Carlton's, which I had ordered into position in the woods in front of General Ransom's brigade, was so severely cut up in a short time by the direct and cross-fires of numerous batteries that I ordered it to retire. The enemy did not make an attempt to retake the woods after they were driven from them, as I have mentioned, but kept up a terrific fire of artillery. There was an incessant storm of shot and shell, grape and canister, but the loss inflicted by the artillery was comparatively very small. Fortunately, the woods were on the side of a hill, the main slope of which was toward us, with numerous ledges of rocks along it. Thus it was, our men, although under this fire for hours, suffered so little from it. I could do nothing but defend the position my division occupied. The line was too weak to attempt an advance. There were not men enough to make a continuous single line. In some places for considerable distance there were no men at all, while just beyond us, across an open field, about 400 or 500 yards distant, were the lines of the enemy, apparently double and treble, supporting numerous batteries, which crossed fire over every portion of the ground. The artillery of the enemy was so far superior to our own in weight of metal, character of guns and numbers, and in quality of ammunition, that there was but very little to be gained by opposing ours to it, and I therefore did not renew the attempt after the first experiments. The ground over which the

Mississippi Brigade (General Barksdale) advanced, and to his right, was thickly strewn with the dead and wounded of the enemy, far exceeding our own, and their dead were much more numerous than their wounded. The close proximity of the combatants to each other may account for the disproportion. General Cobb's brigade, going in, extended itself farther to the right than I intended, but the colonel commanding, Colonel [C. C.] Sanders, Twenty-fourth Georgia, did not hear my orders to correct the error, so it is reported, and, the engagement commencing immediately, the brigade went on to a position several hundred yards to the right of the woods and defended it. General Semmes was sent to the left just after his brigade came on the ground, by direction of General Jackson, to give support to General Stuart. His brigade drove the enemy through the woods and beyond them for a considerable distance. General Kershaw's brigade was more exposed in its first advance than any other, as it had to move over a large, open space before reaching the woods, which then afforded less protection, but the command went on with enthusiasm and drove the enemy up to their batteries and reserves, and then retired to the woods from which they had first driven the enemy, as did the other brigades of Cobb, Semmes, and Barksdale, because of the weakness of their own lines, the want of immediate support, the want of ammunition, and the fatigue of the men. I call attention to the fact that Colonel [J. D.] Nance, commanding the Third South Carolina Regiment, of General Kershaw's brigade, brought his regiment from the ground in perfect order and formed it in the rear, to be supplied with ammunition, with the precision of a parade. This perfect control of his men is owing to the high state of discipline and good drill for which his regiment is distinguished. General Barksdale reformed on the ground he went over; General Semmes was placed in reserve in his rear; General Cobb's brigade on the left of General Kershaw, who had previously moved to the left of the line.

The enemy having abandoned their attempt to advance, I had an opportunity to examine the relative positions of our troops and those of the enemy, and soon became convinced that we had nothing to gain by an advance of our troops. The strong position of the enemy was along the Antietam, the right bank of which (the side toward our army) was swept by numerous batteries of artillery posted along the left bank, which commanded the right. Their position along the left bank was a very strong one, having the Antietam in their front and Maryland Heights in their rear. For us to force them back on the Antietam was to force them to concentration on their reserves, of which we had none, to weaken our lines, and scatter our troops, so that, in the event of a reverse, no rally of any considerable body could be made, and the final results would not probably have been such as to have entitled us to claim, as we now can, the battle of Sharpsburg as one of the greatest successes, if not the greatest success, of the war, when the enormous disparity between our forces and those of the Yankees are considered.

Brigadier-Generals Kershaw, Semmes, and Barksdale deserve high praise for their heroic conduct in the fight and for the skillful manner their brigades were handled. Colonel Sanders, Twenty-fourth Georgia, who commanded Cobb's brigade during the first part of the engagement, carried it forward in good order, and the brigade maintained its position and drove the enemy for some distance, retiring only after losing 43 per cent. of its strength. Lieutenant-Colonel MacRae, of the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment, commanded the brigade during the latter part of the fight.

The losses in the different brigades, including the different batteries, were as follows:

Command.	Carried into action.		Killed and wounded.		Missing.	Per cent.	General average.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.			
Brigadier-General Kershaw.....	112	824	44	305	6	38	} 39.5
Brigadier-General Semmes.....	63	646	27	281	6	44	
Brigadier-General Barksdale.....	89	802	32	258	4	33	
Brigadier-General Cobb.....		357	11	135	10	43	

Which, taken in connection with the small number of missing, shows how dearly, yet how gloriously, their success was obtained.

It is with sincere regret that I have to state my adjutant-general, Maj. T. S. McIntosh, was killed, shot through the heart while carrying out one of my orders. The country has lost in him as brave and as gallant an officer and gentleman as any that survive him. My inspector-general, Major Goggin, was with me during the day, carrying orders and superintending their execution, in the performance of which duties he exhibited great daring and cool, sound judgment. To Captain King and Lieutenant Tucker, aides-de-camp, and Captain Costin, signal officer; Lieutenant Campbell, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant Edwards, ordnance officer, I am indebted for their zeal and activity; their gallantry was conspicuous in the performance of their duties. Col. Henry Coalter Cabell, chief of artillery, who had been absent, sick, joined me on the field, and remained during the rest of the engagement.

I inclose reports of brigade commanders, and call attention to their notices of individual merit.

Very respectfully,

L. McLAWS,
Major-General.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters General Longstreet.

Return of casualties in McLaws' division in the engagement on Maryland Heights, September 13, 1862.

Command.	Engaged.		Killed.		Wounded.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Barksdale's brigade:							
13th Mississippi.....	20	190			1	5	6
17th Mississippi.....	24	260		2		5	7
18th Mississippi.....	24	170				2	2
21st Mississippi.....	22	250				2	2
Total.....	90	870		2	1	14	17

Return of casualties in McLaws' division, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Engaged.		Killed.		Wounded.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Kershaw's brigade:							
2d South Carolina*.....	26	345		14		35	49
3d South Carolina.....	38	428		13	6	94	113
7th South Carolina.....	36	90		6	3	25	34
8th South Carolina.....	4	74					
Read's battery.....							
Total.....	104	937		33	9	154	196
Grand total.....	194	1,807		35	10	168	213

Return of casualties in McLaws' division at the battle of Crampton's Gap, September 14, 1862.

Command.	Engaged.		Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Cobb's brigade:									
Georgia Legion.....	22	226	4	7	2	21	12	144	190
16th Georgia.....	27	341	4	20	6	50	5	102	187
24th Georgia.....	22	270	3	9	9	50		55	126
15th North Carolina.....	27	375	1	10	1	47	9	115	183
Troup Artillery.....	1	30		1		3			4
Total.....	99	1,242	12	47	18	171	26	416	690
Semmes' brigade:									
10th Georgia.....	18	155		†3		†19		†37	59

Return of casualties in McLaws' division at the battle of Sharpsburg, Md., September 17, 1862.

Command.	Engaged.		Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Barksdale's brigade:									
13th Mississippi.....	24	178	1	5	7	47		2	62
17th Mississippi.....	22	248		9	10	67		2	88
18th Mississippi.....	24	162	1	10	7	62			80
21st Mississippi.....	18	182	3	3	3	53			62
Howitzer Battery.....	1	32		1		1			2
Total.....	89	802	5	28	27	230		4	294

* Not engaged.

† Officers and men not separately reported.

Return of casualties in McLaws' division, &c.—Continued.

Command.	Engaged.		Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Cobb's brigade:									
Georgia Legion				4	1	8			13
16th Georgia				5	3	18			26
24th Georgia				4	1	38		2	45
15th North Carolina				3	5	47		8	63
Troop Artillery				1	1	7			9
Total				17	11	118		10	156
Kershaw's brigade:									
2d South Carolina	26	227	2	15	7	70			94
3d South Carolina	27	239	1	10	5	66		2	84
7th South Carolina	29	239	6	17	10	107			140
8th South Carolina	26	45	1	1	11	6		4	23
Read's battery	4	74	1	3		10			14
Total	112	824	11	46	33	259		6	355
Semmes' brigade:									
10th Georgia	13	134		16	8	59			83
53d Georgia*	21	255	1	10	3	60		6	80
15th Virginia†	14	114	1	10	6	58			75
32d Virginia	15	143	3	12	4	53			72
Manly's battery					1	3			4
Total	63	646	5	48	22	233		6	314
Grand total	264	2,272	21	139	93	840		26	1,119

No. 219.

Reports of Brig. Gen. J. B. Kershaw, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations September 12-18.

HDQRS. KERSHAW'S BRIGADE, McLAWS' DIVISION,
September 25, 1862.

MAJOR: On the morning of the 12th instant I was directed, with Barksdale's Mississippi brigade and my own (South Carolina), to move from Brownsville and occupy the Maryland Heights, taking the road by Solomon's Gap to the summit of Elk Ridge, and thence, along the ridge, to the point which overlooks and commands Harper's Ferry. At an early hour the command was in motion and reached the gap without opposition. At this point, however, the pickets of the enemy were discovered, and it became necessary to approach the position carefully, with skirmishers thrown well to the right and left. This being done, the enemy withdrew his picket after a few scattering shots. Reaching the summit of the mountain, skirmishers were thrown well down the mountain to my right, while the column filed to the left along the ridge. Captain Cuthbert, Second South Carolina Regiment, commanding the skirmishers on the right, soon encountered a volley from about three companies of cavalry, but upon the fire being returned the enemy left with some loss. About a mile farther on, Major Bradley, Mississippi regiment, commanding skirmishers, reported an abatis across the line of march, from

* Lieutenant Brown killed.

† Capt. A. V. England killed.

which he was fired upon by a picket. Directing him to press forward and ascertain the force in front, he soon overcame the obstacle without further resistance. Leaving then the path, which at that point passed down the mountain to the right, we filed along the crags on the ridge. The natural obstacles were so great that we only reached a position about a mile from the point of the mountain at 6 o'clock p. m. Here an abatis was discovered, extending across the mountain, flanked on either side by a ledge of precipitous rocks. A sharp skirmish ensued, which satisfied me that the enemy occupied the position in force. I therefore directed Major Bradley to retire his skirmishers, and deployed my brigade in two lines, extending across the entire practicable ground on the summit of the mountain, the Eighth Regiment, Colonel Henagan, on the right, and the Seventh, Colonel Aiken, on the left, constituting the first line; the Third Regiment, Colonel Nance, in rear of the Eighth, and the Second Regiment, Colonel Kennedy, in rear of the Seventh, constituting the second line; General Barksdale's brigade immediately in rear. These dispositions being made, the approach of night prevented further operations; the commands rested on their arms in the position indicated until the morning of the 13th, when I moved forward my first line to the attack. Early in the advance, the Eighth Regiment encountered a ledge of rock which cut them off from further participation in the attack; but Colonel Aiken moved briskly forward, under a heavy fire of musketry, surmounted the difficult abatis, and drove the enemy from his position in about twenty minutes. The enemy is stated by prisoners to have been 1,200 strong at this point. They retired about 400 yards, to a much stronger position, a similar abatis, behind which was a breast-work of logs, extending across the mountain, flanked, as before, by precipitous ledges of rock.

I had, at the commencement of the attack, directed General Barksdale to form his brigade down the face of the mountain to my left, in prolongation of the two lines on the summit, it having appeared the night before that the enemy's skirmishers occupied a part of that face of the mountain. I now directed General Barksdale to advance his command, and attack the enemy in flank and rear, while I pressed him in front. Again I moved forward the Seventh and Eighth Regiments. Reaching the abatis, a most obstinate resistance was encountered, and a fierce fire kept up, at about 100 yards distance, for some time. Our loss was heavy, and I found it necessary to send in Colonel Nance's Third Regiment to support the attack. They, too, were stoutly resisted. General Barksdale then sent me word that he had, with great labor, overcome the difficulties of the route and had reached the desired position, but that he could not bring his men to the crest of the mountain without encountering our fire, as he was in rear of the enemy. I sent to direct our fire to cease, hoping that we might capture the whole force if General Barksdale could get up. Before this order was extended, the right company of Colonel Fiser's regiment, Barksdale's brigade, fired into a body of the enemy's sharpshooters lodged in the rocks above them, and their whole line broke into a perfect rout, escaping down the mountain sides to their rear. This took place at 10.30 o'clock a. m. General Barksdale was directed to occupy the point of the mountain, which he did without encountering anything more than a picket of the enemy, which he soon disposed of. In their retreat the enemy abandoned and spiked three heavy guns, which were in position on the lower slope of the mountain toward Harper's Ferry, and left considerable commissary stores, ammunition, and a number of tents near the same place. The guns were left by me, as it was impossible to remove them without fur-

ther time. Lieutenant-Colonel McElroy was directed to destroy all the stores, &c., which he could not remove when he left his position.

The next day, through the exertions of Major McLaws' assistant quartermaster, a road was opened, and four Parrott guns brought up the mountain and placed in position—two pieces Read's battery, commanded by Captain Read, and two pieces Captain Carlton's battery, commanded by Captain Carlton. As the major-general commanding was present on Sunday, and witnessed the constancy and efficiency of the fire of these guns, it is not necessary for me to refer further to it.

Sunday night I received orders to withdraw the command from the mountain and proceed to Brownsville, to meet the enemy in that direction, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel McElroy's Thirteenth Mississippi Regiment and Read's two pieces of artillery. We left the mountain at daylight Monday morning. In this engagement our loss was heavy; but three of my regiments were engaged, the ground not admitting of the employment of a larger number. The Seventh and Eighth Regiments exhausted their ammunition, and the Third Regiment had but a few rounds left when the place was carried. Prisoners were taken from three different regiments of the enemy, one of which was represented to number 1,000 men. Many of the enemy were left dead on the field, but, from the statement of prisoners and the indications in the rear, it is certain that they removed the most of their dead and wounded during the action. The conduct of the whole command, contending as they were against the most formidable natural obstacles, without water, which could not be obtained nearer than the foot of the mountain, and encountering an enemy most strongly posted and superior in numbers to all that could be brought into position against him, is worthy of the highest commendation. To General Barksdale I am much indebted for his hearty co-operation and valuable assistance. Dr. T. W. Salmond and the medical staff of the brigade were assiduous in the discharge of their duties, under great difficulties, as their ambulances and stores could not be brought upon the mountain. I am much indebted to Major Bradley, of the Mississippi regiment, for his brave and efficient handling of our advanced skirmishers. Col. D. Wyatt Aiken, and his officers and men, who bore the brunt of the battle and suffered the greatest loss, are particularly deserving of mention. Of all the regiments engaged, it is worthy of mention that not one man went to the rear uninjured during the engagement. My thanks are especially due to Captain Holmes, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant Dwight, acting adjutant and inspector-general, and Lieutenant Doby, aide-de-camp, for most efficient and intelligent discharge of the staff duties on the field. I regret to say that Lieutenant Dwight was seriously injured by a fall from the rocks while communicating a message to General Barksdale.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. KERSHAW,

[Brigadier-General].

HDQRS. KERSHAW'S BRIGADE, McLAWS' DIVISION,
Near Winchester, Va., October 9, 1862.

MAJOR: In obedience to orders from division headquarters, I have the honor to transmit a report of the operations of my command at the battle of Sharpsburg:

Owing to the exigencies of the service, my command were without their usual supply of subsistence from Monday morning, September 13, until the night of the 17th. They were also under arms or marching

nearly the whole of the nights of Monday and Tuesday, arriving at Sharpsburg at daylight on Wednesday morning, September 17. As a consequence, many had become exhausted and fallen out on the way-side, and all were worn and jaded.

About 9 o'clock we were ordered forward to the relief of General Jackson's forces, then engaged on the left, in the wood in rear of the church. The Georgia and Mississippi brigades were formed in a plowed field to the right and rear of the wood; my brigade in their rear in the same field. The enemy was discovered in the wood, advancing toward its right face, where some of our guns had been abandoned before our arrival. Perceiving this, Major-General McLaws directed me to occupy that part of the wood in advance of them while our lines were being formed. For this purpose I ordered forward, at double-quick, Colonel Kennedy's Second South Carolina Regiment to march by a flank to the extreme point of the wood; then by the front to enter it. Before the head of the regiment had reached the point, and when entangled in a rail fence, the enemy opened fire upon them from a point not more than 60 yards distant. They promptly faced to the front, and returned the fire so rapidly as to drive the enemy almost immediately. At the same time the brigades of Cobb and Barksdale, now on their left, advanced to their support. I then hurried up my three remaining regiments—the Eighth, Lieutenant Colonel [A. J.] Hoole; Seventh, Colonel [D. W.] Aiken, and Third, Colonel Nance—and conducted them to the right of Colonel Kennedy, who by this time had advanced beyond the wood and to the left of the church, driving the enemy. I then ordered Read's battery to a position on the hill to the right of the wood and sent in Colonel Manning, who reported to me on the field, with Walker's brigade, to the right of my brigade. Our troops made constant progress for some time along the whole line, driving in column after column of the enemy. Colonel Aiken's regiment approached within 30 yards of one of the batteries, driving the men from the guns, and only gave way when enfladed by a new battery placed in position near them, leaving Major White dead and one-half their men killed or wounded upon the field.

About this time the enemy was heavily re-enforced, and our line fell back to the wood, which was never afterward taken from us. Read's battery, having suffered greatly in the loss of men and horses, was withdrawn, by my order, when the infantry fell back. The lines were reorganized behind the fences, near where they entered the fight, and their exhausted cartridge-boxes replenished.

Later in the day we moved to the left of General Early's command, which occupied the wood to the left of the church, where we remained until ordered to move across the river on Thursday night, September 18. I deem it proper to state that I left two companies on picket in front of our lines when we marched under command of Captain Hance, of the Third Regiment, with instructions to remain until relieved by the cavalry.

After daylight next morning, Captain Hance, not having been relieved, perceived the enemy advancing in line of battle, and brought off his men in safety and good order, passing the cavalry pickets some distance in his rear.

I cannot too highly commend to your notice the gallant conduct of the troops of my command.

The Eighth Regiment carried in but 45 men rank and file, and lost 23 officers and men.

The Second Regiment was the first to attack and drive the enemy. Colonel Kennedy was painfully wounded in the first charge, and was sent by myself from the field. After our lines were first driven back,

under command of Major [Franklin] Gaillard, they rallied and broke a fresh line of battle that attempted to follow them.

The Third Regiment, led by its efficient commander, twice changed front on the field in magnificent order, and, after twice driving the enemy, retired with the precision of troops on review.

The Seventh, led by Colonel Aiken, trailed their progress to the cannon's mouth with the blood of their bravest, and, when borne back by resistless force, rallied the remnant left under command of Capt. John S. Hard, the senior surviving officer. Colonel Aiken was most dangerously wounded, and every officer and man in the color company either killed or wounded, and their total loss 140 out of 268 men carried in. The colors of this regiment, shot from the staff, formed the winding-sheet of the last man of the color company at the extreme point reached by our troops that day.

Major White, whose death we lament, was a most gallant and accomplished officer of elevated character and noble principles. No better or braver soldier survives him.

Read's battery performed the most important service in a position of great danger. Second Lieut. Samuel B. Parkman was killed on the field, gallantly discharging his duty. One gun was disabled and abandoned, and so many horses as to render it necessary to bring off their pieces severally. The acts of individual heroism performed on this memorable day are so numerous that regimental commanders have not attempted to particularize them.

I am, as usual, greatly indebted to Captain Holmes, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Doby, aide-de-camp, of my staff, for intelligent and efficient assistance in carrying orders to all parts of the field. They were everywhere exposed, with characteristic courage.

Privates Baur and Deas, orderlies, were also with me in the field, bearing themselves with courage and intelligence. The latter had his horse shot in three places.

I have already transmitted a statement of our losses.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. KERSHAW,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. JAMES M. GOGGIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 220.

*Report of Capt. John P. W. Read, commanding battery, of operations
September 17.*

CAMP BRIGADIER-GENERAL KERSHAW'S BRIGADE,
October 20, 1862.

COLONEL: Your note of 19th instant has just been received, and contents noted.

About 3 p. m. of Wednesday, the 17th ultimo, near Sharpsburg, Md., I was ordered by one of General Lee's staff to take my two rifle guns and report to him (General Lee), who was in the woods on the left-hand side of the road this side of the town. I did so, and was ordered to take my guns and place them in a position so as to bear upon the enemy across some fields over on the right of the road. In going to occupy this position the axle of my 3-inch gun gave way. I then had

it so fixed as to be able to remove it to a safe position, and on Thursday evening turned it (the gun) over to one of your wagons for transportation. I had it put into the wagon and have since seen the gun at Winchester, at the stone church. The gun-carriage was much injured, a few days before, in going up and coming down the mountain (the Maryland Heights) near Harper's Ferry, where it was in use nearly two days. The carriage and limber were left behind, the captain in charge of the train refusing to take them in charge, and I had not the horses, having lost 20 killed and wounded in action in the battle of the morning.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN P. W. READ,

Captain, Commanding Battery, Kershaw's Brigade.

Lieut. Col. E. P. ALEXANDER.

No. 221.

Reports of Col. James D. Nance, Third South Carolina Infantry, of action on Maryland Heights and battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP ON OPEQUON CREEK, VA.,

September 22, 1862.

SIR: Under command of General Kershaw, my regiment, with the others of his brigade, ascended Elk Ridge, opposite Brownsville, on the 12th instant, and marched the whole day on the ridge of the mountain, to attack the enemy posted on Maryland Heights. Late in the evening, having come up with the enemy, in obedience to orders I formed my regiment on the right of a line composed of Colonel Kennedy's regiment (the Second South Carolina) and my own, and in rear of a line composed of Colonel Henagan's (the Eighth South Carolina) and Colonel Aiken's (the Seventh South Carolina) regiments. In this position we slept the whole night.

Early the next morning, the front line was advanced to the attack, while the second line, to which I belonged, was held in reserve. The enemy was soon driven from his first position behind an abatis, when I was ordered forward and thrown in front of Colonel Kennedy's regiment, the nature of the ground and the position, and the position of the enemy, admitting if not requiring a shortening of the second line. After a short rest, the attack was renewed by the Seventh and Eighth Regiments upon the enemy, who had fallen back to a stronger position. After they were engaged for some time, I was ordered by General Kershaw to advance, pass over Colonel Aiken's regiment, and try to carry the works behind which the enemy were posted. I immediately advanced, and, as I reached the nearer edge of the abatis, received a deadly volley from behind the breastworks of the enemy. My command never faltered, but opened in reply as soon as they had cleared Colonel Aiken's regiment. The ground was such that the two companies on the right (B and F) were not very actively engaged, and another (E) had been detached early in the day on picket duty, so only seven companies were in the thickest of the fight. The enemy had made the approach to their well and heavily constructed breastworks (made of chestnut logs) very difficult by the felling of timber for the distance of about 40 yards to their front. I thought it unadvisable to attempt to carry the work at the point of the bayonet until I had engaged them by fire for a time, while I could discover more of their position and force. After

observing for a time, I sent Lieutenant Pope to General Kershaw to suggest a flank movement on the enemy's left by Colonel Henagan's regiment, then on my right. Just before Lieutenant Pope returned, the fire of the enemy slackened, and a yell arose from my ranks, indicating the yielding or perhaps the repulse of the enemy. Almost simultaneously with the happening of this event, Lieutenant Pope returned and reported that General Kershaw ordered me to cease firing, as General ———'s brigade had arrived in a position to make a demonstration on their right flank, and my fire might interfere with this movement. I accordingly ceased firing, and discovered that the works in front were entirely deserted. Very soon afterward I moved forward and held the works, capturing 5 prisoners, several blankets, canteens, guns, &c. I then reported, through Lieutenant Pope, acting adjutant, my position to General Kershaw, who ordered the Second Regiment, Colonel Kennedy, forward and my regiment to the rear to rest and refresh themselves.

The conduct of my command was gallant and entirely satisfactory to me. After going to the rear I made details to bury the dead, and, in conjunction with Colonel Aiken, sent out and gathered the arms and accouterments that were to be found on the field. The parties assigned to these duties performed them with creditable dispatch.

I herewith submit a list* of casualties in the regiment resulting from this engagement.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JAMES D. NANCE,

Colonel, Commanding Third South Carolina Regiment.

Capt. C. R. HOLMES,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

CAMP ON OPEQUON CREEK, VA.,

September 22, 1862.

SIR: Early on the morning of the 17th instant, my regiment was placed in its position in line of battle, near Sharpsburg, Md., and to the east of the turnpike running from Shepherdstown, W. Va., to that place. The position was nearly parallel to a line of woods in which the enemy were posted—southeast of the stone church, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. After holding this position for a few minutes my command was put into action by General Kershaw immediately after a regiment of General Barksdale's brigade. The command advanced steadily, with spirit, under a heavy fire drawn by the troops in front, until we passed through the woods and to the farther skirt, where, for the first time, we were sufficiently increased to open fire. In advancing through the woods, I found it advisable to change my direction slightly to the left, and it was in this direction that my line ran when I engaged the enemy at a halt on the outer skirt of the woods. I now closed the line to greater compactness, and pushed clear of the woods and out into the open field beyond, where the enemy gave way with considerable disorder. His line to my right, supported by strong batteries, was more steadfast, and I found, after advancing some distance in the open field, that I was leaving his forces on my right to my rear, which, together with the fire then opened on me from his batteries on their right and which enfiladed my line, rendered

* Embodied in tabular statement, p. 861.

my position hazardous. No enemy was then visible to me in my front; so I effected a change of front on my first company, which threw my line in a slight hollow that afforded me protection from the artillery fire then raging, and left me in a position to co-operate on the enemy's flank and in any movement against his force in that direction. I directed my men to lie down under cover of the hill in front, while I kept a strict watch for any demonstration of our forces in his front. It was not long before our line advanced most beautifully through the woods up the open slope beyond. The enemy's line broke, and immediately I advanced up the hill across a small road, climbed a fence, and passed to the summit of a hill in a freshly plowed field, where I opened fire upon the enemy. Soon he was re-enforced, and, under the heavy fire of artillery and the press of fresh troops, our line on my right, that just before advanced in such admirable style, fell back so far that I retired to the road I had just crossed. There I halted and fired for a time, until a farther retirement required me to fall back to the hollow in which I had before changed my front. There I remained until the movements of the enemy and the absence of proper supports determined me to retire to the woods. I sent officers out to ascertain the position of our forces. They could find no force, and I retired into the open field near where our line was first formed. There Lieut. W. D. Farley, aide-de-camp, informed me that I was without proper support, and advised (from his knowledge of the condition of our forces) me to take up my position there behind a rail fence, running about parallel to the woods. I then acquainted both Brigadier-General Kershaw and Major-General McLaws with my position, and requested orders. I was directed to remain in my position, and, at my request, General McLaws assisted in replenishing my cartridge-boxes. I remained here for over an hour, when the cross-artillery fire of the enemy became so severe that Brigadier-General Kershaw moved that part of his brigade at that point farther to the left and in a southerly direction, and about a quarter of a mile from the first position occupied by us that day. The line then formed was where the woods joined a corn-field, and its direction made an obtuse angle with the direction of the first line. My command remained on this line until we began our retrograde movement on the night of the 18th.

The conduct of my command was highly gratifying to me. They were even unusually manageable, and preserved such order as I never before saw on a battle-field. They came out of the action in almost as good order as that in which they entered. Where nearly every one did so well it is difficult, if not invidious, to distinguish particular persons. Appended is a list* of casualties resulting from the action.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JAMES D. NANCE,

Colonel, Commanding Third South Carolina Regiment.

Capt. C. R. HOLMES,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.—The difference in the number of men carried into action on the 17th and 13th is to be explained by stating that a large detail was left at Harper's Ferry to bring up rations.

N. B.—It is proper to state that during all the maneuvers I have attempted to describe, my command was under fire of artillery or small-arms, or both.

* Embodied in tabular statement, p. 862.

No. 222.

Report of Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, U. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
Opequon Crossing, September 22, 1862.

GENERAL: On the 13th instant I was ordered by you to take and hold possession of Sandy Hook, near Harper's Ferry; which was done, without serious opposition. On the 14th my command was ordered by you to return to our former camp, at Brownsville. This order was received about 1 o'clock p.m., and the brigade was immediately marched to that point, reaching there about 4 p.m. I had been in camp about an hour when I received a message from Colonel Munford, at Crampton's Gap, distant about 2 miles, recommending the removal of my command to that point, as the enemy were pressing the small force at the gap. I immediately ordered my two strongest regiments to march to their support. Before, however, the head of the column had filed into the road I received a message from Colonel Parham, who was in command of Mahone's brigade at the gap, to the effect that the enemy was pressing him hard with overwhelming numbers, and appealing for all the support I could bring to him. I immediately ordered the remaining two regiments to march, and accompanied the command in person. As I was marching the last of the column, I received a message from you, through your assistant adjutant-general (Major McIntosh) that I must hold the gap if it cost the life of every man in my command. Thus impressed with the importance of the position, I went forward with the utmost dispatch. When I reached the top of the mountain, I found that the enemy had been repulsed and driven back in the center and had been pursued down the other side of the mountain by Mahone's brigade. I soon discovered, however, that the enemy, by their greatly superior numbers, were flanking us both upon the right and left. Two of my regiments were sent to the right and two to the left to meet these movements of the enemy. In this we were successful, until the center gave way, pressed by fresh troops of the enemy and increased numbers. Up to this time the troops had fought well, and maintained their ground against greatly superior forces. The Tenth Georgia Regiment, of General Semmes' brigade, had been ordered to the gap from their position at the foot of the mountain, and participated in the battle with great courage and energy. After the lines were broken, all my efforts to rally the troops were unsuccessful. I was enabled to check their advance by momentary rallies, and, the night coming on, I made a successful stand near the foot of the mountain, which position we held during the night, and until a new position was taken about day-dawn the next morning, in the rear of Brownsville, which position was held until the surrender of Harper's Ferry. General Semmes' brigade and Wilcox's brigade, under the command of Colonel Cumming, of the Tenth Georgia Regiment, had been ordered, the former by General Semmes, the latter by yourself, to my support. They came up to the position I occupied during the night; they could not have reached me sooner. The whole number of troops engaged on our side did not exceed 2,200, whilst the force of the enemy was variously estimated from 10,000 to 20,000 men. It could not have been less than 10,000 and probably reached 15,000.

It is impossible for me to report the casualties, as the fate of only a few of the large number missing is certainly known. Of the number who went into the battle there are now missing and unaccounted for

over 800. The larger portion of this number is believed to be prisoners, as we were flanked on both the right and the left by the enemy, and, thus surrounded, our men were compelled to surrender. For the most successful rally made on the retreat from the crest of the mountain I was indebted to a section of the Troup Artillery, under Lieutenant [Henry] Jennings. They had been ordered forward, and had reached a point where, under the terrific fire of the enemy, their pieces were placed in position, and, by their prompt and rapid firing, checked for a time the advance of the enemy. One of the pieces was brought off safely; the other was lost by an accident to the axle. When I reached the gap I found both Colonel Munford and Colonel Parham active and energetic in the discharge of their duty, which continued to the end of the fight. Shortly after the lines were broken, and I was endeavoring to rally the troops, General Semmes appeared on the field, and, at great exposure and with great coolness and courage, gave me his cordial aid and co-operation. All of the members of my staff were on the field, and did all that could be done under the circumstances. One of them, Col. John B. Lamar, of Georgia, volunteer aide, whilst near my side, earnestly rallying the men, received a mortal wound, of which he died the next day. No nobler nor braver man has fallen in this war. There were many other acts of personal courage which circumstances prevent me from mentioning at present. The remnant of my brigade marched with the rest of your division from Harper's Ferry, and was engaged in the battle of the 17th, at Sharpsburg. I was necessarily absent for two days from the command, and reached it the morning after the battle, and the present absence of the officer then in command of this brigade prevents a report at this time of that day's operation.

Accompanying this report is a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, made out with as much accuracy as practicable under existing circumstances.*

I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

HOWELL COBB,
Brigadier-General.

No. 223.

Report of Lieut. Col. William MacRae, Fifteenth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Cobb's brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with your order, I herewith transmit a statement of the action of your brigade in the battle of Sharpsburg, of the 17th instant:

General McLaws' division, after marching all the previous night, was ordered, about 8 a. m., to take position on the left, your brigade, numbering 357 men, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sanders, Twenty-fourth Georgia, in front. In about half an hour we arrived in front of the enemy and in range of his musketry, when the head of the brigade was ordered to file right when the rear had filed. General McLaws commanded us to march by the left flank. Colonel Sanders, being in front, did not hear the order, but marched on and joined the left of General Rodes' command. (I will here state that we were thus separated from the division, and did not join it until the next morning.) We halted and took position behind a fence, covered from the enemy's musketry

* Embodied in tabular statement, p. 861.

by a hill in front, but not protecting us from the heavy shelling of his several batteries planted on the side of the mountain on our right. For an hour we remained here inactive, suffering considerably, when we were ordered forward; the men, eager to meet the foe upon a more equal footing, gallantly pressed forward with a cheer, the top of the hill gained amid a galling and destructive shower of balls. There we remained, unfaltering, until Colonel Sanders, finding himself unsupported, ordered us to fall back behind the fence. The command was executed in admirable order. We remained here until the force on our right gave way. To prevent flanking, we changed front to the rear on the Fourth Battalion, and took position behind a stone fence, our extreme left remaining unchanged. We had scarcely executed the movement when General D. H. Hill rode up and ordered us forward to check the advance of the enemy. Colonel Sanders, though very unwell, had gallantly remained on the field, cheering his men by words and example until this moment, when he was too much exhausted to remain any longer. Being next in rank, the command devolved upon me.

The brigade, numbering now about 250 men, moved eagerly and unfalteringly forward to within about 100 yards, then opened a destructive fire upon the enemy, largely outnumbering us. He made a short stand, and then fell back behind the hill. Three times did he try to advance, and was as often driven back by the galling fire of our gallant little band. We held them in check (momentarily expecting re-enforcements) until our ammunition was expended. Seeing no sign of support, I was constrained to give the command to fall back. We left the field with not more than 50 of the 250 men. We fell back about 300 yards and joined Colonel Cooke, of the Twenty-seventh North Carolina, remaining with his shattered regiment until he was relieved about 3 p. m.

Where all so nobly did their duty I dislike to discriminate, yet I feel it my duty at least to call your attention to Major [R. E.] McMillan, Twenty-fourth Georgia; Lieut. F. L. Rogers, Company B, Fifteenth North Carolina, and Private J. R. Doster, Company B, Fifteenth North Carolina, who acted with conspicuous gallantry throughout the day. There were numbers of others who deserve the highest praises for their behavior.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. MACRAE,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Fifteenth North Carolina Troops.

Brig. Gen. H. COBB,

Commanding Cobb's Brigade.

No. 224.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes, U. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Sharpsburg.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit herewith the report of Major Holt, commanding the Tenth Georgia Volunteers, of the conduct of his regiment in the battle of Crampton's Gap, on the 14th instant, together with a list of the casualties in his regiment; also Captain Manly's report of the part taken by his battery in the same action:

By order of Major-General McLaws, a picket, consisting of a company, was posted in Burkittsville Gap, which, by my orders, was afterward increased to three regiments and five pieces of artillery, thus employing

all the regiments of my brigade, except the Tenth Georgia, which had been previously sent to picket the Rohrersville road and other avenues leading down Pleasant Valley in the direction of Harper's Ferry. On the 13th instant, Colonel Parham, commanding Mahone's brigade, reported with his command to me by order of Major-General McLaws, with directions to post one of his regiments as a picket in Solomon's Gap.

Having soon become more familiar with the roads and passes, on the morning of the 14th instant I ordered Colonel Parham, with his three remaining regiments and battery, to Crampton's Gap, for the purpose of guarding that pass; and directed him, if he should need support, to call upon Major Holt, commanding Tenth Georgia Volunteers, for his regiment, then posted on the Rohrersville road. On the morning of the 14th instant, Brigadier-General Cobb, with his command, was ordered up the valley to his old camp near mine, by Major-General McLaws. General McLaws informed me that General Cobb would take command of Crampton's Gap, and directed that the troops under my command should be withdrawn therefrom. When General Cobb returned to his old camp, I called on him, and communicated General McLaws' orders, and soon after set out to visit the picket guard in Burkittsville Gap. While on the mountain, the enemy engaged Colonel Parham's troops with artillery and infantry at the base of the mountain. I immediately dispatched this information to General Cobb, with the request that he would hurry forward his troops to Crampton's Gap, to the support of Colonel Parham, and in a few minutes I followed hurriedly on horseback, for the purpose of offering General Cobb whatever assistance it might be in my power to render him. Arriving at the base of, and soon after commencing the ascent of, the mountain at Crampton's Gap, I encountered fugitives from the battle-field, and endeavored to turn them back. Proceeding farther up the mountain, the troops were met pouring down the road and through the wood, in great disorder, where I found General Cobb and his staff, at the imminent risk of their lives, using every effort to check and rally them. I immediately joined my efforts, and those of my staff who were with me, to General Cobb's, and co-operated with him for a considerable time in the vain effort to rally the men. Finding it impossible to rally them so near the enemy, it was determined to post artillery about half a mile farther to the rear and bring up two of my regiments from Burkittsville Gap, which had been previously ordered forward, and make a stand there to arrest the farther advance of the enemy during that night. Line of battle was finally formed here. The enemy made no farther advance.

Colonel Parham, commanding Mahone's brigade, and Colonel Munford, of the cavalry, as I was informed, jointly made the dispositions for the battle, which was conducted under their orders, and the troops under their command had been thrown into disorder and were retiring from the field before General Cobb's command came up.

Major Holt's report shows that up to the time he was disabled his regiment behaved well, and I can testify from my own observation that Captain Loud, upon whom the command devolved, conducted himself most gallantly. A section of Captain Manly's battery, and three pieces of the Reserve Artillery, under command of Captain Macon, which had been ordered to Burkittsville Gap by myself, did good service in breaking the enemy's lines, checking his advance, and inflicting loss on him.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

PAUL J. SEMMES,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. JAMES M. GOGGIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. SEMMES' BRIGADE, McLAWS' DIVISION,
Camp near Martinsburg, W. Va., September 24, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report briefly the part enacted by my brigade, composed of the Fifteenth and Thirty-second Virginia and the Tenth and Fifty-third Georgia Volunteers, and Manly's battery, in the battle of Sharpsburg, on September 17:

Moving forward by the flank in the direction of the enemy, before coming in view, two brigades were met retiring from the front apparently badly cut up. An incessant current of wounded flowed to the rear, showing that the conflict had been severe and well contested. Coming in full view, of the enemy's line, Major-General McLaws, in person, ordered me to move forward in line to the support of Major-General Stuart, on our extreme left. Immediately the order was given, "by company into line," followed by "forward into line," both of which movements were executed, in the presence of the enemy, under a fire occasioning severe loss in killed and wounded. The brigade advanced steadily for 200 yards under fire before the order was given to commence firing. This order was then given at long range for most of our arms, for the purpose of encouraging our troops and disconcerting the enemy. The troops, it is true, needed little encouragement. Their officers had already inspired them with enthusiasm, and they continued to advance with vivacity. The effect on the enemy's fire of the order to the regiments of the brigade that had formed in line to commence firing was distinctly visible in the diminished numbers of killed and wounded. The enemy at first met our advance by a corresponding one. Our troops continued to press steadily forward, pouring a deadly fire into his ranks, and he, after advancing 100 yards, gave way; and we continued to drive him from position to position, through wood and field for a mile, expending not less than 40 rounds of ammunition. My brigade was thrown farther to the front than the troops on my right by about 300 yards, and for a time was exposed to a terrible front and enfilading fire, inflicting great loss.

It gives me satisfaction to be enabled to state that my brigade fought under an inspiration of enthusiasm which impelled the men forward with the confidence of victory. Had it been possible to have strengthened it by a supporting force of 2,000 or 3,000 men, there was not then, nor is there now, a doubt in my mind that the enemy's right, though in vastly superior numbers, would have been driven upon his center and both, in confusion, on his left, utterly routing him. The victory, though decisive, would thus have been rendered signal, and the enemy's lines broken and dispersed.

The loss in killed and wounded was, of the Fifty-third Georgia Volunteers, 30 per cent.; Thirty-second Virginia, 45 per cent.; Tenth Georgia, 57 per cent.; Fifteenth Virginia, 58 per cent., detailed statements of which are herewith submitted. The disparity in the loss of some of the companies of the same regiment is very marked. Three of the four regimental commanders were wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Sloan, commanding Fifty-third Georgia, fell, it was then supposed, mortally wounded, while gallantly leading his regiment forward into line on the extreme left of the brigade.

The regimental commanders displayed conspicuous gallantry, and by their example inspired their commands with the confidence of positive success. Troops never fought more persistently, intelligently, and with more valor.

My staff, Lieutenant Briggs, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenants Redd and

Cody, volunteer aides, were present during the entire action, and were more exposed, if possible, than any of the troops, being often employed in bearing orders to the different parts of my line and to commanders of other troops in the vicinity, displaying coolness and gallantry of the highest order, and all escaping untouched except Lieutenant Redd, who received a slight wound on the body from a spent bullet. Calling for a staff officer to bear an order to the regiments on the left, none being at hand, Captain Henley, acting commissary of subsistence, Thirty-second Virginia, who had been shot through the arm but refused to quit the field, offered himself to become the bearer, which was declined, on account of his wound; whereupon, stating that his wound was slight and that he was not disabled, he was allowed to proceed. While doing so, he fell, severely wounded, pierced with two bullets. This is only a prominent example of many acts of signal daring and valor displayed on that bloody and memorable field by officers and men of all the regiments.

After the enemy was thus driven back, and the fire of his small-arms had for some time entirely ceased, the troops, having been under an incessant musketry and artillery fire for two hours and twenty minutes, were so thoroughly exhausted and their ammunition so nearly expended as to render necessary the order to retire for the purpose of reforming and obtaining a fresh supply of ammunition. Remaining myself an hour longer in front, with Lieutenant Davis and 6 men of the Tenth Georgia Volunteers, I then withdrew and reported to Major-General McLaws, who ordered my brigade to be reassembled in reserve.

Thirty-six prisoners, including a lieutenant-colonel and first lieutenant, were captured at a farm-house, the most advanced position held by my brigade, which is some hundreds of yards in advance of the other portions of our line of battle.

The reports of regimental commanders are herewith submitted, to which reference is respectfully asked for further details.

Manly's battery was detached from my command during the battle. His report is herewith submitted.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
PAUL J. SEMMES,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. JAMES M. GOGGIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS SEMMES' BRIGADE,
October 27, 1862.

MAJOR: In answer to the inquiry by Major-General Longstreet as to the number of colors lost by our troops in the battles in Maryland, I have the honor to state that no colors were lost by the regiments of this brigade. In the battle of Sharpsburg the colors of the Fifty-third Georgia received two shots; that of the Fifteenth Virginia, ten, and the pike was once cut in two; 2 color-bearers were wounded, and 1 of the color-guard was killed and 1 wounded. The colors of the Thirty-second Virginia received seventeen shots, and the pike was once cut in two and 1 of the color-guard killed. The colors of the Tenth Georgia received forty-six shots, and the pike was once hit and twice cut in two; 1 color-bearer and 1 of the color-guard were killed, and 1 color-bearer and 1 of the color-guard wounded. These facts were not incorporated in the

report of the operations of this brigade in the battle of Sharpsburg. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that this communication be regarded as a supplement to that report.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 PAUL J. SEMMES,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. JAMES M. GOGGIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 225.

Report of Capt. Basil C. Manly, commanding North Carolina Battery, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

FIELD NEAR MARTINSBURG,
 September 22, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In accordance with orders, I furnish you with an account of the part borne by my battery in the battle at Crampton's Gap, on Sunday, September 14, 1862.

On Saturday, 13th instant, by order of General Semmes, I took position on the mountains near Crampton's Gap, and remained there all that night, waiting the approach of the enemy, reported advancing. On Sunday morning, about 9 o'clock, the advance of the enemy came in sight; shortly afterward they appeared in heavy columns and formed line of battle about 3 miles off, and commenced advancing on the town of Burkittsville. When within about half a mile of Burkittsville, I opened fire on them from my rifle gun, and, after some eight or ten rounds, succeeded in bringing them to a halt. Shortly afterward they withdrew, and attacked with heavy re-enforcements the lower pass. I kept up a sharp fire on them from my battery all day, with every appearance of doing them considerable damage, as their lines were broken several times, and one of them never formed again. Since then I have learned, from their prisoners, that one of their prominent officers, a general, was killed, instantly, by our shells. I sustained no loss at all in the engagement. My men all acted well. I am indebted to Lieutenant [C. C.] Wrenshall for the fine management of his section during the entire fight.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 B. C. MANLY,
Commanding Artillery, Semmes' Brigade.

Capt. E. B. BRIGGS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 226.

Report of Maj. Willis C. Holt, Tenth Georgia Infantry, of the battle of Crampton's Pass.

NEAR MARTINSBURG, W. VA.,
 September 22, 1862.

CAPTAIN: On the morning of the 14th instant I received an order from General Semmes to move up to a church on the Rohrersville road for picket duty. In the evening I received another order from General

Semmes to go to the support of Colonel Parham, who was picketing at Crampton's Gap, should he send for me. In a short time I received an order from Colonel Munford to bring my command up, as the enemy were approaching in strong force. I moved to the gap, and was ordered by Colonel Parham to a position at the base of the mountain. Just as I had taken the position, I received an order from General Semmes, through Lieutenant Cody, to carry my command back to the church. I started, and, when I reached the summit of the mountain, was ordered by Colonel Parham to remain. Seeing a large force of the enemy in line of battle approaching, and he giving me peremptory orders to remain, I sent two companies to the junction of the roads, and, by his order, moved my command to position on the left of the line he had already formed, which position I maintained until the enemy forced back the regiments on my right and had passed my flank. They (the enemy) being then nearer the gap of the mountain than I was, I was forced to fall back, to prevent being captured, the enemy being checked by a support that had been sent to us by General Cobb. I halted my command, and was forming a line of battle, when I was struck with a spent ball just above the left eye. The blood flowed so profusely from the wound that I was compelled to turn the command over to Capt. P. H. Loud and go to the rear. The loss in this battle was 3 killed, 21 wounded, and 37 missing. Capt. Y. L. Wootton was wounded and left upon the field; Lieutenant Foster was wounded and borne to the rear, and Lieutenant Olmstead has not since been heard from; was probably wounded and in the hands of the enemy.*

The officers and men behaved with great gallantry, except a few who were too cowardly to go to the line of battle.

W. C. HOLT,

Major, Commanding Tenth Georgia Regiment.

Captain BRIGGS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 227.

Report of Capt. P. H. Loud, Tenth Georgia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR MARTINSBURG, W. VA.,

September 23, 1862.

SIR: The Tenth Georgia Regiment went into the action at the battle of Sharpsburg, Md., at 8 a. m. of September 17, on the left of, and distant from, Sharpsburg about 2 miles. The regiment occupied the position of second in line from the right of the brigade, the Thirty-second Virginia Regiment being on the extreme right, and the Fifty-third Georgia Regiment on the extreme left, the Fifteenth Virginia being on our left. The regiment was marched by the right flank to an open field opposite some hay-stacks and piles of rocks, where, finding the enemy fronting us posted in force, the order was given "by company into line" and "forward into line," which movements were made by the regiment under a most galling fire from the enemy's sharpshooters. These move-

* Nominal list of casualties shows 3 men killed and 3 officers and 18 men wounded.

ments having been made and the line formed, the regiment, together with the balance of the brigade, advanced as far as the hay-stacks and piles of rocks, where we opened fire upon the enemy, and maintained this position for about half an hour, when the order was given to advance. Up to and at this point the regiment sustained its principal loss in killed and wounded. The regiment then advanced to a lane, distant some 75 yards, driving the enemy before them, and occupied a road running by a house fronting the lane, where they remained some ten or fifteen minutes, when they again advanced, passing through a small field and skirt of woods up to a fence, the enemy being still driven before them with heavy slaughter. The regiment remained at this fence until their ammunition was nearly exhausted (about half an hour), when they again advanced, under orders, for the distance of near half a mile, crossing two fields and across four fences, and occupied a position in rear of a house, barn, and other outbuildings, near which were some five or six piles of straw, the enemy having occupied a stone wall a short distance to the front, from which position they were driven to seek shelter and protection behind their re-enforcements and artillery, with heavy loss. Here the regiment maintained its position for about three-quarters of an hour (the fire of the enemy's infantry having ceased), though in range of and receiving the fire of their artillery in occasional showers of grape and canister, when, being out of ammunition and no re-enforcements coming to their relief, they were compelled to withdraw to procure ammunition and to reorganize.

At this point we found in the house and barn a number of the enemy, who surrendered without resistance, who were sent to the rear, prisoners. The regiment then retired to an open field near the point where they had entered into the engagement, and waited for ammunition; but supplies failing to reach them, and but few of the regiment remaining (many having left the field bearing the wounded to the rear), withdrew, having been in the action about four hours, suffering very severely, after having driven the enemy with very great loss about a distance of a mile.

The regiment went into action after a march of about 7 miles, crossing the Potomac that morning, exhausted by fatiguing marches, want of food, rest, and many suffering for shoes, &c. They carried into the action 134 muskets and 14 officers, of whom there were 16 killed on the field, 59 men and 8 officers wounded, being over one-half disabled or killed.

The officers wounded were Capt. William Johnston, of Company F, commanding regiment; Capt. P. H. Loud, of Company H, assisting in command; Capt. W. M. D'Antignac, of Company K; Lieut. D. M. Johnson, of Company D; Lieut. J. T. Key, of Company E, wounded and a prisoner; Lieut. T. H. Wood, of Company F; Lieut. S. H. Manget, of Company G, commanding Company H; Lieut. J. McNeil, of Company C, whose leg has since been amputated.

The officers and men, with some solitary exceptions, behaved with the greatest gallantry, as the heavy loss sustained testifies, and where all bore their part so heroically it would be unjust to mention individual instances.

I am indebted to Captains Phinizy and Kibbee (who, with Lieutenants Adams, Davis, and Jenkins, were the only officers who had the good fortune to escape unhurt and to gallantly follow the enemy to the farthest point) for the particulars of the engagement subsequent to my withdrawal from the field, wounded.

The regiment, before going into the action, had been supplied with

fifty rounds of cartridges, about all of which were expended in the engagement.

I have the honor of remaining, sir, your obedient servant,

P. H. LOUD,

Captain, Commanding Tenth Georgia Regiment.

Capt. E. B. BRIGGS,

Atgt. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Semmes' Brigade, McLaws' Division.

No. 228.

Report of Capt. S. W. Marshborne, Fifty-third Georgia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1862.

Commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel [Thomas] Sloan, the regiment entered the engagement of the 17th instant early in the morning with 21 commissioned officers (including Lieutenant-Colonel Sloan and Adjutant [John F.] Hanson) and 255 men. Of this number 1 officer (First Lieut. C. C. Brown, Company E) and 11 men of the regiment were killed, 3 officers (Lieutenant-Colonel Sloan, Lieutenant [John A.] Barnett, of Company A, and Lieutenant Hollon, of Company G) and 60 men were wounded.

The regiment, marching by flank, was formed into line of battle by command, "by company into line," then "forward into line," upon entering the first corn-field, through which it passed. Under the shells of the enemy the regiment moved forward through this field, then through an apple orchard, and then through another corn-field, and halted at the fence. It was here that Lieutenant-Colonel Sloan was seriously wounded. His calmness and bravery deserve special notice. Here, also, Lieutenant Brown fell. His captain informs me that his last words were those of encouragement to his company.

The enemy were over on a hill, and with their long-range guns and shells wounded many of our men. The regiment was ordered forward, and officers and men leaped over the fence, determined to do or die. Continuing to advance, the enemy gave back, and the regiment pursued them with great rapidity over a mile. The number of the enemy's dead and wounded left upon the ground over which we passed, and the scattered manner in which they lay, show the rapidity of his retreat and the execution which the regiment did. Finding ourselves out of ammunition, it was thought prudent to fall back to the lines for a new supply.

To make mention of the many acts of gallantry displayed by officers and men during the engagement would occupy more space than allowed for this report. I saw nothing but fight in officers and men, and feel that I can truthfully as well as proudly say that the Fifty-third Georgia acted in a manner worthy of our cause, and fully sustained the reputation which Georgia troops have ever won upon the field of battle. The general being present and having himself gone to the farthest point to which we advanced, I know that he is prepared to give to the proper authorities and to the public a full account of the action of the regiment during the day.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. W. MARSHBORNE,

Captain, Commanding Fifty-third Georgia Regiment.

Capt. E. B. BRIGGS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 229.

Report of Capt. Edward J. Willis, Fifteenth Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1862.

This regiment went into action under the command of Capt. E. M. Morrison, of Company C, the field officers being all absent. This regiment, as all others of the brigade, was very much worn down by hard marches, loss of sleep, and scanty rations, rendering officers and men unfit for the work before them. Straggling, occasioned by sickness, sore feet, and faint-heartedness, reduced the effective strength of the regiment when presented before the enemy to 14 officers and 114 men. This strength was indeed effective, as their work proved, standing shoulder to shoulder with their brave comrades of the brigade. They showed by their unerring aim and eagerness for the charge their willingness and ability to go wherever they might be commanded by their gallant leader, General Semmes, whose bravery on this occasion commanded unbounded admiration and confidence. This regiment occupied a position in the left wing of the brigade, which was on the extreme left wing of the army. They united with great spirit in the charge to which they were ordered, and bore their part in driving from a strong position a greatly superior number of the enemy, forcing them back with great slaughter nearly 1 mile, from which they never recovered. The regiment held its position until some time after the musketry firing of the enemy had ceased, when they were withdrawn with the brigade to replenish their ammunition, which was well nigh exhausted.

In this battle the Fifteenth Virginia Regiment sustained a greater loss than any regiment of the brigade or army, as far as information has been received. Of the officers (14 in number) who entered the fight, 1 (Captain [A. V.] England, Company D) was killed, and 6 (Captain [E. M.] Morrison, commanding the regiment; Second Lieutenant Bumpass, Company C; Second Lieutenants [J. K.] Fussell and [J. H.] Allen, Company G; Second Lieutenant Berry, Company H, and First Lieutenant [G. P.] Haw, Company I) were wounded. Of the non-commissioned officers and privates, 10 were killed and 58 wounded.

So determined was the courage evinced by all the officers and men who bore a part in this fight, that it would be invidious to call names. The unusual loss, from our ranks, of men and officers has naturally cast a feeling of depression over those who now constitute the regiment.

Soon after the engagement commenced, Captain Morrison, who was bearing himself with great bravery, was seriously wounded by a shot through the right breast, which devolved the command upon Capt. E. J. Willis, of Company A. The color-bearer (P. H. Hall, of Company A) having been wounded, the colors were placed in the hands of Captain Willis by Sergt. Maj. W. H. Briggs, who was severely wounded while bearing Captain Morrison from the field. Having rallied the regiment for the charge, Captain Willis placed the colors in the hands of R. W. Taylor, of Company B, one of the color supporters, who bore them gallantly through the engagement.

To account for the smallness of number of those present after the engagement, it is but proper to state that many were occupied in taking from the field of battle their wounded comrades, and a few who were scarcely able to march with the regiment were completely exhausted by the labor of a severe contest of more than two hours.

Respectfully submitted.

EWD. J. WILLIS,
Captain, Commanding Fifteenth Virginia Regiment.

No. 230.

Reports of Col. E. B. Montague, Thirty-second Virginia Infantry, of the battles of Crampton's Pass and Sharpsburg.

IN THE FIELD NEAR MARTINSBURG, W. VA..

September 25, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to orders from division headquarters, I forward the following report of the part sustained by my command at Brownsville Gap on the 14th instant:

On the evening of the 13th I was ordered by Brigadier-General Semmes to proceed with the Fifteenth Virginia Regiment and my own, and two pieces of Manly's battery, to the top of South Mountain, to watch for and report any advance of the enemy in that direction.

On the morning of the 14th I received a message from Major-General Stuart to the effect that the enemy were advancing in great force, and that I must defend the pass at all hazards, calling for re-enforcements if necessary, should the enemy select it as his point of attack, which, however, he thought doubtful.

At 9 or 10 o'clock the enemy's advance came in sight from the direction of Jefferson, seemingly in great force. At about 11 o'clock they masked the most of their force under a hill and wood about 3 miles, and advanced two brigades by the left flank into a field opposite our position. Meantime I had sent to General Semmes for re-enforcements, and he promptly ordered up the Fifty-third Georgia Regiment and three pieces of artillery (rifled), under the command of Captain Macon, two of his own guns, and one of Captain Magruder's.* I stationed a picket of about 200 men at the foot of the mountain, near Burkittsville, and a line of skirmishers along my whole front, connecting with Colonel Munford's, on my left. Shortly afterward the enemy threw out a large advance of skirmishers, who steadily advanced toward the base of the mountain, supported by a brigade of infantry, the other brigade remaining at a halt. I ordered Captain Manly to open upon them with his 3-inch rifled gun, which he did so effectually as to check the advance of the skirmishers and cause the advancing brigade to fall back on its reserve, beyond our range.

At about 3 or 4 o'clock, after withdrawing his skirmishers, he moved by the right flank, leaving Burkittsville on his left, formed three strong parallel lines of battle, and started the whole in advance, still leaving an immense force in reserve, and moved with great celerity and perfect order against Crampton's Gap. I was in a position to see every move that was made, and saw at once that, by moving my artillery to the left a few hundred yards, I could bring the advancing host within easy range. This was done, and Macon's, Manly's, and Magruder's guns were played upon the enemy with great effect, time and again their ranks being broken by their deliberate and well-directed fire, the enemy's guns not being able to reach us on account of our elevated position. Captain Macon, the senior artillery officer, managed his guns most handsomely, and he and his juniors are entitled to all the credit of the occasion, if any is due. I was more of a spectator than participant in the action. My infantry force was not engaged, though they were ready and anxious to take part in the conflict.

Our guns continued to play on the enemy until dark, long after our

* Reference is probably to Lieut. G. A. Magruder, of Page's Virginia battery, or the Magruder Light Artillery.

forces at Crampton's Gap had been driven from their position. At least three hundred guns were fired during the evening. At least eight brigades of the enemy were engaged in this fight, and many more were coming up when night closed the scene. I withdrew after dark, by order, and joined the balance of our force on the road just above Brownsville.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. B. MONTAGUE,

Colonel Thirty-second Virginia Volunteers.

Captain BRIGGS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

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IN THE FIELD NEAR MARTINSBURG, W. VA.,

September 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part sustained by the Thirty-second Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Semmes' brigade, in the battle of Sharpsburg, on the 17th instant:

Having crossed the Potomac soon after daylight, we were moved rapidly toward the scene of conflict and ordered into action on the left. This regiment, which was on the right of the brigade, formed its line of battle under fire, and advanced steadily across an open field on the enemy, in strong force and position. The advance was continued with great coolness and celerity, and under a murderous fire of grape and musketry, until, under direction of the brigadier-general commanding, I halted my command under cover of a slight hill, which to some degree protected us from the galling fire of the enemy. Here the conflict, at comparatively close quarters, was for a while most severe, and my command suffered heavily, as the enemy had an enfilading fire on our right, besides his heavy fire on our front. In a short time, however, his center (with reference to us) gave way, and the regiment again advanced in pursuit, driving him through a skirt of woods and an open field until he succeeded, with his reserves, in forming a new line in a strong position behind a stone wall, with batteries raking us on our right and front. We advanced, however, within less than 150 yards of his line, where we were compelled to get under shelter of a barn and hay-stacks, ready to advance again when our flank should be supported. Finding, however, after remaining in this position some twenty or thirty minutes, that there was no support on our right, but, on the contrary, that the enemy was again enfilading us from that point, and that my command at this time was reduced to 60 or 80 men, nearly without ammunition, and that there was no supporting force even in sight, I reluctantly determined to withdraw to a less exposed position, which was accordingly done in tolerable order. I subsequently succeeded in gathering from other commands men enough to increase my force to about 150. With these I reported to Major Goggin, of General McLaws' staff, who stationed us under a stone fence leading toward Sharpsburg, where we remained under a terrible fire of artillery until we were relieved late in the evening.

The regiment was engaged in the morning fight two and a half hours, and never did men or officers behave better under fire. Not a man gave back, nor do I think a single one got behind his company until the fight was over. Indeed, so general was the good conduct of all, that I can scarcely call attention to individuals without making unjust discriminations.

I attribute the good conduct of the regiment in a very great degree

to the conspicuous coolness and bravery and admirable dispositions of Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes.

Owing to night marches, sore feet, &c., this command, which was at first quite small, was reduced to 158 men and officers when it entered the fight. Of these 15 were killed and 57 wounded. We captured 36 prisoners, of whom 1 was a lieutenant-colonel.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. B. MONTAGUE,

Colonel Thirty-second Virginia Volunteers.

Capt. E. B. BRIGGS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 231.

Report of Brig. Gen. William Barksdale, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

HDQRS. BARKSDALE'S BRIG., ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Camp Lee, Va., October 12, 1862.

MAJOR: On the morning of September 13 I marched at daylight to Brownsville, where it was supposed the enemy designed making an attack upon our troops. After I reached that place it was discovered that the enemy had disappeared, and the whole command was ordered to rejoin the main army. We reached its vicinity, in the neighborhood of Sharpsburg, at about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 17th. The battle was then, and had been, raging, for several hours. It is proper for me to say that a portion of my men had fallen by the wayside from loss of sleep and excessive fatigue, having been constantly on duty for five or six days, and on the march for almost the whole of the two preceding nights, and that I went into the fight with less than 800 men.

About 10 o'clock I formed a line of battle in an open field, which was at that time being raked by a terrible fire of grape and canister from the enemy's artillery. Kershaw was on my right and Semmes on my left. I at once, in accordance with your orders, advanced upon the enemy, who occupied the woods immediately in front, and from which they had just driven a portion of our forces. In a few moments I engaged them, and, after firing several volleys into their ranks, drove them through the woods and into an open field beyond, and compelled them to abandon their artillery on the hill. At this point I discovered that a very large force of the enemy were attempting to flank me on the left. I therefore ordered the Eighteenth and Thirteenth to wheel in that direction, and not only succeeded in checking the movement they were making, but put them to flight, and pursued them for a considerable distance. As we advanced, the ground was covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy. I did not deem it prudent, however, without more support, to advance farther, and I therefore ordered these regiments to fall back to the woods in front of my first position. The Seventeenth and Twenty-first pursued the enemy across the open field, when, perceiving a very strong force moving to the right and attempting to flank them, and all of our forces having retired from that part of the field, they fell back, under protection of a stone fence, in good order.

About 2 o'clock I advanced with the entire brigade, and occupied the battle-ground over which we had passed in the morning, General Ransom being on my right and General Early on my left, and continued to

hold it until the night of the 18th, when, by your orders, I joined the column of the main army, when it retired across the Potomac.

To both officers and men much credit is due for the courage and daring they exhibited throughout the engagement. Major Campbell, commanding the Eighteenth Regiment, was seriously wounded and taken from the field while nobly leading his regiment in the fight. Lieutenant-Colonel [K.] McElroy, of the Thirteenth Regiment, although wounded, remained in command of his regiment until the battle ceased. Lieutenant-Colonel [John C.] Fiser, of the Seventeenth, and Captain Sims, of the Twenty-first, were conspicuous for the coolness and gallantry with which they handled their respective commands. To Colonel [Benjamin G.] Humphreys, of the Twenty-first, and Lieutenant-Colonel [W. H.] Luse, of the Eighteenth, who reached the field just as the battle was closing, I am under peculiar obligations. Their timely presence not only cheered and animated their own regiments, but the entire brigade. Lieut. J. A. Barksdale, of my staff, was prompt and fearless in the execution of all orders. Surgeons Austin, of the Thirteenth; Green, of the Seventeenth; Griffin, of the Eighteenth, and Hill, of the Twenty-first, were faithful and energetic in their attention to the wounded.

I close this report with the remark that my command did its duty upon the ensanguined field of Sharpsburg.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM BARKSDALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. JAMES M. GOGGIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General, McLaws' Division.

No. 232.

Report of Capt. A. M. Feltus, Sixteenth Mississippi Infantry, of Featherston's brigade, Anderson's division, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1862.

COLONEL: I herewith submit a report of the part taken by the Sixteenth Mississippi Regiment in the action of 17th instant, near Sharpsburg, Md.:

The regiment was on the left of the brigade. About 10 a. m., being ordered to advance in the direction of the enemy, did so in good order. We advanced in line of battle, having the brigade of General Pryor in our front. Passing by a large barn, we proceeded, under a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms, several hundred yards farther, and came on General Pryor's brigade and a brigade of North Carolina troops lying down in a road beyond the first corn-field after passing the barn. The regiment, as did the brigade, passed over these troops and confronted the enemy in line of battle, who were drawn up some 300 yards from the road, pouring a destructive fire in our ranks. During this time the losses in the regiment had been heavy. A murderous fire of grape, canister, shell, and small-arms played on us. Notwithstanding, this regiment gallantly held its position until ordered to retire, which it did in as good order as could be expected from its thinned ranks. When we retired as far as the road, a scene of great confusion ensued from the mingling together of different brigades. We continued to fall back until we reached the barn, where the remnant of the regiment was rallied in its position on the left of the brigade. In this position we advanced

again upon the enemy, and met them in the corn-field beyond the barn. Here, after a desperate fight, we fell back, by orders, to our original position, on account of the terrific cross-fire of the enemy's batteries. We remained in this position, under a heavy fire of shell and solid shot, for about an hour, when the enemy advanced upon us in line of battle. This was about 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The remnant of the regiment, in its proper position in the brigade, moved forward and met the enemy in the orchard by the barn and drove them back. After this, night ensued and the fight ended.

The number of men carried into the action was 228; of them, 144 were killed or wounded, leaving only 84 men.

The officers and men acted with laudable gallantry during the entire engagement.

A. M. FELTUS,

Captain, Commanding Sixteenth Mississippi Regiment.

Col. C. POSEY,

Commanding Featherston's Brigade.

No. 233.

Report of Maj. Gen. David R. Jones, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations September 2-19.

RICHMOND, VA., December 8, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of my division and of the part it performed in the engagements of the campaign in Northern Virginia and Maryland. Serious illness and absence from the field has delayed its appearance till now:*

* * * * *

Remaining in position at Ox Hill during the 2d [of September], I marched on the 3d for Leesburg by the Dranesville road, crossing Goose Creek, and reaching that place on the evening of the 4th.

On the morning of September 6, I crossed my division into Maryland—now increased to six brigades by the addition of Kemper's brigade, Pickett's brigade (commanded by Brigadier-General Garnett), and Jenkins' brigade (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker)—marched through Buckeystown, and encamped on the banks of the Monocacy, marching next day to the Monocacy Junction, and going into camp near Frederick City.

On the morning of the 10th I marched through Boonsborough, Funks-town, and Hagerstown, encamping near the latter place on the Williamsport road on the 12th.

On the 14th I marched on the Frederick road in the direction of that city, hearing heavy firing, leaving Toombs' brigade in command of Hagerstown, and Eleventh Georgia Regiment, of Anderson's brigade, in charge of wagon-train. Halting just beyond Boonsborough, Drayton's and Anderson's brigades were temporarily detached from my command and ordered to report to General D. H. Hill. With my three other brigades present I was ordered by General Longstreet to march to a pass about a mile to the right of the main road, through which the enemy was said to be flanking our army. Reaching the pass and finding the report

* Portion of report here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 578-580.

incorrect, I was directed to bring my brigades as rapidly as possible back to the main road and to the mountain top, and, under orders from General Longstreet, placed Kemper and Garnett, supported by Jenkins' brigade, in position on the ridge to the left of the road and above it. While taking position my troops were exposed to severe shelling, and shortly afterward to a heavy infantry attack in overwhelming numbers. Despite the odds, they held their ground till dark, when, the brigades on my left giving way, they were withdrawn in comparatively good order to the foot of the mountain. The enemy did not pursue his advantage, and our troops were marched to Sharpsburg, which we reached on the morning of the 15th. On this march Anderson's brigade was assigned to General Hood, to act as a rear guard, and General Toombs, with two regiments of his brigade, joined me, the balance of his brigade having been sent to Williamsport with wagons. My command took possession of the heights in front of and to the right of the town, being the extreme right of our whole line. I ordered General Toombs to defend the bridge over the Antietam Creek in front of me with the Second and Twentieth Georgia Regiments, re-enforced by half a company from Jenkins' brigade and the Fiftieth Georgia regiment, of Drayton's brigade. These re-enforcements took but small part in what ensued, from the nature of their position. The enemy appeared on the opposite side of the creek, and heavy artillery firing was kept up during the day, continuing also the 16th, with but little damage to my command.

Daylight of September 17 gave the signal for a terrific cannonade. The battle raged with intensity on the left and center, but the heavy masses in my front—repulsed again and again in their attempts to force the passage of the bridge by the two regiments before named, comprising 403 men, assisted by artillery I had placed in position on the heights—were unable to effect a crossing, and maneuvered as if about to cross below at some of the numerous fords. My command had been further reduced on the right by detaching Garnett's brigade to the front of the town, leaving me, for the defense of the right, with only Toombs' two regiments, Kemper's, Drayton's, and Walker's brigades.

When it is known that on that morning my entire command of six brigades comprised only 2,430 men, the enormous disparity of force with which I contended can be seen.

About this time the two regiments of Toombs' brigade (Seventeenth and Fifteenth Georgia), which had been left behind, accompanied by five companies of the Eleventh Georgia Regiment, Anderson's brigade, came upon the field, and were at once placed at General Toombs' disposal, to aid in the defense of the bridge, my force before having been too weak to aid him with a single man. Before, however, they could be made available for that purpose, the gallant Second and Twentieth, having repulsed five separate assaults and exhausted their last round of ammunition, fell back, leaving the bridge to the enemy. Meanwhile General A. P. Hill had come up on my right and was effecting a junction with my line, several of his batteries already in position assisting mine in firing on the enemy, now swarming over the bridge. Undeterred, except momentarily, by this fire, the enemy advanced in enormous masses to the assault of the heights. Sweeping up to the crest, they were mowed down by Brown's battery, the heroic commander of which had been wounded but a few moments before. They overcame the tough resistance offered by the feeble forces opposed to them, and gained the heights, capturing McIntosh's battery, of General Hill's command. Kemper and Drayton were driven back through the town. The Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel De Saussure, fell back very slowly and in order, forming

the nucleus on which the brigade rallied. Jenkins' brigade held its own, and from their position in the orchard poured a destructive fire on the enemy. General Toombs, whom I had sent for, arriving from the right with a portion of his brigade and part of the Eleventh Georgia Regiment, was ordered to charge the enemy. This he did most gallantly, supported by Archer's brigade, of Hill's command, delivering fire at less than 50 yards, dashing at the enemy with the bayonet, forcing him from the crest, and following him down the hill. McIntosh's battery was retaken, and, assisted by other pieces, which were now brought up to the edge of the crest, a terrific fire was opened on the lines of the enemy between the slope and the creek, which, finally breaking them, caused a confused retreat to the bridge. Night had now come on, putting an end to the conflict, and leaving my command in the possession of the ground we had held in the morning, with the exception of the mere bridge.

In this day's battle fell Lieutenant-Colonel [William R.] Holmes, Second Georgia, and Colonel [W. T.] Millican, Fifteenth Georgia, dying as brave men should die.

On the morning of the 18th much sharpshooting took place, continuing all day. At 9 p. m. I took up line of march for the Potomac, which river I crossed, taking with me all my artillery, wagons, and material, without any loss whatever, encamping near Shepherdstown, W. Va., on the morning of the 19th.

I have the greatest reason to be satisfied with the officers and men of my command.

To my staff I am particularly indebted. Major Coward, my assistant adjutant-general, displayed on all occasions that cool courage and discrimination which predict for him a brilliant military career. I am much gratified at his well-merited promotion.

Capt. Osman Latrobe, my inspector-general, on all occasions, and particularly at Sharpsburg, conducted himself with distinguished gallantry. Wherever the battle raged hottest, there was he, directing and encouraging the troops. I earnestly recommend his promotion to the rank of major.

Surgeon Barksdale, of my staff, did more than his duty, exposing himself on the field and rendering me valuable assistance.

Capt. Philip B. Jones, jr., volunteer aide on my staff, displayed great gallantry, carrying my orders through the heat of battle.

Capt. E. N. Thurston, my ordnance officer, previous to his capture at Ox Hill, carried my orders with great promptness, displaying perfect coolness, on all occasions, when in the face of the enemy.

My regular aide-de-camp, First Lieut. J. W. Ford, during the recent campaign was acting as assistant quartermaster of my division, and discharged the duties of his office to my entire satisfaction.

It affords me pleasure to mention, in the highest terms, the efficiency of Major Moses, my division commissary.

Mr. Charles U. Williams, volunteer aide on my staff, was of much service to me. He was with me throughout the campaign, and never for one moment did he falter in his zeal for the service or in his conspicuous coolness. I heartily recommend him for a commission in the Confederate service.

Capt. H. E. Young, assistant adjutant-general, and Mr. Hugh Rose, volunteer aides for the occasion, served most faithfully, obeying with cool courage and much gallantry all orders given them.

D. R. JONES,
Major-General.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Longstreet's Corps.

[Inclosure.]

Return of casualties in Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones' division, September 14-18, 1862.

Brigades.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Toombs'	3	13	14	108	1	21	160
Drayton's	11	71	16	264	3	176	541
Anderson's		8	7	73	1	5	94
Kemper's	1	14	18	84		27	144
Garnett's	2	28	14	185		32	261
Jenkins'		27	28	168	1	11	235
Total	17	161	97	882	6	272	1,435

No. 234.

Report of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, C. S. Army, commanding division (temporary), of the battle of Sharpsburg.

WASHINGTON, GA., October 25, 1862.

GENERAL: The day that the army, commanded by General Lee, left Leesburg and marched toward Maryland, you notified me that I was assigned to the command of a division, composed of my own brigade, General Drayton's, and Col. G. T. Anderson's. When Major-General Longstreet's command arrived within 4 or 5 miles of Hagerstown, I was ordered to send forward one of my brigades to that point, take possession of Hagerstown, and to hold it until further orders. I asked permission to accompany this brigade, which was granted by Major-General Longstreet. I took with me, for the execution of this order, my own brigade, then under the command of Colonel Benning, of the Seventeenth Georgia Volunteers, leaving Brigadier-General Drayton's and Colonel Anderson's brigades with the main body of the army.

On Saturday night, September 13, while in command at Hagerstown, I received orders to hold my command in readiness to march at daylight the next morning. I received no further orders until about 10 o'clock on Sunday night, September 14. I then received orders to march immediately to Sharpsburg, which I did, and reached there before daylight on Monday morning. On that day I received orders from you to detail two regiments from my own brigade (the only one then with me), and to order them to Williamsport for the protection of the wagon-train, which left me with but two regiments only, and one of those (the Second Georgia) was very small, having less than 120 muskets present for duty. With these two regiments I was ordered by you to occupy the most eligible position I could find on the Antietam River, near the bridge on the road to Harper's Ferry, in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the river. From this position I was ordered to fall back when it should become necessary, by my right flank, and to hold a hill about 400 yards below the bridge and immediately on the river, as long as it might be practicable, and then to fall back and take position on your right in line of battle, with four other brigades of your command, about 600 or 800 yards in rear of the bridge. With these orders I took possession of

the ground indicated in your orders on Monday, September 15, with the Twentieth Georgia Volunteers, commanded by Col. John B. Cumming, and the Second Georgia Volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes (about 400 muskets strong), and both under the immediate command of Col. Henry L. Benning, commanding the brigade.

At this time, no notice having been given me of what disposition was intended to be made of the rest of the division which had been assigned to me, I subsequently understood from you that Anderson's brigade had been attached to Brigadier-General Hood's command, and Brigadier-General Drayton's brigade was retained by you in your line of battle on the heights in my rear, except one regiment (the Fiftieth Georgia Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel [F.] Kearse), hereafter referred to.

The Antietam River runs comparatively straight from a point about 100 paces above the bridge to a point about 300 paces below the bridge, and then curves suddenly around a hill to a ford on a neighborhood road. About 600 yards to my right and rear the road from Sharpsburg to Harper's Ferry from the foot of the bridge over the Antietam turns suddenly down the river, and runs nearly upon its margin for about 300 paces; then leaves the river nearly at right angles. Upon examining the position, I found a narrow wood upon the margin of the river just above the bridge (an important and commanding position) occupied by a company of Texans from Brigadier-General Hood's command. I then ordered the Twentieth to take position, with its left near the foot of the bridge, on the Sharpsburg side, extending down the river near its margin, and the Second Georgia on its right, prolonging the line down to the point where the road on the other side from the mountain approached the river. This required a more open order than was desirable, on account of the smallness of the regiments, both together numbering but a little over 400 muskets.

On Tuesday you placed under my command the Fiftieth Georgia (Lieutenant-Colonel Kearse), numbering, I should suppose, scarcely 100 muskets. I ordered this regiment on the right of the Second Georgia, extending it in open order, so as to guard a blind plantation road leading to a ford between the lower ford before referred to and the right of the Second Georgia Volunteers.

On Tuesday evening I received notice of the withdrawal of the company belonging to Brigadier-General Hood's brigade from the position on Colonel Cumming's left, above the bridge, and was compelled to detail a company from the Twentieth to take its place.

On Wednesday morning I ordered a company from General Jenkins' brigade (whom you had placed under my command) to relieve this company from the Twentieth and occupy its position, that it might resume its position below the bridge. This order was not obeyed, and subsequently I placed the captain and one-half of this company between the Second Georgia and Fiftieth Georgia, and the other half, under a lieutenant, near the lower ford, to prevent or retard the passage of the enemy at this point. This command held its position with fidelity and firmness until withdrawn by my order. This position was important, and had been guarded by a cavalry regiment, with an infantry brigade in its rear, up to Tuesday evening, when both were removed to another position on the field of battle, and left the crossing unprotected, except by the small force I was thus enabled to place there. Finding that the battery belonging to my brigade (Captain Richardson) was placed too far in my rear to render me efficient service in defending the passage at the bridge, I applied to General Longstreet for another battery. He ordered Captain Eubank to report to me, who was placed in my rear,

about half-way between the river and Captain Richardson's battery, and rendered efficient service as long as he remained in that position.

The enemy opened on my position with his artillery on Tuesday evening, and continued it until dark. The damage was but slight. My own skirmishers and the company from General Hood's brigade crossed the river, and were actively engaged with the enemy's skirmishers the most of this day.

On Tuesday night the enemy advanced his artillery and infantry much nearer my position, and on Wednesday morning threw forward his skirmishers and light infantry in greatly increased numbers, and before 8 o'clock drove in my pickets and advanced with heavy columns to the attack of my position on the bridge. This position was not strong. The ground descended gently to the margin of the river, covered with a narrow strip of woods, affording slight protection to the troops. Its chief strength lay in the fact that, from the nature of the ground on the other side, the enemy were compelled to approach mainly by the road which led up the river for near 300 paces, parallel with my line of battle, and distant therefrom from 50 to 150 feet, thus exposing his flank to a destructive fire the most of that distance.

At between 9 and 10 o'clock the enemy made his first attempt to carry the bridge by a rapid assault, and was repulsed with great slaughter, and at irregular intervals, up to about 1 o'clock, made four other attempts of the same kind, all of which were gallantly met and successfully repulsed by the Twentieth and Second Georgia. The Fiftieth Georgia and the half company from General Jenkins' brigade, before referred to, were on the right of the Second Georgia, rather below the main point of attack, and rendered little or no service in this fierce and bloody struggle. After these repeated disastrous repulses, the enemy, despairing of wresting the bridge from the grasp of its heroic defenders, and thus forcing his passage across the river at this point, turned his attention to the fords before referred to, and commenced moving fresh troops in that direction by his left flank. The old road, by the upper of the two fords referred to, led over a hill on my right and in my rear, which completely commanded my position and all ingress and egress to and from it below the bridge. My communications with the rear above the bridge were beset with other, but scarcely less, difficulties. This approach could have been very successfully defended by a comparatively small force, and it was for this purpose that I so often and urgently asked the aid of a regiment on the day of the battle, not having another man available for that purpose. Not being able to get any re-enforcements for the defense of these two fords, and seeing that the enemy was moving upon them to cross, thus enabling him to attack my small force in front, right flank, and rear, and my two regiments having been constantly engaged from early in the morning up to 1 o'clock with a vastly superior force of the enemy, aided by three heavy batteries, the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes, of the Second, having been killed in the action, and the only remaining field officer, Major [Skidmore] Harris, being painfully wounded, and fully one half of this regiment being killed or wounded, and the Twentieth having also suffered severely in killed and wounded, and the ammunition of both regiments being nearly exhausted, and Eubank's battery having been withdrawn to the rear nearly two hours before, I deemed it my duty, in pursuance of your original order, to withdraw my command and place it in the position designated by you opposite the two lower fords, some half a mile to the right and front of your line of battle. In pursuance of this order, Colonel Benning, who had commanded the remnant of the

brigade during the action with distinguished gallantry and skill, withdrew these gallant regiments to their new position, ready again to confront and battle with the enemy. The Fiftieth Georgia and the company from General Jenkins' brigade were at the same time ordered to the same position, and were led back by their respective officers. This change of position was made to my entire satisfaction, and with but small loss, in the face of greatly superior numbers. Before these troops had reached their new position, the Fifteenth Georgia Volunteers, under the command of Colonel Millican; the Seventeenth, under the command of Captain [John A.] McGregor, of my brigade, and Major Little, with five companies of the Eleventh Georgia (Colonel Anderson's brigade), all of whom had been detached several days before to guard ammunition and other trains, arrived on the field and were also placed in the new position before designated. The Twentieth and Second were then ordered to the ammunition train to replenish their cartridge-boxes.

Though the bridge and upper ford were thus left open to the enemy, he moved with such extreme caution and slowness that he lost nearly two hours in crossing and getting into action on our side of the river, about which time General A. P. Hill's division arrived from Harper's Ferry. I then received your order that, as soon as General Gregg (of General A. P. Hill's division) arrived and relieved me, to move my command and take position immediately on your right, on the heights then occupied by the rest of your command. Before I was relieved by General Gregg, I received from you another order to move up my command immediately to meet the enemy, who had already commenced his attack on your position. I immediately put my command in motion, then consisting of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Georgia (lessened by one company from each, sent out as skirmishers), Major Little's battalion, of the Eleventh, a small number of Kearse's regiment, and on the way I found Colonel Cumming and a part of the Twentieth, who had returned from supplying themselves with ammunition and joined me, and hastened with all speed to your position. On my arrival, I found the enemy in possession of the ground I was ordered by you to occupy on your right. He had driven off our troops, captured McIntosh's battery (attached to General Drayton's brigade), and held possession of all the ground from the corn-field on your right down to the Antietam Bridge road, including the eastern suburbs of the town of Sharpsburg, all the troops defending it having been driven back and retired to the rear or through the town.

Under this state of facts, I had instantly to determine either to retreat or fight. A retreat would have left the town of Sharpsburg and General Longstreet's rear open to the enemy, and was inadmissible. I, therefore, with less than one-fifth of the enemy's numbers, determined to give him battle, and immediately and rapidly formed my line of battle in the road within 100 paces of the enemy's lines. While forming in the road, Captain Troup, my aide, on my extreme left rallied a portion of General Kemper's brigade, who were retiring from the field, attached it to my line of battle, and led them into action with conspicuous gallantry and skill.

As soon as possible, I opened fire upon the enemy's columns, who immediately advanced in good order upon me until he approached within 60 or 80 paces, when the effectiveness of the fire threw his column in considerable disorder, upon perceiving which I immediately ordered a charge, which, being brilliantly and energetically executed by my whole line, the enemy broke in confusion and fled. McIntosh's battery was recaptured and our position retaken within less than thirty minutes after

the commencement of this attack upon him. The enemy fled in confusion toward the river and bridge, making two or three efforts to rally, which were soon defeated by the vigorous charges of our troops, aided by Captain Richardson's battery, which I ordered up immediately upon the recovery of the heights, and which, with its accustomed promptness and courage, was rapidly placed in position and action. The enemy, to cover his retreating columns, brought over the bridge a battery and placed it in position. I ordered Richardson's battery to open upon it, and at the same time ordered the Fifteenth and Twentieth Georgia forward, who pursued the enemy so close to his guns as to bring them within range of musketry, which compelled his battery, after a few shots, to join his fleeing infantry and retreat across the bridge. I desired to pursue the enemy across the river, but being deficient in artillery to meet his heavy batteries on the other side, I sent my aide, Captain Troup, to General Lee for the purpose of supplying myself, who ordered Captain Squires to report to me immediately, which he was unable to do, from not receiving the order in time, until nearly night, when it was too late to risk the movement, and, therefore, I ordered him to hold himself in readiness for the movement in the morning, if the action should be renewed. I then determined to move my troops upon and occupy the position held by me on the river at the beginning of the action, but before the execution of this purpose I received your order to change my position and to occupy the heights on the opposite side of the road leading to the bridge from Sharpsburg, on the left of your command, which order was immediately executed and the troops bivouacked for the night.

I am happy to report that our loss in this last attack was unexpectedly small. Such was the heroic vigor and rapidity of the assault upon the enemy, he was panic-stricken; his fire was wild and comparatively harmless. Having been compelled to leave my command before official returns could be brought in, I am unable to state it accurately. Colonel Benning has, doubtless, before this time furnished you with them.

Among the casualties of the day I have to deplore the loss of two commanders of regiments. Colonel Millican, of the Fifteenth Georgia, who greatly distinguished himself both at Manassas and in this action for personal gallantry and efficiency as a soldier and field officer, fell while gallantly leading his regiment in the final charge (and nearly its close), which swept the enemy from this part of the field of battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes, who commanded the Second Georgia Volunteer Regiment, fell near the close of his heroic defense of the passage of the Antietam, and it is due to him to say that, in my judgment, he has not left in the armies of the republic a truer or braver soldier, and I have never known a cooler, more efficient, or more skillful field officer.

The conduct of the officers and men generally under my command in the battle of Sharpsburg was so strongly marked with the noble virtues of the patriot soldier that a narrative of this day's deeds performed by them, however simple and unadorned, if truthful, would seem like the language of extravagant and unmerited eulogy.

The reports of the regimental commanders will bring to your attention the meritorious conduct of officers and men which it may not have been my good fortune to witness, and, as I have not the benefit of their reports before me, I shall have to content myself with bringing to your attention the most conspicuous cases of individual merit which fell under my personal observation. Every opportunity for conspicuous gallantry and valuable services which presented itself seemed to be eagerly embraced by those whose good fortune it was to fall in with it.

Colonel Benning stood by his brigade on the Antietam, guiding, directing, and animating his officers and men with distinguished coolness, courage, and skill; withdrew them from that perilous condition; again led them, with equal skill and courage, in the final conflict with the enemy. He deserves the special consideration of the Government.

Colonel Cumming, with marked gallantry and skill, led his regiment throughout the day, and, after the long and bloody conflict at the bridge, brought up one of its fragments to the last charge, and was among the foremost in it.

Major Harris, of the Second, after the fall of Colonel Holmes, though suffering from a painful wound, stood firmly and gallantly by his command during the whole day.

Colonel Benning being in command of the brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel [Wesley C.] Hodges and Major [J. H.] Pickett both being absent, from severe wounds received by them in former battles, Captain McGregor led the Seventeenth Regiment with ability, courage, and skill.

Major Little led his battalion of the Eleventh Georgia with a dashing courage and success which won the admiration of his comrades. The officers and men of his battalion deserve especial mention for their gallantry and good conduct.

Captain [J. B.] Richardson and his officers and men, of the company of the Washington Artillery attached to my own brigade, were conspicuous throughout the day for courage and good conduct. Captain Richardson clung to the infantry amid every danger, and, being nobly seconded on every occasion by his officers and men, largely contributed to every success. During the whole connection of this battery with my command, its officers and men have so conducted themselves everywhere—on the march, in the camp, and in the battle-field—as to merit and receive my special approbation.

The duties of my staff, from the nature and extent of the operations of my command and its distance from the main body, were peculiarly arduous and dangerous, and I am much indebted to them for their extraordinary efforts on that occasion. Every difficulty was met by increased energy and exertion, and every increased danger with a higher courage and devotion to duty. During the combat on the river they were all constantly engaged in arduous and dangerous duties.

In the final conflict Captain Troup was on the left of my line; Captain [D. M.] DuBose on my right; Cadet [W. T.] Lamar accompanied me personally, and Captain [A. A. F.] Hill, of First Georgia Regulars, assigned to me for special duty, and Lieutenant Grant were actively executing my orders in carrying orders and bringing up troops.

It happened to my aide, Capt. J. R. Troup, on three occasions during the day, while in the performance of his ordinary duties, to pass troops which had broken and left their positions, on all of which occasions he rallied them with great skill and energy, succeeding on one occasion in leading them back into position, and on another inspired them with his own courage and enthusiasm, and led them successfully in the charge on the enemy's columns. Captain Troup's conduct throughout the day was conspicuous for ability and courage, and is entitled to marked and special approbation.

The conduct of one of my couriers, Mr. Thomas Paschal, of Cobb's Legion, deserves special mention for courage and fidelity to duty under circumstances of peculiar difficulties and dangers.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. TOOMBS,

Brig. Gen. D. R. JONES.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett, C. S. Army, commanding Pickett's brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
November 6, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Pickett's brigade, of General D. R. Jones' division, which I commanded in the battle of Boonsborough:

This command, consisting of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Fifty-sixth Regiments Virginia Volunteers, commanded, respectively, by Colonel Hunton, Major Cabell, Colonel [J. B.] Strange, Captain [W. L.] Wingfield, and Colonel Stuart, left the neighborhood of Hagerstown, Md., on the morning of September 14 last, and reached Boonsborough, on the Hagerstown and Frederick turnpike, in the afternoon, after a hot, dusty, and fatiguing march of some 18 miles. A short distance beyond the village, Kemper's, Pickett's, and Jenkins' brigades (the latter commanded by Colonel Walker), in the order named, were moved in a southerly direction on a road running perpendicular to the pike. Having proceeded over a mile, these troops were directed on another route parallel to the turnpike, leading toward a gap in the South Mountain, farther south than that through which the Hagerstown and Frederick road ran. After marching nearly half a mile, Kemper filed to the left, and again moved in the direction of the pike. At this time I received an order, by Major Mayo [Moses?], of General Jones' staff, to bring my troops to an about-face, and to return the way I came until I reached a path, which I must take. He was unable to give me any information respecting the path in question, but said he would go forward and try to obtain some. I did not, however, see him again. I followed Jenkins' brigade, which was now in front some distance; but hearing musketry open on the mountain, I took what I supposed to be a near cut in the direction where I presumed I was wanted. This took me over rough and plowed ground up the mountain side. I at length found an old and broken road, along which General Kemper must have moved. Here I met Capt. Hugh Rose, of General Jones' staff, who had orders for me to return to the turnpike. When I got back to this road my troops were almost exhausted. I consequently lost the services of a number of men by straggling. After a short rest, I proceeded up the mountain, and, having gained the summit on the main road, I was sent, by a narrow lane bearing to the left, to a higher position. A portion of this route was commanded by several pieces of the enemy's artillery, which opened upon my column (marching by the flank) as soon as it came in sight, which they were enabled to do with considerable accuracy, as they had previously been practicing on other troops which had preceded mine. Several casualties occurred from this cause while I was approaching and forming my line of battle, which I did by filing my command to the right through an open field. My right rested in a thick woods, which descended quite abruptly in front, and my left in a field of standing corn. As soon as my troops were formed, I sent forward a line of skirmishers to ascertain the position of the enemy. When these dispositions had been completed (which was only a short time before sunset), I received an order from General Jones to detach my left regiment to Kemper's right (he being on my left), and to withdraw the rest of the

brigade to a wooded ridge a little to the left and rear. The first part of this order had scarcely been executed when the Federal skirmishers made their appearance, immediately followed by their main body, so that the action at once became general.

The brigade sustained for some time a fierce attack by doubtless many times their number. It has subsequently been ascertained that General McClellan's army, consisting of at least 80,000 men, assailed our position, only defended by General D. H. Hill's division and a part of General Longstreet's corps. The left was the first to fall back, and finally the right was forced to retreat, being without support. Many renewed the contest a little farther to the rear, and stoutly disputed the approach of the enemy, but it had now become so dark it was impossible to distinguish objects, except at a short distance. About this time two regiments of Jenkins' brigade came up, and, the probable position of the enemy being pointed out, they advanced to the attack with great gallantry. Just as these troops moved forward, I was ordered to bring off my brigade, which I did.

It is due to the brigade to say that it went into the battle of Boonsborough under many serious disadvantages. It had marched (a portion of the time rapidly) between 22 and 23 miles before it went into action, much oppressed by heat and dust; reached its position a short time before sunset under a disheartening fire of artillery, and was attacked by a much superior force as soon as it was formed in line of battle. That it bravely discharged its duty is fully attested by the number of casualties which occurred during the engagement.

I had been placed in command of the brigade only a few days before the battle of Boonsborough, and, therefore, was personally acquainted with few of the officers, save the regimental commanders. I cannot, therefore, mention names, but can only say I saw several in connection with them, both by words and example, encouraging and cheering on their men in the hottest of the fight. For further information on this subject you are referred to the sub-reports, herewith inclosed.

Colonel Stuart, as I formerly mentioned, was detached with his regiment (the Fifty-sixth Virginia) before the action commenced. His accompanying official report will show the part taken by his command.

Lieutenant McIntire, Eighth [Nineteenth] Virginia Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. Elliott Johnston and A. C. Sorrel, First Georgia Regulars, acting aides-de-camp, composed my staff. It is with much pleasure that I acknowledge the zeal, intelligence, and bravery with which they discharged their duties pending the battle.

We have to mourn in this action many of our companions as killed and wounded, who go to swell the list of noble martyrs who have suffered in our just cause. It was my lot to be acquainted with but one of the officers who fell on this occasion—Col. John B. Strange, Nineteenth Virginia Volunteers. His tried valor on other fields, and heroic conduct in animating his men to advance upon the enemy with his latest breath, and after he had fallen mortally wounded, will secure imperishable honor for his name and memory.

I herewith furnish a list* of the killed and wounded, and have the honor to state that the delay and imperfection of my report with regard to details have been occasioned by my being relieved from the command of Pickett's brigade before the reports of regimental commanders could

* Not found, but see No. 205.

be made out; and although I applied for them some weeks since, I received several of them only yesterday.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. GARNETT,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. A. COWARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General to Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones.

CAMP NEAR CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
November 7, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to forward the following report of the battle of Sharpsburg, as far as participated in by my command (Pickett's brigade):

Early in the forenoon of September 17 these troops, composed of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Fifty-sixth Virginia Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Hunton, Major Cabell, Lieut. William N. Wood, Captain Wingfield, and Captain McPhail, were ordered to the southeastern side of the village to support several batteries of Washington Artillery, commanding the easterly and southerly approaches to the town. As far as practicable the command was sheltered in a hollow in the rear of the artillery. For some four or five hours it was subjected to an almost uninterrupted fire of solid shot, shell, and spherical case, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, which casualties were borne by the troops with remarkable firmness and steadiness. I was subsequently ordered forward on the brow of the hill to dislodge the enemy's skirmishers, who began to annoy our artillery to the eastward. Here we were more exposed to the Federal artillery than in our former position, and suffered considerably. At length, for some cause unknown to me, a large portion of the pieces were withdrawn, and I moved my command farther back to a more secure place. Having been here a short time, I was informed that a portion of Col. Stephen D. Lee's battalion had taken the place of the Washington Artillery, and wished some skirmishers to protect his pieces from the sharpshooters of the enemy. I sent forward the Fifty-sixth Regiment, under the command of Captain McPhail, for this purpose. Not long after, I learned that the enemy had crossed the Antietam (a stream in our front) in very large force, and was moving toward the point occupied by the artillery. I again moved forward my force and took up a position in front of two pieces of Colonel Lee's battalion, in a corn-field, with space enough between the wings for them to be used with effect. The Fifty-sixth Regiment, which was in front, was recalled, and rejoined the left wing of the main body. Soon a large number of the enemy's skirmishers were seen to our left, as if to flank us. There were none of our forces in sight in that direction. A brisk fire from the left checked and finally caused them to retire. Now a large force made its appearance, marching to the front, having debouched from the woods on the banks of the Antietam, which had partially concealed them. At the same time heavy bodies were observed moving to attack our troops on the right, composed of Drayton's and a portion of Kemper's brigades. I moved my command some distance to the front in the standing corn (as many of my guns were short range), in order that they could produce more effect, and opened fire. At this time, I do not think my effective force could have exceeded 200 men, yet these, with two rifled pieces, most gallantly and skillfully served, under the command of Captain Moody, and superintended by Colonel Lee, checked and held at bay a

force of the enemy many times our number. When this unequal contest had lasted over an hour, I discovered that the Federals had turned our extreme right, which began to give way, and a number of the Yankee flags appeared on the hill in rear of the town and not far from our only avenue of escape. I ordered the brigade to fall back, deeming it in imminent danger of being surrounded and captured, as it would have been impossible for it to have held its position without the support of the troops on the right. There being some delay in withdrawing Moody's section of artillery, I take pleasure in saying I saw Major Cabell halt and face his men about, to await its removal, as mentioned in his official report.

The main street of the town was commanded by the Federal artillery. My troops, therefore, passed, for the most part, to the north of the town along the cross-streets. In this direction I found troops scattered in squads from various parts of the army, so that it was impossible to distinguish men of the different commands. Having reached the rear of the town, and learning that General Toombs had re-enforced our right just after it was driven back, and restored the fortunes of the day in that quarter, I gathered as many men as I could get to follow me from among the dispersed force (which did not amount to a large number, as many said they were looking for proper commands), and, accompanied by Capt. William N. Berkeley, of the Eighth Virginia Regiment, and Lieutenants McIntire and Sorrel, of my staff, I joined General Drayton's command south of the village. I found, on my arrival, that the enemy had been successfully repulsed, only a few skirmishers remaining in sight, which were being driven back by our troops of the same description.

The conduct of the brigade during this most trying day, under destructive fires from artillery and musketry, is deserving of the highest commendation, officers and men generally acting with the utmost bravery and coolness. The names of those particularly mentioned by regimental commanders will be found in their reports, herewith furnished.

My staff—Lieutenants McIntire, Johnston (who was wounded in the foot shortly after the infantry engagement commenced, and in consequence of which lost his leg), and Sorrel—are entitled to my thanks for meritorious and gallant services during the day.

I feel it a duty, and grateful to my feelings, again to recur to the part taken by Captain Moody's section of artillery. It is partly due to the brave and energetic manner with which it was handled that the infantry were enabled to hold their position, and it is, therefore, entitled to a full share of the credit for whatever success attended our efforts on that part of the field. Colonel Lee, at times during the action, personally assisted at his pieces. His bravery and intrepidity at the battle of Sharpsburg should add fresh fame to the high reputation he has already won.

In this battle, as in former ones, we are called on to deplore the loss of many brave spirits, who have sealed their devotion to the Southern cause with their life's blood. May their memories ever be enshrined in the hearts of their countrymen!

This report has been delayed for the reasons assigned in my report of the battle of Boonsborough. A list* of killed, wounded, &c., is herewith furnished as far as could be obtained.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. GARNETT,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. A. COWARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General to Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones.

* Not found, but see No. 205.

No. 236.

Report of Col. Eppa Hunton, Eighth Virginia Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

—, —, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following, as the action of my regiment in the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg:

On Sunday, September 14, the regiment, with the rest of the brigade, left Hagerstown and marched toward the gap of the mountain near Boonsborough. After arriving near the gap we were marched south several miles toward another gap. When about to reach this last gap, we were countermarched and carried to the top of the mountain, on the north side of the turnpike, under heavy fire of the enemy's batteries from the opposite side of the pike. The brigade was thrown into line of battle (the Eighth Virginia Regiment on the extreme right) in a wood. The regiment formed the line within 50 yards of the enemy, and under a galling fire of musketry, which opened on us while forming the line. The regiment, with great gallantry, returned the fire of the enemy, and drove the advance of the enemy back. We maintained our ground until the rest of the brigade on our left had fallen back, and, finding that my regiment, consisting of only 34 men, had no support on the right or left, and was opposed to a very large force of the enemy, I retired my regiment to the rear of the fence, and was preparing to make there a further stand, when orders came to retire the whole command. My command sustained a loss of 11 killed and wounded.

That night we took up the line of march toward Sharpsburg, which place we reached on the 15th, when we were formed in line of battle on the east of the town.

On Tuesday the enemy made his appearance in our front and opened upon our position with very heavy guns.

On Wednesday we changed our position a little to the north, and nearly all day were exposed to the most terrific fire of artillery I have ever seen. We were near the extreme right of the line of battle, Jenkins', Drayton's, and Kemper's brigades being the only forces on our right.

The early part of this day was consumed by the enemy in their galling artillery fire, under cover of which they endeavored to cross their infantry over the Antietam Creek. Late in the afternoon the enemy threw large forces over the creek and advanced upon us. The Eighth and Eighteenth first and then the whole brigade were thrown forward to a fence in our front to meet the column advancing upon our position, and nobly your little command stood the shock of battle from greatly superior numbers. Not a man of my command faltered; no one left the ranks except those who had been wounded. We kept the enemy back, and the efforts of the enemy's officers, plainly discernible, to force their men upon us, were all in vain. We could have held this position with ease if our right had been equally successful; but our right gave way—first Kemper's brigade, and then Drayton's. The enemy had gotten beyond our line, and we were flanked by a very large force in addition to that in front. Then you gave the order to fall back, and my command retired with the rest of the brigade. The regiment numbered when it entered this fight 22 men, and came out with 11.

It gives me great pleasure to speak in terms of high commendation of the conduct of the regiment on these two occasions. It met my fullest

approbation; all, officers and men, behaved very handsomely. The casualties have heretofore been specially reported.

I cannot close this report without mentioning the gallant conduct of our artillery, which fought near us—the Washington Artillery first and Colonel Lee's artillery afterward. I am unable to give the names of the different batteries. Captain Squires' battery twice drove back the advancing column of the enemy.

Respectfully reported.

EPPA HUNTON,
Colonel Eighth Virginia Regiment.

Brigadier-General GARNETT,
Commanding Pickett's Brigade.

No. 237.

Reports of Maj. George C. Cabell, Eighteenth Virginia Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

OCTOBER 14, 1862.

CAPTAIN: About 5 p. m. on Sunday, September 14, the Eighteenth Virginia Regiment, about 120 strong, under my command, after a rapid and fatiguing march from Hagerstown, was directed to a position a little north of the gap in South Mountain, near Boonsborough, Md. We were not fairly in position before the enemy's skirmishers were seen not far off and to their rear, their line of battle approaching. Fire was soon opened along the entire front of the Eighteenth Regiment, when the skirmishers retired, and soon the main body of the enemy fell back a short distance, sheltered themselves behind trees, rocks, &c., and opened a heavy fire upon us, which was replied to with spirit and vigor for some time.

After some three-quarters of an hour, word was brought that the regiments on our left had fallen back, and that the left of the Eighteenth was wavering. I at once repaired to the left of the regiment and aided in restoring comparatively good order, but soon after the order came along the lines to fall back, which was done, halting in a ravine about 100 yards to the rear of the position we had just left. Here the regiment was reformed. General Garnett did not approve of this last position, so he ordered the regiment to the edge of the wood and across a fence some 200 yards distant. In going to this position, the ground being uneven, rocky, and covered with bushes and briars, the regiment became a good deal scattered. As many of the regiment as could be, were collected, and, together with Captains Claiborne and Oliver, I marched them forward and took position on the left of Jenkins' brigade, which had just come up, and again engaged the enemy, the men fighting bravely. In some twenty-five or thirty minutes information was brought that General Garnett's brigade was ordered to retire. The men were then withdrawn, and, together with General Garnett, who was upon our left, retired from the field. It is but just to say that the regiment was very much exhausted when it went into the fight, having marched in quick time from Hagerstown and around the mountain some 4 or 5 miles, and therefore fought under disadvantages. It nevertheless did good and effective fighting, and, had it been supported on the left, would have maintained its ground throughout the entire fight.

There were only seven officers besides myself with the regiment, and three of the companies were commanded by second sergeants.

The regiment lost 7 killed, 27 wounded, and 7 missing, a report of which has already been forwarded.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. C. CABELL,

Major, Commanding Eighteenth Virginia Regiment.

General Garnett's ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

OCTOBER 14, 1862.

CAPTAIN: Early on the morning of September 17, the Eighteenth Virginia Regiment, about 75 strong, under my command, was marched by the left flank into a position in rear of two batteries of the Washington Artillery, posted on a hill to the south and east of Sharpsburg, Md. The enemy were pouring a heavy fire of round and canister shot upon the hill when the brigade commanded by General Garnett was put in position, which was continued furiously during the day until about 3 p. m. Our position was changed two or three times during the morning, as circumstances required, moving alternately to the left and right, to shelter the men from a dreadful fire, to which it was impossible to reply with small-arms. The Eighteenth Regiment lost by this artillery fire alone 10 killed and wounded.

About 3 p. m. the enemy crossed the creek in heavy force and advanced upon us. My regiment, with the remainder of the brigade, was ordered to the summit of the hill, and fire was at once opened upon the enemy's skirmishers, who were soon driven back to their advancing line of battle, composed of two or three regiments, immediately in our front. The enemy came up rapidly, and we advanced a short distance to meet them. They, soon after receiving our first fire, fell back some little distance, and took shelter behind a rail fence, and opened a furious fire upon us. The fighting now became general along the line of the brigade, we gaining rather than losing ground, when the enemy was re-enforced by two or three regiments. These last regiments came up upon the left of the regiments already engaged with us, and extended their line perpendicularly to the rear, and opened a severe oblique fire, which was directed principally upon the Eighteenth and Eighth Virginia Regiments. We were compelled to change the front of several of our companies at this juncture, our fire never slackening. The enemy, though outnumbering us at least five to one, were held completely in check, and did not advance a pace. About this time the brigades of Generals Kemper and Drayton fell back, and a large force opposed to them swung round toward Sharpsburg and were already getting in our rear, when General Garnett, from sheer necessity, ordered his brigade to retire. We had moved back some 50 yards when it was discovered that a battery ([A. S.] Cutts', I think) would be endangered by our falling back. I halted my little regiment, faced it about, and waited until the battery limbered up and moved off. The regiment was then drawn off with the remainder of the brigade.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the coolness and gallantry of my men. No man of the Eighteenth Regiment left his post until disabled, and all kept up a rapid and well-directed fire. The officers, too, acted with great gallantry.

Captains [T. D.] Claiborne, [J. A.] Holland, and [E. D.] Oliver; Lieuts. R. S. Jones, acting adjutant, and [W. H.] Smith, of Company K, and

Sergeant Muse, Company G, were particularly active in the discharge of their duties.

The regiment lost in this fight 4 killed and 27 wounded, a report of which has been already forwarded. My entire color-guard was either killed or wounded.

I am, captain, very respectfully,

GEO. C. CABELL,

Major Eighteenth Virginia Regiment, Commanding.

General Garnett's ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

No. 238.

Reports of Capt. B. Brown, Nineteenth Virginia Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

OCTOBER 15, 1862.

[I have the honor to make the following] report of the battle of Slaughter's Gap, September 14:

On Sunday, September 14, the Nineteenth Virginia Regiment, numbering 150 men, after marching from Hagerstown, Md., to Boonsborough, was ordered to load and prepare for action. The sun was nearly setting behind the western hills when the regiment was formed in a line of battle on the top of a hill, with an open space in front, where the enemy lay concealed behind a stone fence, at the distance of 15 paces. A murderous fire was at once opened upon the regiment by the concealed foe, which was manfully replied to by the Nineteenth for more than an hour, when the ranks were thinned to such an extent as to prove a withdrawal absolutely necessary. One-third of the men were rendered unable to fight, and a precipitous retreat from the hill was ordered.

In this engagement Col. J. B. Strange fell, seriously wounded, and in the retreat was left behind. His voice was heard after he had received his wound, urging his men to stand firmly, and he commanded with that coolness and daring that is found only in the truly brave. In addition to this severe loss, the regiment mourns the death of Lieut. M. J. Shepherd, of Company B, than whom a truer patriot, a firmer officer, and a nobler youth is not found in our country's service.

The list of casualties shows the number of the brave ever to be lamented by the friends of the Nineteenth.

The command fell upon Capt. John L. Cochran after the fall of Colonel Strange. Total loss, 63; names* heretofore furnished.

B. BROWN,

Captain, Commanding Regiment.

OCTOBER 15, 1862.

[I have the honor to make the following] report of the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17:

The Nineteenth Regiment, weakened by straggling and the casualties of the 14th, was stationed on an eminent hill on the east side of Sharpsburg, with only 50 men, commanded by Lieut. William N. Wood, acting adjutant, where they were attacked in the evening of the 17th by a large force of the enemy approaching in three directions. Under these cir-

* Not found.

cumstances the regiment maintained its position for two hours, when the enemy had gotten in our rear from the right, and had also passed beyond us on the left, and was pressing with vigor with ten times our number immediately in front of us. Still, death was dealt by the unerring shots of this noble little band. The enemy, with his large force, had come within 80 steps of us, when a hasty retreat down the hill with a circuitous route to the left saved us from the prisoner's cell.

Our loss was comparatively great. The men fought exceedingly well. Among the bravest, I deem it necessary to mention W. T. Rea, a private of Company K; Private E. G. Taylor, Company B, and Ensign L. R. Bowyer.

Loss in this engagement, 8; names* heretofore furnished.

B. BROWN,
Captain, Commanding Regiment.

[Indorsement.]

Brigadier-General GARNETT:

This regiment was acting more directly under your orders than those of its commander, Captain Brown, who was present during the engagement. I did not recognize Adjutant Wood as its commander on that day, he being only third lieutenant.

Respectfully,

JAMES D. McINTIRE.

No. 239.

Report of Col. William D. Stuart, Fifty-sixth Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Boonsborough.

HEADQUARTERS PICKETT'S BRIGADE,
October 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the part taken by the Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiment, under my command, in the engagement on the South Mountain, near Boonsborough, Md., on Sunday, September 14:

Upon reaching the line of battle assigned to your brigade, I was ordered to the support of General J. L. Kemper, immediately on your left, and distant about 200 yards. I promptly repaired to General Kemper's right, and reported to Colonel Corse, of the Seventeenth Virginia, commanding at that point. He assigned me my place in line of battle in a corn-field, through which the enemy were reported to be advancing immediately in front. Here I remained for some time, when, from the direction of the enemy's fire and the appearance of their standards, I found the attack was being made against you on my right, and that my whole flank would be exposed should your position prove untenable. With Colonel Corse's permission, I threw back my right wing, and prepared to meet the enemy from this direction. Dark now settled upon us, and, as it was impossible to see anything of the enemy, and the firing on my right, on your part, had ceased, and a portion of the Twenty-eighth Regiment, of your brigade, had retreated toward my position, I concluded that your position had proved untenable, and advised Colonel Corse again to fall back to the fence separating the cleared and corn

* Not found.

fields some 20 yards in our rear. This was speedily effected, and the line formed, with the fence protecting us. From this point a brisk right-oblique fire was kept up on the enemy for an hour or more, when, our ammunition becoming exhausted, recourse was had to the cartridge-boxes of the dead and wounded around, and I sent a messenger to inform you that re-enforcements or ammunition should speedily be sent us. My messenger (Lieutenant [Ira A.] Miller) returned, having met the adjutant-general of General Kemper (Captain Fry), who informed him that Generals Kemper's and Garnett's brigades had been ordered from the field some time before, and to bear me such orders. Upon the receipt of this order, I informed Colonel Corse, and we agreed to leave the field together, which we did, bringing the men off in good order, after having expended every round of ammunition. I regretted not being able to bring off all of my wounded; but it was so dark that the ambulance corps were unable to find them.

Into the engagement I carried 80 muskets, of which number 40 were either killed or wounded and 5 missing.

I am indebted to Captain McPhail for gallant services on this occasion, who, although severely bruised by a shell, remained on the ground, encouraging the men, until the engagement ceased. Sergeant Tucker, of Company K, and Sergeant Newton, of Company E, are deserving of honorable mention for their bravery.

In conclusion, I beg leave to report that the enemy ceased their firing before we did, and failed to make any advance on our position.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. D. STUART,

Colonel Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiment.

Brig. Gen. R. B. GARNETT.

No. 240.

Report of Capt. John B. McPhail, Fifty-sixth Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 26, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part the Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiment acted in the late battle near Sharpsburg, Md.:

In consequence of the severe illness of Col. William D. Stuart, the command of this regiment devolved upon me at the close of the second day's fight.

On the morning of the 17th, the regiment was marched in your brigade to the support of the Washington Artillery. In this position it remained the greater part of the day, exposed to an enfilading and rarely well-directed artillery fire. In the afternoon, in obedience to orders, my regiment was deployed as skirmishers, to engage those of the enemy that were firing upon the gunners at our batteries. So soon as my skirmishers reached the position assigned them, they became hotly engaged with the skirmishers of the enemy, advancing a little in front of their line of battle. My men, exposed to a heavy musketry and terrific artillery fire, held their position for something less than an hour, when your other regiments were brought into action. My skirmishers were then rallied upon the left of your brigade, and fought with undiminished courage until the brigade was withdrawn.

Though the regiment had been reduced to a handful in numbers, I am gratified to report that the casualties amounted to only 8 men wounded; only 40 were carried into action.

In recalling instances of individual courage, I cannot omit reporting the names of Lieut. F. W. Nelson, commanding Company A; Lieut. John W. Jones, commanding Company B, and Lieut. Matthew Brown, commanding Company D. All three of these officers acted with conspicuous gallantry.

Very respectfully submitted.

JOHN B. MCPHAIL,

Captain, Commanding Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiment.

General R. B. GARNETT,

Commanding Pickett's Brigade.

No. 241.

Report of Col. Montgomery D. Corse, Seventeenth Virginia Infantry, Kemper's brigade, Jones' division, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

BATTLE OF BOONSBOROUGH.

My regiment was placed in line of battle about 4 p. m., in a field to the right of the road leading to the summit of the mountain and to the left of Crampton's Gap. In the act of taking that position the regiment was subjected to a very fierce shelling from a battery of the enemy about 600 or 800 yards on our right, which enfiladed our line. Fortunately, however, we suffered very little loss from that, having but 2 men slightly wounded. I moved the regiment forward about 100 yards, by your orders, toward a woods in our front, and ordered Lieutenant [F. W.] Lelew, with his company, to deploy forward as skirmishers into the woods and to engage the enemy, which were supposed to be there. Very soon I heard shots from our skirmishers. Your aide, Captain Beckham, at this time delivered me an order to move my regiment by the left flank and to connect my line with the Eleventh, occupying a corn-field, which order was obeyed, when Colonel Stuart's regiment (Fifty-sixth Virginia), of Pickett's brigade, joined my right. Immediately the brigade on our right became hotly engaged. We reserved our fire, no enemy appearing in our front. After the fire had continued about fifteen minutes, Colonel Stuart reported to me that the troops on his right had fallen back. I observed that they had abandoned the left of the Eleventh. I communicated my intention to Colonel Stuart and Major Clement, of the Eleventh, to fall back about 10 or 15 steps behind a fence, which was simultaneously done by the three regiments in good order. We held this position until long after dark, under a severe fire of musketry obliquely on our right flank and in front, until nearly every cartridge was exhausted.

Shortly after the enemy had ceased firing (about 7.30 p. m.), I received your order to withdraw my regiment, which was done in good order, and halted to rest on the Boonsborough and Fredericktown road, with the other regiments of your brigade.

In this engagement I was particularly struck with the determined courage of officers and men. They held their ground manfully against a largely superior number, as far as I could judge from the heavy fire of the enemy upon our right and front.

Those who deserve particular mention for distinguished gallantry and activity were Capt. J. T. Burke, of Company D; Lieut. Thomas Perry, of Company A; Lieutenant [S. S.] Turner, of Company B, and Lieutenants Athey and [F. B.] Littleton, of Company C; and Color-Corporals Murphy and W. Harper, of Company E, won my highest admiration for their cool bravery.

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

About 4 p. m. the enemy was reported to be advancing. We moved forward with the First and Eleventh Regiments (the Seventh and Twenty-fourth being detached to operate on some other part of the field) of the brigade to the top of the hill to a fence, and immediately engaged the enemy at a distance of 50 or 60 yards, at the same time under fire from their batteries on the hills beyond. My regiment, being the extreme right on the line there engaging the enemy, came directly opposite the colors of the regiment to which it was opposed, consequently being overlapped by them, as far as I could judge, at least 100 yards. Regardless of the great odds against them, the men courageously stood their ground until, overwhelmed by superior numbers, they were forced to retire.

I have to state here, general, that we put into the fight but 46 enlisted men and 9 officers. Out of this number, 7 officers and 24 men were killed and wounded and 10 taken prisoners.

It was here that Capt. J. T. Burke and Lieutenant Littleton fell—two of the bravest and most valuable officers of my command. Color-Corporal Harper also fell, fighting heroically, at his post. These brave men, I think, deserve particular mention.

I received a wound in the foot, which prevented me from retiring with our line, and was left in the hands of the enemy for a short time, but was soon rescued by General Toombs' brigade and a portion of yours, which drove the enemy back beyond the line we had occupied in the morning.

I saw Major Herbert come up with a portion of the men of the First, Eleventh, and Seventeenth Regiments of your brigade, on the left of General Toombs' line, cheering the men on with his accustomed cool and determined valor.

Lieut. W. W. Athey, Company C, captured a regimental color of the One hundred and third New York Regiment, presented to them by the city council of New York City, which I herewith forward to you.

My wound being painful, I rode to the surgeon to have it examined, leaving the command to Major Herbert.

No. 242.

Reports of Col. Joseph Walker, Palmetto Sharpshooters, commanding Jenkins' brigade, of operations September 14-19.

HEADQUARTERS JENKINS' BRIGADE,
Camp near Winchester, Va., October 24, 1862.

SIR: The division of General D. R. Jones, having, by a forced march from Hagerstown, reached Boonsborough, Md., near the South Mountain, about 4 o'clock Sunday evening, September 14, was immediately thrown forward to the support of the troops engaged with the enemy on the

mountain. Passing through Boonsborough and crossing a branch, this brigade, in conjunction with General Garnett's, marched by the right flank to a church some mile and a half to the right and south of the turnpike, and then filed off to the left about 1 mile to the foot of the mountain. About the time we reached that position, the firing having pretty well ceased, the two brigades about-faced, marched back within a half mile of the turnpike, and filed off to the right and formed in line of battle midway up the mountain, with General Garnett's brigade on my left. Having thrown out skirmishers preparatory to an advance, I was ordered by General Jones to move the brigade along the mountain to the White House Hotel, on the turnpike at the summit of the pass. Upon reaching the hotel, I posted the brigade a little in advance of it and to the left of the turnpike. Some ten minutes afterward, by order of General Jones, I moved the brigade farther up the mountain and obliquely to the right, in the direction of Middleburg [Middletown], and formed it into line of battle at the foot of the hill, where a fierce fight was raging. The First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers (Lieut. Col. D. Livingston), the Sixth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers (Lieut. Col. J. M. Steedman), and the Fifth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers (Capt. T. C. Beckham, commanding), were advanced some 200 yards to the front behind a stone fence, where they engaged in a desultory fire with the enemy until dark, when the brigade was withdrawn to the hotel. Ordered by General Jones to cover the withdrawal of the troops from this portion of the field, I advanced the Second Rifle Regiment South Carolina Volunteers some distance down the turnpike toward Middleburg [Middletown], and threw out a heavy force of skirmishers. This position was held by the brigade until about 4 a. m. September 15, when it was relieved by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, and rejoined the command of General Jones at Sharpsburg.

In this action the loss of the brigade was as follows :

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.
Palmetto Sharpshooters	2
1st Regiment South Carolina Volunteers	1	15
2d Regiment Rifles South Carolina Volunteers	1
5th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers	6
6th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers	2	5
4th Battalion
Total	3	29

Although but partially engaged, I commend the conduct of the officers and privates of the brigade, with but one exception, which is as mortifying to the feelings of a Carolinian as it is unworthy of the flag they bear and the cause which they represent. Lieutenant-Colonel Livingston, of the First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, reports that Company A did not enter the fight, shamefully deserting the regiment while marching through the gap. Why charges have not been preferred against officers and privates for cowardice has not been explained.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH WALKER,
Colonel, Commanding Jenkins' Brigade.

Col. ROBT. JOHNSTON.

HEADQUARTERS JENKINS' BRIGADE,
Camp near Winchester, Va., October 24, 1862.

SIR: By a rapid march from Boonsborough, this brigade reached Sharpsburg, Md., about 11 a. m. on September 15, and took position in line of battle on an eminence in front of the town and to the right of the turnpike. By order of General Jones, it moved late in the evening across a ravine to the right, with Kemper's, Garnett's, and Drayton's brigades, where it remained under a heavy fire of shot and shell until 3 o'clock in the evening of the 17th, when it moved back, by order of General Jones, and occupied its first position in support of [G. V.] Moody's battery and a company of the Washington Artillery (Captain [C. W.] Squires'), both from Louisiana. Here the brigade endured a terrific fire of shot and shell for some half hour, when, the ammunition of the artillery having been exhausted, it advanced some 400 yards to an apple orchard, under a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms. Perceiving the enemy in force in several positions, from any of which we were assailable, I threw out the First, Fifth, and Sixth Regiments South Carolina Volunteers to oppose him on the left, and the Palmetto Sharpshooters and the Second Regiment Rifles South Carolina Volunteers to meet him in the center and on the right. From this position we continued to pour a destructive fire into the ranks of the enemy, at short range, until he recoiled and retreated out of sight among the timber on Antietam Creek.

At this juncture, perceiving that the enemy had advanced three heavy columns some 400 yards in rear of the brigade and to the right across a ravine leading up from the creek, and was steadily driving back the brigades of Generals Kemper and Drayton, I moved this brigade into line parallel with the turnpike and ravine and near to the latter, and opened a destructive enfilade fire upon the enemy, which assisted materially in driving back his columns. Changing the front of the brigade again toward Antietam Creek, and at right angles to the turnpike and ravine, I threw forward a line of skirmishers to a fence near to the timber on the creek, and bivouacked for the night. This position the brigade, alone and unsupported, held during the 18th, burying the dead and caring for the wounded, the skirmishers the meanwhile keeping up a brisk fire upon the enemy.

Just after dark on the 18th I received orders from General D. R. Jones to cover the retreat of his division. Strengthening my line of pickets, and extending it farther to the right and left, I held the position until nearly daylight on the morning of September 19, when I was relieved by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, and withdrew the brigade across the Potomac, effecting the passage a little after sunrise, in perfect safety.

The loss of the brigade in killed and wounded was heavy, in view of the number carried into action, and was as follows:

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.
Palmetto Sharpshooters	8	57
1st Regiment South Carolina Volunteers	4	36
2d Regiment Rifles South Carolina Volunteers	4	17
5th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers	6	27
6th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers	4	47
4th Battalion South Carolina Volunteers		
Total	26	184

In this action Captains [J. E.] Lee and [N. W.] Harbin, of the Palmetto Sharpshooters, were killed. They were brave and promising officers. Lieutenant-Colonel Livingston, of the First Regiment; Captain [E. B.] Cantey, commanding Sixth Regiment; Lieutenant [J. C.] McFadden, of the Sixth, and Lieuts. W. N. Major and H. H. Thomson, of the Palmetto Sharpshooters, were seriously wounded.

I commend to your favorable notice Captains Squires and Moody, who handled their guns with a skill, daring, and endurance seldom equaled and never surpassed.

The officers and men of the several regiments are worthy of the highest praise for their coolness and daring in battle and their patient endurance of hunger and fatigue. I regret, however, to be called upon again to refer to the conduct of a large portion of the officers and privates of the First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers in this battle in terms of censure. The commanding officer reports that the regiment entered the fight with 106 men, rank and file, lost 40 men killed and wounded, and at the close of the day but 15 enlisted men and 1 commissioned officer answered to their names. Such officers are a disgrace to the service and unworthy to wear a sword, for I must believe that their desertions of their companies alone induced such conduct upon the part of their privates. If such conduct is not checked by exemplary punishment the efficiency of the regiment will be destroyed.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH WALKER,

Colonel, Commanding Jenkins' Brigade.

Col. ROBT. JOHNSTON.

No. 243.

Report of Col. George T. Anderson, Eleventh Georgia Infantry, commanding brigade, of operations September 2-17.

HQRS. ANDERSON'S BRIGADE, D. R. JONES' DIVISION,
September 30, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to forward a report of the action of my brigade in the affairs at Rappahannock, August 23; Thoroughfare Gap, August 28; Manassas, August 30; Turner's Gap, Md., September 14; and Sharpsburg, September 17, with the lists of casualties in each engagement:*

* * * * *

In the engagement at Turner's Gap, near Boonsborough, Md., my brigade, in conjunction with General Drayton's, was ordered forward to report to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill. I found General Hill at the Mountain House, and he conducted us in person to the right of our line, and, after giving the necessary orders, left for other parts of the field. Brigadier-General Ripley, the next senior officer, was then left in command of the four brigades, viz, Brig. Gen. G. B. Anderson's, his own, my brigade, and General Drayton's, in line from right to left as enumerated. Before Drayton had formed his line, General Ripley ordered the whole line to move by the right flank, and about this time the enemy opened a heavy fire on Drayton. I had, by moving to the right under General Ripley's order, become separated at least 300 yards from General Drayton's right, when General R[ipley] came by and ordered me to move by the

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 593-595. The lists of casualties for September 14 and 17 are embodied in No. 205.

left flank into the wood, which I did. My skirmishers (the right wing of the Georgia Regulars, Captain [R. A.] Wayne commanding), not having the command to change direction, had continued moving by the flank, and uncovered my front. Having moved some distance over the mountain side, I halted, and sent forward to find Captain Wayne, but could not for the reason above given, and, finding that the fire of the enemy was more to my left than front, I changed front forward on the left, and had the left wing of the Georgia Regulars, under direction of Colonel [William J.] Magill, deployed as skirmishers; and as I was in the act of advancing to find the enemy, Lieutenant Shellman, adjutant Eighth Georgia Regiment, reported the enemy as having turned Drayton's right flank, and being on our left and rear. A few of them were taken prisoners, and several of Drayton's men, who had been captured, released. To prevent the enemy from cutting off my small brigade, being at the time alone (General Ripley's brigade, on my right, being several hundred yards away, as I found by sending Captain [J. G.] Montgomery, First Georgia Regulars, to report for orders, who reported him at least one-quarter of a mile from my right, after a long search), I ordered my brigade to move by the left flank and recross the road, in our original rear, and there reformed my line of battle, and was advancing to find the right of Drayton's brigade when Captain [H. D. D.] Twiggs and Lieutenant [G. B.] Lamar [jr.], First Georgia Regulars, in charge of skirmishers, called my attention to the fact that the enemy were crossing the road in considerable force on my left flank. Seeing this myself, and to prevent my left from being turned, I moved by the left diagonally to the rear to intercept them, and at this time found General Hood's two brigades coming up to support that part of the line. He engaged the enemy and drove him back. Not knowing where to find General Ripley or General Drayton, I reported to General Hood for instructions, and was requested by him to hold my position to protect his left flank, and remained there until drawn off the field after night. In consequence of being separated from Drayton's right by the order of General Ripley, and having to recross the road to avoid being surrounded, my men were not engaged in the fight, except the first line of skirmishers, under Captain Wayne. For casualties see accompanying lists.*

Falling back from this place, I was ordered to report to Brigadier-General Hood, commanding the rear guard, and remained with him until our arrival at Sharpsburg. I was ordered into position in rear of the Washington Artillery, and remained there—except about three hours, being moved to the opposite side of the road for that length of time—until the morning of the 17th.

About 7.30 a. m., the 17th, I was ordered to the left to support General Hood. Without a guide or directions how to find him, I moved off, and directed my course by the sound of the musketry, and succeeded in finding General Hood, who pointed out the position he wished me to occupy. I remained in this position but a few moments (other troops he moved in front of me), and moved by the left flank some 200 yards, and engaged the enemy and drove them for about half a mile, my men and officers behaving in the most gallant manner. By this time the enemy had disappeared from before us, and while I was at a different part of the line some mounted officer (unknown) reported the enemy turning our right flank, and ordered the men to fall back, and some confusion was created, but I soon reformed the line and moved to the right,

near the first position I had held. From this point I was ordered to the Hagerstown road by a staff officer of General Longstreet, and moved to that place, taking position behind the stone fence—a large number of the enemy in front of us in a corn-field. In a short time the enemy opened an enfilade fire on my position with long-range artillery, and I was forced to change, moving down the road toward Sharpsburg under the crest of the hill. At this point I found a 6-pounder gun, and, getting a few men to assist in placing it in position, a lieutenant of infantry, whose name or regiment I do not know, served it most beautifully until the ammunition was exhausted. Parts of several brigades by this time had been collected at this point, and, by direction of General D. H. Hill, were formed in line perpendicularly to and on the right of the road near the position occupied by Rodes' brigade early in the morning. This was about 2 or 3 p. m. Placing me in command, General Hill ordered me to occupy the crest of a hill to my right and rear. I moved to the position and sent forward skirmishers, but failed to find the enemy; and the enemy opening a cross-fire of artillery from the left on us, I moved back to the other position, which was approved by General Hill, who, riding forward to the crest of the hill in our front, called my attention to a line of the enemy advancing apparently to attack us. Suffering them to come near us, I ordered my command to charge them, which they did in splendid style and good order, killing and wounding many of the enemy, taking several prisoners, and routing the remainder. We could not pursue them as far as I wished, because of the severe fire of artillery directed against us from long-range guns that we could not reach.

In this charge parts of Wilcox's, Featherston's, and Pryor's brigades participated with mine, and I am proud to say all officers and men behaved admirably.

The Eleventh Georgia Regiment, Major Little commanding, had been detached at Hagerstown on the 14th by order of Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones, commanding division, and did not join me until the 18th. Major Little, with five companies, reached Sharpsburg the morning of the 17th, and participated in the fight on our right, under command of Brigadier-General Toombs. General D. R. Jones speaks in high terms of their good conduct. I forward Major Little's report, leaving it to the officers under whose command he fought to do him and his men justice.

The battery attached to my brigade (the Wise Artillery, Capt. J. S. Brown commanding) was not with me, nor have I received any report from it. Captain Brown was severely wounded by a musket-ball passing entirely through his foot.

I can but say that in each of these engagements all the officers and men, with a few exceptions, of the brigade have behaved in the most gallant manner, nearly the whole of each action being conducted under my own eye.

I know of no particular cases of individual bravery, and can make no discriminations where all did so well, it appearing to be the determination of every one to do his whole duty, as the lists of casualties accompanying this report will testify, showing a loss of 894 killed, wounded, and missing out of about 2,200 with which I reached Gordonsville.

I must express my many obligations to Lieut. H. D. McDaniel, Eleventh Georgia Regiment, acting assistant adjutant-general during the sickness of Lieutenant Hardwick, for his universal good conduct and gallantry. He was relieved by Lieutenant H[ardwick] on August 28, Lieutenant McD[aniel] having been appointed assistant quartermaster to his regiment. Lieutenant Hardwick being wounded August 30 at

Chinn's house, Lieutenant Blackwell, Eighth Georgia Regiment, has filled the position of acting assistant adjutant-general very much to my satisfaction, and I have found him at all times prompt and faithful in the discharge of his duties.

I am also under many obligations to Capt. Thomas G. Jackson, volunteer aide and acting ordnance officer of the brigade, for his good conduct and ability in the discharge of his duties; and also to Capt. Fred. West, volunteer aide, who has been with me since the affair at Thoroughfare Gap, and has nobly and faithfully done his duty.

Many thanks are due to Captain [R. K.] Holliday, assistant quartermaster of the Seventh Georgia Regiment, for invaluable services rendered on the banks of the Rappahannock in the capacity as volunteer aide.

I must also express my obligations to Lieutenant Tennille, Ninth Georgia Regiment, who aided me and bore himself gallantly under the murderous fire at Manassas, after Lieutenant Hardwick, acting assistant adjutant-general, was wounded.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. T. ANDERSON,

Colonel Eleventh Georgia Volunteers, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. A. COWARD,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 244.

Report of Maj. F. H. Little, Eleventh Georgia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 7, 1862.

SIR: In relation to the part taken by my regiment in the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, I have the honor to report as follows, to wit:

On the night of September 16, I received at Shepherdstown an order from Major-General Longstreet, requiring me to join immediately my brigade with my regiment, the left wing of my regiment being at that time at Martinsburg, having been detailed as a guard for General D. H. Hill's commissary train, under command of Capt. John W. Stokes, senior captain of said wing. Having received a note from Captain Stokes to the effect that he had seen General Longstreet's order, I remained at Shepherdstown, on the bank of the Potomac, hourly expecting him to arrive. At 8 o'clock, Captain Stokes failing to arrive, and, as I have since learned, having been detained by order of provost marshal at Martinsburg, I crossed the river with the right wing, and proceeded with all possible expedition to Sharpsburg, in quest of the brigade to which my regiment belonged. On arriving at Sharpsburg, I was met by Captain Latrobe, aide to General Jones, commander of the division to which my brigade belonged, and received orders from him to move out to the right, stating that he would soon meet me and guide me to the position it was desired for me to occupy. Shortly after this, Major Coward, also one of General Jones' aides, conducted me to a strong position behind a stone fence, immediately on the right of the position occupied by a portion of General Toombs' brigade. Here I was placed under the com-

mand of General Toombs. Skirmishers were sent out, and brisk firing soon commenced on our right. Our skirmishers were run in; the enemy's skirmishers advanced to within about 125 yards of us; a full line of battle was drawn up in their rear. We quietly awaited their advance, but the efforts of their officers to move them forward were unavailing. We did not fire upon them until they began to fall back, and then a portion of the men fired with great coolness and precision, evidently doing execution. About 4 o'clock we were relieved by troops from General A. P. Hill's division, and moved, under command of General Toombs, back in the direction of Sharpsburg, my regiment being in front. Heavy firing was heard just ahead of us, and very soon we were met by one of General Toombs' aides, urging us forward. We moved up in double-quick, fronted the enemy, who were moving forward in handsome style without opposition, our opposing troops having retired. Our arrival was just in time to save one of our batteries, name not known. We immediately opened upon them a well-directed fire, which the enemy stoutly resisted for awhile, but soon broke and fled. General Toombs immediately gave the order to charge, which the men, with loud and long-continued cheers, as promptly obeyed, continuing the chase until ordered by General Toombs to halt.

I carried into this action about 140 men; had 10 wounded, none killed. The action closed a little after nightfall, when, by order of General Toombs, we were removed from the field for the night. The next morning there was brisk picket firing, but the enemy refused to renew the contest.

In this action both officers and men under my command acted with the most commendable courage and coolness, inflicting severe injury upon the enemy.

Respectfully submitted.

F. H. LITTLE,

Major, Commanding Eleventh Regiment Georgia Volunteers.

Col. GEORGE T. ANDERSON,
Commanding Third Brigade.

No. 245.

Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Walker, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations September 9-19.

HEADQUARTERS WALKER'S DIVISION,
Camp near Winchester, Va., October 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the division under my command in the reduction of Harper's Ferry:

On September 9 I was instructed by General Lee to proceed from Monocacy Junction, near Frederick, Md., to the mouth of the Monocacy, and destroy the aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. We arrived at the aqueduct about 11 p. m., and found it occupied by the enemy's pickets, whose fire, as they fled, severely wounded Captain [G. T.] Duffy, of the Twenty-fourth North Carolina Troops, of Brigadier-General Ransom's brigade. Working parties were at once detailed, and set to work to drill holes for blowing up the arches, but, after several hours of labor, it was apparent that, owing to the insufficiency of our tools and the extraordinary solidity and massiveness of the masonry, the work we had

undertaken was one of days instead of hours. The movement of our main army from Frederick toward Hagerstown, which I had been officially informed would take place on the 10th, would leave my small division in the immediate presence of a very strong force of the enemy, and, while it would be engaged in destroying the aqueduct, in a most exposed and dangerous position. I therefore determined to rejoin General Lee by way of Jefferson and Middletown, as previously instructed by him. Before marching, however, I received instructions to cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford and proceed toward Harper's Ferry, and co-operate with Major-Generals Jackson and McLaws in the capture of the Federal forces at that point.

Early on the morning of the 10th the aqueduct over the Monocacy was occupied by a large force of the enemy, with their artillery commanding the aqueduct and its approaches, as well as Cheek's Ford. I then determined to cross at the Point of Rocks, which I effected during the night of the 10th and by daylight on the 11th, but with much difficulty, owing to the destruction of the bridge over the canal and the steepness of the banks of the Potomac. My men being much worn down by two days' and nights' marching, almost without sleep or rest, we remained in camp during the 11th, and proceeded the next day toward Harper's Ferry, encamping at Hillsborough.

On the morning of the 13th we reached the foot of the Blue Ridge, opposite the Loudoun Heights, which I was instructed to occupy. From such reconnoissance as could be made from below, it seemed certain that Loudoun Heights were unoccupied by the enemy. To ascertain if such was the case, I detached Col. John R. Cooke, with his regiment (the Twenty-seventh North Carolina), and the Thirtieth Virginia Volunteers, who took possession of the heights without opposition and held them during the night.

In the mean time the enemy was being attacked on the Maryland Heights by the forces under Major-General McLaws, and in the afternoon it became apparent that our forces had possession of the summit, which commands Harper's Ferry as well as Loudoun Heights.

That night and the next, the entire division, except that portion of it occupying Loudoun Heights, was placed in a strong position to prevent the escape of the enemy down the right bank of the Potomac.

At daylight on the 14th, I sent Captain French, with three Parrott guns and two rifle pieces of [J. R.] Branch's battery, under Lieutenant [M. A.] Martin, to Loudoun Heights, where I immediately proceeded and placed them in position. I informed Major-General Jackson of this, by signal, and awaited his instructions. In the mean time we had attracted the notice of the enemy, who opened their batteries upon us, and it became necessary either to reply or withdraw our pieces. About 1 p. m. I therefore gave orders to open fire upon the enemy's batteries and the troops upon Bolivar Heights, beyond Harper's Ferry. Our guns were served admirably and with great rapidity, and in two hours we had silenced an eight-gun battery near the Barbour House, except one gun, which was so close under the mountain that we could not see it. What other effect our fire had we could not tell, but it evidently produced great consternation and commotion among the enemy's troops, especially the cavalry.

During the engagement, one of the enemy's caissons was blown up by a well-directed shot from French's battery. On our side, we lost Lieutenant [Patton] Robertson, of French's battery, killed; Major [F. L.] Wiatt, Forty-eighth North Carolina Troops, and two privates, of French's battery, wounded. Our guns and horses sustained no injury.

Owing to a heavy mist, which concealed Harper's Ferry from view, we did not open our fire until after 8 o'clock in the morning of the 15th, the enemy replying very feebly at first, and, finally, about 9 o'clock, ceased firing altogether.

About 9.30 o'clock we observed a white flag displayed from a large brick building in the upper town, when our batteries immediately ceased their fire, although I was not satisfied that it indicated a capitulation. It soon became apparent that such was the case, and after a short time we had the extreme satisfaction to see the head of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's column approaching the town along the Charlestown turnpike.

My division that evening crossed the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah River, and by daylight on the 16th reached Shepherdstown, and early in the day crossed the Potomac and reported to General Lee near Sharpsburg, Md.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. WALKER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Maj. E. F. PAXTON,

Asst. Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Jackson's Corps, Army of N. Va.

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HEADQUARTERS WALKER'S DIVISION,
Camp near Winchester, Va., October 14, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part borne by the division under my command in the battle of Sharpsburg, Md., September 17, last:

The division, composed of Ransom's and Walker's brigades (the latter commanded by Col. Van H. Manning, to which was attached French's and Branch's light batteries), after participating in the capture of the Federal forces at Harper's Ferry, crossed the Blue Ridge, the Shenandoah, and the Potomac, the latter at Shepherdstown, and reached the neighborhood of Sharpsburg, Md., on the 16th ultimo, where I reported to General Lee.

In accordance with his instructions, at daylight the next morning I placed the division on the extreme right of our position and about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Sharpsburg, my line of battle extending from a wood on the right to a group of barns, stables, and outhouses on the left, in such way as to cover the ford over the Antietam Creek and to be within supporting distance of the command of Brigadier-General Toombs, which lay in front of the bridge across the same stream. My batteries were placed on commanding heights in such way as to command the roads leading from the east, while a battalion of sharpshooters was posted along the wooded banks of the Antietam, to hold the enemy in check should he attempt to cross the stream at that point. While we were in this position, the enemy made no attempt to cross the stream, and the only evidence of his being in our front was his artillery fire at long range and the reply of General Toombs' batteries, about half a mile to my left.

Soon after 9 a. m., I received orders from General Lee, through Colonel [A. L.] Long, of his staff, to hasten to the extreme left, to the support of Major-General Jackson. Hastening forward, as rapidly as possible, along the rear of our entire line of battle, we arrived, soon after 10 o'clock, near the woods which the commands of Generals Hood and Early were struggling heroically to hold but gradually and sullenly yielding to the irresistible weight of overwhelming numbers. Here we at once formed line of battle, under a sharp artillery fire, and, leaving the Twenty-seventh

North Carolina and Third Arkansas Regiments to hold the open space between the woods and Longstreet's left, the division, with Ransom's brigade on the left, advanced in splendid style, firing and cheering as they went, and in a few minutes cleared the woods, strewing it with the enemy's dead and wounded. Colonel Manning, with the Forty-sixth and Forty-eighth North Carolina and Thirtieth Virginia, not content with the possession of the woods, dashed forward in gallant style, crossed the open fields beyond, driving the enemy before him like sheep, until, arriving at a long line of strong post and rail fences, behind which heavy masses of the enemy's infantry were lying, their advance was checked; and it being impossible to climb over these fences under such a fire, these regiments, after suffering a heavy loss, were compelled to fall back to the woods, where the Forty-sixth and Forty-eighth North Carolina Regiments were quickly reformed, but the Thirtieth Virginia, owing to some unaccountable misunderstanding of orders, except Captain [John M.] Hudgin's company, went entirely off the field, and, as a regiment, was not again engaged during the day. Captain [W. A.] Smith, of my staff, and myself succeeded in gathering up portions of it, which, acting with the Forty-sixth North Carolina, afterward did good service.

Just before the falling back of these regiments, the gallant Colonel Manning was severely wounded and was compelled to leave the field, relinquishing the command of the brigade to the next in rank, Col. E. D. Hall, of the Forty-sixth North Carolina Regiment.

The Forty-eighth North Carolina Regiment, Col. R. C. Hill commanding, after reforming, was sent by me, with French's and Branch's light batteries, to re-enforce General Stuart, on the extreme left, who was specially charged by General Jackson with the task of turning the enemy's right.

The falling back of a portion of Manning's brigade enabled the enemy to temporarily reoccupy the point of woods near the position assigned to Colonel Cooke, commanding the Twenty-seventh North Carolina and the Third Arkansas Regiments, upon whom the enemy opened a galling fire of musketry, which was replied to with spirit; but the enemy having the cover of the woods while Colonel Cooke's command was on the open ground, this officer very properly drew them back to a corn-field and behind a rail fence, which gave them partial protection. From this position they kept up an effective fire upon the enemy, driving his artillerists from a battery they were attempting to get into position to bear upon Colonel Cooke's command. They afterward succeeded in getting off with their guns, but abandoned two caissons filled with rifle ammunition, from which Captain French that night replenished his exhausted limber-chests.

Early in the afternoon, Major-General Longstreet directed Colonel Cooke, with his own regiment (Twenty-seventh North Carolina) and the Third Arkansas, to charge the enemy, who was threatening his front, as if to pass through the opening between the point of timber held by Ransom's brigade and Longstreet's left. This order was promptly obeyed in the face of such a fire as troops have seldom encountered without running away, and with a steadiness and unflinching gallantry seldom equaled. Battery after battery, regiment after regiment opened their fire upon them, hurling a torrent of missiles through their ranks, but nothing could arrest their progress, and three times the enemy broke and fled before their impetuous charge. Finally they reached the fatal picket-fences before alluded to. To climb over them, in the face of such a force and under such a fire, would have been sheer madness to attempt,

and their ammunition being now almost exhausted, Colonel Cooke, very properly, gave the order to fall back, which was done in the most perfect order, after which the regiments took up their former position, which they continued to hold until night.

In the mean time Brigadier-General Ransom, whose brigade was farther on the left, having driven the enemy through and from the woods, with heavy loss, continued, with his own brigade and Colonel Hall's (Forty-sixth Regiment North Carolina), to hold it for the greater portion of the day, notwithstanding three determined infantry attacks, which each time were repulsed with great loss to the enemy, and against a most persistent and terrific artillery fire, by which the enemy hoped, doubtless, to drive us from our strong position—the very key of the battle-field. His hopes, however, were not realized. True to their duty, for eight hours our brave men lay upon the ground, taking advantage of such undulations and shallow ravines as gave promise of partial shelter, while this fearful storm raged a few feet above their heads, tearing the trees asunder, lopping off huge branches, and filling the air with shrieks and explosions, realizing to the fullest the fearful sublimity of battle.

During this time, in the temporary absence of General Ransom from his brigade to post the Twenty-fourth North Carolina, which had gone too much to the left and beyond Barksdale's brigade, the enemy made a furious attack, with heavy masses of infantry, upon the position occupied by General Ransom. Colonel Ransom, of the Thirty-fifth North Carolina, in temporary command of the brigade, not only repulsed the enemy but pursued him across the field as far as the post-and-rail fences, inflicting upon him so severe a punishment that no other attempt with infantry was made on the position during the day. While I was with General Ransom's command, about 4.30 o'clock in the afternoon, an order was brought from General Longstreet directing General Ransom to advance and capture the enemy's batteries in his front. Having been previously instructed by General Jackson to hold my position in the woods until General Stuart could turn the enemy's right and then to advance, I directed General Ransom to delay the execution of General Longstreet's order until I could see General Longstreet, in person, and confer with him on the subject. Upon my representations to him, he approved what I had done, and, while we were in conversation on the subject, General Jackson himself joined us, and informed us that General Stuart had made the attempt spoken of but found it impracticable, as the enemy's right was securely posted on the Potomac and protected by heavy batteries of his reserve artillery. It was then determined that the attempt to force the enemy's right with our fearfully thinned ranks and in the exhausted condition of our men was an effort above our strength.

Toward 5 o'clock in the afternoon, I was directed by General Longstreet to move Ransom's brigade toward the right to re-enforce our center, where the enemy were making demonstrations as if for an advance upon our position. No attack was, however, made, but the enemy's artillery continued to play upon the woods, upon our batteries, and upon every position along our line which they supposed to be occupied by our troops, our own batteries replying but slowly, for the want of ammunition. Gradually, as night approached, this fire died away, and darkness finally put an end to this long and bloody battle. My division rested until next morning where night overtook them and upon the line occupied by them during the day.

The conduct of the division was, generally, excellent, and, in some

instances, was brilliant in the extreme. I desire particularly to call attention to the admirable conduct of the Twenty-seventh North Carolina, commanded by Col. John R. Cooke, and the Third Arkansas Volunteers, commanded by its senior captain, John W. Reedy.

The coolness and good conduct of Col. Van H. Manning, commanding brigade, until wounded and carried from the field, is worthy of all praise. Colonel Hall, of the Forty-sixth North Carolina Troops, who, as next in rank, assumed command of the brigade, handled his regiment and the other portions of the brigade falling under his command with skill and judgment.

To Brigadier-General Ransom's coolness, judgment, and skill we are in a great degree indebted for the successful maintenance of our position on the left, which, to have been permanently gained by the enemy, would, in all probability, have been to us the loss of the battle.

General Ransom speaks in high terms of the conduct of Colonel Ransom, of the Thirty-fifth North Carolina; of Lieutenant-Colonel [S. C.] Bryson, of the Twenty-fifth, and Adjutant [O. D.] Cooke, of the Twenty-fourth North Carolina Regiments, and as having particularly distinguished themselves.

The light batteries of Captains French and Branch, the latter under the command of Lieut. R. G. Pegram, at different times during the day were engaged with the enemy and did good service—especially French's, posted on the extreme left, and under the immediate orders of General Stuart.

Capt. William A. Smith, my assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. J. A. Galt, aide-de-camp, were with me upon the field, and rendered me valuable assistance in transmitting orders.

The division suffered heavily, particularly Manning's command (Walker's brigade), which at one time sustained almost the whole fire of the enemy's right wing. Going into the engagement, as it was necessary for us to do, to support the sorely pressed divisions of Hood and Early, it was, of course, impossible to make dispositions based upon a careful reconnaissance of the localities. The post-and-rail fences stretching across the fields lying between us and the enemy's position, I regard as the fatal obstacle to our complete success on the left, and success there would, doubtless, have changed the fate of the day. Of the existence of this obstacle none of my division had any previous knowledge, and we learned it at the expense of many valuable lives.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. WALKER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Right Wing, Army Northern Virginia.

No. 246.

Report of Col. E. D. Hall, Forty-sixth North Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS WALKER'S BRIGADE,

October 3, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to submit a statement of the part that the Forty-sixth Regiment North Carolina Troops was called upon

to perform in the late engagement at Sharpsburg, Md., on September 17, last :

Early on the morning of the 17th, the regiment, together with the rest of the brigade, was placed in position on the extreme right, from which position it was moved, about 9 o'clock, to re-enforce the center, which was evidently hard pressed, the enemy gaining ground. I formed in line of battle, under the direction of Colonel Manning, commanding brigade, who placed the regiment on the left of the brigade. We advanced through a corn-field into a heavy piece of woods, where the engagement was raging furiously, the men going into the contest in the best of spirits. Simultaneously with our entrance into the woods, the enemy commenced falling back in disorder, and we passed through the woods without seeing them. On arriving at the farther edge of the woods, I found the enemy in heavy force on an elevation, distant about 200 yards, with a battery of artillery in position on the crest of the hill. Between the enemy and the woods were two heavy panel fences, running obliquely. In face of such difficulties I thought it inexpedient to charge farther. I therefore placed my regiment behind a breastwork of rails, which I found just beyond the woods, in short range of the enemy, and commenced firing, my men being well protected. A short time after I had commenced firing, Colonel Manning approached and informed me that he was seriously wounded and would be compelled to retire from the field, and, being next in rank to himself, the command of the brigade would fall upon me.

Being so far on the left, I had lost sight of the other regiments in the brigade, except the Thirtieth Virginia and a portion of the Forty-eighth North Carolina, who, in attempting to charge over the fences and up the ascent, found themselves so massed up that they were compelled to lie down in the face of the enemy and under a withering fire. In this position they suffered severely, and in a short time were compelled to retire. Owing to the nature of the ground, their maneuvers were accompanied by some disorder. I saw no more of these regiments during the day. All things considered, that portion of the Forty-eighth Regiment and the Thirtieth Virginia behaved as well as any troops could who were in such an exposed and fatal position.

The Twenty-seventh North Carolina and the Third Arkansas were so far to my right that I saw nothing of them during the day, but was informed by officers of other commands that their conduct (under Colonel Cooke, of the Twenty-seventh) was beyond all praise. I saw nothing of those regiments until the battle was over. One company from the Thirtieth Virginia and one from the Third Arkansas, which had been left on picket duty on the right, connected themselves with my regiment and throughout the day behaved handsomely.

The falling back of the Forty-eighth North Carolina and Thirtieth Virginia, on the immediate right of the Forty-sixth North Carolina, left a wide gap open, which the enemy began at once to take advantage of in order to re-enter the woods, though a galling fire was kept up by that regiment on their advancing line until I deemed it unsafe for that one regiment, unsupported, to remain in position while the enemy was massing upon its right and rear. The Forty-sixth, therefore, fell back, by my instruction, in good order and without the loss of a single straggler. I carried them out of the woods, and was met by General Jackson, who ordered me to report to General McLaws. General McLaws ordered me to endeavor to hold the woods at all hazards. I then advanced in line of battle to the edge of the woods, which by that time was filled with the enemy, and placed the regiment behind a ledge of rocks, throw-

ing out Company A and the company from the Thirtieth Virginia, as skirmishers. These were, shortly after, driven in. I then sent word to General McLaws that if he would protect my left I would charge the woods. A few minutes after, a brigade, which proved to be General Barksdale's, passed on to my left. As soon as it entered the woods, I moved forward and came upon the right of General Ransom's brigade, which had been engaged and had succeeded in driving the enemy from the woods. Having only my own regiment with me, I informed General R[ansom] that I would connect myself with his command, to which he readily consented. We then took up our position in line of battle, as much protected as the nature of the ground would allow, and remained all day and night, the enemy evincing no desire to contest the woods with us, but satisfied himself with opening on us a very heavy fire of artillery, hoping by that means to drive us out. Although our loss by this fire was considerable, we held the position until the cessation of the battle.

From what I saw of the brigade and what I know of the Forty-sixth Regiment and the two companies before mentioned, which were connected with it, I am sure their conduct will meet the approbation of the general commanding. From the comparative security afforded by the rail breastwork, the losses of the Forty-sixth were not [as great] as they would otherwise have been.

The conduct of the officers and men of the Forty-sixth was all that I could desire; and I must take the liberty of mentioning with commendation the conduct of Captain [H. R.] McKinney, of Company A; he behaved with great gallantry. Adjutant [R.] Mallett also performed his duties with great ability.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. HALL,

Colonel, Commanding Walker's Brigade.

Capt. W. A. SMITH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 247.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom, jr., U. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS RANSOM'S BRIGADE,
Camp near Martinsburg, W. Va., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part performed by my brigade in the battle near Sharpsburg, Md., on the 17th instant:

The regiments present were the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-fifth, and Forty-ninth North Carolina troops, commanded, respectively, by Lieutenant-Colonel [John L.] Harris, Colonel [H. M.] Rutledge, Colonel [M. W.] Ransom, and Lieutenant-Colonel [L. M.] McAfee. The strength present was about 1,600 aggregate.

About 3 o'clock in the morning of the 17th instant, the brigade, followed by the other of the division, was moved to the extreme right of the position occupied by our troops and posted upon some hills which commanded an open country. Here it remained in line until about 9 a. m., when an order from General Lee directed the division to the left, where the enemy was pressing back our forces. From the first position the

brigade moved, left in front, until we had passed the town of Sharpsburg some half mile to the north, when it was formed into line by inversion, bringing the Forty-ninth on the right. The line was formed under a severe fire and in the presence of some of our troops who had been driven back. As soon as formed, the whole brigade was pushed rapidly forward, and, after passing some 200 yards, I received orders to form to the right and resist the enemy, who were in possession of a piece of woods. The change of direction was effected with three of the regiments—the Forty-ninth, Twenty-fifth, and Thirty-fifth—but the Twenty-fourth, on the extreme left, had come upon the enemy and opened fire, and continued in the first direction upon the left of General Barksdale's brigade. Upon reaching the woods, we met parts of Hood's and Early's commands leaving them, and immediately encountered the enemy in strong force, flushed with a temporary success. A tremendous fire was poured into them, and, without a halt, the woods was cleared and the crest next the enemy occupied. At this time I determined to charge across a field in our front and to a woods beyond, which was held by the enemy, but he again approached, in force, to within 100 yards, when he was met by the same crushing fire which had driven him first from the position. I now went to recall the Twenty-fourth, which had passed on, and which had been directed, as I afterward learned, by General Stuart, to occupy a position near the extreme left, but, finding that it was so far away, returned. During my absence, the enemy again attempted to force the position, after subjecting us to a fearful storm of iron missile for thirty minutes. Colonel Ransom, commanding during my absence, repulsed him signally, and put an end to any further attempt, by infantry, to dislodge us. Immediately after this, fire from two large batteries was opened upon us and continued with occasional intermissions until nightfall.

About noon, General Longstreet sent me word to take the battery in our front, and the order to advance was given, when General McLaws arrived and ordered me to postpone the attempt. Again, about 2 or 3 o'clock, I received instructions to advance and take the batteries. Just at this time the enemy was observed to have massed a strong force about the batteries, and General Walker, having arrived, forbade the movement until he could communicate with General Longstreet, in person. Shortly afterward, orders came to defer any attempt upon the enemy's position until General Jackson should have attacked him upon his right flank. This was not accomplished by General J[ackson], and the effort to capture the two large batteries, which had almost incessantly played upon us for eight hours, was not made.

I cannot too highly compliment the action of the men and officers for their gallant behavior during the entire day. They formed, under a galling fire, and, in presence of our retiring troops, pressed forward and drove back a far superior force, and, three times afterward, repulsed determined attacks of the enemy and in largely superior numbers to our own; but the highest credit is due for the perfect staunchness exhibited during an eight hours' exposure to an unparalleled cannonade and within canister range.

I will not close my report without bringing to the notice of the commanding general the conspicuous conduct of Colonel Ransom, of which the general can learn more by inquiry of Colonels Hall and Jenkins, Forty-sixth North Carolina. Major [J. A.] Flemming, too, of the Forty-ninth, evinced a cool daring and soldierly presence of mind eminently praiseworthy. Lieutenant and Adjutant Cooke, of the Twenty-fourth, was foremost in leading his regiment while under my eye, and I have had frequent occasions to observe qualities which mark him as second to

none in courage and capacity. Lieutenant-Colonel Bryson, of the Twenty-fifth, was cool and gallant. I cannot further particularize.

To the members of my staff I owe much for their prompt and untiring assistance—Captain [Thomas] Rowland, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant [W. E.] Brodnax, aide-de-camp; Mr. Mason, volunteer aide, and Lieutenants Ashe and Thorne, the last my ordnance officer, who were ever in the right place. My orderlies (Privates Pierson and DeVane, of the Twenty-fourth) acted with unwonted intelligence and gallantry throughout the day in bearing messages under the hottest fire. The latter had his horse shot.

Though not a part of my brigade, I cannot properly close my report without mentioning the Forty-sixth North Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Hall commanding. About midday he reported to me, with his regiment, and was at once ordered into position on my right, which was unflinchingly maintained throughout. The conduct of the regiment was all it should have been, and the bearing of Colonel Hall and Lieutenant-Colonel [W. A.] Jenkins reflects the highest credit upon themselves and the service.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

R. RANSOM, JR.,
Brigadier-General.

Capt. W. A. SMITH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS RANSOM'S BRIGADE,
Camp near Martinsburg, September 25, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to recommend that Lloyd's battery (North Carolina) be disbanded, and for the following reasons: Upon leaving Petersburg the battery was assigned to duty with my brigade. It consisted of two smooth-bore 6-pounders and two 12-pounder howitzers. Although it started with the wagon-train from Richmond, it did not overtake the command for a week after the train had arrived, and was then in so unserviceable a condition as to be left at Leesburg. It, however, did get across the Potomac into Maryland, but did not fire a gun and was not exposed to fire, but succeeded in losing one gun and two caissons.

Branch's battery is now attached to my brigade, and needs some 40 horses. I earnestly recommend that the men and horses of Lieutenant Lloyd's battery be transferred to Branch's and French's batteries. The service will be benefited, and a considerable expense saved.

I have taken the responsibility of ordering the battery to the rear, where it can get forage. Here it would be an incumbrance.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. RANSOM, JR.,
Brigadier-General.

Col. R. H. CHILTON.

[Indorsements.]

HEADQUARTERS WALKER'S DIVISION,
September 25, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded, with the recommendation that Lloyd's battery be disbanded and the horses be distributed amongst the other batteries of the division, which stand in much need of them.

J. G. WALKER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING,
September 26, 1862.

Respectfully referred to Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, for inspection of this battery, and report of same, with recommendation as to its disposition.

By command of Major-General Longstreet:

G. MOXLEY SORREL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 248.

Report of Brig. Gen. John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding division, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,
September 27, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this division, composed of two brigades—Fourth Alabama, Second and Eleventh Mississippi, and Sixth North Carolina, Col. E. M. Law commanding; my own brigade, First, Fourth, and Fifth Texas, Eighteenth Georgia, and Hampton Legion, and Reilly's, Bachman's, and Garden's batteries, Maj. B. W. Frobrel commanding—in the engagements at Freeman's Ford, on the Rappahannock River, August 22; plains of Manassas, August 29 and 30; Boonsborough Gap, Md., September 14, and Sharpsburg, Md., September 16 and 17.*

* * * * *

The next day [September 1], after burying the dead, the march was continued [from vicinity of Sudley Ford, Va.] to Sudley Ford, and from thence to Hagerstown, Md., via Frederick City, crossing the Potomac at White's Ford, near Leesburg.

On the morning of September 14, we marched back to Boonsborough Gap, a distance of some 13 miles. This division, arriving between 3 and 4 p. m., found the troops of General D. H. Hill engaged with a large force of the enemy. By direction of the general commanding, I took up my position immediately on the left of the pike. Soon, orders came to change over to the right, as our troops on that side were giving way to superior numbers. On the march to the right, I met General Drayton's brigade coming out, saying the enemy had succeeded in passing to their rear. I at once inclined more to the right over a very rugged country and succeeded in getting in a position to receive the enemy. I at once ordered the Texas Brigade, Col. W. T. Wofford commanding, and the Third Brigade, Col. E. M. Law commanding, to move forward with bayonets fixed, which they did with their usual gallantry, driving the enemy and regaining all of our lost ground, when night came on and further pursuit ceased. On this field, fell, mortally wounded, Lieut. Col. O. K. McLenore, of the Fourth Alabama, a most efficient, gallant, and valuable officer.

Soon after night, orders were received to withdraw and for this division to constitute the rear guard of the army. The march was accordingly taken up in the direction of Sharpsburg. Arriving on the heights across the Antietam River near the town, about 12 m. on the 15th instant, I was ordered to take position in line of battle on the right of the road leading to Boonsborough, but soon received orders to move to the

* Portions of report here omitted are printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 604-606.

extreme left, near Saint Mumma church*, on the Hagerstown pike, remaining in this position, under fire of the shells from the enemy, until nearly sunset on the evening of the 16th. The enemy, having crossed higher up the Antietam, made an attack upon the left flank of our line of battle, the troops of this division being the only forces, on our side, engaged. We succeeded in checking and driving back the enemy a short distance, when night came on, and soon the firing ceased. During the engagement, the brave and efficient Col. P. F. Liddell, Eleventh Mississippi, fell, mortally wounded. The officers and men of my command having been without food for three days, except a half ration of beef for one day, and green corn, General Lawton, with two brigades, was directed to take my position, to enable my men to cook.

On the morning of the 17th instant, about 3 o'clock, the firing commenced along the line occupied by General Lawton. At 6 o'clock I received notice from him that he would require all the assistance I could give him. A few minutes after, a member of his staff reported to me that he was wounded and wished me to come forward as soon as possible. Being in readiness, I at once marched out on the field in line of battle and soon became engaged with an immense force of the enemy, consisting of not less than two corps of their army. It was here that I witnessed the most terrible clash of arms, by far, that has occurred during the war. The two little giant brigades of this division wrestled with this mighty force, losing hundreds of their gallant officers and men but driving the enemy from his position and forcing him to abandon his guns on our left. The battle raged with the greatest fury until about 9 o'clock, the enemy being driven from 400 to 500 yards. Fighting, as we were, at right angles with the general line of battle, and General Ripley's brigade being the extreme left of General D. H. Hill's forces and continuing to hold their ground, caused the enemy to pour in a heavy fire upon the rear and right flank of Colonel Law's brigade, rendering it necessary to move the division to the left and rear into the woods near the Saint Mumma church, which we continued to hold until 10 a. m., when General McLaws arrived with his command, which was at once formed in line and moved forward, engaging the enemy. My command was marched to the rear, ammunition replenished, and returned at 12 m., taking position, by direction of the general commanding, in rear of the church, with orders to hold it. About 4 p. m., by order, the division moved to the right, near the center, and remained there until the night of the 18th instant, when orders were received to recross the Potomac.

I would respectfully state that in the morning about 4 a. m. I sent Major Blanton, aide-de-camp, to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill to know if he could furnish any troops to assist in holding the left of our position. He replied that he could not; and the major-general commanding is aware of the number of messages received from me asking for re-enforcements, which I felt were absolutely required after seeing the great strength of the enemy in my front, and I am thoroughly of the opinion had General McLaws arrived by 8.30 a. m. our victory on the left would have been as thorough, quick, and complete as upon the plains of Manassas on August 30.

During the engagement, Major [J. H.] Dingle, jr., of Hampton's Legion, gallantly bearing the colors of his regiment; Major [Matt.] Dale, First Texas, and Major [T. S.] Evans, Eleventh Mississippi, fell, while leading their brave comrades against ten times their numbers.

* This is known as Mumma's or the Dunker church. The ground on which it stands was donated by S. Mumma.

Colonel [J. M.] Stone, Lieutenant-Colonel [D. W.] Humphreys, and Major [J. A.] Blair, Second Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonel [S. F.] Butler, Eleventh Mississippi; Captain [L. H.] Scruggs, Fourth Alabama, and Major [R. F.] Webb, Sixth North Carolina, also received severe wounds.

Conspicuous were Colonels Law and Wofford, commanding brigades. Lieutenant-Colonel Gary, commanding Hampton's Legion; Lieut. Col. P. A. Work, commanding First Texas; Lieut. Col. B. F. Carter, commanding Fourth Texas; Captain Turner, commanding Fifth Texas, although not wounded, deserve great credit for their skillful management and coolness during the battle.

It is but justice to Col. J. C. G. Key, Fourth Texas, to state that he was present at the battles of Boonsborough Gap and Sharpsburg, although unable to take command of his regiment, in consequence of a severe wound received at the battle of Gaines' Farm, June 27.

During this engagement and that of the battle of Manassas, Reilly's, Bachman's, and Garden's batteries were admirably handled by the battery commanders; Maj. B. W. Frobel commanding, acting with great coolness and judgment upon the field.

Too much cannot be said of the members of my staff, the chief, Maj. W. H. Sellers, having his horse shot while ably directing the Texas brigade at the battle of Manassas during the time of my being sent for by the general commanding to receive additional orders. He has proven himself competent to command a brigade under all circumstances. This distinguished officer, together with my two aides (Maj. B. H. Blanton and Lieut. James Hamilton), had their horses shot during the battle of Sharpsburg while most gallantly pushing forward the troops and transmitting orders. Major Blanton, Lieutenant Hamilton, Lieut. Joseph Phillips, C. S. Army, of General Magruder's staff, and Capt. C. S. Mills, assistant quartermaster First Texas Regiment, rendered most invaluable service during the battle of Manassas in bringing forward and placing in position additional brigades upon the long to be remembered heights around the Chinn House.

Lieut. D. L. Sublett, acting division ordnance officer, was prompt in bringing forward ammunition, and otherwise efficiently performed the duties pertaining to his department.

All praise is due Dr. [John T.] Darby, chief surgeon of this division, for his untiring efforts and skillful manner in caring for the numerous wounded.

Dr. [E. J.] Roach, senior surgeon Texas Brigade, and Dr. [H. H.] Hubbard, senior surgeon Law's brigade, Dr. Breckinridge, and all other surgeons and assistant surgeons of this command, have my heartfelt thanks for their able services.

I would be wrong in not acknowledging the valuable services rendered during the several engagements, in transmitting orders, of the following couriers of this command: M. M. Templeman, T. W. C. Lake, J. P. Mahoney, James Malone, W. E. Duncan, J. A. Mann, W. J. Barbee, W. G. Jesse, J. I. Haggerty, and J. H. Drake.

For additional particulars, reference is made to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders, herewith respectfully submitted.

Below will be found a report of casualties.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
TEXAS BRIGADE.							
Freeman's Ford, August 22			1	9			10
Manassas Plains, August 29 and 30	5	70	33	507	1	12	628
Sharpsburg, Md., September 16 and 17	10	59	35	382	1	61	548
LAW'S BRIGADE.							
Manassas Plains, August 29 and 30	3	53	20	244			320
Boonsborough Gap, Md., September 14		3	2	9			14
Sharpsburg, Md., September 16 and 17	6	44	44	335		25	454
Total	24	229	135	1,486	2	98	1,974

No. 249.

Report of Maj. B. W. Frobel, C. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

OCTOBER 1, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders to report the participation of the batteries under my command in the recent engagements before Sharpsburg, I would respectfully submit the following:

After bringing up the rear on the march from Boonsborough, Captains Reilly's and Bachman's batteries were placed in position by Colonel Walton, about noon on Monday, September 15, on a hill to the right of the turnpike road and a short distance in front of Sharpsburg, Garden's battery being held in reserve, in case the enemy should attempt an advance by a bridge over the Antietam, still farther to the right. We held these positions on Monday night. On Tuesday a fierce cannonade was kept up between our batteries and those of the enemy, in which Captain Reilly was ordered by Colonel Walton to participate until his rifle ammunition was exhausted, but without any perceptible result. Bachman's battery was at the same time exposed to a heavy fire, but had orders not to reply. Tuesday night we occupied the same positions.

On Wednesday morning the battle was again renewed. Captain Reilly was sent to the rear to replenish, if possible, his exhausted ammunition. At 8 a. m. Captain Bachman, with a section of Napoleon guns, was ordered to proceed to the extreme left of our line and report to General Longstreet. Shortly after, he was placed in position in a corn-field and opened on the enemy, distance 150 yards. The position was exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, who occupied a wood not more than 50 yards off. In a few minutes the section lost 3 men wounded (2 mortally) and 6 horses killed. Finding that to continue longer would involve the loss of his guns, Captain Bachman withdrew to a hill near by, and reported the section disabled, on account of the loss of men and horses. I ordered him to retire for the purpose of repairing damages. In the mean time his rifle section was hotly engaged near the turnpike.

This section was in charge of Sergeant Schlemmermeyer, who fought his guns most gallantly and remained in position until all his ammunition was expended.

At 2 p. m. I received orders from Major-General Jones to prepare to hold the road leading from the bridge over the Antietam on our extreme right. A few minutes after, the enemy were reported advancing, the infantry near the bridge at the same time giving way. I immediately placed Garden's battery in position on the left of the road. The enemy had crossed the bridge and were advancing rapidly, under cover of a furious fire from all their batteries concentrated upon us, when Garden opened a most destructive fire upon them, and, assisted by a rifle section under Captain Squires, soon drove them back. Fearing they might yet turn us by passing still farther to the right, I directed Captain Garden to look well to the road and woods in front of him, while I proceeded to the right in search of General Jones. On arriving at the top of the hill on the right of the road, the enemy were seen advancing in strong force in that direction. By permission of General Jones, I placed Captain Brown's battery in position at this point. The enemy were distant about 400 yards when he opened a hot and well-directed fire upon them, breaking their ranks and driving them back to the cover of a hill from which they had just advanced. At this time, large bodies of the enemy (infantry and artillery) were moving on the opposite side of the river. When near the bridge they halted some ten or fifteen minutes. I immediately sent to Captain Reilly to come up, as the guns then in position were all short range and could not reach them or the bridge. Being without ammunition, only his howitzer section was available. I at once placed it in position. The enemy had, in the mean time, advanced some eight or ten guns across the river and placed them in front of us. Under fire of these, assisted by all their long-range batteries on the opposite bank, their line advanced. Their sharpshooters, at the same time, opened a hot fire on us from a corn-field on our right, a stone fence in front, and a wood and orchard near by. Our batteries immediately replied, and continued their fire until the line was broken and the enemy recoiled. At this time they were distant less than 100 yards. Our ammunition was exhausted. One of Captain Garden's guns was dismounted, the carriage being entirely destroyed; another, rendered utterly useless by the bursting of a shell, while from one of Captain Reilly's pieces all the horses had been killed. But three guns remained fit for service, and they were without ammunition. Having run the pieces to the rear by hand and secured our disabled guns (the enemy all the time advancing and firing upon us), I ordered the batteries to retire. In passing to the turnpike, Lieutenant Ramsay, in command of the rifle section of Captain Reilly's battery, came up to our support. At that time the enemy occupied the position we had just left and were advancing in line. I ordered Lieutenant Ramsay to take position in the field to the right of the road and open, which he did, soon breaking their line and throwing them in great confusion. At this time General A. P. Hill came up, and, charging, drove them from the field.

I regret to report that First Lieutenant [S. M.] Pringle, of Garden's battery, after fighting his guns most gallantly, fell, late in the day, mortally wounded, and has since died.

I cannot too highly applaud the conduct of both officers and men. Captains Bachman and Reilly fought their batteries with their usual determination and devotion to the cause. Captain Garden, Lieutenants [James] Simons, jr., Myers, Ramsay, and Sergeant Schlemmermeyer deserve particular notice for their gallant conduct during the battle, and

also Assistant Surgeon Buist, for his attention to the sick. Actg. Adj. W. L. Scott rendered me great assistance, and is entitled to my warmest thanks. Inclosed you will find a list* of the killed and wounded.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. W. FROBEL,

Major and Chief of Artillery, Commanding.

Capt. W. H. SELLERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 250.

Report of Col. W. T. Wofford, Eighteenth Georgia Infantry, commanding Hood's brigade (Texas Brigade), of the battle of Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS TEXAS BRIGADE,

September 29, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part performed by this command in the engagements on the evening of the 16th and throughout the day of the 17th instant at Sharpsburg, Md., without referring to the various positions which we occupied after halting on the field:

On the morning of the 15th instant, our division being in the rear of the army from Boonsborough Mountain, this brigade was moved from in front of Sharpsburg on the evening of the 15th to the right and in front of Mumma Church, this being the left of our line and where the main and most of the fighting took place on the 17th instant. While we were moving to this position, the enemy opened a heavy fire upon us from their long-range guns, which was continued after we were in position, and resulted in the wounding of 1 lieutenant and 1 soldier in the Fourth Texas Regiment. We remained in this position the balance of the day and night of the 15th and until late in the evening of the 16th, when we were ordered by General Hood to move by the left flank through the open field in front of the church and to its left about 700 yards, to meet the enemy, who, it was then ascertained, had commenced to cross Antietam Creek to our left. We then formed line of battle and moved up to a corn-field in our front, and awaited the advance of the enemy, who had, by this time, opened upon us a brisk fire of shot and shell from some pieces of artillery which they had placed in position immediately in our front and to the left of our lines, wounding 1 officer and some dozen men.

I feel it due to truth to state that the enemy were informed of our position by the firing of a half dozen shots from a little battery of ours on the left of the brigade, which hastily beat a retreat as soon as their guns opened upon us.

While our line of battle rested upon the corn-field, Captain Turner, commanding the Fifth Texas, which was our right, had been moved forward into some woods, where he met a part of our skirmishers driven in by the enemy, whom he engaged and finally drove back, with the loss of 1 man. Our skirmishers, consisting of 100 men, under the command of Captain [W. H.] Martin, of the Fourth Texas, who had been moved into the woods in front and to the left of the Fifth Texas, were hotly engaged with the enemy, but held their ground until they had expended all their cartridges, and then fell into our line of battle, about 9 o'clock at night, about which time we were relieved by General Lawton's brigade, and were withdrawn from the field to the woods in rear of Mumma

* Embodied in tabular statement, p. 811.

Church for the purpose of cooking rations, our men not having received any regular allowance in three days.

It was now evident that the enemy had effected a crossing entirely to our left, and that he would make the attack on that wing early in the morning, moving his forces over and placing them in position during the night.

At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 17th the picket firing was very heavy, and at daylight the battle was opened. Our brigade was moved forward, at sunrise, to the support of General Lawton, who had relieved us the night before. Moving forward in line of battle in the regular order of regiments, the brigade proceeded through the woods into the open field toward the corn-field, where the left encountered the first line of the enemy. Seeing Hampton's Legion and Eighteenth Georgia moving slowly forward, but rapidly firing, I rode hastily to them, urging them forward, when I saw two full regiments, one in their front and the other partly to their left. Perceiving at once that they were in danger of being cut off, I ordered the First Texas to move by the left flank to their relief, which they did in a rapid and gallant manner. By this time, the enemy on our left having commenced falling back, the First Texas pressed them rapidly to their guns, which now poured into them a fire on their right flank, center, and left flank from three different batteries, before which their well-formed line was cut down and scattered; being 200 yards in front of our line, their situation was most critical. Riding back to the left of our line, I found the fragment of the Eighteenth Georgia Regiment in front of the extreme right battery of the enemy, located on the pike running by the church, which now opened upon our thinned ranks a most destructive fire. The men and officers were gallantly shooting down the gunners, and for a moment silenced them. At this time the enemy's fire was most terrific, their first line of infantry having been driven back to their guns, which now opened a furious fire, together with their second line of infantry, upon our thinned and almost annihilated ranks.

By this time, our brigade having suffered so greatly, I was satisfied they could neither advance nor hold their position much longer without re-enforcements. Riding back to make known to General Hood our condition, I met with you, to whom I imparted this information. By this time our line commenced giving way, when I ordered them back under cover of the woods to the left of the church, where we halted and waited for support, none arriving. After some time the enemy commenced advancing in full force. Seeing the hopelessness and folly of making a stand with our shattered brigade and a remnant from other commands, the men being greatly exhausted and many of them out of ammunition, I determined to fall back to a fence in our rear, where we met the long looked for re-enforcements, and at the same time received an order from General Hood to fall back farther to the rear to rest and collect our men. After resting a short time, we were moved back to the woods in rear of the church from where we advanced to the fight in the morning, which position we held until late in the evening, when we were moved by the right flank in the direction of Sharpsburg to a place near the center of our line, where we remained during that night and next day, and until the recrossing of the Potomac by our army was ordered.

During the engagement of the brigade on the 17th instant I was drawn to the left of our line, as it first engaged the enemy, who had succeeded in flanking us on the left, and, to escape from being surrounded, changed the direction to left-oblique, thus causing large intervals between the regiments on the left and right of the line. The Fifth Texas, under the command of Captain Turner, moved with spirit across the field and

occupied the woods on our right, where it met the enemy and drove and held them back until their ammunition was exhausted, and then fell back to the woods with the balance of the brigade. The Fourth Texas Regiment, which, in our line of battle, was between the Fifth and First Texas, was moved by General Hood to the extreme left of our line on the pike road, covering our flank by holding the enemy in check.

This brigade went into the action numbering 854, and lost, in killed, wounded, and missing, 560—over one-half.

We have to mourn the loss of Majors Dale, of the First Texas, and Dingle, of Hampton's Legion, two gallant officers, who fell in the thickest of the fight; also Captains [R. W.] Tompkins and [H. J.] Smith, and Lieutenant [James J.] Exum, of Hampton's Legion; Lieutenants [T. C.] Underwood and [J. M. D.] Cleveland, of the Eighteenth Georgia; Lieutenants [F. L.] Hoffman, [P.] Runnells, [J.] Waterhouse, [S. F.] Patton, and [G. B.] Thompson, of the First Texas. These brave officers all fell while gallantly leading their small bands on an enemy five times their number. They deserved a better fate than to have been, as they were, sacrificed for the want of proper support.

The enemy, besides being permitted to cross the creek, with scarcely any resistance, to our left, were allowed to place their artillery in position during the night, not only without annoyance but without our knowledge.

Without specially naming the officers and men who stood firmly at their post during the whole of this terrible conflict, I feel pleased to bear testimony, with few exceptions, to the gallantry of the whole brigade. They fought desperately; their conduct was never surpassed. Fragments of regiments, as they were, they moved bodily upon and drove before them the crowded lines of the enemy up to their cannon's mouth, and, with a heroism unsurpassed, fired upon their gunners, desperately struggling before yielding, which they had never been forced to do before.

I herewith transmit the reports of Captain Turner, commanding the Fifth Texas Regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, commanding the Fourth Texas; Lieutenant-Colonel Work, commanding the First Texas; Lieutenant-Colonel Ruff, commanding the Eighteenth Georgia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gary, commanding Hampton's Legion.

Respectfully submitted.

WM. T. WOFFORD,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. W. H. SELLERS,
Adjutant-General.

No. 251.

Report of Lieut. Col. S. Z. Ruff, Eighteenth Georgia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that this regiment was drawn up in line of battle, late in the evening on the 16th instant, to the left of the position it had occupied during the day and previous night, which was north of the town of Sharpsburg and parallel to the Antietam River. On our left was the Hampton Legion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Gary, and on our right the First Texas, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Work.

Just at dark, the enemy advanced and attacked the brigade on our right, when we received orders to advance to a piece of corn a short distance in front, where we remained without firing a gun until about

midnight. The brigade was then withdrawn to a piece of woods, to cook rations.

The next morning, 17th instant, just after daylight, the brigade was drawn up in line of battle, and ordered to lie down under cover of the hill from a terrible storm of shell that the enemy's batteries were at that time pouring into the woods. A heavy firing of musketry had been going on in our front for some time.

About 7 a. m., the brigade was ordered to move forward in the direction of the firing. Advancing about a quarter of a mile through the timber, we came upon the enemy posted in front of a piece of corn, and immediately opened fire upon them. After one or two rounds they gave way, and fell back to a considerable distance in the corn. Advancing, with the left of the regiment resting on the right of the legion, which had its left upon the turnpike, we drove the enemy in fine style out of the corn and back upon their supports. At the far edge of the corn, the ranks of the retreating line of the enemy unmasked a battery, which poured a round or two of grape into our ranks with terrible effect; but it was soon silenced by our riflemen, and the gunners ran away. At this moment we discovered a fresh line of the enemy advancing on our left flank in an oblique direction, threatening to cut us off, and our ranks being reduced to less than one-third their original strength, we found it necessary to fall back. At the edge of the woods we met supports and rallied on them a part of our men; but the regiment was too much cut up for further action, and in a short time, in connection with the whole brigade, was taken from the field.

We carried 176 men into the action, and lost 101 in killed, wounded, and missing; most of the missing are either killed or wounded.

All the men and officers, so far as I was able to observe, acted with the most desperate coolness and gallantry. Not one showed any disposition, notwithstanding their terrible loss, to fall back or flinch from the enemy until they received orders to do so.

I regret exceedingly to report that Lieuts. T. C. Underwood and J. M. D. Cleveland, of Company K, are among the missing. They are known to be wounded, and it is feared they are dead. I regret also to be obliged to record among the wounded the names of Capts. J. A. Crawford and G. W. Maddox and Lieuts. M. J. Crawford, J. F. Maddox, O. W. Putnam, W. G. Calahan, J. Grant, and D. B. Williams.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. Z. RUFF,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

Col. W. T. WOFFORD,
Commanding Texas Brigade.

No. 252.

Report of Lieut. Col. M. W. Gary, Hampton Legion, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR MARTINSBURG, W. VA.,
September 23, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the infantry battalion of the Hampton Legion in the battle of the 17th at Sharpsburg, Md.:

The battle opened about day-break along the whole line. The legion was placed to the left of the brigade, the Eighteenth Georgia being to its right. We began to advance from under cover of woods in rear of

a church, and engaged the enemy so soon as we emerged from them, the enemy being in line of battle near the edge of the corn-field immediately in our front. We advanced steadily upon them, under a heavy fire, and had not gone far when Herod Wilson, of Company F, the bearer of the colors, was shot down. They were raised by James Estes, of Company E, and he was shot down. They were then taken up by C. P. Poppenheim, of Company A, and he, too, was shot down. Maj. J. H. Dingle, jr., then caught them and began to advance with them, exclaiming, "Legion, follow your colors!" The words had an inspiring effect, and the men rallied bravely under their flag, fighting desperately at every step. He bore the colors to the edge of the corn near the turnpike road, on our left, and, while bravely upholding them within 50 yards of the enemy and three Federal flags, was shot dead. I immediately raised the colors and again unfurled them amid the enemy's deadly fire, when Marion Walton, of Company B, volunteered to bear them. I resigned them into his hands, and he carried them gallantly and safely through the battle. Soon after the death of Major Dingle, I discovered that the men to our right were falling back from being flanked on the right. I went to the fence of the turnpike road, and discovered, about 200 yards distant, a brigade of the enemy in line of battle, covering our entire left flank. I immediately ordered the men to fall back under the crest of the hill. I then rallied them and reformed them, and remained with the brigade the remainder of the day.

I have to record the death of many of my best officers. The brave, modest, and energetic Maj. J. H. Dingle, jr., fell, among the foremost in battle, and died with the colors in his hands; Capt. R. W. Tompkins, who was killed near where Major Dingle fell, and was conspicuous in the fight, for his gallantry and efficiency; Lieut. J. J. Exum was killed near the same place, heroically leading his men; Capt. H. J. Smith was mortally wounded, in the same charge, while bravely leading his men (he has since died); Lieut. W. A. B. Davenport was wounded at the head of his company; Lieut. W. E. O'Connor, acting adjutant, was wounded in the engagement the evening before. I have but to mention my four remaining officers—Capt. T. M. Logan, Lieuts. B. E. Nicholson, J. H. M. James, and J. J. Cleveland—all of them in command of their companies, and bearing themselves with great bravery, having shared the same dangers of their less fortunate comrades. The number of the legion was reduced more than one-half by the numerous details for skirmishers, scouts, cooks, and men barefooted, unfit for duty.

The following is a list* of the casualties. Strength of battalion in action, officers and men, 77.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

M. W. GARY,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Hampton's Legion.

Col. W. T. WOFFORD, *Commanding Texas Brigade.*

No. 253.

Report of Lieut. Col. P. A. Work, First Texas Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

NEAR MARTINSBURG, W. VA.,
September 23, 1862.

SIR: The following is submitted as a report of the part taken by the

* Nominal list, omitted, shows 3 officers and 3 men killed and 3 officers and 46 men wounded.

First Texas Regiment in the engagement of Wednesday, September 17, near Sharpsburg, Md.:

The brigade, having been formed in order of battle upon the ground occupied by it on the night of the 16th, in the following order, to wit, First Texas in the center, Eighteenth Georgia left center, Fourth Texas right center, Fifth Texas on the right flank, and Hampton's Legion on the left flank, was moved forward to engage the enemy about — o'clock, the latter having made an attack upon our forces occupying a position in front of this brigade. Advancing through the woods some 200 yards, under a heavy fire of grape, canister, and shell from the enemy's artillery, the brigade emerged into an open clover field some 200 or 250 yards in width, across which the forward movement was continued for some 150 to 200 yards, when, it being discovered that the left flank of the brigade was exposed to attack, I was ordered to move by the left flank, following a corresponding move of the Eighteenth Georgia and Hampton's Legion upon my left, which I did until ordered to move by the right flank, which was also done. Advancing now by the right flank (my original front), I entered a corn-field and soon became engaged with a force of the enemy, driving them before me to the farther side of the corn-field. As soon as the regiment became engaged with the enemy in the corn-field, it became impossible to restrain the men, and they rushed forward, pressing the enemy close until we had advanced a considerable distance ahead of both the right and left wings of the brigade. Discovering that this would probably be the case when my men first dashed forward, I dispatched you two different messengers, to wit, Capt. John R. Woodward, Company G, and Private A. G. Hanks, Company F, stating that I was driving the enemy, and requesting you to hurry up the regiments on my right and left to my support. It was not until we reached the farther side of the corn-field that I could check the regiment. By this time we had broken the first line of battle of the enemy and had advanced to within some 30 steps of his second line, secreted behind a breastwork of fence rails thrown in heaps upon the ground, when a battery of artillery some 150 or 200 yards in our front was opened upon us. My men continued firing, a portion of them at the enemy's men and others at the artillerists, the result of which was that the enemy's second line broke and fled and the artillery was limbered up and started to the rear, when the whole fire of my regiment was concentrated upon the artillerists and horses, knocking over men and horses with such effect that the artillery was abandoned. Very soon, however, a force of the enemy was moved up to the support of this artillery, when it again opened fire upon us.

Just at the farther side of the corn-field was the point where I was in great doubt as to the proper move to be made by me. I was aware that my regiment had advanced 150 or 200 yards farther than the regiment upon my left, so diverging as to leave a wide interval between the right flank of the Eighteenth Georgia and my left, thus exposing both regiments to attack—the Eighteenth upon the right and the First Texas upon the left flank. I was aware at the same time that a heavy force of the enemy was massed upon my left, and felt confident that in case I moved farther to the front I would be attacked upon my left and rear and annihilated. Had I moved forward to carry the enemy's battery I would have exposed the regiment to attack from three different directions, to wit, from the front from infantry and artillery and upon the left and rear from infantry. I am told, also, by some of the men that had I advanced a little farther to the front my right flank would have become exposed to attack, and am assured that some distance to my front

and obliquely to my right was a large force of the enemy. This I did not discover, myself. At this juncture I dispatched Actg. Adj. W. Shropshire to say to you that, unless the regiments upon my left were moved up quickly to my relief and support upon the left, I would be forced to abandon my position and withdraw. Before the return of Shropshire, a fire of musketry was opened upon me from my left and rear, which determined me at once to withdraw, as I had but a handful of men left, all of whom must have been slain or captured had I remained longer. I at once gave the order to fall back, and the few men remaining to me retired, turning to fire upon the enemy as rapidly as their pieces could be loaded and fired.

I entered the engagement with 226 men, officers—field and staff—included, of which number 170 are known to have been killed and wounded, besides 12 others who are missing, and, doubtless, also killed or wounded.

During the engagement I saw four bearers of our State colors shot down, to wit: First, John Hanson, Company L; second, James Day, Company M; third, Charles H. Kingsley, Company L, and, fourth, James K. Malone, Company A. After the fall of these, still others raised the colors until four more bearers were shot down. Not having seen plainly who these others were, I am unable to give their names in this report, but will do so so soon as, upon inquiry, I can ascertain.

It is a source of mortification to state that, upon retiring from the engagement, our colors were not brought off. I can but feel that some degree of odium must attach under the most favorable circumstances, and although such are the circumstances surrounding the conduct of this regiment, the loss of our flag will always remain a matter of sore and deep regret. In this connection it is but proper to state, in addition to that detailed in the above and foregoing report, the additional circumstances and causes which led to its loss. When the order to retire was given, the colors began the movement to the rear, when the color-bearer, after moving but a few paces, was shot down. Upon their fall, some half dozen hastened to raise them, one of whom did raise them and move off, when he was shot down, which was not discovered by those surviving. While falling back, and when we had nearly reached the clover field hereinbefore alluded to (being still in the corn-field), I gave the order to halt, and inquired for the colors, intending to dress upon them, when I was told that the colors had gone out of the corn-field. Then I gave the order to move on out of the corn and form behind the crest of a small ridge just outside of the corn and in the clover field. It was when I reached this point that I became satisfied our colors were lost, for I looked in every direction and they were nowhere to be seen. It was then too late to recover them. There was no one who knew the spot where they had last fallen, and, owing to the density of the corn, a view of no object could be had but for a few feet. By this time, also, the enemy had moved up and was within some 35 or 40 yards of my left (proper) and rear, and another force was following us. No blame, I feel, should attach to the men or officers, all of whom fought heroically and well. There was no such conduct upon their part as abandoning or deserting their colors. They fought bravely, and unflinchingly faced a terrible hail of bullets and artillery until ordered by me to retire. The colors started back with them, and when they were lost no man knew save him who had fallen with them. It is, perhaps, due to myself to state that, when I determined to retire, I requested Captain [U. S.] Connally to give the order upon the right, and stepped to the left to direct Captain Woodward to give the order upon the left, from which point I moved on to the extreme left, to discover,

if possible, the locality of the enemy attacking from that quarter, in order to be prepared to govern the movements of my regiment, so as to protect it as far as possible from danger and damage. While I was at the left thus engaged, the regiment commenced the movement to the rear, and not being near the center I was unable, owing to the density of the corn, to see where the colors were and when they fell.

Capt. John R. Woodward, of Company G, acted in the capacity of major during the engagement, and aided me greatly in directing the movements of the regiment. Major [Matt.] Dale, acting as lieutenant-colonel, had moved from the right, and was conferring with me as to the propriety of advancing or at once withdrawing, when he was killed. Feeling that it was madness to advance with the few men left me, I remained for several minutes after the fall of Major Dale, awaiting orders and information as to what my movements should be, being unwilling to withdraw as long as I had the ability to hold my then position without [orders] to do so.

Submitted herewith and as a part hereof is a list* giving the names of killed, wounded, and missing, together with the character of wound of those wounded.

I am well convinced that had the Eighteenth Georgia and Hampton's Legion not met with the most obstinate and stubborn resistance from a superior force to their left, they would have supported me promptly and effectively upon my left, and that that portion of the enemy's force in our front would have been routed, the tide of battle there turned, and the day been ours. The conduct of this regiment in the engagements of the 17th, and of the night of August 29 and 30, and that of the other regiments of the brigade in these engagements, demonstrates fully the necessity of having supports promptly and quickly upon the field. If required to carry strong positions in a few more engagements, and, after carrying them, hold them unaided and alone, this regiment must soon become annihilated and extinct without having accomplished any material or permanent good.

I will also state that where I last halted, and where my dead and wounded fell, I halted in consequence of an order or direction to that effect from some one in the rear, said by Captain Woodward to have been Capt. W. H. Sellers.

Respectfully submitted.

P. A. WORK,

Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding First Texas Regiment.

Col. W. T. WOFFORD,

Commanding Texas Brigade.

No. 254.

Report of Lieut. Col. B. F. Carter, Fourth Texas Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report the part taken by my regiment in the battle of the 17th instant near Sharpsburg, Md. Owing to the severe illness of Colonel Key, I was in command of the regiment during the day and succeeding night.

Soon after daylight the brigade formed line of battle in regular order,

* Omitted.

the Fifth Texas being on my right and First Texas on my left, and, about 7 a. m., were ordered to advance. I received no order as to which was the directing battalion, but, advancing diagonally to the right through the woods, we entered the open field on the right of the turnpike road. Here the fire upon us became severe, and, owing to our troops being in front of us and the dense smoke pervading, we were unable to return the fire or see the enemy clearly. Still advancing, I came directly behind the Eleventh Mississippi, when I received the order from Captain Sellers for the Texas Brigade to halt. Halting, I ordered the men to lie down. At the same moment the Eleventh Mississippi was ordered to advance, and a portion of two companies on my right, mistaking the order, advanced with them. After a moment I received an order from General Hood to move to the left until the left of my regiment rested on the crest, in advance, next to the turnpike road. Moving left-oblique in double-quick, I occupied the position indicated, and was then ordered by General Hood to move directly up the hill on the left of the troops then advancing. The enemy then occupied the hill in strong force, which receded before our steady advance. Arriving on the top of the hill, at the intersection of the corn-field with the turnpike, I found the enemy not only in heavy force in the corn-field in front, but occupying a ravine in the field on the left of the turnpike, from which position they poured a destructive fire upon us. I discovered at once that the position was untenable, but if I fell back the troops on my right who had entered the corn-field would be surrounded; so, wheeling my regiment to the left, I posted the men along the fence on either side of the turnpike, and replied as best we could to the tremendous fire of the enemy. We held this position for some time, until the troops in the corn-field on my right were falling back, when I ordered the regiment to move along the line of fence by the left flank. This movement, however, exposed us so much that we fell back directly under the hill. Here I ordered the regiment to halt and form, but at the same moment received an order from General Hood to move by the left flank into the woods. Forming here, I advanced on the left of the turnpike up to the fence at the edge of the field, and rested in this position until I was ordered by Colonel Wofford to fall back to the point we started from in the morning, where the remnant of the brigade was formed. We moved about to various points during the day and succeeding night, but nothing worth reporting occurred.

Inclosed I forward you a list* of the casualties in this regiment. I carried into action about 200 men, and you will see how heavy our loss was.

In our loss are embraced many valuable officers. Lieutenant [N. J.] Mills, of Company I, was severely wounded on the 15th instant. On the 17th, Lieutenants [L. P.] Hughes, commanding Company F; [A. J.] McKean and [H. M.] Marchant, of Company A; [J. T.] McLaurin, commanding Company B; [J. C.] Billingsley, commanding Company E; and [John] Roach (of Company G), commanding Company H, were all wounded. Lieutenant Roach was left on the field, and I fear was mortally wounded. Color-bearer Parker, of Company H, was severely wounded and left on the field. At his fall Captain Darden, of Company A, seized and carried the colors until we fell back to the woods. Many who are reported missing I fear were killed, or so severely wounded as to be unable to leave the field.

To Capt. E. H. Cunningham, acting field officer, and Adj. F. L. Price I am indebted for the great assistance rendered me on the field.

* Embodied in tabular statement, p. 311.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the conduct of both officers and men of my command. Exposed to a tremendous fire from superior numbers, in a position which it was apparent to all we could not hold, they fought on without flinching until the order to fall back was given. These men, too, were half clad, many of them barefooted, and had been only half fed for days before. The courage, constancy, and patience of our men is beyond all praise.

Very respectfully,

Lieut. A. H. PATTON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

B. F. CARTER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

No. 255.

Report of Capt. Ike N. M. Turner, Fifth Texas Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR MARTINSBURG, W. VA.,
September 24, 1862.

SIR: [I have the honor to submit the following] report of the part taken by the Fifth Texas Regiment in the late engagements of the 16th and 17th instant, near Sharpsburg, Md.:

Late in the evening of the 16th instant our brigade was moved by the left flank from the position we had been occupying during the day to a field in front of a church. We had not occupied our new position long before a brisk fire commenced between our skirmishers and those of the enemy. The Fifth Texas Regiment was ordered to the edge of the woods as a support for our skirmishers. On arriving at the position assigned, our skirmishers, being hard pressed, fell back and passed to my right. I ordered the regiment to commence firing, which checked the advance of the enemy.

About 8 o'clock at night we were relieved, and retired to the woods in rear of the church. Slept until about day, when firing commenced in front. We were called to attention; thrown around the hull in line of battle to protect us from grape and shell. We had not occupied this position more than half an hour before we were ordered out as support for the Third Brigade. We caught up with said brigade where our first line had been fighting. Here the Fifth was ordered to halt, by Major [Captain] Sellers, and allow the regiments on the right of the Third to advance. While lying here, General Hood rode up, ordering me to incline to the right, press forward, and drive the enemy out of the woods, which we did. The enemy twice tried to regain their position in the woods by advancing a force through the lower edge of the corn-field, which we repulsed. From a point of timber about 400 yards to our front and left, I discovered strong re-enforcements marching out by the left flank down a hollow, which protected them from our fire. Allowing them to get within 75 yards of us with lines unbroken, I saw we would soon be hard pressed. Sent four times to Major [Captain] Sellers for support, determined to hold my position as long as possible. My men were out of ammunition, the enemy not more than 100 yards in my front, no support, no ammunition; all our troops had fallen back on my left; I deemed it prudent to fall back also.

Officers and men, with few exceptions, behaved well,

The casualties of the regiment were 5 killed and 81 wounded; total, 86. Of the wounded, 3 were mortally, and have died; 16 were not removed from the field, and 2 were left on the Maryland side in hospital for want of transportation.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

IKE N. M. TURNER,
Captain, Commanding Fifth Texas Regiment.

Col. W. T. WOFFORD,
Commanding Texas Brigade.

No. 256.

*Report of Col. E. M. Law, Fourth Alabama Infantry, commanding brigade,
of the battle of Sharpsburg.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE,
October 2, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the engagements at Sharpsburg, Md., on September 16 and 17.

When the army arrived at the heights on the south side of Antietam River on the morning of the 15th, I was ordered to take position about a mile from Sharpsburg, on the Hagerstown turnpike. The right of my brigade rested at Saint Mumma's Church (Dunkers' Chapel), and the line extended along the turnpike in the edge of a wood which bordered it on the southwest. Across the road (on the northeast) was an open field a quarter of a mile in width, extending along the whole front of the line and beyond it about 600 yards. This open space was bounded on the northeast (to my front) and northwest (to my left) by woods, an opening being left at the north corner.

Late in the afternoon of the 16th, the enemy's skirmishers advanced into the woods in front of my position. They were held in check by my riflemen and the Texas skirmishers. In the mean time I was ordered by General Hood, commanding the division, to move forward and occupy the edge of the wood in which the skirmishing was going on. This was quickly accomplished, and the enemy was driven, at dark, to the farther side of the wood, toward the Antietam. My brigade was relieved during the night, and moved, with the rest of General Hood's command, to the wood in rear of Saint Mumma's Church (Dunkers' Chapel).

Soon after daylight on the 17th, the attack of the enemy commenced. The battle had lasted about an hour and a half, when I was ordered to move forward into the open field across the turnpike. On reaching the road, I found but few of our troops on the field, and these seemed to be in much confusion, but still opposing the advance of the enemy's dense masses with determination. Throwing the brigade at once into line of battle, facing northward, I gave the order to advance. The Texas Brigade, Colonel Wofford, had in the mean time come into line on my left, and the two brigades now moved forward together. The enemy, who had by this time advanced half-way across the field and had planted a heavy battery at the north end of it, began to give way before us, though in vastly superior force. The Fifth Texas Regiment (which had been sent over to my right) and the Fourth Alabama pushed into the wood in which the skirmishing had taken place the evening previous, and

drove the enemy through and beyond it. The other regiments of my command continued steadily to advance in the open ground, driving the enemy in confusion from and beyond his guns. So far, we had been entirely successful and everything promised a decisive victory. It is true that strong support was needed to follow up our success, but this I expected every moment.

At this stage of the battle, a powerful Federal force (ten times our number) of fresh troops was thrown in our front. Our losses up to this time had been very heavy; the troops now confronting the enemy were insufficient to cover properly one-fourth of the line of battle; our ammunition was expended; the men had been fighting long and desperately, and were exhausted from want of food and rest. Still, they held their ground, many of them using such ammunition as they could obtain from the bodies of our own and the enemy's dead and wounded. It was evident that this state of affairs could not long continue. No support was at hand. To remain stationary or advance without it would have caused a useless butchery, and I adopted the only alternative—that of falling back to the wood from which I had first advanced. The enemy followed very slowly and cautiously. Under direction of General Hood I reformed my brigade in the rear of Saint Mumma's Church (Dunkers' Chapel), and, together with the Texas Brigade, which had also retired, again confronted the enemy, who seemed to hesitate to enter the wood. During this delay re-enforcements arrived, and the brigade was relieved for the purpose of obtaining ammunition.

At 1 p. m., having been supplied with ammunition, I was again ordered to the field, and took position in the wood near the church. Here the brigade remained, under an incessant cannonade, until near nightfall, when it was moved half a mile nearer the town of Sharpsburg, where it lay during the night and the following day.

The good conduct of my brigade in this battle has not been surpassed by it in any previous engagement. Weak and exhausted as they were, and fighting against fearful odds, the troops accomplished and endured all that was within the limits of human capacity.

Our loss in proportion to the numbers engaged was extremely heavy. The officers suffered severely. Colonel Liddell, the gallant and beloved commander of the Eleventh Mississippi Regiment, fell, mortally wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel [S. F.] Butler, of the same regiment, received a painful wound, and Major [T. S.] Evans was killed. Colonel Stone, Lieutenant-Colonel [D. W.] Humphreys, and Major [J. A.] Blair, of the Second Mississippi, were all wounded while leading that distinguished regiment in the charge. Major Webb, commanding Sixth North Carolina, Captain [S. McD.] Tate, an acting field officer of the same, and Captain [L. H.] Scruggs, commanding Fourth Alabama, received wounds while gallantly discharging their duty.

The members of my staff—Lieutenant Terrell, assistant adjutant-general, Captain Kirkman, Lieutenant Law, of the Citadel Academy, and Private Smith, Fourth Alabama—as usual, performed every duty bravely and efficiently.

I inclose a list* of casualties.

I am, captain, very respectfully,

E. M. LAW,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Capt. W. H. SELLERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

* Embodied in tabular statement, p. 811.

No. 257.

Report of Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans, U. S. Army, commanding brigade and division, of operations September 14-17.

HEADQUARTERS EVANS' BRIGADE,
Near Winchester, Va., October 13, 1862.

MAJOR: In pursuance to the written instructions of the major-general commanding, I beg leave to report the action of my command in the recent engagements in Virginia and Maryland: *

* * * * *

On August [September] 14 my division was ordered to support the command of Brigadier-General Rodes, on the left of the road near South Mountain. On marching my brigade up the mountain on our extreme left, I was informed that the two brigades under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Hood had been detached, by order of the major-general commanding, to support our right, and I was further ordered to hold my position on the left; that re-enforcements would be sent. On my arrival at the summit of the mountain, the skirmishers of the enemy were met, supported by several of his batteries that commanded my position. I directed Colonel Stevens, commanding brigade, to push over the summit and engage the enemy, then firing on General Rodes' troops, retiring. Colonel Stevens soon became engaged with a much superior force, two columns of the enemy advancing rapidly upon his small command. This force, however, was bravely met, and the position held until the troops on my right had retired, leaving my brigade nearly surrounded by the enemy. I then directed my troops to retire, firing, to the east side of the mountain, which was done in good order.

During the night I received an order to march in the direction of Sharpsburg, and my division ordered to act as rear guard, which duty was performed until our arrival at the Antietam River on the evening of September 15.

On the morning of the 16th, General Hood, with his two brigades, was detached and sent to the support of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, leaving me but two brigades—Colonel Anderson's and Evans' brigades. During the day my command was held as support to Colonel Walton's artillery; also with orders to defend the bridge over the Antietam; and my skirmishers were engaged throughout the day with the sharpshooters of the enemy.

On the morning of the 17th, the enemy attacked our right [left] in force, and about noon Colonel Anderson's brigade was detached to support General Hood, then supporting Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill on the right [left].

About 2 p. m. I was ordered to rally the troops then flocking to the town from our right [left] and bring them into action. After considerable exertion, with the assistance of my entire staff, I succeeded in collecting about 250 men and officers, whom I formed into two commands, and placed them, respectively, under the command of Colonels Colquitt and Iverson, of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division.

At 3 o'clock, observing the enemy approaching my position (directly on the left of the road), also attempting to cross the bridge on my right, I ordered an advance, Colonels [A. H.] Colquitt and [Alfred] Iverson on the left with Boyce's battery, and Colonel Stevens on the right, supported by two batteries of Col. S. D. Lee's battalion (who came timely

* Portions here omitted are printed in Series I, Vol. XI, Part II, p. 962, and Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 627-629.

at my request to my assistance and rendered material aid in driving the enemy back across the river), with Colonel Stevens' command as skirmishers on the right, while I attacked the enemy with Colquitt's and Iverson's command on the left. This little command gallantly drove the enemy from his cover in the corn-field and caused him to retreat in confusion, leaving a number of their dead and two stand of colors, the latter having been shot down by a well-directed fire of Captain Boyce's battery. I also requested Colonel Walton, of the artillery, to open fire on the enemy's battery that had crossed the bridge, which, being promptly done, had the desired effect of driving it back. My brigade then resumed its original position and bivouacked for the night, sleeping on their arms.

For individual instances of gallantry and distinction, I beg leave to refer to the reports of the immediate commanders. To my general and personal staff I am much indebted for their bravery and fidelity in carrying my orders. Capt. T. D. Eason, ordnance officer; Capt. A. L. Evans, assistant adjutant-general, [and] First Lieut. Samuel J. Corrie, aide-de-camp, were often under heavy fire and executed their several duties with intrepidity. My faithful courier, Mr. Farquhar Trezevant, was shot down near me by a shell, inflicting a wound from which he has since died. His loss was severe to me, both personally and in his official capacity. I am also pained to announce the fall of Capt. Samuel [Lieut. R. P.] Jordan, assistant adjutant-general of Colonel Colquitt's brigade, who was shot down while gallantly transmitting my orders.

Inclosed herewith, please find the reports of regimental and battery commanders.

The total loss of Evans' brigade in the above-mentioned engagements is 1,024 aggregate, from an aggregate of 1,830 on July 30. It is proper to state that the aggregate for duty was afterward increased to 2,200 by the addition of the Twenty-third Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

In conclusion, I would call the attention of the major-general commanding to the gallant conduct of the officers of this brigade. In each engagement some field officer was either wounded or killed.

I had neglected to mention above the loss of the gallant Lieut. Col. T. C. Watkins, of the Twenty-third [Twenty-second] Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, and Lieut. Col. R. S. Means, of the Seventeenth Regiment, both of whom were shot down while cheering on their regiments. Lieutenant-Colonel Watkins was killed instantly, and Lieutenant-Colonel Means severely wounded in both legs and was left in the hands of the enemy.

Respectfully submitted.

N. G. EVANS,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Right Wing.

P. S.—The report of the Eighteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers will be forwarded to-morrow.

HEADQUARTERS EVANS' BRIGADE,
November 5, 1862.

MAJOR: I beg leave to make the following corrections in my report of the actions of Evans' brigade in the recent engagements with the enemy in Virginia and Maryland. In the account of the battle of Sharps-

burg I state that "the enemy attacked our right." For "right" read "left." Also, that "Colonel Anderson's brigade was ordered to support General Hood, then supporting Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill on the right." This should be our left. Again, "to rally the troops then flocking to the town from our right," again read for our "right" our "left."

I would respectfully request that this paper be forwarded as a supplement to my report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. EVANS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. G. MOXLEY SORREL,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Right Wing, Army of Northern Va.

No. 258.

Report of Col. P. F. Stevens, Holcombe (South Carolina) Legion, commanding Evans' brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

HDQRS. HOLCOMBE LEGION, SOUTH CAROLINA VOLS.,

Near Winchester, Va., October 13, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to an order from General Evans, I have the honor to submit the following report of the actions participated in by the troops under my command, first as colonel of my own regiment, and, secondly, as commanding officer of Evans' brigade: *

* * * * *

BATTLE OF FROG PASS (BOONSBOROUGH).

On Sunday, September 14, after marching from Hagerstown to the mountain pass (called, I believe, Frog Pass), I was told by General Longstreet to report with my brigade to General D. H. Hill, who would assign me my position. Turning to the left and east at the pass, I was led up the mountain by Major Fairfax to General Hill. This latter officer directed me to a hill some mile distant and still to the left, where I was to report to and support General Rodes. Having accomplished about half the distance, I received an order from General Evans to halt. You brought me this order. Almost at the same moment a messenger from General Rodes urged me forward. Sending back to General Evans for instructions and forward to General Rodes to tell him why I had halted, I found that the enemy were in the valley below on my right and were already threatening my position. Throwing out the legion as skirmishers to check the advance, I disposed the brigade according to my best judgment along the brow of the mountain side, my left very nearly joining Rodes' right. Before I could receive further instructions from General Evans, I was attacked. My skirmishers were soon driven back and the line opened fire. Being near the Seventeenth South Carolina, and seeing it doing well, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel [F. W.] McMaster, I gave him general instructions and moved to the left. Here I found the Twenty-third and Twenty-second driven back, but rallied under Captains Durham and [M.] Hilton, respectively. Very soon the Eighteenth retired also, and from that time the fight was a retreating one until the enemy occupied the mountain and we were driven from it. General Rodes was at the same time forced back on my left. Captains Durham and Hilton and Adjutant DuBose were conspicuous in

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 629-632.

their efforts to stay the retreat, but I am constrained to say that after once falling back I cannot commend the behavior of the men. Some two or three bravely faced the foe, but a general lack of discipline and disregard for officers prevailed all around me. The Seventeenth and most of the legion were on the right and not with me. The brigade having reassembled on the turnpike, I threw out the legion on picket, deployed along the skirt of woods on the mountain we had just left, and reported to General D. R. Jones.

About 11 or 12 o'clock I received an order from General R. E. Lee to send a small detachment back to the ground where I had fought, and ascertain whether the enemy still occupied it or had retired. This duty I intrusted to Lieutenant DuBose, then on picket. Advancing to the battle-ground, or nearly to it, the lieutenant left his men and moved on alone. In a few moments a shot was fired and a cry was heard. Falling back some 100 yards, his men waited in vain for his return to them, and two or three of the enemy having been seen, they returned to report the loss of their beloved leader. Whether that single shot proved fatal or whether he is a prisoner I know not, but in him I have lost my right arm, and the service as noble, as pure-minded, as fearless an officer as ever battled for his country.

At the battle of Sharpsburg sickness, fatigue, and the casualties of battle had reduced the brigade to a mere skeleton. Placed in position just where the main road from Boonsborough enters the town on the north, it acted as a support for different batteries on either side of the road until Wednesday afternoon, when, the engagement having become general, by order of General Evans, it was deployed as skirmishers to meet those of the enemy. I was with the Twenty-third, Twenty-second, and Eighteenth South Carolina Regiments on the left of the road, and, seeing my men falling rapidly, while the enemy was still advancing, I was apprehensive of being flanked, and ordered them to fall back to a stone wall in our rear. Perceiving that my retreat had left unsupported a section of Boyce's artillery, which I had not before seen, I again resumed my position, and, bringing up Boyce's battery, opened fire with musketry and artillery upon a line of the enemy advancing on the right of the road. The line was broken and driven back. Colonel Walker, of Jenkins' brigade, having sent for artillery, I ordered Captain Boyce to his support. It was now late in the evening, and, my men having nearly exhausted their ammunition, I left general instructions and sought the ordnance officer. Before I could get more ammunition my men had fallen back, in accordance with instructions, and, finding them scattering in town, I marched to the rear and bivouacked for the night.

The next morning, by order of General Evans, we assumed our position in front of the town, acting as a support to Captain Page's artillery until 10 o'clock at night, when we withdrew, according to instructions, and crossed the Potomac. Two days after, General Evans took command of the brigade and I of my regiment.

During the engagement at Sharpsburg my men behaved well, obeyed orders, and never gave back except at my command.

To this report you will please append my report on the case of Major Stewart, Twenty-second South Carolina Volunteers.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. F. STEVENS,

Colonel Holcombe Legion, South Carolina Volunteers.

Capt. A. L. EVANS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

* Not found.

No. 259.

Reports of Capt. R. Boyce, commanding Macbeth (South Carolina) Light Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,
October 20, 1862.

GENERAL: In obedience to your order, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my battery in the action on September 17, at Sharpsburg, Md.:

Early on the morning of the 17th I was ordered by Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, to proceed with my battery beyond the road north of the town of Sharpsburg, to occupy a position to meet the enemy. On reaching the vicinity of the position I supposed I should occupy, I found no person to point it out to me. Colonel Stevens, of your brigade, placed me on the slope of the second hill from the road; but, finding my battery could be of no service in this position, I was posted farther down, in front of another battery. Here, discovering that I was still where I could not see the enemy, I moved my battery through a corn-field immediately in front, and, on reaching the farther side of this field, I found the whole line of battle, for at least a mile, extended before me. I placed my guns in battery in easy range of a portion of the line, but had to wait for an opportunity to fire, as our own troops, engaging the enemy, intervened. Shortly after taking this position, General Lee sent me an order to open fire on a battery which had formed on my left almost beyond the range of my pieces. I fired on the battery, and, having it enfiladed, soon forced it to slacken its fire and change its position. I then turned my guns upon a column of the enemy moving through a corn-field, just to the left of the enemy's battery. The range, however, was too great to do much execution. I received an order at this time to cease firing in that direction. After a protracted struggle immediately in front of me, our infantry abandoned the field to overwhelming numbers. My battery was at this time thrown forward, by your order, into an open field 200 or 300 yards in advance of its original position. The enemy then advanced through a corn-field to the field in which my battery had taken its position, showing a front of several hundred yards in extent, plainly on the right and center, but partly concealed by the corn on the left. The whole line of the enemy here was within canister range, and I opened upon him a destructive fire, cutting down two of his flags at the second or third discharge of the guns. The right and center soon gave way and retired. The battery was then turned upon the left, which held its position more obstinately. This portion of the line took shelter in a ravine at the base of the hill from which I was firing, and it was only with one or two guns that they could be reached. Having no support of infantry, and no other battery assisting me in resisting this large body of the enemy, and being exposed the whole time to a galling fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, after firing 70 rounds of canister and some solid shot I was forced to retire from this hazardous position. I retired, in order, to the corn-field from which I had advanced, changing my direction soon after entering, so as to avoid the fire of a battery just formed on the hill in rear of the enemy's lines. After resting and refreshing my men, and sending some disabled pieces to the rear and repacking my ammunition chests, I found I would only be able to manage two pieces on the field the remainder of the day.

About 5 p. m. a heavy fire of musketry began on my right and rear. I immediately ordered out my two pieces, crossed over to the slope of the hill lying in the direction of the town, and put my pieces in battery, commanding the crest of the two hills, to meet the enemy if he should compel our forces to retire. Colonel Stevens advanced, at this juncture, with a few skirmishers to the crest of the hill, and, finding the ground not occupied by the enemy immediately beyond, signaled me to advance. I went forward and placed my guns on the hill within canister range of the enemy. A few shots soon drove him beyond the reach of canister. I afterward used solid shot, cutting down his flag and driving him back. Having occupied this important position but a few minutes, an order came, from some source, for me to recross the road near the place occupied by me when I received my first order in the morning to go into the battle. I crossed over the road, as ordered, but could find no one there to give me any information as to who gave the order or what was required. This was late in the afternoon, and the battle soon after ended.

I take great pleasure in remarking that my command, as a whole, behaved with great coolness and gallantry.

My loss during the day was 2 killed (Sergt. Thomas E. Dawkins and Private James Rogers, who fell while at their posts faithfully performing their duty), Privates Burr Miller and E. Shirley, mortally wounded, and 15 others wounded, some severely and some slightly. Lieut. H. F. Scaife was among the number wounded, and was compelled, though reluctantly, to leave the field, from the effect of his injuries. Sergt. B. T. Glenn continued to work his piece long after receiving a very severe and painful wound, and left, at last, with much mortification.

I lost 15 horses killed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. BOYCE,

Captain Light Battery, South Carolina Volunteers.

Brig. Gen. N. G. EVANS.

CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 20, 1862.

GENERAL: In all the battles in which my battery has been engaged, the officers under my command, viz, Lieuts. B. A. Jeter, S. W. Porter, H. F. Scaife, and William Munro, have done their duty promptly, bravely, and skillfully. The latter-named gentleman was dangerously wounded at Rappahannock Station, and has not been in any of the battles since that time. The non-commissioned officers—Sergts. B. T. Glenn, William D. Humphries, James Bunch, and J. K. Young; Corporals Rutland, Byrd, Watts, and Schartle—and Privates C. T. Scaife, Charles Garner, Charles [A.] Hodges, Preston Shirley, John W. Simpson, E. [D.] Gonde-lock, Alexander Sim, L. H. Sims, Willis Willard, R. F. Peek, John Gossett, and R. M. Franklin have distinguished themselves for gallantry in the various engagements in which they have participated.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. BOYCE,

Captain Light Battery.

Brig. Gen. N. G. EVANS.

No. 260.

Report of Col. F. W. McMaster, Seventeenth South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 20, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to your orders to report the action of the Seventeenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, in the battles in which it has been engaged since it came to Virginia, I have the honor to report:*

* * * * *

BOONSBOROUGH.

Sunday evening, September 14, about 4 o'clock, after a most fatiguing march, under which some of our men broke down, the brigade took position on the slope of a mountain on the east side of the turnpike. Soon after we had halted, the enemy advanced upon us in overwhelming numbers. After fighting for about an hour, and after the other regiments of the brigade had broken and retired, and we were about being flanked by the enemy, I ordered my regiment to retire, firing. After we began the retreat, we were so unfortunate as to lose our gallant lieutenant-colonel (R. S. Means), who was shot through the thigh. I detailed four men to bear him off, but he magnanimously refused to allow them to make the effort, as the enemy was in a short distance of him and still advancing.

I succeeded in forming a new line of battle, on a knoll about 300 yards in rear of the first line, but was soon flanked by the enemy and compelled to retire. I brought off with me 36 men, rank and file, in order. I was soon ordered by Major Sorrel to form on the left of General Jenkins' brigade; but before we were able to do so night overtook us, and, under the order of General Evans, we retired to the turnpike.

In this battle we had engaged—

Officers	10
Rank and file and ambulance corps.....	131
Total	141

[The following were the casualties:]

Number of killed.....	7
Number of severely wounded.....	13
Number of slightly wounded.....	24
Number of missing.....	17
Total	61

SHARPSBURG.

Tuesday, September 16, we were subjected to a severe shelling at Sharpsburg, and lost 1 man killed and 6 wounded.

In the afternoon, by order of Colonel Stevens, I took my regiment and the Holcombe Legion, in all about 100 men, and moved forward about half a mile to support the skirmishers of Jenkins' brigade and of a Georgia regiment.

About 1 o'clock Wednesday, September 17, the skirmishers were driven in, and, with the assistance of Captain [H. D. D.] Twiggs (a most noble and gallant officer), of the First Georgia Regiment, I suc-

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 632-634.

ceeded in rallying 40 or 50 of the skirmishers, and formed them on my left. In a short time I was informed by a lieutenant of a Louisiana artillery company that a battery of the enemy had proved quite destructive to his battery, and that he would be forced to discontinue firing unless it was silenced. I immediately sent out about 25 volunteers, who silenced the battery of the enemy for some time.

About 3 p. m. a brigade of the enemy flanked my command on the right, and, after firing a few moments, the Holcombe Legion and a few of the Seventeenth Regiment, in spite of my efforts, broke and ran. I then ordered the remainder of my command to retire to an apple orchard, about 200 yards in rear, where, with 40 or 50 men, made up mostly of my regiment and a few Georgians and Palmetto Sharpshooters, I fought the enemy for half an hour or more. Being flanked on both sides, I retired to a stone house adjoining, which I converted into a fort, and fought for some time, until Drayton's brigade, on the right, and Jenkins' brigade, on the left, had completely abandoned the ground, and the enemy had almost entirely surrounded my little band. When resistance on our part was entirely futile, I gave the order to retreat, and the enemy entered the house and took Captain Twiggs and 10 of my men prisoners in three minutes after I left.

The number of men of the Seventeenth Regiment engaged on Wednesday was as follows:

Officers	6
Rank and file and ambulance corps.....	53
Total	59

[The following were the casualties:]

Number of killed.....	4
Number of severely wounded.....	4
Number of slightly wounded.....	8
Number of missing.....	3

Total (Tuesday and Wednesday)..... 19

After I retreated to Sharpsburg it was near night, and I could not assemble my men in sufficient numbers to do any good. As an evidence of the work we did this day, some of the men shot as high as 60 rounds.

Accompanying this report are exhibits* giving the names of the men engaged in the battles of Manassas, Boonsborough, and Sharpsburg; also lists* of the killed, wounded, and missing.

Respectfully submitted.

F. W. McMASTER,

Colonel Seventeenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

General N. G. EVANS.

No. 261.

Reports of Col. W. H. Wallace, Eighteenth South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 21, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In pursuance of orders from brigade headquarters, I have the honor to report that on September 14, while a battle was being fought

* Not found.

between the Confederate forces and the enemy on South Mountain, near Boonsborough, in Maryland, the Eighteenth South Carolina Volunteers was placed in position on the left of the turnpike road crossing the mountain from Boonsborough, and near and just beyond the summit of the mountain. Skirmishers were in front of us engaging the enemy, and were slowly retiring toward our line. General Rodes' brigade, some distance to our left, being hard pressed by the enemy, we were, at this juncture, ordered to its support. When the Eighteenth South Carolina Volunteers arrived near the right of this brigade, it was discovered to be retiring. Under orders from Colonel Stevens, commanding the brigade, the Eighteenth was then ordered to change front forward on first company and advance, with the view of taking a column of the enemy in flank which was advancing upon the point first occupied by the Eighteenth, and which it had left to go to Rodes' support. A sharp engagement ensued, when, a heavy column of the enemy appearing upon our left flank, and the enemy, continuing to press upon Rodes' brigade, were gaining ground toward our rear, the Eighteenth was ordered to face back toward the top of the mountain and form on the right of the Twenty-second South Carolina Volunteers. The enemy advancing, we engaged them in this position until, the troops upon the left giving away, the enemy gained a point from which they enfiladed us again. Whereupon the regiment fell back to the turnpike, where it remained until the march to Sharpsburg began.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

W. H. WALLACE,

Colonel Eighteenth South Carolina Volunteers.

Captain [A. L.] EVANS.

CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 17, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders from brigade headquarters to regimental commanders to report the operations of their regiments in the battle of Sharpsburg, I respectfully report:—

On the morning of September 17, at daylight, the Eighteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, under my command, was placed by Colonel Stevens, acting brigadier-general, in a position immediately in front of Sharpsburg and to the left of the turnpike leading from Sharpsburg to Antietam Creek, and constituting the extreme left of Major-General Longstreet's corps. Here the regiment remained in supporting distance of a succession of batteries that occupied two hills in its front, and subjected to a heavy fire of shells and shot from the batteries of the enemy until afternoon. Although the men were, to a great extent, sheltered from the fire of the enemy by the brow of the hill below which they were lying, yet several were wounded in this position.

As well as I could judge, about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Colonel Stevens (acting brigadier-general), being under the impression that a charge was being attempted by the enemy upon a battery in position on the second hill, immediately in our front, ordered the regiment forward to repel the charge. The regiment moved rapidly by the left flank around the hill upon which they had been lying, and, while ascending the hill upon which the battery was placed that was being charged, formed in line of battle and advanced to the battery, when it was discovered that the battery had succeeded in defending itself and had driven off the enemy. The regiment then took position close to and immediately upon the left flank of the battery in the edge of a corn-field.

After occupying this position but a short time, and the battery having retired under orders from Colonel Stevens, the regiment was deployed as skirmishers, and advanced over the hill to repel the advance of a heavy body of skirmishers thrown forward by the enemy. Our direction of advance was toward the turnpike leading from Sharpsburg toward the bridge across Antietam Creek, and by a rapid movement we gained a rail fence running nearly parallel with the turnpike. This position we held against a very largely superior force of the enemy for a considerable time, when Colonel Stevens, who was upon the left of our line, seeing the left was beginning to suffer severely, ordered the whole line to retreat to a stone fencesome distance in our rear and upon the road running in a northwesterly direction from Sharpsburg. This retreat was accomplished under a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, from which the regiment sustained some damage. Almost immediately the regiment was reduced to a handful of men; was reformed and taken back to the position from which it had been ordered to retreat, and, by the aid of Captain Boyce's battery, held the position until night put an end to the contest.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. WALLACE,

Colonel Eighteenth South Carolina Volunteers.

Captain [A. L.] EVANS.

No. 262.

Report of Maj. M. Hilton, Twenty-second South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 15, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders, I herewith give you as correct an account as can possibly be given of the part the Twenty-second South Carolina Volunteers assumed in the engagements during the months of August and September, commencing at the Rappahannock River on August 23; also at South Mountain, or Boonsborough, Md., and in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, Md., from September 15 to 18.*

* * * * *

BATTLE OF BOONSBOROUGH (OR SOUTH MOUNTAIN).

[On September 14] the regiment marched from Hagerstown, Md. (Lieut. Col. Thomas C. Watkins in command), to South Mountain; reached there about 4 p. m. Found General D. H. Hill's division on the right of the road, engaging the enemy. This regiment was ordered to the left of the road, and marched around the mountain, then filed by left across the mountain, then by right flank forward, when we came in contact with the enemy and immediately opened on them, the enemy occupying a very favorable position against us. After engaging them for about half an hour, we were ordered to fall back, which we did some 30 yards, though in some confusion, Lieut. Col. T. C. Watkins calling to the men to rally to their colors and fall into line. While thus exposing himself, and, having succeeded in forming the regiment in line of battle, he fell, struck by a musket-ball in the head. Thus fell a brave and skillful officer at the head of his command, encouraging and rallying his men with the last breath of life. This misfortune caused the regiment to fall into con-

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 636, 637.

fusion. I then assumed the command, rallying the regiment three times, but the pressure from the enemy was such that it was impossible to hold our positions, and finally fell back to the main road leading to Boonsborough, and there formed under the cover of a fence, where we remained until ordered to fall back on Sharpsburg, it now being night.*

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

After falling back from Boonsborough, on Monday (15th) reached Sharpsburg, and formed line of battle by 10 a. m. on main road leading from Boonsborough to Sharpsburg. During this day the principal services performed by the regiment was to support Captain Boyce's battery of light artillery, and other batteries.

The only casualty was Lieut. R. B. Hughes, Company A, wounded on the right hip by a fragment of a shell.

On Tuesday, the 16th, the regiment held the same position as on the 15th, its services being the same during the day. At night the regiment went on picket service in front of our batteries. During the day L. P. Gordon, private, Company E, was wounded by a fragment of a shell on the right thigh. The regiment acted as skirmishers up to Wednesday evening, the 18th; during most of the time was between the fires of our own and the enemy's batteries, and exposed to the heavy and continuous shelling of the enemy. At one time the enemy advanced their batteries, and our pickets fell back, but our own batteries played on the enemy with such effect that they were forced to retire. Our regiment then resumed its old position until about 4 p. m., when the enemy again advanced with large brigades. I ordered the pickets to fire and fall back on the Eighteenth and Twenty-third South Carolina Regiments, which was done, and the engagement became general. After night set in and our ammunition had given out, we fell back beyond Sharpsburg, for rest and refreshment.

Next day, Thursday, the 18th, marched back to the battle-field and occupied the position we held the day before, and remained, skirmishing with the enemy, until night. About 10 p. m. was ordered to draw in my pickets, which was done, and about 11 p. m. rejoined the brigade near the Potomac River.

Very respectfully,

M. HILTON,

Maj., Comdg. Twenty-second Regiment South Carolina Vols.

Capt. A. L. EVANS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Evans' Brigade.

No. 263.

Reports of Capt. S. A. Durham, Twenty-third South Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

OCTOBER 16, 1862.

GENERAL: By order of Col. P. F. Stevens, commanding brigade at Boonsborough, Md., on September 14, the Twenty-third Regiment, of which I was in command, took position on the left of the brigade. We were carried into action left in front, which threw our right upon the

* Nominal list of casualties reports 1 officer (Lieut. E. J. Calvert) and 9 men killed, 6 officers and 51 men wounded, and 4 men missing.

left of a small road leading from the main turnpike, the left extending along the summit of the mountain. We were ordered to advance down the mountain, and did so for some distance. We then formed line of battle. At this point we were met by our pickets, who were retiring, the enemy advancing in force. I ordered the regiment to lie down. The enemy still advancing, we opened fire upon them. Our position was held until the enemy, in heavy force, both upon our extreme left and in front, were rapidly advancing and quite near. As the regiment was left entirely unsupported at that time, I ordered them to fall back, and we then formed upon the Twenty-second South Carolina. The enemy were still advancing and were attempting to flank us upon the left, and would probably have succeeded but for the timely support of some of our forces, who appeared upon the left. We then held our position until we were again left unsupported, and, the enemy still advancing in heavy force, I then ordered the regiment to retire a short distance, where I was met by General Rodes, who ordered me to form the regiment and hold my position. I did so, when Colonel Stevens, coming up, ordered me to form on the left of the Sixth Alabama Regiment, Colonel Gordon commanding, and to follow that regiment. I fell back with Colonel Gordon to the foot of the mountain, and then formed line of battle and remained in that position until after dark, when we were ordered to retire.

The officers and men behaved with great gallantry, and it gives me pleasure to state that they were perfectly cool under fire and did their duty nobly.

Subjoined I respectfully submit a statement of the killed, wounded, and missing.*

Yours, respectfully,

S. A. DURHAM,

Captain Company H, Commanding Regiment.

Brig. Gen. N. G. EVANS,

Commanding Brigade, South Carolina Volunteers.

OCTOBER 16, 1862.

GENERAL: At Sharpsburg, on September 15 and 16, our regiment was under fire, which on the 16th was quite heavy. We were not, however, called into action until Wednesday, the 17th, when the regiment was deployed as skirmishers and advanced to within 100 yards of the enemy's pickets, where we held our position until all of the ammunition had been exhausted, when we were ordered to retire by Colonel Stevens, who was in command of the brigade.

Having been wounded in the fight of Sunday, the 14th, I was not able to command the regiment the whole of Wednesday, and left it in charge of Lieut. E. R. White.

So far as I can learn, the officers and men reflected great credit upon their native State.

Subjoined will be found a list of the casualties.†

Yours, respectfully,

S. A. DURHAM,

Captain Company H, Commanding Regiment.

Brig. Gen. N. G. EVANS,

Commanding Brigade, South Carolina Volunteers.

* List reports 4 men killed, 1 officer and 15 men wounded, and 4 men missing.

† List reports 6 men killed, 1 officer and 5 men wounded, and 1 man missing.

No. 264.

Reports of Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps, of operations September 5-27.

NEAR HALLTOWN,
September 14, 1862—8.15 p. m.

COLONEL: Through God's blessing, the advance, which commenced this evening, has been successful thus far, and I look to Him for complete success to-morrow. The advance has been directed to be resumed at dawn to-morrow morning. I am thankful that our loss has been small. Your dispatch respecting the movements of the enemy and the importance of concentration has been received. Can you not connect the headquarters of the army, by signal, with General McLaws?

Respectfully,

T. J. JACKSON,
Major-General.

Col. R. H. CHILTON.

NEAR 8 A. M., *September 15, 1862.*

GENERAL: Through God's blessing, Harper's Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered. As Hill's troops have borne the heaviest part in the engagement, he will be left in command until the prisoners and public property shall be disposed of, unless you direct otherwise. The other forces can move off this evening so soon as they get their rations. To what point shall they move? I write at this time in order that you may be apprised of the condition of things. You may expect to hear from me again to-day after I get more information respecting the number of prisoners, &c.

Respectfully,

T. J. JACKSON,
Major-General.

General R. E. LEE.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
September 16, 1862.

COLONEL: Yesterday God crowned our army with another brilliant success in the surrender at Harper's Ferry of Brigadier-General White and 11,000 troops, an equal number of small arms, 73 pieces of artillery, and about 200 wagons. In addition to other stores, there is a large amount of camp and garrison equipage. Our loss was very small. The meritorious conduct of officers and men will be mentioned in a more extended report.

I am, colonel, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON,
Major-General.

Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.—The stores will be taken possession of by my chief staff officer, with instructions to turn them over to yours. Please direct your chief quartermaster and chief of ordnance to come and receive them, or else

give instructions what disposition to make of them. I understand there are only about two days' rations. If this be the case I will give them to the prisoners.

Respectfully,

T. J. JACKSON,
Major-General.

P. S.—It is said that two regiments escaped up the Potomac on the Maryland side, last night, from the Ferry. Cannot your cavalry intercept them?

HEADQUARTERS OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EWELL,
July —, 1863.

MAJOR: I herewith forward to you the last of General Jackson's official reports. I found the two missing pages, and had the whole re-copied.*

You will now oblige me by having my resignation approved by General Lee and forwarded to the Secretary of War.

I am, truly yours,

CHAS. J. FAULKNER.

[Inclosure.]

HDQRS. SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
April 23, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit a report of the operations of my command from September 5 to 27, 1862, embracing the capture of Harper's Ferry, the engagement at Shepherdstown, and so much of the battle of Sharpsburg as was fought by the troops under my command:

My command comprised A. P. Hill's division, consisting of the brigades of Branch, Gregg, Field (Colonel Brockenbrough commanding), Pender, Archer, and Colonel Thomas, with the batteries of the division under Lieut. Col. R. L. Walker; Ewell's division, under Brigadier-General Lawton, consisting of the brigades of Early, Hays (Colonel Strong), Trimble (Colonel Walker), and Lawton (Colonel Douglass), with the artillery under Major [A. R.] Courtney, and Jackson's division, under Brigadier-General Starke, consisting of the brigades of Winder (Colonel Grigsby), Jones (Col. B. T. Johnson), Taliaferro (Colonel Warren), and Starke (Colonel Stafford), with the artillery under Major Shumaker, chief of artillery.

On September 5 my command crossed the Potomac at White's Ford, and bivouacked that night near the Three Springs, in the State of Maryland. Not having any cavalry with me except the Black Horse, under Captain Randolph, I directed him, after crossing the Potomac, to take part of his company and scout to the right, in order to avoid a surprise of the column from that direction. For the thorough and efficient manner in which this duty was discharged, and for the valuable service rendered generally while attached to my headquarters, I desire to make special mention of this company and its officers, Captain Randolph and Lieutenants Payne, Tyle, and Smith, who frequently transmitted orders in the absence of staff officers.

The next day we arrived in the vicinity of Frederick City. Jackson's division encamped near its suburbs, except the brigade of General

* See Morrison's letter, transmitting Jackson's report of operations August 15 to September 3, Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, p. 641.

Jones (Col. Bradley T. Johnson commanding), which was posted in the city as a provost guard. Ewell's and Hill's divisions occupied positions near the railroad bridge over the Monocacy, guarding the approaches from Washington City.

In obedience to instructions from the commanding general, and for the purpose of capturing the Federal forces and stores then at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, my command left the vicinity of Frederick City on the 10th, and, passing rapidly through Middletown, Boonsborough, and Williamsport, recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, at Light's Ford, on the 11th. General Hill moved with his division on the turnpike direct from Williamsport to Martinsburg. The divisions of Jackson and Ewell proceeded toward the North Mountain Depot, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, about 7 miles northwest of Martinsburg. They bivouacked that night in the vicinity of the depot. In order to prevent the Federal forces then at Martinsburg from escaping westward unobserved, Major Myers, commanding the cavalry, sent part of his troops as far south as the Berkeley and Hampshire turnpike. Brigadier-General White, who was in command of the Federal forces at Martinsburg, becoming advised of our approach, evacuated the place on the night of the 11th and retreated to Harper's Ferry.

On the morning of the 12th our cavalry entered the town, as, in the course of the day, did the main body of my command. At this point, abandoned quartermaster's, commissary, and ordnance stores fell into our hands.

Proceeding thence toward Harper's Ferry, about 11 o'clock on the following morning (13th), the head of our column came in view of the enemy drawn up in force upon Bolivar Heights. General Hill, who was in the advance, went into camp near Halltown, about 2 miles from the enemy's position. The two other divisions encamped near by.

The commanding general having directed Major-General McLaws to move, with his own and General R. H. Anderson's divisions, to take possession of the Maryland Heights, overlooking Harper's Ferry, and Brig. Gen. J. G. Walker, pursuing a different route, to cross the Potomac and move up that river on the Virginia side and occupy the Loudoun Heights, both for the purpose of co-operating with me, it became necessary, before making the attack, to ascertain whether they were in position. Failing to learn the fact by signals, a courier was dispatched to each of those points for the required information. During the night the courier to the Loudoun Heights returned with a message from General Walker that he was in position. In the mean time General McLaws had attacked the Federal force posted to defend the Maryland Heights; had routed it and taken possession of that commanding position. The Potomac River flowed between the positions respectively occupied by General McLaws and myself, and the Shenandoah separated me from General Walker, and it became advisable, as the speediest mode of communication, to resort to signals. Before the necessary orders were thus transmitted the day was far advanced. The enemy had, by fortifications, strengthened the naturally strong position which he occupied along Bolivar Heights, extending from near the Shenandoah to the Potomac. McLaws and Walker, being thus separated from the enemy by intervening rivers, could afford no assistance beyond the fire of their artillery and guarding certain avenues of escape to the enemy, and, from the reports received from them by signals, in consequence of the distance and range of their guns, not much could be expected from their artillery so long as the enemy retained his advanced position on Bolivar Heights.

In the afternoon General Hill was ordered to move along the left bank of the Shenandoah, turn the enemy's left, and enter Harper's Ferry. General Lawton, commanding Ewell's division, was directed to move along the turnpike for the purpose of supporting General Hill and of otherwise operating against the enemy to his left. General J. R. Jones, commanding Jackson's division, was directed, with one of his brigades and a battery of artillery, to make a demonstration against the enemy's right, while the remaining part of his command, as a reserve, moved along the turnpike. Major [T. B.] Massie (Twelfth Virginia Cavalry), commanding the cavalry, was directed to keep upon our left flank, for the purpose of preventing the enemy from escaping. Brigadier-General Walker guarded against an escape across the Shenandoah River. Fearing lest the enemy should attempt to escape across the Potomac, by means of signals I called the attention of Major-General McLaws, commanding on Maryland Heights, to the propriety of guarding against such an attempt. The demonstration on the left against the enemy's right was made by Winder's brigade, Colonel Grigsby commanding. It was ordered to secure a commanding hill to the left of the heights near the Potomac. Promptly dispersing some cavalry, this eminence, from which the batteries of Poague and Carpenter subsequently did such admirable execution, was secured without difficulty. In execution of the orders given Major-General Hill, he moved obliquely to the right until he struck the Shenandoah River. Observing an eminence crowning the extreme left of the enemy's line occupied by infantry, but without artillery, and protected only by an abatis of fallen timber, Pender, Archer, and Brockenbrough were directed to gain the crest of that hill, while Branch and Gregg were directed to march along the river and during the night to take advantage of the ravines cutting the precipitous banks of the river and establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works. Thomas followed as a reserve. The execution of the first movement was intrusted to Brigadier-General Pender, who accomplished it with slight resistance, and during the night Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, chief of artillery of Hill's division, brought up the batteries of Captains Pegram, McIntosh, Davidson, Braxton, and Crenshaw, and established them upon the position thus gained. Branch and Gregg also gained the positions indicated for them, and day-break found them in rear of the enemy's line of defense.

As directed, Brigadier-General Lawton, commanding Ewell's division, moved on the turnpike in three columns, one on the road and another on each side of it, until he reached Halltown, when he formed line of battle and advanced to the woods on School-House Hill. The division laid on their arms during the night, Lawton and Trimble being in line on the right of the road and Hays on the left, with Early immediately in his rear.

During the night, Colonel Crutchfield, my chief of artillery, crossed ten guns of Ewell's division over the Shenandoah and established them on its right bank, so as to enfilade the enemy's position on Bolivar Heights and take his nearest and most formidable fortifications in reverse. The other batteries of Ewell's division were placed in position on School-House Hill, on each side of the road.

At dawn, September 15, General Lawton advanced his division to the front of the woods. Lawton's brigade, Colonel Douglass commanding, moved by flank to the bottom between School-House Hill and Bolivar Heights, to support the advance of Major-General Hill. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker opened a rapid enfilade fire from all his batteries at about 1,000 yards range. The batteries on School-House Hill attacked the

enemy's lines in front. In a short time the guns of Captains Brown, [A. W.] Garber,* Latimer, and Dement, under the direction of Colonel Crutchfield, opened from the rear. The batteries of Poague and Carpenter opened fire upon the enemy's right. The artillery upon the Loudoun Heights, of Brigadier-General [John G.] Walker's command, under Captain [Thomas B.] French, which had silenced the enemy's artillery near the superintendent's house on the preceding afternoon, again opened upon Harper's Ferry, and also some guns of Major-General McLaws from the Maryland Heights. In an hour the enemy's fire seemed to be silenced, and the batteries of General Hill were ordered to cease their fire, which was the signal for storming the works. General Pender had commenced his advance, when, the enemy again opening, Pegram and Crenshaw moved forward their batteries and poured a rapid fire into the enemy. The white flag was now displayed, and shortly afterward Brigadier-General White (the commanding officer, Col. D. S. Miles, having been mortally wounded), with a garrison of about 11,000 men, surrendered as prisoners of war. Under this capitulation we took possession of 73 pieces of artillery, some 13,000 small-arms, and other stores. Liberal terms were granted to General White and the officers under his command in the surrender, which, I regret to say, do not seem, from subsequent events, to have been properly appreciated by their Government. Leaving General Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops and take the requisite steps for securing the captured stores, I moved, in obedience to orders from the commanding general, to rejoin him in Maryland with the remaining divisions of my command. By a severe night's march we reached the vicinity of Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th.

By direction of the commanding general, I advanced on the enemy, leaving Sharpsburg to the right, and took position to the left of General Longstreet, near a Dunkard church, Ewell's division (General Lawton commanding) forming the right, and Jackson's division (General J. R. Jones commanding) forming the left of my command. Major-General Stuart, with the cavalry, was on my left. Jackson's division (General Jones commanding) was formed partly in an open field and partly in the woods, with its right resting upon the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike; Winder's and Jones' brigades being in front, and Taliaferro's and Starke's brigades a short distance in their rear, and Poague's battery on a knoll in front. Ewell's division followed that of Jackson to the woods on the left of the road near the church. Early's brigade was then formed on the left of the line of Jackson's division, to guard its flank, and Hays' brigade was formed in its rear. Lawton's and Trimble's brigades remained during the evening with arms stacked near the church. A battery of the enemy, some 500 yards to the front of Jackson's division, opening fire upon a battery to the right, was silenced in twenty minutes by a rapid and well-directed fire from Poague's battery. Other batteries of the enemy opened soon after upon our lines, and the firing continued until after dark.

About 10 p. m. Lawton's and Trimble's brigades advanced to the front to relieve the command of Brigadier-General Hood, on the left of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, which had been more or less engaged during the evening. Trimble's brigade was posted on the right, next to Ripley's, of D. H. Hill's division, and Lawton's on the left.

The troops slept that night upon their arms, disturbed by the occasional fire of the pickets of the two armies, who were in close proximity to each other.

* Lieut. A. W. Garber, commanding Staunton Artillery.

At the first dawn of day skirmishing commenced in front, and in a short time the Federal batteries, so posted on the opposite side of the Antietam as to enfilade my line, opened a severe and damaging fire. This was vigorously replied to by the batteries of Poague, Carpenter, Brockenbrough, Raine, Caskie, and Wooding.

About sunrise the Federal infantry advanced in heavy force to the edge of the wood on the eastern side of the turnpike, driving in our skirmishers. Batteries were opened in front from the wood with shell and canister, and our troops became exposed for near an hour to a terrific storm of shell, canister, and musketry. General Jones having been compelled to leave the field, the command of Jackson's division devolved upon General Starke. With heroic spirit our lines advanced to the conflict, and maintained their position, in the face of superior numbers, with stubborn resolution, sometimes driving the enemy before them and sometimes compelled to fall back before their well-sustained and destructive fire. Fresh troops from time to time relieved the enemy's ranks, and the carnage on both sides was terrific.

At this early hour General Starke was killed. Colonel Douglass, commanding Lawton's brigade, was also killed. General Lawton, commanding division, and Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, were severely wounded. More than half of the brigades of Lawton and Hays were either killed or wounded, and more than a third of Trimble's, and all the regimental commanders in those brigades, except two, were killed or wounded. Thinned in their ranks and exhausted of their ammunition, Jackson's division and the brigades of Lawton, Hays, and Trimble retired to the rear, and Hood, of Longstreet's command, again took the position from which he had been before relieved.

In the mean time General Stuart moved his artillery to a position nearer to the main command, and more in our rear. Early, being now directed, in consequence of the disability of General Lawton, to take command of Ewell's division, returned with his brigade (with the exception of the Thirtieth Virginia Regiment, which remained with General Stuart) to the piece of wood where he had left the other brigades of his division when he was separated from them. Here he found that the enemy had advanced his infantry near the wood in which was the Dunkard church, and had planted a battery across the turnpike near the edge of the wood and an open field, and that the brigades of Lawton, Hays, and Trimble had fallen back some distance to the rear. Finding here Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, with a portion of Jackson's division, which formed on his left, he determined to maintain his position there if re-enforcements could be sent to his support, of which he was promptly assured. Colonel Grigsby, with his small command, kept in check the advance of the enemy on the left flank, while General Early attacked with great vigor and gallantry the column on his right and front. The force in front was giving way under this attack when another heavy column of Federal troops were seen moving across the plateau on his left flank. By this time the expected re-enforcements (consisting of Semmes' and Anderson's brigades and a part of Barksdale's, of McLaws' division) arrived, and the whole, including Grigsby's command, now united, charged upon the enemy, checking his advance, then driving him back with great slaughter entirely from and beyond the wood, and gaining possession of our original position. No further advance, beyond demonstrations, was made by the enemy on the left.

In the afternoon, in obedience to instructions from the commanding general, I moved to the left with a view of turning the Federal right, but I found his numerous artillery so judiciously established in their front and extending so near to the Potomac, which here makes a re-

markable bend, as will be seen by reference to the map* herewith annexed, as to render it inexpedient to hazard the attempt.

In this movement Major-General Stuart had the advance and acted his part well. This officer rendered valuable service throughout the day. His bold use of artillery secured for us an important position, which, had the enemy possessed, might have commanded our left.

At the close of the day my troops held the ground which they had occupied in the morning. The next day we remained in position awaiting another attack. The enemy continued in heavy force west of the Antietam, on our left, but made no further movement to the attack.

I refer you to the report of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill for the operations of his command in the battle of Sharpsburg. Arriving upon the battlefield from Harper's Ferry at 2.30 o'clock of the 17th, he reported to the commanding general, and was by him directed to take position on the right. I have not embraced the movements of his division nor his killed and wounded of that action in my report.

Early on the morning of the 19th we recrossed the Potomac River into Virginia near Shepherdstown. The promptitude and success with which this movement was effected reflects the highest credit upon the skill and energy of Major Harman, chief quartermaster. In the evening the command moved on the road leading to Martinsburg, except Lawton's (Colonel Lamar, of the Sixty-first Georgia, commanding), which was left on the Potomac Heights.

On the same day the enemy appeared in considerable force on the northern side of the Potomac, and commenced planting heavy batteries on its heights. In the evening the Federals commenced crossing under the protection of their guns, driving off Lawton's brigade and General Pendleton's artillery. By morning a considerable force had crossed over. Orders were dispatched to Generals Early and Hill, who had advanced some 4 miles on the Martinsburg road, to return and drive back the enemy. General Hill, who was in the advance, as he approached the town formed his line of battle in two lines, the first composed of the brigades of Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, under command of General Gregg, and the second of Lane's, Archer's, and Brockenbrough's brigades, under command of General Archer. General Early, with the brigades of Early, Trimble, and Hays, took position in the wood on the right and left of the road leading to the ford. The Federal infantry lined the high banks of the Virginia shore, while their artillery, formidable in numbers and weight of metal, crowned the opposite heights of the Potomac. General Hill's division advanced with great gallantry against the Federal infantry in the face of a continued discharge of shot and shell from their batteries. The Federals, massing in front of Pender, poured a heavy fire into his ranks, and then extended with a view to turn his left. Archer promptly formed on Pender's left, when a simultaneous charge was made, which drove the enemy into the river, followed by an appalling scene of the destruction of human life; 200 prisoners were taken. This position on the bank of the river we continued to hold that day, although exposed to the enemy's guns and within range of his sharpshooters, posted near the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Our infantry remained at the river until relieved by cavalry, under General Fitzhugh Lee.

On the evening of the 20th the command moved from Shepherdstown and encamped near the Opequon, in the vicinity of Martinsburg. We remained near Martinsburg until the 27th, when we moved to Bunker Hill, in the county of Berkeley.

* Not found.

The official lists of casualties of my command during the period embraced in this report will show that we sustained a loss of 38 officers killed, 171 wounded; of 313 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, 1,859 wounded, and 57 missing, making a total loss of 2,438 killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. J. JACKSON,
Lieutenant-General.

General R. E. LEE.

No. 265.

Report of Capt. J. L. Bartlett, Signal Officer, C. S. Army, of operations about Harper's Ferry, W. Va.

SUNDAY, September 14, 1862.

My signal-flag was up at daylight, and my glass bearing on Loudoun Heights after sunrise. Major Paxton sent the following: "Artillery coming up the road to be repaired." Before delivering this message I asked "What artillery and what road?" Major Paxton answered "Walker's, and up mountains." About 10 a. m. comes another dispatch from Loudoun Heights: "Walker has his six rifle pieces in position. Shall he wait for McLaws?" General Jackson answers "Wait."

General Jackson and Colonel Smead then come to signal station, and the general dictates the following:

SUNDAY, September 14, 1862.

Generals McLAWS and WALKER:

If you can, establish batteries to drive the enemy from the hill west of Bolivar and on which Barbour's house is, and any other position where he may be damaged by your artillery, and let me know when you are ready to open your batteries, and give me any suggestions by which you can operate against the enemy. Cut the telegraph line down the Potomac if it is not already done. Keep a good lookout against a Federal advance from below. Similar instructions will be sent to General Walker. I do not desire any of the batteries to open until all are ready on both sides of the river, except you should find it necessary, of which you must judge for yourself. I will let you know when to open all the batteries.

T. J. JACKSON,
Major-General, Commanding.

P. S.—If you have not rations, take steps at once to supply yourself; have beef driven to your command, so that you may have enough.

T. J. J.

General Jackson and staff then go to the left. I received soon after the following:

General McLaws informs me that the enemy are in his rear, and that he can do but little more than he has done. I am now ready to open.

General WALKER.

There being no courier at the post, I carry this message to the general, and find him in front on the left. He gives me an answer, and sends Lieutenant Douglas back to signal station with me:

General WALKER:

Do not open until General McLaws notifies me what he can probably effect. Let me know what you can effect with your command upon the enemy.

General JACKSON.

Also—

General McLaws:

Let me know what you can probably effect with your artillery, and also with your entire command. Notify General D. H. Hill, at Middleburg, of the enemy's position, and request him to protect your rear. Send the same message to General Lee, near Hagerstown.

General JACKSON.

The messages next in order came from Loudoun Heights:

General JACKSON:

Walker cannot get position to bear on island.

(No signature; probably from Major Paxton.)

General JACKSON:

I am informed that the enemy are advancing by Purcellville, and have possession of the passes from the valley.

General WALKER.

Generals WALKER and McLAWS:

Fire at such positions of the enemy as will be most effective.

General JACKSON.

Our artillery opens from this side in front of Bolivar; Walker opens from Loudoun Heights, and Yankees are seen coming down on west side of Bolivar to escape Walker's fire, but meet an equal one from our artillery on the left of our line.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. —. }

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
September 14, 1862.

I. To-day Major-General McLaws will attack so as to sweep with his artillery the ground occupied by the enemy, take his batteries in reverse, and otherwise operate against him, as circumstances may justify.

II. Brigadier-General Walker will take in reverse the battery on the turnpike, and also sweep with his artillery the ground occupied by the enemy, and silence the battery on the island in the Shenandoah should he find a battery there.

III. Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill will move along the left bank of the Shenandoah, and thus turn the enemy's left flank and enter Harper's Ferry.

IV. Brigadier-General Lawton will move along the turnpike for the purpose of supporting General Hill and otherwise operating against the enemy on the left of General Hill.

V. Brigadier-General Jones will, with one of his brigades and a battery of artillery, make a demonstration against the enemy's right; the remaining part of his division will constitute the reserve and move along the turnpike.

By order of Major-General Jackson:

WM. L. JACKSON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

If any other dispatches or orders were sent at Harper's Ferry it was done at other posts than mine. Messages were doubtless sent from Loudoun Heights to Maryland Heights between Generals McLaws and Walker. Captain Adams, who was the only commissioned signal officer there, has doubtless full reports of those and all the messages and orders, it being his duty to keep them. I suggest that he be applied to for them.

JOS. L. BARTLETT.

P. S.—After the surrender of Harper's Ferry I was ordered by Major Paxton to remove my station to Barbour's house. I did so after notifying Captain Adams' post, on Loudoun Heights, of the move, telling them to look out for my flag at that point. After locating my station at that place, however, and waving my flag for several hours, I could not get attention from Loudoun Heights to send a message, sent to me by Major Paxton, for General Walker to prepare rations and be ready to march. I afterward learned that the post had been evacuated at that time. Thus ended the signal service at Harper's Ferry.

J. L. B.

No. 266.

*Report of Maj. John A. Harman, C. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster, of captured property during the second and third quarters, 1862.*LIST OF PROPERTY CAPTURED AND TURNED IN TO THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER
VALLEY DISTRICT DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD QUARTERS.

Quires letter paper.....	94	Horses	323
Quires cap paper	64½	Mules	21
Quires note paper	10	Wagons	19
Envelopes	3, 425	Sets of lead harness	9
Steel pens	172	Sets of wheel harness	2
Bottles of ink	95	Pairs of traces	87
Bottle of red ink	1	Pairs of artillery traces	13
Bottle of mucilage	1	Halter chains	47
Camp stoves	65	Tar buckets	10
Cooking stoves	2	Collars	61
Tin plates	292	Saddles	12
Spoons	52	Bridles	21
Tin cups	20	Artillery saddles	27
Table knives	80	Artillery valises	6
Table forks	31	Leg guards	2
Packs of cards	12	Pairs of artillery harness	19
Anvils	8	Breast straps	5
Set of blacksmith tools	1	Breeching	5
Crowbars	33	Feed pockets	16
Vises	7	Wagon bolts	25
Rasps	575	Wagon hammers	320
Files	12	Wheelbarrows	8
Hatchets	31	Axes	13
Cross-cut saws	15	Helves	127
Auger	1	Picks	277
Hammers	10	Shovels	212
Sets of carpenter's tools	3	Spades	82
Chests	5	Mess-pans	50
Iron maul	1	Camp kettles	71
Peg-cutter	1	Skillet-lid	1
Pairs of shoes	305	Buckets	144
Pairs of ladies' shoes	2	Yards of cotton cloth	545
Pairs of misses' shoes	2	Horseshoes	3, 816
Pairs of children's shoes	3	Pounds of horseshoes	14, 061
Oilcloth blankets	30	Pounds of horseshoe nails	860
Blankets	14	Pounds of nails	50
Hats	2	Pounds of spikes	20
Neckties	30	Pounds of rope	303
Boxes of paper collars	7	Feet of picket rope	200
Pairs of socks	90	Pounds of iron	275
Pairs of suspenders	7	Kegs of grease	4
Handkerchiefs	6	Barrel of tar	1
Picket-pins	28	Pounds of leather	5, 300
Pulley-block	1	Cans of oil	1
Lock screw	1	Bundles of telegraph wire	29
Insulators	190	Platform scales	3
Tents	134	Keg of white lead	1

In addition to the above, which is a list of the captured property that came into my possession, a considerable amount came into the hands of the various quartermasters of the command, which, it is supposed, they have reported to Richmond. A large amount of the property captured, however, was not turned into the quartermaster's department at all, the order to turn over such property not having been fully carried out, especially by the cavalry. A very large amount of medical and ordnance stores were captured and sent off by me, for the character and amount

of which I refer you to the heads of those departments. Throughout the corps many worn-out wagons were exchanged for good Yankee ones, the useless ones being left behind.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN A. HARMAN,
Major and Chief Quartermaster Second Corps.

Lieutenant-General JACKSON,
Commanding Second Army Corps.

No. 267.

Report of Maj. W. J. Hawks, C. S. Army, Commissary of Subsistence, of captured property.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT, SECOND ARMY CORPS,
Guiney's Station, Va., February 6, 1863.

GENERAL: The following statement of property captured by your command is as nearly complete as I can make it:

FRONT ROYAL.

Flour	barrels..	85
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WINCHESTER AND MARTINSBURG.

103 head of cattle	pounds, gross..	92,700
Bacon	pounds..	14,637
Hard bread	do..	6,000
Sugar	do..	2,400
Salt	bushels..	350

HARPER'S FERRY.

Salt-pork	pounds..	1,315
Salt-beef	do..	1,545
Bacon	do..	19,267
Hard bread	do..	155,954
Rice	do..	628
Coffee	do..	4,930
Sugar	do..	209
Candles	do..	67
Soap	do..	280
Beans	bushels..	9
Salt	do..	154
Vinegar	gallons..	180
Molasses	do..	80

At McDowell nothing was captured except hard bread, which was issued to troops passing through—an extra ration. At Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harper's Ferry large amounts of supplies were carried off by division wagons, of which no report was made to me. Full rations were issued to 13,000 of the enemy for two days at Harper's Ferry. The issue was made before an inventory was taken.

Very respectfully,

W. J. HAWKS,
Major and Commissary of Subsistence, 2d A. C., Army of N. Va.

Lieutenant-General JACKSON,
Commanding Second Army Corps.

No. 268.

*Reports of Col. S. Crutchfield, C. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, of operations
September 13-19.*

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, SECOND CORPS,
April 16, 1863.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery of this army corps in the capture of Harper's Ferry and battle of Sharpsburg, in September, 1862:

On Saturday, September 13, the command of Lieutenant-General Jackson appeared before Harper's Ferry on the southern side, having approached it from Martinsburg. That day was spent in reconnaissances.

On Sunday a cannonade was opened on the enemy from the batteries of Brig. Gen. John G. Walker, from the Loudoun Heights, and from those of Major-General McLaws, from Maryland Heights. The enemy were strongly intrenched on Bolivar Heights and just around the former house of the superintendent of the armory. At the latter place his fire was pretty well silenced late in the day. Toward the close of the afternoon a general advance was made on the place. Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's division moved along the west bank of the Shenandoah; that of Major-General Ewell, commanded by Brigadier-General Lawton, was on the left of General Hill's, while Jackson's division, commanded by Colonel Grigsby, approached on the road from Harper's Ferry to Shepherdstown. The early approach of night prevented any serious engagement.

During the night, ten guns from the batteries of Captains Dement, Brown, [Lieutenant] Garber, and Latimer were moved up the Shenandoah, and, crossing at Kelly's Ford, moved down on the other side until opposite the left of the enemy's line of intrenchments. This position, although commanded perfectly by Bolivar Heights, yet secured a fire into the rear of the enemy's works on his left, where he had a work with an embrasure battery of four guns, but open in the rear, and the first point of his works to be encountered by Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill. This work gained, his other works were untenable. A road having to be cut for these ten guns prevented their opening at daybreak, as General Jackson had ordered. The attack was begun by a battery of eight guns in front and rather to the right of this work, from the batteries of Captains Pegram, McIntosh, Davidson, and Braxton, of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's division. In a short time the guns of Captains Brown, [Lieutenant] Garber, Latimer, and Dement, being in position, their fire was directed against this work from the rear. Its battery was quickly silenced, the men running from their guns, but returning to them in a short time after the guns directed on the work were brought to bear on the enemy's infantry in his intrenchments. These pieces were, therefore, again directed on the work, and in something less than an hour its fire was completely silenced, and our guns being again turned on the enemy's infantry, they soon began to fall back from their intrenchments in great confusion, and the white flag was raised over their works.

The captured guns being turned over to the quartermaster for removal, I can make no exact return of the number. We had none disabled, and, of course, lost none.

On reaching Shepherdstown late next evening, I met Brig. Gen. W. N. Pendleton, who desired me to return to Harper's Ferry and endeavor to get together batteries of the captured guns and such ammunition as I could and send it to Shepherdstown or the battle-field of Sharpsburg, as our ordnance supplies were getting short and our batteries in an inefficient condition from hard marching and previous fighting. I

therefore returned to Harper's Ferry. After much difficulty I found the quartermaster in charge of the captured guns, and found he had been busy removing them, and in so doing had mismatched the caissons, limbers, and guns to such an extent that after vainly spending half the day at it, I gave up the task of getting together any batteries from among them. The batteries of Captains Brown, Dement, and Latimer had been left at Harper's Ferry, as disabled, on account of the condition of their horses. I therefore had horses turned over to them, filled them up with ammunition, exchanged two of Captain Latimer's 10-pounder Parrotts, whose vent-pieces had burned out in the action of the day before, for two 3-inch rifles of the captured guns, and started them for the battle-field, going on ahead myself. I got there too late in the evening to be able to give any report of the battle. In it, however, we lost no guns. Captain [Charles] Thompson's (then Captain D'Aquin's) battery [Louisiana Guard Artillery] captured one 10-pounder Parrott, which they brought off. In recrossing the Potomac a forge belonging to Captain Crenshaw's battery and a caisson belonging to Captain Brockenbrough's were lost on this side of the river from the sheer exhaustion of the horses, both rolling down a cliff on the side of the road.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. CRUTCHFIELD,

Colonel and Chief of Artillery Second Corps.

Lieut. Col. C. J. FAULKNER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,

September 22, 1862.

GENERAL: I received your order for a report of the batteries of this army corps this morning, and have the honor to submit the following statement of their condition:

1st. In Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's division the condition of the artillery is so satisfactorily set forth in Lieutenant Chamberlayne's report that I submit it as it is.*

2d. In the division commanded by Brig. Gen. J. A. Early, three of his batteries are in excellent order, having been refitted by myself at Harper's Ferry, according to your order to me in Shepherdstown. Another, that of Captain Balthis, will be put in first-rate condition by the securing of the two Napoleon guns I sent them to you for. Two others, those of Captains D'Aquin and Johnson, are disabled from hard service. I have sent them to Martinsburg to recruit their horses and men, by rest, to have their horses shod, &c. If they can get a week or ten days' rest then 30 horses will put them in good order.

3d. In Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division all the artillery is reported unfit for duty. This division has not been associated with us long enough for me to form such an acquaintance with his officers as to enable me to put an entirely reliable estimate upon the judgment of said officers. From the examination I gave to these batteries, I deemed it best to send them back to Martinsburg to refresh men and horses and to shoe the latter. A particular report I sent you by Major Pierson, his chief of artillery.

4th. In Major-General Jackson's own division I submit the report of Major Shumaker, chief of artillery. I have reduced his call for horses to 128 from 204, as I know how scarce they are, and you will find it impossible to supply fully all the demands made on you for them.

* Not found.

I do not consider a forge necessary now for Captain Carpenter, as he can use Captain Poague's. One is needed, however, by Captain Raine and one by Captain Cutshaw. I do not consider that Captain Caskie needs a forge, as he and Captain Cutshaw are attached to the same brigade. Captain Brockenbrough can work the three guns he asks for by turning in his howitzer, and I would be glad to see him get Napoleons. I do not request it, though, if you need them more elsewhere, especially if other batteries can furnish the teams. One of his guns, a 12-pounder Blakely, he reports disabled. The stock was broken in the battle of Sharpsburg, and it was sent to Winchester. If it can be repaired there, or the gun put on another carriage, I would be glad to get it back, and then, by giving Captain B[rockenbrough] two Napoleons and allowing him to turn in his howitzer, he would have a capital battery of four guns, two of them rifled. This is one of our best companies.

Captain Cutshaw has two 12-pounder howitzers, while his caissons are those of 6-pounder guns, and need alteration.

As to the reserve needed by this army corps, I would wish to consult General Jackson before reporting specifically, and as he is now at General Lee's headquarters and may be engaged there some time, I must beg your indulgence for a short time before reporting, which I will do so soon as I see him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. CRUTCHFIELD,

Colonel and Chief of Artillery, Valley District.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM N. PENDLETON,

Commanding Artillery.

[Inclosure.]

HQRS. OF ARTILLERY, JACKSON'S DIV., VALLEY DIST.,

September 22, 1862.

Col. S. CRUTCHFIELD,

Chief of Artillery, Valley District:

SIR: In obedience to your order of yesterday, I have the honor to report the condition of the batteries of this division, their wants, &c., as follows:

Batteries.	Present for duty.				Absent.					Wanted.						
	10-pounder Parrotts.	3-inch rifles.	12-pounder Napoleons.*	12-pounder howitzers.	10-pounder Parrotts.	3-inch rifles.	Blakely rifles.	12-pounder Napoleons.*	6-pounder guns.	Horses.	Forges, horses, and harness.	Forage wagons.	Guns and caissons.	Howitzer caissons.	Wheel harness sets.	Lead harness sets.
Poague's.....	1				1			1	1	25						
Carpenter's.....	1	1	1					1	1	15	1					
Cutshaw's.....		1		2		1				20	1	1		2		
Caskie's†.....																
Rice's.....	1	1	1						1	16	1				4	16
Wooding's.....	1	1							2	8						
Brockenbrough's.....		1		1		1				14			3		4	15
Raine's.....		2		2						30	1					
Total.....	4	7	2	5	2	1	1	1	5	128	4	1	3	2	8	31

* Federal.

† No report.

‡ Iron.

I inclose the reports of the commanding officers of the batteries,* from which this is condensed, from which you will be able to learn the reasons for the separate reports, losses, absence, &c.

Very respectfully,

L. M. SHUMAKER,
Major and Chief of Artillery, Jackson's Division.

No. 269.

Report of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, commanding Ewell's division, of operations September 3-27.

HEADQUARTERS EWELL'S DIVISION,
January 12, 1863.

CAPTAIN: In accordance with instructions from the headquarters of the corps, I submit the following report of the operations of this division since the movement from the neighborhood of Gordonsville, northward, in the month of August last, until it reached Bunker Hill, in September:

This report, however, is necessarily defective in regard to all the other brigades of the division except my own, as there were other division commanders until after the commencement of the battle of Sharpsburg, on September 17—Major-General Ewell having commanded until the night of August 28, when he was wounded in the action near Groveton, and Brigadier-General Lawton having command from that time until he was wounded at the battle of Sharpsburg. It is impossible to supply the necessary information in regard to the particular parts taken by Lawton's and Trimble's brigades in the several actions commencing with the affairs of Hazel River, on the 22d, and Bristoe and Manassas Junction, on August 27, and ending with the battle of Sharpsburg, except as to the part taken by Trimble's brigade at Sharpsburg, as General Lawton, who commanded his brigade until August 29, is absent in Georgia, wounded, and Colonel [M.] Douglass, who commanded the brigade from August 29 to September 17, was killed at Sharpsburg on that day, and General Trimble, who commanded his brigade until August 29, is absent, wounded, and Captain [W. F.] Brown, of the Twelfth Georgia Regiment, who succeeded him in the command, was killed at Ox Hill, near Chantilly, on September 1. There is the same difficulty in regard to Hays' brigade as to the part taken by it on August 30, at Manassas, and at Ox Hill on September 1, as Colonel Strong, who commanded on these occasions, was killed at Sharpsburg. This report, therefore, will not contain particular details of the operations of any brigade but my own in most of the actions in which the division was engaged during the time covered by it.†

* * * * *

On the morning of the 3d [of September] the division, with the rest of the troops, was moved to the left, crossing the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad at a station above Vienna, and then passing through Dranesville in the direction of Leesburg, and encamped on a creek not far from Dranesville.

* Not found.

† Portion of report here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 704-716.

On the next day, it passed through Leesburg and encamped near a large spring. On the next day (the 5th), it took up the line of march to White's Ford, on the Potomac, at which place it crossed into Maryland, encamping some 3 or 4 miles from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and on the morning of the 6th it marched to the railroad bridge over the Monocacy, at the junction of the railroad to Frederick City with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and took up a position so as to command the approaches on and adjacent to the railroad from the direction of Washington City. In this position it remained until the morning of September 10.

MARCH FROM FREDERICK CITY TO HARPER'S FERRY AND CAPTURE OF THAT PLACE.

On the morning of the 10th, the division, with the rest of the troops, moved from the vicinity of Frederick City westward, passing through Middletown, and bivouacked about 10 miles from Frederick.

On the next day, we moved through Boonsborough and took the direction of Williamsport, at which point we recrossed the Potomac and proceeded to the North Mountain Depot, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, near which we bivouacked.

On the next day, we proceeded to Martinsburg, and passed through the town in the direction of Harper's Ferry, and bivouacked on the banks of the Opequon.

On the following morning (the 13th), we marched toward Harper's Ferry, and proceeded to the turnpike road, 1 mile above Halltown, where we encamped.

Late in the afternoon of the 14th (Sunday), we were ordered to advance toward Harper's Ferry in three columns, one along the road and another on each side of it. After passing Halltown, the division advanced to the woods on School-House Hill, in line, in the following order: Lawton's and Trimble's brigades were formed in line of battle on the right of the turnpike; Hays' brigade on the left of it, and my own brigade in rear of Lawton's; and in this manner the whole advanced to the woods without opposition, thus getting possession of this hill, which fronted Bolivar Heights, and was in easy range for artillery. My brigade was then moved across the road by flank and placed immediately in rear of Hays' brigade, which General Lawton put under my command. The several brigades lay on their arms in this woods during the night, it having become dark by the time they reached it. During the night Brown's and Dement's batteries, which had been attached to my brigade at Frederick in lieu of Johnson's, which was transferred to Trimble's, were carried across the Shenandoah, under direction of Colonel Crutchfield, to some heights on the east side of the river, which commanded Harper's Ferry and Bolivar Heights, and placed in position. The rest of the batteries belonging to the division were placed in position on the crest of School-House Hill, on each side of the road. At dawn the brigades were advanced to the front of the woods, and the batteries, including Brown's and Dement's, opened fire, which was kept up until the enemy surrendered. Our artillery fire was but feebly responded to. Lawton's brigade, under the command of Colonel Douglass, was moved by flank, under cover, to the bottom on the right of the turnpike, between School-House Hill and Bolivar Heights, for the purpose of supporting General A. P. Hill's contemplated advance from the right, but the white flag was displayed in a short time, and no further movement was made by this brigade or the rest of the division.

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

Late in the afternoon of the 15th (the day of the surrender), General Lawton received an order to move the division on the road to Boteler's Ford, below Shepherdstown, and he immediately put his own and Trimble's brigades in motion, and gave me an order to follow with Hays' and my own brigades as soon as they could be supplied with rations, which had to be obtained from Harper's Ferry. This detained me until after night, when I followed General Lawton and found him in camp about 4 miles from the ford.

The division moved at dawn next morning, crossing the Potomac at Boteler's Ford and proceeding on the road to Sharpsburg, and was halted and stacked arms in a woods, on the left of the road, about a mile from Sharpsburg. It remained in this position for several hours, and late in the afternoon General Lawton was ordered to move the division to the right, to cover a bridge over the Antietam. This movement was commenced, but was soon countermanded, and he was directed to follow Jackson's division to the left. Following this division, we moved through fields to the left of Sharpsburg until we reached the turnpike from Sharpsburg toward Hagerstown, and then turned to the left on that road until we reached a woods in which there was a Dunkard church. Jackson's division having been placed in position, General Jackson, in person, directed me to place my brigade on the left of his division, then commanded by Brigadier-General Jones, so as to prevent its being flanked, and to communicate with General Jones. It was then getting dark; some of our troops were engaged in front, and the shells from the enemy's guns were flying tolerably thick, and it was some time before I could ascertain where General Jones was. I found him, however, finally, not far from where I was, and, having ascertained that General Starke's brigade was his left, I moved to the left of that and placed my brigade in line along a road on which General Starke's left rested. In a short time Brigadier-General Hays, who had joined his brigade the day before, reported to me, and his brigade was formed in rear of mine, it being too dark to understand enough of the position to make very good dispositions. Lawton's and Trimble's brigades were halted in the woods near the church, and between 10 and 11 o'clock at night were ordered to relieve some brigades of General Hood's division which had been engaged during the evening. These two brigades were posted in the positions occupied by General Hood's brigades, Trimble's brigade, under Colonel Walker, being on the right, next to General D. H. Hill's division, and Lawton's brigade on the left of it. In this position they lay on their arms during the night, with occasional skirmishing in front between the pickets.

Shortly after dawn next morning, Hays' brigade was ordered by General Lawton to move to the position at which his own and Trimble's brigades were in line, and was posted in the open field in rear of Lawton's brigades. At the same time Hays was ordered to make this movement, General Jackson in person ordered me to move my brigade to the left, along a route which he pointed out, to support some pieces of artillery which Major-General Stuart had in position to the left of our line. I immediately commenced this movement, and was thus separated from the rest of the division, and cannot, therefore, speak of its subsequent operations from my own observation, but gather the following facts from the reports of brigade commanders:

At light, skirmishing commenced in front of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades, in a piece of woods occupied by the enemy, and in a very short

time the enemy's batteries, which were posted on the opposite side of Antietam River, so as to enfilade the line of these two brigades, opened a destructive fire. About sunrise, the enemy advanced in line, driving in our skirmishers, and advancing to the edge of the woods. About this time, batteries opened in front from the woods with shell and canister, and these brigades were thus exposed to a terrible carnage. After a short time General Hays advanced with his brigade to the support of Colonel Douglass, under a terrific fire, and passed to the front.

About this time General Lawton, who had been superintending the operations, received a very severe wound, and was borne from the field.

Colonel Walker, by moving two of his regiments (the Twenty-first Georgia and Twenty-first North Carolina), and concentrating their fire and that of the Twelfth Georgia upon a part of the enemy's line in front of the latter, succeeded in breaking it; and, as a brigade of fresh troops came up to the support of Lawton's and Hays' brigades just at this time, Walker ordered an advance, but, the brigade which came up having fallen back, he was compelled to halt and finally to fall back to his first position. His brigade (Trimble's) had suffered terribly, his own horse was killed under him, and he had himself been struck by a piece of shell. Colonel Douglass, whose brigade had been hotly engaged during the whole time, was killed, and about half of the men had been killed and wounded. Hays' brigade, which had been advanced to Colonel Douglass' support, had also suffered terribly, having more than half killed and wounded, both of General Hays' staff officers being disabled; and General Hood having come up to their relief, these three brigades, which were reduced to mere fragments, their ammunition being exhausted, retired to the rear.

The terrible nature of the conflict in which these brigades had been engaged, and the steadiness with which they maintained their position, are shown by the losses they sustained. They did not retire from the field until General Lawton had been wounded and borne from the field, Colonel Douglass, commanding Lawton's brigade, had been killed, and the brigade had sustained a loss of 554 killed and wounded out of 1,150, losing 5 regimental commanders out of 6; Hays' brigade had sustained a loss of 323 out of 550, including every regimental commander and all of his staff, and Colonel Walker and 1 of his staff had been disabled, and the brigade he was commanding had sustained a loss of 228 out of less than 700 present, including 3 out of 4 regimental commanders.

I am sorry that I am not able to do justice to the individual cases of gallantry displayed in this terrible conflict, and must content myself with calling attention to the reports of General Hays' and Colonel Walker's brigade commanders, and of Major Lowe, who succeeded to the command of Lawton's brigade after the death of Colonel Douglass and the disabling of all the other ranking officers. In the death of Colonel Douglass the country sustained a serious loss. He was talented, courageous, and devoted to his duty.

After receiving the order from General Jackson to go to the support of General Stuart, as before stated, I proceeded to do so, moving my brigade through a piece of woods a little back from the left of our line and then through some fields; but, as I was passing through these fields, I discovered some of the enemy's skirmishers moving around our left, and I sent some from my own brigade to hold them in check until I had passed. I found General Stuart about a mile from the position I had moved from, with several pieces of artillery in position on a hill, and engaged with some of the enemy's guns. At his suggestion I formed my line in rear of this hill and remained here for about an hour, when General Stuart,

having discovered a body of the enemy's troops making their way gradually between us and the left of our main line, determined to shift his position to an eminence nearer our line and a little to the rear. He gave the instructions accordingly, and I moved back, taking a route in rear of the one by which I had moved out, and, by General Stuart's direction, my brigade was moved into the skirt of woods through which I had marched in going out. Just as I was getting into line, General Stuart informed me that General Lawton had been wounded, and that General Jackson had sent for me to carry my brigade back and take command of the division. Leaving the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, numbering less than 100 men, with General Stuart, at his request, I then moved to the rear of this woods around a corn-field, as the enemy had gotten into the woods to my right, and as I came near the position at which my brigade had been posted the night before, I found Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, of Jackson's division, rallying some 200 or 300 men of that division at the point at which Starke's brigade had been in position the night before. A body of the enemy, perhaps only skirmishers, had gotten into the woods to the left and was firing upon our men, being held in check by a scattering fire. This was the same body of woods at which the Dunkard church, before mentioned, is located. This woods runs along the Hagerstown road for several hundred yards, entirely on the left-hand side as you proceed from Sharpsburg. Then there is a field, the edge of which runs at right angles to the road for about 200 yards, making thus an elbow in the woods, and then turns to the right and runs along the woods parallel to the Hagerstown road for a quarter of a mile, and the woods again turns square to the left and extends back about half a mile, making at this point again an elbow with the strip of woods running along the road from the church. The church itself is at the end next to Sharpsburg and near the road. The woods is about 400 yards through, where it runs along the road, and back of it is a plantation road, running by a house and a barn and through the long elbow in the woods on the left. The field between the woods and the Hagerstown road forms a plateau, nearly level and on higher ground than the woods, which slopes down abruptly from the edge of the plateau. This woods is full of ledges of limestone and small ridges, affording excellent cover for troops.

A portion of the enemy, as before stated, had gotten into the farther end of this woods, where the field is between it and the road, and, as I came up, Colonels Grigsby and Stafford commenced to advance upon this body, and I immediately formed my brigade in line and advanced along in their rear, the enemy giving way as the advance was made. I halted my brigade on a ridge in this woods, and Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, at my suggestion, formed their men on my left. My line when thus formed was perpendicular to the Hagerstown road, and the right rested near the edge of the plateau above mentioned, but was concealed and protected by the rise in the ground. A considerable body of the enemy's troops was seen in the field in my front, as thus presented, which was evidently endeavoring to make a movement on our flank and rear. I directed Colonel Smith, of the Forty-ninth Virginia Regiment, to take command of the brigade and to resist the enemy at all hazards, and then rode in the direction of the position at which the rest of the brigades had been engaged, for the purpose of taking command of them and ascertaining their condition. I ascertained that these brigades had fallen back some distance to the rear for the purpose of reorganizing, and that they were probably not in a condition to go into the fight again. I dispatched Maj. J. P. Wilson, a volunteer aide, who had been with

General Lawton, to find out where these brigades were, and to order them up. While looking for these brigades I observed that our troops, who were engaged on this part of the line, were giving way before the enemy, and, as soon as I had dispatched Major Wilson, I rode to find General Jackson, and having done so, informed him of the condition of the division, and also that our troops were giving way, and that the enemy was advancing on the flank on which I had formed my brigade. He said that he would send for re-enforcements, and directed me to keep the enemy in check until they arrived. I then returned to my brigade and resumed command of it. I soon found that the enemy was moving up in considerable force toward the woods in which I was, and I sent Major Hale, my acting assistant adjutant-general, to let General Jackson know that the danger was imminent, and he soon returned with the assurance that the re-enforcements should be sent immediately. Just as Major Hale returned, a battery opened at the corner of the woods on the Hagerstown road, where the field spoken of joins the woods. This was not more than 200 yards from my right flank, and was somewhat in rear of it. When this battery opened, I took it for granted that it was one of ours, but Major Hale's attention was called to it by a soldier who happened to be standing up on the edge of the plateau, and discovered that it was one of the enemy's batteries. I was immediately informed of the fact by Major Hale, but I doubted it until I rode to the edge of the woods and saw beyond all dispute that it was the enemy's battery and was firing in the direction of the road toward Sharpsburg, and that it was supported by a very heavy column of infantry, which was also within 200 yards of my right flank. This made me aware of the fact that our troops which I had seen giving way had fallen back, leaving the enemy entire possession of the field in front. It must be borne in mind that the direction of my line was perpendicular to the Hagerstown road, so that, had the enemy seen it, his battery could have raked my flank and rear. Fortunately, my troops were concealed from his view. My condition, however, was exceedingly critical, as another column was advancing in my front and had reached the woods in which I was. I saw the vast importance of maintaining my ground, for, had the enemy gotten possession of this woods, the heights immediately in rear, which commanded the rear of our whole line, would have fallen into his hands. I determined to wait for the re-enforcements promised by General Jackson, hoping that they would arrive in time to meet the columns on my right. I, however, threw my right flank back quietly under cover of the woods, so as not to have my rear exposed in the event of being discovered. I kept an anxious eye on the column on my right, as well as on the one moving up in my front, and very soon I saw the column on my right move into the woods in the direction of the church. I looked to the rear for the re-enforcements, and could not see them coming. I was thus cut off from the main body of our army on the right, and a column was moving against me from the left. There was no time to be lost, and I immediately ordered my brigade to move by the right flank parallel to the enemy, and directed Colonel Grigsby, who commanded the body of troops he and Colonel Stafford had rallied, to move his command back in line, so as to present front to the enemy, who were coming up on the flank. I moved back along the rear of the woods until I caught up with the enemy, who had the start of me. I was, however, concealed from his view, and it was evident that my presence where I was was not suspected. Passing from behind a ridge that concealed my brigade from the enemy, we came in full view of his flankers, who, however, were made aware of my presence by a fire which I directed the leading regi-

ment to pour into them. They immediately ran into the main body, which halted, and I continued to move by the flank until my whole force was disclosed.

Just at this time, I observed the promised re-enforcements coming up toward the woods at the farther end. I ordered the brigade to face to the front and open fire, which was done in handsome style and responded to by the enemy. I did not intend to advance to the front, as I observed some of the troops which had come up to re-enforce me preparing to advance into the woods from the direction of my right flank, and was afraid of exposing my brigade to their fire, and that the two movements would throw us into confusion, as they would have been at right angles. Moreover, the other column was advancing on my flank, held in check, however, by Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, with their men, and by the Thirty-first Virginia Regiment, which was on my left. The enemy in front, however, commenced giving way, and the brigade, which I have always found difficult to restrain, commenced pursuing, driving the enemy in front entirely out of the woods. Notwithstanding my efforts to stop the men, they advanced until my left flank and rear became exposed to a fire from the column on the left, which had advanced past my former position. I also discovered another body of the enemy moving across the plateau on my left flank, in double-quick time, to the same position, and I succeeded in arresting my command and ordered it to retire, so that I might change front and advance upon this force. Just as I reformed my line, Semmes', Anderson's, and part of Barksdale's brigades, of McLaws' division, came up, and the whole, including Grigsby's command, advanced upon this body of the enemy, driving it with great slaughter entirely from and beyond the woods, and leaving us in possession of my former position. As soon as this was accomplished, I caused the regiments of the brigade to be reformed and placed in position as before.

I take great pleasure in bearing testimony to the gallant conduct of Semmes', Anderson's, and Barksdale's commands, whose timely arrival was of so much service to me. I can also bear testimony to the gallant deportment of Colonels Grigsby and Stafford and the men under their command. Major-General Stuart, with the pieces of artillery under his charge, contributed largely to the repulse of the enemy, and pursued them for some distance with his artillery, and the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, under the command of Captain [F. V.] Winston. The conduct of my own brigade was all that I could have desired, and I feel that it would be invidious to mention individual acts of courage where all behaved so well. My acting assistant adjutant-general (Major Hale) and my aide (Lieutenant Early) were very active in bearing my orders, under fire, and were of great service to me.

The loss in my brigade in this affair and under the shelling to which it was exposed while supporting General Stuart, early in the morning, was 18 killed and 166 wounded. Col. William Smith, of the Forty-ninth Virginia, and Lieutenant-Colonel [J. C.] Gibson, of the same regiment, were both seriously wounded, the former receiving three wounds, but remaining on the field in command of his regiment until after the close of the fight.

Shortly after the repulse of the enemy, Colonel Hodges, in command of Armistead's brigade, reported to me, and I placed it in line in the position occupied by my brigade, and placed the latter in line on the edge of the plateau which has been mentioned, and parallel to the Hagerstown road, but under cover. Immediately after his repulse, the enemy commenced shelling the woods where we were, and kept it up for some time,

doing, however, no damage. Major-General McLaws brought up two brigades some time afterward, placing one (Kershaw's) on the left of Armistead's, on the same line, and the other (Barksdale's) on my right. In this position we remained during the rest of the day, the ensuing night, and all day Thursday (the 18th). The enemy made no further attack, but there were several demonstrations, as if another advance was intended, and there were at least three lines of battle formed on the opposite side of the Hagerstown road, near the woods, with a heavy line of skirmishers extending nearly up to the road.

I deem it proper to state that all the killed and wounded of my own brigade were inside of my lines, as I established them after the fight, and that the killed and wounded of the enemy on this part of the field were also within the same lines. All my killed were buried, and all my wounded were carried to the hospitals in the rear, though, by some mismanagement on the part of the surgeons or quartermasters, of which I was not aware until too late, some 10 or 15 of my wounded were left in a hospital on the Maryland side of the river when we recrossed.

Late in the afternoon of the 17th I went to the rear to look after the other brigades of the division, and found Major Lowe, with about 100 men of Lawton's brigade, which he had collected together, and which I had moved up to where my brigade was and posted on the right of it.

Early next morning General Hays, with about 90 men of his brigade, reported to me, and was placed on my left in the same line, and during the morning Captain [I. B.] Feagin [Fifteenth Alabama], with about 200 men of Trimble's brigade, reported to me, and was posted in my rear. Only Johnson's and D'Aquin's batteries accompanied the division across the Potomac, the former being attached to Trimble's brigade, and the latter to Hays' brigade. They were both engaged on the 17th, and suffered to some extent, but I am unable to give an account of their operations, as Johnson's battery was soon after detached from the division, and has since been amalgamated with another battery in some other command, and Captain D'Aquin was killed at Fredericksburg. The other batteries, which had been detained at Harper's Ferry, were brought over the river on the 18th, by my orders.

RE-CROSSING THE POTOMAC, AFFAIRS AT BOTELER'S FORD AND SHEPHERDSTOWN, AND MARCH TO BUNKER HILL.

Having received the order from General Jackson after night on the 18th to move back as soon as my pickets were relieved by General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, which was between 10 and 11 o'clock, I moved the division back, carrying along Armistead's brigade, and I believe this was the last division to move. It recrossed the Potomac at Boteler's Ford shortly after sunrise on the morning of the 19th, and was formed in line of battle on the heights on the Virginia side, under the direction of General Longstreet. After remaining in position for two or three hours, the enemy having in the mean time opened an artillery fire from the opposite side of the Potomac, I was ordered to move toward Martinsburg and to leave Lawton's brigade, then increased to about 400 men, and under command of Colonel [J. H.] Lamar, of the Sixty-first Georgia Regiment, in position on the height just below Boteler's Ford. I accordingly moved in the direction indicated until I was ordered to encamp for the night near a school-house, 5 or 6 miles from Shepherdstown.

On the afternoon of the 19th the enemy commenced crossing a small force at Boteler's Ford, and Lawton's brigade gave way, abandoning its

position. This brigade was very much reduced, having suffered terribly on the 17th, and a considerable number of the men, being just returned from the hospitals, were without arms, and, without knowing the particulars of the affair, I am satisfied its conduct on this occasion was owing to the mismanagement of the officer in command of it.

Next morning I was ordered to move back to the vicinity of Boteler's Ford with the three brigades which were with me. On arriving there, by orders from General Jackson, these brigades were placed in line of battle in rear of General A. P. Hill's division, in the woods on the right and left of the road leading to the ford, my own and Hays' brigades being placed on the right and Trimble's brigade on the left. In this position they remained until late in the afternoon, while General Hill's division was engaged in front, being in range of the enemy's shells, by one of which Captain Feagin, in command of the Fifteenth Alabama Regiment, was seriously wounded, he being the only regimental commander of that brigade who had not been killed or wounded at Sharpsburg. Late in the afternoon I was ordered to move back, and on the way received orders to continue to move on, following Jackson's division, which preceded me, and did so until I was halted about 12 o'clock at night near the Opequon.

We remained at this position until the 24th, and then moved across the Opequon and camped on the Williamsport turnpike, 6 or 7 miles from Martinsburg.

On the next day my camp was moved to a place near the Tuscarora, about 3 miles from Martinsburg, and on the 27th we moved to Bunker Hill.

This embraces the whole of the operations of this division during the period designated in the order of the lieutenant-general commanding this corps, as far as I am able to give them, and I am sorry that I am not able to do more justice to Lawton's, Trimble's, and Hays' brigades in this report, but my difficulties in making it have already been explained, and it is owing to them, and not to any design on my part, that the report as to these brigades is not so complete as it is in regard to my own.

I submit herewith lists* of killed, wounded, and missing, from which it will appear that in the period embraced this division has lost, in killed, 565; in wounded, 2,284, and missing, 70, making an aggregate of 2,919, showing the severity of the conflicts in which it has been engaged. Its loss at Sharpsburg alone was 199 killed, 1,115 wounded, and 38 missing, being an aggregate loss of 1,352 out of less than 3,500, with which it went into that action.

I hope I may be excused for referring to the record shown by my own brigade, which has never been broken or compelled to fall back or left one of its dead to be buried by the enemy, but has invariably driven the enemy when opposed to him, and slept upon the ground on which it has fought, in every action, with the solitary exception of the affair at Bristoe Station, when it retired under orders, covering the withdrawal of the other troops.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Capt. A. S. PENDLETON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

* See addenda, following; see also Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 716, 717.

[Addenda.]

Return of casualties in Ewell's division at the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
Staff.....			2				2	
Lawton's brigade:								
13th Georgia.....	5	43	9	157		2	216	Col. M. Douglass and Lieuts. J. D. Hill, J. A. Adair, E. S. Bass, and Edwin Dallas killed.
26th Georgia.....	1	5	2	47		6	61	Lieut. D. P. Rice killed.
31st Georgia.....		6	3	39	1	4	53	
38th Georgia.....	1	17	6	46		1	71	Capt. W. H. Battey killed.
60th Georgia.....		12	3	45			60	
61st Georgia.....	2	14	8	73	1	6	104	Maj. A. P. Mac Rae and Capt. W. J. Mathews killed.
Total.....	9	97	33	407	2	19	567	
Early's brigade:								
13th Virginia.....				5			5	
25th Virginia.....	1	2	2	18			23	Lieut. Charles W. Delay killed.
31st Virginia.....	1		2	5			8	Capt. Allison D. Robinson killed.
44th Virginia.....		2	2	30			34	
49th Virginia.....		8	5	64		8	85	
52d Virginia.....	1	3	1	23		1	29	Lieut. Wm. F. Dold killed.
58th Virginia.....				10			10	
Total.....	3	15	12	155		9	194	
Trimble's brigade:								
Staff.....			2				2	
15th Alabama.....		8	4	61		6	79	
12th Georgia.....	2	11	6	39		1	59	Capt. James G. Rodgers and Lieut. A. Henderson killed.
21st Georgia.....		3	3	61			67	
21st North Carolina.....		2	2	14		1	19	
Bedford Artillery*.....		1		10			11	
Total.....	2	25	17	185		8	237	
Hays' brigade:								
Staff.....			1				1	
5th Louisiana.....	2	7	9	31			49	Lieuts. N. A. Canfield and Robert Gerrold killed.
6th Louisiana.....	5	6	8	33			52	Col. H. B. Strong, Capts. A. M. Callaway and H. Bain Ritchie, and Lieuts. M. Little and Geo. Lynne killed.
7th Louisiana.....	2	9	9	47		2	69	Capt. E. McFarland and Lieut. William P. Newman killed.
8th Louisiana.....	1	6	14	82			103	Lieut. B. F. Birdsall killed.
14th Louisiana.....		6	5	42			53	
Louisiana Guard Battery.....		1		8			9	
Total.....	10	35	46	243		2	336	

RECAPITULATION.

General staff.....			2				2
Lawton's brigade.....	9	97	33	407	2	19	567
Early's brigade.....	3	15	12	155		9	194
Trimble's brigade.....	2	25	17	185		8	237
Hays' brigade.....	10	35	46	243		2	336
Grand total.....	24	172	110	990	2	38	1,336

* John R. Johnson's (Virginia) battery.

Return of casualties in Ewell's division at Boteler's Ford, September 19, 1862.

[Compiled from nominal list.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Lawton's brigade:							
13th Georgia.....				2			2
31st Georgia.....				1			1
38th Georgia.....				1			1
61st Georgia.....				3			3
Trimble's brigade:							
15th Alabama.....			1				1
Total			1	7			8

No. 270.

Report of Maj. J. H. Lowe, Thirty-first Georgia Infantry, commanding Lawton's brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

OCTOBER 13, 1862.

[I have the honor to make the following] report of the part taken by Lawton's brigade in the engagement of September 17, at Sharpsburg, Md.:

On the evening of September 16, the brigade, commanded by Col. M. Douglass, was ordered to march toward the enemy's line. After marching some distance, the brigade filed into a piece of woods, and there remained, with arms stacked, until about 10 p. m., at which time the brigade was ordered to relieve Brigadier-General Hood, whose command was in line of battle near the enemy's lines. The brigade marched up and formed line of battle, and the Thirty-first Georgia Regiment, in Lawton's brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel [J. T.] Crowder, was ordered out as skirmishers, which order was promptly obeyed. During the night sharp skirmishing ensued.

At dawn, when the enemy could be seen, heavy skirmishing commenced and continued for an hour. The skirmishers, after their ammunition was nearly exhausted, were ordered to retire or fall back with their brigade. At that time the enemy commenced advancing, and soon a general engagement ensued. While the brigade was engaged with the enemy's infantry, it was under a heavy fire from their batteries on our right, killing and wounding many of our men. After a severe engagement, the brigade was compelled to fall back a short distance. Re-enforcements then came, and with them we made a charge in the most gallant manner. During that time (before the charge) the brigade lost its commander, and nearly every regiment lost its regimental commander; also the greater portion of the different companies lost their company commanders. After the charge the brigade fell back, and, in taking off the wounded, a great many were lost for a short time from their regiments.

Finding that I was senior officer present, I reformed the brigade and reported to Brigadier-General Early, and was ordered to take position

on the right of the division in line of battle; there remained until the latter part of the night of the 18th.

I am requested to bring to notice the name of Corpl. Curtis A. Lowe, of Company F, Sixty-first Georgia Regiment, who, after the color-bearer and four of the color-guard were shot down, seized the colors and pressed forward, calling to the men of the Sixty-first to follow their standard. Also, I will note the gallantry displayed by Private M. V. Hawes, of Company E, Thirty-first Georgia, who, after two of the color-bearers had been shot down, took the colors and carried them with his regiment, leading the way in the charge, and afterward carried them off the field with his regiment.

Respectfully submitted.

J. H. LOWE,
Major Thirty-first Georgia.

P. S.—The brigade was engaged at least two hours.

J. H. L.

No. 271.

Report of Col. James A. Walker, Thirteenth Virginia Infantry, commanding Trimble's brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

OCTOBER 11, 1862.

In obedience to orders from division headquarters, calling upon me for a report of the operations of Trimble's brigade on September 17 at the battle of Sharpsburg, I respectfully submit the following:

On the night of the 16th, about 11 o'clock, I was ordered by Brigadier-General Lawton, then in command of the division, to carry my command to the front, to relieve a portion of General Hood's troops, which I did, taking the place of a brigade commanded by Colonel Law. My pickets were posted in the edge of a wood, which was occupied but a short distance farther in by the enemy, and my main body was placed in a plowed field, connecting with Lawton's brigade on my left and with Ripley's brigade, of D. H. Hill's division, on my right, the latter forming a right angle with my line, and facing the Antietam River. Twice during the night the enemy's pickets attacked mine, in force, and a desultory fire was kept up between them the greater part of the night.

At daylight heavy skirmishing commenced between the pickets, and was kept up without intermission until about sunrise, when the enemy's line of battle was advanced, driving my pickets in. Soon after daylight the enemy opened fire from a battery which was posted on a hill across the Antietam, and which consequently enfiladed our position, and, as my command was exposed to full view of their gunners and had no shelter, this fire was very annoying, but less destructive than I at first apprehended it would be. About the time my skirmishers were driven in, the enemy also opened on us from the front with artillery. The line of infantry which they brought up first, advanced to the edge of the woods where my skirmishers had been posted, and opened fire upon us, to which my men replied with spirit and effect, holding them in check. The whole force of the enemy opposed to my regiments occupied the shelter of the wood, except that portion which confronted the left of my line, where the Twelfth Georgia Regiment was posted. Observing that the cool and deliberate fire of this tried and veteran regiment was annoying that portion of the enemy's line very greatly, I ordered the Twenty-first

Georgia and Twenty-first North Carolina Regiments to wheel to the left, and, taking shelter under a low stone fence running at right angles to their former line, direct their fire upon the wavering Yankee regiment, with the view of breaking the enemy's line at this point. They did so promptly, and a few rounds from them had the desired effect, and the enemy's line was entirely broken. At this opportune moment, fresh troops came up to the assistance of Lawton's brigade, which was hotly engaged on our left, and I ordered my command to advance, which they did, but the fresh troops, which were advancing in such good order at first, gave way under the enemy's fire and ran off the field before they had been halted by their officers and almost before they had fired a gun. Being thus left without support on our left, my men could advance no farther with safety, and halted. I tried to hold the advanced position thus gained until troops came to our support, but the enemy was first re-enforced, and we were compelled to fall back to our original line.

About this time the officers of the brigade began to report that their companies were out of ammunition. I directed them to gather what they could from the cartridge-boxes of the dead and wounded, and we were thus enabled to keep up the fight. (I would state here that our supply of ammunition had been heavily drawn upon by the long-continued and heavy skirmishing; the pickets had fired all in their boxes, and I had to divide the ammunition of the men in line with them before they were driven in.) Being thus left without ammunition, when a fresh brigade came to my support I ordered Captain Hall, of General Trimble's staff, to direct the commandants of regiments to bring back what men were still left with them to a designated point in rear of the village of Sharpsburg, where they could be supplied with ammunition, and ordered the other staff officers of the brigade to gather up the stragglers from the different regiments of the command and carry them to the same point.

Having been wounded some time previous, and my wound becoming stiff and painful, I then left the field and reported the fact to General Early, who was then in command of the division, through one of his staff officers.

It gives me great pleasure to bear testimony to the gallantry of the officers and men of this (Trimble's) brigade, which I had the honor to command for a short while.

To General Trimble's staff—Captain McKim, aide; Captain Hall, assistant adjutant-general, and Captain Hoffman, volunteer aide—I am greatly indebted for their assistance and gallant behavior under heavy fire. Captain McKim was severely wounded while bearing an order from me to the Fifteenth Alabama Regiment.

Captain Rodgers, commanding the Twelfth Georgia, and Captain Miller, commanding the Twenty-first North Carolina, were both killed on the field while gallantly discharging their duty. Major Glover, commanding the Twenty-first Georgia, was very severely wounded.

Captain Feagin, commanding Fifteenth Alabama Regiment, behaved with a gallantry consistent with his high reputation for courage and that of the regiment he commanded. I would especially call attention to the case of Captain Feagin, as he asked me to correct an erroneous impression which Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill had conceived of him by finding him with a portion of his command in rear after the ammunition of his men had given out and he had been ordered to fall back, by me. Captain F[eagin] has since been severely wounded at Boteler's Mill, and is absent. I ask that this statement be forwarded to General Jackson, in justice to a gallant officer.

A list of killed and wounded has been forwarded to division headquarters, from which it will appear that out of less than 700 men carried into action the brigade lost 228 in killed and wounded.

Very respectfully submitted.

JAMES A. WALKER,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. S. HALE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 272.

Report of Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays, C. S. Army, commanding First Louisiana Brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST LOUISIANA BRIGADE,
—, 1862.

GENERAL: Tuesday afternoon, September 16, I received an order from General Lawton, commanding the Third (Ewell's) Division, to hold my brigade in readiness to move at an instant's notice. The brigade was then stationed on the left of the road leading from the ford at Shepherdstown to Sharpsburg, about a mile from the battle-field. Between 4 and 5 o'clock I was directed to follow the brigade of General Early, which took up the line of march in the direction of what I subsequently ascertained was the extreme left of our line of battle.

About sunset we arrived in a body of woods behind the Dunkard church, on the Hagerstown road, subjected, as we proceeded to this position, to the shelling of a battery of the enemy posted on an opposite eminence. Remaining here until after dark, and discovering that Early's brigade had moved its position still farther to the left to prevent a flank movement of the enemy, I put my brigade in motion and placed it, at General Early's suggestion, immediately in the rear of his brigade. Here we remained that night.

At light next morning, we were aroused by the report of musketry, and in a short while after putting the troops in readiness I received an order from General Lawton to proceed to a point in our lines yet unoccupied, and fill up the gap thus occasioned. The precise position assigned me being uncertain, from the vagueness of the direction, I dispatched my assistant adjutant-general, Capt. John H. New, to General Lawton for more definite instructions. Captain New was met by a courier sent by General Lawton to point out the place intended for my brigade. This I discovered to be an opening in our lines between General Lawton's brigade, on the right, and General ———'s brigade, on the left. I was accordingly marching to the point, when I was overtaken by another courier from General Lawton, directing me to return with the brigade and take up a position in an open field immediately in rear of his brigade. I obeyed the order. Here I remained until I received from Colonel Douglass, commanding General Lawton's brigade, a request to come to his assistance. I then formed in line of battle and moved to the support of Colonel Douglass. Advancing to the position occupied by his brigade, I proceeded about 150 yards beyond his line in the direction of the enemy, having commenced firing as soon as I came up to the lines of Colonel Douglass.

My brigade at this time did not number over 550 men, and so peculiarly exposed was the position I occupied to an enfilading fire from sev-

eral batteries of the enemy and the fire of their infantry in front, that in a very short time my command was so reduced, having lost more than one-half (323 killed and wounded), that, on General Hood's brigade coming up, as a re-enforcement, I was obliged to retire. I then proceeded to gather together the remnant of my brigade. When this was accomplished, I moved again toward the front, but, on reaching the skirt of the woods above referred to, I found General Hood's brigade, sheltered by the nature of the ground from a very severe artillery fire directed upon it. Upon consultation with General Hood, I considered it best to remain there. I continued in this position until evening, when my brigade, with General Hood, retired about a mile to the rear, and, forming in line in an open field near the large stone barn, there remained during the night.

Early Thursday morning I received an order from General Early, then in command of the division (General Lawton having been wounded), to advance my brigade to the woods then occupied by his own brigade, and, forming upon his left, held that position until late Thursday night, when I received orders to recross the Potomac.

I have no report to make of the action of Captain D'Aquin's battery, attached to my brigade, as that officer was not under my command during the action.

Of the officers and men under my command I have to speak in terms of the highest commendation. The terrible loss among the officers evinces with what fidelity they discharged their duties.

To my staff—Capt. John H. New, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. Dwight Martin, aide-de-camp—I am under particular obligations for their constant attendance and prompt discharge of their several duties. Lieutenant Martin, I regret to add, was mortally wounded early in the morning. Captain New, having his horse killed under him, was disabled by the fall; and I am indebted to Major Young, quartermaster of this brigade, for voluntarily acting as my aide when deprived of the services of the above-mentioned gentlemen.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARRY T. HAYS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding First Louisiana Brigade.

Brigadier-General EARLY,
Commanding Third Division.

No. 273.

Reports of Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding Light Division, of operations September 2–November 3.

HEADQUARTERS LIGHT DIVISION,
Camp Gregg, Va., February 25, 1863.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division from the crossing of the Rapidan, August 20, to the repulse of the enemy at Castleman's Ferry, November 3 [1862], inclusive:

The division was composed of the brigades of Generals Branch, Gregg, Field, Pender, Archer, and Colonel Thomas, with the batteries of Braxton, Latham, Crenshaw, McIntosh, Davidson, and Pegram, under Lieut. Col. R. L. Walker, chief of artillery.

The march was without incident of importance until arriving at the ford opposite the Warrenton Springs.*

* * * * *

On September 5 the division crossed into Maryland near Leesburg, and on the 11th recrossed into Virginia at Williamsport; advanced upon Martinsburg, skirmishing with the enemy's pickets; entered the town on the 12th, and caused General White, with some 3,000 men, to fall back upon Harper's Ferry. A large quantity of commissary and quartermaster's stores were taken at Martinsburg.

Saturday, the 13th, arrived at Harper's Ferry, my division being in advance.

On Sunday afternoon, the necessary signals from the Loudoun and Maryland Heights having notified us that all was ready, I was ordered by General Jackson to "move along the left bank of the Shenandoah, and thus turn the enemy's left flank and enter Harper's Ferry." The enemy occupied a ridge of hills known as Bolivar Heights, extending from the Potomac to the Shenandoah, naturally strong, but rendered very formidable by extensive earthworks. Having first shelled the woods over which my route lay, I moved obliquely to my right until I struck the Shenandoah. Moving down the Shenandoah, I discovered an eminence crowning the extreme left of the enemy's line, bare of all earthwork, the only obstacles being abatis of fallen timber. The enemy occupied this hill with infantry, but no artillery. Branch and Gregg were ordered to continue the march along the river, and, during the night, to take advantage of the ravines cutting the precipitous banks of the river, and establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works. Pender, Archer, and Brockenbrough were directed to gain the crest of the hill before mentioned. Thomas followed as a reserve. The execution of this movement was intrusted to General Pender, his own brigade being commanded by Colonel Brewer. This was accomplished with but slight resistance, and the fate of Harper's Ferry was sealed. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker was directed to bring up his guns and establish them in the position thus gained. This was done during the night, by the indomitable resolution and energy of Colonel Walker and his adjutant (Lieutenant Chamberlayne), ably seconded by the captains of batteries. Generals Branch and Gregg had also gained the position desired, and daybreak found them in rear of the enemy's line of defense. General Pender, with Thomas in support, moved his brigades to within 150 yards of the works, and were sheltered as much as possible from the fire of the enemy.

At dawn, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker opened a rapid enfilade fire from all his batteries at about 1,000 yards range. The enemy replied vigorously. In an hour, the enemy's fire seeming to be pretty well silenced, the batteries were ordered to cease, and this was the signal for storming the works. General Pender had commenced his advance, when, the enemy again opening, Pegram and Crenshaw were run forward to within 400 yards, and, quickly coming into battery, poured in a damaging fire. The enemy now displayed the white flag, and Lieutenant Chamberlayne was sent in to know if they surrendered. This was soon ascertained to be the fact, and the garrison, &c., was surrendered by General White, Col. D. S. Miles, the commanding officer, having been mortally wounded.

By direction of General Jackson, I granted General White the most liberal terms, and regret to report that this magnanimity was not appreciated by the enemy, as the wagons which were loaned to carry off the private baggage of the officers were not returned for nearly two months,

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 670-672.

and not until repeated calls had been made for them. When I entered the works of the enemy, which was only a few moments after the white flag had been shown, there was apparently no organization of any kind. That had ceased to exist.

The fruits of this victory were 11,000 prisoners, about 12,000 stand of arms, 70 pieces of artillery, harness and horses, a large number of wagons, commissary, quartermaster's, and ordnance stores.

My loss was 3 killed and 66 wounded.

SHARPSBURG.

By direction of General Jackson, I remained at Harper's Ferry until the morning of the 17th, when, at 6.30 a. m., I received an order from General Lee to move to Sharpsburg. Leaving Thomas, with his brigade, to complete the removal of the captured property, my division was put in motion at 7.30 a. m. The head of my column arrived upon the battle-field of Sharpsburg, a distance of 17 miles, at 2.30 o'clock, and, reporting in person to General Lee, he directed me to take position on our right. Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones, commanding on our right, gave me such information as my ignorance of the ground made necessary. My troops were rapidly thrown into position, Pender and Brockenbrough on the extreme right, looking to a road which crossed the Antietam near its mouth, Branch, Gregg, and Archer extending to the left and connecting with D. R. Jones' division. [D. G.] McIntosh's battery had been sent forward to strengthen Jones' right, weakened by troops withdrawn to our left and center. Braxton's battery, commanded by Lieutenant [E. A.] Marye (Captain Braxton acting as chief of artillery), was placed upon a commanding point on Gregg's right; Crenshaw and Pegram on a hill to my left, which gave them a wide field of fire. My troops were not in a moment too soon. The enemy had already advanced in three lines, had broken through Jones' division, captured McIntosh's battery, and were in the full tide of success. With a yell of defiance, Archer charged them, retook McIntosh's guns, and drove them back pell-mell. Branch and Gregg, with their old veterans, sternly held their ground, and, pouring in destructive volleys, the tide of the enemy surged back, and, breaking in confusion, passed out of sight.

During this attack, Pender's brigade was moved from my right to the center, but the enemy were driven back without actively engaging his brigade. The three brigades of my division actively engaged did not number over 2,000 men, and these, with the help of my splendid batteries, drove back Burnside's corps of 15,000 men.

The Confederacy has to mourn the loss of a gallant soldier and accomplished gentleman, who fell in this battle at the head of his brigade—Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch, of North Carolina. He was my senior brigadier, and one to whom I could have intrusted the command of the division, with all confidence.

General Gregg, of South Carolina, was wounded, and the brave Colonel Barnes mortally so. My gallant Captain Pegram, of the artillery, was also wounded for the first time.

My loss was 63 killed, 283 wounded; total, 346.

We lay upon the field of battle that night and until the next night at 1 o'clock, when my division was silently withdrawn, and, as directed by General Lee, covered the retirement of our army.

My division crossed the Potomac into Virginia about 10 a. m. the next morning, every wagon and piece of artillery having been safely put on the Virginia shore. I bivouacked that night (19th) about 5 miles from Shepherdstown.

SHEPHERDSTOWN.

On the morning of the 20th, at 6.30 o'clock, I was directed by General Jackson to take my division and drive across the river some brigades of the enemy who had crossed during the night, driven off General Pendleton's artillery, capturing four pieces, and were making preparations to hold their position. Arriving opposite Boteler's Ford, and about half a mile therefrom, I formed my line of battle in two lines, the first the brigades of Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, under command of General Gregg, and the second, Lane (Branch's brigade), Archer, and Brockenbrough, under the command of General Archer. The enemy had lined the opposite hills with some seventy pieces of artillery, and the infantry who had crossed lined the crest of the high banks on the Virginia shore. My lines advanced simultaneously, and soon encountered the enemy. This advance was made in the face of the most tremendous fire of artillery I ever saw, and too much praise cannot be awarded my regiments for their steady, unwavering step. It was as if each man felt that the fate of the army was centered in himself. The infantry opposition in front of Gregg's center and right was but trifling, and soon brushed away. The enemy, however, massed in front of Pender, and, extending, endeavored to turn his left. General Pender became hotly engaged, and informing Archer of his danger, he (Archer) moved by the left flank, and forming on Pender's left, a simultaneous, daring charge was made, and the enemy driven pell-mell into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account they lost 3,000 men, killed and drowned, from one brigade alone. Some 200 prisoners were taken. My own loss was 30 killed and 231 wounded; total, 261.

This was a wholesome lesson to the enemy, and taught them to know that it may be dangerous sometimes to press a retreating army. In this battle I did not use a piece of artillery.

My division performed its share in the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and about November 1 took position at Castleman's Ferry, near Snicker's Gap.

On November 3, Archer's and Thomas' brigades being on picket at the ferry, with Pegram's and Latham's batteries, the enemy made an attempt to cross the river, but were handsomely repulsed by the Nineteenth Georgia and the batteries, with a loss of 200 men.

During this campaign the especial good conduct of Colonels Brewer, [F.] Mallory, [R. W.] Folsom, and Maj. C. C. Cole deserves mention. Captain Wright, of Georgia, commanding my escort, was invaluable to me, and proved himself a cool, clear-headed fighter.

My thanks are due my staff for their hearty co-operation and intelligent transmission of my orders under a fire frequently uncomfortably hot—Maj. R. C. Morgan, assistant adjutant-general; Major [R. J.] Wingate, Capt. R. H. T. Adams, signal officer; Lieut. Murray [F.] Taylor, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant [C. H.] Camfield, of my escort.

My loss during this series of battles was 348 killed and 2,209 wounded; total, 2,557.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. HILL,

Major-General, Commanding Light Division.

Lieut. Col. C. J. FAULKNER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Army Corps.

[Inclosure.]

General summary of killed and wounded.

Date of battles.	Killed.							Wounded.							Total killed and wounded.		
	Brigadier-generals.	Colonels.	Lieutenant-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.	Brigadier-generals.	Colonels.	Lieutenant-colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.		Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.
1862.																	
August 24.....								6							2	10	18
August 27.....								5							2	11	20
August 28.....																3	3
August 29 and 30.....		1	1		5	14	25	153	2	4	1	3	28	78	130	1,062	1,507
September 1.....						5	2	32		1	1	1		11	25	223	306
September 14.....								1					1	3	2	47	54
September 15.....								2						1	1	11	15
September 17.....	1				1	2	16	43	1	1			8	39	226	346	346
September 18.....					1		1	1						3	3	17	26
September 20.....					1		2	27				1	4	11	21	194	261
November 2.....															1	1	2
Total.....	1	1	1	8	21	46	270	3	6	2	5	46	117	226	1,805	2,558

HEADQUARTERS LIGHT DIVISION,

November 3, [1862]—5.20 p. m.

CAPTAIN: One brigade and a squadron of cavalry advanced down to the ford this evening, apparently with the intention to essay a crossing. I had Archer's and Pender's brigades and Pegram's and Latham's batteries there, under command of General Archer. They handsomely repulsed the enemy, and when I left were taking off their dead and wounded, under a white flag. I have added Brockenbrough's brigade to the picket to-night, and sent a picket to Shepherd's Mill, some 4 miles above Castleman's Ferry. Major White gallantly held his position on the other side, and preceded the enemy so closely that caution had to be exercised to prevent exposing his men. I directed General Jones to leave at 2 o'clock. I have not thought it necessary to call upon him.

Respectfully,

A. P. HILL,
Major-General.

Capt. A. S. PENDLETON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 274.

Report of Lieut. Col. R. L. Walker, C. S. Army, commanding Artillery Battalion, of operations September 13-17.

MARCH 1, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part

taken by the artillery of the Light Division in the series of battles commencing with Warrenton Springs, August 24, 1862 : *

* * * * *

At Leesburg the batteries of Capts. A. C. Latham and Fleet and a section of Captain Pegram's were, by order, left in camp, to recruit.

Nothing worthy of mention in this report transpired in our march through Maryland, nor until our arrival at Harper's Ferry, on September 13.

In the afternoon of Sunday, the 14th, my artillery, by order of Major-General Hill, went into battery on a height some 2 miles southwest of Bolivar Heights, from which point we shelled the woods on Bolivar Heights south of the enemy's earthworks. About sunset of the same evening, the rifled section of Captain McIntosh's command went into battery on Bolivar Heights at a point about 800 yards distant from the enemy's earthworks, General Hill's division being in advance of him.

Before dawn next morning (Monday, 15th), a section from the batteries of Captains Braxton, Pegram, and Davidson and the full battery of Captain Crenshaw were carried, though with much difficulty, to the point occupied by Captain McIntosh. Captain Crenshaw's battery was held in reserve, there being no position for his guns. At daylight the batteries opened with rapid and effective fire upon the enemy's works, and were responded to by two batteries firing quickly and without good direction. By General Hill's order, our fire ceased as soon as that of the enemy was discontinued, which occurred in an hour. At the latter part of the engagement Captain Crenshaw relieved Captain Braxton, whose ammunition was exhausted. After a short interval, the enemy's guns again opened, but slowly and without effect. The guns of Captains Pegram and Crenshaw were advanced about 400 yards nearer their earthwork, and opened furiously upon it. In five minutes a white flag floated upon the works, and the battle ceased.

In this battle our casualties were slight, as heretofore reported.

I carried four of my batteries into the fight at Sharpsburg, viz : Braxton's, Pegram's, McIntosh's, and Crenshaw's. Captain Davidson was left at Harper's Ferry with General Thomas' brigade. My command arrived upon the field at about 3 p. m., and went immediately into action. Captain McIntosh took position to the right and in rear of General Toombs' brigade, in rear of the position afterward taken by General Archer's brigade. Here he was hotly encountered by several batteries of the enemy, to whom he responded vigorously until his attention was attracted by the steady and formidable advance of the enemy's infantry upon his position, the infantry on the left not supporting him. The enemy continued to advance, in defiance of his rapid and effective fire, until within 60 yards of his guns, when Captain McIntosh was forced to withdraw his men, horses, and limbers. By this time General Archer's brigade had formed in line of battle to the rear of the battery, and, before the enemy reached the guns, charged and drove them back in great confusion. Captain Pegram's battery was posted on the right of Captain McIntosh, and directed his fire chiefly upon the enemy's infantry. One gun of this battery (the ammunition of the follower having been exhausted), together with Captain Braxton's rifles, which had been engaging the enemy from a point to the right and rear of Captain Pegram's, were, at 4.30 p. m., placed in battery on a height, forming the extreme right of the Light Division, and giving an enfilading fire. From this point they were worked, with beautiful precision and great effect, upon

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 673, 674.

the infantry of the enemy until nightfall closed the engagement. Captain Pegram's gun was withdrawn after a few rounds, the men being exhausted by the march from Harper's Ferry and the labor at the guns. Captain Crenshaw's battery was the last to reach the field, and took position on a hill in front of Captain McIntosh, from which, disregarding the enemy's artillery, he directed his fire entirely at their infantry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. L. WALKER,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Battery Artillery, Light Div.

Maj. R. C. MORGAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Light Division.

No. 275.

Report of Brig. Gen. James H. Lane, C. S. Army, commanding Branch's brigade, of operations September 2-20.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE,

November 14, 1862.

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the various engagements from Cedar Run to Shepherds-town, inclusive:

The report must necessarily be imperfect, as I was not in command of the brigade until after General Branch's fall, while most of the officers who commanded the different regiments are now absent, and did not leave with the assistant adjutant-general any account of the part taken in the various battles by their respective commands.*

* * * * *

HARPER'S FERRY.

The second day after the engagement at Ox Hill we marched through Leesburg, crossed the Potomac into Maryland on the 5th, and moved in the direction of Frederick, where we remained several days. Then recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and marched on Harper's Ferry through Martinsburg. The evening of the 14th, we advanced down the Winchester and Harper's Ferry Railroad. The Seventh Regiment was in advance, and its skirmishers, commanded by Captain [John G.] Knox, succeeded in driving the enemy's sharpshooters from a high position overlooking the railroad. The remainder of the brigade reached this position after midnight, and there slept upon their arms until day, when every one was in readiness and awaited the orders to advance. After a short but rapid and well-directed artillery fire from our batteries, the enemy displayed several white flags, and we marched into the place without further resistance. We captured several prisoners the evening of the 14th. Our loss was 4 wounded.

SHARPSBURG.

We left Harper's Ferry on September 17, and, after a very rapid and fatiguing march, recrossed the Potomac and reached Sharpsburg in time to participate in the fight. The entire brigade was ordered to the right, and, on reaching the field, the Twenty-eighth was detached by General A. P. Hill, in person, and sent on the road to the left leading to Sharps-

* Portions of report here omitted are printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 675-677.

burg to repel the enemy's skirmishers, who were advancing through a field of corn. The rest of the brigade moved nearly at right angles to our line, and on the enemy's flank. The Thirty-third, Seventh, and Thirty-seventh were the regiments principally engaged. They fought well, and assisted in driving back three separate and distinct columns of the enemy. The Eighteenth was not actively engaged. I was ordered, about sunset, to rejoin the brigade, and on doing so ascertained that General Branch had been killed. It was after sunset when I assumed command of the brigade. I found the Seventh, Thirty-seventh, and Thirty-third posted behind a stone fence, and the Eighteenth sheltered in a hollow in rear. I ordered the Twenty-eighth to the left of the line, but the order was delivered to the Eighteenth, which was posted to the left behind a rail fence, a portion of it being broken back to guard against a flank movement. The Twenty-eighth was posted to the left of the Seventh, in the opening caused by the withdrawal of a few Georgia troops. Although annoyed by the enemy's sharpshooters, we held our position until ordered to fall back, on the night of the 18th. We did not cross the river until late next day. General Gregg's, General Archer's, and this brigade formed the rear guard of the army, and were kept in line, facing the enemy, until infantry, artillery, cavalry, wagons, and ambulances had all safely crossed.

Our loss in this engagement was our brigadier-general (L. O'B. Branch) killed, 20 others killed, 79 wounded, and 4 missing.

SHEPHERDSTOWN.

On the morning of September 20, we were moved with the balance of the division back to the ferry near Shepherdstown. Soon after we had taken our position in line in the field of corn in rear of the wheat-stacks, we were ordered to advance, in the face of a storm of round shot, shell, and grape. We moved forward in line until we reached General Pender's brigade, sheltered behind the hill in front of the residence near the ferry. Finding that he was outflanked on the left, we then moved by the left flank until we unmasked his brigade. The men, on reaching the top of the hill, raised a yell and poured a deadly fire into the enemy, who fled precipitately and in great confusion to the river. Advancing at a double-quick, we soon gained the bank of the river, and continued our destructive fire upon those who were attempting to regain the Maryland shore at the old dam just above the ferry. We held our position all that day immediately upon the bank of the river, though exposed to the heaviest cannonading of the war, and in range of the enemy's sharpshooters, who were posted in strong force on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Our loss was 3 killed and 71 wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Purdie, who bravely commanded the Eighteenth in most of these engagements, desires that special mention should be made of Capt. John D. Barry, of Company I, for his coolness and gallantry and devotion to duty. Captains Turner and Knox, of the Seventh, have on all occasions, but especially as commanders of skirmishers, won the admiration of the entire brigade by their daring and efficiency. Lieutenants [W. W.] Cloninger and [G. W.] McCauley, of the Twenty-eighth, are also deserving special notice for their great bravery and faithfulness in the discharge of their duties.

Very respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. R. C. MORGAN.

No. 276.

Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan, C. S. Army, of operations of Gregg's brigade, September 3-December 3.

HDQRS. 2D BRIG., A. P. HILL'S LIGHT DIV., 2D A. C.,
Camp Gregg, Va., February 9, 1863.

MAJOR: In compliance with the request of Major-General Hill, to send in a report of all military operations in which this brigade was engaged from the time when General Lee took command at Gordonsville to the time when we left the valley, I have the honor to submit the following general statement, which has been delayed on account of the absence of two regiments on fatigue duty:

Not having been in command of the brigade, but only of one of its regiments (the Fourteenth South Carolina Volunteers) during these operations, I have not been able to make such a detailed report of particular events as the subject deserved, but am obliged to content myself with a mere outline of operations the most important. Would that the lamented General Gregg, lately in command of the brigade, was here to make out the report of achievements in which he performed so large a part himself and which he could have recorded better than any one else. I understand that the call does not include the Cedar Run (or Slaughter Mountain) campaign, which this brigade, as part of your division, made under Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Jackson.*

* * * * *

CAPTURE OF HARPER'S FERRY.

The brigade left Ox Hill on September 3, and, marching through Dranesville and Leesburg, crossed the Potomac into Maryland at White's Ford on the 5th. They rested at Monocacy Junction, near Frederick City, until the 10th, when, in order to perform their part in the investment and capture of Harper's Ferry, they commenced a forced march, and making a large circuit by way of Boonsborough, Williamsport, and Martinsburg, reached the vicinity of Harper's Ferry from the Virginia side on the 13th.

Sunday, the 14th, the brigade moved down the Winchester Railroad, on the left bank of the Shenandoah, and were engaged during the night until 2 o'clock the next morning in getting into position on the plateau between the Shenandoah and Bolivar Heights, the latter place being held by a strong force of the enemy. Here morning dawned upon the command ready to storm the heights. The view was magnificent, presenting such a spectacle as is rarely seen. At early dawn the batteries of McIntosh and Davidson opened upon the left of our position, and soon after other batteries commenced firing upon the enemy from the Loudoun Heights beyond the Shenandoah. When everything was ready for the assault, a white flag was seen displayed by the enemy as evidence of surrender, and at 7.30 o'clock on the morning of September 15 Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill entered the captured works. At 9 o'clock the brigade was marched up to the heights and employed in guarding prisoners, arms, &c. We sustained no loss in these brilliant operations.

SHARPSBURG.

At Harper's Ferry, during the 16th, heavy cannonading on the Maryland side was distinctly heard, and on Wednesday we made a forced

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 678-683.

march up the river, crossed the river at Boteler's Ford, a short distance below Shepherdstown, and arrived on the field of Sharpsburg in the afternoon, about 2 miles from the Potomac, reaching the actual presence of the enemy at 3.40 p. m., which was not a moment too soon for the fortunes of the day. The general line of our army seemed to be in front of the town of Sharpsburg, facing east, with its right flank stretching toward the Potomac. The enemy were in front along the line of the Antietam River. We came upon the field on the extreme right of our line, perhaps 2 miles from the Potomac. It was seen at once that a large force of the enemy (said to be Burnside's division) were in the act of sweeping down the Antietam and around our right, with the object, manifestly, of cutting off our army from the Potomac. The Light Division came from the proper direction and at the right moment to meet this column and drive it back across the Antietam. Gregg's brigade was placed in position on the right. The Fourteenth South Carolina Volunteers (Lieutenant-Colonel Simpson) being the leading regiment, was thrown out to hold a position on the extreme right, being the point of our line nearest the Potomac. The enemy, checked in his flank movement, never got so far to our right, and consequently that regiment was not actively engaged. The First (Colonel Hamilton), Twelfth (Colonel Barnes), and Thirteenth South Carolina Volunteers (Colonel Edwards) formed in line of battle, and were directed to enter the field to the left of the Fourteenth and drive back the enemy. This line advanced to the top of a hill in a corn-field, and there engaged the enemy, who appeared advancing in force upon the opposite hill, and held a fence in the ravine between the hills. They checked at once the advance of the enemy. Colonel Edwards, on the left, took up a strong position behind a stone fence and held it. Colonel Barnes advanced down the hill, and with a charge gallantly drove the enemy from the fence in front. He was, however, in a few moments flanked by a large body on the right, and had to retire his regiment a short distance up the hill, the enemy immediately reoccupying the fence. Colonel Barnes soon returned to the attack, and upon the same ground charged with his fine regiment three times, and the last time drove them from the fence and up the hill beyond, with great slaughter.

In the mean time Colonel Hamilton, feeling a heavy pressure upon his right, obliqued his regiment in that direction and gallantly drove them, clearing the front and at the same time covering the right of Colonel Barnes. A heavy body now appeared on the right of Colonel Hamilton, and Captain Perrin, commanding Orr's Rifles, was sent out to sweep the field in that direction. He led his regiment up a hill, discovered the enemy in the hollow beyond, dispersed them at once, and held the position, which was somewhat in advance of the general line. Thus, the columns which were enveloping the right of our army were driven back at all points, and, at the last moment, Sharpsburg made a victory for the Confederate arms.

The brigade held its position on the field all night, the next day, and until 3 o'clock in the morning of Friday, the 19th, when they joined the division and moved toward Boteler's Ford, on the Potomac, which was crossed without losing a man. In the critical operation of crossing the river in the face of so large a force, the Light Division (General A. P. Hill) was the rear guard, and Gregg's brigade was in rear of the division. Two companies of the Fourteenth South Carolina Volunteers, under the command of Captain Brown, were thrown out by Lieutenant-Colonel [W. D.] Simpson as skirmishers, in a corn-field about a mile from the river, thus covering the passage of the army.

About 9 a. m., while the Light Division was crossing, Captain Brown's small detachment was attacked by cavalry, but, dispersing them by a single volley, they succeeded in reaching the river and crossing in safety.

The fighting at Sharpsburg was severe, and the loss considerable, being, in the aggregate, 165.

Among the killed were Col. Dixon Barnes, Capt. F. A. Erwin, and Lieutenant [J. B.] Blackman, of the Twelfth South Carolina Volunteers, and Lieut. G. A. McIntyre,* of the First South Carolina Volunteers.

Among the wounded were Capt. M. P. Parker, of the First South Carolina Volunteers; Capts. J. L. Miller and H. C. Davis, Lieuts. R. M. Kerr, W. J. Stover, and S. Y. Roseborough, of the Twelfth South Carolina Volunteers; Capt. J. M. Perrin, commanding Orr's Rifles, and Lieuts. J. M. Wheeler and W. L. Litzsey, of the Thirteenth.

Where all did so well it may not be unpardonable to declare that in this battle the palm was borne off by the intrepid Colonel Barnes, who nobly fell while leading the invincible Twelfth in their last victorious charge. Colonel Barnes was as amiable and generous in peace as he was gallant and irresistible in war. Having large wealth and high position at home, he left all to fall at the head of his beloved regiment, gallantly struggling for the independence of his country.

Statement of killed, wounded, and missing.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
1st South Carolina Volunteers	4	30	34
Orr's Rifles	3	9	12
12th South Carolina Volunteers	20	82	2	104
13th South Carolina Volunteers	1	14	15
Total	28	135	2	165

SHEPHERDSTOWN.

After crossing the river into Virginia and marching about 5 miles, the brigade spent the night, and was ordered back next morning, the 20th, to Boteler's Ford, near Shepherdstown, to drive back the enemy, who was reported to be crossing at that point. General Gregg formed line of battle (Orr's Rifles deployed as skirmishers in front) and advanced in splendid style. The batteries of the enemy on the Maryland side poured upon them a terrible fire of grape, round shot, and shell. Their practice was remarkably fine, bursting shells in the ranks at every discharge. The Fourteenth South Carolina Volunteers (Lieutenant-Colonel Simpson), from the nature of the ground over which it passed, was particularly exposed. When the artillery made gaps in their ranks, they closed up like veterans, and marched on without confusion or in the least losing distance. The Rifles went down near to the river and drove the enemy into the water, most of them being either killed or drowned. The brigade lay under a terrible fire of shells all day, and at dark returned to bivouac.

The loss of the brigade was 63 killed and wounded, mostly in the Fourteenth, among the killed being the brave, generous, and efficient

* It was Archibald McIntyre who was killed. G. A. McIntyre appears as a captain in February, 1864.

Capt. James H. Dunlap, of Laurens, S. C., who was blown to pieces by a shell, and among the wounded was Lieut. D. H. Hamilton, jr., adjutant of the First South Carolina Volunteers.

Statement of killed and wounded.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Aggregate.
Orr's Rifles		1	1
1st South Carolina Volunteers		4	4
12th South Carolina Volunteers		1	1
13th South Carolina Volunteers		2	2
14th South Carolina Volunteers	10	45	55
Total	10	53	63

SNICKER'S GAP.

On Sunday, November 2, occurred the affair at Castleman's Ford, near Snicker's Gap. Gregg's and Thomas' brigades, accompanied by a battery of artillery, were thrown forward as a sort of picket to secure that ford against any effort General McClellan (who was reported to be at Snickersville in force) might make to pass the mountains there. Gregg's brigade took position, and, under light fire of artillery, awaited the approach of the enemy, who never reached our side of the ford. In this affair the brigade lost 3 wounded, 1 mortally.

Statement of killed and wounded.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Aggregate.
Orr's Rifles	1		1
12th South Carolina Volunteers		2	2
Total	1	2	3

The brigade remained in bivouac at different places in the lower valley until Saturday, November 22, when they moved with the Light Division from Jordan's Spring, on the Opequon, near Winchester. Marching up the Winchester and Staunton turnpike, we turned to the left at New Market, passed the Blue Ridge at Milan's Gap, then covered with snow, and on the 27th left the beautiful valley of Virginia. Passing by Madison and Orange, we reached the Massaponax hills, near Fredericksburg, on Wednesday, December 3, having made a march of 175 miles in twelve days.

Again regretting much the many imperfections of this hasty sketch of operations, which must be historical, I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. MCGOWAN,

Brigadier-General, Comdg. Second Brigade, Light Division.

Maj. R. C. MORGAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure.]

Recapitulation—killed and wounded.

Command.	Rappahannock.	Second Manassas.	Ox Hill.	Sharpsburg.	Shepherdstown.	Snicker's Gap.	Aggregate.
Orr's Rifles, South Carolina Volunteers		116	30	12	1	1	160
1st South Carolina Volunteers		143	8	34	4		189
12th South Carolina Volunteers		145	11	104	1	2	263
13th South Carolina Volunteers	2	144	29	15	2		192
14th South Carolina Volunteers	2	65	26		55		149
Total	5	613	104	165	63	3	953

No. 277.

Report of Col. D. H. Hamilton, First South Carolina Infantry, of operations September 2-20.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders from Brigadier-General Gregg, received this date, I herewith beg leave to hand in my report of the part taken by the Twelfth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers in the battles of Manassas, August 29 and 30; battle of Ox Hill, September 1; the capture of Harper's Ferry; the battles of Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown, or Boteler's Ford.

I was not present with my regiment in the three first-named battles, being on sick leave, in consequence of a severe and protracted illness, contracted by exposure and fatigue in the battles of June 26, 27, and 30, and July 1, around Richmond; consequently my report of the battles of August 29 and 30 must be prepared from the reports of company officers, there being no field officer at present with the regiment who was on duty with the regiment at that time.*

* * * * *

At Frederick City, Md., I rejoined my regiment and resumed command of it, and am now able to report from my own personal knowledge the part taken by the First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers in the battles of Harper's Ferry, September 15; Sharpsburg, September 17, and Shepherdstown (or Boteler's Ford), September 20.

In reference to that of Harper's Ferry, we were not at all engaged with the enemy, although brought into position to attack them, as they surrendered after a very feeble defense of their position. I would only remark that my little regiment had the honor of receiving the arms of a brigade of the enemy which surrendered to us.

At Sharpsburg, on September 17, I am happy to say that my regiment performed much more efficient service, adding largely to its well-earned reputation for gallantry. We had scarcely reached the field of battle on the right of our line, when a heavy force of the enemy appeared, with the design of outflanking the Confederate forces which had been

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 683, 684.

engaged previous to our arrival on the scene of action. Immediate and prompt measures were taken by Brigadier-General Gregg to engage the enemy, then so near us. I was thrown forward, and, pressing on over fences and every obstacle, reached a high ridge in a corn-field to find a large force (for my regiment to contend with) moving down upon me and endeavoring to seek such concealment in the corn-field as would enable them to surprise me, but my gallant regiment were too fully alive to the importance of the position which they held, and commenced a deadly fire upon the enemy in the corn-field and on the line of the fence beyond. We had scarcely been fairly engaged, when Major McCreary, who commanded the right wing, came down to inform me that a regiment of the enemy were passing round our flank. I ordered him to throw back the three right companies, in order that a front might be presented to the enemy, and immediately opened fire upon them, cutting them down as fast as they attempted to form on the edge of the corn-field, in the open ground. The fire from my regiment was rapid, and ammunition commenced to fail and the charges to clog in the rifles. In some instances the men were obliged to use stones to hammer the charges down. Just at this time, it was reported to me by one of my officers that another regiment had gained the hill in my rear. This sounded like danger. I looked, but instead of the enemy there floated our own bonny blue flag. The Rifles had come to our assistance, and not one moment too soon, for in a few moments my fire must have ceased for want of ammunition. The enemy soon retired, dark came on, and we slept upon the field of battle.

To say that my regiment (officers and men) behaved well would scarcely be doing them justice. They did all that soldiers may do actuated by courage and steady, good conduct, contending in a noble cause. I cannot particularize officers or men; it would be invidious, and in attempting to praise some I am sure that I should be doing injustice to others.

Our position was maintained until the 18th, when we commenced our march to recross the Potomac, which was effected without molestation from the enemy.

On the 20th the enemy had pushed his skirmishers across the river at Boteler's Ford, near Shepherdstown, W. Va., and at an early hour we were called upon to advance, which was done under a heavy fire of shot and shell from the batteries of the enemy on the other side. My regiment moved steadily forward, regardless of this fire, never for one moment wavering or breaking its line. Our position was attained without casualty, reaching an indentation behind the crest of a hill. We lay for hours subjected to the most deadly fire of artillery, but, beyond a few slight wounds, we escaped without serious injury. I may mention among those wounded was Capt. [Lient.] D. H. Hamilton, jr., acting adjutant First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

I have the honor to submit report* of casualties in the different battles in which the regiment has been engaged since the 29th ultimo, respectively marked A, B, C, D, E, and F.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. H. HAMILTON,

Colonel First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

Capt. A. C. HASKELL.

* Embodied in McGowan's report, p. 989, and in No. 179, Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, p. 682.

No. 278.

Reports of Lieut. Col. James M. Perrin, First South Carolina Rifles, of operations September 15-20.

GREGG'S BRIGADE, LIGHT DIVISION,
September 30, 1862.

COLONEL: In obedience to orders, I submit the following report of the part taken by the First South Carolina Rifles, under my command, at the battle of Harper's Ferry:

This engagement with the enemy was conducted mostly by artillery. The First South Carolina Rifles only held position with the brigade, and was not actually engaged.

On Sunday evening the brigade, with other troops of the division, advanced down the Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad. The regiment, with the brigade, by daylight on Monday morning, had ascended Bolivar Heights and taken position between the enemy and the Shenandoah River. Shortly after we had taken this position, our various batteries opened fire, and in a short time the enemy surrendered.

We had no one killed or wounded in this action. I herewith submit detailed reports of the number of men taken into action, with a list* of those who absented themselves without leave.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. M. PERRIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First South Carolina Rifles.

[Inclosure.]

Statement of the strength of First South Carolina Rifles in the battle of Harper's Ferry, September 15.

Field and staff.....	3
Officers.....	9
Non-commissioned officers and privates	221
Total.....	233

GREGG'S BRIGADE, LIGHT DIVISION,
September 30, 1862.

COLONEL: I herewith submit the following report of the action of the First South Carolina Rifles, under my command, in the battle of Sharpsburg:

The brigade reached the battle-field about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and immediately afterward our line was formed. I was ordered to advance my regiment across the corn-field in front on the right of Colonel Hamilton, First South Carolina Volunteers, who had preceded me by a few minutes. The regiment advanced across the field in good order, moving rapidly, as Colonel Hamilton, on our left, had already engaged the enemy. So soon as we ascended to the crest of the hill in our front, we discovered a regiment of the enemy who had succeeded in turning Colonel Hamilton's right, and were delivering a destructive fire on his flank. Our advance was such as to completely turn the left flank of this regiment. We delivered a destructive volley into it before our presence seemed to be realized. The first volley was followed by a sharp fire from our side, which the enemy at first attempted to return;

* Omitted.

but so great was the confusion caused by our fire, this large, well-equipped regiment failed to rally, broke and fled from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving their guns, knapsacks, and dead and wounded in large numbers on the field. We succeeded in capturing 11 prisoners, among them Captain Bowen, of Rhode Island, who had been slightly wounded in the action.

In the engagement I am happy to report the uniform good conduct of both officers and men. Early in the action the color-bearer (Malone, of Company B) was shot down. The standard was caught up by Private Clinkscales, of Company D, and borne through the fight. I also received a slight wound in the throat, which, fortunately, did not disable me from continuing in command.

During the latter part of the engagement the regiment was much annoyed by the enemy's sharpshooters on the hill to our right. In order to save the command from the fire, I ordered Captain Robertson, of Company B, who occupied the right of the regiment, to detach his company and take such position as would enable him to dislodge them and silence their fire. This order was promptly and effectively obeyed, and we were thus for a time saved from this annoyance.

The battle closed a little before sundown. The regiment held the battle-field, and, with the killed and wounded of the enemy around us, we awaited orders. About this time General Gregg, in person, rode in front of our line and ordered me to hold the position which I had gained. We slept on the field, having secured our lines by a strong picket guard, under the immediate command of Captain Miller, of Company G.

In this engagement we had only 1 man killed with — wounded, most of them slightly. This inconsiderable loss, in my judgment, is attributable to the prompt and effective fire of the regiment.

During the day (Thursday) we held our position of the night previous. In the morning I found the enemy had placed his sharpshooters under cover of a fence on our right and in front. We were annoyed by this fire during the day. As I had received orders early in the morning to do nothing to bring on a general engagement, I refrained from any attempt to dislodge them. During this day I had 1 man killed.

At 11 o'clock Thursday night I was ordered to call in my pickets and silently retire from the field, which I successfully did, after having held it for near thirty-six hours.

In this engagement I acknowledge my indebtedness to the officers of the regiment for the vigor and promptness with which they carried out my orders, and to the men for the spirit with which they executed them.

I herewith inclose reports of the strength of the regiment as it went into action, with a list of the killed and wounded. It is also my unpleasant duty to inclose a list as disgraceful and infamous as the other is honorable and glorious. There are those who bear the name of soldier who have deserted their colors and their comrades in the hour of danger, who have cowardly failed to participate in the glorious achievements which will make a name for the regiment and adorn the State from which we came. I herewith inclose a list* of those who were absent from this battle without the proper leave.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. M. PERRIN,

Lieutenant-Colonel First South Carolina Rifles.

Colonel LIVINGSTON,

First South Carolina Rifles.

[Inclosure.]

Statement of the strength of First South Carolina Rifles in the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17.

Field and staff	3
Officers	8
Privates and non-commissioned officers	183
Total	194

JAS. M. PERRIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First South Carolina Rifles.

GREGG'S BRIGADE, LIGHT DIVISION,
September 30, 1862.

COLONEL: In obedience to your orders, I herewith submit the following report of the part taken by the First South Carolina Rifles, under my command, in the battle of Shepherdstown, on September 20:

In the line of battle, the First South Carolina Rifles formed on the right of the brigade. Before advancing, by order of General Gregg, I detached four companies from the regiment to cover the front of the brigade, as skirmishers. This force I placed under the immediate command of Captain [W. M.] Hadden, of Company A. He deployed his line and advanced, soon engaging and driving in the enemy's line of pickets, after a sharp encounter. The firing along our line of skirmishers becoming continuous, I was ordered to advance the remaining six companies of my command to a position from which I could support my skirmishers, should they need aid. I advanced my line down the road leading to the ford, moving by the left flank, under a very heavy fire from the enemy's batteries on the opposite side of the river. This fire became so severe, as a matter of safety I found it necessary to deploy the regiment at short intervals to the right and left of the road, advancing in this order until I could communicate with Captain Hadden, who was keeping up a continuous fire in my front. This advance was made in fine style and good order, under the most trying fire of shell and shot I have ever experienced. I found that Captain Hadden had secured a most eligible position, commanding the field over which the enemy were attempting to cross to the Maryland side, having been routed by our forces on our left. The fire of our skirmishers must have been very destructive, as they were within easy range, and fired at a confused mass hurrying across the river to a place of safety. Some of the men in this engagement fired as many as 25 rounds. The enemy, by his artillery and sharpshooters, attempted to drive in our skirmishers and control the ford. The effort, however, proved ineffectual.

In the afternoon, General Gregg, in person and alone, made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, passing down the road very near to the ford. Having discovered the enemy still escaping in squads across the river, he directed Captain Hadden to take position, with a part of his force, still nearer the ford, and, in obedience to his order, I directed Captain Miller to advance four companies farther down the road to the right, in order to protect him. Both of these orders were executed promptly and with spirit. The positions had only been taken when we were relieved by a company of cavalry acting as infantry, and our forces ordered to return. I led the regiment out in safety, it having, through the whole day, most wonderfully escaped from the many shells that exploded all around us.

In this action I am happy to report that we lost no one killed and only 2 men slightly wounded.

In this, as in the battle of Sharpsburg, I can but express my entire satisfaction with the spirit and bravery manifested by officers and men. To Captain Hadden I am indebted for the skill and courage which he displayed in the management of his skirmishers. To my adjutant (Lieutenant Higgins, of Company G) I am also greatly indebted for the alacrity and coolness with which he extended my orders and bore my messages to the general under the heavy fire to which we were exposed.

I herewith submit statements of the strength of the regiment in action, with the names of the wounded. I also submit a list* of those who were absent from their commands without leave.

JAS. M. PERRIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First South Carolina Rifles.

[Inclosure.]

Statement of the strength of First South Carolina Rifles in the battle of Shepherdstown.

Field and staff	3
Commissioned officers	8
Non-commissioned officers and privates	197
Total	208

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. M. PERRIN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First South Carolina Rifles.

Col. J. W. LIVINGSTON,
First South Carolina Rifles.

No. 279.

Report of Maj. W. H. McCorkle, Twelfth South Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg and action near Shepherdstown.

OCTOBER 1, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to submit reports of the part taken by the Twelfth Regiment in the battles of Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown, on September 17 and 20, respectively:

About 3 p. m. we arrived, with the Second Brigade, on the field of battle. Immediately, by order of Brigadier-General Gregg, skirmishers, under the command of Capt. John L. Miller, were thrown out. The position of the enemy being soon ascertained, they were called in, and a line of battle formed of three regiments, to wit, the Thirteenth, Twelfth, and First, the Twelfth being the center and the regiment of direction. In obedience to orders, we advanced to the top of the hill, in the corn-field, and there halted a few moments, when the firing commenced. The enemy now appearing in force on the opposite hill, and at the fence in the intervening ravine, the Twelfth, at once and alone, advanced down the hill and to the fence in front. In this charge we were subjected to a terrible cross-fire in front and from both flanks. After reaching the fence we were compelled to fall back to prevent being flanked on the right, the enemy on the left having been driven back. The enemy, being soon re-enforced, advanced toward us as far as the fence. Now

* Omitted.

we again charged on them and drove them back a short distance, but were not able to reach the fence, as in the first charge. There being a very heavy flank movement on the right, we again fell back near the top of the hill. Now the enemy advanced over the fence, when the Twelfth, again and for the third time, charged upon them and drove them beyond the fence, with great slaughter, putting them completely to rout as they ran through the plowed ground and up the opposite hill.

In these charges the regiment suffered severely. In the last the loss was very heavy. Here fell Col. Dixon Barnes, at the head of his regiment, gallantly cheering his men on to victory, and here, also, fell Capt. F. A. Erwin and Lieutenant Stover, mortally wounded, both in the midst of their commands. For particulars I refer to list of killed and wounded, marked D.*

Colonel Barnes having fallen, I immediately assumed command. I remained at the fence with the regiment until near sundown, when, there being no appearance of the enemy, I fell back to the top of the hill, when I was ordered to the rear of the fence occupied by Colonel Edwards' regiment. Here we remained during the night and until ordered to march on the night of the 18th.

SHEPHERDSTOWN.

On arriving on the battle-field on the morning of the 20th, the Twelfth Regiment was formed into line of battle with the brigade. We were not engaged in the fight, but were under a heavy shelling during the entire day, and particularly while marching to our position. Here, being well protected by a hill, this regiment suffered no loss but in 1 man slightly wounded.

In both the engagements I have great pleasure in testifying to the good conduct of the officers and men of this regiment. They all fought with remarkable gallantry, always ready to advance, and never faltering in any instance, whether under shell or before musketry.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. McCORKLE,

Major, Comdg. Twelfth Regiment South Carolina Vols.

Lieut. Col. C. JONES.

No. 280.

Reports of Col. O. E. Edwards, Thirteenth South Carolina Infantry, of operations September 15-19.

CAMP NEAR BUNKER HILL, VA.,
October 2, 1862.

[I make the following] report of the part taken by the Thirteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers in the battle of Harper's Ferry, W. Va., on September 15:

On September 14, when it became apparent, from the opening of the batteries on Maryland and Loudoun Heights, that our troops were in rear of Harper's Ferry, our brigade moved to the right of Bolivar Heights at 3 p. m., in the direction of the Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad. On reaching it, we marched by a flank on the track until hemmed in by the Shenandoah River and the bluff south of the enemy's position. Here we were halted at dark to drive in the enemy's advanced sharpshooters and clear the way, and were detained until 2 a. m. on the 15th. We

* Not found.

then continued our advance on the road for half a mile, and, turning to the left, ascended the almost impassable slope on that side, the Thirteenth Regiment being in front.

At sunrise our batteries opened on the enemy, and we were moved in line of battle to the right and rear of General Branch. At 7.15 a. m. a white flag announced the willingness of our foe to surrender. At a few minutes after 8 a. m. we were ordered to move to the ground before occupied by the enemy. The day was spent in guarding prisoners and stores. There were no casualties.

Respectfully submitted.

O. E. EDWARDS,
Colonel Thirteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

CAMP NEAR BUNKER HILL, VA.,
October 2, 1862.

[I make the following] report of the part taken by the Thirteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers in the battle of Sharpsburg, Md., on September 17:

At 6.15 a. m., September 17, my regiment, in its brigade and division, took up line of march from Harper's Ferry toward Boteler's Ford, across the Potomac, near Shepherdstown, W. Va. Crossed the ford at 2 p. m., and at quick step reached the presence of the enemy at 3.40 [o'clock], about 2 miles beyond the river. Here we reached the range of the enemy's shell, and, turning to our left, took position along a line of fence in line of battle, from which point we advanced to drive the enemy from the corn-fields in front, my regiment having the left of the brigade. The enemy falling back before us, we took position on the summit of an elevation along the fence line on the edge of the corn, and there received the enemy upon our left, drove him back across the field, and held the ground until the action closed, about 8 p. m.

Our position in this action was the extreme right of the Confederate line of battle, and we successfully met and repulsed a dangerous flank movement of the enemy, conducted, as prisoners state, by General Burnside with his forces. My regiment remained upon the field until the morning of September 19.

The bearing and spirit of my command in this engagement were admirable, equal to the exactions of the highest expectation, and their fire was delivered with telling effect.*

Respectfully submitted.

O. E. EDWARDS,
Colonel Thirteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

No. 281.

Reports of Capt. Joseph N. Brown, Fourteenth South Carolina Infantry, of operations September 15-20.

SEPTEMBER 29, 1862.

Pursuant to Special Orders, No. 71, relative to the part taken by Fourteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers at Harper's Ferry, September 15, I have the honor to submit the following report:

The regiment was put in position and remained most of the previous

* Nominal list of casualties reports 1 man killed and 15 wounded.

night on the high hill on the west bank of the Shenandoah, with the two right companies (B and H) during the entire period in front, as skirmishers. Before dawn the regiment was moved down to the railroad, and remained until half an hour by sun, when it again moved up on the hill lower down, in front of our artillery, which was shelling the enemy from the eastern side of the river, which position it kept until the surrender. Lieut. Col. W. D. Simpson was in command of the regiment. The regiment sustained no loss either in killed, wounded, or missing.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH N. BROWN,

Captain, Comdg. Fourteenth Regiment South Carolina Vols.

Brigadier-General GREGG,

Commanding Second Brigade, Light Division.

SEPTEMBER 29, 1862.

Pursuant to Special Orders, No. 71, relative to the part taken by Fourteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers in the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, I have the honor to submit the following report:

The regiment occupied a position on the right of the brigade, and so far on the right of the line of battle that it was not actively engaged, as was the balance of the brigade. One company (E) was detached on picket, and sent half a mile on the extreme right from the regiment, where it remained until the next morning. Lieut. Col. W. D. Simpson was in command of the regiment. There was no loss sustained either in killed, wounded, or missing.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH N. BROWN,

Captain, Comdg. Fourteenth Regiment South Carolina Vols.

Brigadier-General GREGG,

Commanding Second Brigade, Light Division.

SEPTEMBER 29, 1862.

Pursuant to Special Orders, No. 71, relative to the part taken by Fourteenth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers in the battle of Shepherdstown, or Boteler's Ford, on September 20, I have the honor to submit the following report:

The regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Simpson, was on the left of the brigade, and moved in line of battle nearly a mile, and was halted near the summit of a hill overlooking the Potomac, where it was exposed to a terrific shelling from a battery of the enemy on the Maryland side of the river. After suffering considerable loss, the regiment was moved down the hollow, in front of the First Regiment, where the loss was comparatively trifling.

Schedule D* contains a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, as required in the order.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH N. BROWN,

Captain, Comdg. Fourteenth Regiment South Carolina Vols.

Brigadier-General GREGG,

Commanding Second Brigade, Light Division.

Report of Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations September 14-20.

HEADQUARTERS ARCHER'S BRIGADE,
Camp Gregg, near Fredericksburg, Va., March 1, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to present the following report of the operations of my brigade in the series of battles from Warrenton Springs Ford to Shepherdstown, inclusive:*

* * * * *

HARPER'S FERRY.

On the evening of September 14, my brigade, Field's, and Pender's moved from a point on the railroad by a by-road toward the southern defenses of Bolivar Heights. My skirmishers, on the right of the road, soon became engaged with those of the enemy. I immediately formed line of battle, my left resting on the road, and advanced steadily, driving the enemy's pickets before us, until I approached the crest of the hill, in full view and range of their batteries, when I filed out of the field into the woods on my right, in order to flank the enemy's guns, and continued to advance, as rapidly as the rough ground and abatis would permit, until it became dark, and I had become entangled in the almost impenetrable abatis, when I halted, and we lay on our arms, within 400 yards of the enemy's batteries, during the night.

The next morning, our artillery, which had been placed in position during the night, opened a destructive fire, and while I was struggling through the abatis, endeavoring to execute an order from General Hill to get in rear of the guns, the place surrendered.

My loss in this action was 1 killed and 22 wounded.

The regiments of my brigade were commanded as follows, viz: First Tennessee, Colonel Turney; Seventh Tennessee, Major Shepard; Fourteenth Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Lockert; Nineteenth Georgia, Major [James H.] Neal, and Fifth Alabama Battalion, Captain Hooper.

SHARPSBURG.

The next morning after the capture of Harper's Ferry, being too unwell for duty, I turned over the command of the brigade to Colonel Turney (First Tennessee), under whom, with the exception of the Fifth Alabama, it marched to the battle-field of Sharpsburg, while I followed in an ambulance. This was a long and fatiguing march; many of the men fell, exhausted from the march, by the way, so that when the four regiments of my brigade reached the battle-field there were only 350 men. I resumed command just as the brigade was forming into line on the ground assigned to it by General Hill, on the extreme left of his division, but not in sight of any of its other brigades. Marching by flank, right in front, along the Sharpsburg road, the brigade was halted and faced to the right, forming line of battle faced by the rear rank. General Toombs was in line on the same road about 300 yards to my left, with open ground in front. In front of my position was a narrow corn-field about 100 yards wide, then a plowed field about 300 yards

* Portion here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 699-702.

wide, on the opposite side of which was a stone fence. I moved forward, under a scattering musket fire, through the tall corn to the edge of the plowed field, when I found only the right regiment (the Fourteenth Tennessee) with me, the others having fallen back to the road. Some one had called out, "Fall back," which was mistaken for an order from me. I reformed the line as rapidly as possible, and again moved forward against the enemy, posted in force behind the stone fence. In passing over the short distance of 250 yards from the corn-field, I lost nearly one-third of my already greatly reduced command, but it rushed forward alone at double-quick, giving the enemy but little time to estimate its small numbers, and drove him from his strong position. By this time it was nearly sunset. General Branch's brigade came down about thirty minutes after I reached the wall, and formed some 30 paces to my rear, when General Branch was killed, and Colonel Lane, assuming command of his brigade, moved it down to my left.

The next morning about 9 o'clock, the little strength with which I entered the fight being completely exhausted, I turned over the command to Colonel Turney, reported to the major-general commanding, and left the field. My brigade remained all that day in the same position where I had left it, and on the morning of September 19, together with Gregg's and Branch's brigades, formed the rear guard of the army on its return to the Virginia shore.

My loss in this action was 15 killed and 90 wounded; among the latter Colonel [William] McComb, Fourteenth Tennessee, severely, and Captain [T. W.] Flynt, Nineteenth Georgia, dangerously. The gallant conduct of both these officers attracted my attention, though where all who were engaged behaved so gallantly it is difficult to select examples of particular merit.

Capt. R. H. Archer, my assistant adjutant-general, though not yet recovered from a severe illness; Lieutenant Thomas, aide, and Lieutenant [George] Lemmon, ordnance officer, rendered brave and efficient assistance, and charged with the troops upon the enemy.

The regiments of the brigade were commanded as follows: First Tennessee, Colonel Turney; Seventh Tennessee, Lieutenant [G. A.] Howard, adjutant; Fourteenth Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Lockert, and Nineteenth Georgia by Major Neal.

SHEPHERDSTOWN.

I resumed command of my brigade the evening of September 19.

The morning of the 20th, the division moved down to repel the enemy, who were crossing the Potomac at the Shepherdstown ferry. Line of battle was formed in a corn-field about three-fourths of a mile back from the ferry. Pender's brigade moved forward in the direction of the ferry, and General Gregg's and Colonel Thomas' toward a point somewhere to the right. When General Pender had gotten about half way to the ferry, General Hill directed me to take command of the three remaining brigades—Field's, commanded by Colonel Brockenbrough, on the right; Lane's in the center, and my own, under the senior colonel (Turney), on the left—and advance to the support of Pender. I moved straight forward until within a few hundred yards of General Pender's brigade, when, on his sending me back information that the enemy was attempting to flank him on the left, I moved by flank to the left, and the left regiment of my brigade, as soon as it was unmasked by Pender's, and each other regiment, as soon as unmasked by the preceding one, went

in at double-quick; Colonel Lane's next, and then Field's, were in like manner and with equal spirit thrown forward on the enemy, killing many and driving the rest down the precipitous banks into the river. The advance of my command was made under the heaviest artillery fire I have ever witnessed.

Too much praise cannot be awarded to officers and men for their conduct. The litter corps in this, as in all the battles, has displayed as much valor as any troops in the field. Lieutenant Shelby, commanding that corps, displayed his usual gallantry, remaining under fire in the discharge of his duty after [receiving] a severe wound until ordered off the field. Captain Archer and Lieutenants Thomas and Lemmon, of my staff, rendered valuable and efficient assistance. We held our position until dark, when we returned to camp and took up our line of march the same night toward Martinsburg.

The regiments were commanded as follows: First Tennessee, Colonel Turney; Fourteenth [Tennessee], Lieutenant-Colonel Lockert; Seventh Tennessee, Lieutenant Howard, adjutant; Nineteenth Georgia, Capt. F. M. Johnston.

The loss of the brigade was 6 killed and 49 wounded.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. ARCHER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. R. C. MORGAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, A. P. Hill's Light Division.

No. 283.

Report of Capt. F. M. Johnston, Nineteenth Georgia Infantry, of operations August 16–September 21.

NOVEMBER 17, 1862.

August 16, 1862.—Assumed command of regiment; same day marched to Locust Grove; bivouacked three days. Resumed the march on 20th ultimo; crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, and arrived at Manassas Junction on 26th ultimo; same day was engaged with the enemy. Destroyed railroad bridge over Bull Run. Returned to the Junction same night.

August 27.—Marched to Centreville, and from thence across Bull Run; supported Purcell Battery same evening, and moved down to railroad cut that night.

August 28.—Supported Braxton's battery in forenoon; marched to railroad cut in evening, and engaged the enemy until dark, retaining possession of the cut.

August 29.—Moved to the left of our position on yesterday; engaged the enemy during the day, and advanced with Generals Pender's and Thomas' brigades in the evening, capturing the enemy's guns, &c.

August 30.—Marched toward Fairfax Court-House.

August 31.—Stationed on the left of division, and moved up to battle-field same night.

September 2.—Resumed the march, and on 4th ultimo turned over the command to Maj. J. H. Neal.

September 18.—Resumed command of regiment; recrossed the Potomac morning of 19th.

September 20.—Engaged the enemy at Shepherdstown, and same evening returned to bivouac.

September 21.—Resumed the march and bivouacked near Martinsburg; turned over the command to Maj. J. H. Neal.

Respectfully submitted.

F. M. JOHNSTON,
Captain, Comdg. Company A, Nineteenth Georgia Vols.

No. 284.

*Report of Maj. James H. Neal, Nineteenth Georgia Infantry, of operations
September 4–October 19.*

CAMP LEE, VA., November 19, 1862.

Abstract of march made and actions engaged in by Nineteenth Georgia Volunteers from September 4, 1862, to October 19, 1862.

On the 4th of September, 1862, I relieved Capt. F. M. Johnston of the command of the regiment while on the march from Chantilly toward Leesburg. On the 6th crossed the Potomac near the latter place, and on the 7th went into bivouac near Frederick City, Md., where the army remained for four days. From there we marched, by way of Williamsport (where the Potomac was recrossed) and Martinsburg, to Harper's Ferry, and on the 14th participated in the siege of that place, driving in the pickets of the enemy, and taking positions favorable for an attack the next day. On the 15th began a forward movement upon the works of the enemy, when the siege was terminated by the surrender of the enemy. On both days this regiment was under a tolerably heavy fire from the artillery of the enemy, but, owing to the protection afforded by the crest of the hill, lost only 1 man killed and 3 wounded.

On the evening of the 15th this regiment went on duty as guard of the bridges across the river, and on the 16th passed the paroled prisoners across the river. On the 17th marched to Sharpsburg, and at about 4 o'clock p. m. became engaged on the right with the left of the enemy. Was exposed to a heavy fire of musketry while charging through a field of standing corn and across another field, freshly plowed, but succeeded in driving the enemy from a stone wall, behind which they were posted, and retained that position in spite of an advance in large force by the enemy to retake it.

During the night of the 17th the dead and wounded were removed from the field. On the 18th we remained behind the stone wall, under a heavy picket fire, and on that night withdrew from that position and recrossed the Potomac into Virginia.

On the 19th I turned over the command to Captain Johnston, and on the 23d resumed it at Camp Branch.

On the 1st of October Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchins relieved me of the command near Bunker Hill.

This regiment was all the time with the brigade, and had no adventure except participated in by all the regiment.

JAS. H. NEAL,
Major Nineteenth Georgia.

Report of Brig. Gen. William D. Pender, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations September 15-20.

CAMP NEAR BUNKERSVILLE [BUNKER HILL], VA.,
October 14, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of Manassas Junction, the two days' fighting at Manassas, the battles of Ox Hill, Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Shepherdstown:*

* * * * *

At Harper's Ferry my brigade was on the left of the division advancing from the point where the railroad and river met. My brigade advanced within about 60 yards of the breastwork on the west point of Bolivar Heights, having exchanged shots with the enemy several times on their way there. Colonel Brewer was in command of the brigade at this time, and did himself great credit in the manner in which he handled it. Being absent when my brigade had reached the advanced position, on my return I ordered it to fall back a short distance, knowing no troops were in a supporting distance.

The next morning, according to your order, I moved nearer, under cover, while our artillery played upon the enemy. The artillery ceasing, I, in obedience to previous orders, commenced the advance, but halted on the fire of our artillery opening again. I remained in this position, about 150 yards distant from the above-named breastwork, until after the surrender. Here, again, my officers and men behaved finely.

At Sharpsburg, on Wednesday, September 17, my brigade was on the right of the division, but not actively engaged, being under fire at long range of musketry.

The next morning I was ordered to take position between Colonel Brockenbrough, on the left, and Colonel [James H.] Lane, on my right. Here we were exposed all day to the enemy's sharpshooters, about 600 yards distant. We remained in this position until late at night.

At Shepherdstown, September 20, my brigade formed the left of our division. Advancing to within about 300 yards, we were opened upon by the artillery from the opposite side of the river, which lasted all day, at a most terrible rate. We came upon the infantry which had crossed. I had gone to the left to oppose this force, which was far superior to my own. Finding an effort made to flank me, I placed two regiments under cover from artillery, facing the river, and threw the other on my left flank, so as to check this new disposition of the enemy. Holding this position a short while, General Archer came up with three brigades to the support of the advanced line, and, upon seeing the flanking movement of the enemy, moved quickly to the left, when we advanced, driving them headlong into the river. After driving them from the plain, I sent the Twenty-second North Carolina, under the gallant Major Cole, to the river bank to take them as they crossed, and this it did nobly. Others of my brigade had gone to the river, but, finding them too much exposed, I called them back under a hill just overhanging the river. I called out those I had first left in that exposed position, leaving Major Cole with 20 men, who remained all day, the enemy being in heavy force

* Portion omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 697-699.

in the canal on the opposite side. We were exposed all day to a tremendous fire of artillery, and also to the fire of their sharpshooters.

In conclusion, I would beg leave to bring to the notice of the major-general the distinguished gallantry and efficiency of First Lieut. R. H. Brewer, volunteer aide on my staff, whom I recommend for promotion. I would also beg leave to mention the names of a few whose actions entitle them to notice. In the Twenty-second the list will be rather long, as it is upon it and its commander that I usually call when any special and dangerous services are to be performed. Maj. C. C. Cole, commanding Twenty-second, always acts with coolness, courage, and skill. Captain [J. M.] Odell, acting field officer, has invariably behaved in a highly commendable manner. Capt. George A. Graves, Twenty-second, is mentioned for great gallantry, and for having remained with his company even while very sick. Second Lieut. David Edwards, of the same regiment, at Manassas, with the help of two men, rushed ahead of their regiment and captured a piece of artillery when it was on the eve of escaping, having a hand-to-hand engagement with the enemy. At Harper's Ferry he also acted in such a manner as to be particularly noticed. Sergeant Oxford, of Company H, Twenty-second, is mentioned for great daring and coolness at Shepherdstown. Sergt. Jesse H. Pinkerton is mentioned as always going ahead with the colors, and by his undaunted courage encouraging others. He is a young man, and mentioned for promotion. Captain Stowe, commanding Sixteenth North Carolina at Manassas Junction, the two days' fighting at Manassas, and at Ox Hill until wounded, behaved with great credit to himself. Lieutenant-Colonel Stowe, commanding Sixteenth North Carolina at Shepherdstown, Harper's Ferry, and Sharpsburg, behaved with great gallantry. Second Lieut. John B. Ford, of the same regiment, attracted my attention for his good demeanor in all the battles. Captain Ashford, commanding Thirty-eighth North Carolina at Manassas Junction and at Manassas, where he was wounded, has entitled himself to notice as well as promotion by his uniform bravery and good conduct. Lieutenants [A. J.] Brown and [J. M.] Robinson, also of the same regiment, have attracted my attention more than once, as also Adjutant [D. M.] McIntire. There are others, too numerous to mention, who have escaped my memory at this late hour.

The list of casualties is as follows :

Engagements.	Killed.	Wounded.
Near Warrenton Springs, August 20.....	1	3
Manassas Junction, August 27.....	1	3
Manassas, August 29 and 30.....	12	145
Ox Hill, September 1.....	12	46
Harper's Ferry, September 14 and 15.....	2	20
Sharpsburg, September 17 and 18.....	2	28
Shepherdstown, September 20.....	8	55
Total.....	38	300

[W. D. PENDER,
Brigadier-General.]

No. 286.

Report of Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations September 14-20.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, LIGHT DIVISION,
October 26, 1862.

MAJOR:† * * * On September 14 and 15 this brigade was ordered to support General Pender's, then advancing upon Harper's Ferry. We were exposed to a heavy artillery fire, which caused some loss, but took no active part, and had moved to within a short distance of the enemy's works when they surrendered.

At Shepherdstown, on September 20, we were placed in position on the extreme right of the line, and were ordered to advance toward the Potomac River. Moving forward, we took position commanding the ford; remained under a heavy artillery fire until night, and were then ordered back to camp.

Col. R. W. Folsom, Fourteenth Georgia Regiment; Lieut. Col. S. M. Manning, Forty-ninth Georgia, and Maj. W. L. Grice, Forty-fifth Georgia, led their commands with a skill and gallantry highly honorable to them.

Maj. Lewis Ginter, Lieut. William Norwood, and Lieut. John Tyler, of the staff, performed their duties with gallantry on the field, and I take this occasion to acknowledge their valuable services to me.

With few exceptions, the officers and men of this command conducted themselves on the field in a manner highly honorable to them. Their courage, their cheerful obedience to orders, and their patient endurance of hardships cannot be commended too highly.

I have the honor to be, major, with highest respect, your obedient servant,

EDWD. L. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. R. C. MORGAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Light Division.

No. 287.

Report of Brig. Gen. John R. Jones, C. S. Army, commanding Jackson's division, of operations September 7-17.

HEADQUARTERS JONES' BRIGADE,
January 21, 1863.

MAJOR: In obedience to orders received from corps headquarters, I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of Jackson's division during the period which I had the honor to command it, being from September 7 to December 12, 1862:

The division reached Frederick City, Md., on September 7, and was encamped 1 mile from the city, with the exception of Jones' brigade,

† Portions of report here omitted are printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 219, 702.

which was placed in the city as provost guard. I found the division at this time very much reduced in numbers by the recent severe battles and the long and wearisome marches.

Orders were received on Tuesday night, September 10, to march at 3 o'clock the following morning. The march was continued across the Potomac at Williamsport, through Martinsburg, to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry.

It is appropriate at this point to pay the well-merited tribute to the good conduct of the soldiers of this division during their march through Maryland. Never has the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill-provided for as on this march, and yet there was no marauding, no plundering. The rights of person and property were strictly respected, eliciting the following comparison from the New York World of December 15:

The ragged, half-starved rebels passed through Maryland without disorder or marauding, without injury to the country, showing their excellent discipline. The well-fed, well-clothed Union soldiers laid waste everything before them, plundering houses, hen-roosts, and hog-pens, showing an utter want of discipline.

CAPTURE OF HARPER'S FERRY.

Encamped 4 miles from Harper's Ferry. On the 14th orders were received to move the division near the Potomac and above Bolivar Heights, on which the enemy were strongly posted. Commanding positions were secured for the batteries, and a heavy fire opened upon the works of the enemy and their line of battle. While good work was done by our batteries, the enemy replied without any effect, not a single casualty occurring in the division. Toward night I ordered the division to move nearer the river, directing Starke's brigade to rest on the river road to prevent the enemy from making his escape if he should attempt to do so.

At dawn on the 15th the attack was renewed, and at 7 a. m. the garrison surrendered, much to the joy of the toil-worn soldiers, who were ready again to encounter the enemy if necessary. At 3 p. m. orders were received to march back to camp and cook two days' rations and be ready to march. The cooking was completed by 12 o'clock at night, and at 1 o'clock the march was commenced. Reaching the Potomac at sunrise, the division was hurried across and on to Sharpsburg.

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

Resting for two hours in a grove a mile from Sharpsburg, the division was again put in motion, and took up its position on the extreme left, its right resting on the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike. A double line was formed, the front, composed of Jones' and Winder's brigades, placed in an open field, under the immediate command of Colonel Grigsby; Taliaferro's and Starke's brigades, forming the reserve, placed at the edge of a wood, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Starke; the whole under the command of Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones. This disposition was made about two hours before night on September 16. Two companies were at once thrown forward as skirmishers, and Poague's battery was placed in the road on the right. A battery of the enemy, about 500 yards in front and to the right, was playing upon the troops of Hood's division, which was on my right. Poague opened briskly upon it and silenced it in twenty minutes. The skirmishers

were warmly engaged until night. The troops lay on their arms all night, the silence of which was broken by occasional firing by the skirmishers.

At the dawn of day on the 17th the battle opened fiercely. A storm of shell and grape fell upon the division from several batteries in front, and at very short range, and from batteries of heavy guns on the extreme right, which enfiladed the position of the division and took it in reverse. These batteries were gallantly replied to by the batteries of the division, Poague's, Carpenter's, Brockenbrough's, Raine's, Caskie's, and Wooding's. It was during this almost unprecedented iron storm that a shell exploded a little above my head, and so stunned and injured me that I was rendered unfit for duty, and retired from the field, turning over the command to Brigadier-General Starke, who a half an hour afterward advanced his lines to meet the infantry of the enemy, which was approaching. The infantry became at once engaged, and the gallant and generous Starke fell, pierced by three balls, and survived but a few moments. His fall cast a gloom over the troops. They never for a moment faltered, but rushed upon the enemy and drove him back. The struggle continued for several hours, the enemy all the while receiving re-enforcements, and the division, not numbering over 1,600 men at the beginning of the fight, having no support, was finally compelled to fall back to its original line. Early's brigade coming up at this opportune moment, Colonel Grigsby, commanding the division, rallied its shattered columns and joined General Early, and drove the enemy half a mile from the field, capturing many prisoners and covering the field with the dead and wounded of the enemy. After this repulse, the division was ordered back to a grove to rest and get ammunition, when in the evening it again advanced to the support of a battery, but did not again become engaged with the enemy.

In this bloody conflict the "Old Stonewall Division" lost nothing of its fair name and fame. Having won a world-wide fame by its valor and endurance in the splendid campaign in the valley, it entered upon another series of fights, commencing at Richmond and going through Ceder Run, Manassas, Harper's Ferry, and Sharpsburg, entering the last weary and worn, and reduced to the numbers of a small brigade, with its officers stricken down in its many fierce engagements, closing with a colonel commanding the division, captains commanding brigades, and lieutenants commanding regiments. In this fight every officer and man was a hero, and it would be invidious to mention particular names.

Winder's brigade was commanded successively by Colonel Grigsby and Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Williams, Fifth Virginia Regiment; Jones' brigade by Captains [John E.] Penn, [A. C.] Page, and [R. W.] Withers, the first two losing a leg; Taliaferro's brigade by Col. J. W. Jackson and Colonel Sheffield; Starke's brigade by General Starke, Col. L. A. Stafford, Ninth Louisiana Regiment, and Col. Edmund Pendleton, Fifteenth Louisiana Regiment.

Inclosed are reports of the various brigade commanders, which give more particularly the parts taken by their brigades.

The list of casualties has already been furnished, amounting to about 700, killed and wounded.

This brief report is respectfully submitted.

J. R. JONES,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Major PENDLETON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Second Corps.

[Addenda.]

Return of casualties in Taliaferro's brigade at the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862.

[Compiled from nominal list.]

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
47th Alabama.....	1	9	5	30	45	Lieut. George W. Gammell killed.
48th Alabama.....	1	9	4	28	42	Capt. R. C. Golightly killed.
10th Virginia.....						
23d Virginia.....	1	8	4	25	38	Lieut. W. J. Sims killed.
37th Virginia.....	6	6	3	33	48	Capt. Chas. W. Taylor and Lieuts. Jas. H. Barrett, Isaac E. Hortenstine, William McHagy, John A. Rhea, and George W. Wallen, killed.
Total.....	9	32	16	116	173	

No. 288.

Report of Capt. W. T. Poague, commanding Rockbridge Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the battery under my command in the battle of Sharpsburg:

On the evening of the 16th, the battery—consisting of three guns, two 10-pounder Parrotts and one Napoleon, the 6-pounder being on detached service—by order of General Jackson, was placed in position on or near the extreme left of our lines, supported by the First and Second Brigades. In a few minutes a battery of the enemy opened fire at about 500 or 600 yards on one of our batteries on the right of the road, which had been engaged in shelling the woods occupied by the enemy's infantry. Upon this battery, fire was opened, and in about twenty minutes it was silenced, our own battery on the right of the road in the mean time having retired. In this affair we were assisted by one gun of some unknown battery.

About 8 p. m. I was ordered to withdraw my guns a short distance in rear of the infantry, and to resume the same position by daylight next morning.

At my request my two Parrott pieces were replaced next morning by two howitzers from Captain Raine's battery. Owing to the nature of the ground, the range was short, and I wished to economize my Parrott ammunition.

Shortly after daylight on the morning of the 17th, the enemy's infantry commenced advancing. The 12-pounder, under Lieutenant [William M.] Brown, in conjunction with Captain Raine's howitzers, opened upon them, and, after firing several rounds, and finding themselves within range of the enemy's skirmishers, retired to a position in rear of our infantry, from which they fired until compelled by the musketry of the enemy again to fall back; and there being no other position from which the enemy could be reached, they joined their respective batteries. The place occupied by my battery during the night becoming exposed

to a cross-fire of the enemy's heavy guns on our right, I moved the battery back and took position on a ridge, so as to command the woods in case our infantry should be compelled to abandon it. Having reported to General Jackson, I was directed to make a reconnaissance along the road to see if the battery could be of any service in that direction; but finding all the eligible positions already occupied by batteries, I proceeded to the position occupied by the First and Second Brigades during the night. I found no infantry here, but a gap of some 200 or 300 yards in our line. Two guns were immediately put in position and fire opened directly to the front on the enemy's line of battle; but soon our infantry on the right fell back, and, the enemy advancing along our flank, I withdrew my guns, having no support whatever. Subsequently, when the enemy was forced to fall back, I was directed to report to General Stuart on the extreme left, and with other guns kept up an advancing fire on the retreating enemy until he found shelter under a number of reserve batteries.

Here several of my men were wounded, and a large proportion of the horses of two of the pieces killed or wounded, rendering the pieces un-serviceable. They were at once sent to the rear.

Later in the day I was ordered, with my only remaining piece, to report to General Stuart on the left. Along with six or eight other guns, under the direction of Major Pelham, an attempt was made to dislodge the enemy's batteries, but failed completely, being silenced in fifteen or twenty minutes by a most terrific fire from a number of the enemy's batteries.

The following list exhibits the casualties sustained by the battery: * 1 officer and 5 privates wounded, 14 horses killed and wounded, and 3 limber-chests and 1 wheel badly damaged.

All the men and officers acquitted themselves most admirably. I cannot avoid entertaining a feeling of pride in having the command of such men.

Very respectfully, &c.,

WM. T. POAGUE,
Captain Rockbridge Artillery.

Lieutenant THOMAS,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Brigade, First Division.

No. 289.

Report of Maj. H. J. Williams, Fifth Virginia Infantry, commanding Winder's brigade, of operations September 1-19.

JANUARY 15, 1863.

CAPTAIN: In the absence of more competent officers, I have the honor to submit the following notes of the operations of Winder's brigade between September 1 and 19, 1862:

September 1, Winder's brigade, Col. A. J. Grigsby commanding, was thrown into line of battle near Chantilly (the residence of Turberville Stewart, esq.), and marched forward in supporting distance of Starke's brigade to Ox Hill, a densely-wooded crest overlooking the little village of Germantown. At this point the troops in front were moved by the right flank, the First Brigade moving forward to the extreme left of the new line of battle and at right angles with the Little River turnpike.

* Nominal list omitted.

This position it occupied throughout the engagement, nothing occurring worthy of particular note. About 5 p. m. the enemy approached, as well as could be ascertained, to within some 300 yards of our immediate front, apparently with the design of attacking our battery upon the left. After a brisk fire of a few minutes' duration, the enemy retired. The brigade sustained no loss, although subjected for a while to artillery fire and occasional musketry, mostly, however, at long range. Later in the evening, about 20 of the enemy's skirmishers, who seemed bewildered by the thunder, lightning, and rain, which fell in torrents, approached our line, were captured, and sent to the rear. At nightfall the brigade was relieved and marched a mile to the rear for the night.

At 10 a. m. the following morning, the brigade moved to a position in the wood along the dirt road leading from Little River pike to the Leesburg and Alexandria pike, picketing about three-quarters of a mile to the front.

On the morning of September 4, marched in the direction of Leesburg, crossing the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad at Vienna, and striking the Leesburg and Alexandria pike at Dranesville, encamping for the night 1 mile from the village.

September 5, marched through Leesburg to Big Springs, a mile from the town.

September 6, crossed the Potomac in excellent order and high spirits, following the Monocacy road, crossing the river of the same name, and encamped within 7 miles of Frederick City, Md.

Entered Frederick September 7, and encamped about 2 miles from the city, on the Emmittsburg road. Our short sojourn in the land of promise wrought a salutary change in the general appearance and condition of the troops. The ragged were clad, the shoeless shod, and the inner man rejoiced by a number and variety of delicacies to which it had been a stranger for long, long weary months before.

Broke camp at sunrise September 11, and marched to Boonsborough.

On the 12th, recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and encamped near North Mountain Depot, Berkeley County, Virginia.

On the 13th, marched to Martinsburg, halted two hours, and moved toward Harper's Ferry, the Second Regiment, Captain Colston commanding, having been detached as provost guard, remaining in town; encamped for the night within sight of the enemy's tents.

On the morning of the 14th, the brigade was ordered to secure a commanding ridge to the left of Bolivar Heights for the effective working of our artillery. Upon our approach the enemy's cavalry retired rapidly, and the hill from which Poague's and Carpenter's batteries did such admirable execution, contributing so largely to the demoralization of the enemy, was secured without difficulty. During the remainder of the day the brigade rested in rear of the batteries under a brisk artillery fire. After dark our lines were advanced to within half a mile of the heights, and dispositions made to forestall the retreat of the garrison.

The alacrity and determination on the part of both officers and men which characterized this forward movement, seemingly to the assault of a position strong by nature, and rendered doubly so by art, was in the highest degree commendable.

On the morning of the 15th the garrison surrendered, to the delight of the soldiers and the disgust of the contrabands, and the First Brigade, with the other brigades of Jackson's division, marched back to their encampment of the night previous, to cook rations and prepare for the march to join General Longstreet's corps, near Sharpsburg, Md. This march was begun at 2 a. m. September 16, crossing the Potomac at

Boteler's Mill, below Shepherdstown, thence along the tow-path to the main road to Sharpsburg. On reaching the vicinity of Sharpsburg, the division was halted in a grove to the left, where it remained until 3 p. m., whence we were moved $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles northwest of the town, forming line of battle in an open clover field to the left of and perpendicular to the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, in extension of General Hood's line, who had occupied the extreme left until our approach. The disposition of the brigades of the division was as follows: Winder's and Jones' brigades occupying the front line, under command of Col. A. J. Grigsby; Taliaferro's and Starke's brigades in the edge of the woods, 100 yards in rear, under command of Brigadier-General Starke; the whole commanded by Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones. Two companies were thrown forward, as skirmishers, about 100 yards, and Poague's battery, of two Parrotts and one Napoleon gun, put in position upon a knoll between the line of skirmishers and front line, supported by both. In a few minutes one of the enemy's batteries, some 500 yards in front, opened fire upon a battery of ours to the right of the brigade, but was silenced in twenty minutes by Poague's well-directed and rapid fire. Shortly after, a number of batteries, about one-fourth of a mile distant, opened upon our lines, and continued firing for some time after dark. The display was grand and comparatively harmless, except to the stragglers in far rear. Throughout the night a desultory fire was kept up by the skirmishers on both sides.

At early dawn of the morning of September 17, the terrible struggle began in earnest, and the direction of their fire indicated plainly the design of the enemy to turn our left flank. Their heaviest field pieces were brought to bear upon us with wonderful rapidity and fearful precision, front and enfilading fires. Their infantry, advancing, compelled Raine's howitzers and Poague's Napoleon, under command of Lieutenant Brown, to withdraw to our rear, and soon our skirmishers became hotly engaged.

About 6 a. m. the advance column of the enemy approached our front, and the front line (Winder's and Jones' brigades), which had been ordered to lie down for concealment and protection, rose at the command of their intrepid leader and poured in a staggering volley, which stopped his advance. For three-quarters of an hour the front line, numbering less than 400 men, maintained the unequal contest, holding their ground and doing good work. Heavy re-enforcements advancing to the enemy's support, the front line was ordered to retire to the edge of the wood above indicated, where, in conjunction with the reserve brigade of the division, it remained for half an hour exposed to a terrific storm of grape, canister, and shell. At the end of this time, our line advanced into the open field and encountered the enemy upon the ground which we had previously held. The firing was fierce and incessant, the enemy standing firm for a time. Unable to withstand the resolute valor of our troops, he retired in considerable disorder.

It was during this severe contest that the chivalrous Starke, who had succeeded to the command of the division, in consequence of General Jones being disabled, fell, while cheering his men in the discharge of their duty. The command fell to no unworthy successor in the dauntless Grigsby, who took the reins with a fearless spirit and held them with a firm hand, the command of the brigade devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, Fourth Virginia. The heavy losses sustained, the confusion unavoidably arising from the change of commanders, and the protracted nature of the contest, rendered necessary the withdrawal of our weary troops to the wood from which they had advanced. Here the efforts of our active leader, assisted by regimental and company officers,

availed to restore order and reform the commands. General Early coming up with his brigade at this juncture, we formed upon his right and advanced again into the open field for a short distance, when we were transferred to his left, forming a diagonal line, the left occupying a hollow in the edge of a wood, maintaining a desultory firing throughout the whole time. From this position, the division, in line with Early's brigade, retired 100 yards to a barn and stack-yard and along a ledge of rocks, where we held a large force of the enemy in check for upward of an hour, inflicting heavy loss upon him, with little damage to ourselves. The long looked for re-enforcements coming to our aid at this point, the enemy was handsomely charged and driven in confusion for a half mile, leaving scores of killed, wounded, and prisoners in our hands.

Returning to the barn above referred to, about the middle of the day the brigade was relieved and ordered to a grove to supply themselves with ammunition and provisions, by this time entirely exhausted. Here we remained until 5 p. m., when we marched to the support of a battery on a hill in rear of our late line. Night put an end to one of the most sanguinary conflicts which history will have to record, and the tired soldiers sank to rest.

The brigade went into the fight with about 250 muskets, and nobly sustained the reputation for heroism and devotion accorded to it by the country.

When the extraordinary march from the Rappahannock to Sharpsburg, with its attendant circumstances, its sleepless nights and harassing marches, its bloody battles and heavy losses, in all of which the "Old Stonewall" bore a conspicuous part, is carefully considered, the melancholy decrease in number will not appear surprising.

The regiments of the brigade were commanded, respectively, by Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, Fourth Virginia; Maj. H. J. Williams, Fifth Virginia; Capt. Frank C. Wilson, Twenty-seventh Virginia, and Captain Golladay, and afterward Adjutant Walton, Thirty-third Virginia, the Second (Captain Colston) being on detached duty at Martinsburg.

It is impossible, from the length of time which has elapsed, even if it were appropriate for me, to mention the individual acts of gallantry which marked the progress of the fight.

Lieut. James M. Garnett, brigade ordnance officer and acting aide-de-camp, and Orderlies Cox and Stickley, the latter of whom was severely wounded early in the day, rendered indispensable services to Colonel Grigsby throughout the whole trying time.

The full list of casualties, as found in the reports of the regimental and battery commanders, accompanies this report.

Very respectfully,

H. J. WILLIAMS,

Major, Commanding Fifth Virginia Infantry.

Capt. W. T. TALIAFERRO,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Casualties.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Officers.....	1	6	7
Privates.....	10	71	81
Total.....	11	77	88

No. 290.

Report of Capt. F. C. Wilson, Twenty-seventh Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

— — — — —, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following as the part taken in the action near Sharpsburg by the Twenty-seventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers:

After remaining all day in reserve, we were marched to the extreme left of the brigade and placed in position in an open field, supporting Captain Poague's battery, placed in our front. We were ordered to lie flat down, to escape the shells which then commenced passing over us in several directions. The enemy did not approach near enough in our immediate front to engage our skirmishers. Shortly after dark the firing ceased, and we occupied our position during the night.

At daylight the firing again commenced on our right, and in a short time our own skirmishers became engaged and withdrew, allowing the enemy to approach within sight, when we opened fire, causing them to retire. We were then ordered to fall back upon our supports. The regiment was then reformed in the edge of the woods, and again ordered to take position a little farther back; then ordered to take position on the right of the Forty-ninth Virginia. A charge was made by the forces, thus united, which caused the enemy in our front to break and run. Then, a fresh regiment coming to the enemy's support, we were ordered to retire behind the crest of a little hill and take position on the left of Colonel Smith's troops. Then we were ordered still farther back to a position near a barn and straw-stack. Here the fighting was most severe, and many men fell, bravely doing their duty. Here we maintained our position, being stoutly supported by some fresh troops.*

Respectfully,

FRANK C. WILSON,
Captain, Comdg. Twenty-seventh Regiment Virginia Vols.

Lieut. W. H. THOMAS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, First Brigade.

No. 291.

Report of Col. Leroy A. Stafford, Ninth Louisiana Infantry, commanding Starke's brigade, of operations August 31–October 5.

CAMP NEAR PORT ROYAL, VA.,
January 21, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit the following report:

The brigade, consisting [of the] First, Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Fifteenth, and Coppens' battalion Louisiana Volunteers, reported near Gordonsville on or about August 12, 1862, and was assigned to duty in the division of Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson.†

* * * * *

On the 31st we took up the line of march, and on September 1, at Chantilly, we again met the enemy and repulsed them. We resumed our line of march; passed through Dranesville, Leesburg, and crossed the Potomac on September 5. Passed through Frederick City, Md.; encamped 2 miles beyond. Recrossed the Potomac on September 11 at

* Nominal list of casualties reports 3 men killed and 1 officer and 4 men wounded.

† Portion of report here omitted is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 668, 669.

Williamsport; passed through Martinsburg, thence to Harper's Ferry; took part in the reduction of that place. Crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown September 16. Same evening formed line of battle; slept on our arms and in position near Sharpsburg, Md.

Early on the morning of the 17th the engagement became general, continuing throughout the day, this brigade sustaining its part. It was in this battle that Brig. Gen. W. E. Starke fell, while gallantly leading his command. Remained in line of battle all night of the 17th.

Remained in position on the day of the 18th; recrossed the Potomac near Shepherdstown on the morning of the 19th; held in reserve on the 20th; went into camp near Martinsburg on the 21st; remained in camp until the 28th, and moved to Bunker Hill on or about October 5. My command (the Ninth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers) was transferred from Starke's brigade to that commanded by Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays.

No report of casualties has been received from [G.] Coppens' battalion, Captains Raine's and Brockenbrough's batteries. Inclosed find list of casualties in First, Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Regiments Louisiana Volunteers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. STAFFORD,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM B. TALIAFERRO,
Commanding Jackson's Division.

[Inclosure.]

Return of casualties in the Second Louisiana Brigade at the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Enlisted men missing.	Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.			
1st Louisiana.....	1	15	9	36	10	71	Lieut. R. P. Cates killed.
2d Louisiana.....	3	18	1	40	-----	62	Lieuts. H. Hobart, James H. McBride, and M. V. B. Swann killed.
9th Louisiana.....	4	21	2	55	-----	82	Capt. R. Grigsby and Lieuts. A. M. Gordon, N. P. Henderson, and Samuel T. Robinson killed.
10th Louisiana.....	1	15	3	31	7	57	Lieut. A. J. Alexander killed.
15th Louisiana.....	-----	3	2	10	-----	15	
Total.....	9	72	17	172	17	287	

No. 292.

Report of Col. Edmund Pendleton, Fifteenth Louisiana Infantry, commanding Starke's brigade, of operations September 13-17.

HEADQUARTERS STARKE'S BRIGADE,
Camp near Martinsburg, W. Va., October 20, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: In obedience to the order of Lieutenant-General Jackson, requiring of brigade commanders reports of the participation of their commands in the late engagements with the enemy, I have the honor to submit the following statement of the part taken by this bri-

gade in the capture of Harper's Ferry and the immediately following battle of Sharpsburg, Md.:

Having marched from Martinsburg about dawn on the morning of September 13, we reached the vicinity of Bolivar Heights, where the enemy was strongly intrenched, shortly after noon on the same day, and bivouacked on the Charlestown road just beyond the range of his guns until 2 o'clock the next day. At that hour we were ordered to move by an unfrequented road to our left and almost at right angles with the Charlestown road, to a position nearer the Potomac, supporting the Baltimore battery of light artillery, commanded by Captain Brockenbrough and attached to this brigade, which opened upon the enemy and continued its fire until dark, the enemy responding, but without damage to us.

At 8 p. m., when darkness entirely concealed the movement, we were ordered to move forward in closer proximity to the Potomac, and within close range of the enemy's artillery, in obedience to which order we silently occupied a wooded ridge overlooking the river, and along the crest of which a road leads directly to the enemy's fortified position.

The brigade being formed in line across, and at right angles with, the course of the ridge, we lay upon our arms till nearly daylight, the quietude of the night being unbroken, save by a sharp musketry fire of a few minutes' duration in front of our right and a few hundred yards distant, which proved to have occurred between two regiments of the enemy on picket duty, who had mutually mistaken each other for foes.

Shortly before dawn we resumed our position of the evening before, again supporting the Baltimore battery, which reopened its fire and delivered a few telling shots, some of them, I regret to say, after the besieged hoisted the white flag. It is but justice, however, to add that from the position we occupied the flag was imperceptible, nor were we aware of the surrender until a message was received from the major-general commanding, directing a cessation of the fire.

It gives me pleasure to be able to say that not a single casualty of any kind is to be reported in this brigade on that occasion, although the result was so glorious to our arms.

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

Having previously cooked two days' rations, we left our bivouac near Bolivar Heights on Tuesday, September 16, at 2.30 a. m. and took up the line of march by way of Shepherdstown; again crossed the Potomac, and halted about noon in the vicinity and to the southwest of the town of Sharpsburg, Md., where we rested in line of battle till near sunset, at which time we resumed our line of march and moved forward about a mile to take the position assigned to us on the extreme left, preparatory to the anticipated combat of the next morning. In doing so we encountered the shells from three of the enemy's batteries, and had the misfortune about dark to lose several of our number, among whom was the gallant young Gordon, a lieutenant in the Ninth Louisiana Regiment and acting assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, who was killed by a shell which cut off both his legs at the thigh. Under command of Brigadier-General Starke, who remained with us constantly, we lay upon our arms all night, throwing out a line of skirmishers in front and to the left. During the early part of the night we were much disturbed by several of the enemy's batteries, which, crossing their fire, cut the tree-tops over our

heads, and our rest was broken at intervals during the whole night by occasional and spirited firing between the skirmishers.

At the break of day on the 17th the artillery reopened, and the rapidly increasing rattle of musketry notified us of the commencement of a general engagement with a foe vastly superior to us in numbers and confident of an easy victory. Our men, although much worn down with long and rapid marches, and but recently from the bloody fields of Manassas, were again ready to meet our boastful enemy, with undaunted front, and when, at 7 a. m., the order forward was given, it was heard with enthusiasm and obeyed with alacrity from one end of the brigade to the other.

We had scarcely emerged from the woods in which we had rested during the night, when we found ourselves face to face with the enemy, heavily massed and within close musket range. Still, we charged forward in the face of a murderous fire, which thinned our ranks at every step, until our progress was arrested by a lane, on either side of which was a high, staked fence stretching along our whole front, to pass which, under the circumstances, was an impossibility. The men, being formed along this fence, kept up an accurate and well-sustained fire, which visibly told upon the enemy's ranks; and, although we suffered greatly, as well from musketry in front as from a battery on our left, which enfiladed us with grape and canister, still, not a man was seen to flinch from the conflict. By some mistake or misapprehension, the troops which were intended, as I have since been informed, to support us on the left, failed to get in position as early as was expected, and, our left being unprotected, we were about to be outflanked, when the order to retire was given and obeyed, the men withdrawing in tolerable order, and fighting as they fell back.

It was in this early part of the engagement that our brave and chivalric leader, Brig. Gen. William E. Starke, loved and honored by every man under his command, fell, pierced by three Minie-balls, and was carried from the field in a dying condition, surviving his wounds but an hour.

The enemy, flushed with their supposed success in the first onset, rent the air with shouts, and pressed upon us with redoubled energy. Their exultation was, however, but short-lived. The command of the brigade having devolved upon Col. L. A. Stafford, of the Ninth Louisiana, he lost no time in reforming our somewhat disordered line, when, other troops coming to our support, we gathered our strength for a fresh charge upon the rapidly advancing and exulting foe, and, with a determination to win or die, hurled ourselves against his lines with an impetus which first staggered, then drove him, fleeing, from the field, and leaving behind him hundreds of his dead and wounded. The enemy being thus completely repulsed on his right, did not again offer to renew the combat on that portion of his lines during the day.

Later in the day the brigade was again called out to support a battery, when, in consequence of a severe contusion of the foot, received by Colonel Stafford early in the action, which prevented his taking the field, the command devolved upon the undersigned. Those who had passed unharmed through the severe conflict of the morning evinced again their readiness to meet the foe by promptly taking the field, though they were not again called upon to fire a gun.

I beg leave to speak in the highest terms of the gallantry and fearlessness displayed by Col. L. A. Stafford, of the Ninth Louisiana Regiment, who commanded the brigade in the morning.

Col. J. M. Williams, commanding the Second Louisiana Regiment,

was severely wounded by a Minie-ball, which passed through his chest, while gallantly leading his regiment in the first charge.

Lieut. Col. M. Nolan, of the First Louisiana, though painfully wounded in the leg, remained at his post during the fight, commanding his regiment with coolness and bravery.

The Tenth Louisiana was commanded in the engagement by Capt. Henry D. Monier, who faithfully discharged the duty devolved upon him.

It is a noteworthy fact that not a single field officer in the brigade who was on duty that day escaped untouched. I was so fortunate as to escape with only a slight contusion of the ankle from a spherical-case shot, which passed between my feet. When all did their duty so heroically it would seem almost invidious to mention particular names, but on some other occasion which shall seem opportune it will give me pleasure to mention the names of those officers who merit special notice.

A list of the casualties* in the different regiments composing this brigade has been heretofore furnished.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMD. PENDLETON,

Colonel Fifteenth Louisiana Regiment, Comdg. Brigade.

Lieut. MANN PAGE,

Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Division, Jackson's Corps.

No. 293.

Report of Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations July 23–September 17.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,

—, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the battles around Richmond until after the battle of Sharpsburg.

On July 23, I was detached from my division and placed in charge of the Department of the South Side, extending from Drewry's Bluff to the South Carolina line. As McClellan was then at Westover, on the James, some 30 miles from Richmond, and it was thought that he might attempt an advance by the south side, my first attention was given to the defenses in that direction. Heavy details were made from the division and two brigades near the bluff, to complete a line of intrenchments around it, and controlling the Petersburg road. Not a spadefull of earth had been thrown up about Petersburg, and it was in a wholly defenseless condition. A system of fortifications was begun (which subsequently met the approval of the chief engineer, Col. J. F. Gilmer, C. S. Army), and the brigades of Ransom, Walker, and Daniel were put to work on it. About 1,000 negroes were procured (chiefly from North Carolina) and employed in like manner. Pontoon bridges were constructed at several points, to make the connection rapid and secure between the two positions to be secured. The defenses of the Appomattox were also strengthened, and a movable car planned and ordered, to prevent a landing at City Point. An effort was made to organize and make efficient the numerous independent companies in the department, which had been of but little use and much expense to the country. A

* Embodied in tabular statement, p. 813.

concentration of these troops at Weldon and Goldsborough was ordered, to prevent the cutting of our important lines southward.

In accordance with instructions from the general commanding Army of Northern Virginia, I made a personal examination of the Yankee shipping and encampment on the 28th instant, and determined to attack it from Coggins' Point and Maycock's on the south side. This expedition was intrusted to Brigadier-General French, and was a complete success. Forty-three pieces, under command of General Pendleton and Col. J. T. Brown, were placed in position, on the night of the 31st, on the banks of the river, within easy range of the objects to be reached. Much damage was done to the Yankee shipping, some destruction of life caused in the camp, and the wildest terror and consternation produced. The report of General French is herewith submitted.* This officer had charge of the expedition, agreeably to the wishes of General Lee. Doubtless the night attack had much to do with the evacuation of Westover, as it made McClellan feel that his shipping was insecure. Two days after, he took possession of Coggins' Point, and maintained a force on the south side till he left the river. His gunboats were attacked at the mouth of the Appomattox, and points were selected for the further harassing of his shipping. An expedition was sent out under Col. J. R. Chambliss, jr., to within 2 miles of Suffolk. Arrangements were made for the defense of the Blackwater, Chowan, and Tar Rivers, and a point selected for fortifications on the Roanoke, to secure Weldon.

On August 21, I left Petersburg to join the army in Northern Virginia, and was given command of McLaws' division and three brigades of my own division, at Hanover Junction. The brigades of Ripley and Colquitt, of my division, were in advance of us at Orange Court-House.

On August 26, we left Hanover Junction and joined General Lee at Chantilly on September 2, three days after the Yankees had been finally and decisively beaten in the second great battle of Manassas.

On the 4th, Anderson's brigade was sent to fire on the Yankee trains at Berlin, and, with two brigades, we drove away the Yankee forces near the mouth of the Monocacy, and crossed the Potomac. That night and the next day were spent in destroying the lock and canal banks. The aqueduct could not be destroyed for want of powder and tools.

The night of the 5th, my division followed General Jackson to within a few miles of Frederick. The general being disabled by the fall of his horse, the next morning I was placed in charge of all the forces, and marched into Frederick. The telegraph wires were cut and the station seized. A few stores and prisoners were taken in the city.

On the 10th, my division constituted the rear guard, and had charge of the immense wagon-train moving in the direction of Hagerstown.

On the 13th, I was ordered by General Lee to dispose of my troops so as to prevent the escape of the Yankees from Harper's Ferry, then besieged, and also to guard the pass in the Blue Ridge near Boonsborough. Major-General Stuart reported to me that two brigades only of the Yankees were pursuing us, and that one brigade would be sufficient to hold the pass. I, however, sent the brigades of Garland and Colquitt, and ordered my other three brigades up to the neighborhood of Boonsborough.

An examination of the pass, very early on the morning of the 14th, satisfied me that it could only be held by a large force, and was wholly indefensible by a small one. I accordingly ordered up Anderson's brigade. A regiment of Ripley's brigade was sent to hold another pass,

* See Series I, Vol. XI, Part II, p. 940.

some 3 miles distant, on our left. I felt reluctant to order up Ripley and Rodes from the important positions they were holding until something definite was known of the strength and design of the Yankees. About 7 o'clock they opened a fire upon our right, and pushed forward a large force through the dense woods to gain a practicable road to our rear. Garland's brigade was sent in to meet this overwhelming force, and succeeded in checking it and securing the road from any further attack that day. This brilliant service, however, cost us the life of that pure, gallant, and accomplished Christian soldier, General Garland, who had no superiors and few equals in the service. The Yankees on their side lost General Reno, a renegade Virginian, who was killed by a happy shot from the Twenty-third North Carolina. Garland's brigade was badly demoralized by his fall and the rough handling it had received, and, had the Yankees pressed vigorously forward, the road might have been gained. Providentially, they were ignorant of their success or themselves too much damaged to advance. The Twentieth North Carolina, of this brigade, under Colonel Iverson, had attacked a Yankee battery, killed all the horses, and driven off the cannoneers. This battery was used no more that day by the Yankees. Anderson's brigade arrived in time to take the place of the much-demoralized troops of Garland. There were two mountain roads practicable for artillery on the right of the main turnpike. The defense of the farther one had cost Garland his life. It was now intrusted to Colonel [T. L.] Rosser, of the cavalry, who had reported to me, and who had artillery and dismounted sharpshooters. General Anderson was intrusted with the care of the nearest and best road. Bondurant's battery was sent to aid him in its defense. The brigade of Colquitt was disposed on each side of the turnpike, and that, with Lane's battery, was judged adequate to the task. There was, however, a solitary peak on the left, which, if gained by the Yankees, would give them control of the ridge commanding the turnpike. The possession of this peak was, therefore, everything to the Yankees, but they seemed slow to perceive it. I had a large number of guns from Cutts' artillery placed upon the hill on the left of the turnpike, to sweep the approaches to this peak. From the position selected, there was a full view of the country for miles around, but the mountain was so steep that ascending columns were but little exposed to artillery fire. The artillerists of [A. S.] Cutts' battalion behaved gallantly, but their firing was the worst I ever witnessed. Rodes and Ripley came up soon after Anderson. Rodes was sent to the left, to seize the peak already mentioned, and Ripley was sent to the right to support Anderson. Several attempts had been made previous to this, by the Yankees, to force a passage through the woods on the right of and near the turnpike, but these were repulsed by the Sixth and Twenty-seventh Georgia and Thirteenth Alabama, of Colquitt's brigade.

It was now past noon, and the Yankees had been checked for more than five hours; but it was evident that they were in large force on both sides of the road, and the Signal Corps reported heavy masses at the foot of the mountain. In answer to a dispatch from General Longstreet, I urged him to hurry forward troops to my assistance. General Drayton and Col. G. T. Anderson came up, I think, about 3 o'clock, with 1,900 men, and I felt anxious to beat the force on my right before the Yankees made their grand attack, which I feared would be on our left. Anderson, Ripley, and Drayton were called together, and I directed them to follow a path until they came in contact with Rosser, when they should change their flank, march into line of battle, and sweep the woods before them. To facilitate their movements, I brought up a battery and made

it shell the woods in various directions. Anderson soon became partially and Drayton hotly engaged, but Ripley did not draw trigger; why, I do not know. The Fourth North Carolina (Anderson's brigade) attempted to carry a Yankee battery, but failed. Three Yankee brigades moved up, in beautiful order, against Drayton, and his men were soon beaten and went streaming to the rear. Rosser, Anderson, and Ripley still held their ground, and the Yankees could not gain our rear.

Affairs were now very serious on our left. A division of Yankees was advancing in handsome style against Rodes. I had every possible gun turned upon the Yankee columns, but, owing to the steepness of the acclivity and the bad handling of the guns, but little harm was done to the "restorers of the Union." Rodes handled his little brigade in a most admirable and gallant manner, fighting, for hours, vastly superior odds, and maintaining the key-points of the position until darkness rendered a further advance of the Yankees impossible. Had he fought with less obstinacy, a practicable artillery road to the rear would have been gained on our left and the line of retreat cut off.

Colonel [J. B.] Gordon, the Christain hero, excelled his former deeds at Seven Pines and in the battles around Richmond. Our language is not capable of expressing a higher compliment.

General Rodes says :

The men and officers generally behaved well, but Colonel Gordon, Sixth Alabama; Major [E. L.] Hobson, Fifth Alabama, and Colonel [C. A.] Battle, Third Alabama, deserve especial mention for admirable conduct during the whole fight. We did not drive the enemy back or whip him, but with 1,200 men we held his whole division at bay for four hours and a half without assistance from any one, losing in that time not more than half a mile of ground.

He estimates his loss at 422 out of 1,200 taken into action, but thinks that he inflicted a three-fold heavier loss on the Yankees. Colonel [B. B.] Gayle, of the Twelfth Alabama, was killed, and Colonel [E. A.] O'Neal, Twenty-sixth Alabama, and Lieutenant-Colonel [S. B.] Pickens, of the Twelfth, severely wounded.

Major-General Longstreet came up about 4 o'clock with the commands of Brig. Gens. N. G. Evans and D. R. Jones. I had now become familiar with the ground, and knew all the vital points, and, had these troops reported to me, the result might have been different. As it was, they took wrong positions, and, in their exhausted condition after a long march, they were broken and scattered. Our whole left was now fairly exposed, and the Yankees had but to push down to seize the turnpike. It was now dark, however, and they feared to advance. All the available troops were collected behind a stone wall, to resist an approach upon the turnpike from the left. Encouraged by their successes in that direction, the Yankees thought that it would be an easy matter to move directly up the turnpike; but they were soon undeceived. They were heroically met and bloodily repulsed by the Twenty-third and Twenty-eighth Georgia Regiments, of Colquitt's brigade. The fight lasted for more than an hour after night, but gradually subsided as the Yankees retired. General Hood, who had gone in on the right with his two noble brigades, pushed forward his skirmishers and drove back the Yankees.

We retreated that night to Sharpsburg, having accomplished all that was required—the delay of the Yankee army until Harper's Ferry could not be relieved.

Should the truth ever be known, the battle of South Mountain, as far as my division was concerned, will be regarded as one of the most remarkable and creditable of the war. The division had marched all the way from Richmond, and the straggling had been enormous in consequence

of heavy marches, deficient commissariat, want of shoes, and inefficient officers. Owing to these combined causes, the division numbered less than 5,000 men the morning of September 14, and had five roads to guard, extending over a space of as many miles. This small force successfully resisted, without support, for eight hours, the whole Yankee army, and, when its supports were beaten, still held the roads, so that our retreat was effected without the loss of a gun, a wagon, or an ambulance. Rodes' brigade had immortalized itself; Colquitt's had fought well, and the two regiments most closely pressed (Twenty-third and Twenty-eighth Georgia) had repulsed the foe. Garland's brigade had behaved nobly, until demoralized by the fall of its gallant leader, and being outflanked by the Yankees. Anderson's brigade had shown its wonted gallantry. Ripley's brigade, for some cause, had not been engaged, and was used with Hood's two brigades to cover the retreat.

Had Longstreet's division been with mine at daylight in the morning, the Yankees would have been disastrously repulsed; but they had gained important positions before the arrival of re-enforcements. These additional troops came up, after a long, hurried, and exhausting march, to defend localities of which they were ignorant, and to fight a foe flushed with partial success, and already holding key-points to further advance. Had our forces never been separated, the battle of Sharpsburg never would have been fought, and the Yankees would not have even the shadow of consolation for the loss of Harper's Ferry.

We reached Sharpsburg about daylight on the morning of the 15th. The Yankees made their appearance that day, and some skirmishing and cannonading occurred.

There was a great deal of artillery firing during the forenoon of the 16th, and late that afternoon the Yankees crossed the Antietam opposite the center of my line and made for the Hagerstown turnpike. Had we been in a condition to attack them as they crossed, much damage might have been inflicted; but as yet there were but two weak divisions on the ground. Longstreet held the position south of the Boonsborough turnpike, and I that on the right. Hood's command was placed on my left to guard the Hagerstown pike. Just before sundown I got up a battery (Lane's), of Cutts' battalion, to open upon the Yankee columns advancing toward that pike, while Col. Stephen D. Lee brought up another farther on the right. These checked the Yankee advance, and enabled Jackson to take position on Hood's left and covering any attempt to turn us in that direction.

My ranks had been diminished by some additional straggling, and the morning of the 17th I had but 3,000 infantry. I had, however, twenty-six pieces of artillery of my own and near fifty [?] pieces of Cutts' battalion, temporarily under my command. Positions were selected for as many of these guns as could be used; but all the ground in my front was completely commanded by the long-range artillery of the Yankees on the other side of the Antietam, which concentrated their fire upon every gun that opened and soon disabled or silenced it.

At daylight a brisk skirmish began along Hood's front, and Colquitt, Ripley, and McKae (commanding Garland's brigade) were moved up to his support. Hood's men always fight well, and they were handsomely supported by Colquitt and Ripley. The first line of the Yankees was broken, and our men pushed vigorously forward, but to meet another, and yet another, line. Colquitt had gone in with 10 field officers; 4 were killed, 5 badly wounded, and the tenth had been stunned by a shell. The men were beginning to fall back, and efforts were made to rally them in the bed of an old road, nearly at right angles to the Hagerstown

pike, and which had been their position previous to the advance. These efforts, however, were only partially successful. Most of the brigade took no further part in the action. Garland's brigade (Colonel McRae commanding) had been much demoralized by the fight at South Mountain, but the men advanced with alacrity, secured a good position, and were fighting bravely when Captain [T. P.] Thomson, Fifth North Carolina, cried out, "They are flanking us." This cry spread like an electric shock along the ranks, bringing up vivid recollections of the flank fire at South Mountain. In a moment they broke and fell to the rear. Colonel McRae, though wounded, remained on the field all day and succeeded in gathering up some stragglers, and personally rendered much efficient service. The Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment, of this brigade, was brought off by the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, and posted, by my order, in the old road already described. Ripley's brigade had united with Walker's and fallen back with it behind the ridge to the left of this road and near to it. We had now lost all the ground wrested from the enemy, and were occupying the position held in the morning. But three of my brigades had been broken and much demoralized, and all of the artillery had been withdrawn from my front. Rodes and Anderson were in the old road, and some stragglers had been gathered up and placed upon their left.

It was now apparent that the Yankees were massing in our front, and that their grand attack would be made upon my position, which was the center of our line. I sent several urgent messages to General Lee for re-enforcements, but before any arrived a heavy force (since ascertained to be Franklin's corps) advanced in three parallel lines, with all the precision of a parade day, upon my two brigades. They met with a galling fire, however, recoiled, and fell back; again advanced, and again fell back, and finally lay down behind the crest of the hill and kept up an irregular fire. I got a battery in position, which partially enfiladed the Yankee line and aided materially to check its advance. This battery was brought up by my aide, Lieut. J. A. Reid, who received a painful wound in the discharge of that duty.

In the mean time General R. H. Anderson reported to me with some 3,000 or 4,000 men as re-enforcements to my command. I directed him to form immediately behind my men. That gallant and accomplished officer was soon wounded, and the command devolved upon General Pryor. The Yankee fire had now nearly ceased, and but for an unfortunate blunder of Lieutenant-Colonel [J. N.] Lightfoot, Sixth Alabama, no farther advance would have been made by them. General Rodes had observed a regiment lying down in his rear and not engaged. He says:

As the fire was now desultory and slack, I went to the troops referred to, and found that they belonged to General Pryor's brigade. Their officers stated that they had been halted by somebody; not General Pryor. Finding General Pryor in a few moments, and informing him as to their conduct, he immediately ordered them forward. Returning toward the brigade, I met Lieutenant-Colonel Lightfoot, Sixth Alabama, looking for me. Upon his telling me that the right wing of the regiment was exposed to a terrible enfilade fire, which the enemy was enabled to deliver by their gaining somewhat upon Anderson (General G. B.), I ordered him to hasten back and to throw his right wing back and out of the old road referred to. Instead of executing the order, he moved briskly to the rear of the regiment, and gave the command, "Sixth Alabama, about face; forward march." Major Hobson, of the Fifth, seeing this, asked him if the order was intended for the whole brigade. He said, "Yes," and thereupon the Fifth and the other troops on their left retreated. I did not see their retrograde movement until it was too late to rally them, and for this reason: Just as I was moving on after Lightfoot, I heard a shot strike Lieutenant Birney (aide), who was immediately behind me. Wheeling around, I found him falling, and that he had been struck in the face. He found that he could walk after I raised him. I followed

him a few paces and watched him until he reached a barn, a short distance in the rear, where he first met some one to help him in case he needed it. As I turned toward the brigade, I was struck heavily by a piece of shell on my thigh. At first I thought that the wound was serious; but finding, upon examination, that it was slight, I turned toward the brigade, when I discovered it, without visible cause to me, retreating in confusion. I hastened to intercept it at the Hagerstown road. I found, though, that, with the exception of a few men from the Twenty-sixth, Twelfth, and Third, and a few under Major Hobson, of the Fifth (not more than 40 in all), the brigade had disappeared from this portion of the field. This small number, together with some Mississippians and North Carolinians, about 150 in all, I rallied and stationed behind a small ridge leading from the Hagerstown road.

General G. B. Anderson still nobly held his ground, but the Yankees began to pour in through the gap made by the retreat of Rodes. Anderson himself was mortally wounded and his brigade was totally routed. Colonel Bennett, of the Fourteenth, and Major Sillers, of the Thirtieth North Carolina Regiment, rallied a portion of their men. There were no troops near, to hold the center, except a few hundred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees crossed the old road which we had occupied in the morning, and occupied a corn-field and orchard in advance of it. They had now got within a few hundred yards of the hill which commanded Sharpsburg and our rear. Affairs looked very critical. I found a battery concealed in a corn-field, and ordered it to move out and open upon the Yankee columns. This proved to be Boyce's South Carolina battery. It moved out most gallantly, although exposed to a terrible direct and reverse fire from the long-range Yankee artillery across the Antietam. A caisson exploded, but the battery unlimbered, and with grape and canister drove the Yankees back. I was now satisfied that the Yankees were so demoralized that a single regiment of fresh men could drive the whole of them in our front across the Antietam. I got up about 200 men, who said they were willing to advance to the attack if I would lead them. We met, however, with a warm reception, and the little command was broken and dispersed. Major Hobson and Lieutenant [J. M.] Goff, of the Fifth Alabama, acquitted themselves handsomely in this charge. Colonel [Alfred] Iverson, Twentieth North Carolina; Colonel [D. H.] Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina; Captain Garrett, Fifth North Carolina; Adjutant [J. M.] Taylor and Lieutenant [Isaac E.] Pearce, of the same regiment, had gathered up about 200 men, and I sent them to the right to attack the Yankees in flank. They drove them back a short distance, but in turn were repulsed. These two attacks, however, had a most happy effect. The Yankees were completely deceived by their boldness, and induced to believe that there was a large force in our center. They made no further attempt to pierce our center, except on a small scale, hereafter to be mentioned.

It was now about 4 p. m., and Burnside's corps was massing to attack on our right. A heavy column was advancing up the Boonsborough pike, and I ordered up some 200 or 300 men, under command of Col. G. T. Anderson, to the hill already described, commanding Sharpsburg, but they were exposed to an enfilade fire from a battery near the church, on the Hagerstown pike, and compelled to retire to another hill. About 30 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel [W. H.] Betts, Thirteenth Alabama, of my division, remained as supports to my division batteries, under Jones, [R. A.] Hardaway, and Bondurant. The Yankee columns were allowed to come within easy range, when a sudden storm of grape and canister drove them back in confusion. Betts' men must have given them a very hot fire, as Burnside reported that he had met three heavy columns on the hill. It is difficult to imagine how 30 men could so multiply themselves as to appear to the frightened Yankees to be three

heavy columns. On our extreme right, however, the Yankees had been more successful. They had crossed the Antietam, and were driving our men before them. Our forces (supposed to be A. P. Hill's or D. R. Jones') had fallen back nearly to the road in rear of Sharpsburg, and the Yankees advanced in fine style to the crests commanding it. A few hundred yards more and our only line of retreat would be cut off. I called Carter's attention to this imposing force of Yankees, and he opened upon them with three guns, aided by two, I think, of the Donaldsonville Artillery. The firing was beautiful, and the Yankee columns (1,200 yards distant) were routed by this artillery fire alone, unaided by musketry. This is the only instance I have ever known of infantry being broken by artillery fire at long range. It speaks badly for the courage of Burnside's men.

Captain Carter says :

The next movement of the enemy was to advance a heavy column on the extreme right, bearing down on what I supposed to have been the right wing of A. P. Hill's division. Our troops gave way entirely before the column. With three pieces of my battery, aided by two of Lieutenant Elliott's, this column was shattered and driven back without the assistance (so far as I know) of any infantry whatever. Generals D. H. Hill and Rodes witnessed the firing.

Our troops advanced now on the extreme right, and Burnside's whole corps was driven back. This virtually closed the operations of the day, but a movement of a rather farcical character now took place. General Pryor had gathered quite a respectable force behind a stone wall on the Hagerstown road, and Col. G. T. Anderson had about a regiment behind a hill immediately to the right of this road. A Maine regiment (the Twenty-first, I think) came down to this hill wholly unconscious that there were any Confederate troops near it. A shout and a volley informed them of their dangerous neighborhood. The Yankee apprehension is acute; the idea was soon taken in, and was followed by the most rapid running I ever saw.

The night closed in with our troops in the center, about 200 yards in rear of the position held in the morning. We held, however, two-thirds of the battle-field, including the ground gained by General A. P. Hill on our right. The only ground lost was in the center, where the chief Yankee attack had been made, and where there had been the severest fighting and the heaviest loss to both parties. The skulkers and cowards had straggled off, and only the bravest and truest men of my division had been left. It is true that hunger and exhaustion had nearly unfitted these brave men for battle. Our wagons had been sent off across the river on Sunday, and for three days the men had been sustaining life on green corn and such cattle as they could kill in the fields. In charging through an apple orchard at the Yankees, with the immediate prospect of death before them, I noticed men eagerly devouring apples.

The unparalleled loss of the division shows that, spite of hunger and fatigue, the officers and men fought most heroically in the two battles in Maryland. The division lost 3,000 out of less than 9,000 engaged at Seven Pines; 4,000 out of 10,000 in the battles around Richmond; but now the loss was 3,241 in two battles, out of less than 5,000 engaged; that is, the loss was nearly two-thirds of the entire force. Of these 925 are reported missing. Doubtless a large number of the missing fell into the hands of the Yankees, when wounded; but even supposing that none of the missing were killed or wounded, still, we have 2,316 reported killed and wounded, or nearly one-half of those taken into action. Among these was 1 brigadier-general killed, 1 mortally wounded; 3 brigade commanders wounded; 4 colonels killed, 8 colonels wounded; 1 lieutenant-

colonel killed, 7 lieutenant-colonels wounded; 2 majors killed, 2 majors wounded. There were but 34 field officers present in the battles, and only 9 left when they were over. The mortality was equally great among company commanders, and several regiments were left under command of lieutenants. Still, the stubborn spirit of the men was not subdued. From 1,500 to 1,700 were gathered together, on the morning of the 18th, and placed in a position more sheltered than the one occupied the day before, and I think would have fought with determination, if not with enthusiasm, had the Yankees made an advance. Our Northern brethren were too much shattered to renew the contest, and that night we recrossed the Potomac.

The battle of Sharpsburg was a success so far as the failure of the Yankees to carry the position they assailed. It would, however, have been a glorious victory for us but for three causes:

First. The separation of our forces. Had McLaws and R. H. Anderson been there earlier in the morning, the battle would not have lasted two hours, and would have been signally disastrous to the Yankees.

Second. The bad handling of our artillery. This could not cope with the superior weight, caliber, range, and number of the Yankee guns; hence it ought only to have been used against masses of infantry. On the contrary, our guns were made to reply to the Yankee guns, and were smashed up or withdrawn before they could be effectually turned against massive columns of attack. An artillery duel between the Washington Artillery and the Yankee batteries across the Antietam on the 16th was the most melancholy farce in the war.

Third. The enormous straggling. The battle was fought with less than 30,000 men. Had all our stragglers been up, McClellan's army would have been completely crushed or annihilated. Doubtless the want of shoes, the want of food, and physical exhaustion had kept many brave men from being with the army; but thousands of thieving poltroons had kept away from sheer cowardice. The straggler is generally a thief and always a coward, lost to all sense of shame; he can only be kept in ranks by a strict and sanguinary discipline.

List of casualties.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Rodes' brigade	111	289	225
Ripley's brigade	110	506	124
Garland's brigade	46	210	187
Anderson's brigade	64	299	202
Colquitt's brigade	129	518	184
Artillery	4	30	3
Total	464	1,852	925

In this sad list we have specially to mourn many distinguished officers. Brigadier-General Garland was killed at South Mountain—the most fearless man I ever knew, a Christian hero, a ripe scholar, and most accomplished gentleman. Brig. Gen. G. B. Anderson was mortally wounded at Sharpsburg—a high-toned, honorable, conscientious Christian soldier, highly gifted, and lovely in all the qualities that adorn a man. Col. C. C. Tew, Second North Carolina Regiment, was one of the most finished scholars on the continent, and had no superior as a soldier in the field. Col. B. B. Gayle, Twelfth Alabama, a most gal-

lant and accomplished officer, was killed at South Mountain. Col. W. P. Barclay, Twenty-third Georgia, the hero of South Mountain, was killed at Sharpsburg. There, too, fell those gallant Christian soldiers, Col. Levi B. Smith, Twenty-seventh Georgia, and Lieut. Col. J. M. Newton, of the Sixth Georgia. The modest and heroic Major [P.] Tracy, of the Sixth Georgia, met there, too, a bloody grave. The lamented Captain [W. F.] Plane, of that regiment, deserves a special mention. Of him it could be truly said that he shrank from no danger, no fatigue, and no exposure. Maj. Robert S. Smith, Fourth Georgia, fell, fighting most heroically, at Sharpsburg. He had received a military education, and gave promise of eminence in his profession. Capt. James B. Atwell, Twentieth North Carolina, deserves to live in the memory of his countrymen for almost unsurpassed gallantry. After having greatly distinguished himself in the capture of the Yankee battery at South Mountain, he fell, heroically fighting, at Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Ripley received a severe wound in the throat from a Minie-ball, which would have proven fatal but for passing through his cravat. After his wound was dressed, he heroically returned to the field, and remained to the close of the day with his brigade. Brigadier-General Rodes received a painful contusion from a shell, but remained with his command. Colonel McRae, commanding brigade, was struck in the forehead, but gallantly remained on the field. Colonel Bennett, Fourteenth North Carolina Regiment, who had conducted himself most nobly throughout, won my special admiration for the heroism he exhibited at the moment of receiving what he supposed to be a mortal wound. Colonel [W. L.] De Rosset, Third North Carolina, received a severe wound at Sharpsburg, which I fear will forever deprive the South of his most valuable services. Col. F. M. Parker, Thirtieth North Carolina, a modest, brave, and accomplished officer, was severely wounded at Sharpsburg. Col. J. B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama, the Chevalier Bayard of the army, received five wounds at Sharpsburg before he would quit the field. The heroic Colonel [B. D.] Fry, Thirteenth Alabama, and Colonel [E. A.] O'Neal, Twenty-sixth Alabama, who had both been wounded at Seven Pines, were once more wounded severely, at Sharpsburg, while nobly doing their duty. Lieutenant-Colonel [S. B.] Pickens, Twelfth Alabama, and Major [R. D.] Redden, Twenty-sixth Alabama, were both wounded at South Mountain, the former severely. They greatly distinguished themselves in that battle. Lieut. Col. J. N. Lightfoot, Sixth Alabama, and Lieutenant-Colonel [William A.] Johnston, Fourteenth North Carolina, were wounded at Sharpsburg, the latter slightly. Major [S. D.] Thruston, Third North Carolina, received a painful contusion, but did not leave the field. Lieutenant-Colonel Ruffin, Thirteenth North Carolina, remained with his regiment on South Mountain after receiving three painful wounds. Lieutenant-Colonel [W. H.] Betts, Thirteenth Alabama, was slightly wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel [C. T.] Zachry, Twenty-seventh Georgia, had just recovered from a severe wound before Richmond to receive a more serious one at Sharpsburg. Lieutenant-Colonel [E. F.] Best and Major [J. H.] Huggins, Twenty-third Georgia, gallant and meritorious officers, were severely wounded at Sharpsburg.

It becomes my grateful task to speak in the highest terms of my brigade commanders, two of whom sealed their devotion to their country with their lives. Major [J. W.] Hatchford, Major Pierson, chief of artillery, and Lieut. J. A. Reid, of my staff, were conspicuous for their gallantry. Captain Overton, serving temporarily with me, was wounded at Sharpsburg, but remained under fire until I urged him to leave the

field. Captain West and Lieut. T. J. Moore, ordnance officers, discharged faithfully their duty and rendered important service on the field at South Mountain. Maj. Archer Anderson, adjutant, had been wounded in crossing the Potomac, and I lost his valuable services in Maryland. Sergeant Harmeling and Privates Thomas Jones and Minter, of the couriers, acquitted themselves handsomely.

Brigadier-General Rodes reports as specially deserving notice for their gallantry, Colonel O'Neal and Major Redden, Twenty-sixth Alabama; Col. J. B. Gordon, Lieutenant-Colonel Lightfoot, Lieut. P. H. Larey, Sergt. J. B. Hancock, Sixth Alabama; Maj. E. L. Hobson, Capt. T. M. Riley, Lieut. J. M. Goff, Sergt. A. Swicegood, Color-Corpl. Joshua Smith, Fifth Alabama; Col. C. A. Battle, Capt. E. S. Ready (badly wounded), Lieuts. J. J. Lake (killed) and E. T. Randall (wounded), Sergts. N. M. Howard, William Taylor, J. W. Hauxthall, James Stewart, Henry Donnelson, and George Ellison, Corpl. Josiah Ely, and Privates Joseph Lee and Hollanquist, Third Alabama.

Brigadier-General Colquitt reports in like manner N. B. Neusan, Color-Sergt. J. J. Powell, W. W. Glover, H. M. James, and N. B. Lane, color-guard Sixth Georgia; Corples John Cooper, Joseph J. Wood, Privates J. W. Tompkins, B. C. Lapsade, L. B. Hannah, A. D. Simmons, W. Smith, J. M. Feltman, and J. C. Penn. Captain [W. M.] Arnold, Sixth Georgia, who commanded a battalion of skirmishers at South Mountain and Sharpsburg, is entitled to the highest commendation for his skill and gallantry. Captain [N. J.] Garrison, commanding Twenty-eighth Georgia, was severely wounded at the head of his regiment. Captain [James W.] Banning, Twenty-eighth Georgia Regiment, was distinguished for his intrepid coolness, fighting in the ranks, with gun in hand, and stimulating his men by his words and examples. W. R. Johnson and William Goff, Twenty-eighth Georgia; Lieuts. B. A. Bowen, R. S. Tomme, and L. D. Ford, First Sergeant Herring, Sergts. J. L. Moore, T. P. W. Bullard, and J. J. Adams, Corpl. J. A. Lee, and Privates W. A. Estes, J. S. Wingate, W. S. Walker, Isaac Hundley, Thomas Sudler, J. J. Gordon, Simeon Williamson, Mosely, McCall, J. M. Vanse, J. Hutchings, Thomas Argo, J. S. Dennis, W. J. Claybanks, Joseph Heron, and W. D. Tingle, Thirteenth Alabama.

The officers commanding the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Georgia Regiments report that it is impossible for them to make distinctions where so many acted with distinguished bravery. In the Twenty-seventh every commissioned officer except one was killed or wounded at Sharpsburg, and this sole survivor was unwilling to discriminate among so many brave men.

Brigadier-General Doles (now commanding Ripley's brigade) pays a tribute to the memory of Maj. Robert S. Smith, Fourth Georgia, and speaks in the most complimentary terms of Colonel De Rosset and Major Thruston, Third North Carolina (the former severely and the latter slightly wounded), and Captains [E. G.] Meares, [Lieutenant D. E.] McNair, and [D.] Williams, of the same regiment. Lieut. Col. H. A. Brown and Capt. J. N. Harrell, acting major of the First North Carolina Regiment, are also highly commended. Lieut. Col. Phil. Cook, Captains [W. H.] Willis, [F. H.] DeGraffenried, and Lieutenants [E. A.] Hawkins, [R. M.] Bisel, [W. W.] Hulbert, [J. T.] Gay (wounded), [J. G.] Stephens, [C. R.] Ezell, [F. T.] Snead, [L. M.] Cobb (killed), [J. C.] Macon (severely wounded), "all commended themselves to my special notice by their gallant and meritorious conduct." Captain [John C.] Key, commanding Forty-fourth Georgia, and Captain Read, assistant adjutant-general, are equally commended. Asst. Surg. William P. Young remained on

the field after he was wounded, caring for the wounded, and fell into the hands of the enemy. Privates Thomas S. Cartright, Joseph L. Richardson, and Henry E. Welch, Fourth Georgia, are mentioned with distinction. The first-named fell with the colors of his regiment in his hand; Richardson was wounded. Privates R. Dudley Hill and Thomas J. Dingler, two lads in the Forty-fourth Georgia, attracted, in an especial manner, the attention of their commander by their extraordinary daring. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, of the First North Carolina Regiment, who commanded in both battles in Maryland, says that all did their duty in his regiment, and he cannot discriminate.

The following officers and men of Garland's brigade are specially commended for their good conduct: Cols. D. K. McRae, Iverson, and Christie; Lieutenant-Colonels Johnston and Ruffin. The latter was wounded three times at South Mountain, and exhibited the highest qualities of the officer and soldier. Captains [T. M.] Garrett, [B.] Robinson, and [Jacob] Brookfield, Adjt. J. M. Taylor, and Lieutenant [Isaac E.] Pearce, of the Fifth; Captain Atwell (killed) and Lieutenant [John H.] Caldwell, of the Twentieth, conducted themselves with soldier-like gallantry. Lieutenants [C. R.] King, [D. H.] Ray, [M. J.] Malone, [E. M.] Duguid, Felton, and Sutton; Sergeants Riddick, Ingram, Pearce, Johnson, and Dennis; Privates Hays, Ellis, Campbell, Hilliard, and Kinsant, of the same regiment, are highly commended by their regimental commanders. Sergts. A. W. Fullenwider, John W. Glenn, C. W. Bennet, and Privates E. F. Howell and W. C. Watkins, of the Twenty-third North Carolina, exhibited extraordinary coolness and daring. Sergeant Fullenwider has been six times wounded during the war, but still lives to perform more heroic deeds. Private David Jones, Twentieth North Carolina, was specially distinguished as a bold and intelligent scout at South Mountain.

In Anderson's brigade the field officers present in the battles—Colonel Tew, Second North Carolina (killed); Colonel Grimes, Fourth North Carolina; Colonel Bennett (wounded) and Lieut. Col. W. A. Johnston (slightly wounded), both of Fourteenth North Carolina; Colonel Parker (severely wounded) and Major Sillers, both of Thirtieth North Carolina—are all worthy of the gratitude of their country for gallant and meritorious services. Colonel Grimes was disabled, by the kick of a horse, from being with his regiment (Fourth North Carolina) at Sharpsburg, and unfit for duty for months afterward. The Fourth thus lost his valuable services. This gallant regiment, which has never been surpassed by any troops in the world for gallantry, subordination, and propriety, was commanded by the heroic Captain [William T.] Marsh, and, after his fall, by the equally heroic Captain [D. P.] Latham, who shared the same fate. All the officers of this noble regiment present at Sharpsburg were killed or wounded. Their names deserve to be preserved. Captains Marsh, Latham, and [E. A.] Osborne; Lieutenants [Jesse F.] Stansill, J. C. Cotton, [T. M.] Allen, Parker, [T. J.] Brown, [F. H.] Weaver, Crawford, and [B. T.] Bonner; Sergts. John Troutman and J. W. Shinn; Corples J. A. Cowan and H. H. Barnes, and Private J. D. Barton, of this regiment, were greatly distinguished for their courage. Private J. B. Stinson, of same regiment, acting as courier to General Anderson, was wounded in three places at Sharpsburg, and there, as on every other battle-field, behaved most nobly.

Colonel Bennett, of the Fourteenth North Carolina, commends Captains [Joseph] Jones, [Eli] Freeman, [T. B.] Beall, [J. R.] De Berry, and [W. M.] Weir; Lieutenants [W. A.] Liles, [J. L.] Mitchell, [F. M.] Harney, [D. C.] Shankle, [C. W.] Bevers, [W. A.] Threadgill, and [W. G.] Meachum; Sergts. Jenkins and McLester; Corpl. Crump; Privates McGregor, Byerly, Odell, and Morgan.

The Second North Carolina, after the death of the gallant and accomplished Tew, was commanded by Captain [G. M.] Roberts, since resigned. The Thirtieth North Carolina, after the fall of its gallant colonel, was commanded by Major Sillers, a brave and meritorious officer. I much regret that the officers of these two regiments have declined to present the names of those specially distinguished for coolness and courage. The Thirteenth North Carolina, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ruffin, greatly distinguished itself at South Mountain. I regret that I have no report from that heroic officer, now absent, sick. He often, however, spoke of the great gallantry of Sergt. Walter S. Williamson.

Respectfully submitted.

D. H. HILL,
Major-General.

Gen. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 294.

*Report of Capt. Thomas H. Carter, commanding King William (Virginia)
Artillery, of the battle of Sharpsburg.*

OCTOBER 14, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders from General Rodes, I herewith forward an account of the part taken by my battery in the Sharpsburg engagement:

The battery consisted of five pieces, posted as follows: Two howitzers on the left of Rodes' brigade, two 6-pounders in front of Garland's brigade, and one Parrott piece a short distance to the left. When the battle commenced on the left, at the point of woods, three pieces were brought to bear on the enemy, and the firing kept up until our infantry entered the woods. Soon after, the enemy appeared in line of battle on the open field to the left of the woods and of the Hagerstown road. The division was then ordered to the left. I considered it unsafe to keep the battery so far in advance without infantry support, and subject to an artillery fire in reverse from left and right when it should open. General Rodes concurred with me, and ordered the three long-range pieces to some good position in the rear and within supporting distance of the brigade, and the two howitzers to some point immediately in rear of the brigade. Having no definite knowledge of the position for the howitzers, and some confusion occurring in consequence of some horses being killed, I determined to take the whole battery across the Hagerstown road on the eminence to the left, where it could command any position taken by the division, whether in the direction of the burning house or toward the line of the enemy, then on the open field to the left of the Hagerstown road. To cross the two stone walls of this road it was necessary to follow the lane nearly to the outskirts of the village. On my way I met General Lee. He seemed to fear that the whole left wing, then hard pressed and losing ground, would be turned, and that the enemy would gain possession of the range of hills some three-quarters of a mile to the left of Sharpsburg. He ordered me to this ground, with all the artillery that could be collected, to prevent this movement. Having communicated with Major Pierson, several batteries were gathered together on this part of the field. General Lee soon arrived there, in person. Heavy re-enforcements had, by this time, come to the relief of the left wing, and the enemy was forced back. I now received an order

from General Rodes to plant my battery on the left of the Hagerstown road, near the Donaldsonville Artillery. With the consent of General Lee, I at once moved my battery to this point. On reaching it, I found several batteries engaged in driving off a Yankee battery posted near the spot occupied in the morning by my two howitzers. My battery at once took part in this fire, and continued firing until the battery was withdrawn. There was at this time a pause in the engagement.

The next movement of the enemy was the advance of a heavy column on the extreme right, bearing down on what I supposed to have been the right wing of A. P. Hill's division. Our troops gave way entirely before this column. With three pieces of my battery, aided by two of Lieutenant Elliott's, this column was shattered and driven back without the assistance, so far as I know, of any infantry whatever. Generals D. H. Hill and Rodes both witnessed this firing. Soon after, Colonel Stephen D. Lee requested me to post my battery on the hill in front of Sharpsburg, and to open on the enemy to the right, then contending with A. P. Hill. I moved the battery to this place, but before it took position found it untenable from a heavy reverse artillery fire, and, by the advice of Colonel Lee, removed it. The evening was now closing in, and the engagement was conducted to its close by General A. P. Hill, on the extreme right.

At dark General Lee sent for me, as I was about to encamp in rear of the village, and ordered me to guard the bridge across Antietam Creek by posting my battery near the turnpike and on the crest in front of Sharpsburg.

I have to report 1 private killed, junior First Lieutenant Dabney mortally wounded (since dead), 3 wounded, and 1 missing; total, 6.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. H. CARTER,

Captain, Commanding Battery.

Capt. H. A. WHITING,

Assistant Adjutant-General of Brigadier-General Rodes.

No. 295.

Report of Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS RIPLEY'S BRIGADE,
Camp on Opequon Creek, September 21, 1862.

MAJOR: On the evening of September 13 I received orders from Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill to march with my brigade and take a position with it and a battery of artillery on the eminence immediately on the northeast of Boonsborough, and to send a regiment at daylight on the following morning to occupy the Hamburg Pass. This was accomplished, and on the following morning, at an early hour, Colonel [George] Doles, with the Fourth Georgia Regiment, was in position at the pass.

At about 9 o'clock I received orders to send forward my artillery, and, soon after, to move with the whole force to the main pass east of Boonsborough. Upon arriving, I was directed to follow the road leading to Braddock's Gap, and place myself in communication with Brigadier-General Anderson, who had preceded me in that direction. Upon coming up and communicating with that officer, it was arranged that he should extend along the Braddock road and make room for the troops of my command, and that an attack should be made upon the enemy, then

occupying the heights to the south. While taking position, General Hill arrived, and with him Brigadier-General Drayton's command. General Hill directed General Anderson's and my command to extend still farther on the road, making room for General Drayton's troops, and that the attack should be made as soon as all were in position. General Anderson's and my own brigade got into position on the road, and General Drayton's command was rapidly forming when the action commenced by the enemy attacking him in force. This he sustained for some time, General Anderson's and my own brigade pushing forward through dense thickets and up very steep acclivities to outflank the enemy and come into General Drayton's support. The natural difficulties of the ground and the condition of the troops prevented these movements being made with the rapidity which was desirable, and the enemy forced his way to the Braddock road between General Drayton's force and my own, and sent a column of troops down the road as if to cut off the troops forming our right. In this object he was thwarted by two pieces of artillery belonging to Colonel Rosser's cavalry, which was speedily placed in position a short distance in our rear on the Braddock road. A few well-directed shot and shell drove the enemy up the hill, leaving the road in our possession.

Meantime General Anderson had extended far to the right and come up with the enemy, with whom he had a short engagement. My own brigade had pressed up to within a short distance of the crest of the heights, and held its position under a noisy but comparatively harmless fire, but Anderson's brigade having extended far to the right, it was for the time unsupported by any other troops. Soon after, Brigadier-General Hood's command came from the main pass, and, forming upon my left, the troops pressed up the road, driving the enemy before them until they occupied their first position and darkness put an end to the operations. I found soon afterward that General Anderson's command had been withdrawn at nightfall from the heights to the Braddock road.

Orders were received from Major-General Longstreet to renew the attack as early as practicable, and arrangements were in progress when further orders were received to move back to the main road and follow the army. The movement was made without confusion, and upon coming on the road near Boonsborough the route was taken following the main army to Sharpsburg.

Upon arriving on the west bank of the Antietam River, on the 15th, under orders from Major-General Longstreet (during the temporary absence of the division commander), I posted my own, Anderson's, and McRae's brigades on the heights overlooking the river, with the right resting on the road from Boonsborough to Sharpsburg, facing the river. The troops bivouacked during the remainder of the 15th and the 16th in this position.

On the morning of the 16th the enemy made his appearance in force in our front, and from about 9 o'clock until nightfall we were subjected to an annoying artillery fire.

During the evening I received orders to move my brigade to the left of our division, and take up a position to cover a road leading from our left to the turnpike leading from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and in support of certain batteries of artillery in our vicinity. The troops rested on their arms during the night of the 16th.

Early on the morning of the 17th, the skirmishers of Colonel Walker's brigade, of Jackson's corps, immediately on my left, became engaged, and the enemy from his batteries on the eastern bank of the Antietam

opened a severe enfilading fire on the troops of my command, the position which we had been ordered to occupy being in full view of nearly all of his batteries. This fire inflicted serious loss before the troops were called into positive action, the men lying under it, without flinching, for over an hour, while the enemy plied his guns unceasingly. During this while, a set of farm buildings in our front were set on fire to prevent them being made use of by the enemy.

At about 8 o'clock I received orders to close in to my left and advance. The troops sprung to their arms with alacrity and moved forward through the burning buildings in our front, reformed on the other side, and opened a rapid fire upon the enemy.

While engaged in reforming the brigade, I received a shot in the neck, which disabled me, and the troops moved forward under command of Colonel Doles, of the Fourth Georgia Regiment. After an absence of an hour and a half, I returned to the field with such force as I could collect from detachments, and found my brigade relieved and in position to the west of Sharpsburg. I remained with it until the afternoon, when, finding myself faint and exhausted, I relinquished the command to Colonel Doles, to whose report I must refer for the operations of the brigade while under his command.

I noticed the gallant and efficient conduct of officers and men, which in many instances was admirable, especially in consideration of the hardships to which they had been subjected, many having been without food for twenty-four and some for forty-eight hours.

The commanding officers of regiments—Colonel Doles, of the Fourth Georgia; Colonel [William L.] De Rosset, of the Third North Carolina (severely wounded); Lieutenant-Colonel [Hamilton A.] Brown, of the First North Carolina, and Captain Key, of the Forty-fourth Georgia—all led their troops gallantly. They were ably seconded by their respective field officers, and I concur in the remarks of the regimental commanders concerning their various officers.

Capt. B. H. Read and Lieut. H. H. Rogers, acting on my staff, rendered, throughout the operations, valuable and efficient service. Captain Read remained on the field after I had been disabled. Lieutenant Rogers was severely wounded while in the discharge of his duties.

The return of killed, wounded, and missing will be forwarded with the report of Colonel Doles, upon whom the command of the brigade will devolve during my absence.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. RIPLEY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. ARCHER ANDERSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General, &c.

No. 296.

Report of Brig. Gen. R. B. Rhodes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

HEADQUARTERS RODES' BRIGADE,
Wright's Farm, Va., October 13, 1862.

MAJOR: I have the honor herewith to report the operations of this brigade during the actions of September 14 and 17 in Maryland.

On the morning of the 14th my brigade relieved Anderson's about

half a mile west of Boonsborough. Toward noon it was ordered to follow Ripley's brigade to the top of the South Mountain. Overtaking Ripley's brigade on the mountain, it was halted, and I immediately reported to Major-General Hill. After looking over the field of battle, I was ordered by Major-General Hill to take position on the ridge immediately to the left of the gap through which the main road runs. Remaining there three-quarters of an hour, part of the time under artillery fire, and throwing out scouts and skirmishers to the left and front, I was then ordered to occupy another bare hill about three-quarters of a mile still farther to the left. The whole brigade was moved to that hill, crossing, in doing so, a deep gorge which separated the hills. This movement left a wide interval between the right of my brigade, which in its last position rested in the gorge, and the balance of the division, which being reported to General Hill, together with the fact that no troops supported the battery on the first-mentioned ridge, by his order I sent back one of my regiments (the Twelfth Alabama) to support the battery. By this time the enemy's line of battle was pretty well developed and in full view. It became evident that he intended to attack with a line covering both ridges and the gorge before mentioned, and extending some half a mile to my left. I had, immediately after my arrival on the extreme left, discovered that the hill there was accessible to artillery, and that a good road, passing by the left of said hill from the enemy's line, continued immediately in my rear and entered the main road about half a mile west of the gap. Under these circumstances, I sent for artillery, and determined upon the only plan by which the enemy could be prevented from immediately obtaining possession of said road, and thus marching entirely in our rear without difficulty, and that was, to extend my line as far as I could to the left, to let the right rest in the gorge, still, and to send to my superiors for re-enforcements to continue the line from my right to the gap on the main road, an interval of three-quarters of a mile at least. Having thrown out skirmishers along the whole front and to the left, they very soon became engaged with the enemy's skirmishers.

This was about 3 p. m., and it was perfectly evident then that my force of about 1,200 muskets was opposed to one which outflanked mine on either side by at least half a mile. I thought the enemy's force opposed to my brigade was at least a division. In a short time the firing became steady along the whole line, the enemy advancing very slowly. The danger of his possessing the top of the left hill, and thus being in my rear, became so imminent that I had to cause my left regiment (the Sixth Alabama, under Colonel [J. B.] Gordon) to move along the brow of the hill, under fire, still farther to the left. He did so in good style, and, having a fair opportunity to do so with advantage, charged and drove the enemy back a short distance. By this time the enemy, though met gallantly by all four of the regiments with me, had penetrated between them, and had begun to swing their extreme right around toward my rear, making for the head of the gorge, up the bottom and sides of which the whole of my force, except the Sixth Alabama, had to retreat, if at all. I renewed again, and yet again, my application for re-enforcements, but none came. Some artillery, under Captain Carter, who was moving up without orders, and some of Colonel Cutts', under a gallant lieutenant, whose name I do not now recollect, was reported by the last-named officer to be on its way to my relief; but at this time the enemy had obtained possession of the summit of the left hill before spoken of, and had command of the road in rear of the main mountain. The artillery could only have been used by being hauled up on the high peak, which arose upon the summit

of the ridge just at the head of the gorge before mentioned. This they had not time to do, and hence I ordered it back.

Just before this, I heard that some Confederate troops had joined my right very nearly. Finding that the enemy were forcing my right back, and that the only chance to continue the fight was to change my front so as to face to the left, I ordered all the regiments to fall back up the gorge and sides of the mountain, fighting, the whole concentrating around the high peak before mentioned. This enabled me to face the enemy's right again, and to make another stout stand with Gordon's excellent regiment (which he had kept constantly in hand, and had handled in a manner I have never heard or seen equaled during this war), and with the remainder of the Fifth, Third, and Twelfth Alabama Regiments. I found the Twelfth had been relieved by other troops and closed in toward my right, but had passed in rear of the original line so far that, upon re-establishing the line on the main peak, I found that the Third Alabama came upon its right. The Twenty-sixth Alabama, which had been placed on my right, was by this time completely demoralized; its colonel ([E. A.] O'Neal) was wounded, and the men mingled in utter confusion with some South Carolina stragglers on the summit of the hill, who stated that their brigade had been compelled to give way, and had retired. Notwithstanding this, if true, left my rear entirely exposed again (I had no time or means to examine the worth of their statements), I determined, in accordance with the orders I received about this time, in reply to my last request for re-enforcements, to fight on on the new front.

My loss up to this time had been heavy in all the regiments except the Twelfth Alabama. The Fifth Alabama, which had occupied the left center, got separated into two parts in endeavoring to follow up the flank movement of Gordon's regiment. Both parts became engaged again before they could rejoin, and the right battalion was finally cut off entirely. The left and smaller battalion, under Major Hobson's gallant management, though flanked, wheeled against the flanking party, and, by desperate fighting, silenced the enemy so far as to enable his little command to make its way to the peak before mentioned. In the first attack of the enemy up the bottom of the gorge, they pushed on so vigorously as to catch Captain Ready and a portion of his party of skirmishers, and to separate the Third from the Fifth Alabama Regiment. The Third made a most gallant resistance at this point, and had my line been a continuous one it could never have been forced. Having re-established my line, though still with wide intervals, necessarily, on the high peak (this was done under constant fire and in full view of the enemy, now in full possession of the extreme left hill and of the gorge), the fight at close quarters was resumed, and again accompanied by the enemy throwing their, by this time apparently interminable, right around toward my rear. In this position the Sixth Alabama and the Twelfth suffered pretty severely. The latter, together with the remainder of the Third Alabama, which had been well handled by Colonel [C. A.] Battle, was forced to retire, and in so doing lost heavily. Its colonel (Gayle) [B. B.] was seen to fall, and its lieutenant-colonel [Samuel B.] (Pickens) was shot through the lungs; the former was left on the field, supposed to be dead; Pickens was brought off. Gordon's regiment retired slowly, now being under an enfilading as well as direct fire and in danger of being surrounded, but was still, fortunately for the whole command, held together by its able commander. After this, I could meet the enemy with no organized force except Gordon's regiment. One more desperate stand was made by it from an advantageous position. The enemy by this

time were nearly on top of the highest peak, and were pushing on, when Gordon's regiment, unexpectedly to them, opened fire on their front and checked them. This last stand was so disastrous to the enemy that it attracted the attention of the stragglers, even, many of whom Colonel Battle and I had been endeavoring to organize, and who were just then on the flank of that portion of the enemy engaged with Gordon, and for a few minutes they kept up a brisk enfilading fire upon the enemy; but, finding his fire turning from Gordon upon them, and that another body of Federal troops were advancing upon them, they speedily fell back. It was now so dark that it was difficult to distinguish objects at short musket range, and both parties ceased firing. Directing Colonel Gordon to move his regiment to his right and to the rear, so as to cover the gap, I endeavored to gather up stragglers from the other regiments. Colonel Battle still held together a handful of his men. These, together with the remnants of the Twelfth, Fifth, and Twenty-sixth Alabama Regiments, were assembled at the gap, and were speedily placed alongside of Gordon's regiment, which by this time had arrived in the road ascending the mountain from the gap, forming a line on the edge of the woods parallel to and about 200 yards from the main road. The enemy did not advance beyond the top of the mountain, but, to be prepared for them, skirmishers were thrown out in front of the line.

This position we held until about 11 o'clock at night, when we were ordered to take the Sharpsburg road and to stop at Keedysville, which we did. We had rested about an hour, when I was ordered to proceed to Sharpsburg with all the force under my command—Colquitt's brigade and mine—to drive out a Federal cavalry force reported to be there. On the way Colonel [R. H.] Chilton, chief of General Lee's staff, met me with contrary orders, which required me to send only a part of my force. The Fifth and Sixth Alabama were sent. In a few minutes, however, we received orders from General Longstreet to go ahead, and did so; found no cavalry.

In this engagement my loss was as follows:

Killed	61
Wounded	157
Missing	204
Total	422

The men and officers generally behaved well, but Colonel Gordon, Sixth Alabama; Major [B. L.] Hobson, Fifth Alabama, and Colonel Battle, Third Alabama, deserve especial mention for admirable conduct during the whole fight. We did not drive the enemy back or whip him, but with 1,200 men we held his whole division at bay without assistance during four and a half hours' steady fighting, losing in that time not over half a mile of ground. I was most ably and bravely served during the whole day by Captains [H. A.] Whiting and [G.] Peyton and Lieut. John Birney, who composed my staff.

On the 15th, after resting on the heights south of Sharpsburg long enough to get a scanty meal and to gather stragglers, we moved back through that place to the advanced position in the center of the line of battle before the town. Here, subsisting on green corn mainly and under an occasional artillery fire, we lay until the morning of the 17th, when began the engagement of September 17. The fight opened early, on the left, but my brigade was not engaged until late in the forenoon. About 9 o'clock I was ordered to move to the left and front to assist Ripley, Colquitt, and McKee, who had already engaged the enemy, and I had hardly begun the movement before it was evident that the two

latter had met with a reverse, and that the best service I could render them and the field generally would be to form a line in rear of them and endeavor to rally them before attacking or being attacked. Major-General Hill held the same view, for at this moment I received an order from him to halt and form line of battle in the hollow of an old and narrow road just beyond the orchard, and with my left about 150 yards from and east of the Hagerstown road. In a short time a small portion of Colquitt's brigade formed on my left, and I assumed the command of it. This brought my left to the Hagerstown road. General Anderson's brigade, occupying the same road, had closed up on my right.

A short time after my brigade assumed its new position, and while the men were busy improving their position by piling rails along their front, the enemy deployed in our front in three beautiful lines, all vastly outstretching ours, and commenced to advance steadily. Unfortunately, no artillery opposed them in their advance. Carter's battery had been sent to take position in rear, by me, when I abandoned my first position, because he was left without support, and because my own position had not then been fully determined. Three pieces, which occupied a fine position immediately on my front, abandoned it immediately after the enemy's skirmishers opened on them. The enemy came to the crest of the hill overlooking my position, and for five minutes bravely stood a telling fire at about 80 yards, which my whole brigade delivered. They then fell back a short distance, rallied, were driven back again and again, and finally lay down just back of the crest, keeping up a steady fire, however. In this position, receiving an order from General Longstreet to do so, I endeavored to charge them with my brigade and that portion of Colquitt's which was on my immediate left. The charge failed, mainly because the Sixth Alabama Regiment, not hearing the command, did not move forward with the others, and because Colquitt's men did not advance far enough. That part of the brigade which moved forward found themselves in an exposed position, and, being outnumbered and unsustained, fell back before I could, by personal effort, which was duly made, get the Sixth Alabama to move. Hastening back to the left, I arrived just in time to prevent the men from falling back to the rear of the road we had just occupied. It became evident to me then that an attack by us must, to be successful, be made by the whole of Anderson's brigade, mine, Colquitt's, and any troops that had arrived on Anderson's right. My whole force at this moment did not amount to over 700 men—most probably not to that number.

About this time I noticed troops going in to the support of Anderson, or to his right, and that one regiment and a portion of another, instead of passing on to the front, stopped in the hollow immediately in my rear and near the orchard. As the fire on both sides was, at my position at least, now desultory and slack, I went to the troops referred to, and found that they belonged to General Pryor's brigade. Their officers stated that they had been ordered to halt there by somebody, not General Pryor. Finding General Pryor in a few moments, and informing him as to their conduct, he immediately ordered them forward. Returning toward the brigade, I met Lieutenant-Colonel [J. N.] Lightfoot, of the Sixth Alabama, looking for me. Upon his telling me that the right wing of his regiment was being subjected to a terrible enfilading fire, which the enemy were enabled to deliver by reason of their gaining somewhat on Anderson, and that he had but few men left in that wing, I ordered him to hasten back, and to throw his right wing back out of the old road referred to. Instead of executing the order, he moved briskly to the rear of the regiment and gave the command, "Sixth Alabama, about face; forward march." Major Hobson, of the Fifth, seeing

this, asked him if the order was intended for the whole brigade; he replied, "Yes," and thereupon the Fifth, and immediately the other troops on their left, retreated. I did not see their retrograde movement until it was too late for me to rally them, for this reason: Just as I was moving on after Lightfoot, I heard a shot strike Lieutenant Birney, who was immediately behind me. Wheeling, I found him falling, and found that he had been struck in the face. He found that he could walk after I raised him, though he thought a shot or piece of shell had penetrated his head just under the eye. I followed him a few paces, and watched him until he had reached a barn, a short distance to the rear, where he first encountered some one to help him in case he needed it. As I turned toward the brigade, I was struck heavily by a piece of shell on my thigh. At first I thought the wound was serious, but finding, upon examination, that it was slight, I again turned toward the brigade, when I discovered it, without visible cause to me, retreating in confusion. I hastened to intercept it at the Hagerstown road. I found, though, that, with the exception of a few men from the Twenty-sixth, Twelfth, and Third, and a few under Major Hobson, not more than 40 in all, the brigade had completely disappeared from this portion of the field. This small number, together with some Mississippians (under Colonel —) and North Carolinians, making in all about 150 men, I rallied and stationed behind a small ridge leading from the Hagerstown road eastward toward the orchard before spoken of, and about 150 yards in rear of my last position, leaving them under the charge of Colonel —.

It is proper for me to mention here that this force, with some slight additions, was afterward led through the orchard against the enemy by General D. H. Hill, and did good service, the general himself handling a musket in the fight. Major Hobson and Lieutenant [J. M.] Goff, of the Fifth Alabama (the latter with a musket), bore distinguished parts in the fight. After this, my time was spent mainly in directing the fire of some artillery and getting up stragglers.

In this engagement the brigade behaved very handsomely and satisfactorily, and, with the exception of the right wing of the Sixth Alabama (where Colonel Gordon, while acting with his customary gallantry, was wounded desperately, receiving five wounds), had sustained almost no loss until the retrograde movement began. It had, together with Anderson's troops, stopped and foiled the attack of a whole corps of the enemy for more than an hour, and finally fell back only when, as the men and officers supposed, they had been ordered to do so. We might have been compelled to fall back afterward (for the troops on my right had already given way when we began to retreat), but, without the least hesitation, I say that but for the unaccountable mistake of Lieutenant-Colonel Lightfoot, the retreat would not have commenced at this time, if at all. He was wounded severely in the retreat.

I saw but little of the operations of Carter's battery during the battle. I only know that it was actively engaged the whole day, and with some loss. The gallant captain received a slight wound on the foot, and one of his lieutenants (Dabney) received one from which he has since died. I beg leave to refer to his report, which is submitted herewith.

My force at the beginning of the fight was less than 800 effective men. The loss was as follows:

Killed	50
Wounded	132
Missing	21
Total	203

The aggregate loss in the two engagements is as follows :

Killed	111
Wounded	289
Missing	231
Total	631

The missing are either prisoners or killed. Most of them were captured on the mountain on the 14th.

Captain Whiting and Lieut. John Birney, C. S. Army, of my staff, were both wounded. They, with Capt. Greene Peyton, assistant adjutant-general, discharged their respective duties with ability and gallantry.

The subjoined tabular statement* will exhibit the loss in the respective regiments of the brigade in both engagements. The enemy's loss in both engagements was far heavier than mine. I believe they lost three to my one at Sharpsburg, and at least two to one on the mountain.

Respectfully submitted.

R. E. RODES,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's Division.

HEADQUARTERS D. H. HILL'S DIVISION,
February 4, 1863.

Lieut. Col. C. J. FAULKNER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Second Corps :

COLONEL: In reply to your note of yesterday, I beg to say that I am informed that General Hill has already forwarded to General Lee a report of the operations of this division during the period indicated. Under these circumstances, and being only temporarily in command of the division, I would respectfully refer the lieutenant-general commanding to that document.

I have the honor to be, colonel, your obedient servant,

R. E. RODES,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

No. 297.

Reports of Col. D. K. McKae, Fifth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Garland's brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
Camp on Wright's Farm, October 18, 1862.

MAJOR: In obedience to orders calling for a report of the part taken by this brigade in the battle of the 14th at South Mountain, I have the honor to report that, under the command of Brigadier-General Garland, this brigade occupied the right of the turnpike leading from Middletown to Boonsborough, just below the Mountain House, toward the former place, on the morning of the 14th about sunrise. From the turnpike at this point a road runs along the ridge for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and at the end

* Not found.

of this distance is intersected by a road which, passing from the direction of Middletown, runs parallel with the base of one of the mountains of the range, and at the point of intersection with the ridge road turns off in a southwesterly direction toward Sharpsburg, and from this road several wagon roads lead down the mountain into the valley below on the Sharpsburg side of Boonsborough. Midway between this intersecting road and the turnpike, and at nearly right angles with the latter, runs what is known as the old Sharpsburg road. Near and to the left of this latter road General Garland, early in the morning, had posted the Thirtieth North Carolina Regiment, under the command of Lieut. Col. Thomas Ruffin, jr., and the Twentieth North Carolina, under the command of Col. Alfred Iverson. I was ordered, with the Fifth North Carolina, to move farther to the right, and to take position near to the left of the intersecting road I have before mentioned. The Twelfth North Carolina, commanded by Capt. S. Snow, and the Twenty-third, Col. Daniel H. Christie, were moved up and halted upon my left along the ridge road. At General Garland's request, I went forward with him to reconnoiter for a position. Immediately in front of the ridge road were stubble and corn fields, and, for about 40 paces to the front, a plateau, which suddenly broke on the left into a succession of ravines, and, farther beyond and in front, a ravine, of greater length and depth, extended from the road which ran along the base of the mountain far out into the field, and, connected with the ravine on our left, formed natural parallel approaches to our position. Between and beyond these ravines to our right was a dense growth of small forest trees and mountain laurel, through which this intersecting road ran for some distance, and on the mountain side to the top this growth was continued. General Garland and I had been but a few moments in the field when our attention was directed to persons moving at some distance upon this road, and, apprehending that the enemy might be preparing to make a lodgment upon the mountain side, he ordered me to advance a body of 50 skirmishers into the woods to our right oblique front, to go as far as possible and explore. This was done, and they had not passed 50 steps from where we then stood when they encountered the enemy's skirmishers and the fight commenced.

This was about 9 a. m. I was then ordered to take out my regiment to their support, which I did. We found the growth very thick, so much so that it was impossible to advance in line of battle. The enemy's skirmishers had advanced almost to the very edge of the woods nearest us, and, as we appeared at the edge, a sharp skirmish fire ensued, with much more effect on our side than on that of the enemy, as we lost no men and several of the enemy were seen to fall and 1 taken prisoner; but at this moment I found that the raw troops on my right, who had never been under fire, had had no drill, and had but few officers, were breaking in some confusion, the rest of the line remaining firm. I immediately hastened back and rallied those retreating at our first position, and at General Garland's suggestion recalled the regiment back to that point. I then stated to General Garland my belief that the enemy had massed a very large force in those woods, and were preparing to turn our right, and suggested that he might be dislodged or his position discovered by shelling the woods, when General Garland informed me that Captain Bondurant's battery, which had previously been put in position, had been so severely pressed by the enemy's sharpshooters that it had been necessary to withdraw it. He then passed to the left, and in a few moments intelligence was brought me that this useful and brave officer had received a mortal wound and was no more, and that the command of

the brigade had devolved upon me. I felt all the embarrassment which this situation was calculated to inspire. The brigade numbered scarce 1,000 men. I was satisfied that the enemy, largely superior in numbers and having the advantage of position, was immediately in our front and on the right, and was preparing a heavy movement against us. Previous to this time the Twenty-third North Carolina had been advanced into the field in front of the ridge road, under cover of some piles of stone which afforded shelter to his men, and from this point they had been, with great coolness, pouring a constant and destructive fire into the enemy as they attempted to pass from the woods into the ravines or to advance upon our position. It was by the fire of this regiment that General Reno was killed and a portion of his staff wounded, the fact having been reported to me at the time of its occurrence. Most gallantly for an hour and a half did this regiment, from this advanced position, harass the enemy and retard his movements. The Twelfth North Carolina had been ordered forward to the support of the Fifth, but a large portion of this regiment, led by its captain commanding, had fled the field early in the fight, and he has not since reported for duty, that I am aware of. By this time the Thirteenth and Twentieth had been ordered up from the left, and both had engaged the enemy from their respective positions. As the operations of the Thirteenth were conducted altogether beyond my observation, I forward herewith the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Ruffin, setting forth its action.

As soon as I saw the condition of things, I dispatched Captain Halsey, General Garland's assistant adjutant-general, to Major-General Hill, with instructions to state to him that the force at my command was wholly inadequate to maintain the position, and very soon thereafter Col. C. C. Tew, of Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson's brigade, reported to me with two regiments. Though ranking me, this officer declined to take the command; but, concurring with me as to the extreme danger which menaced us, he offered to make such disposition of his forces as I would suggest. At my request, he was about to take position on the left of the Thirteenth, connecting with it and prolonging our lines in that direction; while we were making these arrangements, Colonel Tew received orders from General Anderson to move off to the left. I immediately sent Captain Wood, of General Garland's staff, to communicate this fact to General Hill, to explain to him my situation, and to request re-enforcements, and, in anticipation of their arrival, I ordered Colonel Ruffin to move to the left, and keep his connection with Colonel Tew. I then hastened to the right, intending, if time allowed, to move the Fifth North Carolina to the left and fill with it the space vacant in the line, but I found that, under my previous order, this regiment had already been advanced into the field on the right of the Twenty-third, and it was dangerous to withdraw it.

During this time the situation of affairs had not been quiet. The enemy had planted a battery immediately in front of the Twentieth North Carolina, and had opened a fierce fire, when Colonel Iverson dispatched a company under Captain Atwell (a brave officer, who afterward received a mortal wound at Sharpsburg) to flank this battery. This was executed in gallant style. The gunners were destroyed, and there is but little doubt that this battery of four pieces was for the day abandoned. Unfortunately, the smallness of our numbers did not allow us to push this advantage by a charge upon the enemy's line. The object of the enemy was now clearly ascertained and reported to me by Colonel Iverson and others, confirming my own observations, and this object was hastened to completion. The position now stood thus: The Fifth,

on the extreme right, was nearest to the intersecting road, which was threatened. It was advanced into the field, sheltered in some degree by a fence which ran perpendicularly to its line. Next, in the field, under cover of the piles of stone, was the Twenty-third. Back on the ridge road, to the left and rear of the Twenty-third, was the Twentieth. This regiment could not be advanced with the others because of the exposed position, and because this would discover to the enemy at once the vacuum in our line. Between this and the Thirteenth was the open space of 250 to 300 yards, which I had been so anxious to fill. The enemy, having now filed through the succession of ravines and formed in three lines, approached under entire cover toward the brow of the plateau in our front, and, with a long-extended yell, burst upon our line, surrounding the Twentieth on both flanks, and passing to the rear of the Twenty-third. The distance was so short that no opportunity was given for more than a single fire, which was delivered full in the enemy's face, and with great effect, for his first line staggered and some of his forces retreated. A portion of the Twenty-third received his advance upon their bayonets, and men on both sides fell from bayonet wounds; but the enemy's strength was overpowering, and could not be resisted. The Twentieth and a portion of the Twenty-third, finding themselves surrounded, were compelled to retreat, and this they did, under a severe fire, down the mountain side. With the aid of Colonels Iverson and Christie, I rallied the men as soon as possible, and, obtaining a courier from Colonel Rosser, of the cavalry, I communicated with General Hill. At Colonel Rosser's request, I occupied an adjacent height, with remnants of the Twentieth and Twenty-third, to support a battery which he proposed to put in position. Colonel Christie reported to me that many of his men had fired off most of their ammunition, and having neither courier nor aide (for I did not see either Captains Halsey or Wood after the morning until late in the evening, though both endeavored to return), I had no means of communicating with the ordnance officer, whose locality was also unknown to me. Subsequently Lieutenant Haywood reported to me, but his ammunition was at such a distance that it could not be reached before night.

About this time I received an order from General Hill to occupy the position I then held, which was done during the remainder of the day.

When I took command of the brigade, I placed the Fifth under the command of Capt. Thomas M. Garrett. When the enemy charged upon the front and flank of the Twentieth and Twenty-third, this officer found his regiment, with the right of the Twenty-third, cut off, so that he was obliged to make his way out by moving off to the right and rear. This was done for a short space in some confusion, but Captain Garrett ordered his flag to be placed upon the ridge road, and was endeavoring to make a rally there, when his color-bearer was shot down, and he was compelled to fall back farther down the hill. He did, however, rally the regiment, and, passing out to the turnpike, reported to General Hill, when this regiment was assigned to a position, which it occupied the remainder of the day.

Notwithstanding the disadvantage of position, the absence of artillery support, and the injurious effect produced by the death of its general, who had possessed in the warmest degree the confidence and affection of the troops, and the great superiority of the enemy's numbers (a prisoner taken early reported the force in our front at sixteen regiments, naming many of them), this brigade maintained its ground for more than three hours, and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, destroying his cannoners, compelling him to abandon his guns, killing his general officer,

and so intimidating him as to prevent pursuit, and the consequent passage of his force into the valley between us and Sharpsburg, which was evidently his first intention.

A list* of casualties has been heretofore reported.

I am, very respectfully, major, your obedient servant,

D. K. McRAE,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS GARLAND'S BRIGADE,

October 20, 1862.

MAJOR: I submit the following report of the action of this brigade in the battle of September 17, near Sharpsburg:

The brigade was moved from its position, on the Hagerstown road, to the support of Colquitt's, which was then about engaging the enemy on our left front. This was about 10 o'clock. We moved by the left flank, until we reached a point near the woods, when line of battle was formed and the advance begun. Some confusion ensued, from conflicting orders. When the brigade crossed the fence, it was halted and formed and again advanced. Coming in sight of the enemy, the firing was commenced steadily and with good will, and from an excellent position, but, unaccountably to me, an order was given to cease firing—that General Ripley's brigade was in front. This produced great confusion, and in the midst of it a force of the enemy appearing on the right, it commenced to break, and a general panic ensued. It was in vain that the field and most of the company officers exerted themselves to rally it. The troops left the field in confusion, the field officers, company officers, and myself bringing up the rear. Subsequently several portions of the brigade, under Colonel Iverson, Captain Garrett, and others, were rallied and brought into action, rendering useful service. I refer to their general reports for their conduct.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. K. McRAE,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

No. 298.

Report of Capt. Thomas M. Garrett, Fifth North Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

CAMP, *October 11, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Fifth North Carolina Troops in the action of October [September] 17 at Sharpsburg:

At an early hour in the morning and shortly after the battle had opened with musketry, the regiment was moved along with the brigade by the left flank across the open field north of the town in the direction of the firing. The brigade was halted upon the left of the "burning house," and formed in line of battle. While halted here for a few minutes, and while passing to our position, we were subjected to a very severe cross-fire from the enemy's artillery, and had the misfortune to lose for the day Lieut. Charles R. King, commanding Company H, who

* Embodied in Nos. 205 and 293, *ante*.

was wounded severely in the arm by the fragment of a shell. The regiment, being formed in line on the right of the brigade, was moved forward rapidly across the open field and over a fence into the woods in front. Here a state of confusion ensued which it is difficult to portray. Various conflicting orders (mere suggestions, perhaps, taking that shape) were passed down the line, the men in ranks being allowed by the officers to join in repeating them, so that it became utterly impossible to understand which emanated from the proper authority. The regiment, following the movements of the brigade, which were vacillating and unsteady, obliquing to the right and left, came upon a ledge of rock and earth, forming a fine natural breastwork. Under the cover of this the regiment, following the example of those on the left, fell down and sought shelter. Seeing a regiment of the enemy coming up in the open field in our front and somewhat on the flank, and the breastwork turning where the right of the regiment rested in such a manner as to expose a few files of men of my regiment, I ordered these to deploy as flankers to the right and take shelter behind the trees. At this moment, and while directing this movement, Captain [T. P.] Thomson, Company G, came up to me, and in a very excited manner and tone cried out to me, "They are flanking us! See, yonder's a whole brigade!" I ordered him to keep silence and return to his place. The men before this were far from being cool, but, when this act of indiscretion occurred, a panic ensued, and, despite the efforts of file-closers and officers, they began to break and run. I have employed this language in regard to Captain Thomson's conduct because he remained upon the ground and exerted himself to rally the men, and, while it manifests clearly a want of capacity to command, my observation of him did not produce a conviction that it proceeded from a cowardly temper. I gave an order to the few men who remained—not more than 10 in number—to retire, and called upon the few officers who were around me to rally behind the fence in our rear. A few rallied by the example of Lieut. Isaac E. Pearce, commanding Company B, who acted with great spirit, and all of the men belonging to my company present in the regiment rallied to my side. With them I made a stand at the fence, and ordered the men to fire upon the advancing enemy. This they did with coolness and deliberation. I observed, however, immediately, that all the brigade on the left were retreating in disorder, and had already passed the fence without halting. I retired with the few men behind the fence, toward the town. I could see no body of men of my regiment on the way, and I went immediately down into the town in the hope of getting up with them. Here I met General Lee in the street, and reported to him the misfortune which had befallen me, and asked for directions. He ordered me to rally all the stragglers I could, without regard to what command they belonged, and report with them to General Evans. Only about 50 of my regiment could be found; but, with the assistance of yourself and Lieutenant Pearce, about 150 were rallied and carried up to General Evans, on the hill, on the north edge of the town. These were formed in line, under my command, along with other stragglers, and all placed under the command of Colonel Iverson, of the Twentieth North Carolina. Very soon we advanced into the open field, and, meeting with General D. H. Hill, were ordered to attack a regiment of the enemy which was maintaining a doubtful contest with a small body of our troops. We moved up in line on the right and engaged them with spirit, and forced them, for a moment, to give back. Very soon, however, the left of the line of which my command formed part gave way, and being left with but the men from my regiment, I ordered them to retire, and form

behind a large rock in the field, about 50 yards distant. This was done, and, by the determined conduct of these few men, the regiment of the enemy was held in check for twenty-five or thirty minutes. After feeling our strength, however, he began to advance, and I ordered the men to retreat.

In this affair I observed, as throughout the day, your admirable self-possession and command of your faculties in the midst of danger, and I am greatly indebted to you for valuable aid rendered me.

Retiring again to General Evans' headquarters, and being furnished with a horse, I went again into the town and gathered up another body of stragglers, who, with what remained of the Fifth North Carolina, were formed. General Evans asked me to take command of them, but a slight wound on the foot had by this time become so painful as to forbid it, and he called upon you to lead them. How well this was done I would be glad to be able to narrate, but being separated finally from any organized body of the regiment this report necessarily closes.

In this last affair we have to lament the loss of our much-esteemed friend, Lieut. John M. Felton, Company G, who was killed instantly by a round shot from the enemy's battery. He was modest and unassuming as he was brave and determined.

The casualties* of the day have already been reported.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. M. GARRETT,

Captain Company F, Commanding Regiment.

Lieut. J. M. TAYLOR,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 299.

Report of Lieut. Col. Thomas Ruffin, jr., Thirteenth North Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Boonsborough.

OCTOBER 12, 1862.

In obedience to the order calling for reports of the parts respectively taken by the several regiments of the brigade in the battles of the 14th and 17th ultimo, I have the honor to report the action of the Thirteenth North Carolina Regiment.

Owing to the dangerous illness and absence of Colonel Scales, I was in command on the 14th at South Mountain.

Early in the morning of the 14th we were ordered by General Garland to go, in company with the Twentieth North Carolina, commanded by Colonel Iverson, out by a road leading along the top of the mountain, and then to occupy a position on the left of the old Sharpsburg road, which we did at about sunrise, and remained there about two hours. We were then ordered to move farther to the right to the support of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, which we proceeded to do, and, being met by General Garland, were directed to take position in an open field upon the brow of a high hill. The enemy, we found, were posted upon a high hill densely wooded, and immediately facing the hill occupied by ourselves. There was also a regiment under cover of a rail fence upon our left. Not being able to see the enemy in our front, our whole fire was directed upon those upon the left, and, as our men were cool and fired

* Not found.

with precision and effect, they soon drove that portion of the enemy entirely off the field. All this, while those in our front were firing constantly into us, and it was then that General Garland fell. Not deeming it prudent to advance down the hill in the face of an enemy so strongly posted, and whose force, though we could not see them, we judged, by their fire, to be very strong, the regiment was withdrawn about 50 yards from the brow of the hill. There I received an order from Colonel McRae, in person, he having succeeded to the command, to move by the left flank until our left was brought in contact with the right of General Anderson's brigade, which we did, and took our new position upon the road on the right of General Anderson, and supposed that our own brigade was extended in one continuous line on our right. The enemy advancing in our front, we became soon entirely engaged, and were evidently getting the advantage of him, but to our great surprise a heavy fire was opened upon us from the right, which we supposed to be occupied by our own brigade. Our adjutant was immediately dispatched to see what was the matter, and, returning, reported that the enemy had obtained the road on our right, and were coming down upon us from that direction. An order for a charge to the front was immediately given, and, the men obeying it with alacrity, we had the satisfaction to see the enemy give way. We pursued as far as it was thought to be prudent, and, falling back, changed front, so as to meet those on the right; charged them also and drove them back. While thus engaged, the enemy appeared upon our left, which position had been occupied by General Anderson's brigade, but which had been removed without our knowledge. Finding this to be so, our regiment about-faced and charged, and, as it turned out to be but a party of the enemy's skirmishers, there was no difficulty in repulsing them. It was then determined to get into position somewhere from which we could communicate with our commanding officer, and with this view the regiment was removed to the Sharpsburg road, where we found General Anderson's brigade. Not being able to find Colonel McRae, and, indeed, hearing that he and his command had been cut off, we reported to General Anderson, and asked to be taken under his command, to which he assented, and we remained with him the rest of the day. By him we were formed in line of battle in the old Sharpsburg road, our regiment being on the right of his brigade, and were moved up the side of the mountain. It is difficult to conceive a more arduous march than this was; but it was performed in good time, and, when we reached the top of the mountain, we found a road, along which we moved to the left until we came to a dense corn-field, on the right of the road. In this field we found the enemy in strong force, with a battery in position, which we were ordered to charge, and attempted to do, in conjunction with the Second North Carolina Regiment, but were repulsed with great loss. It then being dark, we were ordered to retire.

I feel it to be due to those under my command, though so little was accomplished by their efforts, to say that they deserve high praise, both officers and men, for their conduct on this day. With a few exceptions they all acted well.

I noticed particularly the gallant bearing of Captain [J. H.] Hyman, acting as major; Captain [E. B.] Withers, of Company A; Captain [L. H.] Hunt, of Company C; Captain [H. A.] Rogers, of Company D; Captain [G.] Foster, of Company F; Lieutenant [T. A.] Martin, commanding Company E, and Lieutenant [R. L.] Watt, commanding Company K. Lieutenant [J. C.] Joyce, commanding Company H, led his men into action bravely and coolly, but was killed by the very first fire. Captain

Glenn, of Company I, led his company all day, through all the engagements, with great spirit, but was killed by the last shot fired at us. Lieut. C. N. Civalier acted as adjutant to the regiment, and did all that a brave and patriotic soldier could do. He also was dangerously wounded in the last charge, and Lieutenant [H. B.] Fowler, of Company A, behaved with great coolness and courage. I hear the conduct of other officers spoken of in high terms, but I have mentioned only those whom I had the opportunity to observe.

Of the privates whose conduct came under my observation, I take occasion to mention particularly Frank Scales, of Company H, as the bravest man in battle I ever saw. I should have recommended him for promotion, but that, unfortunately, he was wounded and left on the field in the battle of the 17th. John R. Neland, of Company E, acted particularly well, and is respectfully mentioned as worthy of promotion, as is Sergeant Smith, of Company B.

I feel it to be just that I should acknowledge the fact that we were joined by a small party of the Twelfth North Carolina Regiment early in the morning, who continued with us throughout the day and rendered us very efficient aid. As to their names and other particulars, I refer to the commanding officer of that regiment, to whom I have reported in full the action of his men.

Owing to an accident, I was not able to command the regiment on the 17th, and, therefore, have the honor to call your attention to the accompanying report from Captain Hyman, who commanded on that day.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

T. RUFFIN, JR.,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Thirteenth North Carolina Regt.

Lieut. J. M. TAYLOR,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 300.

Report of Col. R. T. Bennett, Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry, commanding Anderson's brigade, of the battle of Sharpsburg.

DECEMBER 6, 1862.

I have the honor of submitting the following report of the action of the Fourth Brigade in the engagement of September 17, at Sharpsburg:

The command of this brigade devolved upon me after the disabling and death of the ranking officers. The major-general commanding the division is perfectly cognizant of the position occupied by the command, he having led in person the head of the column to the ground retained until compelled to fall back by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. The enemy, soon after the road had been taken by Anderson's brigade, came into the field in front of us from the direction of the locality of Garland's brigade. Their advance was beautiful in the extreme, and great regularity marked their column. As the center was unmasked by the right and left flanks, this precision of movement was preserved by the lines until a space not exceeding 50 yards separated the combatants. Then it was that a well-directed fire sent them in disorder some 50 paces rearward. Recovering, however, they charged our position with same result as aforesaid, with the addendum of wild confusion. The bravery of a field officer apparently checked the spreading symptoms of panic, and once more their courage was brought to the test.

Poor return, indeed, they made for the gallantry of their leader. Confusion that seemed remediless followed. At this juncture the colonel commanding gave orders for bayonets to be fixed, preparatory to an advance of the line. However, two fresh columns of the enemy were seen double-quickening to the relief of the shattered ranks of the foe, and stern necessity bade us be satisfied with simple holding of our ground. During all this time the Fourth Brigade appeared perfectly self-possessed, so far as the observation of the colonel commanding extended. Shortly after the occurrences aforesaid, word came for the command to keep a lookout on the extreme right. While directing ourselves to that point, masses of Confederate troops in great confusion were seen, portions of Major-General Anderson's division as we then knew, for the Sixteenth Mississippi and Second Florida, of that command, coming to our succor, broke beyond the power of rallying after five minutes' stay. In this stampede, if we may so term it, the Fourth North Carolina State Troops and Thirtieth North Carolina Troops participated.

The hour of 1 p. m. had arrived. Anderson's division had gone to the rear. Two regiments (Fourth and Thirtieth) of our own brigade were missing. The dark lines of the enemy had swept around our right, and were gradually closing upon the ground of Rodes' brigade. They having gone to resist the lines in front was an easy task, to contend against front and rear attacks we were totally inadequate, and the bare alternative of retreat was presented. The command was ordered to make the retreat by the right-oblique, with frightful loss in some regiments, as the list of mortality will show. The task was achieved. The command was reformed at the road leading to Sharpsburg, and participated in all the skirmishes of the afternoon. About sunset the colonel commanding was taken from the field, disabled.

Here find list of casualties :

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Aggregate.
2d North Carolina State Troops.....	14	36	50
4th North Carolina State Troops.....	6	40	46
14th North Carolina Troops.....	27	112	139
30th North Carolina Troops.....	10	57	67
Total	57	245	302

I have the honor to be,

R. T. BENNETT,

Colonel, Comdg. Anderson's Brigade at Sharpsburg, Md.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 301.

Report of Col. Bryan Grimes, Fourth North Carolina Infantry, of the battle of Boonsborough.

OCTOBER 13, 1862.

In compliance with your order of this morning, I submit the following report as to the part taken by the Fourth Regiment North Carolina State Troops in the engagement on Sunday, September 14:

At 3.30 a. m. were ordered to march down the turnpike toward Boons-

borough, and, upon approaching that town, were drawn up on the hills adjacent in line of battle, in which position we remained an hour or two, when we were ordered to continue our advance by the flank down the turnpike. Upon arriving at the summit of the mountain, were filed on a left-hand road, which overlooked the enemy's approach. The Fourth Regiment, together with the Second, was here detached, under command of Colonel Tew, to go to the support of General Garland, then engaging the enemy on the right of the turnpike. Upon joining on to General Garland's left wing, Colonel Tew saw the necessity for re-enforcements to our left, and requested Captain Grimes to return and report the fact to General Anderson or General Hill. Captain Grimes has never been heard from since. Whether he delivered the message or not I have been unable to learn. After remaining in this position for perhaps half an hour, the enemy in front, from 100 to 200 yards distant, and my best marksmen shooting them whenever they appeared, I have reasons to believe they killed several, when an order was received to flank to the left, which was done. After remaining in our new position nearly an hour, we were ordered to move more to our left, which order was complied with, joining on to the right of the regiments of our own brigade, leaving an interval of from 300 to 400 yards unoccupied between our right and General Garland's left wing, which fact was reported immediately. Our two regiments, together with the Thirteenth North Carolina, were flanked for some distance to the right and formed in line of battle at right angles with our former position, and advanced for some distance up the side of the mountain, but, not finding the enemy, were recalled and carried still farther to the right, and, forming in line of battle, moved up the mountain, and upon reaching the summit discovered a battery of the enemy in a corn-field and supported by infantry. We made a charge upon the battery, but were repulsed. Falling back and reforming, when, now too dark to proceed, were ordered down for the night.

I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRYAN GRIMES,

Colonel Fourth North Carolina State Troops.

Lieut. V. E. TURNER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 302.

Reports of Capt. A. J. Griffith, Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry, of operations September 14-17.

—, 1862.

[I make the following] report of the part the Fourteenth Regiment North Carolina Troops bore in the engagement at Crampton's Pass [Turner's Pass], Md., September 14, commanded by Col. R. T. Bennett:

The regiment received orders on the night of the 13th to prepare to move at a moment's warning.

Early in the morning of the 14th the regiment took up line of march down the turnpike in the direction of Crampton's Pass. It was in front of the brigade, and rested on the left of the road at the pass for a short time, and then received orders to march back and pass to the right of the turnpike to re-enforce General Garland. Coming upon a squad of the enemy, it formed line, but, by some mistake in orders, marched back

to the turnpike without firing on the enemy, at which place it received orders to face about and march back to the field, where it was joined by General Ripley and thrown on his right. The whole line then moved forward on the enemy, who had taken position on the mountain. Before coming upon the enemy the second time, it being nearly night, it received orders to fall back to an old road, with only 1 man wounded, and await orders to re-enforce General Ripley, if necessary. No orders arriving, the regiment was not called into action. In the absence of the commanding officers, it is impossible to give a more detailed account.

A. J. GRIFFITH,

Captain, Comdg. Fourteenth Regiment North Carolina Troops.

—, 1862.

[I make the following] report of the part the Fourteenth North Carolina Troops bore in the engagement at Sharpsburg, Md., on September 17, commanded by Col. R. T. Bennett:

The regiment arrived at Sharpsburg on the 15th, and formed line of battle, and remained in line until the morning of the 17th. About 8 o'clock received orders to move by the left flank, passing through a corn-field into an old road; filed to the left, and took position in front of the enemy, which was well protected by banks. The enemy advanced immediately, and a heavy fire opened on both sides. At this position it drove the enemy back three times, disorganizing their lines, with heavy loss. About 11 o'clock received orders from the right that a new line of the enemy was advancing in the rear. The regiment fell back to a road, and took position behind a stone fence, losing many men while changing position. Having but few men, it rallied with other regiments and drove the enemy back, and remained in line in front of the enemy until late at night; then marched a short distance to the rear to rally. Took position next morning on the line, and remained there until it received orders to fall back.

The casualties were 213 killed, wounded, and missing, including Col. R. T. Bennett, blown up by a shell (severely shocked), and Lieut. Col. William A. Johnston, wounded in the arm. The commanding officers being absent, it is impossible to give a report in detail.

A. J. GRIFFITH,

Captain, Comdg. Fourteenth Regiment North Carolina Troops.

No. 303.

Reports of Maj. William W. Sillers, Thirtieth North Carolina Infantry, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

EIGHT MILES NORTH OF WINCHESTER, VA.,

October 13, 1862.

In obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Thirtieth Regiment North Carolina Troops, Col. F. M. Parker commanding, in the battle of South Mountain, September 14, to wit:

The regiment, except as to its skirmishers, was not actually engaged with any visible portion of the enemy's forces at any time during the battle. Late in the forenoon our skirmishers exchanged a few shots

with those of the enemy near the point where General Garland's brigade engaged the enemy, by which we lost 1 captain and 3 privates wounded; total, 4.

A few minutes before night the regiment was under fire from an unseen foe. The fire was replied to; with what effect is not known, as it soon became dark and the brigade moved down the mountain. We changed position several times during the day, marching up and down the mountain. In these movements, made very rapidly and in the heat of the day, some of the men became exhausted and fell out of the ranks. Others were, no doubt, wounded, in the random firing late in the afternoon, causing a loss, in missing, of 15 privates, and making a total of wounded and missing, during the day, of 19.

Respectfully submitted.

W. W. SILLERS,
Major, Commanding.

Col. W. P. BYNUM,
Commanding Brigade.

EIGHT MILES NORTH OF WINCHESTER, VA.,
October 13, 1862.

In obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Thirtieth Regiment North Carolina Troops in the battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, to wit:

Supposing that the main road which leads from the bridge across Antietam Creek through the center of Sharpsburg to run north and south, our brigade took position northwest and about half a mile from the town, and the Thirtieth Regiment was on the right of the brigade. Our line was formed in a road which, by the wear of travel, had been let down to the depth of a foot or more into the earth. In front of the right wing of our regiment, and at a distance of not more than 50 paces, there was a ravine which, extending diagonally to the left, gradually narrowed down the level space in front until in front of the extreme left of the Thirtieth there was not more than 30 paces of level ground. Our position was taken, I suppose, about 8.30 a. m. In the space of half or three-quarters of an hour the enemy made his appearance, crossed the ravine, and began his advance up the hill. A well-directed fire broke his line and drove him back. Up to this time, as far as the eye could reach to the right (300 yards), there was no support to our brigade; but about this time Brigadier-General Wright's brigade came up. The enemy continued to make his appearance, first on one hill, then another, but always at long range. The line was ordered to advance, and halted on the edge of the ravine. Here a hot fire was kept up for a few minutes. Soon the line was ordered to take its first position, and did so. In a very short time Colonel Parker passed me, retiring, seriously wounded, from the field. From this time, about 11.30 a. m., the regiment was under my command. A desultory fire was kept up for some time, the enemy making demonstrations in front of the brigade on our right. Our fire at this point was not very effective, the range being too great and a fence intervening. Soon my attention was called to our right, which was again unsupported. Almost immediately my attention was called to the opposite flank (the left), which was uncovered as far as I could see. I sent a captain to the left to see if any one was there, and he reported no one. I then gave the order to fall back. We retired about 300 yards. Here we made a stand. Twice we advanced from this point, and

twice we fell back to it. A short time before sunset the enemy advanced. We joined in a charge against them, and drove them so effectually that they did not appear again. In our last position we were under a pretty severe fire from artillery, playing on the front and flank. Here we remained until after nightfall, when we were withdrawn by order of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill.

The regiment before the fight numbered about 250, all told. We lost in killed, 10, in wounded, 62, and in missing, 1, making a total of 76. I brought off from the fight 159.

Very respectfully submitted.

W. W. SILLERS,
Major, Commanding.

Col. W. P. BYNUM,
Commanding Brigade.

No. 304.

Reports of Col. A. H. Colquitt, Sixth Georgia Infantry, commanding brigade, of the battles of Boonsborough and Sharpsburg.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
Near Bunker Hill, Va., October 13, 1862.

SIR: Herewith I submit a report of the action of my brigade in the battle of South Mountain, September 14.

On the night of September 12 I left the camp of the division with the brigade and Captain Lane's battery, with instructions to occupy the commanding points at Boonville [Boonsborough], 4 miles to the rear. The march and the unavoidable delay in selecting positions in the dark consumed most of the night.

Early the next morning General Hill arrived. While engaged in making a reconnaissance, he received information that General Stuart, commanding the cavalry in rear, stood in need of support. I was ordered to move at once with my brigade and the battery of artillery. Proceeding along the turnpike $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 miles, I reached the summit of South Mountain, and discovered the enemy's cavalry advancing and ours gradually giving back. I reported my arrival to General Stuart, and consulted with him as to the best disposition of the forces. Two pieces of artillery were ordered to the front, to a position commanding the turnpike leading down the valley. The continued advance of the enemy rendered the execution of the order impracticable. They were thrown rapidly into position at the most available points, and the infantry disposed upon the right and left of the road. The enemy made no further efforts to advance, and at dark withdrew from my immediate front.

To the right and left of the turnpike, a mile distant on either side, were practicable roads leading over the mountain, and connecting by a cross-road along the ridge with the turnpike. Upon each of these roads I threw out strong infantry pickets, the cavalry being withdrawn, and my main body was retired to the rear of the cross-road, leaving a line of skirmishers in front. Early the next morning my pickets were called in, being relieved by other forces which had arrived during the night, and my brigade advanced to the position it occupied the day previous. Upon the right of the road, across the valley and upon the hillside, three

regiments were placed, with instructions to connect with General Garland's line on the right. The force was insufficient to reach that distance, and there was a gap left of 300 or 400 yards between the two brigades. The remaining regiments of my brigade, to wit, the Twenty-third Georgia and Twenty-eighth Georgia, were put in position on the left of the turnpike, under cover of a stone fence and a channel worn by water down the mountain side.

The first attack of the enemy was made upon the extreme right of my line, as with the view to pass in the opening between Garland's and my command. This was met and repulsed by a small body of skirmishers and a few companies of the Sixth Georgia.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon a large force had been concentrated in my front and was moving up the valley along each side the turnpike. I informed General Hill of the movement, and asked for supports. Being pressed at other points, he had none to give me. The enemy advanced slowly, but steadily, preceded by skirmishers. Upon the right of the road, 400 yards in advance of my line, there was a thick growth of woods, with fields opening in front and around them. In these I had concealed four companies of skirmishers, under the command of Captain Arnold. As the enemy advanced, these skirmishers poured upon his flank a sudden and unexpected fire, which caused the troops on this part of his line to give back in confusion. They were subsequently rallied and thrown to the right, strengthening the attack to be made upon my left. Two regiments here were to meet at least five, perhaps ten, times their numbers. Nobly did they do it. Confident in their superior numbers, the enemy's forces advanced to a short distance of our lines, when, raising a shout, they came to a charge. As they came full into view upon the rising ground, 40 paces distant, they were met by a terrific volley of musketry from the stone fence and hillside. This gave a sudden check to their advance. They rallied under cover of the uneven ground, and the fight opened in earnest. They made still another effort to advance, but were kept back by the steady fire of our men. The fight continued with fury until after dark. Not an inch of ground was yielded. The ammunition of many of the men was exhausted, but they stood with bayonets fixed.

I am proud of the officers and men of my command for their noble conduct on this day. Especial credit is due to Colonel Barclay, of the Twenty-third Georgia, and Major [Tully] Graybill, Twenty-eighth Georgia, who, with their regiments, met and defeated the fiercest assaults of the enemy.

My thanks are due to Lieutenant Jordan and Lieutenant [G. G.] Grattan, of my staff, for their assistance this day.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. COLQUITT,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
Near Bunker Hill, Va., October 13, 1862.

SIR: I give you below an account of the part taken by this brigade in the battle of September 17.

About 7 o'clock in the morning my brigade entered the fight. It was

moved to the front and formed on the right of General Ripley's brigade, which was then engaged. After a few rounds had been discharged, I ordered an advance, and at the same time sent word to the regiments on my left to advance simultaneously. The order was responded to with spirit by my men, and, with a shout, they moved through the corn-field in front, 200 yards wide, and formed on the line of fence. The enemy was near and in full view. In a moment or two his ranks began to break before our fire, and the line soon disappeared under the crest of the hill upon which it had been established. It was soon replaced by another, and the fire opened with renewed vigor.

In the mean time Garland's brigade, which had been ordered to my right, had given way, and the enemy was advancing, unchecked. The regiments upon my left having also failed to advance, we were exposed to a fire from all sides and nearly surrounded. I sent in haste to the rear for re-enforcements, and communicated to General Hill the exposed condition of my men. With steady supports upon the right we could yet maintain our position. The support was not at hand and could not reach us in time. The enemy closed in upon the right so near that our ranks were scarcely distinguishable. At the same time his line in front advanced. My men stood firm until every field officer but one had fallen, and then made the best of their way out.

In this sharp and unequal conflict I lost many of my best officers and one-half of the men in the ranks. If the brigades upon the right and left had advanced, we should have driven the enemy from the field. He had at one time broken in our front, but we had not strength to push the advantage.

Colonel [L. B.] Smith, of the Twenty-seventh Georgia; Colonel [W. P.] Barclay, of the Twenty-third Georgia, and Lieutenant-Colonel [J. M.] Newton, commanding the Sixth Georgia, fell at the head of their regiments. Their loss is irreparable. Upon every battle-field they had distinguished themselves for coolness and gallantry. Colonel [B. D.] Fry, of the Thirteenth Alabama, and Captain [N. J.] Garrison, commanding Twenty-eighth Georgia, were severely wounded.

Subsequent to the action of the forenoon, portions of my brigade encountered the enemy in two desultory engagements, in which they stood before superior numbers and gave a check to their advance. In one of these a small party was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel [W. H.] Betts, and directed to deploy as skirmishers along the crest of a hill upon which the enemy was advancing. They did so with good effect, keeping back a large force by their annoying fire and the apprehension, excited by their boldness, that they were supported by a line in rear.

During the engagements of this day I had the misfortune to lose my acting assistant adjutant-general (Lieut. R. P. Jordan). He fell while gallantly dashing toward the enemy's line. I have not known a more active, efficient, and fearless officer. Lieutenant Grattan, my aide-de-camp, was conspicuously bold in the midst of danger and untiring in the discharge of his duties. I regret that I cannot here mention the names of all, dead and living, who are entitled to a tribute at my hands.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. COLQUITT,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Major RATCHFORD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 305.

Confederate Roll of Honor.

GENERAL ORDERS, } ADJT. AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
 No. 93. } *Richmond, Va., November 22, 1862.*

I. The following acts of Congress, having been approved by the President, are published for the information of the Army:

* * * * *

No. 27.—AN ACT to authorize the grant of medals and badges of distinction as a reward for courage and good conduct on the field of battle.

The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to bestow medals, with proper devices, upon such officers of the armies of the Confederate States as shall be conspicuous for courage and good conduct on the field of battle; and also to confer a badge of distinction upon one private or non-commissioned officer of each company after every signal victory it shall have assisted to achieve. The non-commissioned officers and privates of the company who may be present on the first dress-parade thereafter may choose, by a majority of their votes, the soldier best entitled to receive such distinction, whose name shall be communicated to the President by commanding officers of the company; and if the award fall upon a deceased soldier, the badge thus awarded him shall be delivered to his widow; or, if there be no widow, to any relation the President may adjudge entitled to receive it.

Approved October 13, 1862.

* * * * *

By order :

S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

GENERAL ORDERS, } ADJT. AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
 No. 131. } *Richmond, Va., October 3, 1863.*

Difficulties in procuring the medals and badges of distinction having delayed their presentation by the President, as authorized by the act of Congress approved October 13, 1862, to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the armies of the Confederate States conspicuous for courage and good conduct on the field of battle, to avoid postponing the grateful recognition of their valor until it can be made in the enduring form provided by that act, it is ordered—

I. That the names of all those who have been, or may hereafter be, reported as worthy of this distinction, be inscribed on a roll of honor, to be preserved in the office of the Adjutant and Inspector General for reference in all future time, for those who have deserved well of their country, as having best displayed their courage and devotion on the field of battle.

II. That the roll of honor, so far as now made up, be appended to this order, and read at the head of every regiment in the service of the Confederate States at the first dress-parade after its receipt, and be published in at least one newspaper in each State.

III. The attention of the officers in charge is directed to General Orders, No. 93, section No. 27, of the series of 1862, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, for the mode of selecting the non-commissioned officers and privates entitled to this distinction, and its execution is enjoined.

* * * * *

By order :

S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

GENERAL ORDERS, } ADJT. AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
No. 64. } *Richmond, Va., August 10, 1864.*

I. The following roll of honor is published in accordance with Paragraph I, General Orders, No. 131, 1863. It will be read to every regiment in the service at the first dress-parade after its receipt.

* * * * *

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

Alabama.

Eighth Regiment of Infantry:

Corpl. Davis Tucker, Company A.
Sergt. G. T. L. Robison, Company B.
Private John Curry, Company C.
Sergt. C. F. Brown, Company D.
Sergt. T. S. Ryan,* Company E.

Corpl. J. R. Searcy, Company F.
Fifth Sergt. James Castello,* Company G.
Private J. Herbert,* Company H.
Private James Ryan, Company I.
Private O. M. Harris,* Company K.

* * * * *

By order:

S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

GENERAL ORDERS, } ADJT. AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
No. 87. } *Richmond, Va., December 10, 1864.*

I. The following roll of honor is published in accordance with Paragraph I, General Orders, No. 131, 1863. It will be read to every regiment in the service at the first dress-parade after its receipt.

* * * * *

BATTLE OF BOONSBOROUGH.

Mississippi.

Second Regiment Mississippi Infantry:

Private R. L. Boone, Company A.
Sergt. T. B. McKay,† Company B.
Sergt. Robert Harris,‡ Company C.
Private W. B. Houston, Company D.
Private G. W. Monk,§ Company E.
Private T. G. N. Thompson,‡ Company F.

Private John Vanzant,* Company G.
Private B. Weatherington, Company H.
Private E. Browning,‡ Company I.
Private James L. Ackers, Company K.
Private Jacob McCarty,* Company L.

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

Mississippi.

Second Regiment Mississippi Infantry:

Private W. H. Looney,* Company A.
Private H. H. Johns,* Company B.
Private A. C. Howard,* Company C.
Private J. B. Elliott, Company D.
Sergt. J. P. Black,* Company F.

Sergt. F. H. Daggett, Company G.
Sergt. P. F. Harris,* Company H.
Corpl. M. L. Golding,* Company I.
Private J. W. Gibson,* Company K.
Private Leander Griffin,* Company L.

* * * * *

By order:

S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

* Killed in action.

† Afterward killed at Sharpsburg.

‡ Afterward killed at Gettysburg.

§ Afterward killed at Bristoe Station.

SEPTEMBER 6-16, 1862.—Campaign in the Kanawha Valley, W. Va.

EVENTS.

- Sept. 6, 1862.—Loring's command moves from The Narrows.
 10, 1862.—Action at Fayetteville.
 11, 1862.—Skirmishes at Cotton Hill, Gauley (or Miller's) Ferry, Armstrong's Creek, and near Cannelton.
 12, 1862.—Skirmish at Hurricane Bridge.
 13, 1862.—Action at Charleston.
 16, 1862.—Union forces reach the Ohio River.

REPORTS.

- No. 1.—Col. J. A. J. Lightburn, Fourth West Virginia Infantry, commanding District of the Kanawha.
 No. 2.—Col. Edward Siber, Thirty-seventh Ohio Infantry, commanding First Brigade.
 No. 3.—Col. Samuel A. Gilbert, Forty-fourth Ohio Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.
 No. 4.—Maj. Gen. William W. Loring, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Southwestern Virginia.
 No. 5.—Col. C. E. Thorburn, C. S. Army, Chief of Ordnance.
 No. 6.—Maj. J. Floyd King, C. S. Army, Chief of Artillery.
 No. 7.—Capt. R. L. Poor, C. S. Army, Chief Engineer.
 No. 8.—Surg. John A. Hunter, C. S. Army, Medical Director.
 No. 9.—Brig. Gen. John S. Williams, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.
 No. 10.—Col. William H. Browne, Forty-fifth Virginia Infantry.
 No. 11.—Maj. Alexander M. Davis, Forty-fifth Virginia Infantry, commanding Twenty-sixth Virginia Battalion.
 No. 12.—Col. G. C. Wharton, Fifty-first Virginia Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
 No. 13.—Col. John McCausland, Thirty-sixth Virginia Infantry, commanding Fourth Brigade.

No. 1.

Reports of Col. J. A. J. Lightburn, Fourth West Virginia Infantry, commanding District of the Kanawha.

GAULEY, VA., September 11, 1862—3 a. m.

Fayette attacked to-day at noon by a superior force of the enemy. Fighting continued all the afternoon, our troops holding the post at sundown. Jenkins, with heavy cavalry force, on my right flank, in the rear. I am compelled to fall back, probably to Point Pleasant, Ohio River.

J. A. J. LIGHTBURN,
Colonel, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, NEAR CHARLESTON, VA.,

September 13, 1862.

I have again engaged the enemy. Will hold this point if I can. Point Pleasant and Gallipolis should be looked after, as I shall, if compelled, have to fall back by Ripley road toward Ravenswood. No road down the Kanawha on east side.

J. A. J. LIGHTBURN,
Colonel, Commanding District.

Major-General HALLECK.

POINT PLEASANT, VA., *September 19, 1862.*

I am here with my command. Was compelled to fall back from Fayette, but not until after a day's hard fighting, with skirmishing all the way to Charleston, where I made a stand, but was compelled, by a superior force, to fall back from there, which I did in good order, bringing my transportation but losing my stores. I find Point Pleasant untenable without some works, which I shall proceed to erect as speedily as I can. My report will be forwarded by mail.

J. A. J. LIGHTBURN,
Colonel.

General H. W. HALLECK.

POINT PLEASANT, VA., *September 19, 1862.*

In falling back to this point, the Kanawha Salt Works have fallen into the enemy's hands. They were in good condition; could not be successfully destroyed, and have a large amount of salt on hand. Would it not be best to reoccupy the valley that far, as soon as possible?

J. A. J. LIGHTBURN,
Colonel, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE KANAWHA,

Point Pleasant, W. Va., September 24, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of what has transpired since I assumed command of the District of the Kanawha:

Pursuant to General J. D. Cox's order, of August 17, 1862, I assumed the command of the district. The troops composing the command were the Thirty-seventh, Thirty-fourth, Forty-fourth, and Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Virginia Volunteer Infantry, and the Second Virginia Cavalry, together with eight mountain howitzers, three rifled and three smooth-bore field-pieces of artillery, manned by a detail from infantry regiments. The forces were stationed as follows: The Thirty-fourth and Thirty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, with four mountain howitzers and two smooth-bore field-pieces, under command of Col. E. Siber, Thirty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, at Raleigh Court-House, with two companies of infantry, as a guard for trains, at Fayette Court-House; the Forty-fourth and Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, with two companies Virginia cavalry, at Camp Ewing, a distance of 10 miles from Gauley Bridge, on the Lewisburg road, under command of Col. S. A. Gilbert, Forty-fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; two companies of the Ninth Virginia Infantry, and two com-

panies of the Second Virginia Cavalry, under command of Major Curtis, were stationed at Summerville; the remainder of the Ninth and Fourth Virginia Infantry, and Second Virginia Cavalry, were stationed at different points from Gauley Bridge to Charleston, including an outpost at Coal River, in Boone County, with my headquarters at Gauley.

Soon after assuming command, I became satisfied that the enemy was massing troops at the Narrows of New River, Union, and other points, for a demonstration upon the Kanawha Valley. Finding it impossible to obtain re-enforcements, and my flanks and rear being unprotected, I ordered Colonel Siber, at Raleigh, to fall back to Fayette Court-House, and Colonel Gilbert also to fall back to Gauley Mountain, or Tompkins' farm. A day or two before I gave the order to Colonel Gilbert, I learned that Jenkins, with a heavy force of cavalry, had left Union, Monroe County, and, fearing he would attack Summerville, I ordered Colonel Gilbert to send six companies of the Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, under command of Colonel Elliott, to re-enforce that point. Finding these positions untenable against the reported force of the enemy, and Jenkins already in my rear, I ordered Colonel Paxton, with six companies of the Second Virginia Cavalry, to look after him, and, if possible, keep open communications with the Ohio River, by way of the Kanawha River. I, at the same time, ordered the quartermaster and commissary stores, of which there was a large quantity, to be shipped to Charleston, directing that the most valuable be shipped first, which had to be transported by land to Camp Piatt and Charleston; but, before much could be done in moving the stores, except the clothing, which was mostly got away, my outpost at Fayette Court-House, under command of Colonel Siber, was attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy. Learning that his communication with me was cut off, I immediately ordered three companies of the Fourth Virginia Volunteer Infantry to re-enforce him, with orders to fall back to Gauley, if he thought he could not hold his position. I also ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Parry, with five companies of the Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, to Cotton Hill, to meet the retreating force of Colonel Siber, who fell back, skirmishing, the entire road from Cotton Hill to the Kanawha River. I also, upon learning that Fayette was attacked, ordered Colonel Siber, with his command, to Gauley; also Colonel Elliott's command from Summerville, which command did not reach there until the enemy got possession of the opposite side of the river, and, consequently, was compelled to destroy their wagons and cross the mountains, joining the command near Cannelton.

Colonel Gilbert's command, with his artillery, was stationed in a position commanding the road leading from Fayette, and did good execution in covering the retreat of Colonel Siber's column. I also ordered all the wagons at Gauley to be loaded with the most valuable commissary stores, and to push forward, without stopping, until they crossed Elk River, below Charleston. This order was not obeyed, from some cause, the wagons and teams being in and above Charleston, which, no doubt, caused the confusion among the quartermasters, referred to in Colonel Gilbert's report. After Colonel Siber's command had passed and the enemy somewhat dispersed, Colonel Gilbert retired, skirmishing, which was kept up along almost the entire road, until we reached Charleston, September 12, where I thought to make a stand. I accordingly ordered the wagons that had been stopped in town across Elk River, which had hardly been done when the enemy made the attack upon the Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, which had been ordered by Colonel Gilbert to take a position above town, feel the enemy, and

bring on the engagement, which was done in a spirited manner, as seen by Colonel Gilbert's report. At 3 p. m. the Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, not being able to hold the enemy in check, fell back below Elk River, and the engagement became general, both with artillery and infantry, and lasted until, finding the enemy at least two to our one in front, with Jenkins' force, 1,200 to 1,500 strong, on our right flank and rear, and owing to our immense train of wagons (over 700 in number), I ordered the command to fall back, under cover of the night, and took up our line of retreat on the Ripley road for this point, where we arrived on the 16th instant, bringing off all our trains except a few wagons and one or two ambulances that broke down, and all our artillery, including five extra pieces that were not manned. I am sorry to have to report the destruction, by fire, of a large amount of stores, which was done to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. During the march from Gauley, and during the engagement at Charleston, the officers and men behaved nobly, every one seeming to perform his duty as though upon him alone depended success. I do not wish to speak disparagingly of any officer. All did their duty. But, in addition to what is said in the respective reports, I wish to say that Colonels Siber, Gilbert, and Toland deserve particular mention for their excellent counsels, gallantry, and promptness in the discharge of their respective duties. They are officers who have heretofore won the confidence of their officers and men, and, in our late engagements, their conduct has merited the confidence and esteem of all Union-loving citizens. The Second Virginia Cavalry, under Colonel Paxton, did good service in keeping Jenkins' force at bay, thereby preventing an attack in our rear. I wish, also, to state that Colonel Paxton, with 300 men, attacked Jenkins' whole force (from 1,200 to 1,500), and drove them from Barboursville, which, no doubt, kept them from an attempt to harass our retreat.

Our loss is 25 killed, 95 wounded, and 190 missing. It is supposed that a number of the missing will come in, as some have already reported. The loss of the enemy is not known, but, from the best information we can get, their loss is heavy. My command is now at this point, and will be ready for a move again in a few days.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. J. LIGHTBURN,
Colonel, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. HORATIO G. WRIGHT,
Commanding Department of the Ohio.

— — —
No. 2.

Report of Col. Edward Siber, Thirty-seventh Ohio Infantry, commanding First Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST PROVISIONAL BRIGADE,
Point Pleasant, W. Va., September 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following engagements and marches of the force under my command:

Having fallen back, with the Thirty-fourth and Thirty-seventh Ohio Volunteers, from the position of Raleigh to that of Fayette, I had resolved to hold the last-named intrenched position until the quartermaster and commissary stores, heaped up at this place, were removed. I had been informed, by repeated reports, that strong forces of the enemy would attack

my command, already, when at Raleigh; but no direct information about the real force of the enemy, or the time of this predicted attack, reached me. The position at Fayetteville had been intrenched during the winter by a great amount of labor, but was completely commanded on its right flank and rear by surrounding wooded hills. It could, besides, be turned on this flank, as well by Laurel as by Loop Creek. When, therefore, on the night of September 9 and 10, I received the information that one of the most inveterate "secesh" in Laurel Creek had expressed that he would need his rifle the next morning, I sent the same morning a sergeant and 6 cavalry orderlies, which constituted my whole mounted force, to Laurel Creek, to take him up. This detachment had scarcely reached the house of the mentioned "secesh" (Tetam, by name), when they perceived a detachment of about 30 rebel cavalry, by whom they were hotly pursued down Laurel Creek. This circumstance gave me warning of the approaching attack, and I detached, about 11 o'clock, Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin, with two companies of the Thirty-fourth Regiment, to Cassidy's Mill, on Laurel Creek, while two other companies should go up the creek to join him. These four companies were to cover the right flank of the position as a reconnoitering party. Two companies of the Thirty-seventh Regiment, under command of Captain Moritz, advanced one hour later on the Raleigh pike road, in order to reconnoiter in front. These two companies had scarcely made 2 miles when they met the advance guard of the approaching enemy, consisting of several companies of regular infantry. The engagement began thus before our front, and I ordered (as soon as I had personally convinced myself of the large force of the enemy, accompanied by a numerous staff) a retreat to the intrenchments, which was executed, skirmishing, and without any loss on our side, the enemy already pursuing us with artillery fire. The attack against the front of our position commenced shortly afterward, but was, at all points, repelled by Companies B, C, D, F, and G, of the Thirty-seventh Regiment, who held the advance redoubt, occupied by two 6-pounders, under command of Lieutenant West, and the skirt of the woods. In the meanwhile, however, the greater part of the enemy's force had, undiscovered, advanced through the woods on our right, and completely outflanked our position, and even intercepted our retreat. Of this circumstance I became convinced, when the first teams of our regimental train (which, at the commencement of the engagement, I had ordered to fall back to Cotton Hill) were attacked by a murderous fire, which, extending over a space of about 2 miles in our rear and right flank, showed the difficulty of our situation. In this emergency I ordered Col. John T. Toland, with the remaining six companies of the Thirty-fourth regiment, which had been held in reserve on the left, to clear the road to Gauley, and to drive the enemy from the position which he had taken on the skirt of the woods in our rear. This perilous task was executed by Capt. H. C. Hatfield, Thirty-fourth Regiment, with two companies on the Gauley road, and by Colonel Toland, personally, with the four others on his left, against the summit of a steep hill, with the utmost bravery and valor of officers as well as men. The engaged six companies of the Thirty-fourth Regiment suffered here, in the three hours' murderous and unequal combat, a very severe loss in officers, as well as in men, without being able to gain the woods (thickly occupied by the enemy), but held the ground opposed to it until after dark. The enemy was here prevented from making progress by well-directed and uninterrupted fire of four mountain howitzers, commanded by First Lieutenant Anderson, Thirty-fourth Regiment, and placed in battery at the main redoubt. In the mean while the enemy

repeated, during the whole afternoon and until late after dark, his attacks against the front and the right flank of the open field-works, occupied by the several companies of the Thirty-seventh Regiment, especially against an open redan, bravely defended by Lieutenant-Colonel Blessingh, with Companies A, E, H, and K. But neither in flank nor in front did the rebels make the slightest progress, and suffered considerable loss. These losses and the complete failure of all attacks forced the commander of the enemy's force (General Williams) to withdraw, at sunset, the regiments which he had sent on our right flank, thus opening our line of retreat. In front, however, the combat lasted till late after sunset, when the enemy was here also driven back, even pursued some distance, by the companies of the Thirty-seventh Regiment, with fixed bayonet. In this moment arrived, first, Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin, with the four detached companies of the Thirty-fourth Regiment, who had fallen back down Laurel Creek, and, next, a detachment of 25 horse, of the Second Virginia Cavalry, and three companies of the Fourth Virginia Infantry, under Captain Vance, sent to our assistance from Gauley by Colonel Lightburn. Judging, however, that these reinforcements would not enable me to hold the position another day, and to save the remaining commissary stores, I first ordered, during the night, the removal of our wounded, more than 80 in number; after these, that of the post and regimental trains, and gradually withdrew, between 1 and 2 o'clock in the morning, the whole force from the position of Fayetteville, unperceived by the enemy. This retreat was effected, after the commissary stores had been set fire to, without any other molestation but from a company of the enemy, still hidden in the woods in our rear. This ambush fired upon the cavalry, in the head of the column of the Thirty-fourth Regiment, wounding a few men of the last. In this hard-fought combat, against a vastly superior and regular force of the enemy, all the officers and men of both regiments fought with the greatest valor and resolution. Colonel Toland had two horses killed under him. Lieutenant-Colonel Blessingh, although sick, held his post during the whole day. Lieutenants West, Thirty-seventh Regiment Ohio Volunteers, and Anderson, Thirty-fourth Regiment Ohio Volunteers, commanded their artillery with skill and determination. Infantry and artillery had, at the end of the combat, twice exhausted their full ammunition. The Thirty-seventh Regiment, however, lost a part of their trains. The command reached, in the morning, safe and unmolested, the position at Cotton Hill, where I found five companies of the Forty-seventh Regiment, likewise sent from Gauley to our support. But scarcely had I reached the top of Cotton Hill, when the enemy deployed at its foot his whole force (at least six or seven regiments, colors flying, in order of battle), and immediately attempted to attack this new and strong position, on the new as well as on the old road. By this attempt a second combat was brought on in the morning of September 11, in which, on our side, only five companies of the Thirty-seventh Regiment became engaged. At their fire, and by that of our artillery, the enemy was, about 10 o'clock, driven back, with loss, to the foot of the mountain, giving me thereby time to withdraw the several regiments and detachments of my command down from Cotton Hill, on the left bank of the Kanawha River, to Loop Creek, and to destroy the magazines opposite Gauley. At Loop Creek I found a detachment of 120 men (cavalry), and, after a rest of two hours, I continued my retreat to Armstrong's Creek, where, late in the afternoon, the pursuing cavalry of the enemy reached our rear guard, consisting of the Forty-seventh Regiment Ohio Volunteers, who repelled them again. After this I

ordered the narrow defile, which forms the road on the left bank of the river, to be barricaded. A further pursuit of the enemy on this side became thereby impossible, and the whole command reached, on the morning of September 12, quietly, Brownstown, opposite Camp Piatt, where, in the evening, I crossed the Kanawha River, joining the force of Colonel Lightburn. I add the report of Col. John T. Toland.* The losses of the Thirty-seventh Regiment in these combats were insignificant in proportion to those of the Thirty-fourth, by reason of their having occupied the breastworks.

I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. SIBER,

*Colonel Thirty-seventh Regiment Ohio Volunteers,
Commanding First Brigade, Kanawha District.*

Lieut. B. D. BOSWELL,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Kanawha District.

No. 3.

*Report of Col. Samuel A. Gilbert, Forty-fourth Ohio Infantry, commanding
Second Brigade.*

HDQRS. SECOND PROV. BRIG., DIST. OF THE KANAWHA,
Camp, opposite Point Pleasant, W. Va., September 21, 1862.

SIR: The following is my report of the operations of the troops under my command, from the time of the evacuation of our positions near Gauley, at the head of the Kanawha Valley, on the 10th instant, until our arrival at this place on the 18th:

My command was disposed as follows, at the time the movement commenced: The Forty-fourth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Maj. A. O. Mitchell, commanding; a battery of four mountain howitzers, manned from the Forty-seventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Lieut. F. Fischer, and a section of two 10-pounder rifled field pieces, manned from the Forty-fourth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Sergeant Hamilton, at Tompkins' farm; three companies of the Forty-seventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Captain Dove's company, and part of Captain Allen's company, Second Virginia Cavalry, at Turkey Creek, 6 miles in advance of Tompkins' farm, on the Lewisburg turnpike, and Captain Hunter's company, Forty-seventh Regiment, and part of Captain Allen's company, Second Virginia Cavalry, at Camp Lookout, 18 miles in advance, on the Lewisburg turnpike, all under command of Lieut. Col. A. C. Parry, Forty-seventh Regiment, the cavalry being under command of Maj. John Hoffman, Second Virginia Cavalry, and six companies of the Forty-seventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. L. S. Elliott, at Summer-ville, in Nicholas County.

At 3 p. m. on the 10th instant I received your order to concentrate my command at Gauley, for which the necessary orders were at once given, and, at 8 p. m., I reported in person at your headquarters, near the falls. At 10 p. m. I ordered Major Hoffman and a small detachment of cavalry to go to Loop Creek, on the west side of the Kanawha River,

* Not found.

and blockade the road which leads to the river from Raleigh down Loop Creek, and guard the same until after Colonel Siber's command had passed by that point, which he did. At 3 a. m., on the 11th, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Parry, with four companies of the Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, to Cotton Hill, to protect trains from Fayette and to re-enforce Colonel Siber at that point, which duty he performed, and remained with Colonel Siber's command until he recrossed the Kanawha, at Camp Piatt, on the 12th, as also did Major Hoffman, with the detachment of cavalry sent to Loop Creek. At 8 a. m., on the 11th instant, I ordered Major Mitchell to take position opposite the point where the Fayette road reaches the river, with the Forty-fourth Ohio Volunteers, and attached to it one company of the Fourth Virginia and one company of the Ninth Virginia, which had been placed under my command. I, at the same time, posted the artillery at suitable points to command the road on the opposite side of the river, so as to cover the line of retreat over which Colonel Siber's column would pass. Lieutenant De Lille, of the Fourth Virginia, with one iron smooth-bore (6-pounder), and one 10-pounder James' rifled brass field piece, manned from the Fourth Virginia Regiment, reported to me for duty, and was assigned positions. About 10 a. m. the enemy appeared in close pursuit of the rear guard of Colonel Siber's column, and we opened upon them, checking their advance upon the road. Their sharpshooters, however, took position on the wooded hillsides, and kept up a brisk fusilade as long as we remained in range. The skirmishers of the Forty-fourth Ohio Volunteers replied to them with spirit. We held the position for about an hour, when, receiving your orders to fall back, we slowly retired, the infantry skirmishing by alternate divisions, and the field pieces and howitzers taking positions as often as favorable openings offered. About the time we commenced to retire, the enemy answered our artillery with a 12-pounder field howitzer, and, apparently, two rifled field pieces, which were apparently well served. After falling back in this manner about 4 miles, all firing ceased, and the enemy kept out of range until toward night, when, just above Cannelton, their advance came up with our rear guard, on the west side, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the enemy were driven back, with loss.

Our column moved on down to Smithers' Creek, and halted, about dark, to await the arrival of Colonel Elliott, who, having failed to reach Gauley as soon as was expected, was ordered to destroy his train and cross through the mountains, and join the main column at this point, which he did about 10 p. m. During the day the men behaved well, performing their duty with cool alacrity while being obliged to move under the fire of hidden foes. At midnight we moved on, through Cannelton, and encamped at Bowsman's, opposite Clifton, where we remained the rest of the night and until after breakfast. We resumed our march about 7 a. m. on the 12th, and reached Camp Piatt, 12 miles, about 4 p. m., in a series of heavy rain showers. I left a heavy cavalry picket about 5 miles above Camp Piatt, and posted four companies of the Fourth Virginia Infantry about 2 miles above, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, who had been ordered up from Camp Piatt for that purpose. Before dark the enemy drove in our cavalry picket, and a slight skirmish ensued, when the enemy retired and the cavalry moved out again for the night. The Forty-fourth and Forty-seventh Regiments Ohio Volunteers took position about half a mile above Camp Piatt, to cover the crossing of Colonel Siber's column to the east side of the Kanawha River, which was effected without interruption, and,

about 2 a. m. of the 13th, we moved down to Charleston, where the whole column, except the Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry and the cavalry, took position on the north side of Elk River. I had given Colonel Elliott, Forty-seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, orders to take position in the upper part of the town, and hold it as long as possible, and left with him Lieutenant Fischer, with three mountain howitzers. About 9.30 a. m. the enemy's advance drove in the cavalry picket, which had been left a mile above town, and, on hearing of it, I went immediately to the upper end of the town, and found Colonel Elliott and the cavalry retiring. I halted them immediately, and, after a careful examination of the ground, posted them above the thickly settled portion of the town, and then returned immediately to the main body and ordered Major Mitchell to take position on the wooded slope, to the left of the Ripley road, with one company deployed along the bank of Elk River, from the bridge up, and Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to form the Fourth Virginia on the left of the Forty-fourth Ohio, with two companies deployed along the bank of the Elk, covering his front and extending some distance beyond his left flank. I had ordered my field pieces to report to Colonel Siber for orders, as the slopes on the left were wooded and inaccessible to artillery. They were posted under his direction. About this time, 11.30 a. m., the firing at Colonel Elliott's position had become quite brisk, and I went back there and changed the position of the cavalry support, under Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis, and directed him to throw out vedettes to watch any attempt of the enemy to turn Colonel Elliott's left and cut him off from the main body. I found Lieutenant-Colonel Parry had been placed in charge of the extreme rear (now become the front), and was keeping up a spirited skirmish with the enemy's advance, on west side of river, his rifles being re-enforced by a howitzer, which was doing good execution. Finding things going on well in this locality, I returned to the main body, and, about 2 o'clock, was informed that the enemy were coming in, along the hills, in strong force, back of the town. I therefore ordered Colonel Elliott to withdraw, and destroy the Government stores, &c., as he came through the town. This was done by Lieutenant-Colonel Parry, who brought up the rear, and they finished their work by destroying Elk Bridge, after all had crossed. About this time, 3 p. m., the skirmishers along Elk became actively engaged, and the infantry firing became general all along the line, and, soon after, the enemy opened batteries, which had been planted on the west side of the Kanawha, opposite the mouth of Elk, and on the hills east of the town, thus making a cross-fire upon our position. They also threw a large body of infantry up Elk, on our left, but this move was promptly met and foiled. All who crossed were either disabled, or recrossed precipitately, and we held our own until dark, when, in accordance with orders, I withdrew my skirmishers and retired from the field, the batteries on the west side of the Kanawha playing vigorously upon us, without effect, as we moved off.

Three companies of the Fourth Virginia Regiment had become detached in the woods on the left, and failed to come in with the rest, but they joined the main body on the next day at noon, having come through the woods to near Sissonville.

Some 3 or 4 miles after leaving the battle-field, we found the road blockaded with our trains. The quartermasters seemed to have abandoned them, and word reached me that the enemy had appeared in our front. In accordance with your order, I ordered Colonel Elliott, with the Forty-seventh Ohio, to push forward and get the train in motion,

which was done after considerable delay. We found wagons loaded with the effects of citizens, with whole families of negroes, and, in many cases, two four-horse wagons fastened together, a load in one and but two or three horses attached to them, and other irregularities, which proved the utter incapacity or carelessness of the quartermasters, whose duty it was to look after these things. After the train had been started, long intervals were allowed to occur, through the carelessness or stupidity of drivers and the absence of wagon-masters, or other persons, whose duty it is to regulate trains. Such was the condition of these trains, and so completely had they blockaded the road, that if any pursuit had been made by the enemy, our artillery, as well as the entire train, must have fallen into their hands.

I cannot in too strong terms express my indignation that officers who have been in the employ of the Government as long as most of these quartermasters have, should have so neglected their duties, or be so ignorant of those duties as not to know how to perform them better. I passed along full 4 miles of these trains, and could find no one in charge. I found teamsters near the head of the train, quietly engaged in feeding themselves and horses, their wagons standing in the middle of the narrow road, so as to prevent others passing them. Also, I found cases where ammunition had been thrown out along the road, to lighten loads, while wagons were hauled empty, or loaded with the property of citizens. I found many wagons loaded with things of little or no value, while I know of large quantities of valuable stores being destroyed at Charleston. I have no hesitation in stating, and consider it my duty to state, that it is my belief that a large amount of the loss incurred at Charleston, and from Charleston to the Ohio River, is chargeable to the utter neglect or incapacity of the quartermasters, whose duty it should have been to attend to the care of it.

After passing about 4 miles of the train, and learning that no enemy had appeared in our front, I took position to cover the train as it passed, Colonel Elliott still keeping on to the front with seven companies of the Forty-seventh Regiment, with orders to give his attention to keeping the train in order, and guarding it from any interruption from a body of cavalry, said to be hovering on our right toward Spencer. As the train filed by my position, I could neither see nor hear of but two quartermasters. Some three or four wagon-masters appeared along the line, in charge of special trains. First Lieut. J. S. Rogers, acting quartermaster Forty-fourth Regiment, remained with his regimental train, and it reached the Ohio River in good order, with everything with which it started from Tompkins' farm. All the wagons were well, and even heavily, loaded. First Lieut. J. R. Craig, acting brigade quartermaster of the Second Brigade, also remained with the train, and all of his wagons got through with their loads. I ordered him to give his attention to the general interest, which he did with indefatigable and intelligent zeal.

After we left Charleston the only firing that occurred was a false alarm of the pickets on the night of the 14th, and the wounding of two of the pickets of the Forty-seventh Regiment at Ripley, by bushwhackers, on the night of the 15th. We arrived at Ravenswood, on the Ohio River, at 10 a. m. on the 16th, crossed the river, and marched 7 miles down that night, having shipped the artillery and the Fourth Virginia Regiment on steamboats and barges.

On the 17th we continued our march to Syracuse, on the Ohio River, and there embarked on steamboats and barges, and reached Point Pleas-

ant at dusk on the 18th, having spent most of the day aground at Eight-mile Island Bar.

The men are in excellent spirits, and appear to feel a renewed confidence in themselves and their officers, having thus successfully brought off an immense amount of property, in the face of a largely superior force, successfully holding them in check whenever they came up with us.

This is the first retreat that the Forty-fourth Ohio and the Fourth Virginia Regiments have participated in, and the first general action in which the latter has been engaged, and I have to express my great admiration at the coolness with which they performed their duty. All waited for orders, and obeyed them carefully to the letter. There was no confusion or disorder at any time among any portions of the troops of my brigade. Officers and men, without exception, conducted themselves in the most soldierly manner. The Forty-seventh Ohio, being an older regiment, and having seen more service in the field, performed its duty with that steadiness which is expected of such troops. No commander need feel any apprehensions for the result, when chances are anything near equal, if he has the ability himself to handle the troops in action or on the march, while he has such troops under his command. Lieutenant-Colonel Parry, of the Forty-seventh Ohio, deserves particular mention, both for his participation in the retreat of Colonel Siber's column from Cotton Hill, on the 11th instant, and in the battle at Charleston on the 13th. His gallantry and clear-sighted sagacity won him the confidence of officers and men. Lieutenant-Colonel Russell and Major Mitchell each managed their respective commands, during the entire time covered by this report, with that uniform skill and judgment which marks them both as valuable officers, of whom their States may well be proud. The honor of the Union cause will not be tarnished when intrusted to their keeping. The medical staff of the brigade was under general control of the medical director, Dr. Kellogg, and I am not able to report upon them. Doctors Bonner, of the Forty-seventh, and Rodgers and Luce, of the Forty-fourth, were frequently in my sight on the march, on the battle-field, and in bivouac, and appeared to be attentive to their duties. A number of ambulances were unnecessarily abandoned along the route from Charleston, but I do not know who is responsible. First Lieut. J. G. Telford, adjutant Forty-fourth Regiment, and acting as assistant adjutant-general and aide-de-camp (none having been detailed) for my command, deserves special mention for his gallantry and activity. Always ready, carrying orders to the most exposed positions on the field and along the line, in several cases himself directing the movements of detachments, where emergencies required it, he was my mainstay throughout the whole time. The detachments in charge of the artillery were composed of men who, in most cases, had been recently detailed from the infantry regiments. None of them had ever been in action before with that arm of service. The horses were also in the same undrilled condition, and the officers in charge of these pieces, Lieutenant De Lille, Lieutenant Fischer, and Sergeant Hamilton, deserve your thanks for the excellent manner in which their pieces were brought along on the march and served in action. Sergeant Hamilton, especially, deserves notice. He, having served in the artillery in the Regular Army, was enabled to afford me the greatest service, and to his judgment and experience we are mainly indebted for the efficiency of the field battery of my command, and I would respectfully recommend that he be given a lieutenant's commission, as a reward for meritorious service.

The following is a list of the casualties in the brigade under my command:

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Remarks.
44th Ohio, Maj. A. O. Mitchell, commanding.....	1	1	15	17	
47th Ohio, Col. L. S. Elliott, commanding.....	3	5	10	18	
4th [West] Virginia, Lieut. Col. W. H. H. Russell, commanding.....	5	2	53	60	
Artillery detachments:					
Lieutenant De Lille's section.....					One wheel disabled.
Lieutenant Fischer's section.....					One horse wounded.
Sergeant Hamilton's section.....					Nothing injured or lost.
Total.....	9	8	78	95	

The loss will, no doubt, be reduced, as we have already heard of the arrival of several of those so reported from the Fourth Virginia at the Ohio River.

I have asked for no report from the cavalry detachment commanders, as they were continually shifted from place to place, without my orders, and, therefore, virtually detached from my command. For further details as to officers and material, I will refer you to the inclosed copies of reports of regimental and detachment commanders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL A. GILBERT,

Colonel Forty-fourth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry,

Comdg. Second Provisional Brigade, District of Kanawha.

B. D. BOSWELL,

Second Lieutenant and Actg. Asst. Adjutant-General,

District of Kanawha, Point Pleasant, Va.

No. 4.

Reports of Maj. Gen. William W. Loring, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Southwestern Virginia.

HQRS. DEPT. OF SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA,

The Narrows, W. Va., September 1, 1862.

(Received September 5, 1862.)

SIR: Before I received your telegram, dated the 29th ultimo [following], upon the information of my scout, I had determined upon an offensive movement against the enemy in the Kanawha. It has been delayed only to accumulate forage and transportation enough to take me over the sterile district of 100 miles between me and the enemy. This has been a Herculean task; but to its accomplishment I have bent all my energies, and expect to move on Friday or Saturday next. It will be my policy when I move to endeavor to reach the Kanawha without stoppage, experience in our campaigns in this region last summer having shown that, while our armies paused in menacing proximity to the enemy, for want of forage and transportation, though at the time they were weak enough to be overcome by us, yet they improved our delay by re-enforcing from the convenient population of the northwest, and, in three or four weeks afterward, took the offensive successfully against us. I await with interest the full development of your plans for my future march to the valley through Northwest Virginia, and co-operation with the army

in that region. The intervening distance of 300 or 400 miles is so rugged as to make such a march one of great difficulty.

I observe, with great satisfaction, the evidence of increasing loyalty from the people of West Virginia, who are now coming into my army daily. I am very sanguine that when I get into that region the accessions to my army will be large, and, to arm these men, I earnestly request you to send me, by rapid express to Dublin, at least 5,000 stand of small-arms and accouterments for the same. I will so far anticipate your action on this subject as to receive corps to be armed in this way. There can be, I think, no occasion where the arms of the Government can be put to better use. I also desire to be authorized to appoint officers to command the regiments which I may get in West Virginia, in anticipation of your appointment, so that the new troops may be made effective at once.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,

Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

[Inclosure.]

RICHMOND, VA., August 29, 1862.

Maj. Gen. W. W. LORING,
Dublin Depot, W. Va. :

Pope's letter-book has been captured. On August 11, Cox was ordered to retain 5,000 men in Western Virginia, and to send the remainder by river and railroad to Pope. On August 16, Cox telegraphed from Gauley Bridge that his command would be at Parkersburg on the evening of the 20th, and asked for railroad transportation.

Clear the valley of the Kanawha and operate northwardly to a junction with our army in the valley. Keep us advised of your movements.

GEO. W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

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HDQRS. DEPT. OF SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA,
Camp Narrows, W. Va., September 6, 1862.
(Received September 12, 1862.)

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I take up the line of march to-day with my command, about 5,000 strong, for the Kanawha, in accordance with your orders. I have nothing new to communicate from the enemy, except that they are said to expect re-enforcements of the new levies.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. W. LORING,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

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HDQRS. DEPT. OF SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA,
Fayette Court-House, W. Va., September 11, 1862.
(Received September 19, 1862.)

SIR: After a fatiguing march, I came upon the enemy near this place on yesterday at 1.30 p. m. with the part of my forces which were in

front. After contesting every inch of my advance for some miles, he entered his fortifications at this place, which were strong, and consisted of formidable outer works inclosing a quadrangular fort with glacis and redoubt, and well mounted with nine pieces of artillery. My men pushed up to the walls with great spirit, inflicting great loss on the enemy. Our loss small. About nightfall to the force of the enemy already in the fort three regiments were added, as re-enforcements, by one of the many roads which my forces were not numerous enough to guard. This made the enemy about five regiments strong. But while we lay on our arms, intending to renew the attack this morning, the enemy fled, probably by the same road the re-enforcements entered, and I am now master of their works. I am now pursuing with all my force.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,

Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA,
Fayette Court-House, W. Va., September 11, 1862.
(Received September 19, 1862.)

SIR: General Jenkins captured Buckhannon, Upshur Court-House, General Kelley's main depot, with 5,000 stand of arms and immense stores, all of which were destroyed. He took the commanding officer and 30 prisoners. The next day he captured Weston; the next day he took Glenville; the next day he captured Colonel Rathbone and his regiment at Roane Court-House; the next day he drove a force of the enemy from Ravenswood, and the next day crossed into Ohio, marching 20 miles in that State. He was, at last accounts, on the Kanawha.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,

Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

CHARLESTON, KANAWHA CO., W. VA., *September 13, 1862.*
Via Giles Court-House and Dublin, W. Va., September 16, 1862.
(Received at Richmond, Va., September 16, 1862.)

After incessant skirmishing from Gauley down, we took this place at 3 p. m. The enemy (six regiments strong) made stout resistance, burning their stores and part of this town in their retreat. Our loss slight; the enemy's heavy. He is in full retreat; Jenkins in his rear.

W. W. LORING,

Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 14, 1862.

SIR: I reached here yesterday afternoon, capturing the town after a stout resistance from the enemy, in which their loss was heavy, ours

very slight. The rapidity of our advance saved the city from flames. We had marched in exactly one week from Giles Court-House to this place, fighting for more than half a day at Fayette Court-House, and again, on the next morning, at Cotton Hill and Gauley, and skirmishing all the way to this place. In these rapid victories over a numerous enemy, six regiments strong, all furnished with artillery and cavalry, besides inflicting a great loss in men, we have captured immense amounts of wagons and horses, inventories of which we are now taking, and which will doubtless amount to at least \$1,000,000. In the rapidity of our movements we have left the greater part of our train in rear, which has caused us to pause at this place. The enemy, fresher than we, and within 50 miles of the Ohio, have so much the advance that it is useless to pursue him farther. Roads from Guyandotte, Point Pleasant, and Ravenswood, on the Ohio River, converge at this place, so that if I move forward on any of these roads the enemy could use the other to get in my rear. Here, then, I will pause until our supply train reaches us—perhaps until I hear from you. If I advance toward the valley of Virginia, as you instructed me in a former letter, I shall have all these roads in my rear and between my column and trains, besides the difficult ranges of mountains running across my course, and with very bad roads over them. This valley, however, I can hold with its magnificent crop of growing corn and its salt. The salt-works prove uninjured, preserved by our activity from fire, and only lack labor to supply the whole Confederacy. The negroes, by whom they were formerly worked, have been carried off by the enemy. I think that many recruits will be added to my command here if I hold the country long enough, while a rapid march through the valley of the Kanawha would only expose it to fresh invasions from the enemy.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. W. LORING,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully submitted to the President. If General Floyd's command be turned over to the Confederate States Government and be filled up to a full brigade, it might hold the valley of the Kanawha. General Loring could then operate northwardly. I will prepare and submit a letter of instructions to him.

G. W. R.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 15, 1862.

SIR: The reception and welcome which the army received in this valley were so cordial that I deemed it politic to issue a proclamation of the temperate character of that which I inclose. I trust that it will meet with the approbation of the Government, as it does of all the citizens of the county, especially our firm and discreet friends.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

[Inclosures.]

To the People of Western Virginia :

The army of the Confederate States has come among you to expel the enemy, to rescue the people from the despotism of the counterfeit State government imposed on you by Northern bayonets, and to restore the country once more to its natural allegiance to the State. We fight for peace and the possession of our own territory. We do not intend to punish those who remain at home as quiet citizens in obedience to the laws of the land, and to all such, clemency and amnesty are declared ; but those who persist in adhering to the cause of the public enemy and the pretended State government he has erected at Wheeling will be dealt with as their obstinate treachery deserves. When the liberal policy of the Confederate Government shall be introduced and made known to the people, who have so long experienced the wanton misrule of the invader, the commanding general expects the people heartily to sustain it, not only as a duty but as a deliverance from their task-masters and usurpers. Indeed, he already recognizes in the cordial welcome which the people everywhere give to the army a happy indication of their attachment to their true and lawful Government. Until the proper authorities shall order otherwise, and in the absence of municipal law and its customary ministers, martial law will be administered by the army and provost-marshal. Private rights and property will be respected, violence will be repressed and order promoted, and all the private property used by the army will be paid for.

The commanding general appeals to all good citizens to aid him in these objects, and to all able-bodied men to join his army to defend the sanctities of religion and virtue, home, territory, honor, and law, which are invaded and violated by an unscrupulous enemy, whom an indignant and united people are now about to chastise on his own soil. The Government expects an immediate and enthusiastic response to this call. Your country has been reclaimed for you from the enemy by soldiers, many of whom are from distant parts of the State and the Confederacy, and you will prove unworthy to possess so beautiful and fruitful a land if you do not now rise to retain and defend it. The oaths which the invader imposed upon you are void. They are immoral attempts to restrain you from your duty to your State and Government. They do not exempt you from the obligation to support your Government and to serve in the army, and if such persons are taken as prisoners of war the Confederate Government guarantees to them the humane treatment of the usages of war.

By command of Major-General Loring :

H. FITZHUGH,
Chief of Staff.

GENERAL ORDERS, }	HDQRS. DEPT. OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
No. — }	Charleston, W. Va., September 14, 1862.

The commanding general congratulates the army on the brilliant march from the southwest to this place, in one week, and on its successive victories over the enemy at Fayette Court-House, Cotton Hill, and Charleston. It will be memorable in history that, overcoming the mountains and the enemy in one week, you have established the laws and carried the flag of the country to the outer borders of the Confederacy. Instances of gallantry and patriotic devotion are too numerous to be specially designated at this time ; but to brigade commanders and their

officers and men the commanding general makes grateful acknowledgment for services to which our brilliant success is due. The country will remember and reward you.

By command of Major-General Loring :

H. FITZHUGH,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 20, 1862.

GENERAL:† * * * On the 6th instant I marched from near Giles Court-House for the Kanawha with my command, about 5,000 strong. The enemy at Raleigh fled at our approach and concentrated his force at Fayetteville, where I arrived on the 10th instant with the advance of my column, consisting of General Williams' and Colonel Wharton's brigades. After an obstinate resistance, commenced 2 miles from the town, the enemy was driven before us into his fortified positions at the town, consisting of formidable and regularly constructed and connected works, armed with nine pieces of artillery, and sheltering from 1,500 to 2,000 men, under command of Colonel Siber. I directed Colonel Wharton's brigade, to which was added Colonel [Geo. S.] Patton's Twenty-second Virginia Regiment, to turn the enemy's positions and cut his connections, while General Williams attacked him in front and on his right. Upon reaching his position, Colonel Wharton was attacked by nearly the whole force of the enemy, which he repulsed in gallant style, inflicting great loss and advancing our positions nearer to him. At this juncture, I ordered General Williams to move to a nearer and more commanding position, which he promptly did, driving the enemy's skirmishers within their fortifications. Here a violent firing of cannon and small-arms was kept up until after dark, when the enemy effected his escape toward the Gauley by means of one of the many roads in his rear, in his flight exposing a portion of his force to the fire of Colonel Wharton, by whom great loss was inflicted upon him and much of his train and stores captured. General Williams and Colonel Wharton pursued, rapidly followed by General Echols, who had now come up by a march longer than that of the other brigades, and accomplished in unexpectedly short time, and early enough to execute a movement to the enemy's left, planned for him on the next day if the enemy had not fled on the arrival of our re-enforcements.

At 10 o'clock the next day (the 11th) the enemy made a stand at a strong natural position on Cotton Hill; but this being turned by Colonel Wharton and General Echols, while General Williams engaged him in a sharp conflict in his front, he again fled after suffering much loss. His efforts to cross his troops over the Kanawha into the fortified positions at Gauley were prevented by the swiftness of the pursuit, which drove the larger portion of his column down the south bank of the Kanawha, while the remainder, on the opposite side of the river, was quickly overpowered and followed, but not before his magazines were blown up and his immense stores, accumulated at that point, were mostly destroyed.

It is proper that the gallantry of Dr. Joseph F. Watkins, surgeon of the Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment, and several other soldiers of the command, should be noticed and commended, who swam the river in the

† Portion here omitted relates to Jenkins' expedition, August 22, 1862, and is printed in Series I, Vol. XII, Part II, pp. 756, 757.

face of some danger from the retreating enemy and extinguished the fire which was rapidly consuming the enemy's ferry-boats.

I immediately caused General Echols' brigade, together with the Twenty-second and Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiments, to be thrown across the river, and with his and the brigades of General Williams and Colonel Wharton, on the other side, I continued the pursuit of the enemy, with occasional skirmishing, to the vicinity of Charleston, which I reached on the afternoon of the 13th instant, the route of retreat being marked with burned and abandoned property. At Charleston the enemy again offered a most determined resistance until the brigades of General Williams and Colonel Wharton, reaching a commanding position on the opposite bank of the river, poured a destructive artillery fire into his right, while Colonel McCausland, then in command of the First Brigade, on account of the sickness of General Echols, covered and assisted by Chapman's battery, placed on a commanding hill on the right, and which kept up a destructive fire on the enemy, pushed into the burning town and drove the enemy below the Elk River. The enemy destroyed the suspension bridge across the Elk [River] behind him, and, planting batteries upon the opposite shore, held the position until nightfall, when he again resumed his flight, which he has since rapidly continued, by the way of Jackson Court-House and Ravenswood, into the State of Ohio, followed, however, by enough of my disposable cavalry to harass his retreat and capture much valuable property. The march of near 150 miles and the detailing of forces to guard captured stores in the rear caused such abatement and exhaustion of my command as compelled me to halt at Charleston. This place, too, being the point of departure of many lateral roads, in any event is necessary to be held.

In the various engagements and skirmishes with the enemy up to this time, my loss in killed and wounded is about 80 men, while that of the enemy, from reliable information, cannot be less than 1,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. At least \$1,000,000 worth of stores were captured, including many Federal flags, two pieces of artillery, besides several millions of dollars' worth of stores which were destroyed by the enemy in his flight.

To Generals Williams and Echols and to Colonels Wharton and McCausland, commanding brigades, I take pleasure in according the praise which they deserve for their efficient services and cordial execution of my commands.

To each of the several officers commanding regiments, battalions, and batteries, great credit is due for their gallantry and promptness. Major King, chief of artillery; Captain [Lawrence S.] Marye, of the ordnance; Captains Poor and [John M.] Robinson of the engineers, for services in their respective spheres, and Captain [R.] Laidley, of the Twenty-second Virginia Regiment, wounded while gallantly fighting at Fayetteville, and Lieutenant [T. G.] Jarrell, of the Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment, for coolness and courage evinced at Gauley; Captain [H. T.] Stanton, adjutant-general of General Williams, for entering the town of Charleston and taking down the garrison flag, and Captain [R. H.] Catlett and Mr. McFarland, of General Echols' staff; Lieut. Henry Robinson, artillery, and Dr. Hunter, chief medical director of my command, for his care of the sick and his energy in securing captured medical stores; Captains [T. H.] Stamps, [G. G.] Otey, [William M.] Lowry, and [G. B.] Chapman, and Lieutenant [David N.] Walker, of the artillery, all deserve especial mention. Colonel Fitzhugh, chief of staff; Captain [W. B.] Myers, of the adjutant-general's department, and Colonel Thorburn, inspector-general and chief of ordnance, and Captains [John D.] Myrick and [C. L.] Mathews, my aides-de-camp, merit the warmest approba-

tion for their activity and services on the march and in the field ; and to the soldiers of the army too much praise cannot be given for their uncomplaining endurance of the fatigues of the march, and their gallant bearing in the dangers of the fight. It will be a source of great pleasure to me to mention hereafter acts of individual gallantry and usefulness of officers and men (many of which occurred) as they are brought to my notice. I have the honor to inclose herein the reports of commanders of brigades and others, in which the meritorious conduct of commanders of regiments, battalions, and others is mentioned.

The precise number of my killed and wounded will appear from the valuable report of Dr. Hunter,* my chief medical director.

The rapidity of the pursuit of the enemy preserved the salt works and most of the town of Charleston from the flames, and rescued many worthy citizens from confinement, among the number Mr. Price, of Greenbrier County.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,
Major-General, Commanding.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 22, 1862.
(Received September 30, 1862.)

SIR : I have the honor to present, through Captain McFarland, of my staff, the flags captured in our recent conflicts at Fayetteville, Gauley, and Charleston. In the rapidity of our march, the collection of trophies has been imperfectly made, and many of this and other kinds which fell into our hands have been lost and destroyed.

The recent information derived from Northern sources confesses a demoralization and destruction of the invading army of the Kanawha Valley greater than I have hitherto represented.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

No. 5.

Report of Col. C. E. Thorburn, C. S. Army, Chief of Ordnance.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 17, 1862.

In compliance with your order, the following report is respectfully submitted :

Cannon ammunition expended in the battles of Fayette, Cotton Mountain, Charleston, and pursuing the enemy : 6-pound shell, 6-pound shot, 12-pound shell, 3-inch rifled shell, musket, rifle.

On the evening of the 10th, in obedience to your order, the enemy's position was reconnoitered to the west and north. A good point was selected 500 yards from the commanding fort, where a battery would

* See p. 1081.

have soon silenced his fire, while to the north the work was approached to within 200 yards, and the ground over which our storming party was to pass in attacking was carefully noted. These positions were described to Brigadier-General Echols, who was ordered to occupy the ground, but the enemy fleeing during the night gave us possession of his works, which were found to be quite formidable. The arms and ammunition left were collected, but I am unable to give you a report of the number and quantity. The agent left to collect them has not yet reported.

Retreating from Fayette, the enemy made a stand on Cotton Hill, holding the column of General Williams in check. The brigades of Colonel Wharton and General Echols being ordered to flank him to the left, he discovered the movement and again retreated, blocking up the road. The next stand was made at Montgomery's Ferry, from which position he was driven by our artillery and sharpshooters, burning a large quantity of his stores and leaving many quartermaster's and commissary stores in our possession. At Camp Piatt the enemy left one 6-pounder and several boxes of rifled cannon ammunition.

On the 13th we again came up with the enemy, and about a mile from Charleston commenced skirmishing with him on the right bank. The brigade of General Williams having taken position on the left bank, his artillery opened, when our advance, under Lieut. Col. Clarence Derrick [Twenty-third Virginia Battalion], pushed the enemy into the town. The enemy had expressed a determination to burn Charleston, and, finding himself beaten, set fire to the town in several places, but so hotly was he pushed that his attempt failed, though several store-houses and dwellings contiguous thereto were destroyed. Several of the store-houses were saved. The bridge being destroyed, and having no boats to cross Elk River, it became impossible to bring the retreating foe to close quarter. Our cannon, planted on south side of the river, could only annoy him while retreating.

I desire to call your attention particularly to the efficiency displayed by Captain Chapman's artillery. A 3-inch rifle gun of his battery, though breaking an axle, was most admirably worked, and did most efficient service.

Very respectfully,

C. E. THORBURN,

Colonel and late Chief of Ordnance.

Maj. Gen. W. W. LORING,

Commanding General.

No. 6.

Report of Maj. J. Floyd King, C. S. Army, Chief of Artillery.

HDQRS. ART. CORPS, ARMY OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
September 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit to the brigadier-general commanding the following report of the part the artillery enacted in the battle of Fayetteville and on the march to and at the battle of Charleston, commencing on the 10th and ending on the 13th instant:

On nearing Fayetteville a section of Captain Otey's battery was thrown to the front with General Williams' brigade. The body of the artillery brought up the rear of the infantry. A brisk skirmish ensued,

the enemy falling back. Arriving in sight of the enemy's works, it was decided to bombard them. Our infantry having driven the enemy's skirmishers in, the artillery was conducted to an eminence within 500 yards of his first fort. Here Captains Otey's and Stamps' batteries were engaged. It was soon determined to advance our artillery to an eminence nearer the enemy's works. It could not be done without crossing a hill under a heavy fire from the enemy of canister, grape, and musketry. Under the direction of Brigadier-General Williams, the enemy was driven from the houses and ravine situated between us and the fort. General Williams, at the head of a battalion of infantry and Captains Otey's and Stamps' batteries, charged over the hill across the ravine and occupied the desired position within a short distance of the enemy's works. Here the fire became fierce. Captain Chapman's 24-pounder, commanded by the captain in person, and Captain Lowry's battery were brought up. The action continued with constancy and energy until night, it having opened at 2 p. m.

The courage and gallantry displayed by the officers and men on this occasion renders it unjust almost to make any distinction, but the commanding courage of Lieutenant Walker, of the Otey battery, and the bravery and efficiency displayed by Captain Stamps in action, were most cheering.

To Captains Lowry, Otey, and Chapman the command is indebted for great encouragement.

To Captain Stanton, chief of General Williams' staff, the thanks of this corps are due for his volunteer services in the command of one of Captain Otey's pieces, which had almost all of its cannoneers killed or wounded, and, from a deficiency in the number of commissioned officers present, was left without a commander. Captain Stanton served the piece during several hours of severe firing.

The presence and efficient services of Surgeon [Basil C.] Duke on the field attracted much attention. Notwithstanding the remonstrance of officers, he persistently remained, attending to the wounded, though a ball through his coat and a wounded soldier killed in his arms by a shell admonished him of his exposed situation.

To Captains Myrick and Marye, of the commanding general's staff, the artillery is also indebted for gallant services.

On the morning of the 11th instant, the enemy having abandoned his works and retreated during the night, Brigadier-General Williams, at the head of his brigade, led in pursuit of him. A section of Captain Otey's battery, under Lieutenant Norvell, was kept to the front, and, under General Williams' personal supervision, was often, with our skirmishers, engaged with the enemy's rear guard. Across Cotton Hill and Gauley, and down the left bank of the Kanawha, General Williams pressed, keeping up an almost continual artillery duel with the enemy, and rested at night on the ground from which a few moments before his pickets had been driven.

At Gauley, from a misapprehension of which side of the river the major-general commanding intended to move down in person, the chief of artillery followed the left bank, with Captain Bryan's company, a part of Captain Stamps', and a section of Captain Otey's battery, supported by General Williams' and Colonel Wharton's brigades. A 5-pounder of Stamps' and a 12-pounder howitzer of Otey's battery were left at Gauley, by order of the major-general commanding, to report to the commander of the post. Captains Chapman's and Lowry's and a section of Otey's battery followed Brigadier-General Echols' brigade on the right bank of the river. Nothing of importance transpired on the march of the 12th.

On the 13th the pursuit was resumed, and at Charleston the enemy was overtaken. He occupied the left bank of the Kanawha with a strong force of sharpshooters and artillery, which commanded either side of the river. To the rear of the town, across Elk River, his lines were drawn up behind his wagons, his right resting near the Kanawha, and his artillery in front of his wagons. The chief of artillery having been sent across the left bank of the Kanawha, by the major-general commanding, with orders to Brigadier-General Williams, can make no report of the part the batteries enacted on the right bank of the river. On joining General Williams, the artillery was ordered to the front, the general accompanying in person. The enemy's sharpshooters were driven across the river and his artillery from the town. From the hills on the left bank of the Kanawha, below the mouth of Elk River, Captains Otey's, Bryan's, and Stamps' batteries commanded the entire right flank of the enemy's lines. A bombardment at once ensued, which, with the assistance of the force on the right bank of the Kanawha, caused the enemy to abandon his situation in haste, driving off the most of his wagons, but leaving many, and quantities of camp and garrison equipage, several of his regiments having left their blankets and knapsacks on the line they were drawn up to fight on. The destruction of an artillery carriage, and also the destruction of the apparatus of a mountain howitzer of the enemy, besides killing many of his horses, attests the precision with which our artillerists managed their guns.

At the battle of Charleston there were 4 artillerists wounded on the left bank of the Kanawha. At night the firing ceased, the enemy having retreated.

The conduct of the officers and men of the artillery on this occasion confirmed the confidence their commanders had already felt could be reposed in them.

Throughout the march, the spirited and energetic manner in which Brigadier-General Williams directed the artillery inspired it with the highest confidence and courage.

To the surgeon's report I refer you for the casualties in the artillery corps. In addition to men, it lost upward of 20 horses killed.

To the general commanding the army the artillery corps is grateful for the skill of his general directions and the trusts he reposed in it.

Very respectfully,

J. FLOYD KING,

Major and Chief of Artillery, Department of West Virginia.

Captain STANTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 7.

Report of Capt. R. L. Poor, C. S. Army, Chief Engineer.

HQRS. DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 17, 1862.

GENERAL: In compliance with Orders No. —, issued from these headquarters, of this date, I have the honor to report as follows the operations of the Engineer Corps during the several conflicts therein mentioned:

During the engagement at Fayetteville, General Williams requiring an increase of staff, Captain Robinson and self were detached from yours and ordered to report to him. At the same moment Captain Myers, assistant adjutant-general, communicated your desire to have the enemy's posi-

tion reconnoitered. Accordingly, after having reported to General Williams, left Captain Robinson to act as aide-de-camp, and pushed forward to reconnoiter. Upon reaching the advanced corps (Forty-Fifth Regiment), found it impracticable to advance farther (the enemy's sharpshooters being in sight), and bore off to the left, where, upon debouching from the woods, caught sight of the enemy's works, distant about 100 yards. The irregular trace of the work (not being able to penetrate to the rear of it) deluded me into reporting it a square redoubt. Upon inspection next day, found the works to consist, first, of an irregular work of three faces, each of 40 yards' development, 8 feet in command, and 7 in relief; barbettes in each salient, covering well the ground in front; located on admirably selected position, enfilading the approach from Raleigh, and commanding the surrounding open plains. Second, a similar work, constructed as a musketry defense, flanked by felled timber, rifle-pits. Third, a formidable, well-constructed, and inclosed located lunette, connecting, by covert way, with flanking redan on commanding ground, barbettes in each salient, commanding each of the advance works, with development sufficient for a regiment.

Being directed at night, after the first day's engagement, to erect a breaching battery, made reconnaissance for same, and selected what I conceived to be an advantageous position commanding the work, and being in the prolongation of the capital line to the right salient, and only 130 yards distant. At 10 p. m. broke ground, and by 2 a. m. had the battery sufficiently complete in its parts to occupy with two siege guns, namely, a 24-pounder howitzer and 12-pounder rifle gun, ready at a moment's notice to open upon the enemy's work, when the force covering my working party was advanced. With a yell and volley, they scaled the parapet to find the enemy gone. With General Williams and command, started in active pursuit; hence cannot present you with a detailed plan of the enemy's position and works.

At Cotton Hill and Gauley had the honor of acting on Brigadier-[General] Williams' staff, and this place on Colonel McCausland's; hence, pertaining to my department, have nothing further to report than the erection of a pontoon bridge over the Elk River. The officers associated with me will need no further mention than to say that Captain Robinson ably assisted and seconded me—being under your personal supervision, his merits are known; that Lieutenant Hart displayed general intelligence, efficiency, and meritorious conduct. Taking great pleasure in testifying to his merit, respectfully request for him a favorable mention in your report.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. L. POOR,

Captain and Chief Engineer of Department.

Maj. Gen. W. W. LORING,

Commanding Army of Western Virginia.

No. 8.

Report of Surg. John A. Hunter, C. S. Army, Medical Director.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 25, 1862.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,

Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. :

SIR: I have the honor herein to transmit the report of Dr. John A.

Hunter, the medical director of this army, containing a list of casualties of this army, from the attack on Fayette Court-House to the closing action at Charleston and Elk River, by which it will be seen how small our loss was compared with the enemy's. I ask again to commend the energy, skill, and gallantry of Dr. Hunter and the efficiency of his medical corps, who have been, since their connection with this army, equal to every emergency.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,
Major-General, Commanding.

[Inclosures.]

CONFEDERATE STATES HOSPITAL,
Charleston, W. Va., September 15, 1862.

SIR: It is with great pleasure that I report to you the sanitary condition of your army. After a toilsome march over mountain range and valley, a distance of 169 miles, we have no cases of essential fever, developed either in camp or hospital, and but one or two cases of rubecula and parotitis, occurring sporadically, during this march. We fought the Federal forces first at Fayetteville with the following casualties: 16 men killed upon the field (1 lieutenant and 1 corporal in that number), and 32 wounded, 4 of this number, I may say, mortally. One man killed in the skirmish at Cotton Hill and 3 wounded, 1 of this number mortally. No one hurt at Montgomery's Ferry, except from the accidental discharge of a gun while crossing the river, wounding 1 man. Six killed at Charleston and 8 slightly wounded, making in all 23 killed and 43 wounded.

I may here call your attention to the conduct of the medical staff, whose duties required their presence with their commands, placing them in most exposed positions and liable to casualties in common with the soldiers. Their conduct was marked by great gallantry and most indefatigable energy in the discharge of their professional duty.

It is but due to the corps that I should specially call your attention to the conduct of Surgeon [S. C.] Gleaves, Assistant Surgeon [C. N.] Austin, and particularly to the daring exploits of Surg. Joseph [F.] Watkins at the ferry, swimming the river and saving the ferry-boat, capturing also one stand of colors.

The enemy's loss at Fayetteville, in killed outright, was 65 that we know of; their wounded could not be correctly ascertained, but it is known that three barge-boats were shipped from Montgomery's Ferry and passed Charleston *en route* for the Ohio, and that four wagons, filled either with wounded or killed, were burned along the road from Fayetteville to this place, leaving exposed, in the most inhuman manner, portions of partially consumed bodies on the road. We could not ascertain the number killed and wounded in the different combats on the road. Judging from the most correct information, they could not have been less than 180 wounded in that action. Four were left dead in Charleston and 5 wounded. Their loss west of Elk River, opposite Charleston, where they met with heavy loss, could not be ascertained, as the bridge across the river was destroyed to prevent our crossing, thereby enabling them to carry off their dead and wounded. The capture of hospital and medical stores cannot fall short of \$20,000.

Permit me, in conclusion, to congratulate you upon the success of your arms and the health and working condition of your army.

Subjoined you will find the names* of the killed and wounded at Fayette, Cotton Hill, Montgomery's Ferry, and Charleston.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. A. HUNTER,

Surg., C. S. Army, Medical Director Dept. S. W. Va.

Maj. Gen. W. W. LORING.

Supplementary return of casualties in the Army of the Kanawha, September 6-16, 1862.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
22d Virginia, Col. Geo. S. Patton		1	1	8	10
36th Virginia, Col. John McCausland	1		2	18	21
45th Virginia, Col. William H. Browne	1	1		14	16
50th Virginia		1		1	2
51st Virginia, Lieut. Col. A. Forsberg		3		16	19
63d Virginia, Col. J. J. McMahon		2		3	5
23d Virginia Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick		2		2	4
26th Virginia Battalion, Maj. A. M. Davis, 45th Virginia, commanding		2		8	10
30th Virginia Battalion		1			1
Otey's (Virginia) battery		3		11	14
Stamps' (Virginia) battery				5	5
Total	2	16	3	86	107

[JNO. A. HUNTER,

Surg., C. S. Army, Medical Director Dept. S. W. Va.]

P. S.—I may here say that the numbers reported as wounded, namely, 43, included those whose wounds prevented them from moving on with the army. In this supplemental report I have included all those who were slightly wounded either by ball or accidents, but whose injuries did not prevent their continuance with their commands and in line of duty.

[J. A. H.]

No. 9.

Report of Brig. Gen. John S. Williams, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,

September 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: On the morning of the 10th instant, agreeably to Major-General Loring's order, I detached the Twenty-second Virginia Regiment (Colonel Patton), and directed him to report to Colonel Wharton, commanding Third Brigade. Wharton left the turnpike and took a mountain path to the left, about 6 miles from Fayette Court-House, for the purpose of attacking the enemy in the rear. It was agreed between him and myself that the march of my brigade should be retarded one hour, so that he might turn the enemy's position and the attack be made

*Nominal list omitted. See supplementary return, following.

simultaneously front and rear. My brigade proceeded by the turnpike road, and, when within 3 miles of the Court-House, my front guard, under Captain [E. S.] Read [Twenty-sixth Virginia Battalion], was attacked by three companies of infantry. Captain Read engaged them with spirit. It was now discovered that the enemy held possession of the thickly-set woodland on both sides of the road. I ordered Major Davis, with Edgar's battalion, to skirmish on the right, and companies of the Forty-fifth Virginia to the left, Lieutenant-Colonel [E. H.] Harman commanding. After a short and sharp resistance, the enemy was driven from the woods toward a square redoubt in the open field which commanded the road. By this time the crash of Wharton's rifles was distinctly heard. Two hills, running at right angles to the road, lay between us and the enemy's position. A dense forest extended from my position to that of Colonel Wharton, passing within 200 yards of the enemy's redoubt. I moved two 12-pounder howitzers and two rifled pieces to the top of the first hill, and the Forty-fifth and Thirty-sixth Virginia under cover of the woodland along the right flank of the enemy's position. Edgar's battalion was placed in rear of the batteries. Our batteries opened upon the enemy, and were replied to by a storm of shell and grape, and Minie-balls from sharpshooters, who held the ravine and the opposite hill. The artillery was parts of Otey's, Stamps', and Chapman's batteries. Our loss here was considerable in men and horses; the heaviest in Otey's battery. The fortification was revetted with sod, and did not crumble much, although one shell did terrible work within. The distance here was 500 or 600 yards, too great for very effective firing, and I determined to move to the next hill. Edgar's battalion, under Major [A. M.] Davis [Forty-fifth Virginia], cleared the front of sharpshooters and drove them in gallant style, and the whole of the artillery—Otey's, Stamps', Chapman's, Bryan's, and Lowry's batteries—dashed in magnificent style over the ridge, down the slope and up to the top of the next hill, where they unlimbered within 300 yards of the enemy's fort, and opened a terrible cannonade upon it. Colonel Browne led the Forty-fifth along the woodland, driving the enemy before him, and McCausland with the Thirty-sixth in gallant style occupied a house and some stumps of trees, from which the enemy had greatly annoyed us. We lost several gallant officers and a number of brave men in these movements. Here I discovered that the enemy's position was much stronger than was at first supposed. Besides the square redoubt in front, there was one to the left and rear of the court-house, which was at that moment engaged by Colonel Wharton, and to the right and rear another strong fortress upon a high hill, which commanded both the other forts. These facts I communicated to you by Captain Marye, with the opinion that my force could take the first redoubt by assault, but the sacrifice of life would be great, and that it could not be held unless the fort on the hill was first taken. Night fell upon us, and the wearied men slept upon their arms within a stone's throw of the enemy.

Just before day-break on the 11th, the noise like the marching of men was heard in the direction of the enemy's works, which indicated that they were evacuating. This was confirmed by the opinion of Colonel Wharton, who communicated with me in person, whereupon I sent Captain [William E.] Fife (Thirty-sixth Virginia) with his company to approach the position of the enemy and ascertain whether the noise proceeded from the retirement from the front or from the arrival of reinforcements, which we had reason to apprehend they were expecting. The captain replied by a shout from the walls that the enemy had gone. In twenty minutes the whole brigade was in hot pursuit. The road was

strewn with guns, knapsacks, blankets, overcoats, wagons, hospital and sutlers' stores, horses, and men. They made a fruitless effort to burn the town, but the flames were extinguished and a sufficient guard placed over the stores and property by Captain Stanton. At the foot of Cotton Hill we came upon the enemy's rear, and our march was greatly obstructed by trees which he had felled across the road. I here directed Colonel Wharton, with his brigade and Patton's regiment, to take a mountain path to the left and endeavor again to reach the enemy's rear. As men were brought forward, and two companies from the Twenty-second and one from the Forty-fifth Regiment, as skirmishers, under Major [R. A.] Bailey, who drove the enemy before them (while the pioneers under Lieutenant [W. T.] Hart cleared the road of obstructions), the column moved on, almost without halting, until near the top of the hill, where Major Bailey was met by a fresh regiment on its march to re-enforce Fayette. I ordered Colonel Browne, with the Forty-fifth, to sustain Major Bailey, and brought McCausland to the front. The enemy placed two howitzers in position on the hill, and opened upon us with grape and canister, but our loss was not great. Here he made stout resistance, but, by the determined courage of Browne and Bailey, was driven from his position and retreated double-quick down to Montgomery's Ferry. McCausland, with the Thirty-sixth, kept close upon him. Captain [Lieutenant] Jarrell, at the head of the skirmishers, displayed great courage and energy. The entire brigade went down the hill with a shout and at double-quick time. I had previously ordered a 12-pounder howitzer to the front for the purpose of destroying the enemy as he crossed the river. Lieutenant Norvell brought down the piece, at a full gallop, and planted it on the river bank. The enemy set fire to his magazines and attempted to destroy all his commissary stores. By this time half his force had crossed the river under cover of four guns planted on the opposite bank; the rest retreated down the south bank. Lieutenant Norvell, by a dozen well-directed shots, silenced or drove away the enemy's four pieces. The ferry flats had been carried by the enemy to the opposite side and set on fire. I called out for half a dozen bold swimmers to swim the river with their hats on, extinguish the flames, and bring over the ferry-boats. Dr. Watkins, of the Thirty-Sixth Virginia; Lieutenant Samuels, of my staff; W. H. Harman, Forty-fifth Virginia; Allen Thompson, Forty-fifth Virginia, and six or eight others sprang into the river and boldly swam, under a shower of grape and canister. These brave men seized the burning boat, and, making fire buckets of their hats, extinguished the flames as they rowed it over. A Yankee lieutenant and 10 men here surrendered to Lieutenant Samuels. I ordered Colonel McCausland, with his own and Colonel Patton's regiment and two pieces of artillery, across the river, and, with the remainder of my brigade and Colonel Wharton's command, which was next to my own, moved after the enemy's column on the left bank. Several sharp skirmishes occurred during the day, and at nightfall we came upon them as they were preparing to encamp, drove them before us, and slept upon their ground at Buster's. Lieutenant-Colonel [J. Lyle] Clarke [Thirtieth Battalion Virginia Sharpshooters], of Colonel Wharton's brigade, in command of advanced skirmishers, drove the enemy from the cornfields. The pursuit had been so rapid that our supply wagons did not come up in time, and we procured supplies from the country people and renewed the pursuit early in the morning.

During the day the enemy on the opposite side of the river attempted to burn all the salt furnaces, but were prevented, by the rapidity of the pursuit and the well-directed shot of Otey's, Stamps', and Bryan's bat-

teries, which I kept next to the skirmishers, from destroying more than one. A large number of trees were felled across the road, and the bridges broken, but these impediments were rapidly removed by the energetic pioneers of Edgar's battalion, under Lieutenant Hart, of the engineer corps, Wharton's brigade. At night we came up with the enemy, captured his picket guard, drove him from his camp, and slept again upon the ground which he had selected for himself.

At day-break we resumed the pursuit, and found that his force had crossed the river before day at Camp Piatt. I brought all the artillery to the front, and kept up a galling fire upon his rear as he moved down the narrow plain on the opposite bank. As we approached Charleston I discovered masses of infantry crossing the river to the south side for the purpose of checking our advance. I immediately sent Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke with his battalion of sharpshooters, supported by the Forty-fifth Virginia Regiment, who gallantly drove the enemy back, some fleeing down the river, others recrossing it. The enemy by this time had nearly completed the evacuation of Charleston, and were preparing to give us battle on the opposite bank of Elk River, behind their wagons and hastily thrown-up breastworks. A height on the south bank of the Kanawha, just below the bank of Elk River, overlooked and commanded the enemy's entire position, but his artillery commanded the road to this height, and his sharpshooters lined the opposite bank of the Kanawha. I sent Clarke's battalion, with some companies of the Forty-fifth, to engage these sharpshooters, while the artillery, under Major King, dashed by at full gallop, and, with but small loss, obtained the desired height, and from six pieces opened upon the enemy's right flank a most destructive fire. A few effective rounds drove the enemy from his position, and his regiments and wagons began a disorderly retreat, and nothing was left but his artillery to contest the ground. At this moment the suspension bridge across Elk River fell. I now sent Captain Marge with the information which my position enabled me to gain, suggesting that the bridge had been destroyed, but that Elk River could be crossed on flat-boats and the enemy's cannon taken. You at once put me in command of four regiments on the north bank of the Kanawha, with instructions to cross Elk River and take the enemy's batteries. This was rendered unnecessary by the enemy withdrawing his pieces and following his retreating column with the whole of his artillery.

Colonel Wharton, while associated with me, behaved with his accustomed coolness and courage. Major King managed his artillery with great ability, and displayed that calm courage so necessary to an artillery officer. Captain Stanton, my adjutant-general, rendered important service, and accomplished a feat of gallantry which should be remembered. While the enemy still occupied one-half of Charleston, accompanied by Lieutenant Hackler, of the Forty-fifth, and 3 men of the same regiment, [he] crossed the river in a skiff, under a heavy fire, hauled down the garrison flag of the enemy, and returned, unhurt, with the trophy. At Fayette Court-House he took command of a piece of artillery, the gunner of which had been killed and 3 drivers wounded, and managed the piece, under a terrible fire, with great effectiveness. Private Harper and the remaining members of this piece behaved nobly. Captain [William M.] Peyton, my aide-de-camp, deserves mention for his conspicuous gallantry and fearless horsemanship through all the heat of battle. Col. John Morris, volunteer aide, rendered important service. Captains Myers and Buckner were prompt in carrying orders. Dr. Duke displayed the qualities of both surgeon and soldier. Maj. Peter Otey,

of Clarke's battalion, was conspicuous on the last two days of pursuit in leading the skirmishers. Captain Marye, of the ordnance department, was active, brave, and intelligent. I found his perception quick, his judgment good, and his courage of the highest order; his suggestions were useful to me. Captains Robinson and Poor, engineer officers, aided me efficiently at Fayette Court-House. The artillery officers and men all behaved with coolness and courage. Captain Stamps and Lieutenant Walker were particularly distinguished.

This hurried account embraces all that now occurs to me worth mentioning of the four days' march and fighting from Fayette Court-House to Charleston.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JNO. S. WILLIAMS,

Brigadier-General, &c.

Capt. WILLIAM B. MYERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, &c.

No. 10.

Report of Col. William H. Browne, Forty-fifth Virginia Infantry.

CAMP BLAN, NEAR CHARLESTON, W. VA.,

September 17, 1862.

SIR: You requested that I should give you a statement of the part which the Forty-fifth Regiment played in the three days' marching and fighting, commencing on September 10 and ending on the 12th.

In making the attack upon Fayetteville the Forty-fifth Regiment occupied the second place in the column of attack, Edgar's battalion, commanded by Major Davis, being at the head of the column. Advancing in this order to within perhaps 2 miles of Fayetteville, the advance guard of the battalion was fired into by a picket of the enemy. By your order, the battalion was deployed as skirmishers, on the right of the road, and two companies of the Forty-fifth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Harman, on the left, and ordered to advance. The column was then ordered forward, under the protection of the skirmishers, who drove the enemy's skirmishers before them. Within half a mile of the enemy's fortifications his skirmishers made a stand in a dense laurel thicket. You then ordered up two pieces of Otey's battery. After a few rounds the skirmishers advanced again, driving the enemy before them. There were yet three small hills between us and the enemy's works, upon which the enemy was posted, and which were to be taken successively. I then moved, by your order, the Forty-fifth Virginia Regiment up the side of the first hill, which was in range of the enemy's guns, particularly the artillery. I here placed the right wing to hold and to divert the attention of the enemy, and while I moved the left wing by a flank movement through the woods to the next hill, I posted my left, then concealed, in sight of the enemy, with orders not to fire until I returned. I then brought up the right wing and posted them on the left and in advance of the right, under cover of the woods, when we opened upon the enemy and drove them from the house in front of the enemy's fortifications. Here the enemy threw grape and Minie-balls thick as hail around us. After some brisk fighting in this position, and when the enemy had been driven to his stronghold, I advanced my right obliquely to the left to a position in the woods to within about 100 yards of the enemy's fortifications.

Night coming on, we lay down to get a little rest. I was awakened by cheering at daylight in the morning. Some of my advance pickets had discovered that the enemy had fled during the night.

In taking the first hill, a gallant young officer (Columbus Beavers, second lieutenant Company A, Forty-fifth Virginia Regiment) was killed and several men wounded, not dangerously. The second hill was taken with a greater loss in wounded, and another gallant officer (Lieutenant [J. P.] Cox, Company C, Forty-fifth Virginia Regiment) killed.

My every movement was made by your orders, given me in person.

We pursued the retreating enemy to Cotton Hill, at which place you ordered one of my companies forward, under command of Major Bailey, who took with him also a company from the Twenty-second Regiment, as skirmishers. The Forty-fifth you ordered to follow them. Our skirmishers drove theirs back to the top of the mountain and discovered that the enemy were blockading the road and had sent a regiment back down the mountain to engage us. I flanked my regiment to the top of a ridge running perpendicular to the road and waited until they came in sight, when we opened upon them and drove them over the mountain, losing two of my brave boys. I engaged my regiment no more until I got to Charleston. There I occupied the hills on the south bank of the river and had some sharp fun dislodging the enemy's sharpshooters from the streets and the opposite banks of the river.

The officers and men of my regiment deserve praise. They marched without a murmur and fought gallantly. And to you, general, who led us to the conflict, we feel that we have done our duty. Your own noble daring had its influence in prompting us.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. BROWNE,

Colonel Forty-fifth Virginia Regiment.

General JOHN S. WILLIAMS.

No. 11.

Report of Maj. Alexander M. Davis, Forty-fifth Virginia Infantry, commanding Twenty-sixth Virginia Battalion.

CAMP WILLIAMS, W. VA.,

September 18, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following statement of the part acted by the battalion in the recent series of engagements, commencing at Fayetteville, on the 10th instant, and ending at Charleston, W. Va., on the 13th:

On the arrival of our forces within about 4 miles of Fayetteville, the command of Colonel Wharton, with the Twenty-second Virginia Regiment attached, having left the turnpike, taking a road upon our left leading to the enemy's rear, the battalion was thereby thrown in front. By your order, I threw forward a company, under command of Captain Read, as an advance guard, with instructions to drive in the enemy's pickets and await re-enforcements. When within about 3 miles of the enemy's position, Captain Read encountered a scouting party of three companies. He engaged them in gallant style, drove them back into an open field, where he discovered their superiority of numbers and withdrew his men to a shelter of woodland, and there remained until the arrival of re-enforcements. By your order, the battalion was then

deployed as skirmishers upon the right, and advanced as such until recalled by order. I then formed the battalion in the road, and advanced by the right flank in the direction of Fayetteville until again deployed as skirmishers upon the right, by your orders. I then advanced, skirmishing, until I came within about 300 yards of the enemy's works. Here I stationed my men under cover of the woods until I received your order, communicated by Captain Peyton, of your staff, requiring me to withdraw the battalion to my former position in the road, reform, and report to you on the second ridge in front of the enemy's position. This order I obeyed immediately upon its reception. You then ordered me to place the battalion in position on the second hill, and prepare for a charge to take possession of the first hill in front of the enemy's first redoubt, and there remain as a support for the artillery. This order was obeyed, and the charge made in open ground under your immediate observation, and you are the best judge of the manner in which it was executed. The conduct of Capt. E. S. Read in this charge and his gallantry throughout the day deserves special mention and commendation.

Our last position placed us within convenient range of the enemy's guns, both large and small, and there we remained until nightfall, exposed to a galling fire of shell, shot, and Minie-ball. I then withdrew, by your order, to the foot of the hill in our rear, and ordered my men to rest upon their arms until morning.

In this day's engagement I lost 2 brave soldiers—William F. Level and Robert S. Paxton, of Company B—killed on the field, and 8 wounded, 1 mortally. This loss I sustained in my charge and subsequent position on the hill.

About one hour before day, we were aroused by the firing of our skirmishers, who had discovered the evacuation of the forts by the enemy and their retreat. When the firing commenced, I formed the battalion and moved, by your order, in immediate pursuit, and was in supporting distance of the Forty-fifth Virginia Regiment during their engagement upon Cotton Hill, though not actually engaged. That night we encamped upon the banks of the Great Kanawha.

The pursuit was resumed early on the morning of the 12th, and, by your order, my command took the lead. I then forwarded all the long-range guns of the battalion as an advance, and these were afterward strengthened by a company of sharpshooters from the Fifty-first Regiment, under command of Captain [D. P.] Graham. During this day's pursuit, my command performed the arduous task of removing the blockades of the enemy. About 6 o'clock in the evening our advance captured two of the enemy's pickets, and I encamped the battalion on the ground they had occupied.

In the next day's march the Forty-fifth Virginia Regiment was in advance, and the battalion next in pursuit.

During the engagement at Charleston the battalion was held as a support to the artillery upon the south bank of the Kanawha, but was not actively engaged.

The battalion acted well its part upon the march and in the field, but to you, general, I accord the praise, for your undaunted courage and untiring energy inspired not only the battalion but the whole command with an enthusiasm irresistible.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

A. M. DAVIS,
Major, Commanding Battalion.

Brig. Gen. JOHN S. WILLIAMS,
Commanding Second Brigade, Army of Western Virginia.

No. 12.

Report of Col. G. C. Wharton, Fifty-first Virginia Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.

HQRS. THIRD BRIG., ARMY OF SOUTHWESTERN VA.,
Camp near Charleston, W. Va., September 17, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the participation of the Third Brigade in the action at Fayetteville, on the 10th instant, and the skirmishes between that village and Charleston:

On the morning of the 10th, within $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Fayetteville, I was ordered by Major-General Loring to proceed with the Twenty-second Regiment, Colonel Patton; the Fifty-first Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel [August] Forsberg, and Clarke's battalion of sharpshooters, Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, by a road to the left, in order to attack the enemy in rear, while the main body should proceed directly along the turnpike and attack him in front. At 11.15 o'clock we left the turnpike under the direction of a guide, who was said to be thoroughly acquainted with the country. The anxiety of our guide to take us to the rear of the enemy, to make the surprise complete, caused him to take the column by a more circuitous route (one much longer and much more difficult to march over than had been represented), which delayed our making the enemy's rear until about 2.15 o'clock. When we reached the rear, the enemy's batteries were not in the position which had been described. We found in front two batteries well constructed, and so arranged as to command, by a cross-fire, the cleared space (about 1,000 yards) between these batteries and the wood on the ridge where we took position. Through this cleared space ran the turnpike from Fayetteville to Gauley Bridge. Between the ridge on which we were posted and the batteries, the ground was very rough, being broken by steep hill slopes, ravines, thick underbrush, and fallen timber, making a very good abatis. A hasty reconnaissance demonstrated the batteries could not be successfully attacked from our position unless the fire of the battery could be diverted to the column attacking in front, and, in addition, the excessive heat of the day, and the long, fatiguing march by the circuitous route along which we had been led by our guide (we having crossed over five mountains or high hills, 2 miles of which was so rough, and the brush and undergrowth so dense that we could only march in single file), that our force was scattered and very much exhausted. Under these circumstances, upon consultation with some of the officers, we determined to take and hold such position as commanded the turnpike leading from Fayetteville to Montgomery's Ferry, to prevent the passing of his trains, and, if possible, cut off his retreat. To effect this, Major [S. M.] Dickey, with three companies of the Fifty-first Regiment, was directed to take position on a spur extending out and commanding the turnpike on our extreme left, and about half a mile in rear of the batteries. Immediately on his right, Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, with a portion of his sharpshooters, was placed to prevent Major Dickey's being flanked. Colonel Patton, with a portion of the Twenty-second Regiment, was thrown farther to the right to occupy another spur, commanding, with large [long]-range guns, another part of the turnpike, and Major Bailey, of the Twenty-second, was sent, with a detachment, on our extreme right and nearer the batteries; the remainder of the force, as they came up, was held in reserve to support any part of our line that might be attacked, and also to be ready to charge the batteries, if an opportunity should

arise. While our forces were getting into position, the entire line was vigorously attacked by the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters. At the same time the batteries poured in a well-directed fire of shell and grape.

Our officers behaved with great energy and gallantry in hurrying the men to the positions respectively assigned, and in repelling the attacks of the enemy. Three different attempts were made by the enemy to dislodge us and drive us from our positions, each time with defeat and heavy loss to them. Late in the evening, as our ammunition was nearly exhausted, the men were ordered only to fire should the enemy advance. Major Bailey made three attempts to drive the enemy from the battery on our right, and succeeded, but could not hold the position, as both the battery and the space between our position and the battery were thoroughly commanded by the battery opposite our center.

About dark, our scouts reported that re-enforcements were approaching from the direction of Gauley Bridge, and, soon after, information was brought from our left that both infantry and cavalry were seen on the turnpike in the same direction. As soon as ammunition was brought up, our forces were thrown farther to the front and nearer the road, when the firing was renewed, the enemy making two very vigorous efforts to drive us back. During these attacks, they succeeded in running by with a small body of cavalry and two or three pieces of artillery and some wagons. Their infantry, having been driven back, retired beyond the range of our guns, and made their escape under cover of the woodland and hills on the opposite side of the turnpike.

For the details of this engagement, I respectfully refer you to the reports* of Colonel Patton and Lieutenant-Colonels Forsberg and Clarke.

It was equally my duty and pleasure to bear testimony to the gallantry, cool bravery, and soldierly bearing of the above-named officers during the day and night. I also, with equal pleasure, call the attention of the general commanding to the chivalric bearing and efficiency of Majors Bailey, Dickey, and Otey. All the officers and men behaved with commendable coolness and bravery.

On the morning of the 11th, the Third Brigade joined in the pursuit of the retreating enemy, crossed Cotton Hill by the old road, and united with the Second Brigade at Montgomery's Ferry, with which brigade it co-operated until the enemy were driven from Charleston.

I respectfully refer you to the surgeon's reports* for the list of casualties.

In the hurry of pursuit it was impossible to ascertain with accuracy the loss of the enemy. Prisoners taken represent that one of the regiments which engaged this brigade at Fayetteville lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners 150. Many more were killed and captured in the pursuit.

I desire particularly to acknowledge my indebtedness to Lieutenant Hart, of the engineers, and Mr. C. A. DeRussy, acting assistant adjutant-general, for the energy and promptitude with which the duties assigned them were discharged.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

G. C. WHARTON,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.

Capt. WILLIAM B. MYERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

* Not found.

No. 13.

Report of Col. John McCausland, Thirty-sixth Virginia Infantry, commanding Fourth Brigade.

HDQRS. FOURTH BRIGADE, ARMY OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., September 18, 1862.

In obedience to instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of the troops under my command at the battle of Charleston, W. Va.:

While the troops were encamped at Dickerson's farm, I was directed by General Loring to take command of General Echols' brigade (he being sick), the Thirty-sixth and Twenty-second Regiments, Otey's and Lowry's batteries, and the cavalry under Major Salyer. I at once ordered Major Salyer to pursue the enemy, and I found him near Charleston when I arrived. We passed Camp Piatt, the Salines, Maulden, and other places, but found no enemy. Upon my arrival at a point near Charleston, I discovered the enemy's skirmishers posted behind fences and behind a barricade they had erected near the river. I at once deployed Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick's battalion as skirmishers, and advanced them so that the left would sweep through the town and the right rest upon the hills beyond. I supported the right with Colonel [J. J.] McMahon's regiment, the center with Colonel Rodgers' [Poage's] regiment, and the left with Colonel Patton's. The reserve consisted of the Thirty-sixth Regiment, Lowry's battery, a section of Otey's, and the cavalry. It was stationed in the road near the river. The whole line advanced, with occasional skirmishing, to the banks of the Elk River, and there found the enemy posted upon the opposite bank, with all communication with the opposite bank cut off. They had destroyed the bridge. I at once determined to concentrate the troops on the extreme right flank and attempt to cross at a ford about 2 miles above town. We moved in that direction under cover of our artillery, which was posted on a hill commanding the enemy's position and also other parts of the field. Upon the arrival at the ford, it was found impossible to cross with infantry and artillery. I ordered the cavalry to cross and move down the opposite shore, and then moved toward our extreme left, where we collected boats and were ready, when nightfall put an end to the conflict. Strong pickets and support for the batteries were left, and the troops sent back to the wagons to get rations, &c., and sleep.

The next day we crossed and came to their camp. General Echols was kind enough to send me his staff. Captain Catlett rendered me great aid. Captains Poor, St. Clair, and Roche assisted me and were prompt in communicating my orders. The officers and men acted well.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN MCCAUSLAND,
Colonel.

Col. H. FITZHUGH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SEPTEMBER 16, 1862.—Reconnaissance toward Thoroughfare Gap and Aldie, Va.

Report of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,
Seminary, Va., September 19, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Second Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Brinton, proceeded, under my instructions, in pursuance of orders from Major-General Heintzelman, on a reconnaissance to within 2 miles of Thoroughfare Gap and 3 miles of Aldie. They captured some 32 prisoners, 4 wagons, and a number of horses, which have been brought in. They came within a few miles of General Ewell, who was on his way to Richmond, and captured 3 of his body guard.

The enemy has withdrawn the force from Bristoe Station, and has placed it at Gainesville. A guide, reporting himself as being in the secret service of Generals Banks and Geary, reports 900 wagons at Ashby's Gap, guarded by two regiments of cavalry (800), and no force this side. I sent the guide to General Banks' headquarters with the prisoners. I should like him returned to me, if he is a trusty guide.

I sent to-day a cavalry force to Annandale, with instructions to take the road from that place to Accotink Village, thence to the Occoquon Ferry, with instructions to find out the haunts of a squadron of rebel cavalry, said to be foraging and scouting on the other side.

I sent two officers and 50 men, with a wagon, loaded with shovels and picks, to the Bull Run battle-field, to bury the dead. It seems that the One hundred and thirty-ninth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, detailed for that duty, contented themselves with throwing a few clods of dirt over the dead, leaving uncovered hands and feet. The slight rains since have uncovered them.

The detail sent with flag of truce was unarmed.

Yours, respectfully,

D. B. BIRNEY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieutenant-Colonel McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SEPTEMBER 16-19, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Upton's Hill to Leesburg, Va., and skirmish.

Report of Col. J. Mansfield Davies, Second New York Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS BAYARD'S CAVALRY,
Upton's Hill, Va., September 19, 1862.

I have the honor to report the return of the reconnaissance sent by me to the Bull Run Mountains.

It consisted of ten companies of cavalry (six of the Second New York, two of the Ninth Pennsylvania, two of the First New Jersey) and a section of Captain Buell's artillery. They left Upton's Hill, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kilpatrick, Second New York Cavalry, at 2 p. m., 16th instant; arrived at Dranesville same night. My instructions were for them to leave about midnight for Aldie, or some gap

toward Leesburg. Intelligence received at Dranesville raised the possibility of a considerable force there, and Colonel Kilpatrick deemed it best to advance on Leesburg with caution, and ascertain their force. At Goose Creek he found the bridge away and crossing difficult. The enemy's pickets were found at this point. He advanced on Leesburg, drove their cavalry (numbering almost 200) into the town, and found it occupied by about 500 infantry, including convalescents and armed citizens. A few shells, fired over the town, caused these to withdraw to a wooded hill, beyond the town. Our forces found several hundred muskets and rifles, which they destroyed. One 12-pounder howitzer was brought off. Paroled many prisoners and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy.

Our loss was 2 killed, 12 wounded; and 1 missing. Colonel Kilpatrick gives great credit to the admirable manner in which our guns were served, and the conduct of the Tenth New York Cavalry, which twice charged through the town. As far as could be learned, the enemy are not in any force in either Snicker's or Ashby's Gap, or Vestal's Gap; small scouting parties being, however, numerous in front of the Blue Ridge. The force at Leesburg was principally composed of convalescents, and cavalry sent to escort them. The whole country, from Warrenton to Leesburg, is filled with sick soldiers, abandoned on the way-side by the enemy. The expedition seems to have been conducted with spirit and judgment by Lieutenant-Colonel Kilpatrick.

J. M. DAVIES,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel McKEEVER,
Chief of Staff, Third Army Corps.

APPENDIX.

Embracing documents received too late for insertion in proper sequence.

Report of Maj. Silas M. Baily, Eighth Pennsylvania Reserves, of battles of South Mountain (14th) and Antietam, Md. (17th).

SEPTEMBER 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the battles of September 14 and September 17, 1862:

On the afternoon of the 14th, the Eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Corps came to the foot of the South Mountain. Immediately the division was formed in line of battle, General [Colonel] Magilton's brigade occupying the left, the Eighth constituting the extreme left. Soon after this arrangement, the whole line moved forward. Immediately after arriving at the base of the hill, they became engaged with the enemy, who were driven at every point, though they brought forward different regiments during the engagement. It gives me great pleasure to state that every officer and man behaved with great gallantry; still, our loss throws a shade of melancholy over the splendor of the action. First Lieut. William M. Carter, of Company B, a true soldier and brave man, fell, mortally wounded, whilst leading his men in the deadly conflict. One and another of the different commanders sealed their devotion to their country's interest by shedding their blood on the mountain's side.

The total loss was 15 killed and 34 wounded.

Capt. C. L. Conner, of Company D, rendered me most important aid in command of the left wing during the entire action.

September 17.—On the afternoon of the 16th, the regiment again came in conflict with the enemy, who were in large force in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. They were immediately thrown into line of battle, and remained under arms during the night. Early on the morning of the 17th, the Eighth became engaged. Passing from their first position, through an open field, they were thrown beneath the galling fire of the unnatural foe. Still, without faltering, they pressed forward to the woods beyond, which they held against superior numbers until relieved. Our loss was less than could have been expected; 11 fell to rise no more; 40 received wounds of different degrees of severity. Coolness and great firmness characterized both officers and men. Where all did their part so well, it would be invidious to mention individuals.

Respectfully submitted.

S. M. BAILY,

Major, Comdg. Eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Corps.

Col. A. L. MAGILTON,

Comdg. 2d Brigade, 3d Division, 1st Army Corps.

(1093)

*ALTERNATE DESIGNATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.**

- Abraham's** (James) **Cavalry**. See *George W. Gilmore's Cavalry*.
Adams' (Alexander D.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 27th Regiment*.
Adams' (Alonzo W.) **Cavalry**. See *New York Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Adams' (Julius W.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 67th Regiment*.
Aiken's (D. Wyatt) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 7th Regiment*.
Alberger's (William C.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 49th Regiment*.
Alexander's (Charles M.) **Infantry**. See *District of Columbia Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Alleghany Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Allen's (Edward J.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 155th Regiment*.
Allen's (Samuel H.) **Cavalry**. See *Maine Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Allen's (Thomas S.) **Infantry**. See *Wisconsin Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Ames' (Adelbert) **Infantry**. See *Maine Troops, 20th Regiment*.
Amherst Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Amsden's (Frank P.) **Artillery**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery G*.
Ancell's (John J.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Anderson's (E. J.) **Artillery**. See *Thomas Artillery*.
Anderson's (Robert) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 9th Reserves*.
Anderson's (Thomas M.) **Infantry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 12th Regiment, 2d Battalion*.
Andrews' (George L.) **Infantry**. See *Massachusetts Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Andrews' (George L.) **Infantry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 17th Regiment*.
Andrews' (John W.) **Infantry**. See *Delaware Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Appelman's (Hiram) **Infantry**. See *Connecticut Troops, 8th Regiment*.
Arndt's (Albert) **Artillery**. See *New York Troops, 1st Battalion*.
Ashby's (Turner) **Cavalry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 12th Regiment*.
Ashford's (John) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 38th Regiment*.
Ashland Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Atterbury's (William) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 83d Regiment*.
Austin's (Jonathan) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 78th Regiment*.
Ayres' (Romeyn B.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment, Battery F*.
Babcock's (Nathan S.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 77th Regiment*.
Bachman's (Alois O.) **Infantry**. See *Indiana Troops, 19th Regiment*.
Bachman's (W. K.) **Artillery**. See *German Artillery*.
Baily's (Silas M.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 8th Reserves*.
Baker's (Edward D.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 71st Regiment*.
Baker's (L. S.) **Cavalry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Ballier's (John F.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 98th Regiment*.
Balthis' (W. L.) **Artillery**. See *Staunton Artillery*.
Baltimore Artillery. See *Maryland Troops, Confederate*.
Bamford's (Robert C.) **Infantry**. See *Maryland Troops, Union, 1st Regiment, P. H. B.*
Banning's (Henry B.) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 87th Regiment*.
Barclay's (W. P.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 23d Regiment*.
Barlow's (Francis C.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 61st and 64th Regiments*.
Barnes' (Almont) **Artillery**. See *New York Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery C*.
Barnes' (Dixon) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 12th Regiment*.
Barnes' (Joseph H.) **Infantry**. See *Massachusetts Troops, 29th Regiment*.
Bartram's (Nelson B.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 17th Regiment*.
Battle's (C. A.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 3d Regiment*.
Baxter's (De Witt C.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 72d Regiment*.
Beach's (Francis) **Infantry**. See *Connecticut Troops, 16th Regiment*.

* References are to index following.

- Beal's** (George L.) **Infantry**. See *Maine Troops, 10th Regiment*.
Becker's (Gottfried) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 28th Regiment*.
Beckham's (T. C.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 5th Regiment*.
Bedford Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Belton's (Emory W.) **Infantry**. See *Michigan Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Benjamin's (Samuel N.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment, Battery E*.
Bennett's (R. T.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 14th Regiment*.
Bentley's (Richard C.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 63d Regiment*.
Black Horse Cavalry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 4th Regiment*.
Blackshear's (James A.) **Artillery**. See *Sumter Artillery, Battery D*.
Blessingh's (Louis von) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 37th Regiment*.
Blethen's (Zebulon B.) **Cavalry**. See *Maine Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Blumenberg's (Leopold) **Infantry**. See *Maryland Troops, Union, 5th Regiment*.
Blunt's (Matthew M.) **Infantry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 12th Regiment, 1st Battalion*.
Bolinger's (Henry C.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 7th Reserves*.
Bomford's (George N.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 42d Regiment*.
Bondurant's (J. W.) **Artillery**. See *Jeff. Davis Artillery*.
Bootes (Levi C.) **Infantry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 1st and 6th Regiments*.
Bossert's (Henry M.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 137th Regiment*.
Bower's (C. A.) **Artillery**. See *Bedford Artillery*.
Boyce's (Robert) **Artillery**. See *Macbeth Artillery*.
Brady Sharpshooters. See *Michigan Troops*.
Bragg's (Edward S.) **Infantry**. See *Wisconsin Troops, 6th Regiment*.
Branch Artillery. See *North Carolina Troops*.
Branch's (James R.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Braxton's (C. M.) **Artillery**. See *Fredericksburg Artillery*.
Brestel's (Charles) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 7th Regiment*.
Brewer's (Melvin) **Cavalry**. See *Michigan Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Brien's (L. Tiernau) **Cavalry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 1st Regiment*.
Brinton's (Joseph P.) **Cavalry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Brisbane's (William) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 49th Regiment*.
Brockenbrough's (J. Bowyer) **Artillery**. See *Baltimore Artillery*.
Brooke's (James V.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Brooke's (John R.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 53d Regiment*.
Brooks Artillery. See *South Carolina Troops*.
Brown's (B.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 19th Regiment*.
Brown's (Hamilton A.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Brown's (Henry W.) **Infantry**. See *New Jersey Troops, 3d Regiment*.
Brown's (Joseph N.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 14th Regiment*.
Brown's (J. S.) **Artillery**. See *Wise Artillery*.
Brown's (W. Harvey) **Infantry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 14th Regiment, 1st Battalion*.
Brown's (William D.) **Artillery**. See *Chesapeake Artillery*.
Brown's (William M.) **Artillery**. See *Rockbridge Artillery*.
Browne's (William H.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 36th Regiment*.
Browne's (William H.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 45th Regiment*.
Bruen's (John T.) **Artillery**. See *New York Troops, 10th Battery*.
Brundage's (Charles R.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 60th Regiment*.
Bryan's (Thomas A.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Buck's (Samuel L.) **Infantry**. See *New Jersey Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Bucktails, Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 13th Regiment, Reserves*.
Buell's (Frank) **Artillery**. See *West Virginia Troops, Battery C*.
Bull's (James H.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 66th Regiment*.

- Burbank's (Elisha) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 12th Regiment.*
- Burke's (John) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 63d Regiment.*
- Burks' (Richard H.) Cavalry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 2d Regiment.*
- Burnham's (Hiram) Infantry. See *Maine Troops, 6th Regiment.*
- Butler's (Benjamin) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 93d Regiment.*
- Butler's (John H.) Artillery. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment, Battery G.*
- Butler's (M. C.) Cavalry. See *South Carolina Troops, 2d Regiment.*
- Byrnes' (James N.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 2d Regiment, Reserves.*
- Cabell's (George C.) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 18th Regiment.*
- Cake's (Henry L.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 95th Regiment.*
- Callis' (John B.) Infantry. See *Wisconsin Troops, 7th Regiment.*
- Campbell's (Jacob M.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 54th Regiment.*
- Campbell's (J. C.) Infantry. See *Mississippi Troops, 18th Regiment.*
- Campbell's (Joseph B.) Artillery. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment, Battery B.*
- Candler's (John H.) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 48th Regiment.*
- Cantey's (E. B.) Infantry. See *South Carolina Troops, 6th Regiment.*
- Caraher's (Andrew P.) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 28th Regiment.*
- Carlisle's (J. Howard) Artillery. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment, Battery E.*
- Carlton's (H. H.) Artillery. See *Troup Artillery.*
- Carman's (Ezra A.) Infantry. See *New Jersey Troops, 13th Regiment.*
- Carpenter's (Joseph) Artillery. See *Alleghany Artillery.*
- Carrington's (James McD.) Artillery. See *Charlottesville Artillery.*
- Carroll's (Howard) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 105th Regiment.*
- Carruth's (Sumner) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 35th Regiment.*
- Carter's (B. F.) Infantry. See *Texas Troops, 4th Regiment.*
- Carter's (Thomas H.) Artillery. See *King William Artillery.*
- Caskie's (William H.) Artillery. See *Hampden Artillery.*
- Cavanagh's (James) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 69th Regiment.*
- Chapin's (Robert H.) Artillery. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment, Battery M.*
- Chapman's (Alford B.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 57th Regiment.*
- Chapman's (G. B.) Artillery. See *Monroe Artillery.*
- Chapman's (George H.) Cavalry. See *Indiana Troops, 3d Regiment.*
- Chapman's (William H.) Artillery. See *Dixie Artillery.*
- Charlottesville Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Chesapeake Artillery. See *Maryland Troops, Confederate.*
- Chew's (R. P.) Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Chicago Dragoons. See *Frederick Schambeck's Cavalry.*
- Childs' (James H.) Cavalry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 4th Regiment.*
- Childs' (Jonathan W.) Infantry. See *Michigan Troops, 4th Regiment.*
- Christie's (Daniel H.) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 23d Regiment.*
- Clarke's (J. Lyle) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 30th Battalion.*
- Clarke's (Melvin) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 36th Regiment.*
- Clark's (John) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 3d Reserves.*
- Clark's (John B.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 123d Regiment.*
- Clark's (Joseph C., jr.) Artillery. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment, Battery E.*
- Clark's (William S.) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 21st Regiment.*
- Cobb's Legion. See *Georgia Troops.*
- Cobb's (Amasa) Infantry. See *Wisconsin Troops, 5th Regiment.*
- Cochran's (John L.) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 19th Regiment.*
- Coffin's (John N.) Artillery. See *Asa M. Cook's Artillery.*
- Coke's (John A.) Artillery. See *Williamsburg Artillery.*
- Cole's (Christopher C.) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 22d Regiment.*

- Cole's (Henry A.) Cavalry.** See *Maryland Troops, Union.*
Coleman's (Augustus H.) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 11th Regiment.*
Colgrove's (Silas) Infantry. See *Indiana Troops, 27th Regiment.*
Collet's (Mark W.) Infantry. See *New Jersey Troops, 1st Regiment.*
Collier's (Frank H.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 139th Regiment.*
Collins' (John) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 5th Regiment.*
Colston's (R. T.) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 2d Regiment.*
Comly's (James M.) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 23d Regiment.*
Congdon's (James A.) Cavalry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 12th Regiment.*
Conner's (Freeman) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 44th Regiment.*
Cook's (Asa M.) Artillery. See *Massachusetts Troops, 8th Battery.*
Cook's (Benjamin) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 12th Regiment.*
Cook's (David M.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 11th Regiment.*
Cooke's (John R.) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 27th Regiment.*
Cooper's (James H.) Artillery. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery B.*
Coppens' (G.) Infantry. See *Louisiana Troops.*
Corliss' (Augustus W.) Cavalry. See *Rhode Island Troops, 7th Squadron.*
Corning's (Joseph W.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 33d Regiment.*
Corse's (Montgomery D.) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 17th Regiment.*
Cothran's (George W.) Artillery. See *New York Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery M.*
Coulter's (Richard) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 11th Regiment.*
Courtney Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Cowan's (Andrew) Artillery. See *New York Troops, 1st Battery.*
Crane's (Orrin J.) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 7th Regiment.*
Crenshaw's (W. G.) Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Croasdale's (Samuel) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 128th Regiment.*
Crome's (George L.) Artillery. See *J. R. McMullin's Artillery.*
Cross' (Edward E.) Infantry. See *New Hampshire Troops, 5th Regiment.*
Crowder's (J. T.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 31st Regiment.*
Crowninshield's (Casper) Cavalry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 1st Regiment.*
Cumming's (J. B.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 20th Regiment.*
Curtin's (John I.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 45th Regiment.*
Curtis' (Joseph B.) Infantry. See *Rhode Island Troops, 4th Regiment.*
Cutshaw's (W. E.) Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Daboll's (Henry W.) Infantry. See *Connecticut Troops, 5th Regiment.*
Dance's (W. J.) Artillery. See *Powhatan Artillery.*
Danville Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
D'Aquin's (Louis E.) Artillery. See *Louisiana Guard, Artillery.*
Davidson's (C. A.) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 1st Battalion.*
Davidson's (Greenlee) Artillery. See *Letcher Artillery.*
Davis' (Alexander M.) Infantry.* See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 26th Battalion.*
Davis' (Benjamin F.) Cavalry. See *New York Troops, 8th Regiment.*
Davis' (Hasbrouck) Cavalry. See *Illinois Troops, 12th Regiment.*
Dawes' (Rufus R.) Infantry. See *Wisconsin Troops, 6th Regiment.*
Day's (Levin B.) Infantry. See *Delaware Troops, 3d Regiment.*
Dearing's (James) Artillery. See *Latham Artillery.*
De Bevoise's (William H.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 84th Regiment.*
Delaney's (Dennis) Cavalry. See *William B. Harrison's Cavalry.*
De Lille's (John) Artillery. Official designation unknown. See *John De Lille.*
Dement's (William F.) Artillery. See *Maryland Troops, Confederate.*
De Rosset's (William L.) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 3d Regiment.*
Derrick's (Clarence) Infantry. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 23d Battalion.*
De Saussure's (W. D.) Infantry. See *South Carolina Troops, 15th Regiment.*
Devereux's (Arthur F.) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 19th Regiment.*

* Temporarily commanding.

- Devin's (Thomas C.) *Cavalry*. See *New York Troops, 6th Regiment*.
- Dick's (Samuel B.) *Infantry*. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 9th Reserves*.
- Diehl's (William H.) *Infantry*. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 50th Regiment*.
- Dixie *Artillery*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Doles' (George) *Infantry*. See *Georgia Troops, 4th Regiment*.
- Donaldsonville *Artillery*. See *Louisiana Troops*.
- Downey's (Stephen W.) *Infantry*. See *Maryland Troops, Union, 3d Regiment, P. II. B.*
- Dryer's (Hiram) *Infantry*. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment*.
- Duane's (James C.) *Engineers*. See *Union Troops, Regulars*.
- Dudley's (William W.) *Infantry*. See *Indiana Troops, 19th Regiment*.
- Durell's (George W.) *Artillery*. See *Pennsylvania Troops, Battery D*.
- Durham's (S. A.) *Infantry*. See *South Carolina Troops, 23d Regiment*.
- Duryea's (J. Eugene) *Infantry*. See *Maryland Troops, Union, 2d Regiment*.
- D'Utassy's (Frederick G.) *Infantry*. See *New York Troops, 39th Regiment*.
- Edgar's (George M.) *Infantry*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 26th Battalion*.
- Edgell's (Frederick M.) *Artillery*. See *New Hampshire Troops, 1st Battery*.
- Edwards' (John, jr.) *Artillery*. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 3d Regiment, Batteries L and M*.
- Edwards' (O. E.) *Infantry*. See *South Carolina Troops, 13th Regiment*.
- Elder's (James G.) *Infantry*. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 126th Regiment*.
- Elliott's (Lyman S.) *Infantry*. See *Ohio Troops, 47th Regiment*.
- Elliott's (William) *Artillery*. See *Brooks Artillery*.
- Ely's (Ralph) *Infantry*. See *Michigan Troops, 8th Regiment*.
- Eshleman's (B. F.) *Artillery*. See *Louisiana Washington Artillery, 4th Battery*.
- Eubank's (J. L.) *Artillery*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Eustis' (Henry L.) *Infantry*. See *Massachusetts Troops, 10th Regiment*.
- Ewing's (Hugh) *Infantry*. See *Ohio Troops, 30th Regiment*.
- Faehzt's (E. F. M.) *Infantry*. See *Maryland Troops, Union, 5th Regiment*.
- Fairchild's (Lucius) *Infantry*. See *Wisconsin Troops, 2d Regiment*.
- Fauquier *Artillery*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Feagin's (I. B.) *Infantry*. See *Alabama Troops, 15th Regiment*.
- Fellows' (Enoch Q.) *Infantry*. See *New Hampshire Troops, 9th Regiment*.
- Feltus' (A. M.) *Infantry*. See *Mississippi Troops, 16th Regiment*.
- Fillebrown's (James S.) *Infantry*. See *Maine Troops, 10th Regiment*.
- Fischer's (F.) *Artillery*. Official designation unknown. See *F. Fischer*.
- Fiser's (John C.) *Infantry*. See *Mississippi Troops, 17th Regiment*.
- Fisher's (Joseph W.) *Infantry*. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 5th Reserves*.
- Fleet's (W. C.) *Artillery*. See *Middlesex Artillery*.
- Floyd-Jones (De L.) *Infantry*. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 11th Regiment*.
- Folsom's (Robert W.) *Infantry*. See *Georgia Troops, 14th Regiment*.
- Ford's (Thomas H.) *Infantry*. See *Ohio Troops, 32d Regiment*.
- Forsberg's (August) *Infantry*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 51st Regiment*.
- Fowler's (Henry) *Infantry*. See *New York Troops, 63d Regiment*.
- Frank's (John D.) *Artillery*. See *New York Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery G*.
- Frank's (Paul) *Infantry*. See *New York Troops, 52d Regiment*.
- Frank's (Royal T.) *Infantry*. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 8th Regiment*.
- Fredericksburg *Artillery*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- French's (Thomas B.) *Artillery*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Frick's (Jacob G.) *Infantry*. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 129th Regiment*.
- Fry's (B. D.) *Infantry*. See *Alabama Troops, 13th Regiment*.
- Fry's (C. W.) *Artillery*. See *Orange Artillery*.
- Garber's (A. W.) *Artillery*. See *Staunton Artillery*.
- Garden's (H. R.) *Artillery*. See *Palmetto Artillery*.
- Gardner's (R. D.) *Infantry*. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 4th Regiment*.
- Garibaldi Guard, *Infantry*. See *New York Troops, 39th Regiment*.

- Garrett's** (Thomas M.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 5th Regiment*.
Garrison's (N. J.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 28th Regiment*.
Gary's (M. W.) **Infantry**. See *Hampton Legion*.
Gates' (Theodore B.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 80th Regiment*.
Gayle's (B. B.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 12th Regiment*.
Georgia Legion Infantry. See *Cobb's Legion*.
Gerhardt's (Joseph) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 46th Regiment*.
German Artillery. See *South Carolina Troops*.
Gibbon's (John) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment, Battery B*.
Gibson's (Horatio G.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 3d Regiment, Batteries C and G*.
Gile's (George W.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 88th Regiment*.
Gilmore's (George W.) **Cavalry**. See *West Virginia Troops*.
Glassie's (Daniel W.) **Artillery**. See *Seth J. Simmonds' Artillery*.
Glover's (Thomas C.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 21st Regiment*.
Golladay's (J. B.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 33d Regiment*.
Gordon's (George A.) **Cavalry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment*.
Gordon's (John B.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 6th Regiment*.
Gould's (J. Parker) **Infantry**. See *Massachusetts Troops, 13th Regiment*.
Graham's (John H.) **Artillery**. See *New York Troops, 5th Regiment, Heavy*.
Graham's (Samuel) **Artillery**. See *New York Troops, 5th Regiment, Heavy*.
Graham's (William M.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 1st Regiment, Bat'y K*.
Grandy's (Charles R.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Grant's (Lewis A.) **Infantry**. See *Vermont Troops, 5th Regiment*.
Graves' (Frank) Infantry. See *Michigan Troops, 8th Regiment*.
Graybill's (T.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 28th Regiment*.
Gregory's (Edgar M.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 91st Regiment*.
Grice's (W. L.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 45th Regiment*.
Griffin's (Charles) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment, Battery D*.
Griffin's (Simon G.) **Infantry**. See *New Hampshire Troops, 6th Regiment*.
Griffith's (A. J.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 14th Regiment*.
Grimes' (Bryan) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 4th Regiment*.
Grimes' (Carey F.) Artillery. See *Portsmouth Artillery*.
Grover's (Ira G.) **Infantry**. See *Indiana Troops, 7th Regiment*.
Guiney's (Patrick R.) **Infantry**. See *Massachusetts Troops, 9th Regiment*.
Gustin's (Richard) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 12th Reserves*.
Gwyn's (James) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 118th Regiment*.
Hains' (Peter C.) Artillery. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment, Battery M*.
Haldeman's (Isaac L.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 124th Regiment*.
Hall's (E. D.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 46th Regiment*.
Hall's (Michael) **Artillery**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery D*.
Hall's (Norman J.) **Infantry**. See *Michigan Troops, 7th Regiment*.
Hamilton's Artillery. Official designation unknown. See *Sergeant Hamilton*.
Hamilton's (D. H.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 1st Regiment, P. A*.
Hammersly's (William W.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 128th Regiment*.
Hampden Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Hampton Legion. See *South Carolina Troops*.
Hampton's (Robert B.) **Artillery**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, Battery F*.
Hanover Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Hard's (John S.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 7th Regiment*.
Hardaway's (R. A.) **Artillery**. See *Alabama Troops*.
Harman's (A. W.) **Cavalry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 12th Regiment*.
Harman's (M. G.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 52d Regiment*.
Harris' (John L.) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 24th Regiment*.
Harris' (Skidmore) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 2d Regiment*.

- Harrison's** (William B.) **Cavalry**. See *West Virginia Troops*.
Harrow's (William) **Infantry**. See *Indiana Troops, 14th Regiment*.
Hart's (J. F.) **Artillery**. See *South Carolina Troops, Washington Artillery*.
Hartranft's (John F.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 51st Regiment*.
Hatch's (William B.) **Infantry**. See *New Jersey Troops, 4th Regiment*.
Hawley's (Joseph W.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 124th Regiment*.
Hayes' (Joseph) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 18th Regiment*.
Hayes' (Rutherford B.) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 23d Regiment*.
Hazard's (John G.) **Artillery**. See *Rhode Island Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery B*.
Hazlett's (Charles E.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment, Battery D*.
Henagan's (John W.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 8th Regiment*.
Hewitt's (Sylvester M.) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 32d Regiment*.
Hexamer's (William) **Artillery**. See *New Jersey Troops, 1st Battery*.
Higgins' (Jacob) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 125th Regiment*.
Hildebrandt's (Hugo) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 39th Regiment*.
Hildt's (George H.) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 30th Regiment*.
Hill's (R. C.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 48th Regiment*.
Hilton's (M.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 22d Regiment*.
Hinks' (Edward W.) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 19th Regiment*.
Hobson's (E. L.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 5th Regiment*.
Hoffman's (Henry C.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 23d Regiment*.
Hoffman's (John J.) **Cavalry**. See *West Virginia Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Hofmann's (J. William) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 56th Regiment*.
Holcombe Legion. See *South Carolina Troops*.
Holmes' (William R.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Holt's (Willis C.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 10th Regiment*.
Hoole's (A. J.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 8th Regiment*.
Hooper's (Charles M.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 5th Battalion*.
Hopkinson's (Oliver) **Infantry**. See *Delaware Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Howard's (G. A.) **Infantry**. See *Tennessee Troops, Confederate, 7th Regiment*.
Huckstep's (Charles T.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Hudson's (Henry W.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 82d Regiment*.
Huger's (Frank) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Humphreys' (Benjamin G.) Infantry. See *Mississippi Troops, 21st Regiment*.
Hunt's (Charles J.) **Infantry**. See *Michigan Troops, 7th Regiment*.
Hunton's (Eppa) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 8th Regiment*.
Hupp's (A.) **Artillery**. See *Salem Artillery*.
Huson's (William) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 12th Regiment*.
Hyde's (Breed N.) **Infantry**. See *Vermont Troops, 3d Regiment*.
Hyde's (Thomas W.) **Infantry**. See *Maine Troops, 7th Regiment*.
Irman's (J. H.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 13th Regiment*.
Irwin Artillery. See *Sumter Battalion, Battery E*.
Isler's (John B.) **Sharpshooters**. See *Union Troops, Volunteers, 1st Regiment*.
Iverson's (Alfred) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 20th Regiment*.
Jackson's (Lyman J.) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 11th Regiment*.
Jackson's (Nathaniel J.) **Infantry**. See *Maine Troops, 5th Regiment*.
Jackson's (Samuel M.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 11th Reserves*.
Jardine's (Edward) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 89th Regiment*.
Jeff. Davis Artillery. See *Alabama Troops*.
Jeff. Davis Legion, Cavalry. See *Mississippi Troops*.
Johnson's (Charles A.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 25th Regiment*.
Johnson's (George W.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 49th Regiment*.
Johnson's (John R.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Johnson's (Marmaduke) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.

- Johnson's (Riley) Cavalry.** See *New York Troops, 6th Regiment.*
Johnston's (F. M.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 19th Regiment.*
Jones' (Cadwalader) Infantry. See *South Carolina Troops, 12th Regiment.*
Jones' (Theodore) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 30th Regiment.*
Jones' (William B.) Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Jordan's (T. C.) Artillery. See *Bedford Artillery.*
Kearse's (F.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 50th Regiment.*
Keenan's (Peter) Cavalry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 8th Regiment.*
Kelly's (James) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 69th Regiment.*
Kelly's (Patrick) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 88th Regiment.*
Kennedy's (John D.) Infantry. See *South Carolina Troops, 2d Regiment.*
Kerr's (James K.) Cavalry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 4th Regiment.*
Key's (John C.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 44th Regiment.*
Kimball's (Edgar A.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 9th Regiment.*
Kimball's (John W.) See *Massachusetts Troops, 15th Regiment.*
Kingsbury's (Henry W.) Infantry. See *Connecticut Troops, 11th Regiment.*
King William Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Kirby's (Edmund) Artillery. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 1st Regiment, Battery I.*
Kirkpatrick's (Thomas J.) Artillery. See *Amherst Artillery.*
Kleiser's (Alfred von) Artillery. See *New York Troops, 1st Battalion, Battery B.*
Knap's (Joseph M.) Artillery. See *Pennsylvania Troops, Battery E.*
Knipe's (Joseph F.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 46th Regiment.*
Kusserow's (Charles) Artillery. See *New York Troops, 1st Battalion, Battery D.*
Lancers, Cavalry. See *Richard H. Rush's Cavalry.*
Lane's (James C.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 102d Regiment*
Lane's (John) Artillery. See *Sumter Artillery, Battery E.*
Langner's (Robert) Artillery. See *New York Troops, 1st Battalion, Battery C.*
Latham Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Latham's (A. C.) Artillery. See *Branch Artillery.*
Latham's (D. P.) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 4th Regiment.*
Latimer's (J. W.) Artillery. See *Courtney Artillery.*
Leake's (W. D.) Artillery. See *Turner Artillery.*
Leckey's (David A.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 100th Regiment.*
Lee Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Lee's (William R.) Infantry. See *Massachusetts Troops, 20th Regiment.*
Leech's (William A.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 90th Regiment.*
Lemon's (George F.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 32d Regiment.*
Letcher Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Lewis' (Enoch E.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 71st Regiment.*
Lewis' (John W.) Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Liddell's (P. F.) Infantry. See *Mississippi Troops, 11th Regiment.*
Little's (F. H.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 11th Regiment.*
Littlefield's (Calvin) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 94th Regiment.*
Livingston's (D.) Infantry. See *South Carolina Troops, 1st Regiment, Volunteers.*
Lloyd's (W. P.) Artillery. See *North Carolina Troops.*
Lockert's (James W.) Infantry. See *Tennessee Troops, Confederate, 14th Regiment.*
Lord's (Newton B.) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 35th Regiment.*
Loud's (P. H.) Infantry. See *Georgia Troops, 10th Regiment.*
Loudoun Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Loudoun Rangers, Cavalry. See *Virginia Troops, Union.*
Louisiana Guard, Artillery. See *Louisiana Troops.*
Lowry's (William M.) Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Luse's (William H.) Infantry. See *Mississippi Troops, 18th Regiment.*
Lusk's (John A. M.) Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
Lyle's (Peter) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 90th Regiment.*

- Lyman's** (Chauncey A.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 7th Reserves*.
- Lyon's** (Henry W.) **Cavalry**. See *New York Troops, 6th Regiment*.
- McAfee's** (Lee M.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 49th Regiment*.
- McArthur's** (Joseph H.) **Cavalry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment*.
- Macbeth Artillery**. See *South Carolina Troops*.
- McCarter's** (James M.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 93d Regiment*.
- McCarthy's** (E. S.) **Artillery**. See *Richmond Howitzers, 1st Company*.
- McCarthy's** (Jeremiah) **Artillery**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery C*.
- McCausland's** (John) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 36th Regiment*.
- McCorkle's** (W. H.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 12th Regiment*.
- McCormick's** (Thomas H.) **Cavalry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment*.
- McCrady's** (Edward, jr.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 1st Regiment, P. A.*
- McElroy's** (Kennon) **Infantry**. See *Mississippi Troops, 13th Regiment*.
- McGee's** (Dennis) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 13th Reserves*.
- McGilvery's** (Freeman) **Artillery**. See *Maine Troops, 6th Battery*.
- McGrath's** (Eugene, sr.) **Heavy Artillery**. See *New York Troops, 5th Regiment*.
- McGregor's** (J. A.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 17th Regiment*.
- McGregor's** (John D.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 4th Regiment*.
- McIntosh's** (D. G.) **Artillery**. See *Pee Dee Artillery*.
- McIntyre's** (James B.) **Cavalry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment*.
- McKeen's** (H. Boyd) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 51st Regiment*.
- McKibbin's** (David B.) **Infantry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 14th Regiment, 2d Battalion*.
- McKie's** (John, jr.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 22d Regiment*.
- McLemore's** (O. K.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 4th Regiment*.
- McMahon's** (J. J.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 63d Regiment*.
- McMaster's** (F. W.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 17th Regiment*.
- McMichael's** (Richards) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 53d Regiment*.
- McMullin's** (James R.) **Artillery**. See *Ohio Troops, 1st Battery*.
- McNeil's** (Hugh W.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 13th Regiment, Reserves (1st Rifles)*.
- Macon's** (M. C.) **Artillery**. See *Richmond Fayette Artillery*.
- McPhail's** (John B.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 56th Regiment*.
- McQuade's** (James) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 14th Regiment*.
- McRae's** (D. K.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 5th Regiment*.
- McReynolds'** (Andrew T.) **Cavalry**. See *New York Troops, 1st Regiment*.
- MacThomson's** (James) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 107th Regiment*.
- Madison Artillery**. See *Louisiana Troops*.
- Magill's** (W. J.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 1st Regiment, Regulars*.
- Maginnis'** (Arthur) **Infantry**. See *Delaware Troops, 3d Regiment*.
- Magruder Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Maidhof's** (Joachim) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 11th Regiment, Militia*.
- Mallon's** (James E.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 42d Regiment*.
- Manly's** (B. C.) **Artillery**. See *North Carolina Troops*.
- Mann's** (Daniel P.) **Cavalry**. See *Oneida Cavalry*.
- Manning's** (S. M.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 49th Regiment*.
- Mapes'** (William H. H.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 28th Regiment*.
- Marsh's** (W. T.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 4th Regiment*.
- Marshall's** (Elisha G.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 13th Regiment*.
- Marshall's** (John W.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 10th Regiment*.
- Marshborne's** (S. W.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 53d Regiment*.
- Martin's** (Augustus P.) **Artillery**. See *Massachusetts Troops, Battery 3d (C)*.
- Martin's** (Leonard) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment, Battery F*.
- Martin's** (W. T.) **Cavalry**. See *Jeff. Davis Legion*.
- Marye's** (E. A.) **Artillery**. See *Fredericksburg Artillery*.

- Massie's** (John L.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Matheson's (Roderick) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 32d Regiment*.
Matthews' (Ezra W.) **Artillery**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery F*.
Maulsby's (William P.) **Infantry**. See *Maryland Troops, Union, 1st Regiment, P. H. B.*
Maurin's (Victor) **Artillery**. See *Donaldsonville Artillery*.
Means' (Samuel C.) **Cavalry**. See *Loudoun Rangers*.
Medill's (William H.) **Cavalry**. See *Illinois Troops, 8th Regiment*.
Meredith's (Solomon) **Infantry**. See *Indiana Troops, 19th Regiment*.
Middlesex Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Miles' (Nelson A.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 61st and 64th Regiments*.
Milledge's (John, jr.) **Artillery**. See *Georgia Troops*.
Miller's (F. P.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 21st Regiment*.
Miller's (M. B.) **Artillery**. See *Louisiana Troops, Washington Artillery, 3d Battery*.
Miller's (Marcus P.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment, Battery G*.
Millican's (W. T.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 15th Regiment*.
Mitchell's (A. O.) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 44th Regiment*.
Monier's (Henry D.) **Infantry**. See *Louisiana Troops, 10th Regiment*.
Monroe Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Monroe's (J. Albert) **Artillery**. See *Rhode Island Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery D*.
Montague's (E. B.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 32d Regiment*.
Moody's (G. V.) **Artillery**. See *Madison Artillery*.
Moorman's (M. N.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Morehead's (Turner G.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 106th Regiment*.
Morris Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Morrison's (David) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 79th Regiment*.
Morrison's (E. M.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 15th Regiment*.
Muhlenberg's (Charles P.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment, Battery A*.
Muhlenberg's (Edward D.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 4th Regiment, Battery F*.
Muirheid's (Henry P.) **Cavalry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 6th Regiment*.
Mulligan's (James A.) **Infantry**. See *Illinois Troops, 23d Regiment*.
Munford's (Thomas T.) **Cavalry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 2d Regiment*.
Murphy's (John McL.) **Engineers**. See *New York Troops, 15th Regiment*.
Myers' (George R.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 18th Regiment*.
Myers' (Henry R.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 88th Regiment*.
Myers' (S. B.) **Cavalry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 7th Regiment*.
Nance's (James D.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 3d Regiment*.
Naylor's (John E.) **Cavalry**. See *New York Troops, 2d Regiment*.
Neal's (James H.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 19th Regiment*.
Neill's (Thomas H.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 23d Regiment*.
Nelson's (G. W.) **Artillery**. See *Hanover Artillery*.
Nevin's (David J.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 62d Regiment*.
Newton's (J. M.) **Infantry**. See *Georgia Troops, 6th Regiment*.
Nolan's (M.) **Infantry**. See *Louisiana Troops, 1st Regiment*.
Northrup's (Charles) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 97th Regiment*.
Norvell's (Edward) **Artillery**. See *G. G. Otey's Artillery*.
Nyce's (John) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 4th Reserves*.
Oakford's (Richard A.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 132d Regiment*.
O'Brian's (John D.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 24th Regiment*.
O'Neal's (E. A.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 26th Regiment*.
Oneida Cavalry. See *New York Troops*.
O'Neill's (Joseph) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 63d Regiment*.
Orange Artillery. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
Orr's (James L.) **Rifles**. See *South Carolina Troops, 1st Regiment*.

- Otey's** (G. G.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Overton's** (Edward) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 50th Regiment*.
- Owen's** (Charles D.) **Artillery**. See *Rhode Island Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery G*.
- Owen's** (Joshua T.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 69th Regiment*.
- Owen's** (Samuel W.) **Cavalry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 3d Regiment*.
- Page's** (A. C.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 21st Regiment*.
- Page's** (R. C. M.) **Artillery**. See *Morris Artillery*.
- Page's** (T. J., jr.) **Artillery**. See *Magruder Artillery*.
- Palmer's** (Oliver H.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 108th Regiment*.
- Palmer's** (William J.) **Cavalry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 15th Regiment*.
- Palmetto Artillery**. See *South Carolina Troops*.
- Palmetto Sharpshooters**. See *South Carolina Troops*.
- Pardee's** (Ario, jr.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 28th Regiment*.
- Parisen's** (Philip J.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 57th Regiment*.
- Parker's** (F. M.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 30th Regiment*.
- Parker's** (Francis J.) **Infantry**. See *Massachusetts Troops, 32d Regiment*.
- Parker's** (W. W.) **Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Parry's** (Augustus C.) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 47th Regiment*.
- Patterson's** (George M.) **Artillery**. See *Sumter Artillery, Battery B*.
- Patton's** (George S.) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 22d Regiment*.
- Paxton's** (John C.) **Cavalry**. See *West Virginia Troops, 2d Regiment*.
- Pee Dee Artillery**. See *South Carolina Troops*.
- Pegram's** (R. G.) **Artillery**. See *James R. Branch's Artillery*.
- Pegram's** (W. J.) **Artillery**. See *Purcell Artillery*.
- Pelham's** (John) **Artillery**. See *Stuart Horse Artillery*.
- Perkins** (Sanford H.) **Infantry**. See *Connecticut Troops, 14th Regiment*.
- Perrin's** (James M.) **Infantry**. See *South Carolina Troops, 1st Regiment, Rifles*.
- Pettes** (William H.) **Engineers**. See *New York Troops, 50th Regiment*.
- Pettit's** (Rufus D.) **Artillery**. See *New York Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery B*.
- Peyton's** (Jefferson) **Artillery**. See *Orange Artillery*.
- Phillips** (John C.) **Artillery**. See *Illinois Troops, 2d Regiment, Battery M*.
- Pickens** (Samuel B.) **Infantry**. See *Alabama Troops, 12th Regiment*.
- Pinto's** (Francis E.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 31st Regiment*.
- Pittsburgh Artillery**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, Battery F*.
- Poage's** (Thomas) **Infantry**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 50th Regiment*.
- Poague's** (William T.) **Artillery**. See *Rockbridge Artillery*.
- Poland's** (John S.) **Infantry**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d and 10th Regiments*.
- Porter's** (Josiah) **Artillery**. See *Massachusetts Troops, Battery 1st (A)*.
- Portsmouth Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Post's** (Henry A. V.) **Sharpshooters**. See *Union Troops, Volunteers, 2d Regiment*.
- Potter's** (Robert B.) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 51st Regiment*.
- Potts** (Benjamin F.) **Artillery**. See *Ohio Troops, 26th Battery*.
- Powell's** (Eugene) **Infantry**. See *Ohio Troops, 66th Regiment*.
- Powhatan Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Prevost's** (Charles M.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 118th Regiment*.
- Pulaski Artillery**. See *Georgia Troops*.
- Purcell Artillery**. See *Virginia Troops, Confederate*.
- Purdie's** (Thomas J.) **Infantry**. See *North Carolina Troops, 18th Regiment*.
- Purnell Legion**. See *Maryland Troops, Union*.
- Pye's** (Edward) **Infantry**. See *New York Troops, 95th Regiment*.
- Quay's** (Matthew S.) **Infantry**. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 134th Regiment*.
- Raine's** (Charles I.) **Artillery**. See *Lee Artillery*.
- Randol's** (Alanson M.) **Artillery**. See *Union Troops, Regulars, 1st Regiment, Batteries E and G*.
- Randolph's** (Robert) **Cavalry**. See *Black Horse Cavalry*.

- Ransom's** (Dunbar R.) **Artillery.** See *Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment, Battery C.*
- Ransom's** (M. W.) **Infantry.** See *North Carolina Troops, 35th Regiment.*
- Raphael's** (William) **Infantry.** See *Pennsylvania Troops, 28th Regiment.*
- Rathbone's** (John C.) **Infantry.** See *West Virginia Troops, 11th Regiment.*
- Read's** (John P. W.) **Artillery.** See *Pulaski Artillery.*
- Reedy's** (John W.) **Infantry.** See *Arkansas Troops, 3d Regiment.*
- Reilly's** (James) **Artillery.** See *Rowan Artillery.*
- Reno's** (Marcus A.) **Cavalry.** See *Union Troops, Regulars, 1st Regiment.*
- Reynolds'** (John A.) **Artillery.** See *New York Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery L.*
- Rhett's** (A. B.) **Artillery.** See *Brooks Artillery.*
- Rice's** (W. H.) **Artillery.** See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Richardson's** (J. B.) **Artillery.** See *Louisiana Troops, Washington Arty., 2d Batty.*
- Richardson's** (Richard H.) **Infantry.** See *New York Troops, 26th Regiment.*
- Richmond Fayette Artillery.** See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Richmond Howitzers, Artillery.** See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Rigby's** (Silas F.) **Artillery.** See *Indiana Troops, Wilder Battery.*
- Ringgold Artillery.** See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Ringold's** (Benjamin) **Infantry.** See *New York Troops, 103d Regiment.*
- Roberts'** (Charles W.) **Infantry.** See *Maine Troops, 2d Regiment.*
- Roberts'** (G. M.) **Infantry.** See *North Carolina Troops, 2d Regiment.*
- Roberts'** (R. Biddle) **Infantry.** See *Pennsylvania Troops, 1st Reserves.*
- Robertson's** (James M.) **Artillery.** See *Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment, Batteries B and L.*
- Robinson's** (Lucius N.) **Artillery.** See *Ohio Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery L.*
- Robinson's** (O'Neil W.) **Artillery.** See *Maine Troops, 4th Battery.*
- Rockbridge Artillery.** See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Rodgers'** (James G.) **Infantry.** See *Georgia Troops, 12th Regiment.*
- Rogers'** (A. L.) **Artillery.** See *Loudoun Artillery.*
- Rogers'** (William F.) **Infantry.** See *New York Troops, 21st Regiment.*
- Ross'** (H. M.) **Artillery.** See *Sumter Artillery, Battery A.*
- Rosser's** (Thomas L.) **Cavalry.** See *Virginia Troops, Confederate, 5th Regiment.*
- Rowan Artillery.** See *North Carolina Troops.*
- Rowley's** (Thomas A.) **Infantry.** See *Pennsylvania Troops, 102d Regiment.*
- Ruff's** (S. Z.) **Infantry.** See *Georgia Troops, 18th Regiment.*
- Ruffin's** (Thomas, jr.) **Infantry.** See *North Carolina Troops, 13th Regiment.*
- Ruger's** (Thomas H.) **Infantry.** See *Wisconsin Troops, 3d Regiment.*
- Rush's** (Richard H.) **Lancers.** See *Pennsylvania Troops, 6th Regiment, Cavalry.*
- Russell's** (Charles H.) **Cavalry.** See *Maryland Troops, Union, 1st Regiment.*
- Russell's** (David A.) **Infantry.** See *Massachusetts Troops, 7th Regiment.*
- Russell's** (W. H. H.) **Infantry.** See *West Virginia Troops, 4th Regiment.*
- Russell's** (William F.) **Sharpshooters.** See *Minnesota Troops, 2d Company.*
- Rutledge's** (H. M.) **Infantry.** See *North Carolina Troops, 25th Regiment.*
- Salem Artillery.** See *Virginia Troops, Confederate.*
- Sammon's** (Simeon) **Infantry.** See *New York Troops, 115th Regiment.*
- Sanders'** (William P.) **Cavalry.** See *Union Troops, Regulars, 6th Regiment.*
- Saunders'** (John) **Sharpshooters.** See *Massachusetts Troops, 1st Company.*
- Sawyer's** (Franklin) **Infantry.** See *Ohio Troops, 8th Regiment.*
- Schambeck's** (Frederick) **Cavalry.** See *Illinois Troops.*
- Scruggs'** (L. H.) **Infantry.** See *Alabama Troops, 4th Regiment.*
- Seaman's** (Jonas) **Cavalry.** See *Ohio Troops, 3d Company (Independent).*
- Searing's** (William M.) **Infantry.** See *New York Troops, 30th Regiment.*
- Seaver's** (Joel J.) **Infantry.** See *New York Troops, 16th Regiment.*
- Segoine's** (Jesse) **Infantry.** See *New York Troops, 111th Regiment.*
- Schlen's** (John C. H. von) **Artillery.** See *Indiana Troops, 15th Battery.*

- Selfridge's (James L.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 46th Regiment.*
- Seymour's (Frederick A.) Infantry. See *Ohio Troops, 7th Regiment.*
- Seymour's (George E.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 109th Regiment.*
- Shaler's (Alexander) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 65th Regiment.*
- Shamburg's Cavalry. See *Maryland Troops, Union, 1st Regiment.*
- Shaut's (William B.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 131st Regiment.*
- Shepard's (S. G.) Infantry. See *Tennessee Troops, Confederate, 7th Regiment.*
- Sherrill's (Eliakim) Infantry. See *New York Troops, 126th Regiment.*
- Sigfried's (Joshua K.) Infantry. See *Pennsylvania Troops, 48th Regiment.*
- Sillers' (William W.) Infantry. See *North Carolina Troops, 30th Regiment.*
- Simmonds' (Seth J.) Artillery. See *Kentucky Troops, Union.*
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